Implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French Defense Cooperation

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The paper analyzes, from a predominantly UK perspective, the implications for the U.S. of the November 2, 2010, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Treaty. The current pressures on British and French defence budgets were the primary driving force behind this cooperative effort. London and Paris have made steps toward improving joint efforts in a number of areas with defence acquisition and industrial cooperation being prominent. In the UK, there appears to be strong political support at the highest levels, which has permeated to lower levels in the bureaucracy, while the UK defence industry appears to be cautiously optimistic about future business opportunities. The impact of enhanced Anglo-French cooperation on the U.S. would appear to be largely favourable for Washington. Rather than providing a basis for weakened UK attention to the U.S., as some fear, the efforts by London and Paris will potentially generate greater national military capability from scarce resources and could serve as a vehicle for broader European efforts to enhance their defence capabilities. While multinational European military development projects are viewed with scepticism in the UK, the Anglo-French arrangement could strengthen the prospects for bilateral projects in which other European states may elect to participate.
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Preface & Acknowledgements

Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.

We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past and hope this symposium will spark even more participation.

We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.”

We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research.

We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:

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James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor

Thursday, May 17, 2012

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Al Volkman—Mr. Volkman is the director of the International Cooperation for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). He is responsible for establishing international armaments cooperation policy, ensuring that policy is properly implemented, and engaging with U.S. allies and friends around the world to achieve closer cooperation.

Mr. Volkman has a long history in international cooperation beginning in the late 1970s when he negotiated the initial agreements with the United Kingdom that resulted in the cooperative development of the AV-8B Harrier Aircraft. In the early 1980s he served on the NATO Air Command and Control Systems team in Brussels, Belgium, where he was instrumental in shaping the international acquisition strategy for that program. Mr. Volkman has served in a variety of international staff positions for both the Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Volkman has extensive acquisition experience. He began his civilian career as a contracting specialist and contracting officer with the Naval Air Systems Command and has served as both the director of contract policy and administration and the director of foreign contracting in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Volkman has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Valparaiso University and a Master of Business Administration from George Washington University. He served as an officer in the United States Army from 1966 to 1969. His service included one year with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He has received numerous awards and medals for distinguished performance throughout his military and civilian service.

Mr. Volkman is married and has three adult children.

Bernard Udis—Udis, PhD, is a professor emeritus of economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder and a visiting research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. His distinguished academic career also included visiting appointments at the Air Force Academy, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, and a NATO research fellowship. Professor Udis’ published work includes three books and numerous articles in scholarly journals on defense industries and military power. A number of his works are considered classics in defense economics. Professor Udis’ current research focuses on competition and cooperation in the aerospace industries of the U.S. and the EU.

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Peter Ito—Mr. Ito earned a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Juris Doctor (law) degree and a master's degree in international affairs from George Washington University in Washington, DC. He worked for 25 years as a foreign service officer for the U.S. State Department, serving in South Korea, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, and Washington, DC. His primary focus was political affairs, particularly defence and security policy. He joined Cranfield University in September 2007, working as a researcher in the areas of strategic management and change management, before moving to his current position. [p.ito@cranfield.ac.uk]

David M. Moore—Mr. Moore worked in purchasing, logistics, and supply chain management within public-sector and commercial organisations before entering academia. He has designed, developed, and delivered a range of professional courses, undergraduate and master’s programmes for organisations and universities. He has undertaken extensive education, training, speaking, and consultancy assignments in the UK, USA, Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. Moore’s particular interests include outsourcing, using contractors for service provision, developing professionalism, and humanitarian logistics. He has written a number of books, book chapters, and conference and journal papers. Moore completed his service in the Royal Logistic Corps as a Lt Colonel in 1999. [d.m.moore@cranfield.ac.uk]

Peter Antill—Mr. Antill is currently a research assistant working for Cranfield University at the UK Defence Academy’s College of Management and Technology in Shrivenham, England. Antill has practical experience in the service industry as well as the civil service. A degree holder from Staffordshire University and the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, he also holds a post compulsory education (PGCE) from Oxford Brooks University. A published author, he is currently conducting postgraduate research into British defence policy, historical procurement programmes and expeditionary operations, as well as privately collaborating with two colleagues on a military history project. [p.antill@cranfield.ac.uk]

Stuart Young—Mr. Young retired from the Royal Navy as an engineer officer in 2008, having served in a variety of postings at sea, and in the UK Ministry of Defence. These postings included three years based in the British Embassy in Washington as a technical liaison officer and as program manager for a major multinational technology development program. In his final appointment, he was responsible for developing acquisition management skills for military and civilian personnel across the MoD. Joining Cranfield University in 2008, he is the deputy director of the Centre for Defence Acquisition. [s.young@cranfield.ac.uk]

Kevin Burgess—Mr. Burgess has private- and public-sector experience. In the past 20 years he has held a range of senior management and executive roles in asset intensive industries, namely Telcos and Railways. Burgess’s last job in industry in 2008 was as group general manager, Shared Services in QR. He has 10 years of experience as a business excellence evaluator. His academic interests have been primarily on integrating social and technical systems to improve overall corporate performance. His PhD was in innovation in supply chains. He is widely published and currently holds the title of adjunct professor at three Australian Universities. [k.burgess@cranfield.ac.uk]

Abstract

The paper analyzes, from a predominantly UK perspective, the implications for the U.S. of the November 2, 2010, Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Treaty. The current pressures on British and French defence budgets were the primary driving force behind this cooperative effort. London and Paris have made steps toward improving joint efforts in a number of areas, with defence acquisition and industrial cooperation being prominent. In the UK, there appears to be strong political support at the highest levels, which has permeated to lower levels in the bureaucracy, while the UK defence industry appears to be cautiously optimistic about future business opportunities.
The impact of enhanced Anglo-French cooperation on the U.S. would appear to be largely favourable for Washington. Rather than providing a basis for weakened UK attention to the U.S., as some fear, the efforts by London and Paris will potentially generate greater national military capability from scarce resources and could serve as a vehicle for broader European efforts to enhance their defence capabilities. While multinational European military development projects are viewed with scepticism in the UK, the Anglo-French arrangement could strengthen the prospects for bilateral projects in which other European states may elect to participate.

Introduction

From the UK TV series Yes Minister, an exchange between senior civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby and Minister James Hacker on fallout shelters:

Appleby: Well, you have the weapons; you must have the shelters.
Hacker: I sometimes wonder why we need the weapons.
Appleby: Minister! You’re not a unilateralist?
Hacker: I sometimes wonder, you know.
Appleby: Well, then, you must resign from the government!
Hacker: Ah, no, no, no, no, no. I’m not that unilateralist! Anyway, the Americans will always protect us from the Russians, won’t they?
Appleby: Russians? Who’s talking about the Russians?
Hacker: Well, the independent deterrent.
Appleby: It’s to protect us against the French!
Hacker: The French?!! But they’re our allies!
Appleby: Well, they might be now; but they were our mortal enemies for centuries, and old leopards don’t change their spots.

