Introduction:
Diversity of opinions and ideas is inherent to most societies and institutions and fringe ideas are those that depart significantly from prevailing or mainstream views. Depending on the “oppositional” nature of these outlier ideas, and the social organization, activity and influence of their adherents, culturally distinguishable fringe groups may be harbingers of disruption of the mainstream religious, cultural, social or political status quo. This project has examined the state-of-the-art understanding and research on social influence and how fringe ideas spread from one person or culture to another. Overall, it focused on the persuasive nature, influence and propagation of compelling ideas, the bases for group receptiveness and trust and the socio-cultural factors and dynamics critical to the formation and sustenance of fringe groups. Despite the theoretical and practical importance of understanding these issues, there remain a number of fundamental questions that need to be addressed

An informed perspective on the roles of influence and persuasion on the formation and sustainment of social fringe groups was developed based on interactions with a broad multi-disciplinary community of recognized thought leaders. Science project objectives for follow on research that can broaden the research base in support of US national defense were identified, developed and rationalized.

MOTIVATION AND GOALS OF THE PROJECT

The current project emerged as an outcome of a series of discussions about the best strategy for raising the cumulative “impact” of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research’s (AFOSR) research investment into socio-cultural modeling on our understanding of the collective behavior of groups, societies and cultures. An approach that AFOSR knew would yield high returns involved funding multi-disciplinary collaborations between computer and social scientists. Such multi-disciplinary collaborations seem to push at the boundaries of understanding and practice in complex socio-technical domains in novel and interesting ways. Hence, the notion emerged of
The goals were to develop an expert consensus on the fundamentals and dynamics underlying fringe group formation and sustainment, to identify leading researchable questions that push at the boundaries of understanding and practice and to formulate some disruptive (i.e., transformative) strategies for acquiring the needed data.

**Subject Terms**
Social Dynamics, sociocultural modeling, Psychology

**Security Classification of:**
- Report: unclassified
- Abstract: unclassified
- This Page: unclassified
organising an interdisciplinary workshop where international thought leaders could interact while being pressed to identify leading researchable questions that push at the boundaries of understanding and practice bearing on the problem of Social-Fringe Group Formation and Sustainment

The goals of the workshop were to develop an expert consensus on the fundamentals & dynamics underlying fringe group formation and sustainment, to identify leading researchable questions that push at the boundaries of understanding and practice and to formulate some disruptive (i.e., transformative) strategies for acquiring the needed data.

**Key Theoretical and Technical Challenges**

Based on a detailed review of the literature, we identified key theoretical and research questions and issues that could be used to challenge the workshop participants and provide a focus for ongoing discussions and subsequent products. These questions were binned into four categories that, in turn, provided the organizing framework for the workshop. These are organized and listed below.

- **On the nature of compelling “outlier” ideas**
  - What underlies “attractiveness” and “stickiness” of compelling fringe ideas?
  - What is the role of social-cultural context (e.g. religious, political, socio-economic, etc.)?
  - How do modes of representation and conveyance (e.g. rumor, propaganda, ideology, etc) promote influence, aid persuasiveness and engender trust of fringe ideas?
  - What enables some ideas to go viral?

- **On recruitment and fringe group formation**
  - What are the personality and social characteristics of adherents that increase their receptiveness to fringe ideas?
  - What are the life-cycle dynamics of fringe groups as they evolve and transform?
  - What is the role of “trust” in facilitating commitment and subordination to organized fringe group authority?

- **On commitment and sustainment of fringe groups**
  - What strategies and mechanisms do fringe groups use to re-new and maintain commitment to shared beliefs and values?
  - How are fringe group dynamics and resilience influenced by the nature of social linkages and organizational architectures?
  - What factors facilitate or enable broader social acceptance of some fringe ideas eventually bringing them into the mainstream?
• On methods & tools for study, analysis and prediction
  o What are the options and limitations of analytic, empirical and modeling approaches to characterizing, studying and understanding the propagation and influence of compelling ideas?
  o How can fundamental R&D in social sciences and anthropology provide value to understanding and predicting fringe group behavior?
  o How can social media be exploited as a tool for understanding the socio-cultural factors and dynamics critical to the formation and sustenance of fringe groups?
  o How can data from multiple approaches (e.g. field work, surveys, ethnographic, network, modeling, simulation and case study analyses) be “viably” integrated to support inferences about current, alternative or possible future states of fringe groups?

From Workshop to Participant Selection

Our broad strategy was to identify and assemble an inter-disciplinary group of expert researchers and practitioners across a spectrum of the domains pertinent to the nature and behavior of social fringe groups. The theoretical and technical challenges listed above were used to attract and solicit interest from “candidate” participants from whom the final workshop participants were selected.

Participants were selected so as to achieve a good mix of domain expertise, cultural perspectives, and sage thought-leaders vs. "Young Turks" in the final group to assure stimulating and productive interactions. Participants were selected from twelve countries (Australia, Egypt, India, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States). Table 1 lists the domains reflecting the disciplinary roots and affiliations of participants. Table 2 shows self-reported domains of current expertise and practice. Table 3 lists specific research areas in which participants were engaged during the timeframe of the workshop.
Table 1: Participant Disciplinary Roots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer Science (4)</td>
<td>Political Science (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Systems</td>
<td>Religious Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemistry/Biochemistry</td>
<td>Psychology, Clinical, Political, Cross-Cultural, Social, Quantitative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>Sociology: Cross-cultural (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Relations (2)</td>
<td>Communications (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Psychology (4)</td>
<td>Military Studies</td>
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<td>Anthropology (2)</td>
<td>Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cognitive Sciences</td>
<td>Life Sciences</td>
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<td>Industrial and Organizational psychology</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociology (3)</td>
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<td>Counseling Psychology</td>
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<td>Philosophy (3)</td>
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<td>Mathematics</td>
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<td>Human Factors (2)</td>
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<td>Civil Engineering</td>
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Table 2: Participant Domains of Expertise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychology, Sociology &amp; Human Factors</th>
<th>Political</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural cognition</td>
<td>Politics of Islam in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust, influence, organizational change</td>
<td>International relations, non-western historical legacies and rising powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust, trust in leaders, trust violations and trust repair</td>
<td>Muslim Politics and Social Movements Religion and Violence</td>
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<td>Negotiation, conflict, revenge, forgiveness</td>
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<td>Motivation and cognition of terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militancy, Insurgency and terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development, politics, middle class &amp; civil society, ethnicity</td>
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<td>Coalition formation</td>
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<td>Ostracism and social exclusion</td>
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<td>Social identity &amp; shared representations of history and ideologies</td>
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<td>Group &amp; intergroup dynamics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle class &amp; civil society, ethnicity</td>
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<td>Social Relations (Ethnic, religious, gender)</td>
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<td>Social Values &amp; Survey Research</td>
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<td>HCI &amp; Computer-Supported Coop Work</td>
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<td>Affective Design</td>
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<td>Modeling human behavior in disaster management</td>
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<td>Philosophical</td>
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<td>Social epistemology</td>
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<td>Philosophy of S&amp;T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conspiracy Theories &amp; Rumours</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computational:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Info systems &amp; web programming</td>
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<td>Web-scale info management</td>
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<td>Distributed data-intensive systems</td>
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<td>Computational Modeling</td>
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<td>Dissemination in Mobile Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social network methodologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treatment of former cultic group members &amp; their families</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemistry, Biochem, Life Sciences</td>
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</table>
Table 3a: Participant Research Interests

**IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES & INFLUENCE**
- How social perspectives, ideas, & beliefs become entrenched, perpetuated, and/or extinguished.
- How outlier ideas become influential and their impacts on social change.
- The nature of compelling ‘outlier’ ideas at the societal rather than small group level.
- Understanding the dominant beliefs and ideologies that propel groups towards radical ideas.
- Beliefs and ideologies that justify violence in the context of intergroup relations.
- The science of influence in terms of the cognitive, social, and behavioral mechanisms that drive influence effects.
- Attractiveness of “fringe” or extremist religious ideologies and why some diffuse rapidly or “go viral” and others have limited appeal.
- Social dimensions of knowledge.

**Culture**
- How people use information differently in different cultures to make sense of daily events in their attribution of causes and decision making.
- Cultural transmission of conflict and in particular how aspects of culture affect transmission of revenge across social networks and time.
- Understanding cultural group attitudes toward natural and human-induced disasters.

**Communications & Technology**
- Ethics of communication and problems arising from expert testimony, IT, and the media.
- How technology affords the transmission of ideas and how these can be computationally modeled.
- Interest in the influence of augmented reality technology on social networks and collaboration.

Table 3b: Participant Research Interests

**Political & Organizational**
- The role rumours play in the transmission of information about and from public institutions and whether such sources can be trusted.
- Informal trust networks within organizations.
- Determinants and consequences of trust in leaders.
- Focus on trust violations and trust repair e.g. how individuals react to violations and how leaders attempt to repair trust after a violation.
- How extremist groups strategically go mainstream by exploiting electoral & political processes.
- Uses of influence and persuasion in democratic governance & control of global terrorism.
- How shared social representations of history confer a warrant of legitimacy or historical entitlement that enables political fringe groups to thrive in different societies.
- Public policy that values the potential contributions to society of SFGs.

