Information Operations and Public Affairs: A Union of Influence

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Class of 2012

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# Information Operations and Public Affairs: A Union of Influence

**Abstract**

The roles and responsibilities of public affairs and information operations can be complimentary. When the two functions are properly integrated, the unity of the communication effort supports the commander. Although public affairs and information operations are strategically designed to cover the battle space with overlapping fields of fire that both inform and influence audiences, gaps may exist. Both public affairs and information operations have defined mission sets and are necessarily separated by doctrine, regulation, law and self-induced checks. This separation can lead to a gap or space where the enemy may operate unopposed. Additionally, many information operations functions require public affairs support to succeed. And if not carefully managed, information operations plans may be compromised or rendered ineffective if public affairs and information operations do not properly integrate because of perceived or real doctrinal or legal issues. This research paper explores the extent to which information operations and public affairs functions are integrated in current operations. It concludes with recommendations for synchronizing public affairs and information operations efforts in future operations.

**Subject Terms**

Strategic Communication, Propaganda, Media Relations

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**Security Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS: A UNION OF INFLUENCE

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The roles and responsibilities of public affairs and information operations can be complimentary. When the two functions are properly integrated, the unity of the communication effort supports the commander. Although public affairs and information operations are strategically designed to cover the battle space with overlapping fields of fire that both inform and influence audiences, gaps may exist. Both public affairs and information operations have defined mission sets and are necessarily separated by doctrine, regulation, law and self-induced checks. This separation can lead to a gap or space where the enemy may operate unopposed. Additionally, many information operations functions require public affairs support to succeed. And if not carefully managed, information operations plans may be compromised or rendered ineffective if public affairs and information operations do not properly integrate because of perceived or real doctrinal or legal issues. This research paper explores the extent to which information operations and public affairs functions are integrated in current operations. It concludes with recommendations for synchronizing public affairs and information operations efforts in future operations.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS: A UNION OF INFLUENCE

Today, information management is as important as maneuver and fires, from the psychological-operations campaign you conduct to the way you handle the media. And it isn’t just the U.S. media, with their impact on public opinion and inside-the-beltway decision making.¹

—Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC, following Operation RESTORE HOPE

Sun Tzu used information operations even if he didn’t refer to it as information operations. He understood the importance of information, of an integrated military strategy, and of a coherent message to his adversary: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”² Information operations is not new; what is relatively new is the formal Department of Defense designation of information operations as a core military competency. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, asserts “Information Operations is integral to the successful execution of military operations.”³ Around the world, the Department of Defense is engaged in information operations on global computer networks and electronic systems.

The factual reporting of military operations and missions, good or bad, has been recorded since Thucydides first put pen to paper to chronicle the Peloponnesian Wars. This reporting continues today with modern public affairs.⁴

Through the responsive release of accurate information and imagery to domestic and international audiences, public affairs puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations, helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts, and contributes to the achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives.⁵

The roles and responsibilities of public affairs and information operations can be complimentary. When the two functions are properly integrated, the unity of the communication effort supports the commander. Although public affairs and information
operations are strategically designed to cover the battle space with overlapping fields of
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Background

Information technology is exploding into what many are calling an information
revolution.6 This explosion is profoundly affecting all aspects of our lives, including the
conduct of U.S. military operations.7 Military activities in all domains are affected by
information. Information has always been important in military operations, even
decisive. This will not change. What is new is the speed and volume of information
available to military commanders on a near real-time basis from a diverse variety of
sources. Information arriving from so many sources requires improved monitoring and
analysis capability. Speed and volume of information are critical to successful
operations. But instant, voluminous information is also a double-edged sword
threatening to overwhelm commanders’ ability to process data and act effectively in a
timely manner.8
Although military integration of strategic communication has taken place in the past, such as during peace keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Pentagon did not have an established organization responsible for strategic communication when the Global war on terror began. Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense made one of the first attempts to formalize and coordinate the concept of integrated strategic communications when it set up an Office of Strategic Influence. However, this office was ultimately shut down after a February 2002 *New York Times* article accused the office of propagandizing the American public and utilizing the press to spread misinformation and falsehoods.

The proper employment of the U.S. military’s various capabilities for providing information to public audiences has been the subject of extensive discussion. Much of this deliberation has centered on the distinction between public affairs and all other information activities that are usually grouped under the doctrinal umbrella of information operations. The *New York Times* warned of “blurring the traditional lines” between public affairs and information operations, thereby “leaving the American public and a world audience skeptical of anything the Defense Department and military say, a repeat of the credibility gap that roiled America during the Vietnam War.” This issue has permeated our military from the top of the military command structure down to the boots on the ground. In 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning about the risks of integrating public affairs and information operations. And in 2005, the Public Relations Society of America publicly advocated a “firewall separation between information operations and public affairs.”
As planners, senior staff officers, commanders, and strategic leaders deliberate the roles of public affairs and information operations at the strategic and operational levels of war, they should consider the public context of the debate. Further, they should take into account the major factors shaping service views of both disciplines. Rather than simply defining how public affairs and information operations are either understood, or in many cases, misunderstood, our strategic leaders should take this opportunity to challenge some fundamental assumptions about the operational role of public communications.14