“France has no friends, only interests.” – Charles de Gaulle

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual.” – Lord Palmerston

Background

On November 2, 2010, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Anglo-French Defence Co-Operation Treaty. It is comprised of an overarching treaty on defence cooperation, as well as a subordinate treaty related to joint nuclear facilities. The Letter of Intent signed by the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff of both countries noted increasing interoperability between the armed forces of the UK and France as a major goal, as well as a number of separate joint initiatives.

As the UK Ministry of Defence noted at the signing of the treaty, the measures agreed upon between the UK and France included work in the following areas: jointly developing a combined joint expeditionary force as a non-standing bilateral capability; developing the ability to deploy a UK–French-integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries (building primarily on maritime task group cooperation centered on the French carrier Charles de Gaulle); developing joint military doctrine and training programmes; extending bilateral cooperation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies; aligning (wherever possible) logistics arrangements; developing a stronger defence industrial and technology base; and enhancing joint working to defend against
emerging security concerns, such as cyber security. Overall, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) noted that the treaty is intended to enable the strengthening of operational linkages between the UK and French armed forces, sharing and pooling of materials and equipment, building of joint facilities, mutual access to defence markets, and increased industrial and technological cooperation (Ministry of Defence, 2010).

It would be fair to say that previous attempts at Anglo-French cooperation, most recently the St. Malo declaration of December 1998, did not achieve the level of bilateral cooperation that many observers, or indeed London and Paris, initially anticipated. Nor, as will be discussed later, did St. Malo serve as the foundation for a larger European effort to generate defence capabilities, as had been anticipated by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.

In the case of the 2010 treaty, it is apparent that pressures on both countries’ military budgets have driven a shift in policy toward greater bilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of defence acquisition. Subsequently, the 2011 cooperation between London and Paris on military operations in Libya provided further indication of the benefits of greater bilateral coordination in the security area. On the other hand, the political dispute at the end of 2011 regarding the reluctance of the UK to fully support Franco-German proposals to save the Euro led to concerns that a weakened overall Anglo-French political relationship would have an impact on future defence cooperation. However, the outcome of the February 2012 Anglo-French Summit indicates that, despite the clash over the Euro, there appears to be continued determination to proceed with strengthened bilateral military cooperation.

This paper seeks to assess, from a predominantly UK perspective, the potential implications for the U.S. of such enhanced Anglo-French defence cooperation, recognising that future problems in non-defence areas could put a brake on such efforts. The paper will mainly focus on defence cooperation and not the subordinate agreement regarding limited cooperation on nuclear weapons, although a brief examination of that document is necessary. The agreement addresses cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification, and countering nuclear and radiological terrorism. The immediate focus is the construction of joint radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities (Harries, 2012, p. 13) and the initiatives were possible due to "long-term strategic shifts" (p. 21) but appear to be driven by "acute financial pressures, symptomatic of severe structural deficiencies" (p. 15).

Past Successes and Failures

As Jones (2011) noted, enhanced defence cooperation between the UK and France would appear to be a natural fit (p. 12). In 2010, the UK defence budget was around €43.4 billion (£36.4 billion),\(^1\) and the French budget around €39.2 billion.\(^2\) Defence spending was between 3.5% and 5% of total government spending in both countries. The two combined defence budgets were just under half of all European defence spending (€82.6 billion compared to €193.5 billion) and accounted for around 75% of research and development spending (€6.48 billion compared to €8.56 billion; Pires, 2012). Jones (2011) added that RAND has estimated that by 2015, combined UK and French defence budgets could be around 65% of European Union (EU) defence spending (p. 12).

There has been a long-standing record of Anglo-French defence coordination. The two established a High-Level Working Group in 2006 to promote closer cooperation in armaments programmes. They had already established a Franco-British European Air Group (1994), completed a Letter of Intent on naval cooperation (1996) and a Letter of

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\(^1\) On February 29, 2012, £1 equalled $1.59 or 1.194 Euros.
\(^2\) On February 29, 2012, 1 Euro equalled $1.33
Intent on cooperation between the two armies (1997), and established a Joint Commission on Peacekeeping (1996) to harmonise peacekeeping procedures and doctrine.

On the other hand, the history of Anglo-French defence acquisition cooperation has been spotty. There were successful programmes in the 1960s and 1970s (including the Puma and Gazelle helicopters and the Jaguar strike aircraft); and the establishment of MBDA, Europe’s leading manufacturer of guided weapons, in 2001, is a significant Anglo-French creation. However, there have been notable failures. For example, the UK dropped out of the agreement with France and Germany for production of the Trigat anti-tank missile and the Trimilsatcom communications satellite programme. The UK also dropped out of the Horizon Common New Generation Frigate project, which included France and Italy (Antill, 2011).

Continued Commitment

At the February 17, 2012, UK-France Summit, the two leaders reemphasized their commitment to do more in the area of defence cooperation. They noted that the 2010 agreement has led to expansion of cooperation “in every major field: capabilities, industry, operations and intelligence” (para. 2). After analyzing the Libya operation, the two countries “have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance; and precision munitions” (para. 7). They also noted that the Libya experience reinforced the desire to set up the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (para. 9), and the two nations will establish a Combined Joint Forces Headquarters by 2016 (para. 14).

It was notable that the most concrete results the two leaders cited were in specific areas of defence equipment. The desire for cooperation on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was made manifest with specific projects. With regard to the medium-altitude long endurance (MALE) drone, the two leaders announced that they would soon “place with BAE Systems and Dassault a jointly funded contract to study the technical risks associated with the MALE UAV” (para. 16). France also confirmed its “interest for the (British) Watchkeeper system” with an evaluation by France to begin this year (Chuter, 2012).

There was also a reaffirmation of the pledge “to undertake in 2013 a joint Future Combat Air System Demonstration Programme that will set up a co-operation of strategic importance for the future of the European Combat Air Sector.” The document highlighted the contract let to the MBDA in December 2011 for two initial studies on a future cruise and an anti-ship weapon (para. 23). And it noted the intention to sign a contract in coming months for development and manufacture of the Future Anti-Ship Guided Weapon.