**Recruitment & Commitment**
- The psychology of radicalization, extremism and terrorism.
- How and why people form coalitions.
- Why normal as well as troubled people join deviant and abusive cultic groups, why they leave, and how they can re-orient themselves to mainstream society.
- Psychological and group dynamics of “Cultic groups” and their methods of control and manipulation of members.
- Psychology of deradicalization.
Participant Perspectives Surveyed

Just prior to the workshop, participants were surveyed as to what they viewed to be the key research challenges that might push our understanding of influence and persuasion in the formation and sustainment of social-fringe groups. The responses were detailed and they provide valuable insights into the views of participants prior to their interaction at the workshop. These survey findings are outlined below:

1. Ideas, Ideologies and Influence

   Nature:
   • How can we understand the degree to which an idea is genuinely ‘fringe’ and not simply a product of suppression in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian societies?
   • How are social belief systems formed and how do they become entrenched?
   • Can the causal power of ideas be measured and predicted?
**Power to influence:**
- What underlies the plausibility and power of rumors and fringe ideas among the SFGs in which they circulate?
- How do contemporary influence theories (such as Cialdini’s influence principles) hold up in a digital world? We need a science and supporting theories to support “socio-digital influence.”
- What are the precursors of social action arising from fringe ideas?
- When and how best can “out-of-kilter” belief systems be rebutted with minimal unintended consequences?
- What empowers highly influential humans in competitive environments and what are the means for sustaining or countering influence in a dynamic and changing world?
- Why do leaders in the “spotlight” of a trust violation typically adopt dysfunctional, self-destructive trust repair strategies, and what are alternative options?
- Elaborate a psychology of counter-persuasion

**Transmission:**
- What cultural issues affect the power of persuasion?
- How are ideas and memories that contribute to identity socially transmitted?
- What can be expected as a result of emerging technologies that change the nature of social interactions?
- How do inter-cultural communication processes and media between members and non-members of fringe groups influence the dissemination and acceptance of outlier ideas?
- Modeling the spatial and temporal constraints of social media on mass persuasion and community formation to better understand the bases of short-term local effects vs longer-term wide-area effects
2. Recruitment & Formation

Receptiveness:
- What factors determine which people are attracted to which fringe groups?
- What cultural issues affect the power of persuasion in recruitment & formation of SFGs?
- What are the needs and aspirations of people who are socially excluded and marginal?
- What types of messages appeal to marginalized members of societal groups?
- What goals are served by becoming a member of a SFG and can such goals be served by any other means?
- Given attraction to a particular SFG, what factors determine an individual’s movement toward affiliation or away from the group?
- What indicators might enable early detection of SFGs in a pre-influential stage of emergence?

Structure:
- What is an operational definition of “social-fringe groups” that clarifies boundary constraints and avoids bias?
- What are the dynamics and constraints wrt size, configuration, and level of formality of SFG associations?
- What is the social structure that best permits a fringe idea to be transmitted and to become accepted more widely?
- How does SFG structure interact with individual-level psychological predispositions?
- How does the SFG structure relate to the social structure that best disseminates the fringe idea?
- What are the social dynamics of information/affective diffusion within social-fringe groups

Communications:
• By what ways & means is information filtered, understood and transmitted among group members and across constituencies?

• How do inter-cultural communication processes and media between members and non-members of fringe groups influence the dissemination and acceptance of outlier ideas?

• How does a tool like the internet change the field of opportunities available for fringe group activity?

• What are the roles of social networking in the development, formation and sustainment of social-fringe groups?

• How does social media change the nature of group interaction or the speed of collective action?

• What kinds of people are susceptible to messages disseminated over social networks and to what extent is this culturally dependent?

• Understanding of the radical pathways” within educational institutions, cleric/spiritual leader-disciples relationships, or peer-group interactions by which young Islamic disciples are influenced and persuaded by radical ideology

• What are “mechanisms” and means by which the influence & persuasion of “hostile” SFGs may be countered?

3. **Commitment & Sustainment**

• What is an operational definition of “social-fringe groups” that clarifies boundary constraints and avoids bias?

**Cohesion:**

• What factors determine whether an individual will remain in or leave a group?

• What are the effects of individual motivation, group ideology, and group dynamics on “commitment”?

• What is the social structure that permits a fringe group to retain discipline and internal integrity and how do individual-level psychological factors relate to that structure?

• When and how best can “out-of-kilter” belief systems be rebutted reducing commitment to and sustainment of SFGs?
• What treatment and educational approaches can help fringe group leavers adjust to life in the mainstream?

Communications:
• What underlies the plausibility and power of rumors and fringe ideas that support commitment to and sustainment of SFGs?

• By what ways & means is information filtered, understood and transmitted among group members and across constituencies?

• How does social media change the field of opportunities available for commitment to and sustainment of SFGs?

• What are the roles of social networking in the development, formation and sustainment of SFGs?

Extremism:
• After individuals affiliate with a group, what factors determine whether or not they will be persuaded to behave in ways contrary to their pre-group values or to their self-interest?

• More specifically, what are the root causes and sources of militant ideology in radical Islamic movements?

4. Methods & Tools

Field Research:
• Data collection methodologies for field research in remote, limited access, high threat areas controlled by militant groups or in war zones

Models & Testbeds:
• Representing and reasoning about context and meaning in computational models

• Modeling SFG formation and growth from a dynamic network/trust perspective

• Development of deep structural syntactic models that move beyond semantic analysis of surface features of ideologies to a) distinguish between potentially violent and non-violent groups sharing similar doctrinal propositions and b) ID individuals and groups surreptitiously promoting violence without participating in it.

• Design of information systems that engage and veritably capture the contextual feelings, judgment and opinions of extremists
Analysis:

- Metrics to support early detection of fringe-groups at a pre-influential stage of emergence

- Reliable & valid metrics to support SFG research design and data interpretation?

- Individual and group-level measures & analyses to study the cultural cognition and dynamics of radicalization

- Identification of patterns of leadership and influence in fringe groups that are unorganized social movements

- Measuring and representing complex patterns of relationships among fringe and mainstream groups

- Measuring and representing how SFGs may appear different depending on the “issue of the day.”

- Computation-based detection and temporal analysis of the artifacts and evidence of influence and persuasion in massively-scaled socio-computational systems

Workshop Organization and Process

The Workshop took place in Kuching, Malaysia on the island of Sarawak during February 19-22, 2012. Table 4 shows the organizing framework of the Workshop. Participants were assigned to one of four working groups (Ideas, ideologies and influence, Recruitment and Formation, Commitment and Sustainment and Methods and Tools) each of which was focused on the key theoretical and technical challenges outlined earlier.

The workshop utilized a modified sandpit design where participants could easily mix and form productive relationships that could lead to new and novel insights. The members of the working groups were encouraged to self-organize and to narrow or broaden the stated challenges as necessary, in order to capitalize on the experience and perspectives of the group members. The four working groups progressed through a series of three working sessions over the course of three days. Session 1, the “Cognitive Mixer”, was a baselining exercise where group members could introduce themselves, present their perspectives, and build relationships. Session 2, “Innovative Challenges promoted divergent thinking and challenged the group to push past the limitations of current ideas, concepts and/or strategies in the domain. Session 3, “Research Priorities”, promoted convergent thinking and challenged the group to identify and describe R&D options likely to push the states-
of-the-art of understanding of influence and persuasion in the formation and sustainment of social-fringe groups. Following each working group session, all participants met in a plenary session to share and advance their ideas for going forward. The intent was to facilitate self-organization, energetize interactions and value outcomes. The next section represents selected insights that emerged from discussions in each of the working groups.

Table 4. Organizing Framework

**Workshop Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORKING GROUPS</th>
<th>IDEAS, IDEOLOGIES &amp; INFLUENCE</th>
<th>RECRUITMENT &amp; FORMATION</th>
<th>COMMITMENT &amp; SUSTAINMENT</th>
<th>METHODS &amp; TOOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Session #1: COGNITIVE MIXER <em>(Baseline)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Session #2: INNOVATIVE CHALLENGES <em>(Divergent)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Session #3: RESEARCH PRIORITIES <em>(Convergent)</em></td>
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**Key Rule of Engagement: Self-Organization**

**WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS**
All work groups agreed that the study of the behavior and dynamics of social fringe groups (SFGs) is important. SFGs are a pervasive social phenomenon that induces negative and positive societal change. The promotion of an open civil society necessitates the balanced management of inclusiveness and tolerance. The challenge is in achieving this openness without undermining it. Hence, the question of how an open society can both protect itself and allow room for alternative visions of civil society. Dynamism in Society often comes from the fringes, so a better understanding of effective constructive policies that enable benevolent social change and avoid disruptive/destructive actions is needed.

**Ideas, ideologies and influence**
The work group agreed on a working definition for “fringe ideas” as those that challenge the mainstream, are identity-based, demonstrate a tension between “universal”/common features, and are relative and context-specific with respect to time/place and minority/majority relations. “Universals” may involve struggle (i.e., intellectual, political, violent), are persistence and need to be anchored and reinforced, even if only through everyday practices. How a given ideology influences the success or failure of a fringe group in most certainly context dependent. One Hypothesis suggested is that those Ideologies anchored in notions of shared values and collective memories are likely to have wider appeal than novel, alien, or futuristic ideas. Hence, the emergence of some ideological SFGs is likely primed by specific historical circumstances. The relationship between fringe ideas and social movements needs further study. For example, there is a complex role of identity present in all fringe ideas motivated by grievance or opportunity affordances. Their acceptance and promotion involves social risks though some of these ideas may eventually move into the mainstream as they acquire adherents. For fringe ideas to succeed they need to be affirmed and repeated and the lifecycle of fringe ideas likely involves repeated activations, deactivations and reactivations.

