HOW OPERATIONS IN HAITI AND JAPAN INFORMED JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08: THE FUTURE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS?

A Monograph

by

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How Operations in Haiti and Japan Informed Joint Publication 3-08: The Future of Interorganizational Operations?

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The whole of government approach is vital to coordinate actions in support of the national security interests of the United States. With the end to operations in the mature theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, future operations under the whole of government construct will occur in areas where the U.S. government does not have a significant presence. In the last three years, two foreign countries requested the assistance of the government of the U.S. due to natural disasters, the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 (Operation Unified Response) and the tsunami in Japan in March 2011, (Operation Tomodachi). Reviewing these operations allows for an understanding of how the agencies of the U.S. government will coordinate future operations in immature theaters. In conjunction, reviewing the doctrine that the Department of Defense produced after these operations will allow an understanding of the gaps that potentially exist in the understanding of both the whole of government approach and how joint commanders and planners should approach these types of operations. Additionally, these relief efforts occurred in vastly different countries in terms of population preparedness, infrastructure and standard of living. The scale of interorganizational integration across these two operations adds to the joint team’s understanding as well. The new publication makes substantial improvements between 2006 and 2011 in terms of relaying understanding of the whole of government approach however key lessons learned from Haiti and Japan are not fully integrated.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

HOW OPERATIONS IN HAITI AND JAPAN INFORMED JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08: THE FUTURE OF JOINT INTERORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS? by MAJ David J. Pasquale, 54 pages.

The whole of government approach is vital to coordinate actions in support of the national security interests of the United States. With the end to operations in the mature theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, future operations under the whole of government construct will occur in areas where the U.S. government does not have a significant presence. In the last three years, two foreign countries requested the assistance of the government of the U.S. due to natural disasters, the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 (Operation Unified Response) and the tsunami in Japan in March 2011, (Operation Tomodachi). Reviewing these operations allows for an understanding of how the agencies of the U.S. government will coordinate future operations in immature theaters. In conjunction, reviewing the doctrine that the Department of Defense produced after these operations will allow an understanding of the gaps that potentially exist in the understanding of both the whole of government approach and how joint commanders and planners should approach these types of operations. Additionally, these relief efforts occurred in vastly different countries in terms of population preparedness, infrastructure and standard of living. The scale of interorganizational integration across these two operations adds to the joint team’s understanding as well.

There are five areas where the military historically has challenges during foreign disaster relief: (1) coordination with host nation and other organizations, (2) situational awareness and assessments, (3) medical capabilities, (4) distribution management and (5) roles and responsibilities. This monograph will use these as the foundation to assist in identifying gaps in knowledge and doctrine at the joint level. When the Department of Defense identified these gaps, placing them in the new publication, Joint Publication, 3-08 Interorganization Coordination during Joint Operations is the next step. Since policy informs doctrine, it follows that reviewing influential policy to the whole of government approach before and after these operations is appropriate. The new publication does not refer to the operation in Japan and has only one mention of the operation in Haiti, which lays out the use of the Cluster system in Haiti by the UN. While the new publication makes substantial improvements between 2006 and 2011 in terms of relaying understanding of the whole of government approach, key lessons learned from Haiti and Japan are not fully integrated. The Department of Defense should take steps during the doctrine rewrite that incorporates the lessons learned from operations in immature theaters while retaining the integration lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. The integration of lessons learned from Haiti and Japan will ensure that the next generations of joint leaders stand on a solid foundation for successful interorganizational joint operations.
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USG    United States Government
DOD    Department of Defense
FDR    Foreign Disaster Relief
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INTRODUCTION

Interorganizational efforts are the foundation of the whole of government approach. These efforts are vital to harnessing the combined efforts of the nation’s power and integrating that power with allies.¹ Since September 2001, numerous agencies within the United States Government (USG) have contributed to the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DOD) and other organizations have benefitted from the interaction and the joint learning environment these missions provided in the last eleven years. That interactive learning environment will no longer be available post-2014, with the USG’s plans to bringing closure to the efforts in Afghanistan. One mission will remain where the whole of government approach is required and is vital to saving lives, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR). As such, the United States lists FDR among its national security interests.² This type of mission does not occur often, however when required there are often hundreds of thousands of lives in immediate danger. While our joint doctrine has evolved to address actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there remain gaps from historical lessons learned in terms of FDR.³ With the opportunity for interorganizational interaction decreasing after 2014, it is important that the DOD capture the correct lessons learned from its most recent FDR missions to allow for “the integration of skills


²Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington D.C: Department of Defense, 2010), 11.

³Debarati Guha-Sapir et al., Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake (Silver Spring, MD: The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2011). This independent review made seven recommendations focusing on the whole of government approach to bridge these gaps. Three of these recommendations dealt specifically with USG interorganizational issues.
and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly.”

Due to two natural disasters in the past three years, the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 (Operation Unified Response) and the tsunami in Japan in March 2011 (Operation Tomodachi), governments of two foreign countries requested assistance from the USG. Both relief efforts occurred in vastly different countries in terms of their populations and preparation, and the DOD was integral to the whole of government efforts. These two disasters provided the USG and DOD excellent opportunities to look at their approach to the whole of government method in two vastly different environments. They would then meet the intent of the capstone joint operational concept, Unified Action, which specifies the whole of government solution in line with the USG’s National Defense Strategy. Since the DOD published the governing joint doctrine for interorganizational operations within months of Operation Tomodachi and a year from completion of Operation Unified Response, it is acceptable to believe that the lessons learned did not make it into publication, thereby creating the opportunity for the joint force to make the same mistakes in future FDR missions. To what degree does the guiding doctrine, Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, published in March 2011, capture the lessons learned from two incredible natural disasters to inform future joint commanders and staffs?

FDR operations provide the leadership and populations of foreign countries an understanding of how the United States interacts within the dynamic system of the global network of nations. With worldwide real-time updates available of the manmade or natural disasters that lead to FDR, our allies and adversaries can judge the strength of the United States. The world views the whole United States government on this stage and with the end of operations in Iraq

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4Office of the President of the United States.
and Afghanistan, FDR remains as a significant platform and possibly the lone platform, for the world to see this approach and the significant role played by the DOD.

The DOD’s understanding of the whole of government approach significantly affects five historical areas specific to FDR. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis describes these areas as:

1. Coordination with host nation and other organizations
2. Situational awareness and assessments
3. Medical capabilities
4. Distribution management
5. Roles and responsibilities

The joint leader can use the above and determine to what degree DOD captured and incorporated the lessons learned from these two disasters in the new Joint Publication 3-08. Further, reviewing the changes between the 2006 and 2011 provides an answer to whether or not DOD bridged the historical gap in joint doctrine to prevent learning the same lessons in the future joint operations.

**Policy and Doctrine Informed by Lessons Learned**

The commander and planners within a joint task force perform operational art “through the use of creative thinking … to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.” Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, skillfully describes

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5Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), Considerations and Implications of Response to Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (Norfolk, VA: JFCOM, 2011), 2–3.

6Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons Learned: Key to Successful International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (Norfolk, VA: US Joint Forces Command, 2008), 15. Footnotes five and six are used to show that these are indeed historical challenges understood by the joint community. Joint Forces Command identified them as challenges both before (2008) and after the earthquake in Haiti in 2011.

operational art as linking tactical action to strategic purpose. National and theater objectives, as defined by policy inform this strategic purpose. Therefore, not only will policy inform doctrine, policy will inform the ideas shaping the ends, ways and means that will enlighten the whole of government approach.