Analyzing the Problem

The role and importance of public affairs has been recognized by the Department of Defense and the individual services for decades. Major General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, recognized this after WWI when he stated,

The future success of the Marine Corps depends on two factors: first, an efficient performance of all duties to which its officers and men may be assigned; second, promptly bringing the efficiency to the attention of the proper officials of the Government, and the American people.15

In contrast, the role and importance of information operations, particularly in light of rapid technological improvements, has expanded and access to information outlets and dissemination venues has dramatically increased. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have provided positive direction, but the responsibility to organize, train, and equip remains with the services. This allows for the services to interpret the guidance and therefore organize differently. The conviction that public affairs and information operations are oil and water and do not mix is evident with a quick review of the current Marine Corps public affairs guidance, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.3, January 2000:
Marine Corps policy is to tell the truth as quickly as possible. That includes good news as well as bad. Public affairs is the discipline of communication that informs and educates. It is not designed to influence. Public affairs personnel often must work to separate public affairs from other informational efforts aimed at manipulating perceptions. Any deviation from the truth will destroy the credibility and effectiveness of Marine Corps public affairs operations and will negatively affect the institution.\textsuperscript{16}

This statement from MCWP 3-33.3 implies that information operations may operate in falsehoods that would destroy public affairs credibility with the press and publics at large. This also implies that public affairs should operate at a distance from information operations. However, in fact, information operations and public affairs functions can only effectively inform, influence, disrupt, degrade, or deny an adversary’s ability to make a decision if they work together in an integrated manner and enable commanders to achieve their strategic vision.

The recurring debate over public affairs and information operations is focused on public affairs credibility. This debate questions whether public affairs’ involvement in a broader strategic-information campaign will inherently damage the credibility of the military with media representatives and, by extension, with the audiences served by those media. In the opening scenes of the 2004 battle for Fallujah, public affairs issued a press release announcing that the attack would commence at dawn. The media broadly reported this operational detail. Consequently insurgents located throughout Fallujah moved to reinforce positions and occupy key points. Observers of these movements speculated the enemy was responding to the press release announcing the attack which was widely reported by the media. But when no hostilities commenced at dawn media representatives accused the public affairs officer of lying or using the press to achieve military objectives and thereby compromising the trust between the military and the press.\textsuperscript{17}
The media claimed that the public affairs officer’s credibility, and by extension the military’s, had been compromised by the military’s use of the press to create a military ruse to confuse the insurgents in the city. These accusations were levied even after media representatives were informed that coalition reconnaissance elements had in fact crossed the line of departure. So the siege had begun without a firefight.\(^\text{18}\) If reporters believe that public affairs staffs are using them to deceive the enemy, these reporters may view this deception as blatant dishonesty. Our military should not shy away from answering the reporter’s quandary: The military does not lie! Everything the public affairs staff releases is verifiable fact. All of operations, including public affairs and communications, are part of an overall military strategy. A war reporter knows that public communication is part of a military strategy; for a reporter to think otherwise he must believe that there will be a point reached when the military’s honesty becomes the victim of its objectives. This type of mistrust is at the center of the division and the debate.

Military conflicts since WWII have been politically divisive. Military operations from Vietnam to Somalia and now those in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly raise the stakes on all sides. But the historic truth is some version of the public affairs and information operations debate has been with us at least since the fourth century BCE, when Sun Tzu’s Art of War broadly characterized successful military strategy as a matter of deception. From ancient China to the front page of today’s newspaper, many observers still regard truth as the first casualty of war.\(^\text{19}\)

The conflict over who owns the rights to truth persists in the current global information environment. The media is always distrustful of military activities but these
tensions are not limited to media and the military. The conflict is also waged among various media outlets and rival private or public entities. Distortions, spins, and unverified facts abound amid media rivals. Advocacy for any organization’s version of the truth is commonplace. Against this backdrop of media distrust and perceived and mandated requirements for public affairs to separate themselves from other information activities, it should not be surprising that efforts to develop military public affairs and information operations capabilities suited to this environment have met with so much resistance. The tendency to resist, rejects, and flat-out legislate against proposals for a closer public affairs and information operations relationship is often grounded in a few critical areas. Strategic leaders should understand these issues and lead the way ahead for both disciplines.

The Challenges: Lies, Credibility, and Advocacy

Truth is one of the largest roadblocks cited by opponents of close operations between public affairs and information operations; they believe only a firewall between public affairs and information operations will assure the integrity and functionality of both. Contrary to opponents perceptions that the two disciplines serve entirely different moral ends. Public affairs officers are required by law to tell the truth and military information support operations do not rely on lies. “Psywarriors have found that ‘the truth is the best propaganda,’ says COL [Colonel] James Treadwell, [U.S. Army, the former] 4th [Psychological Operations] Group’s commander. Otherwise, ‘you lose credibility,’ he explains, and the audience tunes out.”