**Recruitment and Formation**
SFGs were characterized as those collectives that challenge the mainstream with their desire to impose change. This often entails representing something offensive or intolerable within the mainstream that may lead to actions of consequence or conflicts. Fringe groups have leaders, structures, engage in recruitment, development, strategy and tactics, and are operationally concerned with sustaining their membership and their trust in core values of the group. SFGs vary in available resources and sophistication in their use of rumor and propaganda distributed by word of mouth, print and digital media. Influence tools and methods useful for organizing and recruiting are commonly available on the internet. Some evidence exists that financial backing of some SFGs is provided by external agencies that stand to benefit from destabilization of the mainstream.

**Commitment and Sustainment**
By definition, SFGs connote a degree of deviancy from the mainstream. This deviation may be narrowly-centered on some religious, political, cultic, cultural beliefs but be otherwise consistent with other cultural norms. Commitment to a given SFG is characterized by some demands on time and a sense of exclusivity of membership and enlightenment reinforced by a) interactions with gurus and mentors, b) obligations and duties, investment of self and/or other resources, sacrifice and commitment through rituals. Sustainment involves maintaining individual and group commitment over time and maintaining/defending the core ideas, beliefs and values of the movement. It includes boundary control (i.e., proselytizing versus defending); implied cost-benefits analysis where benefits are equal to status, significance and social connectedness, whereas cost are equal to loss of autonomy and/or loss of options. Exit costs (e.g., ostracism, personal danger, supernatural fears) must be kept high whereas exit benefits (reconnecting and reclaiming lost options) must be perceived as low. Other issues for sustainment are defection, succession of leadership, and group splintering and ideological schisms of beliefs and values (i.e, the maintenance versus breakdown of “Warrants of Legitimacy”).

The social structure of SFGs is adaptive in ways that can enable sustainment in competitive, non-receptive, or antagonistic environments. For example, social structures may be centralized versus diffuse (e.g., hierarchical vs. distributed/flat); and may include succession plans in the event of leadership removal or decapitation. Last, the extent to which institutional channels can invite or suppress fringe group behavior is likely dependent on the contextual public trust in institutions.

Methods and Tools
Improved methods and tools are needed to aid the empirical study and analysis of the behavior and dynamics of SFGs. Key challenges to research noted include standard field research methods pertinent to SFGs particularly in dangerous contexts, common data coding systems, missing data, data accuracy and reliability and the need for integration of methods from different disciplines such as a meta-language (i.e., that establishes a common vocabulary that translates across case studies or applications).

Numerous constructs for which data and methods standards are needed include dynamic networks, trust, feelings, judgment and opinions, pre-influential stage of emergence, cultural cognition, radicalization (i.e., dynamics), leadership and influence (i.e., identification of patterns), influence and persuasion. Some candidate methods for application to the study and analysis of SFGs were discussed by the WG. These included deep structural syntactic models, network pattern analysis including event stream analysis and temporal analysis, automated scene analysis, lexical analysis, discourse analysis, sentiment analysis and approaches to embedding these in computational models capable of processing heterogeneous sources of data.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The pre-workshop survey responses and the results of the working group discussions suggest some overarching observations. First, different disciplines have different perspectives and people involved with real world problems have rather different views from theoreticians addressing abstractions and/or simplifications of reality. It is very difficult to approach the full reality of complex socio-technical systems with a purely axiomatic approach.

Despite these differences – or perhaps due to these differences -- creative insights and ideas emerged from synergies across varying perspectives. Nowhere was this more evident than when groups having disparate perspectives attempted to develop an integrated formulation of a research problem and a recommended approach to this research. An outline follows of the research proposals developed at the workshop.

Ideological Responsiveness of Fringe Groups to Individual Motivations

This research is centered on building an understanding of (1) what kind of ideologies are appealing to whom and what is the motivation basis of their appeal? (2) Determining whether ideology matters as basis of political action and (3) Determining what makes a given ideology effective and (4) How likely are different individuals to live up to ideological requirements? To address these issues data will be collected and analyzed to determine (a) The collective resonance of the ideology. i.e., its anchorage in cherished values and collective memories; (b) The individual resonance of the ideology. i.e., responsiveness to individuals’ needs and motivations; (c) The capacity of the ideology to motivate action. (d) Ways of imparting ideology in terms of communication and persuasion (i.e., implicit and explicit techniques). (e) The content and structure of ideology, in terms of content, rigidity of its boundaries, and how tightly coupled specific beliefs are and how they are embodied in social practice. The approach will employ a combination of top-down ad bottom-up approaches. Specifically, a broad set of propositions will be developed that are lower level components that can be configured within ideological systems of meaning and a taxonomy of Islamic ideologies that incorporates both textual and live sources will be devised. The degree of match or discrepancy between textual and lived ideologies/ propositions will suggest testable hypotheses regarding match and mismatch (e.g., commitment & sustainment, relative deprivation, hidden agendas, etc.) and should illuminate the relationship of different institutional modalities or domains for the expression of ideology and ideologically driven behavior.

The actual data collection will include (a) translation and content analysis of texts (including video, web search, computerized linguistic analysis, parliamentary debates, policy statements); (b) Identifying collaborative and negotiable elements versus rigid and incommensurable elements; (c) Structured Interviews; (d) Personality Profiles; (d) Ethnographic observations; (e) Quantitative Surveys; (f) Developing simple propositional statements representing different ideologies and fringe groups from the content analyses;
(g) Persuasion & Counter-persuasion Experiments in different Contexts. The data obtained through these techniques will be analyzed via “Multi-level Network Analysis” to investigate the inter-relational between fringe groups and ideology, identify relations between different fringe groups (level 1), Identify relations between ideological elements (level 2) and to identify cross-level relations between fringe groups and ideological elements (both textual and lived).

Understanding the Nature and Dynamics of Social Fringe Groups: The Basis for a Unified Fringe Psychology

There is a great need to understand the commonalities among different fringe groups from different domains and across time (e.g., scientific fringe groups, terrorist groups, social movements such Eugenics, Nazism, etc.). A model of universal types of variables that underlie the emergence and sustainment of SFGs needs to be developed. This would likely include some characterization of enabling conditions (e.g., crisis, void, great societal uncertainty, deprivation, etc.), whether core ideologies have their basis in extant societal and historical discourse, the nature of the group and its available resources (is the group identity based or not?), the societal mainstream ideology against which the fringe group is contrasted and how strong is it, and societal mainstream resources that can be brought against the fringe groups. Construction of such an integrative understanding of fringe groups would require a theoretical integration based on multiple disciplines that help to identify through a top down fashion the types of variables that need to be coded in cases. A large comparative case study (over 100+ cases) would be needed in order to identify the dimensions on which the cases vary. These cases would be coded and then sorted into categories for their underlying dimensions using such techniques as MDS.

Once this is accomplished, it would then be possible to be able to examine the trajectory of fringe groups based on particular characteristics. For example, we theorize based on dynamical systems theory that fringe groups that are born in crisis and tremendous societal uncertainty and that have very large material resources and an idea that has historical basis in societal discourse and that started with a fringe idea that was only moderately different than the mainstream would have large success. Other life cycles could be identified through MDS that took much longer to take hold and the conditions that characterized their groups. This technique could also be used to predict the lifecycle of fringe groups in the future given their situational conditions.

Understanding Hackers & Crackers

Computer hackers are individuals who exploit computer weaknesses motivated by a multitude of reasons, such as profit, protest, or challenge. Types of hackers include “White hats” (i.e., people who claim to be “good” hackers) and “Black hats” (i.e., evil hackers or “crackers”. The Problem is how can we understand (a) the behaviors of IT-hackers and crackers; (b) Dynamics aspects of their communications (e.g., Information
flow, Information dissemination, etc.) and (c) conditions enabling the formation of the fringe group. The importance of this problem is lined to threats to privacy and security. It is proposed that data on the behavior, attitudes, motivations, communication styles of hackers and crackers be collected by structured interviews and that based on this a simulation test-bed be developed on which simulated and real hacker/cracker networks could be systematically studied.

Reconfiguring the Nation: Contesting History and Identity in a Globalizing World

In a globalizing world where access to information has proliferated, we are increasingly bearing witness to heated contests over national identity and trajectories in non-Western nation-states whose nation-building projects are often less than a century old. These debates, though divergent in substance due to the unique context in each country, display striking similarities such as revisionists’ invocation of historical legacies, both real and imagined, to legitimize their attempts to reconfigure national identities and trajectories. The goal of this project emanates from the insight that by comparing the structure of these debates, the strategies and tactics employed, and patterns of coalition-building and shifting across what are substantively extremely divergent cases we can generate building blocks for theorizing contests over national identity in the ‘second wave’ of nation-building in the non-West. Several national cases for “Process-Tracing” and “Inductive Theorizing” are proposed: Turkey; Indonesia (Jojakarta); New Zealand. This research could, in turn, provide the basic theoretical framework for a subsequent large-N study (e.g India, Brazil, Iran, China, Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Mexico, S. Korea).

Study of Social Fringe Group Formation Processes: Crystallization vs. Transformation

This proposes to use case study analysis to characterise SFG formation processes. The first step is to build a representative/near-exhaustive sample/catalogue of international SFGs which use judgments by expert raters to track existing groups moving to the fringe and to detect and identify new crystallizing groups that are still forming identities. Criteria for classification will include both qualitative and quantitative estimates of relative frequency of crystallization versus degeneration processes and estimates of mainstream support (e.g., through bankrolling of small groups). Social fringe groups operate under (perceived) threat (i.e., awareness of being seen as posing a challenge to the mainstream). Several Lab-based group formation studies, under simulated conditions of majority threat are proposed leveraging on pre-existing identities (e.g., groups from rival universities put under pressure to self-organize).