The five above-mentioned areas address interorganizational understanding and allow for focus on what specifically the DOD should have learned from *Operations Unified Response* and *Tomodachi*. Understanding the lessons learned in these areas allows for a greater appreciation of the recommendations made in several reviews for policy change in relation to the whole of government approach. With the understanding of lessons learned and the recommended policy changes, the focus turns to the new doctrine. This will assess the foundational ability of future operational level planners and commanders to account for past errors and determine their ability to focus on the immediacy of the mission and the task of preventing the further loss of human life joint operations.

Joint operational planners, due to the immediacy of the mission, have a limited time to create understanding and develop the plan for the operational commander to synchronize tactical actions in time and space with a unified purpose to achieve the overall strategic objectives. Historically, the requirement to stand up a Joint Task Force to execute a joint operation such as FDR does not happen often. Therefore, the knowledge that the staff and commander retain from previous FDR missions is minimal and often there is a new team in place. Consequently, joint doctrine is the foundation from which the mission understanding is derived and contributes to the commander’s understanding in visualizing and describing the intent of his solution to the problem. Accordingly, it is imperative that the doctrine be sound and as inclusive as possible for the planners to initiate the planning process.

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8Ibid. Figure I-5 displays this graphically and includes the text referencing the linkage between tactical tasks and strategic purpose.
EXPLAINING THE HISTORICAL CHALLENGES FOR FDR

The five historical aforementioned challenges also allow for evaluation between efforts in Haiti and Japan, two diametrically different counties in terms of economy, preparation and infrastructure. Further, these areas allow for assessment of how the joint task forces structured their assistance to the host nations and the ability to account for historic challenges that affect interorganizational coordination.\(^9\) The following further develops the understanding of these five areas and the importance they play in interorganizational operations.

Coordination with host nation and other organizations includes both government and non-governmental organizations from the host country and those countries giving assistance. During the initial emergency phase of FDR, the need is immediate and often unknown in terms of quantity or quality. The challenge in coordinating a response in the emergency phase, defined as the first forty-eight hours, is for the lead nation or agency to take charge. The lead organization from the United States for FDR will be U.S. Agency for International Development per National Security Presidential Directive-44.\(^{10}\) The host nation does not relinquish sovereignty and if able establishes the overall lead organization at the submittal of their initial request for assistance. The disaster contributed considerable influence on the host nation’s ability to take that role themselves and that role could fall to the United Nations or another organization if required.

Situational awareness and assessments are interdependent. Assessments create situational understanding and situational understanding tailors the assessments required. It is imperative that the lead agency make several initial calls with respect to how they manage the assessments to increase understanding of the problem. These assessments are critical to the initial response as

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\(^9\)Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Fact Book"

they inform further requests for assistance.\textsuperscript{11} During the emergency phase, the lead agency makes several decisions with respect to prioritization of assets from personnel and equipment to food and water. Proper assessments will allow the lead agency to manage a most likely strained logistics channel.

The U.S. military does not have the capacity in terms of medical supplies for even medium grade disasters. Integration with outside organizations, such as the World Health Organization or the host nation is significant to the promotion “of the host nation’s long-term medical capacity.”\textsuperscript{12} A key capability that the U.S. military can provide is assessments of the local medical facilities and linking up their need with the services provided by governmental and non-governmental organizations. The scale of the disaster will play a considerable role here as well.

U.S. policy defines the roles and responsibilities for the supported (U.S. Agency for International Development) and supporting (DOD) agencies in FDR. However, due to the size of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Disaster Assessment Response Team, approximately fifteen personnel, the size of the disaster and expectations may prove to be overwhelming. The lead agency needs to reinforce roles and responsibilities to all those that support to ensure there is no duplication of effort to properly utilize scarce resources.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Applying the Historical Challenges to Operation Unified Response: Haiti}

The massiveness of the destruction as well as the response provides the uniqueness of the operation in Haiti as well as the essential learning points. On January 12, 2010 Haiti experienced

\textsuperscript{11}United States Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis, \textit{Considerations and Implications of Response to Japan Earthquake and Tsunami} (Fort Belvoir, VA, 2011), 2.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13}Guha-Sapir et al., 41.
an earthquake in the magnitude of 7.0. The considerable devastation to the capital of Port-au-
Prince and surrounding suburbs killed an estimated 316,000 people and left over three million
Haitians affected by the earthquake.\footnote{14} The USG assigned the Joint Task Force-Haiti responsibility
to Southern Command, augmentation came from U.S. Army-South and XVIII Airborne Corps.
Within two weeks, Joint Task Force-Haiti consisted of over 22,000 service members, fifty aircraft
and twenty naval ships.\footnote{15} Further issues stemmed from the fact that Haiti had one doctor for every
4,000 people and the extensive damage to medical facilities in the Port-au-Prince area.\footnote{16}

Given this incredible task, the commander of the Joint Task Force, General P.K. Keen,
understood the mission in this context:

\begin{quote}
"The purpose of the Joint Task Force was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to
mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to
the Government of Haiti and United States Agency for International Development."
\end{quote}

Key to this statement is the understanding of the supported and supporting relationship by the
commander between the military, the host government and U.S. Agency for International
Development.

The presence of the United Nations in Haiti added further uniqueness to the mission. Due
to security issues and civil unrest, they established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in

\footnote{14}United States Agency for International Development, \textit{Fact Sheet #11, Fiscal Year 2011}

\footnote{15}P.K. Keen, "Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations," \textit{Military

\footnote{16}Central Intelligence Agency. The agency defines medical doctors as doctors that study,
diagnose, treat, and prevent illness, disease, injury, and other physical and mental impairments in
humans through the application of modern medicine. They also plan, supervise, and evaluate care
and treatment plans by other health care providers. The World Health Organization estimates that
fewer than 2.3 health workers (physicians, nurses, and midwives only) per 1,000 would be
insufficient to achieve coverage of primary healthcare needs. The Central Intelligence Agency
Factbook for Haiti lists theirs as 0.25 per 1000.

\footnote{17}P.K. Keen, "Relationships Matter; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in
Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti or MINUSTAH) in 2004. In October 2009, the United Nations increased their strength with eighteen countries providing military personnel and forty-one countries providing police. Additionally the mission commanded by Major General Floriano Peixoto of Brazil, suffered greatly in terms of loss of personnel and equipment. The General Keen and General Peixoto knew each other for over twenty-five years and were in quick agreement on an augmentation of a Brigade Combat Team from the Global Response Force of just over 3,000 personnel and their supporting role.

General Keen encountered General Floriano Peixoto the same day he arrived in Haiti, and they immediately decided both organizations would be completely open and transparent with no classified briefs. General Keen stated,

“I can honestly say that … we have not had any problems sharing information. One of the key reasons for this is that from the outset of this crisis, we at the Southern Command Headquarters decided to classify our Operations Order as unclassified. This classification gave us ease of transmission across the military, civilian sectors and with our partner nations.”

While classification was not an issue, a unified message and understanding was hard to create. The joint task force established a Joint Information Center to facilitate information flow due to the issues with maintaining a unified message between all the agencies. Additionally, foreign

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19Keen, "Relationships Matter; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti," 6.


21Keen, "Relationships Matter; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti," 4–6. 82nd Airborne Division rotates the Global Response Force through brigade combat teams for a one-year period. In January 2010, this mission belonged to 2nd Brigade in the 82nd Airborne Division.

22Ibid., 11–12.