Only one highly specialized and compartmentalized discipline of information operations knowingly provides false information, properly designated as military deception. Even in this area falsehoods are so rarely used that the issue does not
merit much discussion. Most often, the objectives of deception are accomplished merely by allowing the enemy to reach his own wrong conclusions about observed facts. Deception operations are not focused on or used against populations or people. They are mounted to confuse individuals in positions to make decisions, such as adversary commanders or other political-decision makers. Military deception’s goal is to cause an individual to act in a manner advantageous to friendly forces on the basis of the facts he perceives. Additionally and in accordance with the Joint Doctrine for Deception Operations: “these operations will not intentionally target or mislead the U.S. public, the U.S. Congress, or the U.S. news media. Misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence U.S. decision-makers and public opinion violates Department of Defense policy.”

Military information support operations, formerly psychological operations, the largest component of information operations’ influence capabilities, provide factual information. Military information support operations are used to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. In any case, U.S. military information support operations do not spread false information or lies. The primary objective of military information support operations is to minimize the effects of an adversary’s hostile propaganda and disinformation campaign against U.S. forces. Discrediting an adversary’s propaganda or disinformation regarding the operations of U.S. and coalition forces is critical for maintaining favorable public opinion. Although methods of military information support operations often rely on emotional appeals more characteristic of
advertising than journalism, they do share the counter-propaganda mission with public affairs. Their audiences may differ, but not always.\textsuperscript{29}

Regardless of the true nature of information operations, even the perception of an association between information operations and public affairs is enough to destroy credibility. In her recent \textit{Military Review} article, Deputy Chief of Public Affairs Officer for U.S. Army Europe, Lieutenant Colonel Rumi Nielson-Green, U.S. Army, asserts that the public affairs officer who worked with information operations planners would have their credibility destroyed immediately, forever, and with everyone.\textsuperscript{30} Those opposed to the integration of information operations and public affairs view this issue absolute. However credibility is not absolute. An individual – or a representative of an organization – is not simply credible or not credible. Credibility is not something that one necessarily has or does not, it varies. Each situation will dictate its own credibility credentials or lack thereof. The credibility of different media outlets varies from spokesman to spokesman – and certainly from audience to audience. The credibility of an infantryman talking to Fox News differs from the credibility of a senior Pentagon official talking to al-Jazeera, even if they’re talking on the same day about similar topics. In the case of al-Jazeera, the credibility of the spokesperson is completely determined by the audience, the same way the credibility of Bill O’Reilly or Bill Maher is established by their audiences.

Second, to conclude that public communication cannot succeed and is outright doomed to failure without the unquestioned credibility of the outlet and spokesman clashes with the ironic overwhelming evidence that adversaries have enjoyed good, if not excellent, media success without being particularly truthful or knowledgeable about
any given incident. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, remarked in speech at Kansas State University that “It is just plain embarrassing that Al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.”

There is also the perception that the modern media are often more concerned with framing ideological conflict than with gaining credibility and conveying the truth. Many times the modern media outlets report what amounts to their own versions of the truth with impunity. Generally speaking, there is only one truth or correct reporting of a situation, although it may be subject to various perspectives and viewpoints.

There is little doubt that credibility is of great value. Audiences expect credible reporting. Most expect the military to report the truth and it does. Any perception that the military does not report truthfully is not in itself a reason to consider the two functions completely incompatible and force separation. It is paramount to continue in the perceptual challenge that the military is always engaged in with the public media as information operations and public affairs planners attempt to coexist in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment.

Media have been and continue to be very skeptical about successful coalition operations in recent conflicts. In fact, when public affairs officers report accurately on achievements of military objectives, some media reporters accuse the public affairs officers of having a political agenda. During Operation DESERT STORM The U.S. Marines welcomed journalists, but even this tried and true practice of the past seemed to have backfired. The media later charged that “it had been unwittingly co-opted into an elaborate deception designed to draw attention to the Marine amphibious force off the
coast—a force that the joint commander in chief, General Norman Schwarzkopf, did not intend to employ—so as to distract the Iraqis from the true objectives.\textsuperscript{35}

During WWII, public affairs reported that the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army, under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., participated in eight major operations and gave new meaning to "hard charging, hard hitting, mobile warfare."\textsuperscript{36} The Third Army's swift and tenacious drive into and through France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria contributed immeasurably to the destruction of the Nazi war machine of Adolph Hitler's Germany. The Third Army liberated or captured 81,522 square miles of territory. An estimated 12,000 cities, towns, and communities were liberated or captured, including 27 cities of more than 50,000 in population. Third Army captured 765,483 prisoners of war; 515,205 of the enemy surrendered during the last week of the war to make a total of 1,280,688 POW's processed by the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army. The enemy lost an estimated 1,280,688 captured, 144,500 killed, and 386,200 wounded, adding up to a total of 1,811,388 casualties.\textsuperscript{37}