• Studying recruitment
  – Methodological assumption: Continuity between (clear) mainstream, ‘less mainstream’, periphery, special-interest, and fringe groups
• Testing assumptions and mechanisms by studying more accessible groups (rather than most extreme – and l Questionnaire/survey-based, causal models, qualitative analysis, field experiments, lab-based approach

• Field experiments by tracking members of actual fringe (or peripheral) groups, and their beliefs:

• Study contrast between ‘crystallized’ and ‘transformed’ groups

• Meta-analysis of case studies

• east accessible – cases)

– Hypotheses (1)

• Compare different social, political, historical contexts, ‘real-world’ experiments (e.g., post-Arab spring countries, Iraq, U.S.)

• Context rather than actual diachronic studies

• Look at distribution between transformed and crystallized groups

  • Societies with democratic/pluralistic traditions may have same number of fringe groups, but more transformed groups;

  • By contrast, (post-)totalitarian societies may have relatively more crystallized fringe groups (although not necessarily more FGs in total

– Hypotheses (2)

• Difference in magnitude, type and processes of polarization?

  • Transformative FGs have a history of polarization
  
  Crystallized FGs start off by bringing together members with fairly homogeneous off-mainstream views

– Challenges

• Cataloguing of (existing) fringe groups for purposes of expert rating seems feasible

• Making case studies commensurable, using simple metrics

• Lab studies: Premised on validity of the binary classification of FGs

• Tracking members (and their beliefs) over time, in field experiments: difficult
APPENDIX A: Program Agenda

Interdisciplinary Workshop on
Influence and Persuasion in the Formation and Sustainment of Social-Fringe Groups

Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia
19-22 February 2012

SUNDAY, 19 February 2012

14.00 Main Registration (Secretariat room, Mendu room)

MONDAY, 20 February 2012

07.45 Late comer Registration (Secretariat room)
08.00 Welcome by Halimahtun Khalid (Ballroom III)
08.15 Workshop (WS) Introduction & Objectives by Kenneth Boff
08.45 Self-Introductions
10.00 Break
10.15 Presentation: From Mainstream to Radical Fringe: How Ordinary People Become Terrorists by Arie Kruglanski
11.00 Presentation: Rumour, Gossip, and Conspiracy Theories: Communicative Pathologies or Cases of Epistemic Dependence? by Axel Gelfert
11.45 Working Group (WG) Organization
12.15 Lunch Break
13.30 Presentation: From indigenous rights to Estonian street riots to Islamic terrorism: Representations of history and religious ideology as warrants of legitimacy for fringe groups by James Liu
14.15 WG Session (1): Cognitive mixer exercise: Perspectives and positions on provocative issues
15.30 Working Break
16.15 WG Reports and Plenary Discussion (Ballroom III)
19:00 Social Networking: Workshop Dinner (MV Equatorial, Kuching Waterfront)
22.00 End of Day 1

TUESDAY, 21 February 2012

08.30 Presentation: From Periphery to Centre: The Rise of 'Ottomanism' in Contemporary Turkey by Nora Fisher Onar
09.15 WG Session (2) Transformative Concepts: (Divergent Thinking)
10.30 Working Break
10.45 WG Session (2) continued
11.30 WG Reports and Plenary Discussion (Ballroom III)
12.30 Strategic Pause
13.00 Lunch Break
14.30 Technical Tour (Sarawak Cultural Village)
18.30 Social Networking: Tour Dinner (Buntal Village)
22.00 End of Day 2

**WEDNESDAY, 22 February 2012**

08.30 Presentation: *Beliefs, Ideologies and Support for Political Violence* by Purnima Singh
09.15 WG Session (3) Research Challenges
10.30 Working Break
11.30 WG Reports and Plenary Discussion (Ballroom III)
12.30 Break
13.30 Presentation: *Modeling Fringe Groups in Muslim Societies: Indonesian Examples* by Mark Woodward
14.15 Discussion: Directions for Future Research
15.30 Break
16.00 Options and Opportunities for Next Steps
17.00 CLOSING REMARKS
APPENDIX A: Key Presentations

1. From Mainstream to Radical Fringe: How Ordinary People Become Terrorists by Arie Kruglanski

2. Rumour, Gossip, and Conspiracy Theories: Communicative Pathologies or Cases of Epistemic Dependence? by Axel Gelfert

3. From indigenous rights to Estonian street riots to Islamic terrorism: Representations of history and religious ideology as warrants of legitimacy for fringe groups by James Liu

4. From Periphery to Centre: The Rise of 'Ottomanism' in Contemporary Turkey by Nora Fisher Onar

5. Beliefs, Ideologies and Support for Political Violence by Purnima Singh (Omitted)

6. Modeling Fringe Groups in Muslim Societies: Indonesian Examples by Mark Woodward
FROM MAINSTREAM TO RADICAL FRINGE: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE BECOME TERRORISTS

Arie W. Kruglanski + Michele Gelfand
University of Maryland

A PLAY IN THREE ACTS

❖ ACT I: A Conception of Fringe Phenomena
❖ ACT II: A Theory of “Fringing” (Radicalization)
❖ ACT III: Empirical Support for the Theory
ACT I: A CONCEPTION OF FRINGE PHENOMENA

- Fringe = Periphery, Deviation from Center
- Pertains to Deviant Views and Actions
- Relative View of Deviancy: Point of Reference Problem
- The Asch Conformity Study: Insight into Fringe Phenomena

ACT I: A CONCEPTION OF FRINGE PHENOMENA

- How to maintain fringe beliefs in face of majority opposition?
- 75% of conformity (at least on one trial) against unanimous majority
- Drop to 5-10% in presence of an ally
- Fringe views and actions require group support
ACT II: HOW DO ORDINARY PEOPLE BECOME TERRORISTS? A THEORY OF RADICALIZATION

- Actions (but also Beliefs!) are Motivated: They are Goal Driven
- Action and Beliefs are means to Some Goals: They are Motivated
- What Goals are Served by Radical (Fringe) Beliefs?
- In What Sense are Radical Beliefs Means to Those Goals?

WHAT GOALS ARE SERVED BY TERRORISM JUSTIFYING BELIEFS: WHAT MOTIVATES THE TERRORISTS

- A Laundry-List of Motivations: Honor, Trauma, Religion, Humiliation, Stigma, Feminism, Perks of Paradise
- A Deeper Level Goal: The quest for Significance
- Prior psychological notions (effectance, competence, mastery, achievement, control)
- Attainment of what the group culture says is worth attaining
Awakening the Quest for Significance

- Significance Loss
- Threat of Loss
- Opportunity for Significance Gain

Significance Loss

- Personal Conflict-Related (loss of loved ones in enemy hands, rejection, humiliation.
- Personal Conflict-Unrelated (deviation from group norms, failure to live up to expectations)
- Social Identity Related
Group Grievance and Humiliation: A Tool in Al-Qaeda Propaganda

“Jihad in Algeria today is YOUR hope with permission from Allah in redemption from the hell of the unjust ruling regimes whose prisons are congested with YOUR youths and children if not with YOUR women; [regime] which thrust its armies, police, and intelligence to oppress YOU, for which they opened the doors to punish YOU.. So join YOUR efforts to theirs, add YOUR energies to theirs... and know that their victory is YOUR victory.. Their salvation is YOUR salvation.”

Threat of Significance loss (the Japanese Kamikaze)
THREAT OF SIGNIFICANCE LOSS (THE JAPANESE KAMIKAZE)

• “I find it so hard to leave you behind... I want to be held in your arms and sleep... [yet] All men born in Japan are destined to die fighting for the country. You have done a splendid job raising me to become a honorable man.” Hayashi Ichizo, tokkotai pilot, died in mission on February 22, 1945

SIGNIFICANCE GAIN

• “self anointed individuals with larger than life callings and with insatiable urge to use catastrophic attacks.. to write a new chapter in history” (Sprinzak, 2001)
SOCIALIZATION INTO MARTYRDOM (SIGNIFICANCE GAIN):

- Hizballah’s “Imam al-Mahdi Scouts, range in age from 8-16, number in the tens of thousands, and are indoctrinated with the ideology of radical Iranian Islam.

- According to Ruz al Yusuf the objective is:
  “to train high caliber Islamic generation of children who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah (awlad istishhadiyyun).”

Socialization into martyrdom (significance gain):

Hezbollah scouts wearing uniforms and carrying plastic rifles in a parade on the anniversary of the outbreak of the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada (Mohamed Azakir/Reuters, September 27, 2002)
Terrorist Ideology as Means Provider (suggests that terrorism is means to great significance boost)

- grievance
- culprit (the enemy responsible for the grievance)
- method (terrorism)
- Ideology provides the “rhyme and reason” for terrorism
- Portrays terrorism as means to significance

The Road to Terrorism: A Trajectory from Quest Arousal to Support for Martyrdom

- Goal Awakening
- Search for means in collective ideology (collectivistic shift)
- Empowerment effect, Sacrifice effect
ACT III: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

STUDY 1: PERSONAL FAILURE AND COLLECTIVISM

- Survey with representative samples from Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan
- Participants rate the extent to which they had experienced personal success in their lives
- Participants select whether they identify primarily as members of their nation, their religion or as individuals (items embedded in a large unrelated survey)
STUDY 2

- Participants completed a language test (said to be a good predictor of future academic and career success)
- They received success or failure feedback
Participants in Failure Condition scored higher on the interdependence scale than participants in the Success condition.