23Keen, "Relationships Matter; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti." 12.
embassies in D.C. barraged the State Department with inquiries. In turn, this caused Southern Command to adjust their support to the lead agency.**24** Joint Task Force-Haiti used the All Partners Access Network and a User Defined Operational Picture, which created a link into the lead agency and other governmental sites. Though intended to create a near real-time information-sharing environment, the lack of a common operational picture and the ability to communicate with all interorganizational partners about the existence of these tools resulted in limited collaboration and information sharing across the interagency operation.**25**

The non-governmental organizations provided substantial relief in medical supply capability and capacity, with field hospitals set up by volunteers from the U.S. and other countries. Due to the earthquake, many hospitals were structurally unsound, forcing the placement of all patients outside the hospitals and thereby exposing patients to the elements. These conditions, coupled with the transition from the Emergency Phase to the Recovery phase exposed two immediate needs: (1) requirement to deal with amputees (2) acquisition and distribution of pharmaceuticals to prevent and treat both acute and chronic illness.**26** While supplies were located at a warehouse in Port-au-Prince run by Programme de Médicaments Essentiels an inventory and request mechanism did not exist.**27** Further was a distant need, with

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**24**DiOrio, 12.

**25**Ibid., 13.

**26**Guha-Sapir et al., 25–26. As the non-governmental organizations and members of the Joint Task Force-Haiti visited the camps, they identified numerous persons needing further medical treatment and space at both hospitals and field hospitals became an issue. The U.S. Navy’s ship, *Comfort* provided elevated levels of care for both Haitians and U.S. Service personnel. However, that ship reached capacity quickly and needed to maintain a percentage of available bed space for emergencies.

**27**Pan American Health Organization, *Health Cluster in Haiti Bulletin Number 6* (Washington DC: Pan American Health Organization, 2010), 1–2. The author augmented this paragraph with personal knowledge having served in 2/82 in Haiti from January to April of 2010. There were forty-eight local hospitals located in the Port-au-Prince Area, augmented by twelve field hospitals towards the end of January.
the rainy season approaching the requirement for vaccination against communicable diseases
drew closer each day.28

The Haiti disaster created equal levels of confusion as to who was in charge from an
interorganizational and international prospective. This despite the U.S. Agency for International
Development receiving a clear mandate as the lead agency for the USG efforts from the President
of the United States. The seventeen-person Disaster Assessment Response Team from the lead
agency faced many challenges stemming from an already established, yet broken United Nations
and non-governmental organization structure. Simultaneously, they had a growing U.S. military
presence and a United Nations police organization with the Brazilian military in the lead, backed
by a country that wanted to assert itself on the world stage.29 The under resourced seventeen
person team struggled with their mandated responsibilities for such a large and complex
disaster.30 The way Southern Command arranged their staff increased confusion of roles and
responsibilities. They arrived aligned with the agencies they coordinated with on a day-to-day
basis at their headquarters in Tampa, not by traditional joint staff codes. As stated by General
Keen, “This made the task of forming a Joint Task Force very challenging.”31 This was a
significant issue and he decided to change the arrangement to the joint staff model in the very
beginning of the crisis.32 The next challenge was how to integrate supporting and supported
relationships with the United Nations.

28Emergency Support Function-8 Planning and Response Program, Emergency Support
Function-8 Planning and Response Program Update (Haiti Earthquake) (New Haven, CT: Yale
University School of Public Health, 2010), 6–8.

29Alan G. Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents

30Guha-Sapir et al., 11,39–40.

31DiOrio, 6.

32Ibid., 7–8. The Joint Task Force integrated 274 new members from the Joint Staff, other
The United Nations asserted control by giving “approval of a United States humanitarian mission and stated that the American troops would not stay long although the plan was not yet developed.”\textsuperscript{33} The lead U.S. agency asserted itself by taking on the responsibility to coordinate USG efforts for the roads, port, airports, and humanitarian aid distribution. As a result, they had final approval of missions and leveraged already existing relationships with non-governmental organizations to create a more coordinated response. They struggled to prioritize all the required efforts with their limited organizational structure. They consistently reasserted themselves as they continued to face additional bureaucratic and administrative trials. Several of the USG agencies that operated in Haiti were familiar with the \textit{United States National Response Framework} and could function within its perimeters and expectations. However, the international model run did not have the same level of institutional knowledge nor did it account for the United Nations organizations or host nation assets and personalities.\textsuperscript{34} Despite the disaster-imposed limitations on both the United Nations and Haiti, they still had to be part of the solution. Procedures between agencies did not occur as expected and the consistent issue of funding through title responsibilities was ambiguous.\textsuperscript{35}

Results from an independent review found the need for the policy makers to delineate the mandate and role of the military, complete with an endstate before mobilization. With a lack of a plan, Southern Command and the Joint Task Force felt the need to plan for everything.\textsuperscript{36} Adding

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{35}Guha-Sapir et al., 45.

\textsuperscript{36}United States Joint Forces Command, "USSOUTHCOM and JTF Haiti…Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force," (Task Force 41 and Washington D.C: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2010), 45.
further complications, United States Forces Command, the command designated with the responsibility to align personnel to missions, does not assign the Global Response Force task force the capability to perform as a Joint Task Force. The skeletal Joint Task Force supplied by the XVIII Airborne Corps lacked a joint logistics element and command and control capability, provided by a Joint Communications Support Element. Further enablers required (Engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and medical) were not in a contingency status like the Global Response Force. 37 In addition to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the Joint Task Force integrated staff from the Joint Force Maritime Component Command, Task Force 41. 38 Medical staff and personnel from the 12th U.S. Air Force Air Component Coordination Element provided further augmentation. 39

To integrate with the United Nation cluster system the Joint Task Force placed a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell at the United Nations Logistical Base. The Joint Task Force Commander designated Brigadier General Nicolas Matern, a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps as the lead. 40 This organization worked to forward issues and assessment by cluster participants (military units and non-governmental organizations) and tied them to resources. 41 Because the supported and supporting agencies lacked an internal trained assessment capability and capacity respectively, the joint task force created the cell. With both organizations working in parallel and no standard for data collected or the priority placed in

37 Ibid., 9.


40 DiOrio, 11.

collection, everything seemed important at once.\(^{42}\) Therefore, those that came with data first or could use convincing verbiage received resources. The lack of a common operational picture also generated confusion. Different maps reflecting varying degrees of reality permeated the Joint Operations Area. This completes the historical challenge assessment in Haiti.

The historical challenges identified before the earthquake in Haiti were still issues during Operation Unified Response. It is arguable that Southern Command established the best relationship with outside agencies of any combatant command. Their deputy was from the State Department and the structure of their headquarters established for interaction with those organizations. That did not work. The whole of government approach did not work to its maximum potential due to the five historical challenges.

Applying the Historical Challenges to Operation Tomodachi: Japan

On March 11, 2011 an earthquake occurred off the shore of Japan with a magnitude of 8.9 that resulted in a tsunami and subsequently a foreign disaster relief request from the Government of Japan. Due to the drastic difference between Japan and Haiti and the nature of the disaster there would be a considerably different approach required. The extensive differences between Japan and Haiti were most noticeable in terms of government preparedness and ability to solve their own problems. However, the same areas became the immediate focus as provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis on March 11, 2011 to the Joint Staff in an information paper.\(^ {43}\) Analyzing these challenges within this unique problem will further assist the joint force in establishing complete lessons learned. Ideally this will inform

\(^{42}\)Guha-Sapir et al., 13.

\(^{43}\)United States Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2–4. These were the same five historical challenges prior to Haiti.
doctrine to create a common understanding of solving like problems and preventing similar lessons from being relearned across the joint force.