Contrasting the report, above, with a more recent report from Iraq creates reason for concern. During a superb performance by Marines and soldiers in Fallujah, U.S. forces suffered 476 casualties, about 8\% of the total assault force, a low but not insignificant loss for two weeks of combat. Additionally, a large number of U.S. troops were wounded and returned to duty in Iraq, about 45\% overall. For example, I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander, Lieutenant General John Sattler, reported that 170 troops had been wounded seriously, and 490 Marines and soldiers suffered wounds but were able to return to duty. This resulted in actual wounded at more than 1,200 men,
20% of the assault forces, a casualty rate that is not significantly lower than historical precedents. In both reports, the facts are correct, political neutrality is maintained, and credibility is intact. The difference is that the WWII report advocates for military success, and the Iraq report does not.

In the case of the current conflict, reality speaks for itself. The military forces help gather or report the preponderance of bad news from Iraq and Afghanistan. Public affairs should be proponents of the military; they should also exhibit a proper balance when dealing with the press and telling the military’s story. However, according to Major Tadd Sholtis, U.S. Air Force, in his *Air and Space Power Journal* article, there is a difference between seeking balance and taking sides. America’s elected officials and leaders make the decision to commit military forces. Following those decisions, honest attempts by military communicators to convince various audiences that those forces are making a difference are often better interpreted as part of a strategy for mission success, not as political cronyism.

The military is morally and ethically bound to conduct truthful and faithful public affairs operations. The military’s civic duty is to report honestly and accurately. A casualty count is a fact. A criminal charge against Marines in Fallujah committing homicide on non-combatants after a roadside bombing attack is a fact. The military has always met its civic obligations to release information, good or bad. Generally speaking, bad news has no problem getting immediate, worldwide attention, deservedly or not. Other news is also deserving, usually more helpful, and certainly is true, like the
construction of a school, well, hospital, or road for the local population affected by the war.

The American military, in particular public affairs activities, must maintain public trust. Credibility and honesty are at the heart of the public’s trust. So leaders must take action whenever questions of credibility arise. More importantly, all strategic opportunities for coordinated messaging that could support military and national objectives should be taken advantage of in a timely fashion.41

U.S. Air Force Colonel Jack Ivy believes all communication leaders – from the commander, the information operations specialist, and the public affairs officer – must have a complete understanding about the battle space referred to as public information. It is a battle space much like any other and this public information battle space must be contested, controlled, and denied to the enemy.42 Ivy asserts that truth is the best use of information and the military can utilize public information as an information operations tool, as long as those efforts are based on the truth.43 This perspective has gained much traction over the last decade since the Serbian conflict and truth-based public information efforts comprise the vast majority of information operations. With all participants operating in the sphere of truth, it will allow for the full integration of public affairs into the information operations campaign without placing the credibility and integrity of the public affairs officer at risk.44 In today’s media fueled environment, integration of public affairs and information operations is mandatory. Any other option would cede the information battle space to the enemy.45

Public Affairs and Information Operations Organization

Military leaders are challenged to define and organizing public affairs and information operations forces in a way that clarifies these persistent misunderstandings
and provides our military with the most effective information capabilities. This task is complicated by a lack of consistency between Department of Defense, joint, and service doctrine and the variations in information operations and public affairs doctrine at all levels. The Air Force has the most collaborative and coordinated language in its doctrine utilizing the term “influence” and describing public affairs as “an important and necessary military capability of influence operations.” This is important because military information support operations and military deception are the primary components that conduct influence operations. Joint information operations doctrine promotes coordinated efforts, and joint public affairs doctrine alludes to coordination efforts. But it emphasizes separation and indicates credibility is lost when the two are not undisputedly separate. Conversely, the joint doctrine for military deception, the only component of information operations that may operate in falsehoods, promotes coordination with public affairs and stresses integration.

Public affairs doctrine prohibits the use of public affairs as a tool for either military information support operations or military deception because of greater concerns surrounding the implications of using deception or selected facts to influence certain audiences. Under strategic communication, public affairs is integrated with other information processes; however, public affairs is prohibited by doctrine and policy from having any direct role in planning or executing military information support operations or military deception. Nonetheless, public affairs officers must remain aware of information operations plans in order to deconflict its own activities and avoid any unintentional compromise of friendly information. Conversely, information operations are prohibited from compromising the primary purpose and rules under which public affairs and the
other related capabilities operate. Joint public affairs doctrine clearly states that both information operations and public affairs execute similar missions, their intent and audience may differ and must be kept separate.