Participants in interdependent condition scored significantly lower on scale of death anxiety than participants in the independent condition.
Participants in the failure condition scored higher on the interdependence scale and lower on the independence scale.

**STUDY 4**

- Participants randomly assigned to one of two conditions and asked to circle pronouns in an essay (procedure fashioned after Brewer and Gardner, 1996).
- Participants in the independent condition circled personal pronouns (e.g., I, me, my).
- Participants in the interdependent condition circled interpersonal pronouns (e.g., we, us, ours).
- Participants completed a self report scale of death anxiety (Templer, 1970).
Ps in the interdependent condition “approach” death related words more quickly, and “avoid” them more slowly than participants in the independent condition.

FIGURE 5

StUDY 6: COLLECTIVISM AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

- Internet survey in 12 Arab Countries, Pakistan and Indonesia
- Ps asked if they identify primarily as members of their (a) nation, (b) religion, (c) as individuals
- Ps asked four questions concerning their support for violence against civilian citizens from the United States and Europe.
Participants who primarily identify as members of nation or religion more likely to support terrorism than participants who identify as individuals.

Participants who support collectivistic (religious or national) goals support terrorism more than participants who support individualistic goals for their children**.
STUDY 8

- 96 male participants (age = 19.39) were recruited for a Study on Religion and Modern Issues.
- Ps completed the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Religion Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967).
- Then, Ps were randomly assigned to one of two perceptual tasks:
  1) neutral images
  2) sexual images
FIGURE 8: SEXUAL GUILT ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS (N = 96)

- Low Intrinsic Religious Motivation
- High Intrinsic Religious Motivation

FIGURE 9: SUPPORT FOR MARTYRDOM ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS (N = 96)

- Low Intrinsic Religious Motivation
- High Intrinsic Religious Motivation
CONCLUSION

- Fringe Groups Form Around Deviant Ideas with Action Implications
- Such Ideas and Actions are Means to Individuals’ Goals
- A Pre-Eminent Goal of Members of Fringe Groups is to Restore, Maintain, or Augment Their Sense of Personal Significance.
Rumour, Gossip, & Co.: Communicative Pathologies or Cases of Epistemic Dependence?

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

20 FEBRUARY 2012
KUCHING, SARAWAK

Social Epistemology

- Departure from classical (individualist) epistemology
Social Epistemology

‘Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information. There is little consensus, however, on what the term “knowledge” comprehends, what is the scope of the “social”, or what the style or purpose of the study should be.’

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

- The *testimony* of others is a social source of knowledge: direct reliance on others

Indirect epistemic dependence

- Dependence on the **coverage-reliability** of one’s social environment
  - Embedded in epistemic routines: Subscribing to newspapers, checking trusted online news sources, relying on friends and colleagues for updates on ongoing developments
  - Success depends on coverage-reliability of one’s community
  - ‘...our dependence on others for what we know and justifiably believe outstrips our reliance on their testimony.’ (Goldberg 2010)
Beliefs and ‘coverage-support’

- Beliefs may be underwritten by simple reliance on one’s social environment: ‘coverage-supported beliefs’

Coverage heuristic

‘If things were different from what I believe them to be, I would have heard about it by now.’

- Epistemic value of the coverage heuristic depends crucially on prevalent conditions in the subject’s social environment
- Failure of coverage-reliability: disrupted pathways of communication, extreme bias or polarization
‘Pathologies of testimony’

- Communicative practices – rumour, gossip, & co. – which look like testimony, yet which invite moral and epistemic suspicion (Coady 2006)
  - Assumption: Underlying the institution of testimony are norms of assertion
- Harmless example: Small talk (norms of truth-telling and relevance are partly suspended)
- Rumour and gossip: Typically presented as true

The received view on rumours

Immanuel Kant

‘The intentional spreading of something that detracts from another’s honour – even if what is said is true – diminishes respect for humanity.’ (italics added)
The received view on rumours

Immanuel Kant

‘The intentional spreading of something that detracts from another’s honour – even if what is said is true – diminishes respect for humanity.’ (italics added)

An observer of U.S. American political life

‘So many absurd and contradictory things are said that it becomes necessary to renounce any opinion founded on rumors and admit only that which is approved by the strictest good sense and the most rigorous moderation.’

The received view on rumours

Immanuel Kant

‘The intentional spreading of something that detracts from another’s honour – even if what is said is true – diminishes respect for humanity.’ (italics added)

Louis Moreau Gottschalk, pianist (1862)

‘So many absurd and contradictory things are said that it becomes necessary to renounce an opinion founded on rumors and admit only that which is approved by the strictest good sense and the most rigorous moderation.’
Defining ‘rumour’ (1)

- Whereas ‘the basis of gossip may or may not be a known fact, the basis of rumor is always unsubstantiated.’ (Rosnow & Fine 1976)
- A rumour is ‘a specific (or topical) proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence being present.’ (Allport & Postman 1947)
- But:
  - ‘unsubstantiated’ ≠ ‘unreliable’
  - ‘absence of secure standards in general’ ≠ ‘no basis in fact in a specific case’
Defining ‘rumour’ (2)

Rumour is hearsay that is ostensibly propagated and presented as informative – whether explicitly as hearsay or not – and that cannot presently be verified, or refuted, by independent sources.

The reliability of rumours

- What percentage of rumours are true?
  - 16.2% (study using data from a phone hotline during a campus strike)
  - nil % (Sinha 1952, Prasad 1935) – negligible
  - 43% (Financial rumours, as reported in WSJ’s ‘Heard on the Street’ column)
  - 80% (Studies in established organizational settings; Davis 1972, Marting 1969, Rudolph 1973, Walton 1961)
  - >90% (Study of workplace rumours; DiFonzo & Bordia 2007)

- Theodore Caplow (Study of World War II rumours):
  ‘Every major operation, change of station, and important administrative change was accurately reported by rumor before any official announcement had been made.’
Variability and filtering

- Two kinds of reliability
  - (1) Reliability as a measure of truth content of a rumour
  - (2) Reliability of the transmission process
    Possibility of error in transmission may corrupt content.
Variability and filtering

- Two kinds of reliability
  - (1) Reliability as a measure of *truth content* of a rumour
  - (2) Reliability of the transmission process
    Possibility of error in transmission *may corrupt* content.

- But: Possibility of filtering
  ‘If you hear a rumour, it is not only *prima facie* evidence that it has been thought plausible by a large number of people, it is also *prima facie* evidence that it has been thought plausible by a large number of reliable people. And that really is *prima facie* evidence that it is true.’ (David Coady 2006)

Affective factors and informational cascades

- Cass Sunstein et al.
  ‘An informational cascade occurs when people with incomplete personal information on a particular matter base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others.’
  \[ \Rightarrow \text{Unwarranted amplification} \]

- Other sources of unwarranted amplification
  - Source credibility bias: Equating strength of belief with credibility of the source
  - NB: polarization!
Group sense-making

- Tamotsu Shibutani (Improvised News, 1966):
  Rumour is ‘a recurrent form of communication through which men caught together in an ambiguous situation attempt to construct a meaningful interpretation of it by pooling their intellectual resources.’

A Malaysian example (December 2012)

The ‘oily man’ strikes fear

The supernatural phenomenon purportedly terrorising Kampung Laksamana in Gombak has rallied the residents to stand together in defence of the young girls in their community.
It was crawling up the stairs of the house, just like Spiderman. When it reached the top it suddenly jumped onto the roof. I don’t think a human could do that.

— P. MOHAN

Zaki then takes out his phone to show photos of his Almi. He also shows his bow. One of his dogs is now howling nearby.

The Sunday Star, 1 January 2012
Sense-making vs. the pursuit of coverage (1)

- Sense-making driven by affective factors, known to detract from reliability
  - Also: Often in the form of urban legends (cf. orang minyak)

Better model: Shibutani’s *Improvised News*

‘Unsatisfied demand for news – the discrepancy between information needed to come to terms with a changing environment and what is provided by formal news channels – constitutes the crucial condition of rumor formation.’

- But goes on to relate rumours to states of ‘collective emotional excitement’...
Sense-making vs. the pursuit of coverage (2)

- Rather than highlight social tensions and affective factors, acknowledge that in information-deprived social environments with little coverage-reliability, rumours may transmit information that could not otherwise be had.
  - Rumour becomes an expression of a wider phenomenon of epistemic dependence.

The dual role of rumour

- (1) Rumours address an informational (not necessarily emotional) need of a community.

- (2) For the (external) analyst of rumour, the presence of rumours can serve as a diagnostic tool for the perceived lack of coverage reliability – and, by extension, lack of trust in public sources of information – in a community.
From Indigenous rights to Estonian street riots to Islamic terrorism: Representations of history, Social Contracts and Religious Ideology as Warrants of Legitimacy

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Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research
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Warrants of Legitimacy for Society

- German political philosopher Dolf Sternberger writes: “Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”

- Legitimacy is both the ultimate and the most human form of power because it derives from consent and a sense of moral rectitude. Therefore it does not require excessive monitoring. It is self monitoring.

- Legitimacy is the basis of hegemony as distinct from tyranny. Critics describe it as “Manufacturing Consent”
“The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place.”

