Allegiance in a Time of Globalization

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Released by – James A. Riedel

BACKGROUND

This review of selected works from the social science literature and government reports focuses on how to assess allegiance to a nation-state during a period of globalization, and the related issues of recognizing and evaluating foreign influence and foreign preference. Given the current context of globalization, questions about how to assess, investigate, and adjudicate allegiance are of increasing concern both to the personnel security community and to counterintelligence agencies. This exploration of scholarly and policy literature, which seeks to clarify these issues and to pose directions for further dialogue, will be of interest to members of both professions.

HIGHLIGHTS

Allegiance is increasingly difficult to assess in a context of globalization. Movement across borders is being enhanced by cheap and accessible transportation. Worldwide electronic communications in real time influence patterns of immigration, naturalization, and assimilation to the United States. New patterns of immigration are emerging, including the “transnational,” the “sojourner,” and the modern “diaspora.” Earlier assumptions about allegiance, based on the expectation that a person is being born and raised in one national community, are challenged when people move back and forth between nations repeatedly, or when they work in one country while their families live in another. Since 1990, more countries are offering dual citizenship to those who immigrate and naturalize elsewhere, trying to bind their citizens to the countries of origin. This has allowed the collecting of dual or multiple citizenships, which dilutes the meaning of citizenship and confuses allegiance.

The social science and policy literature reviewed here offers insights about allegiance in a time of globalization. It raises questions for discussion and further research. Some scholars argue that globalization is challenging the traditional nation-state paradigm. If so, that would also test assumptions about allegiance based on that paradigm. To account for the changes around us, we may need to imagine a new paradigm.
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1. REPORT DATE: (05-12-2008)
2. REPORT TYPE Technical Report 08-10
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 1985 - December 2008

4. Allegiance in a Time of Globalization

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER:
5b. GRANT NUMBER:
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER:
5d. PROJECT NUMBER:
5e. TASK NUMBER:
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER:

6. AUTHOR(S): Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Defense Personnel Security Research Center
99 Pacific Street, Suite 455-E
Monterey, CA 93940-2497

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER PERSEREC: Technical Report 08-10

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S):

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT: (A) Distribution Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:

14. ABSTRACT: This review of social science and policy literature explores the assessment of allegiance to a nation-state during a period of globalization, when many trends appear to change or undermine earlier assumptions about allegiance. It discusses global mobility and immigration trends, the impact of transportation and communications on patterns of mobility such as “transnational” life or the “sojourner.” It explores the impact of increasingly common dual or multiple citizenships on the meaning of allegiance based on territorial citizenship. It surveys social psychological studies of group processes and political socialization. It lists insights these studies offer for ways to think about allegiance and further research and discussion on how to adjust personnel security procedures to the challenges posed by globalization.

15. SUBJECT TERMS: Allegiance, Loyalty, Foreign Influence, Foreign Preference, Adjudicative Guidelines, Globalization, Background Investigation

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED
a. REPORT: UNCLASSIFIED
b. ABSTRACT: UNCLASSIFIED
c. THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT:

18. NUMBER OF PAGES: 63

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON: James A. Riedel, Director
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code): 831-657-3000

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) Prescribed by ANSI std. 239.18
PREFACE

The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) performs behavioral science research and analysis to support improved policies and procedures in personnel security. The research seeks to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of the personnel security system. Assessment of allegiance has been part of background investigation and adjudication for eligibility for access to classified information since the origins of the current personnel security system 60 years ago, yet the multifaceted trends in globalization since 1985 challenge the usual assumptions that underlie how we perform an assessment of allegiance.

This report explores literature in the social sciences and research reports on personnel security policy to consider how globalization is shaping issues of assessing allegiance. It examines relevant aspects of allegiance such as citizenship, immigration, and evolving concepts of the roles and powers of nation-states. It is an exploration intended to raise awareness of these issues and to provoke further questions, discussion, and debate within the personnel security and counterintelligence communities on the changing dimensions of allegiance.

James A. Riedel
Director
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Allegiance to the United States is a bedrock requirement for evaluating applicants for potential federal employment and for granting access to classified information, yet it remains difficult to evaluate, investigate, and adjudicate. Elements of globalization raise new concerns about allegiance and pose new questions about previous comfortable assumptions about allegiance.

Since roughly 1985, the sheer change in scale of international trade and finance suggests that globalization has become an unprecedented phase in world history. Investment and business decisions have caused this exponential growth based on government policies that support free-market economics and on advances in information technology that allow individuals and corporations to identify and pursue economic opportunities around the globe. This literature review focuses on several aspects of globalization that are particularly relevant to national allegiance, including migration, transportation, and communications.

Due to increased migration, the United States is becoming more ethnically diverse than at any time in its history, while the sources of immigration have shifted from European countries to the Americas and Asia. In addition to the traditional “push” and “pull” motives for immigrating, that is, being pushed from the country of origin by poverty, war, or persecution and pulled to an adopted country by better opportunities, globalization has created a third set of motives: “network” factors, including cheap and easy flow of information using information technology, ready access of global communications, and fast and relatively cheap transportation, especially global air transportation. People are in motion around the world as never before, and they move in more complex patterns than earlier generations of immigrants. These patterns include “transnational,” “sojourner,” and “diaspora” ways of life, each of which involves clinging to the country of origin while living in an adopted host country. These may affect allegiance in unexpected ways.

The scholarly and policy research reviewed here includes contributions from social psychology, cultural anthropology, political science, law, history, and sociology. The vast bodies of scholarship in each of these fields are not exhausted in this brief review; instead, selected books and articles are discussed that offer insights for further research and discussion within the personnel security and counterintelligence communities.

Insights suggested for assessing allegiance include the assumption that an immigrant’s allegiance shifts steadily over time from the country of origin to the adopted country may be too simple; generational differences within immigrant families further contradict a smooth trajectory of assimilation; diasporic peoples may bring particular resentments with them that affect transferal of allegiance; several immigrant communities have developed “sojourner” patterns of entrepreneurialism that raise issues of allegiance; the meaning of citizenship is being diluted by globalization’s impetus toward dual or multiple citizenships;
political socialization during childhood into allegiance to one’s country of origin influences adults later in life in ways not always recognized; various programs that attempt to incorporate globalization’s effects into personnel security procedures are so individualized that they may not support large-scale screening. If globalization is undermining the nation-state paradigm in international relations, as some scholars argue, we may need to develop a new paradigm.
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Allegiance to the United States is the bedrock expectation for evaluating applicants for potential federal employment and for granting access to the nation’s secret or sensitive information. When federal civil service began in the 1880s, policy simply assumed that citizens would be loyal, and did not mention allegiance. The first stated demand that insiders will be loyal to the nation dates from April 1917, when fear that disloyalty would betray the nation’s interest appeared in federal policy. Concerned about German sympathizers as he declared America’s entry into World War I, President Woodrow Wilson authorized dismissal of government employees for “conduct, sympathies, or utterances, or because of other reasons growing out of the war” (Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, 1997). Thereafter, statements requiring loyalty from employees, and their sworn oaths of loyalty, were fixed in federal hiring policy. In 1947, as anxiety grew about subversion by Communist infiltrators and the safety of the new atomic weapon, President Harry Truman codified the requirement for loyalty in a Federal Employee Loyalty Program (Executive Order 9835, 1947; Isserman, 2000). That program overreached by omitting procedural safeguards for citizens, so President Dwight Eisenhower replaced it in 1953 with one that relied on a preemployment background investigation by issuing Executive Order 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employees.