The joint force commander comes to the fight with a robust collection of information operations capabilities or enabling forces to choose from in a major operation. The commander may use a joint military information support operations task force and civil affairs groups or units trained to directly engage with foreign populations and communities. Issues arise, however, because these disciplines, either as a result of legal restrictions or the degrees of specialization involved, tend to operate independently with little coordination. The detailed techniques and procedures for how the joint force commander should integrate the messages and themes with information operations and public affairs in support of higher strategic communications efforts are still unsettled. Organizational changes may or may not be in order but leaders responsible for planning, coordination, and implementation require tools and authorities to accomplish the task. To adequately implement, coordinate, or direct activities for an operation, commanders must be given the requisite authority, tools, and other resources to accompany the responsibility.

Integration and Failures

Even where public affairs and information operations share common ground regarding truth, commanders must also consider the intents and purposes of their actions from a broader perspective. In an example of an initiative that lacked an effective public affairs plan to counter propaganda, information operations planners in Iraq employed the assistance of a civilian contractor, the Lincoln Group, to secretly pay Iraqi news organizations to publish positive stories about the war effort. A Department
of Defense Inspector General’s report completed in 2006 determined that no laws or regulations were violated in this program since the stories were determined to be factual. However, public disclosure of this program triggered significant backlash in the press and within the international community, prompting former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Lawrence Di Rita, to publicly denounce the operation.55

Nonetheless, countering false and misleading insurgent propaganda in the Iraqi press was a valid and critical information operations objective. Once again, however, public affairs officials were either unwilling or unable to counter propaganda with an aggressive and proactive public affairs plan of their own. Consequently, information operations planners resorted to what some considered out-of-the-box tactics to fill a void left by public affairs. The public affairs community claimed these editorials inadvertently undermined the credibility of the military, regardless of their intentions.

General George W. Casey Jr., Commanding General Multi-National Forces – Iraq, then disbanded his information operations cell at Multi-National Forces – Iraq. Only after December 2006 when an information operations assessment team from the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center arrived and conducted a top-to-bottom review of information operations capabilities and activities in the Multi-National Forces – Iraq area of operations was the information operations cell reestablished. The resulting assessment showed large gaps and missteps in information operations coverage.56

**Cultures That Force Organization**

Structure and organization are hallmarks of most military hierarchies, but some are more hierarchical than others. Who or what a public affairs or information operations
cell works for can either frustrate or facilitate cooperation and integration. In the joint world, responsibility for information operations usually resides with the operations officer. The public affairs directorate is usually special staff to the commander and receives direction from the commander. This arrangement supports the view that public affairs and information operations integration would ultimately lead to public affairs becoming one of many permanent operations functions. If this happens, the cultures contend that public affairs will be subjected to highly structured operational ways of doing business, which will reduce its effectiveness, corrupt its purpose, and challenge its status as a direct adviser on the commander’s special staff.  

Loss of public affairs’ identity as a function separate from operations is no small concern, especially when the immediate global effects and personal accountability associated with public communications during a conflict demand rapid responses from the highest levels of command. However, the trend toward collaboratively meshing public affairs and information operations on strategic-communication staffs in Iraq indicates that the time may be ripe for a serious effort to determine how we should organize, train, and equip public affairs and information operations forces for future joint operations.  

Joint force commanders will face formidable information challenges in any future conflict. Judging by the challenges information operations and public affairs warriors dealt with in Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan, this task will not get easier. Although several studies have been accomplished, including the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication and the Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication, a formal plan to integrate has yet to be offered. Public affairs and
information operations could certainly benefit from a comprehensive plan. Such a plan would closely examine what public affairs and information operations can be, based on current law and other existing restraints; what those capabilities should be, based on the opportunities and challenges of the information environment; and what must be done to get from where they are to where they need to be. During the course of the past few years, the department of Defense has begun to configure and organize to more effectively execute strategic communication. This will continue to be a work in progress in order to ensure that strategic communication supports future national and military objectives.59

Way Forward: Integrating Public Affairs and Information Operations

Audiences matter. If information operations and public affairs address the same foreign audience, then they should deliver coordinated messages. The concept of strategic communication acknowledges the difficulty of separating the effects of public affairs and information operations in the information environment. To sustain effective strategic communication the two should not be separated.

This also applies to military deception, the only information operations discipline that may use some falsehoods.60 Even this black art consists of openly observable facts that public affairs must at least be aware of and remain prepared to comment on. Otherwise, the deceptive effort could potentially be compromised. There is simply no conceivable way to separate information spheres so that public affairs operates with global news media and performs its mission to build support among U.S., coalition, or neutral populations, while information operations focuses on influencing the enemy and degrading his capabilities.62 This construct would simply not be operationally sound. Even if specific adversary populations could be isolated from other audiences, they can
collect information from the same satellite news channels or Internet sites that everyone else in the area does too. After information has been released, senders have no further control over who receives messages or what is done with this information.