Rationale: Policy Concurrence

To determine what the Anglo-French Treaty may mean for the U.S., it is important to assess the driving forces behind this renewed effort at Anglo-French defence cooperation. The question, as formulated by Lindley-French (2010), is whether the Anglo-French Treaty is “a new departure or simply the latest twist in the centuries-old Anglo-French tussle for power? It is probably a bit of both” (p. 20). As he adds, ”if Britain and France are to remain European powers with global reach they will need to share a vision of the big picture and stick to it” (p. 20). Put even more bluntly, but in terms that will probably resonate in Washington,

defence cooperation between Britain and France is and must always be about power. The alternative is the decline of both countries, along with the rest of a Europe that seems to accept weakness as strength, equating an inability to act as meaning no need to act in the hope that danger simply
bypasses a continent too weak to matter any longer. (Lindley-French, 2010, p. 20)

James Arbuthnot, the Chairman of the UK House of Commons Defence Select Committee, provided a similarly frank assessment in an overarching view of Anglo-French cooperation. Arbuthnot stated that the opportunity to cooperate with France is one that the UK cannot pass up. Certainly, he added, there are suspicions between the UK and France. The UK is always suspicious of what France can do or wishes to do. But Arbuthnot suggested that it may be best to view the UK and France like two brothers: although they quarrel, what unites them is more than what divides them.

General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, Chief of Defence Materiel at the UK Ministry of Defence until 2011, concurred that the UK and France have roughly the same capabilities and policy views. Bilateral cooperation is clearly logical for the UK. Assessing the agreement from the French perspective, he believed that it makes sense for Paris to collaborate with London.

**Rationale: Shortage of Money**

The impact of budget cuts for the UK and France in spurring a desire for defence cooperation cannot be overstated. Arbuthnot conceded that scarce resources are a key driving force for increased cooperation. But referring to the earlier point on policy, he emphasized that there are also shared threats and responses that make Anglo-French defence cooperation easier to develop.

Indeed, Stevens (2011) has argued that the focus of the bilateral effort is not even to preserve defence capabilities, but “it is apparent that the strong aspiration will be to achieve a specific quantum of savings” (p. 6). In the UK, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a cut of around 8% in UK defence spending in real terms over four years (HM Government, 2010; International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], 2010a). As a result, Bickerton (2010) commented that “there is a chance that the budgetary crisis in the UK will push the government to recognise that potential savings can be made to the defence budget by cooperating more closely with France on armaments” (p. 121).

With regard to France, Jones (2011) noted that “a senior French military officer believes that the defence cuts in France in future are likely to be ‘unprecedented’ with ‘big decisions’ on major programmes necessary” (p. 16). Stevens (2011) agreed that France is facing the same problem, noting that Defence Minister Morin announced a reduction of 3% out of the defence budget, which cut across a range of capabilities (p. 3). Perhaps more important, Stevens (2011) added that there is speculation that even without a change of government, there could be a further 4–5% reduction (p. 3). Such tight budgets necessitate a focus on how best to generate military capability from scarce resources. Bickerton (2010) noted that “the French Government has also been interested above all in capabilities and force effectiveness” (p. 115).

However, some analysts warn against placing too much emphasis on funding problems as the motivator behind the Anglo-French Treaty, arguing that there are more fundamental issues involved. Jones (2011) argued that “it would be wrong to see Franco-British defence cooperation as driven purely by a short-term need to balance the books” (p. 7), outlining three long-term trends that challenge traditional thinking in London and Paris. First, “defence budgets have not been funded to compensate for the rising cost of military capability.” Second, the security environment makes it “all but impossible to make the political case for more defence spending.” Finally, “flat or lower spending combined with increasingly expensive technology undermines the viability of national, and even
multinational, industries.” Jones (2011) asserted that these factors threaten British and French national defence industrial capabilities and, potentially, operational autonomy (p. 7).

If the Anglo-French treaty is indeed driven purely by immediate budgetary considerations, this raises questions regarding the long-term prospects of this partnership. As Gomis (2011) noted,

The Franco-British treaties, although signed for a 50-year period, focus on the short-term need for capabilities. A number of crucial questions therefore remain. What will happen when the British and French economies recover? Will the two countries’ strategic differences re-emerge? Will they return to old habits of more protectionism and nationalism in the defence realm? Will both governments gradually abandon the increased financial imperative in defence spending recently induced by budgetary austerity? (p. 18)

As a partial response, Jones (2011) cited the overarching political, military, and industrial considerations that are critical to London and Paris, commenting,

For now, Franco-British defence cooperation is driven primarily by an aspiration in both countries to retain access to a full spectrum of military capabilities, sufficient to contribute strategic effect and retain credibility in the eyes of the United States, and therefore NATO. A secondary motive is to sustain their national defence capabilities for core sovereign obligations. A third is to contribute to bilateral and European missions, as well as to sustain general European military capabilities for an uncertain future. (p. 21)

Rationale: Practical Defence Cooperation

It also can be argued that the intentions behind this latest Anglo-French effort are quite practical and are focused on the need to simply maintain credible military capabilities. Jones (2011) stated that the motivation

is to maintain French and British aspirations to power projection and to military credibility in the eyes of the United States. The many similarities and shared vital interests of France and the UK underpin, but do not drive, the initiative. The end-goal is to retain access to military capability, whether that is through mutual dependence on each other’s industrial base and armed forces, or through pooling and sharing capability. (p. 5)

Reinforcing the point that there are practical aspects to the cooperation, Jones (2011) asserted that although London and Paris want to be seen as credible partners by Washington, national sovereignty is also a key consideration. The UK and France are driven by the motivation of retaining access “to a full range of capabilities to pursue independent foreign policies” (Jones, 2011, p. 8).

Echoing the point of practical areas for developing capabilities, one UK official commented that there is potential with regard to better Anglo-French cooperation in areas such as joint support and training. There could be more use of simulators, for example, as well as opportunities for sharing facilities. With regard to practical examples of defence cooperation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS; 2010b) noted that the UK and France have an agreement to develop a common support plan for the A-400M transport, and there is discussion of an arrangement whereby France could use some of the extra capacity in the UK Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft.
Political Leadership Is Key

There appears to be widespread agreement that political leadership in London and Paris is essential to making bilateral cooperation work. That certainly was the case in previous agreements, such as St. Malo, which also highlighted the significance of the rationale (at least from the UK perspective) behind pursuing greater Anglo-French defence cooperation. With regard to St. Malo, Bickerton (2010) noted that “the wars in Yugoslavia and rising tensions in Kosovo had pushed Tony Blair towards a Franco-British defence agreement in order to enhance the EU's capabilities for intervention” (p. 120). Shearer (2000) concurred that the Bosnia crisis was a “major challenge to Britain’s defence identity” (p. 288) and strengthened “Britain’s sense of belonging to a European political community.” Later, the Kosovo crisis was a key factor for Blair, as it made apparent “Europe’s relative military impotence” (Shearer, 2000, p. 293).