This executive order became the basis for all subsequent iterations of the personnel security program. It prominently featured loyalty. It outlined a standard set of information to be collected in the required background investigation of all potential employees because the “interests of national security” required that federal employees be “reliable, trustworthy, of good character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States” (Executive Order 10450, 1953). The personnel security program that evolved after 1953 was repeatedly revised, yet it never lost the imprint of the 1953 outline, still visible in civil service regulations, in the current Executive Order that governs eligibility for access to classified information (Executive Order 12968, 1995), and in the 2005 revision of the guidelines by which adjudicators decide eligibility (The White House, 2005). Standards in those Adjudicative Guidelines were added or revised over the decades, but “Allegiance to the United States” remained and still remains the first of the guidelines that adjudicators consider when evaluating an applicant.

Despite its primacy, loyalty is difficult for background investigators to look into and it is difficult for adjudicators to ascertain. Other guidelines request information about behaviors or actions, such as indebtedness, criminal acts, misuse of drugs or alcohol, or past security violations. The “Allegiance” guideline asks about evidence of a feeling, a commitment, an attitude, an internal state. An applicant is asked during a background investigation if he or she is loyal to the nation, and the answer is recorded, but it is possible to lie about feelings and attitudes. Investigators ask references, coworkers, and sometimes neighbors about the applicant’s loyalty, and whether they have noted instances of disloyalty.
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Investigators also seek indirect evidence of concern about allegiance: they document the applicant’s memberships and activities in organizations for subversive associations; they evaluate the applicant’s family, friends, and associates for foreign connections that could offer competing loyalties through foreign influence or preference; and they consider ties to foreign nations implicit in owning property or other activities abroad (The White House, 1997; Information Security Oversight Office, 2004). Despite these carefully crafted procedures, evidence about the allegiance of an individual often remains inconclusive.

Recent trends and developments have exacerbated the difficulties inherent in deciding whether a person is—and more importantly, is likely to remain—loyal to the nation. Globalization—multifaceted, unpredictable, and changing rapidly—intensifies concern about loyalty while it raises significant new issues about it. Aspects of globalization challenge the requirement for loyalty to the nation by restructuring the context in which national security is sought and won. It raises questions about comfortable assumptions. Fueling these concerns are findings from recent research on espionage by American citizens that show a trend since 1990 toward more espionage motivated by divided loyalties, more espionage linked to transnational terrorism, and more espionage done by naturalized citizens helping their country of origin (Herbig, 2008). These observations are based on a small number of cases—39 individuals since 1990—yet they should raise disquiet among security professionals and curiosity about how globalization may be contributing to them.

While the current era of globalization is perhaps 20 years old, already a vast body of research and description has been produced about it. Since the concern here is with the loyalty of individuals and whether or how that loyalty can be evaluated, this review focuses on contributions from various social sciences that focus on the individual and interactions of individuals in groups, and not on studies of large-scale human activities such as economics, international trade and finance, or development of underdeveloped regions. The articles and books selected for discussion come from social psychology, cultural anthropology, political science, law, history, and sociology. This literature review does not exhaust the relevant research in any of these fields. Instead, works are discussed if they promise to be useful starting points for personnel security and counterintelligence officials to follow their specific concerns into further reading. As if jumping from the tip of one iceberg to the next, this review surveys only some of the relevant examples that break the surface; much larger bodies of work remain out of view.
LOYALTY, ALLEGIANCE, AND THE NATION-STATE

Loyalty and allegiance are often used interchangeably (as they sometimes will be here), but they are not exactly the same. Loyalty refers to the faithful discharge of commitments or obligations with an attitude of attachment, adherence, or devotion. At its core, loyalty is a sentiment, a devotion that is demonstrated toward a person, family, organization, or nation. Allegiance refers specifically to a relationship between persons, or between persons and institutions. In its precise meaning, allegiance defines “a citizen’s duty to his or her country, or, by extension, one’s obligation to support a party, cause, or leader” (Loyalty, n.d.). The word allegiance comes from the medieval term “liege,” meaning a subject who owed “legeance,” respect and duty, to his lord in exchange for the lord’s protection. In this original sense, when one pledges “allegiance” one is recognizing a solemn legal obligation to support an entity, usually a government, in return for the rights and protections of belonging to that entity (Allegiance, 2007). Common usage has blurred the distinction between loyalty and allegiance. Now even dictionaries define one word in terms of the other, and in advertisements one may be urged to give “allegiance” to brand X. Yet “allegiance” still maintains some of its original sense of a sacred duty to the source of one’s well-being, while loyalty is the broader term.

The duty of allegiance to the United States by employees of its government and persons entrusted with its secret and sensitive information is the focus here, and thus it is necessary to establish some definitions for basic concepts of national allegiance. The United States is a nation-state that interacts with 195 other nation-states in an international context. Allegiance to the United States means allegiance to one of the world’s nation-states. This may seem obvious, and yet the meanings of nation, state, and nation-state are not obvious (except possibly to political scientists) and they are essential to a discussion of allegiance. Summarizing concepts from an excellent brief overview of national identity by Kelman (1997) provides a starting point for a consideration of the changes globalization implies.

Kelman summarizes some standard political science definitions:

“A nation is an ethnic-cultural unit that has a meaning apart from the shape of political boundaries. One might substitute the term nationality or people for the term nation…and these nations may have existed long before the emergence of the modern nation-state….Nation refers to groups of people who share a common language, history, tradition, religion, way of life, sense of destiny, and a common set of memories and aspirations.” Not all these common elements are necessary to make a nation, but “there must be enough commonality to provide a ready basis for communication…and a consciousness that these common elements represent special bonds that tie the members to one another—in short, the consciousness of being a nation.”
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A state is a political organization of people in a territory, a government that exercises sovereignty over a territory; a country.