Nevertheless, currently joint and service doctrine attempts to separate the two related disciplines by audience. This leads to stove-pipe operations. This separation and resulting stove-piped approach inevitably yields uncoordinated information products. With no integrated messaging, the potential for mixed or even conflicting messages is real. Such confused communications will affect all audiences in unpredictable and indiscriminate ways.

Not long ago news from the other side of the world was not available – or reported in week-old newspapers. Then populations could be segregated, and an enemy force could be isolated both by fires and information. Information now flies around the globe at the speed of light. Regardless of location, any population has access to satellite broadcast from global news networks and internet service. Globalization ensures the same coverage for any audience and makes it imperative that public affairs and information operations integrate strategies and tactics to present consistent messages. An essential enabler is knowledge through collaboration. Public affairs and information operations need to know not only what information is being released and through what sources, but also to what audiences at any point in time. Otherwise, information fratricide can and will result because of audience and message overlaps. Additionally cooperation and coordination may yield greater efficiencies. Fully integrated public affairs and information operations forces would inevitably reveal overlaps in areas such as skills training, planning products, or assessment tools.\textsuperscript{63}
Both public affairs and information operations will continue to have their specific tactical approaches to the military’s information objectives. Both functions will share a common objective; they will work toward achieving this objective in similar and complementary ways. Both information operations and public affairs clearly attempt to influence human perceptions. The differences and nuances of both can be exploited to achieve better effects as both tactical approaches contribute to a desired outcome. Information operations messages are unambiguous: We are winning the enemy is losing.

On the other hand, the public affairs messages allow media and audiences to draw their own, possibly contrary, conclusions. The Fox News slogan says this nicely: “We report, you decide.” Public affairs messages convey no bias or slant but they influence opinion nonetheless. Information operations products are received only by people who actively pick up the leaflet or tune in to specific broadcast frequencies: The public affairs message, after being picked up by a news outlet, can permeate many different media. There they may be viewed, heard, or read in any corner of the globe.

For all those who think primarily in kinetic terms, think of public affairs as a B-52 bombing raid. Like the carpet bombing of a B-52 raid, public affairs blasts information across a broad landscape of audiences. Many people feel, see, or hear the information effects of public affairs efforts, including hostile, neutral, and friendly parties. But not everyone is affected in the same way. They will or should come to their own conclusions regarding the raid. However, information operations messages are like the laser guided tank missile: The people in the targeted tank of the weapon are immediately affected. In the most optimal situation and if the intent of information operations is achieved, other
audiences remain unaware of or unaffected by the missile’s effect. However, it is acknowledged that given today’s world of social media and consumer-driven communications, there is no assurance that an IO message might not bounce off intended targets and spread to unintended audiences. Both munitions have value, but both also have appropriate constraints and restraints on their practical use. Both weapons should be used to complement and reinforce the effects of the other. Information operations can wear down adversary morale or support friendly kinetic operations, while public affairs focus’ on building a public case for decisive military action. Only an integrated and coordinated effort can yield any type of desired outcome.

Like any weapon, characteristics of these integrated operations must be understood by the commander. If public affairs and information operations lack the strategic focus needed to use their means to achieve strategic objectives, this mismatch is quite possibly because commanders do not have a complete understanding or appreciation of the capabilities, limits, and risks associated with information activities. Although, according to the Commander’s Strategic Communication Handbook, commanders are responsible for synchronizing communication strategies to support operations, many are unsure if messaging will have any effect; they are unaware of how to establish any measures of effectiveness that will inform them meaningful data or the usefulness of the instrument. Information concepts are misunderstood by commanders most familiar with kinetic operations and are often utilized in attempts to clean up messes after the fact. Consequently, they become inherently reactive and often ineffective.
Communication can be measured to help inform commanders about its reception and effectiveness. In many cases this measurement is simple. For example, an individual or group that has been informed to do something at a particular point in time either do it or does not do it. For instance, consider a public message, both on the radio and print, that the population can come to the local clinic for free shots. If members of the populace show up, the message was not only heard but acted on. Qualitative or quantitative responses to the message over time may also be measured through surveys and focus groups, two of the most widespread assessment activities used even during wars. Polling can be very accurate. The less informed commanders are about public affairs and information operations, the less they will demand from them in exercises or operations. Low expectations lead to commanders devoting little thought, effort, or resources to maturing public affairs and information operations forces. Poorly coordinated and ineffective messages will result.

Conclusions

For decades, a wall or line has separated the interrelated disciplines of information operations and public affairs. This wall consists of disparate doctrine from the joint community to the individual services regulations as evidenced in the Commander’s Strategic Communications Handbook.