The St. Malo example highlights two issues. The first issue is whether Anglo-French defence cooperation can survive if bilateral relations are strained over other issues. As noted by one writer, the St. Malo spirit was dashed by the sharp policy divisions regarding Iraq and reflected the divergent political views in London and Paris (Howorth, 2003, p. 188). The results of the initial test for the 2010 agreement would seem to provide grounds for optimism. Even after the critical dispute over the package to support the Euro, the results of the 2012 Anglo-French Summit were quite positive.

The second issue is the extent to which this bilateral push is a creation of the political leadership. If that is indeed the case, that raises the two questions of (1) whether bilateral cooperation has become embedded as business as usual in the two bureaucracies, and (2) whether it can survive a change in leadership. The mixed views on the first question are provided later. On the second question, this leads, from the UK perspective, to the immediate question of the extent to which French enthusiasm will continue if Sarkozy does not stay on as President. Writing about the French return to the NATO-integrated military command, Bickerton (2010) noted that from the UK perspective, there is a question of whether the French attitude regarding the U.S. and NATO “goes much further than the President himself and much will depend on whether or not Sarkozy is able to win a second term” (p. 117).

Addressing these issues, Arbuthnot stressed that the high-level political push on Anglo-French cooperation is essential, particularly with regard to bilateral commercial success. At summits, there is a drive to get deliverables and action. That has a direct impact on efforts that lead to industry taking concrete steps. That would certainly appear to be apparent in the various defence industrial initiatives announced in 2012.

Arbuthnot conceded that the difficulties regarding the Euro could well remain a critical factor, which leads to questions regarding the personal relationship between Cameron and Sarkozy. He emphasized, however, that the press always seizes on personal relationships as the decisive factor, while he believes the drive for bilateral cooperation goes deeper than that. Arbuthnot noted that when he and the Deputy Chair of the Defence Select Committee went to Paris soon after the dispute over the Euro, UK and French officials were very clearly determined to ensure that bilateral defence cooperation would continue.

On the question of the level of support for bilateral cooperation below the political leadership, O'Donoghue commented that there are lots of challenges and mistrust which must be overcome. He asserted that the MoD leadership has bought into Anglo-French cooperation. But with regard to farther down in the UK bureaucracies, the level of support is mixed, as some individuals are pro-U.S. and some are pro-Europe. O'Donoghue stressed
that the point is that these are not mutually exclusive but acknowledged that these differing views exist.

Taking a different perspective on the issue, a UK official noted that Anglo-French defence cooperation will work as well as the politicians want it to work. He cited as a good example the establishment of the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matière d'Armement (OCCAR), which was set up to handle the through-life management of collaborative European defence equipment programmes. The OCCAR has six European members, including the UK and France. The UK official noted that there was a big political push to establish the OCCAR and a lot of support at that time. The intention was to change European defence acquisition, and steps were taken quickly to achieve that goal. It had impressive results, and a treaty was concluded.

But then, noted the UK official, the politicians walked away and left it to the bureaucrats to manage; and in the absence of political leadership, the result was an ethos of not making decisions. Each country wanted to make things work in its own way, while no-one was there “to bang heads together.” The UK official commented that this would apply to any effort, and the key is whether there is real political support in London and Paris to make Anglo-French defence cooperation work.

And in the view of this UK official, this is still an open question. This could still be a case of just good words and not following up. Below the political level, there is a lot of scepticism in the UK MoD and UK defence industry about big ticket items, especially due to doubts about whether the Anglo-French initiative will be enduring. In addition, he reiterated the point that defence cooperation is subject to developments in non-defence areas, such as the Euro and elections.

On that count, Jones (2011) noted that “if bureaucratic and industrial obstacles can be overcome, there is a clear path to substantial cost savings and interoperability gains” (p. 35). However, he appears to agree with O’Donoghue and the UK official that there is a risk that the Anglo-French effort could flounder due to simple bureaucratic inertia:

Ministries of Defence in both London and Paris have highly effective 'immune systems', notorious for rejecting new ideas. It can be challenging enough to embed change within the confines of a single department, never mind across different departments in two different countries. It is only natural that such a process will meet resistance from those who will tend to protect their functions and be cautious of different ways of working. (Jones, 2011, p. 33)

**Impact of Libya**

It is apparent that the Anglo-French efforts in the military operation regarding Libya have been a shot in the arm for bilateral defence cooperation. Nick Harvey, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, told a UK Parliamentary Committee that Anglo-French cooperation on Libya was “undoubtedly . . . a significant success” (IISS, 2011b). He went on to note that “we are pleased to have demonstrated the ability of the UK and France to act together in a leading role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for the future.”

Certainly, there were positive aspects of the Libya experience. For example, there was solid UK-French air and maritime cooperation. However, commentators noted that the Libya campaign exposed the problems that remain in bilateral military cooperation. There were difficulties in communications, different concepts of operation, gaps in intelligence sharing, and a problem with aligning political ambition and military capabilities. Perhaps most important were the problems in sharing classified information. Whether that particular issue can be resolved can come down to the question of whether the UK can expand its
exchanges with Paris while not risking its arrangements with Washington (IISS, 2011b). Jones (2011) noted that there are agreements in place between the UK and France to share intelligence, but they are “lower-key” (p. 13), and Lindley-French noted that “enhanced intelligence-sharing will be critical” to enhanced bilateral cooperation, and was noticeable by its absence in the 2010 agreement (p. 16).

Taking a larger perspective on the lessons from the Libya experience, Arbuthnot noted that the U.S. took a positive step by giving Europeans the opportunity to take the lead. Ultimately, the U.S. provided assistance when it became necessary to address European shortfalls. But the Libya operation, stressed Arbuthnot, reminded Europeans of their obligations, highlighted the gaps in their military capabilities, and subsequently allowed the U.S. to press Europe to fill those gaps.

**Practical Impediments**

The commentary on weaknesses in intelligence sharing during Libya operations highlights some of the practical difficulties with enhancing defence cooperation. For example, there continue to be comments about the extent to which the UK and France might be able to work together with regard to their aircraft carriers. One area the 2010 agreement cited is the development of an integrated carrier strike group. The UK decided in its SDSR that it would continue with the construction of two carriers, but potentially bring only one into service. Some commentators have noted that the UK decision to get the F-35C carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter might allow the UK’s F-35Cs to land on the French Charles de Gaulle (IISS, 2010a).

Assessing such an idea, O'Donoghue asked what kind of Anglo-French cooperation on aircraft carriers was really possible. He asked, as a practical matter, whether there is enough room on the carriers for combined crews. O'Donoghue noted that when he saw how the U.S. carrier George Washington operated, it appeared to be chaos, but it worked due to years of training. With any combination of Anglo-French planes and carriers, there would be the same kind of chaos, but without the years of training. A French carrier alongside a UK carrier would be a separate issue, added O'Donoghue. But he questioned whether it is really realistic to try to fly two different types of aircraft off of one carrier.