A nation-state is a political entity in which a state coincides with or defines a nation, a particular population in a particular bounded territory. The modern nation-state claims paramount authority, or sovereignty, as a political unit, with the right to overrule both smaller and larger units. In principle, the boundaries of the state also constitute the boundaries of the nation, and this conjunction justifies its authority and its claim to best represent that nation’s people, to offer them its protection, and to advance the people’s interests.

Patriotism is “a set of attitudes and beliefs that refers to individuals’ attachment and loyalty to their nation and country—to the ‘homeland,’ the conjunction between country and nation—the loyalty to one’s people and its land” (Kelman, 1997).

A moment’s reflection on current international conflicts will bring to mind the fact that patriotism is usually but is not necessarily expressed toward a nation-state. It can also be an attachment to a homeland that is hoped for in the future, or to a memory of such lost in the past, a “homeland” defined as territory that is not now a nation-state, or may never have been one. Examples include the fierce patriotic attachments to territory that belongs to other nation-states, such as the Basques in Spain and France, or the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Other examples are reminders that despite the principle of the nation-state, in which a single ethnic and cultural group pursues its destiny within its own political boundaries, in messy fact nation-states often encompass more than one ethnic and cultural group: Switzerland, Canada, India, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria are examples of the many nation-states in which more than one ethnic group coexists and sometimes contends within one nation-state. The United States, with its history and tradition as a nation of immigrants, is an even more polyglot example.

With these concepts in place, Kelman explores how national identity, which he defines as a group’s enduring characteristics and basic values, evolves and is claimed by the people who make up the nation. He suggests that psychological processes are at work when a person incorporates the national identity into his or her individual identity, making American or French a part of a person’s self-description in feeling as well as fact. Kelman maintains that taking national identity into one’s concept of self involves three components: knowledge, affect, and action. In his view, a person must know about the elements of the nation’s identity, must feel those values as meaningful, and must put them into concrete practice. (Kelman, 1997).

Why are people so loyal to a nation-state that they may be willing to die for it, when, after all, it is an abstraction? Kelman suggests two central human “psychological dispositions” are at play in generating such deeply felt allegiance: the need for self-protection, and the need for self-transcendence. For self-protection the individual turns first to those closest to him or her, to family; self-transcendence
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requires a group that stretches beyond space and time, something that is “bigger than oneself,” and that will persist beyond the brief span of a mortal’s life. The nation can satisfy this second need—it is bigger than one’s family, but closer and more immediate than the whole world. Kelman points out that the first familial attachments (reflecting the basic need for self-protection) are often projected onto the nation as well (for example, in images of the fatherland or the mother tongue) and the socialization of children often encourages applying family attachments to the nation. Defending the nation becomes a way of protecting the family and all that it means to the individual. On the other hand, self-transcendence is expressed through the nation by identifying with its people though space—they are innumerable, they live far and wide, and one will never personally know them all—and through time in its national history and legends.

Since whether a person has a reliable allegiance to nation is the concern of this study, this level of detail will be useful for further discussion on how a person does or does not develop such an allegiance. Kelman demonstrates that allegiance symbiotically serves both the individual’s basic psychological needs and the nation’s political needs for unity and devotion from its members. If their populations lack the awareness of “nation-ness,” nation-states will typically engage in “nation-building” to build up that allegiance. In Kelman’s summary:

Loyalty to the nation thus represents a blending of self-protection with self-transcendence, as well as a blending of sentimental or identity concerns with instrumental ones. These mixed inputs are reflected in the themes that dominate both patriotic and nationalist rhetoric: the themes of security and group survival, of power and expansion, of national self-expression and self-fulfillment. More generally, they create [allegiance], the special combination of selflessness and self-interest in the relationship of the individual to the nation (Kelman, 1997).
WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

The process known as globalization has so many dimensions to it that it is difficult to define, yet often people feel that they “know it when they see it.” The Levin Institute at the State University of New York sponsors a detailed educational website devoted to explaining and documenting globalization, and it offers definitions at a nontechnical level that are useful for this discussion.

According to the Levin Institute,

Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in societies around the world (Levin Institute, n.d.).

While globalization is not a new phenomenon, given the thousands of years that traders carried goods across land and sea to distant customers, the sheer change in scale of international trade and finance since 1985 suggests that globalization has become an unprecedented phase in world history. Two factors have driven the investment and business decisions that caused this exponential growth: (1) government policies that moved to free-market economics, opened national economies to free trade, and promoted foreign investments, and (2) advances in information technology that provided “all sorts of individual economic actors—consumers, investors, businesses—valuable new tools for identifying and pursuing economic opportunities, including faster and more informed analyses of economic trends around the world, easy transfers of assets, and collaboration with far-flung partners” (Levin Institute, n.d.). The topics treated in detail under the heading “globalization” at this website include trade, technology, investment, health, culture, environment, migration, transportation and communications, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, development, women, international law and organizations, energy, and human rights.

This study takes the large, multifaceted trend of globalization as necessary background, but it focuses only on a few aspects of globalization that have impacts on national allegiance, especially migration, transportation, and communications.
The United States is becoming more ethnically diverse than at any time in its history (Shrestha, 2006). Underlying this result are rising rates and shifting sources of immigration. The percentage of foreign-born persons in the population in 2003 was 11.7%, which began to approach the historic high point of 14% that was reached in the 1910s. The number of foreign-born persons was 33.5 million in 2003. It has more than doubled since 1980, and is at its highest point ever (Larsen, 2004; Wasem, 2003). Sources of immigration have shifted away from European countries that traditionally sent immigrants to the United States. Europe has been replaced by North and South America, which sent 36% of all legal immigrants in 2004, and Asian countries, which sent 35% in 2004. The leading source countries for legal immigrants to the United States in 2004 were Mexico (18.5%), India (7.4%), the Philippines (6.1%), China (5.4%), Vietnam (3.3%), and the Dominican Republic (3.2%) (Shrestha, 2006).

Of course, immigration has been a consistent reality throughout the history of the United States. It has been celebrated in themes promoting national unity as a nation of immigrants and the common immigration experience. It has also contributed conflict between ethnic groups and political struggles between factions, some supporting liberal immigration policies, others demanding exclusion of disfavored groups, reductions in the numbers or types of immigrants, or suspension of immigration altogether. A period of generous welcome toward immigrants often has generated and been followed by a reaction against immigrants and a narrower, more exclusionary policy (Jacoby, 2004; “Gathering and Interactions,” n.d.).