As U.S. Joint Forces Command continues to interact with the combatant commands and Services, we recognize that there is no universal agreement on the best way to plan and execute a strategic communication and related activities strategy. Additionally, there is very little doctrinal guidance. It is supported by laws, and widespread perceptions that support conventional wisdom. When public affairs and information operations operate right up against that wall, a seam remains available for exploitation by adversarial forces. Uncoordinated and
poorly conceived public affairs and information operations activities that operate further from that wall leave a gap in the line. This gap cedes battle space in which the enemy can operate unopposed. Furthermore, this separation inhibits a commander’s ability to inform and influence various parties at all levels of war and conflict types. Despite recent efforts in strategic communication policy, the strategic leader remains challenged across the information battle space by an enemy that is more agile, more flexible, less constrained and more determined to exploit gaps and seams in U.S. information strategy and doctrine.

Public affairs should play a more prominent role in planning and executing from beginning to end in information operations activities. They can do this without compromising to the credibility of public affairs. These efforts would synchronize public affairs activities with information operations to disseminate complementary factual and truthful information. Information operations should also better support public affairs efforts by expanding the reach of public affairs themes and messages to foreign audiences not normally accessible through traditional mass media channels of communication. Public affairs should be a member of and fully participate in information operations planning within the information operations cell. A better synchronized information and influence plan through a better public affairs and information operations relationship will achieve greater unity of effort. It will provide the warfighter with more tools in the arsenal to adequately confront the enemy on the information battlefield. The common denominator in the public affairs and information operations relationship is truth. Credibility stays intact. Only a public affairs officer’s belief in the propaganda of the press, an information operations campaign in its own right, contributes to the
perception that credibility is at stake when public affairs is associated with information operations.

**Recommendations**

Redefining how public affairs and information operations can integrate to maximize information and influence operations for the strategic leader will require changes in military culture, doctrine, and policy. Strategic guidance, joint doctrine, training programs and operational planning processes need to progress from the draft to the published and reflect the mutually supportive roles public affairs and information operations can play to enhance unity of effort and increase mission effectiveness. Specifically, the following changes should be considered:

*Update Directives.* Department of Defense directives for information operations and public affairs should be updated to reflect the important role public affairs can and should play in supporting information operations planning and operations. Emphasis on coordination versus separation in all areas will enhance operational and strategic effectiveness. Joint public affairs and information operations doctrines should be updated to widen the aperture and specify the conditions for public affairs to serve as a supporting capability, especially for military information support operations and other related information operations.

*Adopt a Proactive Policy.* Public affairs should be more proactive in disseminating news and information that supports the commander’s military objectives, not merely cite the facts of the day, regurgitate talking points or offer bland responses to queries from the media. Continual engagement with media representatives and organizations should increase media understanding and reinforce the military’s
commitment to providing factual, truthful information to the public consistent with applicable law and the Department of Defense principles of information.70

Maintain information superiority. The goal is to maintain information superiority and thereby decision superiority.71 Influence operations are designed to shape adversary perceptions, this cannot be accomplished unless information operations and public affairs are unified to both inform and influence. Information is impacting the spectrum of conflict more than ever before. Information dominance has always been important but the speed and methods at which it can be sent, analyzed, and acted upon are increasing exponentially. We should train and equip for the information battle.

Endnotes


4 Thucydides (English pronunciation: /θuˈsɪdɪds/; Greek: Θουκυδίδης, Thoukydídes; c. 460 BC – c. 395 BC) was a Greek historian and author from Alimos. His History of the Peloponnesian War recounts the 5th century BC war between Sparta and Athens to the year 411 BC. Thucydides has been dubbed the father of "scientific history", because of his strict standards of evidence-gathering and analysis in terms of cause and effect without reference to intervention by the gods, as outlined in his introduction to his work.


9 Pascale Combelles-Siegel, “Target Bosnia-Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operation,” Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, (Washington DC: National Defense University, January 1998), 115. http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Siegel_Target.pdf (accessed March 09, 2012). : “Effective communication in Bosnia-Herzegovina required that all purveyors of information disseminate a coherent message in line with what actually occurred on the ground. To ensure message coherence, the commander’s information activities within the command had to be closely associated and coordinated with international organizations. However, ensuring coordination was a major challenge”

10 James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “A Nation Challenged; Hearts and minds; Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” New York Times, February 19, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/19/world/nation-challenged-hearts-minds-pentagon-readies-efforts-sway-sentiment-abroad.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed December 9, 2011). The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) was “established as a response to concerns the United States was losing public support overseas for its war on terrorism, particularly in Islamic countries.” In the February 19, 2002, New York Times article, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld let it be known that, while he was “broadly supportive of the new office,” he had “not approved its specific proposals and asked the Pentagon’s top lawyer, William J. Haynes, to review them.” OSI, headed by Air Force Brig. Gen. Simon P. Worden, began “circulating classified proposals calling for aggressive campaigns that use not only the foreign media and the Internet, but also covert operations.” Worden envisioned "a broad mission ranging from 'black' campaigns that used disinformation and other covert activities to 'white' public affairs that rely on truthful news releases," according to Pentagon officials. "It goes from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white,’ a senior Pentagon official said.” The Pentagon’s announcement, including that the OSI planned "to provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly countries,” gave immediate rise to negative publicity. On February 26, 2002, Rumsfeld announced that the OSI was closed, telling reporters that "The office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively.”