Confucian Warrant of Legitimacy:

- History/Tradition
  - Conservative
  - Sacred Ritual that does not speak of the Gods but derives from them and It (Heaven)

- Religion
  - Ritual observances rather than theology
  - Confucian Ethics (relational) and Morality
“Hear, Israel, the decrees and laws I declare in your hearing today. Learn them and be sure to follow them. The LORD our God made a covenant with us...It was not with our ancestors that the LORD made this covenant, but with us, with all of us who are alive here today.”

Biblical Warrant of Legitimacy

- Religion
  - as the Word of God
  - for Jews, treated as and debated as law
  - for Christians, add salvation theology of the New Testament

- Social Contract
  - between God and his people

To understand political power aright, and derive from it its origin, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man...For in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom.

Liberalism’s (& Locke’s) Warrant of Legitimacy:

- Social Contract Theory
  - Rule by Law & by Reason

- Religion or History Not Required
  - Belief in Universal Human Rights
  - Derived from the European Enlightenment
Functions of the Warrants

- History: Dynamic Continuity
- Religion: Bounded Moral Community
- Social Contract: Negotiated Process Anchors

Three Warrants of Legitimacy

- **History/Tradition**: Why is this so? Because our forefathers made it so. We were here first.
- **Religion**: Why is this so? Because God/the Gods made it so. God(s) ordered it so.
- **Social Contract Theory**: Why is this so? Because we reasoned it to be for the best of all of us. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.
- 4th Basic Warrant: Genealogy (Monarchy)
- 5th: Science
- I claim these are the ultimate and most human bases of power, and constrain or facilitate the rise and fall of fringe groups in society vs. the mainstream (Representational Content)
Relative Deprivation & Social Identity Theory Process Model Predictions

Defined as “the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities”.

Crosby (1976) specified that the availability and feasibility of alternative outcomes coupled with a feeling of entitlement to, and lack of self-blame for failing to obtain desired outcomes were necessary and sufficient for the experience of relative deprivation. She subsequently reasoned that among these, a sense of entitlement was most essential.

Tajfel & Turner (1979) concur that the perceived stability and legitimacy of the social system are the preconditions for preventing social competition between groups.

► Fuelled by Inequality and made by Social Comparison

Theoretical Model for Warranting Societal Legitimacy

![Diagram of the theoretical model]

- **Process:** Structural/Group-Based Inequality → Relative Deprivation → Warrants of Legitimacy
- **Content:** History, Religion, Social Contract
- **Power inside and outside Society:**
  - Structural/Group-Based Inequality
  - Relative Deprivation
  - Warrants of Legitimacy
- **Political Protest & Institutional Change:**
  - Institutional Channels & Actions
  - Political Protest & Institutional Change
  - Incarceration/Crime
Three Case Studies

Case 1: The Indigenous (Māori) post-colonial protest movement in New Zealand

Alternative & overlapping warrants of legitimacy in NZ from History and from a Liberal Social Contract provide alternative & overlapping visions for society within a set of British liberal institutions.

10 MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN NEW ZEALAND HISTORY

ACCORDING TO GENERAL SAMPLE OF MAORI AND PAKEHA/NZ EUROPEANS (Liu, Wilson, McClure & Higgins, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maori (N=37)</th>
<th>Pakeha (N=94)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Treaty of Waitangi</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Land Wars</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3= Maori/Polynesian Arrival</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3= European Arrival</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3= World Wars</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Suffrage</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Colonisation</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8= Education Act passed providing free education.</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8= NZ became independent state.</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8= Musket Wars between Tribes</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8= NZ Government formed</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How well have Maori and Pakeha/NZ Europeans honoured the Treaty of Waitangi?
Implicit Associations with Symbols of National Identity

At the symbolic level (IAT), Maori and Pakeha are BOTH part of the national identity.
NZ accommodation between History and the Liberal Social Contract: Symbolic but not Resource-Based Equality for Maori

NZ has a set of adaptations to manage the fundamental inequalities between settler and indigenous society that are impressive, but still less than ideal.

If NZers are all so equal in principle, how is it that Maori form 16% of the total population and 50% of the prison population? How is it that Maori die 8 years younger than the NZ average?

Symbolic Accommodation: Support for Biculturalism in Principle (4.9/7)

- Maori language should be taught in all New Zealand schools
- The New Zealand national anthem should be sung in both Maori and English.
- New Zealand should be known and seen as a bicultural society, reflecting an equal partnership between Maori and Pakeha.
- If New Zealand were to change to a republic, then the Treaty of Waitangi should be used as a foundation for our constitution.
- New Zealand should embrace it’s cultural diversity.
More Support for Liberal Social Contract of Equality & Opposition to Resource-Based Biculturalism (5.7/7)

- We are all New Zealanders, and no one ethnic group should get special privileges.
- It is racist to give one ethnic group special privileges, even if they are a minority
- I feel that although Maori have had it rough in past years, they should still be treated the same as everyone else.
- No one group should be given privileges on the basis of ethnic or racial background
- I find the idea of giving priority or special privileges to one group appalling, minority or otherwise

Historical Negation as a Legitimizing Myth for NZ Europeans (Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Historical Negation Scale</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due compensation offered to the</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>descendants of those who suffered from such injustices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand law needs to recognize that certain ethnic minorities have been treated</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfairly in the past. People belonging to those groups should be entitled to certain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefits and compensation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage to others</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caused by earlier generations of people from my ethnic group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement is offered to Maori in</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compensation for past injustices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differences and conflicts</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between ethnic groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is true that many things happened to Maori people in the past that should not have</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>happened, but it is unfair to hold current generations of Pakeha/NZ Europeans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountable for things that happened so long ago.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who weren't around in previous centuries should not feel accountable for the</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions of their ancestors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(r) = item is reverse scored.
Maybe not racist, but it does maintain NZ European privilege through policy preferences denying the impact of the past

Symbolic Inclusion, Resource-based Inequality, Institutional Accommodation, Neo-Liberal Economics

- Māori as a whole over-represented on negative statistics, but also highly symbolic of national identity. Represented in Parliament (Māori seats); Govt- Ministry of Māori affairs; Corporates- Treaty Settlements; Policing- Māori wardens,
- Contemporary History of Peaceful Protest & Institutional Change + Māori over-representation in Crime (but no political violence)
  - 1975 Bastion Point March, 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act
  - 1981 Springbok Tour & Protest,
  - 1985 Te Reo made an Official Language of NZ
  - 1992 Te Papa – bicultural design for National Museum
  - 2004 Seabed & Foreshore Act, 2011 Repealed
Liberal Model of Pluralistic Influence:
Smoke but generally no Fire

Tūhoe Nationalism: the “Face of Māori Radicalism”
Simulated Land Confiscation of 1863-7
“Welcomes” Waitangi Tribunal to Ruatōki
Commander Tame Iti: Symbolic Violence of Shooting NZ Flag

Operation 8 Police pre-emptive strike against “Tūhoe Terror”: Tit-for-Tat Spiral of Decline in relations w Govt
NZ Summary: Symbolic Accommodation + Pressure Release Pluralism

Historical Warrant from Treaty and Liberal Social Contract contest to produce societal discourses such as Symbolic and Resource-based biculturalism and Historical Negation to manage influence.

Institutional Changes allowing exceptions to Liberalism provide Māori elite, both tribal and otherwise, with significant voice.

Creation of multiple identity positions for Māori as Māori. Inter-marriage does NOT produce full assimilation because of biculturalism.

No ceiling for Māori achievement, but over-representation at bottom. Dynamic & Contested, but not Volatile or Violent.
Case 2: Russian Post-Communist Bronze Soldier Riot in Estonia

Polemical Representations of Communist Era History produce conflicting Historical Warrants of Legitimacy for Estonia.

Estonian Social Contract claims to be liberal, but has no specific means of institutionally accommodating its 30% Russian minority. It has a language test for citizenship, and some long-term Russians in Estonia are not citizens. Gini Coefficient is 31 (& dropping) compared to NZ’s 34 (and growing). Very High incarceration rate (259/100K).

2007 Removal of Bronze Soldier commemorating Russian soldiers in WW2 resulted in 2 days of riots where 1200 (mainly youth) were arrested.

PhD Thesis of Larissa Kus (2011)
Both Qualitative and Quantitative studies
Soviet Era and Post-Communist Historical Warrants for Estonia

**Soviet Era**
Estonia voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1939, then was conquered by the Nazis.
Estonia viewed as being liberated from Nazis by the Red Army in the course of WWII.
Russians designate battle against Nazis as the Great Patriotic War, distinct from WWII.

**Independent Estonia**
Illegality of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact signed in 1939 with Germany by which Estonia was forcefully incorporated to the Soviet Union.
Russians as colonizers and conquerors, not liberators.

The Bronze Soldier in Tallinn Commemorating Russians in the Great Patriotic War

Soldier was removed in 2007 at night (to less prominent location) by Estonian government sparking a riot with 154 injuries & 1 death. 1,200 people were arrested and significant damage was done to the capital city.
**Russian Historical Discourses**

“Bronze Soldier – it is a monument for the Red Army men who fell at the liberation of Tallinn from the German fascist army. In 1944 the Red Army did not fight with any country, she liberated Europe from terrible plague. Transfer of the monument – this is mockery of the remains of the Soviet soldiers, violation of the memory of millions of our fathers and grandfathers. It was not the monument that was stolen, but the memory, and this is holy.

“Estonians try to impose on Russians morally that they were occupiers of this land.”