The current, larger number and proportion of immigrants in the American population is not an accident; it is an aspect of globalization, and it reflects worldwide trends. In the same way that investment capital, manufacturing activities, and nongovernmental organizations are flowing from “home” countries to other places around the world that offer advantageous conditions, workers are also flowing to other countries as never before, seeking advantages for themselves. The most common motive to move is economic betterment, but not all migration reflects the “pull” factors of better pay or living conditions. Some migrants suffer from “push” factors, and are driven from their homes by war, famine, disease, or persecution. Analysts of migration patterns typically find a combination of “push” and “pull” factors at work, motivating people to leave one place and go live in another. Now conditions of globalization have created a third element, the “network” factors, which include the cheap and easy flow of information using information technology, ready access of global communications, and fast and relatively cheap transportation, especially global air transportation. As a consequence, the number of persons living outside their countries of origin (i.e., first-generation immigrants) grew from 120 million in 1990 to 191 million in 2005—which was almost 3% of the world’s population (Levin Institute, n.d.). Despite
widespread reluctance among developed nations to liberalize their immigration policies, people continue to flow in and out of them (Martin & Widgren, 2002).
TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORAS

Concepts necessary to this study, including loyalty and allegiance, nation-state and nation, globalization, migration as a symptom of globalization, and the increasing and more diverse immigration to the United States have been summarized. A discussion follows of selected works in the social sciences that are relevant to better understanding how changes produced by globalization can affect an individual’s allegiance to nation.

“SIMULTANEOUSLY EMBEDDED IN MORE THAN ONE SOCIETY”

A review article by Vertovec (2004) provides a comprehensive overview of research in a scholarly field devoted to studying transnationalism by drawing on the social sciences, and so is an excellent core source on the topic. Vertovec raises many issues that apply to developing and maintaining allegiance. He defines transnationalism as “a set of sustained long-distance, border-crossing connections” that occur in migrant populations (his area of interest) but that also operate in other dimensions of globalization such as global corporations, media networks, international social movements, criminal or terrorist networks, and major religions. Quoting another author, he elaborates:

Current scholarship on transnationalism provides a [new means to see] the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information, and symbols triggered by international labour migration. It allows an analysis of how migrants construct and reconstitute their lives as simultaneously embedded in more than one society (Vertovec, 2004).

Migration in a context of globalization is often more complicated than traditional immigration patterns used to be. Instead of leaving one’s country of birth and settling in another country, possibly naturalizing there and becoming a full member of that adopted nation-state, now a significant proportion of migrants repeatedly travel back and forth between countries, often even naturalizing in one but preserving dual citizenship in the other, keeping in close touch with those left behind by telephone or email—in effect, simultaneously living in two nation-states at once.

Vertovec reports that some scholars claim that the scale of such transnationalism has become so great as to constitute an engine of transformation for whole societies—including the United States. He argues that “The extensiveness, intensity, and velocity of networked flows of information and resources may indeed combine to fundamentally alter the way people do things...there are times when a quantitative change results in a qualitative difference in the order of things.” He focuses on three areas of life in order to expand on this claim for transformation by transnationalism: ways of everyday living, the political framework of citizenship,
and means of economic development. Citizenship questions will be discussed below (Vertovec, 2004).

Telephone usage is one example of how Vertovec develops his point that for migrants and their sending societies, everyday life is being transformed by transnational migration. Being able to keep in frequent conversation with family members and others in a migrant’s country of origin makes possible a transnational life. International telephone rates have fallen dramatically since 1985, and usage has increased accordingly. The number of calls made from the United States to other countries increased from 200 million calls in 1980 to 6.6 billion calls in 2000. Some calls were for business or other purposes, but many were migrants keeping in touch with those they left behind. Readily available prepaid telephone cards have made telephoning easier than ever. Use of telephone cards doubled just between 2000 and 2002. Some distributors of cards specialize in the “ethnic markets,” others market the cards to a particular immigrant group such as the Chinese in the Pacific Northwest, the Indians in San Jose, or the Cubans in Florida. Personal, real-time contact provided by cheap international phone calls has radically changed the life of a transnational migrant: “they are still physically distanced [from those left behind], but they can now feel and function like a family” (Vertovec, 2004).¹

Vertovec claims that in many communities in underdeveloped nations, transnational ways of life have become the norm—expected and normal. In these places people shape their plans for work, marriage, children, and retirement around migrating elsewhere to spend periods of time working in a better job and saving the money needed to support their plans for the rest of life when they return. Social networks of kin and friends in the destination support migrants with information, guidance, and help. Migrant transnationalism generates even more migration, as the pioneers send back money and information that encourages others to follow (Vertovec, 2004). In many studies, transnational migrants describe experiencing their repeated moves back and forth between radically different national settings in terms of “bifocality,” or dualism, because “they constantly compare their situation in their ‘home’ society to their situation in the ‘host’ society abroad.” This dual consciousness becomes habitual for the migrant generation and difficult to lose, and it continues to resonate into the second generation, even when the children are raised and settle down in the new location, causing them confusion and stress (Vertovec, 2004).

¹ Since this article was published in 2004, Internet capabilities for communicating globally have improved exponentially. For example, companies such as Skype make software available free to be downloaded from their Internet site that enables a user to speak to another Skype user through their respective computer speakers or, to improve the sound quality, through a headset. For a fee, subscribers to Skype can use their computers to call a land-line telephone or a cell phone anywhere in the world. A list on the Skype website of rates per minute for such phone calls shows that it costs $.40 per minute to call Afghanistan, $.11 per minute to call India, $.18 to call Nigeria, and $.14 to call Uruguay. European countries are typically $.02 cents per minute. The list includes hundreds of countries and regions as available calling destinations (http://www.skype.com).
Another dimension of transnationalism is discussed in an article by Portes, Escobar, and Radford (2007). The authors compare 90 organizations established by immigrants to the United States from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, organizations that are intended to help and support the societies migrants left behind. Such organizations are an important means of keeping transnational ties intact while sharing with less developed areas the resources and expertise gained by immigrants in the United States. Purposes of these philanthropic organizations vary; some are civic (such as the Miami Colombian Lions Club), others are hometown committees devoted to helping a particular town by building schools or clinics, or social welfare agencies devoted to specific immigrants, or groups with a religious focus, or political groups aimed at generating and supporting political activity back home (Portes, Escobar & Radford 2007).

Besides demonstrating the startling scale of such immigrant organizations and the range of their activities, Portes, Escobar, and Radford (2007) studied the type of immigrants that participate in them. They report findings that contradict the assumptions of an “orthodox” assimilation perspective. According to the expected pattern, these organizations should attract the most recent immigrants, who should feel the strongest homeland ties, have the least facility in English, and be the most determined to help those they left behind. In this standard perspective, as immigrants grow comfortable in their new home and learn English, they are likely to shift their attention and energies to this nation and their lives in it, and to discontinue activities tied to the old homeland.