16 Ibid., 1-4.

17 Violet Jones, “Mainstream Media is Pentagon’s Propaganda Arm,” *Infowars.com*, December 1, 2004, http://www.infowars.com/articles/military/psy-ops_meets_pr.htm (accessed January 5, 2012). “Troops crossed the line of departure,” 1st Lt. Lyle Gilbert declared, using a common military expression signaling the start of a major campaign. "It's going to be a long night." CNN, which had been alerted to expect a major news development, reported that the long-awaited offensive to retake the Iraqi city of Fallujah had begun.


19 Sholtis, *Public Affairs and Information Operations; A strategy for Success*.


21 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication 3-61, X.


23 Military deception exposes “false or confusing information,” uses false vehicle markings, creates “false indicators” and “false weaknesses,” generates “false pictures,” and may provide “false communications” or “false intelligence.” However, the discipline does not operate in lies. Although possibly a fine point, it is important for the paper’s thesis. For more information on military deception, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Deception*, Joint Publication 3-13.4 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 26, 2012)


27 Ibid., I-6.

28 Ibid., I-6.


34 VUCA: volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. This term is widely used at the US Army War College to describe the environments where U.S. forces will be operating both today and in future conflict.


37 Ibid.

39 Sholtis, Public Affairs and Information Operations; A strategy for Success.


41 Ibid.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.


48 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Deception*, Joint Publication 3-14.4, II-8. “MILDEC [military deception] operations should be coordinated with public affairs (PA) to avoid potential compromise of the deception operation and to work out other details of planning such as compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) policies and procedures that affect MILDEC. MILDEC operations must not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US news media. Using PA to misinform the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence US decision makers and public opinion is contrary to DOD policy. Coordinate MILDEC operations that have activities potentially visible to the media or the public with the appropriate PA officers to identify any potential problems. Coordination will reduce the chance that PA officers will inadvertently reveal information that could undermine ongoing or planned MILDEC operations.”

49 Ibid.

50 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13, X.

51 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication 3-61, II-9. “PA and IO activities directly support military objectives; counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation; and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO plan and execute public information activities and conduct media analysis, IO may differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent. As such, they are separate functional areas. JFCs ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities consistent with the DOD principles of information, policy, or legal limitation and security.”

53 Ibid., xix.


55 Ibid.

56 Colonel Mark Johnson, U.S. Army (Retired), telephone interview by author, February 20, 2012, about *Information Operations Capabilities: Iraq Area of Responsibility: A Report to the Commanding General, Multi-National Forces – Iraq*, (Bagdad, Iraq: Multi-National Forces – Iraq Headquarters, January 2007). In December 2006 General Casey, Commanding General Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I), requested an evaluation team from the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) be dispatched to MNF-I to conduct a review of MNF-I, Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I), and divisional level information operations capabilities. COL Johnson, then Deputy Commander of the JIOWC lead the team and delivered the report to GEN Casey. The author was also a member of the evaluation team from the JIOWC.


59 Ibid., 11.


62 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13, IX.

63 Sholtis, Public Affairs and Information Operations; A strategy for Success.

64 Fox News slogan “We Report You Decide,”

65 Sholtis, *Public Affairs and Information Operations; A strategy for Success.*
Use of the term “weapon” to describe information efforts is surrounded by controversy. Here, use of the term weapon illustrates how many military personnel think in abstract terms of information as non-lethal fires as opposed to other lethal military capabilities (e.g., explosive ordnance). Both messages (non-lethal) and ordnance (lethal) are delivered with a desired effect. There are many precedents for portraying information as a weapon. For instance, journalist Maud S. Beelman once wrote, “If Information Operations is a battlefield strategy, then information is the weapon.” See http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/74-analysis-us-militarys-information-operations-doctrine-is-a-sort-of-monster.html (accessed March 20, 2012). Brigadier General Pete Worden, U.S. Air Force, used an even more powerful description of information when he said, “Information is the atomic bomb.” “How Rocket Scientists Got Into the Hearts-And-Minds Game,” U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.b1.htm (accessed March 20, 2012). However, it is not the intent of the author to portray information or the communication process as a destructive concept. On the contrary, when properly planned and executed, integrated communication processes can prevent violence and save lives.


Commander Brendan C. McPherson, U.S. Coast Guard, “More Than a Hand Shake: Synchronizing Public Affairs Operations with Information Operations in the 21st Century,” (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, November 31, 2008), 19, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a494323.pdf (accessed December 09, 2011). These recommendations are primarily synthesized from Cmdr McPherson’s research papers recommendations. Although Cmdr McPherson indicates that the law should be changed to allow for closer operations between IO and PA, this paper believes the problem is in DoD policy and then implementation.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 1-1.