The efforts of disaster relief came to bear for the U.S. and Japanese forces with the resources of twenty U.S. Naval ships, 140 aircraft, and over 19,000 personnel involved in humanitarian assistance that would deliver over 220 tons of aid to the victims.\textsuperscript{44} Supporting a world leading country with the third largest economy in the world, the United States through its military delivered three times the amount of food and twenty times the amount of water than the government of Japan.\textsuperscript{45} Admiral Robert Willard’s, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, request for 450 radiological and consequence management experts made this mission decidedly different from the FDR mission performed in Haiti.\textsuperscript{46} Other differences include the number of people affected. With an estimated population of over 14.8 million people before the disaster, 1.6 million lived within five kilometers of the coast; the affected areas provided a separate relief challenge. The remaining figures associated with the Japanese relief effort are over 15,800 dead, over 3,200 missing and over 342,000 evacuated.\textsuperscript{47}

The uniqueness of the Japanese natural disaster was the earthquake and tsunami “caused a crisis at the six-unit Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, which resulted in explosions, core meltdowns, and radioactive offsite release.”\textsuperscript{48} Tailored for only a nuclear disaster in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission response program lacks an international


\textsuperscript{46}Feickert, 6.

\textsuperscript{47}Government of Japan, \textit{Road to Recovery} (Tokyo, Japan, 2012), Slide 3.

response plan. The U.S. National Strategic Response guidance was the only document that provided a foundation on how to act, however it did not provide integration or guidance for international disasters. As a result, the U.S. nuclear response teams lacked the ability to communicate effectively with their Japanese counterparts, to the point of not utilizing the same units of measurement for radiation exposure.\(^49\)

Better defining lead and supporting agencies for an international response effort could result in communications that are more effective and coordination between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Japanese counterparts.

Admiral Patrick Walsh, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, established the Joint Support Force March 24, 2011 by activating elements of Joint Task Force 519 to augment the staff of U.S. Forces-Japan. This force supported the both the government of Japan and the Japanese Security Defense Force and oversaw humanitarian assistance and disaster response from the military as part of Operation Tomodachi.\(^50\)

The first U.S. military command post in Japan came from Third Marine Expeditionary Force and Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which sent their Forward Command Element of fourteen personnel into Japan on March 12, 2011 just twenty-nine hours after notification. Four humanitarian assistance survey teams accompanied this element. The lead USG agency did not enter the country until the arrival of the U.S. State Department’s Agency for International Development personnel four days later.\(^51\) Further, the Japanese had a divided Joint Task Force and did not operate as a fully integrated staff. The orders coming from this headquarters lacked the detail to integrate the U.S. military augmentation. This Japanese Task Force had “little or no experience in joint, combined and interagency operations required in such


\(^{50}\)Center for Excellence In Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance, *Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update* (Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii, 2011), 42.

an effort.” Nor did they truly understand the capabilities and capacities that the United States provided to the relief efforts. In addition, rather than a coordinated Department of Defense response, each service component used its immediate response authority independently without an understanding of other component’s activities.

The USG identified the U.S. State Department as the lead and supported agency in the whole of government approach for Operation Tomodachi. Requests circumvented the lead U.S. agency from the Japanese task force and went directly to the Marine Forward Command Element. Subsequently the Marines worked through the Japanese Security Defense Force and issues developed over how to request assistance. Ultimately, they developed the Bilateral Coordination Center, a name chosen because Japanese thought the more commonly used terms (Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell and Civil-Military Operations Center) applied to operations in less developed countries. This center worked out to the benefit of both the U.S. military and the Japanese Security Defense Force. Here they resolved conflicts and coordinated all future requests for assistance. Requests from the Bilateral Coordination Center went forward to the Marines and Joint Task Force commander for action. If unable to support from that level these requests went forward to the commanders and staffs of U.S. Forces Japan and the Japanese Security Defense Force. Capping the review of issues involving roles and responsibilities the after action review


55Rohr, 6–8.

56Wilson. Wilson states that there are conflicting sources that attribute the establishment of the Bilateral Coordination Center to both 3rd MEB and the Department of State through United
from operations officer of the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade states that his organization “must be able to function as the lead agency in Joint and Combined operations.” This clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding with respect to USG policy for foreign disaster relief. This was further amplified in the after action review for the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, the Joint Forces Land Component Commander stated that he received his order to stop humanitarian aid from the Japanese government and not the lead U.S. agency. He identified frustrations with the Japanese and the limitations they placed on the U.S. military.

The survey teams mentioned above came in the form of Humanitarian Aid Survey Teams. These teams consisted mainly of logistics, engineers, aviation, medical, and civil affairs personnel and became part of the future operations cell in the Marine Forward Command Element. Land Component Commander stated that the Japanese restricted the movement of their survey teams and this limited the information the land component received. With these teams only able to accompany the Japanese Security Defense Forces and obtain assessments in the areas they went the teams supported the needs of the host nation and not, as identified by the Land Component commander, the needs of the Joint Support Force. Assessments were further coordinated through Air and Maritime components and the use of ISR in support of the Japanese for line of communication, infrastructure and remains assessment.

States Agency for International Development

57 Rohr, 10.

58 United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 18.

59 Ibid., 24.

60 Ibid., 17.

61 Ibid., 29.
With confusion in roles and responsibilities came confusion in the ability to communicate. The Japanese Joint Task Force experienced significant difficulties with communication. The disaster caused the collapse of the supporting civilian communication infrastructure and issues became apparent with relaying assistance for communication augmentation. The repair of the civilian communication infrastructure and the identification of augmentation requirements occurred simultaneously. Despite the commander’s guidance to establish a platform that those providing relief and the Japanese people could use, the number of platforms created confusion. The use of separate internet based methods and tools that subordinates used to communicate with their higher headquarters and other organizations created confusion. This included All Partners Access Network, Harmonieweb, Sharepoint, different chat room programs and Defense Connect On-line. Separately the UN created the “Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan,” a network of NGO/volunteer organizations to simplify communication and exchange of information to coordinate assistance among the organizations working in the Tohoku region.

POLICY AND DOCTRINE LEADING TO EFFORTS IN HAITI AND JAPAN

The changing events of the world inform our leaders who shape our policy to create strategic advantages for our nation. The military, informed by this policy, will shape their doctrine, the foundation for planning and operations, to support the policy established by their strategic leaders. In 2006, during the presidency of George W. Bush, the foundation of the Project

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62Rohr, 6.
63Ibid., 6,8.
64United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 17.
65Wilson.
66Center for Excellence In Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance, 6.
on National Security Reform sought to increase the security of the United States by combining the power of the agencies within the USG. The result of the project led to a report in 2008 that led to the idea of the “whole of government approach.” Operations in Haiti utilized this approach and as a result twenty-eight agencies within the USG contributed to providing assistance to the relief efforts. The intent of the project and their recommendations was to reform the structures and processes that at the time were over sixty years old and arguably no longer facilitated the construction of national security strategy. While lending to the importance of interagency coordination and truly capitalizing on the whole nation’s power to solve problems, several of the issues that the report raised were still in place a year later when the earthquake struck Haiti. Several core documents formulate our national security strategy with respect to interagency cooperation. By reviewing selected documents and the doctrine that supported them, we can endeavor to see where policy and doctrine collaborated to allow the same five historical problem areas to appear in both foreign disasters.

The Policy that Shaped Efforts in Haiti and Japan

_The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961_ established the United States Agency for International Development and Congress amended the Act in 2002 to establish the “Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance whose responsibility shall be to promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in responses to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors. Included among the Special Coordinator’s responsibilities shall be the formulation and updating of contingency plans for

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67 Guha-Sapir et al., 35.

providing disaster relief.” For the response to the Haiti earthquake President Obama named Rajiv Shah, as the Unified Disaster Coordinator and identified U.S. Agency for International Development as the lead federal agency to coordinate the response for the USG. Unfortunately, for the administrator he took the oath of office five days prior to the Haiti Earthquake. Despite the standing and support of the political leadership, an independent review stated the “the agency lacked the political standing and operational capacity to completely fulfill its leadership mandate.” For the Japanese earthquake, the President did not appoint a lead disaster coordinator with the agency only sending a Disaster Assistance Response Team and two Urban Search and Rescue teams. This explains why the U.S military reported to the Japanese Joint Task Force and not the mandated lead agency from the USG.

The Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 during the 110th Congress supported the realignment of the Southern Command staff that focused on interagency and international coordination and not that of the standard Napoleonic structure. There were issues raised particular to Southern Command’s ability “to manage and evaluate its internal transformation, including measures of progress” as well as integration with commands “that maintain traditional joint directorate structures and vertically with the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.” Southern Command began to implement these changes in 2008 and they completed them prior to the earthquake in Haiti. In the Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee requested that Southern Command capture the lessons learned from the transform for the DOD to apply to other


70Guha-Sapir et al., 10-11.

71House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington D.C.: House of representatives, 2008), 409-410. The act also required Southern Command to pass their lessons learned to African Command, which is now formed in the exact manner that Southern Command was prior to the Haiti earthquake.
combatant commands. As mentioned in the review of roles and responsibilities section previously, this transformation proved too difficult for the Southern Command headquarters to integrate into both the Joint Staff and Joint Task Force Haiti. As a result, General Keen ordered the transition back to the Napoleonic staff structure within the first two weeks of Operation Unified Response.

The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development released their strategic plan for FY 2007-12 in May 2007. This document stated the mission as:

“Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”

Released during the presidency of George W. Bush, the strategic plan is in line with “The Bush Doctrine.” The document laid out seven strategic goals, with number five being, “Providing Humanitarian Assistance” which includes disaster relief. This shaping of policy based off strategic guidance provided by the executive placed emphasis clearly on the Middle East and Africa, the origin of and most likely locations for terrorism. This strategy identified the need to assist affected nations during disasters and allow that nation’s government to serve its people and thereby prevent inroads for terrorists in a failed state. The strategy did not prioritize disaster relief, understandably with a majority of the efforts of the USG focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, in the western hemisphere only one country did not have a democratically elected government, an identified key component for stability. The focus on democracy in the Middle East and Africa rightfully drew competing resources at the height of the wars in Afghanistan and

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73Ibid. President G.W. Bush stated in his second inaugural address ““It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” He aimed to provide peace and security to all.

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Iraq. However, as a result democratic poor countries such as Haiti, did not receive considerable efforts from U.S. Agency for International Development, despite their presence in that country for decades. Emphasis on Disaster Assessment Response Team development and integration with DOD did not make a long list of priorities despite emphasis placed on Humanitarian Assistance.\textsuperscript{74}

Nor did this integration make the discussion in the Civil-Military Cooperation Policy published in 2008 with the focus of the policy on stability operations performed by the USG in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{75} Despite multiple coordination efforts with DOD in fiscal year 2009, the U.S. Agency for International Development and its office, the Office of U.S. Disaster Assistance, did not issue guidance for civil-military cooperation. This is most likely due to the scale of DOD involvement in relief efforts. In the two years leading up to the disasters in Haiti and Japan, less than ten percent of the over 180 disasters responded to by the Disaster Assistance Office required assistance from the DOD, mostly for their logistical and engineering capability. Haiti and Japan represented two of the largest operations conducted for FDR and the framework understandably was not in place to support the levels of disaster. The foundation to integrate support from the DOD in terms of hundreds of personnel and several aircraft cannot compare to the over 22,000 personnel and hundreds of aircraft and boats that supported Haiti and Japan. Improvising to execute relief and the whole of government approach on this scale happened during the emergency phase of the effort. “These improvisations included developing protocols for the exchange of staff between agencies, managing the transfer of budgetary authorities, and setting up systems for communication and sharing of information among agencies.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 30–34, 54–58.


Finally, at the time of both FDR missions, the most current directive from the DOD is directive 5100.46 *Foreign Disaster Relief* published in 1975. This document does not reference lead agency responsibilities and does not mention the U.S. Agency for International Development, despite its founding in 1961. This is most likely due to the Clinton administration not identifying the agency’s role in FDR until 1995. With this document as a base, it instructs the combatant commander to report his actions once completed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and no direction to the Department of State, requiring only the establishment of liaisons. Of specific issue in the one after action review from Haiti was the DOD issuance of humanitarian aid without direction from the U.S. Agency for International Development. This DOD directive gives great flexibility to the military, “Nothing in this Directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so.” Further issues in Haiti developed from funding between the Departments of State and Defense that this document lent zero clarity. The directive stated that the military commander would forward the bills and vouchers to the Department of State for payment.

*Doctrine that Shaped Haiti and Japan*

*Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization During Joint Operations Volume One*, published on March 17, 2006 is the first rewrite from the original published in 1996. Additionally, it is the first rewrite since the terrorist attacks in 2001. Informed by the Bush Doctrine from the National Security


Strategy of September 2002, this publication saw an increased emphasis on homeland defense and DOD’s integration with the Department of Homeland Security. For examples of FDR, the concentration is from operations in the early 1990s focusing on *Operations Restore Hope* and *Support Hope*. The joint publication mentions a shift from the bipolar world of the Cold War and the acceptance of the liberal ideas behind the United Nations.80 The support the DOD provides other countries in the operational environment described in the 2006 version are Peace and Complex Contingency Operations. FDR is not mention by definition. However, of the two operations mentioned, Complex Contingency fits the current definition for FDR the closest.81

There is significant conflict with roles and responsibilities in the identification of the lead federal agency for Complex Contingency Operations. From the examples, the lead organization for foreign humanitarian assistance is the DOD. The joint publication did emphasize command support relationships through the identification of “close coordination” regardless of established supported or supporting relationships. The command relationship section mentions the U.S. Agency for International Development as an “implementing partner,” but offers no further relationship definition. Later, the publication clarifies Complex Contingency Operations as “likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by an ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military


81Ibid., GL-6, GL-13. JP 3-08 from 2006 defines *Peace Operations* as: a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. 3-08 defines *Complex Contingency Operations* as: Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency.
organizations in the operation.”82 Between the examples provided and the unconsolidated and ambiguous references for command and coordinating relationships there is opportunity for misunderstanding before planning for an operation begins. The publication offers greater clarity for planning operations.

The publication places emphasis on the requirement for including other USG agencies and regional resources, such as non-governmental organizations during the development of the campaign. Further stating that part of the campaign plan should involve the discussion of the transition of roles and responsibilities once the military force has left the operational area to nonmilitary bodies at the conclusion of contingency operations.83 The publication identifies the joint interagency coordination group as the means through which the combatant commander and his staff will collaborate at the operational level. This group and its members retain the ability to reach back into their parent organizations to participate in crisis operational planning synchronizing the efforts of civilian agencies from the USG. This group plays a significant role in the development and resourcing for courses of action for the commander. Collaboration within the joint interagency coordination group allows the commander to ensure the unity of effort throughout his campaign plan and the associated contingencies. Integral in the planning process is the political advisor; they will assist in the interagency cooperation and promote the development of relationships between planners. 84 Figure 1 represents the outside agencies that Southern Command collaborated with for their 2009 campaign plan.85

82Ibid., I-3–I-7.
83Ibid., II-3.
84Ibid., II-15–II-17,II-20.
Figure 1. Contributing Partners to Southern Command 2009 Theater Campaign Plan.

*Source: Joint Operational War Plans Division, Joint Staff.*

With reference to the publication, both Southern Command and Pacific Command did an excellent job in placing emphasis on interagency relationship building. As seen above in the “Applying of Historical Challenges” section, this was not enough to build success. Was the difference the United Nations involvement?