In fact, these authors found that it was the “older, better-educated, and more established immigrants” who were the most likely participants in these philanthropic organizations. According to the authors, “The explanation is that these are the individuals with the information, the security, and the resources of time and money to dedicate to these initiatives.” They note that “close to 70 percent of members of these organizations have lived in the United States for ten years or more and half are already U.S. citizens. Only one-tenth are relatively recent arrivals...” While recent immigrants must devote themselves to their own survival and advancement in a new land, those who are further along in adapting, and who feel more secure, can turn to working with organizations that help home localities (Portes, Escobar & Radford, 2007). Different immigrant groups support different types of organizations, depending on the circumstances of those who migrated, their reasons for leaving, and the reception they received in the United States. Colombians tend to form middle-class civic and religious organizations; Dominicans form political organizations tied to parties in the Dominican Republic; while Mexicans have formed hundreds of hometown committees to funnel money and information to aid development in their largely rural communities (Portes, Escobar & Radford, 2007). This finding challenges the notion that the longer an immigrant lives in the adopted country, the less important and deeply felt ties to the homeland become.
Several sociological studies on assimilation add detail to the claim that transnational migrants, including those who eventually become permanent residents or citizens, maintain linkages to home that are distinctive to this era of globalization. Waldinger (2007) analyzed transnational activities among various Latino immigrant groups to see whether maintaining connections with a country of origin through such activities is associated with three dimensions: stronger or weaker views of the United States, greater or lesser attachment to the U.S., and a stronger or weaker sense of identity as an American (Waldinger, 2007). The transnational activities surveyed were telephoning to relatives weekly, traveling back annually for visits, and sending remittances (regular financial support payments). He found that almost two thirds of the sample, 63%, engaged in one or two of the three transnational activities to keep in regular contact with those left behind, but only one in 10 immigrants did all three activities, and almost three in 10 never did any of them. Recent immigrants (those who had been in the United States less than 10 years) differed from those who had been here for a long time (more than 30 years), in that those who came recently engaged in more transnational activities to keep in touch and to help those they left. However, in terms of attachment to the United States, the author found similar levels of attachment no matter how much contact the migrants had with their countries of origin. Even among recent immigrants, more than half intended to remain in the United States permanently, and saw their focus of political life in this country, not back home. Waldinger argues that although transnational activities demonstrate that the country of origin remains an important dimension of identity for immigrants, those activities do not interfere with the process of shifting allegiance to their adopted country. “The best way to characterize the immigrants’ ‘here-there’ connection,” Waldinger concludes, “is to describe them as ‘in-between,’...keeping in touch and trying to remain true to the people and places they have left behind, and simultaneously shifting loyalties and allegiances to the U.S., where they see a bright future for themselves and their children and where they plan to stay for good” (Waldinger, 2007).

Rumbaut (1997) also considers how well the traditional notion of assimilation explains the recent experience of transnational migration. He writes that instead of a linear progression of steady “homogenization” into one American society from distinct immigrant cultures, his research demonstrates an opposite result. Writing in 1997, Rumbaut begins his argument by reminding readers that recent immigrants are diverse not only in cultures, but in class and education as well:

The United States today is attracting some of the most skilled (and perhaps healthiest) immigrants in its history, notably among the flows from certain Asian and increasingly African countries...Among immigrant adults in the United States in 1990, over 60% of those from India, Taiwan, and Nigeria had college degrees, as did between a third to a half of those from Iran, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan,
South Korea, and China, and about 50% of all immigrants from Africa (Rumbaut, 1997).

He next surveys the level of ethnic identification among various second-generation immigrant groups to see how strongly they identified as “American.” Rumbaut tested the typical assumption about assimilation that there will be a linear movement over time across generations toward an “unhyphenated American” identity. Instead, he reported an increasing level of identification among the children of immigrants with the parental ethnic groups, and a “reactive ethnic consciousness,” in which individuals born in the United States often “return to the ancestral or immigrant identity” that they themselves never experienced. Interviewed when they were 14 or 15 years of age, it took this cohort of second-generation teenagers more time and more life experience to become unconditionally American than it had their immigrant parents.

Rumbaut also challenges the facile notion that all immigrants start out poor, desperate, and unable to speak English. Instead, he notes that a substantial proportion of recent immigrants are more highly educated than the norm for Americans, and they arrive already speaking good or even flawless English. Roughly one third of adult immigrants between 1970 and the late 1990s have been professionals, executives, or managers in their countries of origin, although the reality is that there are sharp differences between immigrants from various countries, and between different waves of immigration even from the same country. The continuum between accomplished professionals immigrating from India or Taiwan, where they are recognized in those countries as a “brain drain,” and the mostly manual laborers from Haiti or Vietnam cautions against broad generalizations about recent immigrants to the United States. Finally, this author reminds us that many immigrants arrive already quite “Americanized” by the relentless global export of popular American culture, clothing, music, slang, movies, and books. Rumbaut argues for developing a more nuanced and sophisticated theory of assimilation that would incorporate the realities of globalization and the likelihood that newcomers are transforming the core American identity at the same time that they are being transformed and eventually absorbed into it (Rumbaut, 1997).

One implication of these studies of transnational migration for the development of allegiance to the host nation is that immigrants to the United States have many more choices in a globalized world than did immigrants in the 18th, 19th, or early 20th centuries. Some immigrants have always managed to return home even in eras when transportation was costly and dangerous, but the transportation options available now allow the regular straddling of two places on the globe. Telephone and email communication allows a person virtually to live in two places at once, sharing in real time the intimacies and decisions of families separated in space. As discussed below, with the trend toward dual citizenship offered by many countries, a decision to naturalize as a citizen of the United States often does not force a choice to give up the old citizenship (Spiro, 2008). Allegiance as the devotion
required by the ruler or government that provides one’s security now has to stretch to fit the circumstances of so many choices, and it grows thinner in the process of stretching.

“COLLECTIVE HISTORIES OF DISPLACEMENT”

A review article on diasporas (Clifford, 1994) describes another dimension of transnationalism. Diasporas as a type of transnationalism have been studied since the early 1990s as a phenomenon of globalization. The first and archetypal diaspora refers to the banishment of the Jews from ancient Judea by Rome, after which for centuries the Jewish people lived apart but among the peoples of other nations, until the founding of the modern nation-state of Israel. Some sociologists and anthropologists now find the generalized concept of a diaspora useful for studying displaced and scattered peoples who maintain their original group identities while they are living elsewhere. Clifford defines diasporas as

Expatriate minority communities (1) that are dispersed from an original “center” to at least two “peripheral” places; (2) that maintain a “memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland”; (3) that “believe they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host country”; (4) that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) of which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are “importantly defined” by this continuing relationship with the homeland (Clifford, 1994).