Continuing on with the issue of practical impediments and addressing it at a higher level, O'Donoghue noted that the French budget and financial system is different from that of the UK. While the larger goal may be to come together, the two processes are different, and that has an impact. The key, stressed O'Donoghue, is to find the common ground that allows possible solutions and cooperation to go forward.

**Multinational Defence Cooperation in General**

Before turning from the area of practical defence cooperation to defence industrial cooperation, it is worthwhile to assess the general UK experience with regard to multinational defence industrial cooperation. In general, the UK record on multinational defence acquisition has been beneficial to the UK. A 2001 report from the National Audit Office (NAO; 2001), cited by a UK official as still the best assessment on benefits to the UK of multinational defence cooperation, noted that cooperation in defence research offers economic and technology benefits, generating a 5:1 return on the Department’s £40 million annual investment on joint research programmes and providing knowledge with an annual value of approximately £280 million at minimal cost through information exchange programmes. (p. 1)
In general terms, the NAO (2001) assessed that cooperative defence acquisition can bring economic benefits due to cost-sharing and economies of scale. Moreover, it can enhance interoperability with allies as well as develop technological competence and influence industrial restructuring (NAO, 2001, p. 1). With regard to the OCCAR, the NAO (2001) noted that it offers “the opportunity for significant improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of European cooperative procurement” (p. 35). It commented that the OCCAR was intended to serve as the body that would place contracts, manage cooperative European acquisition programs, and generate European cooperative military programmes.

However, it is notable that the overall conclusions by the NAO (2001) on multinational defence cooperation are that cooperation adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of procuring equipments within time, cost and performance parameters and subsequently supporting them in-service. The track record of defence equipment cooperation to date has been mixed. Whilst there have been economic, political, military and industrial benefits, on significant numbers of cooperative procurement programmes, not all of the potential benefits have been secured. (p. 5)

**Industrial Cooperation Is Key**

As noted previously, the 2012 Summit declaration placed great emphasis on bilateral defence industrial cooperation, and the case can be made that industrial cooperation may, over the long haul, be more valuable than practical military cooperation. For that reason, it is notable that “the treaties have been warmly received by the defence industries of both countries” (Gomis, 2011, p. 16).

One of the goals of expanded bilateral cooperation was to provide some support for defence industries in both countries, which are facing reduced defence spending. As some commentators noted, “By moving closer to commonly set equipment requirements, the treaty was intended to promote stepped-up cross-channel industrial ties between the two nations' defence-aerospace sectors” (IISS, 2011b).

At the lower level, noted a UK official, there have been successful bilateral projects. However, they do not get much attention, citing marine engines as a good example. They are not high-profile items, but they are built on an existing relationship, and there is a solid commercial basis for the work. Cooperation works, emphasized the official, but because of that commercial logic. Critically, this removes the bureaucracy as a hindrance. Citing another example, the UK official asserted that MBDA is a good and more prominent example of a result of Anglo-French political commitment.

The question arises as to whether Anglo-French industrial cooperation actually is possible across the board or might have to be limited to smaller, non-controversial areas such as marine engines and, if it has broader applicability, how would the UK and France establish “red lines” to protect national interests? Is it a case of deciding the items that are appropriate for cooperation? Or is it a case of establishing processes to limit activities, such as information sharing? O’Donoghue came down strongly in favour of deciding the specific items, emphasizing that “if you select the right equipment, there are no red lines. If there are red lines, you have pushed the wrong equipment.”

**Impediments to Industrial Cooperation**

But if the critical long-term aspect of Anglo-French cooperation is on defence procurement, there are numerous obstacles, as commentators have noted. One commentator, Carre (2001), wrote soon after St. Malo that
sensible defence procurement between Britain and France means that those two proud and sometimes arrogant nations have to concede political, technical and manufacturing grounds to one another and accept some form of loss of independence, concessions on foreign policy, intrusions in the shaping of industry, and last but not least the inevitable jobs casualties, a price that fewer and fewer politicians are prepared to pay. (p. 6)

There are clear differences in the views on defence procurement. France has “traditionally retained a protectionist attitude towards its defence sector, which is in large part owned by the state, in line with the country’s tradition of Colbertian economic policies in which the central government retains a central role” (Gomis, 2011, p. 17). The UK approach has been to allow for the defence market to be free. Moreover, while France’s industrial relations “are more oriented towards Europe,” UK industries retain strong ties with the U.S. market (Gomis, 2011, p. 17).

As Carre (2001) noted, UK defence procurement is “a clear means to a clear end—that is to equip the defence forces” (p. 7). On the other hand, Carre (2001) noted that the French policy aim is being pro-active in contributing to the building of a European defence base with a strong French footprint. This is mainly to be able to compete and/or establish partnerships with U.S. companies, on an equal foothold. The means to achieve this goal remains a direct interventionist policy, enforced by an elite administration. Thus, French defence procurement has been and remains an element to achieve this ultimate political goal of creating a European defence force equipped with, at worst, inter-operable systems and, at best, the same weapons... In such an environment, economic rationale, efficiency and defence companies’ profits have been, for some years, the least of the concerns for the French State. (p. 7)

Moreover, there are fundamental conflicts between the behaviours of the two countries regarding defence acquisition. A UK official noted that there are differences in the way the two countries approach efforts at defence cooperation. The UK declares its intention for cooperation early. In contrast, the French declare it late when they frankly have a solution they want others to buy into.

There are many practical hurdles to be overcome in obtaining greater defence industrial cooperation. Lindley-French noted that then-UK Defence Secretary Fox highlighted the need for UK firms to have better access to French military procurement projects (p. 17). For their part, the French “regard the British as unreliable partners, too subject to political whim and the sudden cancellation of or adjustment to programmes” (p. 17). Having said that, Lindley-French reinforced the point that even a cursory analysis of the defence economics and costs of production in Britain and France suggests that it is only through greater synergy between their defence industries that any MoDicum of affordability and security of supply and re-supply will be assured. (p. 17)

Arbuthnot concurred with many of the points noted above. France has a directed industrial strategy, and the French government owns a good chunk of the French defence industry. The UK does not have that kind of ownership pattern, and the UK defence market is open. But Arbuthnot emphasized that these are not insurmountable obstacles, and the value of the bilateral defence cooperation should be considerable and can overcome those obstacles, stressing that there is a fundamental logic for Anglo-French cooperation.
Taking a different perspective, O’Donoghue commented that industry has to change, and the MoDs in London and Paris need to work to smooth the path. He noted that government cannot change the goals of industry, but it can influence how industry’s goals evolve. For example, the UK does not necessarily want the ability to cut steel for future armoured vehicles. What it needs is the ability to integrate complex systems and subsystems. If that is a clear government policy, industry will then change its perspective.