Of particular note is the mention of the United Nations humanitarian organizational structure, through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Since this structure only accounts for a headquarters and operational field elements there is no counterpart at the operational level. Therefore, when the United Nations is in the lead, as was the case in Haiti, there is structural shortage specific to planning and executing FDR with a Joint Task Force. This requires improvisation from both the United Nations and operational level commander during FDR. In the case of Haiti, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs eventually
established a field team that worked out of the United Nation logistical compound. This late attempt did fill the discussed gap; however, there were issues with application of resources as well. Next for review are the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, Disaster Assistance Response Team, and Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team are key resources available at the operational level as commanders applied them in Haiti and Japan.

Doctrinally, the commander sends the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team forward to determine the resources that are immediately required to stabilize the humanitarian crisis. When employed properly, the team will deliver the capability of the agencies and organizations in the crisis area and provide recommendations during the course of action development as to where the military can best contribute. This team consists of members from the interagency community and establishes liaison contact with the United Nations Embassy and organizations, the host nation, non-governmental organizations and other USG agencies. So empowered, the team will “define coordination relationships and lines of authority among military, the embassy or consulate, U.S. Agency for International Development and other USG and non-USG organizations. This action helps identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort.” As discussed this did not happen in Haiti or Japan. Ideally, this team conducts an assessment with the Joint Task Force assessment team.

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86 Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, II-23–24. The author’s firsthand account provides the location of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs team.

87 Ibid., III-8–III-14. The author derives the following three paragraphs, to include Figure III-5, from these pages and personal experience.

88 Ibid., III-10. Neither combatant level commands sent a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team in Haiti or Japan. After action reviews refute the need as in both operations these combatant commands had personnel on the islands. However, the personnel located did not fulfill the roll described in the Joint Publication and assisted in the loose definitions applied to roles and responsibilities nor did they have the ability to make proper assessments.
The Joint Task Force assessment team is the early entry argument to the challenges of FDR. They are similar in function to the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team, acting as liaisons with the “ambassador, chief of mission, country team, host nation, and, if present, multinational members, United Nations representatives, and inter/non-governmental representatives.”89 In conjunction, the two teams will facilitate the baseline coordination between the Joint Task Force, Combatant Command and with the interagency partners within these two command organizations. This team consists of “staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operations. USG agency representation may include U.S. Agency for International Development…Disaster Assessment Response Team for purposes of foreign humanitarian aid operations…may also assist in clarifying the mission and determining force requirements and force deployment sequence for the Joint Task Force.”90 Commanders did not use these assessment teams or the Disaster Assessment Response Team accordance with doctrine, if made available they may have avoided these early issues.

U.S. States Agency for International Development’s Disaster Assistance Response Team from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is specific to disaster relief more than in name. This team of normally twenty-two personnel “can determine the full range of services necessary.”91 Unfortunately, the publication does not define the term services. However, review of the composition of the Disaster Assessment Response Team places personnel with specialties in the following fields: logistics (supply, transportations and aviation), operations (medical,

89Ibid., III-14. The Joint Task Forces established for Operations Tomodachi and Unified Response did not provide assessment teams to their early entry capability into their Joint Operations Area (JOA).

90Ibid., III-14–III-15.

91Ibid., III-10.
technical/scientific and search and rescue), procurement, administrative, information, communications and planning. The assessments provided by this team feed into the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell for further action by the unified team. In Haiti and Japan these team required more personnel to make the assessments required to focus planning and efforts.

Joint Task Forces for both Haiti and Japan used a version of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell adopting the doctrinal aspects of the cell. By doctrine, the combatant commander establishes a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell to assist with interagency coordination and planning. It is normally a temporary body used during the early stages of planning and coordination of FDR or humanitarian assistance. The lead civilian agency replaces this cell and establishes a civil humanitarian operations center. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell receives support from and integrates into the combatant command staff. The 2006 publication gives an example of a civil-military operations center as seen in figure 2.92

![Figure 2. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center](image)

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08 2006

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Ibid., III-18.
In both Japan and Haiti, this informed the shaping of the Bilateral Coordination Center and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell respectively. The commands used these names instead of civil-military operations center due to cultural sensitivities either in the host nation or with the United Nations and supported non-governmental organizations to facilitate military interagency cooperation. Once the cells receive these assessments, the requirement to share that data now exists.

Information sharing between the Joint Task Forces, interagency and non-governmental organizations, United Nations and the host nation is critical to timely updates to assessments and sharing of requirements to establish prioritization for minimal available resources during the initial stages of FDR. The 2006 publication placed emphasis on proper classification of documents, recommending guidance on over-classification avoidance to ensure maximum sharing and collaborative capability. The publication provides further guidance in minimizing the terms, which may hinder cooperation with non-governmental organizations due to sensitivities with military collaboration such as referring to analyzed data as intelligence. The publication largely draws from operations in the early 1990s. During this period, the Internet was less accessible and phone networks were not as established or as advanced as the modern 3G or 4G networks. Therefore, the assessment of the 2006 publication does not draw on the Internet, shared networking or social media as collaboration tools, despite numerous examples of this type of collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan. During complex contingency operations, the communication structure that the military provides can be beneficial, as can be their logistical capability.

The 2006 version identifies logistical capability and capacity as the main resources the military can provide to the whole of government approach, specifically in complex contingency operations in an undeveloped theater. Additionally, the military has a robust command and control capability with the ability to plan, deploy and secure this logistics capability. Further
mentioned is the assignment to the Joint Task Force of the logistical requirements for USG agencies, the United Nations and inter/non-governmental organizations. Per 2006 doctrine, the Joint Task Force is to establish the movement priorities between itself and other team members in the whole of government approach. This becomes significant in FDR, as not only are the logistical capabilities competing with themselves for the build of logistical power. The disaster can create degraded throughput and places logistical capacity in competition with further disaster relief capability such as search and rescue and humanitarian supplies. Therefore, both the assessment of current capabilities and requirements on the ground is crucial to ensure proper prioritization of logistical throughput.

**DID POLICY AND DOCTRINE CHANGE AFTER HAITI AND JAPAN?**

**Policy for the way ahead?**

Since the USG established the Department of State as the lead agency for FDR it makes sense to begin with a review of what this department has changed in terms of policy and perspective with relation to the whole of government approach. The base agency document, designed to look forward by reflecting on actions in the past, is the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review published in December 2010.

While the document itself provides many actions for the department to pursue internally, those that focus on the whole of government approach provide insight to how they will integrate with DOD for *Unified Action*. Namely, the authority granted to the Chief of Mission as Chief Executive Officers of interagency missions with the authority to direct, supervise and coordinate all civilian personnel at oversea posts. However, the document does not reach beyond civilian agencies, emphasizing the need to seek input from other agencies. Additionally the department charges this position with the ability to inject in the evaluation of all government officials by their parent organizations. The department paves the path forward towards the whole of government approach without encroaching on the authority within DOD structure. Specifically the department
holds themselves accountable to their own ideals in that they use the ability to cooperate as criteria for selection to the position. Further, the department recognizes the influence of other agencies and states they will engage their interagency counterparts outside the United States. The State Department places the responsibility of implementation of the whole of government approach within the position of the Chief of Mission.93 By holding their highest representatives outside of Washington D.C. as the standard-bearers for this approach, the tone is set across the organization for success on the world stage.