The distinction this viewpoint draws between immigration and diaspora suggests why it may be useful to security officials to be aware of the phenomenon of diaspora. While immigrants suffer temporary displacement and nostalgia for the place they left behind, they generally are moving toward replacing the old with a new home in the new place. Diasporic persons are not moving toward assimilation, because they maintain “important allegiances and practical connections to a homeland or a dispersed community located elsewhere. Peoples whose sense of identity is centrally defined by collective histories of displacement and violent loss cannot be ‘cured’ by merging into a new national community...especially when they are the victims of ongoing, structural prejudice” (Clifford, 1994). Diasporas are transnational displacements plus some experience of rejection, prejudice, and ongoing exclusion. Clifford readily admits the difficulty in maintaining conceptual boundaries between diasporas, migrations, and immigrations when people may and do shift between them. Yet the “edge” of resentment among diasporic peoples makes this experience distinctive. Examples of contemporary diasporas include the Vietnamese “boat people,” Cuban anti-Castro migrants, Armenians, and Palestinians, and in the past, examples include Chinese and Polish diasporas. It is the particular emphasis on what has been lost, seemingly unfairly, in the homeland that gives diasporic peoples a greater ambivalence and unease in their new
surroundings. They did not leave voluntarily, and they probably cannot go back. Some observers claim that among diasporic peoples divided loyalties can be sharp when the interests of the homeland they have lost conflict with those of their host state (Shain & Wittes, 2002).

“TEMPORARY SOJOURNERS”

Another aspect of the phenomenon of transnationalism that is relevant to individual allegiance is found in Saxenian’s work on foreign-born entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley area of northern California. In 2001, Saxenian conducted an online survey of members of 17 professional associations in Silicon Valley, focusing on engineers, software developers, and computer manufacturing businesspersons. Her questions probed the extent of involvement by the foreign-born in these associations, the nature of professional connections this group formed with professionals in their home countries, and “the extent to which immigrants are becoming transnational entrepreneurs and establishing business operations in their native countries” (Saxenian, Motoyama & Quan, 2002). Saxenian and her colleagues report majorities of foreign-born entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley know at least one person who returned from the United States to India, mainland China, or Taiwan to work or start their own companies. Half of the foreign-born professionals responding to the survey traveled to their home countries on business at least once a year; a fifth of the Taiwanese travel home two to four times annually. “Eighty-two percent of the region’s foreign-born respondents report that they share information about technology with their colleagues in their native countries….and 69 percent share information about jobs or business opportunities in their native country” (Saxenian, Motoyama & Quan, 2002). Significant percentages of these immigrants saw themselves as “temporary sojourners”: half of those under 35 years of age reported that they would seriously consider moving back to their home country, while for older persons or for those who became naturalized American citizens, the proportion of those who still saw themselves likely to return approached 20% (Saxenian, Motoyama & Quan, 2002).

A second group of researchers applied Saxenian’s focus on immigration and entrepreneurialism to a nationwide sample of data, including all engineering and technology companies founded between 1995 and 2005, and the World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Cooperation Treaty database for international patent applications. The question asked was what role foreign-born immigrants to the United States played in these activities. They found that the pattern Saxenian and her colleagues found for Silicon Valley, of “highly skilled immigrants leading innovation and creating jobs and wealth, has become a nationwide phenomenon.”

- In 25.3% of these companies, at least one key founder was foreign-born. States with an above-average rate of immigrant-founded companies include California (39%), New Jersey (38%), Georgia (30%), and Massachusetts (29%). Below
average states include Washington (11%), Ohio (14%), North Carolina (14%), and Texas (18%).

- Nationally, these immigrant-founded companies produced $52 billion in sales and employed 450,000 workers in 2005.

- Indians have founded more engineering and technology companies in the U.S. in the past decade than immigrants from the U.K., China, Taiwan and Japan combined. Of all immigrant-founded companies, 26% have Indian founders.

- Chinese (Mainland- and Taiwan-born) entrepreneurs are heavily concentrated in California, with 49% of Mainland Chinese and 81% of Taiwanese companies located there. Indian and U.K. entrepreneurs tend to be dispersed around the country, with Indians having sizable concentrations in California and New Jersey and the British in California and Georgia.

- The mix of immigrants varies by state. Hispanics constitute the dominant group in Florida, with immigrants from Cuba, Columbia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Guatemala founding 35% of the immigrant-founded companies. Israelis constitute the largest founding group in Massachusetts, with 17%. Indians dominate New Jersey, with 47% of all immigrant-founded startups.

- Almost 80% of immigrant-founded companies in the U.S. were within just two industry fields: software and innovation/manufacturing-related services.

- Immigrants were least likely to start companies in the defense/aerospace and environmental industries. They were most highly represented as founders in the semiconductor, computer, communications, and software fields (Wadhwa, Saxenian, Rissing & Gereffi, 2007).

This ferment of capitalist activities across national boundaries is generating new wealth and economic development in the United States as well as for the partner countries, but it does beg the question about these transnational entrepreneurs: given their simultaneous economic interests in several countries, where does their national allegiance lie—with their adopted nation, with their home country, or nowhere? Saxenian notes that from the 1970s through the 1990s

Tens of thousands of immigrants from developing countries, who had initially come to the U.S. for graduate engineering education, accepted jobs in Silicon Valley rather than return to their home countries where professional opportunities were far more limited. By 2000, over half (53 per cent) of Silicon Valley’s scientists and engineers were foreign-born. Indian and Chinese immigrants alone accounted for over one-quarter of the region’s scientists and

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2 NSF data shows that over 95% of foreign-born engineering and science doctorate holders from India and China planned to stay in the US after graduation.
engineers, or some 20,000 Indian and 20,000 Chinese (5,000 Taiwan- and 15,000 mainland-born engineers. [The author] argues that the same individuals who left their home countries for better lifestyles abroad are now reversing the brain drain, transforming it into brain circulation as they return home to work, establish partnerships, or start new companies, while maintaining business and professional ties with the U.S. (Saxenian, 2007).