O’Donoghue also noted that this is even more important regarding larger policy issues. If the UK gives up a logistical capability, it cannot get it back, so the UK has to be clear about what it wants to do. Industry faces a similar situation. O’Donoghue stressed that a big request is being made of the UK defence industry. Will it get rid of 50% of its engineers? Will it actually rely on the French over the long haul?

Returning to the importance of leadership, a UK official emphasized that big political statements and commitments are critical to make better Anglo-French commercial relationships. If the political commitment is weakened, there can be work on minor, lower level items, but the big ticket projects will not happen, and this is precisely the area where Europe has expertise, perhaps even a comparative advantage and needs to focus its attention.

**Cutting-Edge Defence Technology**

The 2012 Summit declaration had a particular focus on Anglo-French high-tech defence cooperation. One of the areas in which there is particular emphasis is on UAVs. On MALE UAVs, commentators have noted that there is a business logic to the arrangement, as BAE Systems and Dassault have capabilities in the area, and their domestic markets would generate a market of only some 40–50 MALE UAVs (IISS, 2010b). Indeed, should MALE work, there is the possibility of more collaboration on unmanned combat air vehicles, and such work would probably be important to maintaining the skills of European industry (IISS, 2011b). Returning to the practical considerations noted above, what will be interesting to observe is whether this cooperation will be possible in light of competition in other areas, for example, after India selected the Rafale from Dassault over the Eurofighter from BAE Systems as its preferred choice for its new fighter in late 2011.

Certainly, the argument could be made that the French approach to long-term planning with regard to defence technology could appeal to the UK. As Carre (2001) noted, the French MoD has upwards of a 30-year prospective plan, which is updated annually (p. 9). In the case of the UK, the government reconfirmed through its white paper “National Security Through Technology” (MoD, 2012, p. 9) that it would maintain its baseline of spending 1.2% of its defence budget on science and technology (around £400 million annually).

In addition, Lindley-French highlighted the agreement concerning a 10-year strategic plan for the UK and French Complex Weapons sector, commenting that it “makes sense if it does lead to the creation of a single European prime contractor (and realizes 30% savings as envisaged)” (p. 17). A UK official noted that the UAV area is one in which France is trying to bring the UK into a joint venture and where there is potentially substantial growth. But harkening back to the point noted above, the broader cost to the UK has to be considered and a clear policy decision must be made.

Arbuthnot asserted that work in this high-tech area is important in a broader Western context. Large U.S. firms clearly have an advantage over European companies. But high-quality defence research is broadly needed, and that cannot be obtained with just small UK and French firms. Thus, there is logic to UK-French cooperation in this expensive, high-tech area. However, he conceded, although there are benefits of scale, there is also a natural
suspicion. There is a mutual concern in France and the UK that the other is stealing intellectual property. Those suspicions have to be overcome by openness, noted Arbuthnot, and both a top-down and bottom-up approach for further bilateral cooperation is needed to spur progress and generate that transparency. In that regard, Libya served as practical experience to increase that level of trust and obtain more openness by both sides.

O'Donoghue commented that three years ago, it was clear to officials in the UK and France that more industrial cooperation, in general, would be mutually beneficial. Citing complex weapons specifically, he said there are clear options, and it is far too expensive for each country to work in this area separately. True, he noted, the UK could simply have bought high-tech U.S. equipment. But the other option was to have an arrangement between Paris and London, with each spending as much as possible to generate an Anglo-French complex weapons capability.

It took a long time for defence industries in the UK and France to recognise the benefits of such collaboration, admitted O'Donoghue. He concurred with the point Arbuthnot made about obstacles due to attitudes and behaviours. But he asserted that a lot of the problem may have been due to media hype about potential conflicts. Addressing practical problems, O'Donoghue cited intellectual property rights and third party sales, commenting that London and Paris have to generate arrangements to smooth obstacles in these and other areas for industry.

Perhaps most important, up to this point, noted O'Donoghue, is that industry has not put its weight behind Anglo-French cooperation. It will be interesting to see whether they are ready to do so from now on. In short, asserted O'Donoghue, it is not clear whether industry has “crossed the Rubicon” and is ready to embrace bilateral cooperation; but in his view, they certainly need to do so. Industry, he asserted flatly, has to get that message.

Reaction of Other Europeans

The Anglo-French agreement has not been met with universal approval, especially as it involves the two largest defence budgets in Europe seeking to cooperate more with each other, rather than working to develop European capabilities. Gomis (2011) notes that “reactions in Berlin have demonstrated Germany’s unease over an exclusive Franco-British agreement” (p. 14). A UK official agreed that Anglo-French cooperation has generated tensions within the rest of Europe. Italy and others are “incensed.” But he added that the question to be asked of the other Europeans is simple: who has the money?

Consideration has now turned to the question of whether the bilateral efforts could potentially provide an impetus to a larger European effort to generate defence capabilities. One writer commented that “given the difficulties encountered in defence procurement in the past decade, the Franco-British treaties can nonetheless be seen as a first salutary step towards more joint action in European defence procurement” (Gomis, 2011, p. 17). Lindley-French argued that

Anglo-French defence cooperation would be a pioneer group par excellence for the rest of Europe. Thus permanent structured cooperation and reinforced cooperation, as stipulated in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, would assist Britain and France to create a European strategic culture worthy of the name. (p. 14)

One commentator noted that “the enhancement of Franco-British common efforts will benefit the EU by stemming the deterioration of British and French military capabilities, on which EU deployments rely” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 428). The effort has significance as London is “particularly exasperated by its European partners inertia; but even in Paris
frustrations are mounting” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 428) regarding the absence of effort in the rest of Europe to maintain defence capabilities.

Arriving at a similar destination through a different route, Jones (2011) asserted that the primary motivation for the Anglo-French initiative is “not to produce a greater or more effective ‘European’ military capability” (p. 5). He noted that it could possibly “cause divisions among European states if the Franco-British relationship is seen as too exclusive and not sufficiently concerned with wider European security” (p. 5). However, Jones (2011) also noted that Anglo-French cooperation could indeed be “a road-map to more effective European defence cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency” (p. 5). Indeed, taking the point further, he noted that unless Europe ascertains “how, and, indeed, whether, the initiatives that France and the UK embark on can work in practice, wider European defence cooperation has little hope of delivering anything” (Jones, 2011, pp. 5–6).