“…even Isaac Asimov has not seen greater fiction.”

---

**Estonian Historical Discourses**

“They have been taught history that does not have information about the war between Russia and Estonia, in our history it is very present.”

“The elder generation of Estonians does not find interaction ‘relaxing’ as 50 years of occupation has been tiring for them.

“Most of the Russian Estonians’ lack the ability to look back at the events of the first half of the last century (WWII) soberly and calmly.”

---

**Russian and Estonian Identity Positions after Power Reversal**

**Estonians:** Denial of Injustice, Perceived Threat, Assimilationist Policy

**Russians:** Contemporary Injustice, Discrimination, Call for Fairness
Estonian Summary: Smoke & Fire


Rampantly Polemical Discourses.
Defensive Orientation from Estonian majority does not allow for accommodation of Russian minority interests in terms of language & citizenship. No biculturalism, but an assimilationist policy with majority rules.

Few institutional pressure release valves.
Nearby Russian media & government have added fuel to the fire.

Estonia has EU protection, but shares a Volatile Situation within many EU countries.

Warranting Societal Legitimacy in Estonia

[Diagram showing the process of Structural/Group-Based Inequality leading to Relative Deprivation, then to Warrants of Legitimacy and finally to Assimilation Policies.]

Process: Social comparison

Warrants of LEGITIMACY

Content: History, Religion, Social Contract

Power inside and outside Society

Political PROTEST & Institutional CHANGE

Incarceration/CRIME (259/100K)
European “Failure of Multiculturalism” “Failure of Assimilationism” from a NZ/Canadian perspective

"The riots bothered me a great deal, on two counts. First, nothing really has changed. Some kids at the bottom of the ladder are deeply alienated, they've taken the message of Thatcherism and Blairism and the coalition: what you have to do is hustle. Because nobody's going to help you. And they've got no organised political voice, no organised black voice and no sympathetic voice on the left. That kind of anger, coupled with no political expression, leads to riots. It always has.

The second point is: where does this find expression in going into a store and stealing trainers? This is the point at which consumerism, which is the cutting edge of neoliberalism, has got to them too. Consumerism puts everyone into a single channel. You're not doing well, but you're still free to consume. We're all equal in the eyes of the market.”

—Stuart Hall on the 2011 London Riots

Case 3: Indonesian Sacred Violence & Terrorism: The Religious Warrant

Christian Smith (1998) identifies six elements that reveal religious strength 1) Adherence to beliefs; 2) Salience of faith; 3) Robustness of faith (lack of doubt); 4) Group participation; 5) Commitment to mission; 6) Retention and recruitment of members. He concludes that “modern American evangelicalism enjoys a religious vitality – measured sociologically – that surpasses every other major Christian tradition in the country”.

American Evangelicalism “thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, and threat”. 

Subcultural Identity Theory: “Religion survives and can thrive in pluralistic, modern society by embedding itself in subcultures that offer satisfying morally orienting collective identities which provide adherents meaning and belonging...In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups...”
Pancasila: Founding 5 Principles for Indonesian state (1945)

1. Belief in the one and only God (in Indonesian, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa). In committee this was Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/Syari'ah-"Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya"

2. Just and civilized humanity (Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab).

3. The unity of Indonesia, (Persatuan Indonesia)

4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberation (Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan)

5. Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia (Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia)
Special Forum of *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*

Hamdi Muluk & Dhyah Madya Ruth, University of Indonesia

Idrahamsyah Putra & Zora Sukabdi, University of Indonesia

Mirra Milla, Faturochman, & Djamaludin Ancok, Gadjah Mada University
Interviews with Convicted Terrorists: Globalized Religion Trumps Nationalism

"After seeing films of Muslims in Palestine, Bosnia and Afghanistan, I was moved... I wanted to improve myself, because I had not really done anything meaningful in my life..."

“Our government is satan (evil). They do not care about Muslims. We stand up for defending Muslims across countries. Muslims are like having one body, if one part of body is hurt, the others will feel. We feel their (Muslims’) pain...”

“When dozens, hundreds of Muslim children and women are murdered, raped, in Ambon, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and we did not say anything... in the Koran letter An Nisa verse 75 Allah explained ‘and why do you not fight in the way of Allah, whereas the weak, women and children pray for defense, then the law of this is sin.”

➢ Religious Warrant of Legitimacy makes superordinate category of Muslim salient vs. injustice of Infidels.

Milla: Organized pathway thru Jihadists originating in Afghan conflict vs Soviet Union.

“That was my first meeting with him [Abdullah Azzam], the figure I have always admired. He patiently guided me in understanding Syar’iah [Islamic law] knowledge, something very important for my further struggle...” (Ali Gufron)

“I have never in my life, felt a sense of tranquillity, comparable of when I lived in Afghanistan. Living only for i’daad (preparing jihad)... distant from maksiat (sin)... Whatever we do there, its worth is reward” (Ali Imron)

➢ Admiration for and training from Jihadists in theatres of simple combat between good vs. evil. Idealists & Purists, not psychopaths.
Bali Bombers: Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra and Amrozi Nurhasyim

Syari’ah Law and Daulah Islamiyah

Maulawi Mullah Omar succeeded in leading the famous Afghani Daulah Islamiyah [Islamic State] with the Taliban... Security had really made Afghanistan a safe country. There was no long any opium. No longer any alcohol and free sex...

“I cannot understand why it is so hard to establish Islamic law when the majority of the (Indonesian) population is Muslim [...] It is obvious that terrible conditions here are manifested from our neglect on syariah law...”

“From our standpoint Indonesia is still in a state of war. We have been invaded by the West. Do you not see? Look at our economy, politics, all. Indonesia had its independence merely for five years after the Independence Day, not anymore now, do not you know? We are being occupied, yet we do not realize it [...] Hence, to conduct jihad fisabilillah here, by sword, by weapons, is understandable.

- Indonesia is corrupt and in a state of war which makes violent jihad acceptable
Jihadi Ideology

“No one here would want to carry out suicide bombing, suicide is forbidden in Islam [...] However, if sacrificing one’s life for the benefit of the ummah, such action is the most exalted in the eyes of God. Such action is not suicide bombing, rather, it is ‘syahid bomb’ [holy]”

“Numerous people think that the greatness of a person’s tauhid [Islamic thought] lays on his ability to be able to speak with great lengths... However, expertise in a normative sense is only a supporting aspect. It’s application is what’s most determining... In the battlefield, we will see who the true expert in tauhid is” (Ali Ghufron)

“The situation in Indonesia is chaotic; there are rampant crime and violence against Muslims by non-Muslims, it means ‘the door to jihad fisabilillah is wide open and brightly lit’ [...] Jihad fisabilillah is war [...] The purpose of jihad is to protect Muslims, to enforce justice, and to destroy evil.”

Kuta- Australian Sin City in Bali
Indonesia Summary: An Islamic Warrant of Legitimacy, an alternative language for governance

Syari'ah Law for governing Daulah Islamiyah [Islamic State]

Desire for a Caliphate (first system of government in Islam representing the unity of the Ummah [Community], last claimed by the Turkish Empire).

Daar al-harb [a state of war] unleashes Jihad fisabilillah [struggle in the path of God]

In Daar as-salam [a state of peace] other forms of struggle are more appropriate.

➢ Terrorism & Sacred Violence are NOT pathological, but a defence of Pure Religion
From Periphery to Center:
The Rise of ‘Ottomanism’ in Contemporary Turkey

Nora FISHER ONAR
Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bahcesehir University
Visiting Fellow, Centre for International Studies (CIS), University of Oxford

Turkey Transformed

- Pro-secular, military-bureaucratic center displaced by new, pro-religious, commercially-oriented periphery
- Economic boom
- Unprecedented domestic debates about history and identity
- Shifting foreign policy orientation
(Multi-)regional aspirations and Ottoman legacies

- New orientation often simplistically framed as “switching axes” or “turning from west to east;”

- Misleading & risks engendering self-fulfilling prophecy - > **Analytical challenge:**

  **How to capture complexity, with clarity?**

- Can be achieved by embedding analysis of the present in the longue durée. Useful because both:
  i. Method and diagnostic tool;
  ii. Constitutive part of reconfiguration process

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Defining ‘Ottomanism’

“Invocation of Ottoman precedents or legacies, real or imagined, to shape current day trajectories.”

Islamists, as well as some liberals and right-wing nationalists, have handed down tropes about the Ottoman past and its place in Turkish identity/foreign policy despite Kemalist rejectionism.

Each new generation, empowered or disempowered by evolving economic, social, political, regional, & systemic conditions, as well as available technologies, seeks to “retune” the narrative.

My process oriented approach is agnostic about content, therefore analytical-descriptive and potentially generalizable.
The Ottomans

- Three ideal-typical dimensions of Ottoman paradigm:

1. Ottoman Empire
2. Ottoman Islam
3. Ottoman Pluralism

Ottoman structural dilemma

- Must westernize to keep ascendant West at bay -> strategies along a spectrum of:

  engagement _________to_________resistance

- Strategies of engagement:

  selective, syncretic, wholesale

Abandoning the Ottomans

• Ottomanism (1850s - 1870) (abandons imperial pretentions)

• Pan-Islamism (1871 - 1908) (abandons pluralism vis-à-vis religiosity)

• Turkism (Young Turks) 1908 - 1923 (abandons pluralism vis-à-vis ethnicity)

Turkish Republic 1923

1. Non-irredentist,
2. Secular
3. Unitary nation-state

• 1920s - 1940s: Revolutionary denial of all things Ottoman in Manchiean juxtaposition to all things Republican.