“IDENTITIES CAN THUS BE PARTIAL, INTERMITTENT, AND REVERSIBLE”

Not all scholars agree that transnationalism created by globalization over the last several decades constitutes a new phenomenon. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) question such claims by transnationalism’s proponents, and offer a useful counterargument. These two authors believe that the current phenomenon of transnationalism has more in common with past migrations than scholars eager to identify uniqueness typically credit. Waldinger and Fitzgerald define transnationalism as “the collision of the social organization of migration, and its state-spanning results, with the reactive efforts by state and civil society actors to produce state-society alignment.” In other words, it is not enough only to study the many ways in which today’s immigrants keep in touch with and interact with their countries of origin. One must also take into account the efforts of the host nation-states to maintain themselves as nation-states in the face of immigration from outside. These efforts by states include controlling the state’s boundaries, specifying who may enter and who may settle within, setting foreign policies toward other nation-states even if those policies override the interests and wishes of immigrant groups resident there, and asking for the exclusive allegiance of its citizens. In all these ways and to varying degrees, a nation-state can choose to encourage or discourage transnational interactions by immigrants, and how it chooses depends on historical circumstances. Transnational practices presuppose that there are immigration and foreign policies on the part of host states that allow them; in closed states—Cuba, North Korea, or Myanmar, for example—the purportedly global phenomenon of transnationalism is lacking. Waldinger and Fitzgerald remind their readers that the kind of relaxed policies that nurture transnationalism are a product of relative peace, and when nation-states are under threat by international conflicts or war, the potential for divided loyalties from such policies often becomes insupportable, and more restrictive policies replace the earlier relaxed ones (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004).

Vertovec, in his review essay discussed above, points out that the nation-state correctly senses threat from globalization in the rise of competing regional and global structures that cut across the claims of sovereignty that were previously reserved for nation-states. The nation-state paradigm, in which a people who

3 Indians accounted for 13% and Chinese for 14% of the region’s engineers and scientists. This data is from the 5% Microdata Sample, 2000, US Census.
identify themselves as a nation live within borders that contain that people and keep others out, borders that define their distinctive political order, is disrupted when numerous groups hold multiple identities, physically move back and forth across national borders, and participate in the political orders of other nation-states as well as that of their host country.

The ability to change countries of residence with relative ease and the possibility of reversing the move can vitiate the need to make lasting identitive commitments. Identities can thus be partial, intermittent, and reversible in the modern Western democratic state. Order no longer depends on the unalloyed loyalty stemming from immutable national identity—identity for which there is not plausible or legitimate alternative...migration tends to attenuate territorial sovereignty, monolithic order, and identitive solidarity (Vertovec, 2004).

Vertovec claims that already a large literature has developed “spanning the social sciences” debating whether and how globalization is affecting the nation-state. Some of the authors he cites claim that the nation-state is “outdated,” or that its authority or its autonomy is “declining” in the face of globalized processes of production, finance, and trade. Some announce the “death” of the nation-state; others are content to note that its pretensions to sovereignty are being severely challenged (Vertovec, 2004). Since the allegiance required by the United States federal personnel security system assumes a unitary nation-state, if these claims of challenges, declines, or even death of the nation-state are at all accurate, they raise difficulties for continuing such a requirement into the future. Transnationalism and related phenomena such as diasporas and migrations—the increasing movement of peoples in a globalized context—is one dimension of globalization’s impact on national identities and the allegiance they express. Policies on citizenship are another.
One of the consequences of the increasing incidence of migration across the globe has been a change in citizenship policies. As Kelman noted in his discussion on the nation-state, traditionally citizenship has meant security and belonging within a bounded political territory; the bargain was that “insofar as individuals are included within the boundaries of the political system and are secure in their citizen status, they can rely on the nation-state to meet their basic needs and protect their interests” (Kelman, 1997). Globalization and its effects have upset this understanding of citizenship.

Peter Spiro, a lawyer specializing in citizenship law, has written several explorations of the meaning of citizenship. His recent book is a core resource for studying trends in allegiance (Spiro, 2008). Spiro describes the legal bases for citizenship in the United States, which are (1) birthright citizenship based on having been born on American territory, and (2) parental citizenship passed to children with certain provisions. He briefly traces the history of how these laws evolved and have been applied over time. Since the United States is a nation of immigrants who brought with them many ethnic identities, the territorial basis for citizenship, not an ethnic basis (German or French, for example) has come to define who belongs as an American—if one is born here, one is an American, despite some complications that flow from that rule. As a nation of immigrants, the ability and encouragement to naturalize, that is, to shift one’s allegiance from a previous nation to the United States, has been a crucial policy for nation-building ever since the nation was formed. Indeed, one of the first laws passed by the newly re-formed Congress in 1790 began to specify naturalization policies (Spiro, 2008).

Since citizenship is meant to express the national community, as long as people stayed put in a nation-state, birthright citizenship based on being born there coincided with that community. It took over 300 years for race to be divorced from citizenship in the United States, but there has been a steady trend toward including everybody born here. Immigrants in the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries could be expected to settle and become part of the community as citizens, notwithstanding that roughly one quarter of them eventually returned to their countries of origin.

Globalization challenges these notions. As described in previous sections, increasing migration rates, circular patterns of immigration and return, transnationalism supported by communications and easy transportation—all mean more churning of humanity in and out of the nation. While living in the United States, temporary residents have children who automatically become citizens, and they take their American citizenship back to their parent’s countries of origin when they move back. Transnational and diasporic communities can now actively maintain the cultural practices and political ties to their homelands while living in the United States, challenging expectations of assimilation to American mores. These trends weaken the assumption that citizens live contained within a nation’s
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boundaries and express one community in an overarching national identity (Spiro, 2008).

Spiro argues that citizenship itself means less in a globalized context, and cites the increasing tolerance of multiple citizenships and the easing of naturalization policies as indications that citizenship is losing its distinctiveness as indicative of one’s basic identity.

A citizenship that denotes nothing more than place of birth or parental status [and not national identity] will not bear the burdens of redistributive sacrifice. I will not fight for someone who shares membership merely because his parents were passing through when he was born, nor will I be inclined to share my paycheck with him. Ditto for someone who was born and has lived abroad all her life and happens to have had one American parent who spent five years in the United States...

But in fact, physical location, especially at one point in time in any person’s life (even the point of time at birth) is less defining of identity that it once was. The person born in Bangalore may have uncles and cousins in the United States and parents who travel there often, end up working for Microsoft (while continuing in India), and follow American political and cultural developments. The person born in Indiana may have parents who are there temporarily, may have no other familial connections in the United States, may not speak English, and are otherwise detached from the dominant culture. The answer [to the question ‘what exactly it means to be an American’] cannot simply be to be born in America is to be American. And yet that is the answer that citizenship law supplies. In other days, the answer worked insofar as being born in America came bundled with other characteristics that, one way or another, were associated with the national identity. Today, place of birth is becoming increasingly detached from identity, even as the law remains unchanged.