It is notable that there is speculation that the request for proposals for the MALE UAV could be open to other European (as well as possibly U.S) firms (IISS, 2011b), and there is the possibility that broader cooperation could be expanded. However, other commentators note that the UK has been burned by multinational European projects like the A-400M and will not be enthusiastic about such expanded projects (IISS, 2011b).

Indeed, it appears that the UK has had enough of projects involving a number of European partners. A commentator from the IISS (2011a) stated, “Having tired of the delays and haggling that often accompany multilateral European procurements, the UK now firmly prefers collaborative procurement on a bilateral basis.” Jones (2011) noted that there is “a pragmatic assumption that bilateralism between ‘natural partners’ ought to work more effectively than a multilateral approach” (p. 8). He added that the UK “now prefers bilateral programmes as a matter of policy, on the grounds that they are more ‘straightforward’” (Jones, 2011, p. 15).

The trend of UK reluctance to participate in Europe-wide defence efforts, which had already begun under the previous Labour government, has continued. Although there are many factors, it has been argued that the principal motivating force is

the belief, widely held in government and military circles, that efforts in this direction are an inefficient use of Britain’s limited resources—a belief resulting from years of frustrations at the lack of serious commitment to defence on the part of many European countries. (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 420)

Then-UK Defence Secretary Fox stated in September 2011 that the Anglo-French arrangement will not be copied between the UK and other Europeans, stating, “The UK-French agreement is not a prototype for wider European defence, but I do think it might be useful in setting an example to other European nations who want to work closely together” (Bell, 2011). That view reflects the fact that the SDSR only specifically cited France (MoD, p. 60) along with the U.S. as countries with which the UK would be working assiduously to strengthen bilateral efforts.

In line with the points above, Arbuthnot commented that it is too early to say if there would be more European initiatives as a result of the Anglo-French agreement. He thought that European efforts would probably expand a little as a result but emphasized that the extent of the expansion depends on how others are willing to go along with the Anglo-French framework. Arbuthnot firmly noted that it is definitely not desirable to have a new framework that destroys the UK-French arrangement.
The main idea, stressed Arbuthnot, is to get the two big European countries to work together. If bringing in others means the dilution of Anglo-French cooperation, this would not be acceptable. Other European states should decide whether to join the existing arrangement. As it stands, he noted, Italy is “cross” about the Anglo-French cooperation, Spain is not happy, and Germany would like to be involved. With regard to defence industrial cooperation, it must be based on an arrangement between the UK and France, or British and French firms, with other European states or firms then joining.

O’Donoghue concurred strongly with Arbuthnot, stating that he dislikes multinational projects but supports bilateral programmes. Mistakes in past efforts on joint cooperation could and should be fixed. But with regard to future European efforts in defence cooperation, the Anglo-French path is the one and only road that should be followed.

It is important to note that other analysts who share that view believe this means the death of any European efforts to maintain a defence capability and acknowledgment that only bilateral efforts will work. O’Donnell (2011) argued that the agreement “could come to symbolize the demise of EU defence efforts” as “the summit took place against the backdrop of a loss of interest in the CSDP within Paris and, to an even greater extent, London” (p. 433).

It appears for that very reason to be in the interest of the U.S. that Anglo-French defence cooperation proceed. It is arguably the only way in which European defence capabilities can be maintained. O’Donnell (2011) noted that “little demonstration is required of the hollowness of EU defence cooperation without the full support of Britain and France” (p. 428) and flatly stated that

EU defence efforts are doomed to flounder if there is no enthusiasm from the only two EU countries with extensive experience in expeditionary warfare and global ambitions in security, and which between them account for nearly half of Europe’s defence spending. (p. 429)

U.S. Interest

And therein lies the reason for the U.S. to support the Anglo-French efforts and hope that they will succeed. To return to the paper topic, the implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French cooperation are quite clear: they constitute the best hope of providing a vehicle or framework for European Allies to develop defence capabilities. With European defence budgets having shrunk over the last decade, economic difficulties making it unlikely that there will be any major increases in the near future, and an absence of political will to spend large sums on defence, one hope for the U.S. of getting more defence capabilities out of its European Allies is that others will join an effort driven by London and Paris.

Commentators have noted that one of the key conditions for success for the Anglo-French treaty includes the “support of the United States, based on the understanding that the Franco-British treaties do not clash with its global role but will rather reinforce it” (Gomis, 2011, p. 4). Gomis (2011) added later that “Washington may be tempted to view this partnership as competition, but it is very unlikely to be the case” and asserted that “the Franco-British treaties are useful for European defence and should not be opposed” (p. 12). Indeed, the argument is made that the U.S. “has a crucial role to play in making the case for the treaties and other examples of bilateral cooperation that would benefit both NATO and the EU” (p. 19).

Indeed, Prime Minister Cameron emphasized the benefit of the treaty to U.S. interests when he stated that “they want European countries like France and Britain to come together and share defence resources so that we actually have greater capabilities. . . . So I
think this will get a very warm welcome in Washington” (Gomis, 2011, p. 11). One commentator asserted that “it is generally recognized that Washington perceives the Anglo-French Defence Treaty as a potential catalyst for creating the greater cooperation on conventional capabilities in Europe” (Stevens, 2011, p. 4).

Those who are particularly critical about European capabilities focus on the possibilities in the Anglo-French treaty. Lindley-French frankly noted that “the central challenge for both Britain and France is that much of the European continent remains on strategic vacation” (p. 9). Continuing on, he argued that “at the very least, Anglo-French defence cooperation will need to regenerate a European strategic culture” (p. 9). He also made the point that the Anglo-French Treaty

only makes political sense if it is seen as an attempt to kick-start Europe as a whole into considering its strategic future; and that will require a degree of political solidarity and consistency for which neither London nor Paris are renowned. (Lindley-French, p. 4)

He bluntly stated that “Franco-British defence cooperation is thus not just vital for London and Paris but for a Europe that is dangerously and strategically adrift” (p. 5).

Arbuthnot also asserted that the U.S. should encourage Anglo-French cooperation, noting that it is likely to maximise defence output for the UK and France, which would benefit the U.S. And it could increase the defence output of other European countries if others are willing to sign on to the Anglo-French framework. Arbuthnot commented that his hope is that the U.S. will welcome the idea that Allies are working together to increase military capabilities. As for what concrete steps it should take with regard to Anglo-French cooperation, Arbuthnot stated that the U.S. could simply take “a benign watching brief.”

O’Donoghue echoed the point that Anglo-French cooperation is not an either/or situation vis-à-vis the U.S. If Europe “gets its act together,” it would be better for the U.S. Indeed, O’Donoghue said that his message to the U.S. would be that both the UK and France will both be better allies for the U.S. if they engaged in more robust defence cooperation. Without collaboration, they will just lose capabilities and it will be harder to generate more efficient use of resources.