Multi-party Period, 1950-2002

- 1950s: Pro-religious right representing rural periphery/majority seeks to rehabilitate religiosity, but maintains nationalist and anti-imperialist themes

- 1960s-1970s: Left fears cultural counter-revolution from Right. Yet, challenges Eurocentric underpinnings of modernization narrative, whilst maintaining nationalist and anti-imperialist themes

- 1980s-1990s: Pluralisation of debates; first articulation of ‘neo-Ottomansim’; heated contest over attempts to rehabilitate of Islam in public life;

Contesting the Ottomans in the 2000s

- **Kemalists**
  - Deny religiosity & empire & pluralism;
  - Deny religiosity & empire; endorses pluralism

- **Liberal(-Leftists)**
  - Deny empire; endorses pluralism (and religiosity in name of pluralism)
  - Deny empire & religiosity; endorses pluralism
Contesting the Ottomans in the 2000s

- **Islamists**
  - Endorse religiosity & pluralism
  - Endorse religiosity & empire

- **Ultra-Right Nationalists**
  - Endorse empire
  - Endorse empire & religiosity

Increasingly central in social life

- Mini-series
- Films
- Novels
- Fashion
- Video games
- Home décor
- Architecture
- Design
- Popular discourses: ‘as heir of the Ottomans...’
- Enhanced resonance of Suleiman the Magnificent/Mehmet the Conqueror as icons; diminished resonance of Atatürk
Increasingly Salient in Domestic and Foreign Policy

- Municipalities (Tulip Festival; ‘Conquest of Istanbul’ Day)
- Banknotes, Monuments
- Infrastructural projects (‘Crazy Project’)
- PM Erdogan increasingly likened to a new sultan
- FM Davutoglu’s doctrine of ‘Historical’ & ‘Geopolitical’ Depth
- Minister of State Cicek’s proposal for a Commonwealth

Explanation for Popularity?

- Partially meets Mitzal’s (2003) criteria for successful ‘keying’ and Schmidt’s (2008) for successful policy revision:

COGNITIVE: Provides a heuristic framework that enables policy-making elites and society at large to make sense of the emerging agenda and their roles therein.

NORMATIVE: Provides reassurance that the project is in tune with the underlying values of the society in question for core constituents of the AKP who amount to a plurality/majority of Turkish society.

However, heterogeneous nature of the society and broader region mean that unease also felt at normative/existentia l level by non-core constituents.

From Periphery to Centre

IDEA&AGENTS

- Idea had some purchase in diverse constituencies but was systematically repressed (1923-1950);

PROCESS OF REHABILITATION

- Shy revisionism by pro-religious/liberal thinkers under stop-and-go political liberalization (1950-1980)
- Empowered by AKP rise to hegemonic political position and embourgeoisement of core constituency (2002-2012)

MECHANISMS

- Political discourses
- Communication technologies
- Commodification (impt for cross-cutting appeal beyond AKP supporters)

CONTEXT&SYSTEM

- In a turbulent post Cold War (weakening of tran-Atlantic anchor);
- post 9/11 (rise of Islamophobia and moribund EU process)
- post Arab revolutions (opportunity for influence and threat of regional instability)
- Ottomanism, offers a formula for DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION in a Turkey seeking to navigate its perennial identity crisis

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS?

- Relevance of Turkish experience for broader region?
- Relevance of framework for other countries or regions? (e.g. Russia, China, Iran)
Modeling Recruitment to, Sustainability of and Departure from Fringe Groups in Muslim Societies:

A Case Study of the Indonesian Islamic State Movement

Mark Woodward
Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict
Arizona State University

Interdisciplinary Workshop on
Influence and Persuasion in the Formation and Sustainment of Social Fringe Groups
Kuching, Malaysia: 20-22 February 2012

Modeling and Mapping

• Model building undertaken by ASU-CSRC Minerva-funded Finding Allies for the War of Words: Mapping the Diffusion and Influence of Counter-Radical Muslim Discourse integrates ethnographic, survey and web-mining research efforts.

• We understand modeling as a complex data management technique leading to empirical generalizations that are the precursor to theoretically driven explanations, a dialectic between empirical observation and theoretical suppositions, or what Kuhn (1969) describes as “normal science.”

• Major goals: to ascertain the varieties of counter-radical discourse and praxis and to map their social locations in order to aid in the formulation of culturally and religiously appropriate intervention strategies.
Factors in Understanding and Modeling the Dynamics of Counter-radicalism

- The concept of “counter-radicalism” is broadly, but negatively defined in theory and practice.
- It is necessary to consider the varieties of radicalisms, the compelling nature of radical ideologies and the social, cultural, and religious characteristics of individuals and groups at risk of recruitment to “fringe groups.”
- In Southeast Asia: concept/metaphor of radicalism as “disease,” and strategies for combating radicalism as “vaccine”
- To extend the medical analogy, it is crucial to understand the contagion-and its epidemiology-to cure, or better still, prevent it.

Modeling Rooted in Social Movement Theory

- Our modeling efforts are grounded in social movement theory and more directly in recent attempts to apply it in the analysis of Muslim movements.

- Social movement theory has been developed and applied primarily in studies of the behavior of issue oriented groups in secular, industrialized western democracies. Social movements are vehicles for collective action operating outside formally established political systems.
Five Continuous Variables

- **Epistemology**: Refers to basic propositions concerning the nature and organization of knowledge. In the case of religious groups, it refers to ways of thinking about how basic texts and beliefs should be understood.
- **Diversity Tolerance**: A measure of willingness to accept difference. It applies to differences within a tradition and to tolerance of other groups.
- **Engagement**: Measure of the degree to which an individual or group attempts to influence others.
- **Range**: Measure of the social and geographic space within which a group is present. At one end of the continuum are “face to face” communities. At the other are global Diasporas and communities that exist as much in cyber than in geographic spaces.
- **Violence**: Is broadly defined to include discursive and symbolic violence as well as physical injury and the destruction of property.

Modeling with Continuous Scales
Mapping Muslim Movements

Latent Scales: Goals and Methods

• Goals
  - Radical Change: change the existing social order in fundamental structural ways.
  - No Change: maintain the existing social order.

• Methods
  - Violent: uses, advocates or legitimizes violent methods.
  - Non-Violent: Opposes violence and uses non-violent methods.
NI Model Positions

• NII is located on the near the center of the *Epistemology* continuum, the extreme left of the *Violence, Diversity Tolerance and Change* continuum and roughly the midpoint of the *Range* variable.

• Its position on the *Range* continuum distinguishes NNI from transnational terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah. Its goal is to establish Indonesia as an Islamic State. It has no trans-national goals, affiliation or funding.

Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)

• NII, sometimes referred to as Darul Islam (DI), meaning “House of Islam” is a political movement founded in 1942, and formalized in 1949 in West Java by Maridjan Kartosuwiryo.

• The movement sought the creation of an Islamic state, rejecting the new Republic, and gained ground in the early and mid-1950s, spreading through much of South Sulawesi and Aceh.

• Suppressed under martial law, negotiations between 1959-1962 resulted in a peace agreement between NII and the state, granting Aceh semi-autonomous status.

• Though formally disbanded, members of the former group were connected to violence throughout the 1970s and 80s.

• Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) is considered a contemporary outgrowth of the Negara Islam Indonesia organization. Experience in the Afghanistan war played a critical role in shifts on the range variable.
Negara Islam Indonesia (NII): a Case Study of a Radical Fringe Group

- This paper draws on ethnographic data concerning the recruitment and retention strategies of NII, and first person accounts of how and why members came to reject its message and lose trust in its leaders.
- Interviews were primarily with former members who are now actively involved with counter-radical education programs, and with those who left the movement before completing an indoctrination process NII refers to as “basic training” and many Indonesians call “brain washing.”
- Sourcing both, we are able to use NII as a vehicle for describing the modeling efforts.
NII: Recruitment strategies

- NII targets young adults with incompletely formed identities and limited knowledge of Islam.
- Young people with strong religious identities, affiliation with established Muslim organizations, and students at Islamic schools and universities are seen as highly resistant to recruitment.
- Recruitment may be analyzed as a rite of passage, as described by Victor Turner.
  - Recruits are socially isolated,
  - Next they are subjected to training in the group’s teachings and organization.
  - On completion they formally initiated into the organization and swear an oath of allegiance.
  - Finally, they are assigned responsibilities, principally fund raising and recruitment.

Ciri-Ciri Negara Islam Indonesia
[Characteristics of NII]

- A former member discusses the recruitment techniques of the group and his experiences in a YouTube video posting from April of 2011:

Http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RMkd3_ZsNI
“Basic Training” NII

- Key elements of “basic training” move people from quadrants A and B to C and towards NNI positions in the five variable model. It is based on the following propositions.
  - The Islamic State is the only acceptable form of governance for Indonesia
  - Indonesia is currently ruled by Zionist kafir (unbelievers). Christians and Secularists are actually Zionists.
  - Struggle against the Indonesia state is a religious obligation
  - People who are not members of NII and do not engage in this struggle are kafir. It is forbidden to associate with them and permissible to steal from them and to injure or kill them.
  - NII and its leaders are the only “path to God and Heavens.” There is no salvation outside the movement.
Exit Strategies

• Family loyalty
• Leadership failures to meet religious expectations
• Falsification of religious claims
• Community ties trump group loyalty