Through the Presidential Policy Directive – Six, issued in 2010 by the Obama administration, the executive branch elevated development as a pillar of national power to that of diplomacy and defense. Additionally, this directive places specific guidance in a balanced power approach between agencies cooperating in crisis management.94 Unfortunately, the U.S. Agency for International Development does not use the same tone and language seen in the review for the State Department in their Policy Framework 2011-2015. Mentioning the DOD for cooperation in the Global Health Initiative and the Global Warming and not in international crisis management or humanitarian assistance misses the opportunity to place emphasis in the lexicon used within the agency of the whole of government approach. While identifying itself as the lead agency for the USG in humanitarian crisis and placing considerable emphasis on planning and assessing throughout the document, the agency identifies the way ahead from some key lessons learned from both Haiti and Japan. Highlighting both capacity issues and the emphasis on joint planning informed by these assessments.95 Despite these improvements and emphasis from lessons learned,


in terms of the whole of government approach this document does not improve upon the limited civil-military cooperation policy produced by the agency in 2008.96

DOD made significant improvements with the issuance of DOD Directive 5100.46 in July of 2012.97 This directive clearly identifies the U.S. Agency for International Development as the lead agency of the USG for FDR. Additionally it lends clarity to the funding issue that came about in Haiti and Japan, giving specific direction to the use of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds. The directive provides further clarity with respect to the action of the military commander supporting the FDR mission: “Nothing in this Directive shall be construed as preventing a military commander with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the host nation and U.S. Chief of Mission of the affected country before committing forces.”98 This statement also provides clear guidance with respect to the supported authority and is in line with what the Department of State mentions above, with the Chief of Mission being overall responsible for the actions of all USG agencies in a foreign country. To prevent the directive from becoming outdated, like that of the 1975 directive, DOD establishes an expiration date five years from the publication in 2012. Clearly taking from the lessons learned in Haiti and Japan, this document provides clear and succinct guidance that informs doctrine.


96United States Agency for International Development, "Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy."


98Ibid., 2.
Doctrine for the Future?

Published in June of 2011, Joint Publication 3-08 saw significant changes in conjunction with the focus on Unified Action in Joint Publication 3-0 and Joint Publication 1-0. DOD makes this effort throughout the publication, specifically in chapter one and chapters with relationship building focus. DOD completely rewrote chapter one with the overall focus of the joint force within Unified Action. The change in tone throughout the publication is considerable and stands out during a side-by-side comparison of the two versions of Joint Publication 3-08. This is more likely due to a considerable change in how the DOD approaches the whole of government approach through the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan than the lessons learned in Haiti or Japan. DOD replaced the negative and at times combative tone located throughout the 2006 publication with vocabulary that is more in line with the ideal of Unified Action. This makes the publication easy to read from an interagency perspective. Should a representative from outside of the DOD pick up the 2011 publication as a reference it alters the baseline of how the military perceives them for the better. Read from cover to cover it is less of a definition-based document and more idea-based, specifically in the first two chapters. The definitions are more properly positioned in context within chapters three (Domestic Considerations) and chapter four (Foreign Considerations). Of particular note in the language change is the removal of the term Complex Contingency Operations referenced in the 2006 publication. The review of the 2011 Joint Publication 3-08 will be similar to that of the review of the 2006 doctrine. Additionally analysis below will show (1) what influenced the change from 2006 to 2011, (2) the benefit or disadvantage due to this change, and (3) how this change does or does not support the intent of Unified Action.99

99Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011), I-1 – IV-36. With respect to Complex Contingency Operations, the DOD has not replaced the term just removed it from doctrine. In one instance, the term “crisis” replaced Complex Contingency Operations.
Focusing on roles and responsibilities the new publication clearly defines the Department of State and particularly U.S. Agency for International Development as the lead agency for disaster relief. However, in two separate chapters the publication retains some of the conflicting examples from the 2006 version. Specifically, the mention of the military being the lead for foreign humanitarian assistance mission in the early 1990s for Operation Provide Comfort remains. While the DOD changed the title of the section from “Command Relationships” to “Working Relationships and Practices” between the 2006 and 2011 version, the very first paragraph still identifies military in the lead in an example role that it clearly subordinates itself to U.S. Agency for International Development in chapter four. The effort to expand the understanding how interorganizational relationships are separate from that of the military is undone with this poor example. “During combat operations such as Operation Desert Storm or in foreign humanitarian assistance operations such as Operation Provide Comfort, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG agencies.”\textsuperscript{100} It is unclear what point the DOD was trying to relay with this example from a mission in 1996 when discussing roles and responsibilities for the lead agency in foreign humanitarian aid missions. Operation Unified Response would have been a better choice to prove the point of the paragraph.

Additionally the publication misses an excellent opportunity to expand of the relationship between General Keen and his Brazilian counterpart, General Floriano Peixoto during Operation Unified Response. Instead, a change to one example provides an explanation of the relationships between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus in Iraq and General McCrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan. Missed as well is the close working relationship with leaders in Japan and Pacific Command during Tomodachi and the State Department and World

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid., I-9.
Food Programs planning efforts with the Joint Task Force staff during Operation Unified Response.

While both operations in Haiti and Japan did not use Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams due to the immediacy of the disaster and the need created, it is helpful to point out that the lessons learned from both operations have not affected this version of the publication nor is this section influenced by Unified Action. With the mention of the supported commander having the option of using the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams to “acquire information for planning.”

The team by doctrine is organic to the combatant commander and pulls information as described above from the Disaster Assessment Response Team and host nation government as required. By tying the usage of the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team to the supported commander there is conflicting language that tends to create ambiguity for future missions, namely FDR. Combatant commanders are not the supported commanders for FDR per chapter four in the 2011 publication. This may seem overcritical, however language matters in doctrine and if a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams is an option to the combatant commander regardless of the relationship his HQs has (supported / supporting) then the publication should remove this “supported” reference as it has Complex Contingency Operations throughout the publication.

While the publication still identifies correctly the limitation of interorganizational and interagency manning to liaison at the strategic, operational and tactical levels it does improve the knowledge presented to the audience on the capabilities of United States Agency for International Development and their ability to indeed plug in or represent at all three levels. In figure 3, the

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101 Ibid., IV-17.
new joint publication gives improved detail on the representative structure of United States Agency for International Development, the lead organization for FDR.\footnote{Ibid., I-14.}

Figure 3. Organizational Structure Comparison of U.S. Agencies.

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, 2012.

The expansion of explanation on short versus long term view between the military and other governmental agencies will prove to be helpful to the staff of a Joint Task Force executing FDR or a Combatant Command staff managing a Joint Task Force in that role. While not specifically mentioned the emphasis placed on short and long term is very much in line with thinking of both departments. The reader should acknowledge the word choice and care in connecting the two, particularly the working of capability between these two thoughts. Specific to
FDR and in the case of Operation Unified Response, where United States Agency for International Development focused on long term planning and working to fix the underlying issues of government corruption and manipulation of the market and the military focused on getting food and shelter to people of need. This does not mean that United States Agency for International Development did not focus on the crisis. However, the United States Agency for International Development did not properly convey the problem and associated long-term view to the Joint Task Force and its subordinates. A Joint Task Force staff should pay close attention to this emphasis and compatibility between the two missions and convey this understanding horizontally and vertically, specifically to subordinates.

The new publication expresses further changes in roles and responsibilities by the removal of verbiage that specifies the combatant commander as the lead organizer of “many operations” and supplants this idea with a more unified effort approach in line with Unified Action. Further, the publication changes the idea of transitions. Gone is the reference to what the combatant commander desires as the conditions to enter and exit the operations. Replacing that idea is a more inclusive effort of integration of agencies and organizations outside the military in the planning process with a unified effort to identify transition points. The tone as mentioned above, changes in this portion as well. In the terms of planning and development coordination, DOD replaces the term mutual interference with language that is not as divisive and more in line with the theory of Unified Action. Not specifically mentioned as attributed to Haiti and Japan, the reader notices the change based on several of the issues mentioned in the lessons learned section. The publication places care again in the involvement often and early of outside organizations in the planning efforts, particularly with Annex V, “Interagency Coordination.”