He went on to posit that it may be better for the West to have different capabilities. O’Donoghue stressed that the UK and France have superb engineers. Indeed, some UK equipment and technology is better than that produced in the U.S. And in some capability areas, noted O’Donoghue, made in the U.S.A is not necessarily the best label, and a European label might be better. The U.S. should welcome an Anglo-French military-industry capability, posited O’Donoghue. Europe is not big enough to have national defence industrial competition. But pan-European competition is possible. An Anglo-French effort could compete on complex weapons, and other areas. The U.S. government ought to welcome this cooperation as strengthening Allied capabilities, even if U.S. industry is not enthused.

Conclusion

From the literature, public statements, interviews, and, above all, actions, it is clear that the U.S. has little, if any, reason for concern regarding enhanced Anglo-French defence cooperation. Any fears that this would signal a weakening of attention by the UK towards the U.S. appear groundless. This latest initiative is driven by practical considerations: reduced defence budgets require London and Paris to find new ways to get more bang for the buck. There are policy factors that promote enhanced cooperation. The French return to the NATO-integrated military command and the policies generally pursued by the Sarkozy
government have made it easier for London to seek greater bilateral efforts, and it should be noted that the clearly stated U.S. shift in emphasis towards Asia has also prompted the UK to re-evaluate the extent to which it needs to focus more on European Allies, which could really assist in generating defence capabilities.

It would appear that the primary U.S. concern lies in how to ensure that the Anglo-French initiative succeeds. If it does indeed meet the goals that have been set forth, it would assist London and Paris in becoming more capable Allies and moving beyond that goal; it would be in the interest of the U.S. if the Anglo-French cooperation could be the foundation for other European states to also participate and develop their military capabilities. U.S. dissatisfaction with the overall European effort in the Libyan campaign was apparent across Europe. However, there is no indication that European governments are ready to do more on defence, especially with continued economic problems in the Eurozone.

From a U.S. policy perspective, the recommendation from Arbuthnot is relatively straightforward and worth consideration: Washington should simply watch the developments. It is hard to imagine active U.S. support for more Anglo-French cooperation, particularly as such work on the industrial side might generate negative commentary from U.S. defence industry. Moreover, it is hard to imagine such U.S. support having much effect, particularly in view of the lack of response in European capitals to the constant U.S. requests for European Allies to do more in developing military capabilities.

However, if the U.S. is genuinely concerned about the level of European military spending and, more important, the extent of the military capabilities that Allies can bring to any future operations, it has a vested interest in seeing Anglo-French cooperation succeed and serve as a vehicle for other Europeans to develop their military forces. Criticism from Washington will have a difficult time overcoming the lack of political will and financial resources in European capitals for effective national action. The Anglo-French efforts may at least provide a vehicle for channeling scarce resources into more effective defence spending. Although that may yet turn out to be more of a hope than reality, it is certainly in line with U.S. defence and security policy interests, and worthy of support.

References


Implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation

David Moore/Pete Ito/Peter Antill/Stuart Young/Kevin Burgess
Cranfield University

Acquisition Research Symposium
May 16-17, 2012
Summary

• The cooperation is driven by significant defence spending cuts.

• There are efforts regarding practical military cooperation.

• A promising area involves increased defence industrial cooperation.

• The leadership of the two countries is committed; there are mixed signals in the bureaucracies; the issue is if defence industries have bought in.

• The UK wants Anglo-French projects to which other European countries can sign on; no more multinational efforts like the A-400M.

• The hope is that the U.S. will not try to kill it.

• It is one of the few initiatives so Europe can get decent capabilities out of declining defence budgets.
To Be Clear

• France has no friends, only interests -- Charles de Gaulle

• We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual . . .
   Lord Palmerston
Defence Spending

• In 2010, UK defence budget was 43.5 billion Euros.
• French defence budget was 39 billion Euros.
• Combined budgets are now about half of all European defence spending.
• About 75% of all defence R&D spending.
• By 2015, combined budget could be 2/3 of all European defence spending.
Defence Spending Cuts

• In the UK, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review mandated a cut of around 8% in UK defence spending in real terms over four years.
• In France, Defence Minister Morin announced a reduction of 3% out of the defence budget, which cut across a range of capabilities.
• One writer notes that "a senior French military officer believes that the defence cuts in France in future are likely to be 'unprecedented' with 'big decisions' on major programmes necessary"
Libya 2011

• There was solid UK-French air and maritime cooperation.
• However, Libya exposed the problems which remain in bilateral military cooperation.
• There were difficulties in communications, different concepts of operation, gaps in intelligence sharing and a problem with aligning political ambition and military capabilities.
• Perhaps most important were the problems in sharing classified information.
Libya – Steps To Be Taken

• As noted in 2012 UK-France Summit Declaration.
• Prioritise joint work in the key areas of: command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions.
• Reinforced the desire to set up the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force.
• Will establish a Combined Joint Forces Headquarters by 2016.
National Sovereignty

• Cooperative efforts are needed so the UK and France can be credible partners to the U.S.
• They are also driven by the need to have the capabilities to pursue independent foreign policies.
Depth of Relationship

• This must have political support from the highest level and be driven by the leadership.

• However, it is an open question with mixed signals on whether it is taking root in the bureaucracies.

• The big question is if defence industry believes in cooperation.
Defence Equipment - 1

• 2012 Summit cited the most concrete results in areas of defence equipment.
• The desire for cooperation on UAVs was made clear with specific projects.
• With regard to the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, the two leaders announced they would place with BAE Systems and Dassault a jointly funded contract to study the technical risks associated with the MALE UAV
• France also confirmed its interest for the UK Watchkeeper system with an evaluation by France to begin this year.
Defence Equipment - 2

- Will establish in 2013 a joint Future Combat Air System Demonstration Programme.
- Contract let to MBDA in December 2011 for two initial studies on a future cruise and an anti-ship weapon.
- Intention to sign a contract in coming months for development and manufacture of the Future Anti-ship Guided Weapon.
Industrial Complications

• UK and French systems are fundamentally different.
• Role of government in France is much more than in UK.
• Can those practical hurdles be overcome by government?
• Will UK industry in particular accept the risks and buy in?
Basis for European Cooperation

- From the UK perspective, there will be Anglo-French agreements.
- Other European countries can then sign on.
- No more multinational efforts like A-400M.
- Other European states are not happy with Anglo-French agreement.
U.S. Interest

• It is in the U.S. interest to hope that Anglo-French efforts succeed.
• It is one of the few initiatives that could get more military capabilities out of declining European defence spending.
• A “benign watching brief” by the U.S. may be all that is needed.
• But the UK and France certainly hope that the U.S. does not act against it.