The new publication states that this Annex should receive the same focus as Annex C, Operations, from a joint staff. The inclusion of those mentioned in the annex in its development is essential. “USG agencies do not want to react to a military plan after the fact. USG agencies want
a seat at the table to conduct strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning.”

The publication provides further guidance in stating that the supported command is responsible for the development of Annex V. Here is where considerable issues have the potential to arise. Since the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International Development are the supported agency and the DOD is the supporting role; this begs the question of who in the Department of State or United States Agency for International Development will compose Annex V. The data provided in Annex V are: capabilities desired by the military, shared understanding of the situation, and common ways to the unified ends. All of these are important to subordinate units to the Joint Task Force. They increase their understanding of how they will support the mission and other organizations. This example obviously stems from lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and not from FDR where, in accordance with the JP, the United States Agency for International Development is the lead and supported agency.

The publication uses an example from when, in 2008, Southern Command restructured their command and control structure to fall in line with a more integrated interagency approach. Additionally, the publication mentions how African Command is using the same model. Presented in figure 4 is an example of how Southern Command organized prior to the execution in Haiti. The publication fails to mention that GEN Keen terminated this structure only a few days into the operation as that design did not have the link in points that their subordinate Joint Task Force had under the normal joint staff model. This caused considerable confusion at first as the two headquarters had issues communicating with each other.

103 Ibid., II-7.
104 Ibid., I-6.
Second, the difficulty increased significantly when GEN Keen decided to change over to the Joint Staff model only a few days into the mission, as seen in figure 5.\(^{106}\)

Listing this as an example and not identifying the risk and issues involved is unfortunate. Since the departure away from the joint staff model required additional funding it required

\(^{106}\)Ibid., 28.
Congressional approval. Therefore, this approval is a limitations placed on combatant commanders to prevent this from happening again.\textsuperscript{107} Southern Command published the updated U.S. Southern Command Pamphlet 0103-Organization and Functions Manual on June 15, 2012.\textsuperscript{108}

The new publication specifically addresses the ability to share information over the Internet. This addition is more attributable to the current times and less to the lessons learned in Haiti or Japan. What is lacking is the discussion of the establishment of a collaborative environment early on in the planning, be it for crisis or other contingency planning particularly in the standup of the joint interagency coordination group or as an assigned output of the joint assessment teams. Continued improvements in the 2011 publication focus on the understanding of the host nation and their interaction with the information technologies that exist today. Specifically once the Joint Task Force meets the conditions established by the lead agency and host nation, a requirement for FDR is the host nation receives the transfer of all the efforts. This paper will address further comparison with lessons learned from Haiti and Japan later.\textsuperscript{109}

The publication offers clearer definition of the lead agency in terms of roles and responsibility, with the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development identified in chapter four as the lead agency for disaster response. Further expanded in chapter four is the nesting of the combatant commander’s campaign plan to that of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan, Bureau Strategic and

\textsuperscript{107}House Armed Services Committee, 196.


\textsuperscript{109}Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations}, II-26–II-27.
Resource Performance Plans and Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. Of consideration and alluded to in the 2011 publication is that United States Agency for International Development and Department of State are not regionally aligned as the Combatant Command are aligned. The Joint Task Force should consider this when planning during disaster relief, as Foreign Policy Advisors for the combatant commander may only be a conduit for regional issues. Further complication will undoubtedly come from the United States Agency for International Development geographic bureaus being located in Washington D.C. and not in the specific geographic region of responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

The USG scale of operations to assist other nations or act in the strategic interest of the United States is independent of the complexity of that operation. In a globalized world where interaction between nations occurs through a variety of mediums, even small operations can have multiple actors that contribute. This contribution through interaction provides an opportunity for the USG to learn how its agencies act in the dynamic system of globalization. The USG finds itself consistently operating this system with its many interconnected and interdependent parts. The agencies that construct the USG systemic response will remain a significant actor within the global network of nations. Their coordinated efforts must be able to respond efficiently and rapidly to the demands of the nation, be it to influence a natural or man-made crisis. The executor from the DOD in this system is the joint task force and their foundation for action is joint doctrine.

There is relationship between doctrine and practice when “brought together in a single learning-cycle” provide the ability to increase knowledge as an “outcome of the subjective

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interpretation of human experience within given contexts.” The requirement stands that joint doctrine needs to accomplish this. By using the experiences of the joint force as a positive feedback loop based on the emergent lessons of those operations, DOD can codify concepts in doctrine that prevent a negative feedback loop; whereby joint forces operate from doctrine that forces the same lessons to be re-learned. This requirement to re-frame truly creates a learning organization and allows the DOD to contribute in a manner that saves lives, resources and effort. The missions in Haiti and Japan allowed this re-framing process to take place.

The Operations in Haiti and Japan undoubtedly informed both USG policy and doctrine. However, DOD missed some of the most important lessons learned in these unique disasters and at times, captured them incorrectly. There is a lack of attentiveness to ensure that the doctrine is consistent in examples and context of Unified Action. The new publication includes and should, many references and lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. These lessons include those from provincial reconstruction teams and other joint interorganizational operations. The lessons learned from Haiti and Japan should hold equal footing. For they represent the harder of the tasks where the integration of agencies and organizations outside of the DOD and USG are required on a moment’s notice. The opportunity for force build up or diplomacy to buy time does not exist with hundreds of thousands of lives in the balance. With the intent of doctrine to be the foundation of learning and application in planning, it is important that we retain the lessons of the wars that we are still fighting while maintaining the lessons from conflicts in the past. Each operation has its lessons that future generations can benefit from. Both the disasters that resulted in Operations Unified Response and Tomodachi are disasters at levels unseen since the evolution of joint doctrine under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As such, these operations provided an excellent opportunity to capture

\[\text{\textsuperscript{111}}\text{Ibid.}\]
lessons learned that might not be applicable for years at the scale the joint task forces operated. However, a joint task force can apply these lessons across all interorganizational operations regardless of the scope of the mission and could very well define the strategic future for both the organizations involved and the USG.

The opportunity to re-frame how the DOD sees itself interacting within the system of the USG and the whole of government approach is continuous. The DOD should not limit themselves to just FDR lessons from the 1990s, the *Global War on Terrorism* and the *Overseas Contingency Operations* that followed to improve its understanding of interorganizational operations. Foreign disaster relief gives the joint force an excellent medium to test interorganizational responsiveness to operate as a true joint force under the capstone concept of *Unified Action*. This is true for three reasons. First, the United States is a global leader with the ability to project power and influence can save lives and assist governments in foreign countries when they are most vulnerable. Second, the ability to project this power in an immediate fashion is only an advantage if the lead agency can coordinate these efforts in concert with the organizations that will influence the outcome of the operation. Lastly, FDR provides a platform for the DOD to have a strategic effect to influence other nations to the benefit of the USG.

*Operations Unified Response* and *Tomodachi*, when looked at from the outside were successful; the USG prevented loss of life and delivered historic levels of aid to two completely different countries. When looking inward, the DOD cannot miss the opportunity to prevent the mistakes that they and other organizations made. Disasters of this magnitude most likely will not occur in the immediate future and the lessons learned from these events are indeed unique. The DOD needs to codify them in doctrine before the lessons learned are lost to another generation of joint leaders.
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