The one change globalization has made to citizenship that has the most impact on allegiance is the recent increasing tolerance for dual or even multiple citizenships. As Spiro points out, during most of American history, dual citizenship was seen as abhorrent, was actively discouraged, and was often ruled illegal. From the naturalization act of 1795 that required new American citizens to solemnly swear a renunciation of all previous citizenships, to a 1958 Supreme Court decision that upheld the termination of a dual citizen’s American citizenship after he voted in a foreign election, law and policy defined citizenship as singular. Most other nations took the same position through the middle of the 20th century. Because it was thus enforced as exclusive, citizenship was a highly valued status that identified where an individual belonged—it defined “us” as citizens living within the territorial boundaries of our nation-state, versus “them” living outside those borders who were
citizens of some other state. Because it was an exclusive affiliation, citizenship expressed the deeply felt allegiance to that nation-state and a loyalty to the fellow-citizens of that nation in an intense attachment. Immigrants to the United States were welcome to fondly recreate the cultures and practices of their countries of origin, but they were expected to put their new relationship as citizens of America first; “...one came to the table as a person of German or Italian or East European origin, but the table itself was American. That was acceptable. It was not acceptable to also sit at another table, defined by another citizenship” (Spiro, 2008).

These assumptions and associations shaped the requirements for allegiance by federal employees and by those granted eligibility for access to classified information. Only citizens of the United States can be considered for such access, and those with dual citizenship, which was only rarely encountered when the requirements were first written, are subject to special investigation procedures. The trend toward dual citizenship as the norm, however, threatens to undermine this policy.

In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Afroyim v. Rusk that it was unconstitutional for the government to terminate the American citizenship of a person because he or she voted in a foreign election, thus reversing a decision of a decade earlier. Their argument was that the act of voting abroad did not imply the person was choosing to abandon American citizenship. Gradually, later rulings have further reinforced the idea that what a person does in another country, such as voting or joining the military there, does not imply that they are thereby giving up their U.S. citizenship. It has become quite difficult to lose American citizenship, and it requires a deliberate official renunciation by the individual. Voting in foreign elections, serving as public officials of other countries, serving in foreign armed forces, or naturalizing as a citizen of another country—all are legally permissible for American citizens, although they are not encouraged. The attitude of “don’t ask, don’t tell” applies. “To the extent one is eligible,” Spiro notes, “one can in effect collect citizenships and the benefits that come with them.” So, for example, having one Irish or Italian grandparent now allows an American to naturalize as a dual citizen of Ireland or Italy, gaining the practical benefits of European Union membership while maintaining all their rights and obligations as an American.4

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4 A PERSEREC staff member who reviewed this paper passed along to the author a personal anecdote that illustrates this point. His daughter-in-law is a native-born U.S. citizen whose mother emigrated from Argentina. The daughter-in-law told him that four of her relatives living in Argentina have applied for and received Italian citizenship in what they see as a safety precaution, should the political or economic situation in their native Argentina become insupportable. This has convinced my colleague’s daughter-in-law to apply for Italian citizenship for her two young daughters, both born in the United States, because with passports from a country that belongs to the European Union come permission to work in Italy, and an advantage should they ever apply for jobs with U.S. companies that do work in Europe. The basis of this Argentinean family’s successful claim to dual Italian citizenship is relatives who emigrated from Italy to Argentina between 1870 and 1880.
Changes by other nations in their laws and practices have produced the most
dramatic increases in Americans eligible or declared to be dual citizens. In the past,
when a person naturalized to become an American and renounced his or her
previous citizenship, most other nations promptly cancelled that person’s original
citizenship, reinforcing the global preference for exclusive national allegiances.
Since the 1990s in accelerating numbers, most nations now permit the retention of
their citizenships when a person adds another one. For example, of the top 20
sending nations of immigrants to the United States, 19 of them permit dual
citizenship, and many of those prevent the individual from renouncing their first
citizenship even if they want to. Spiro points to the rise of laws and treaties
mandating international human rights as a major reason for this relatively sudden
acceptance of dual citizenship. When individuals had to rely on the intervention of
their nation for their protection when they traveled abroad, dual citizenship could
only provoke conflict over whose jurisdiction applied if trouble arose. The global
expectation of and subscription to human rights, with some nations as notable
exceptions, has extended human rights to persons, not nationalities, and
diminished the potential for international conflict over how one nation’s citizens are
treated by another (Spiro, 2008).

Among the reasons for acceptance and even encouragement of dual citizenship by
sending countries are the benefits they now derive from it. One enormous benefit is
the money sent back by immigrants earning more in developed countries that they
would at home. Remittances sent voluntarily to families and hometowns by
immigrants now amount to millions of dollars, and they have become a major
source of income for less developed countries. To foster and maintain these
lucrative ties, sending nations have been making it easier for their “residents
abroad” to participate in the life “back home.” Keeping them as dual citizens is one
way. To encourage political participation, in another example, countries are
providing polling places in consulates abroad, or permitting mail-in or online
balloting. The rise of multiple citizenships both reflects and exacerbates the
increasing mobility labeled transnationalism: people not only move back and forth
across national borders, but they maintain citizenship in both places, and doing so
encourages them to take ever more advantage of the benefits available to the person
with multiple citizenships and even to seek other benefits. Spiro’s book-length
exploration of globalization’s impact on citizenship is neither critical nor laudatory
about the trend. He is resigned. He argues that globalization is a major world
development that is not going away, and he sees its impacts on citizenship as likely
to be permanent, requiring adjustment, not reactionary demands that politically
would be most unlikely to succeed (Spiro, 2008).

Other authors are not so neutral about the changes globalization is making to
citizenship and allegiance. Renshon (2005) has produced a series of reports and
articles arguing that too many immigrants are being admitted into the United
States and that lax policies on multiple citizenships are threatening American
national identity. Renshon takes a conservative point of view that assumes the
primacy and inevitability of the nation-state. To him, immigration since 1965 puts
dangerous pressure on American national identity because it has increased the
racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the United States, and brought
multiculturalism with it. Increases in multiple citizenships seem to him glaring
examples of the dilution of the meaning of citizenship. To Renshon

Some kinds of psychological attachments [such as national
allegiance] are simply incompatible; others require a choice about
which will be primary. Dual citizenship, especially when it entails
active participation in the political life of an immigrant’s home
country, leads to conflicts of interest, attention, and attachment
(Renshon, 2005).

Renshon describes six ways an American can become a dual citizen, and he
estimates that some 150 countries allow one of those forms of dual citizenship.
Illustrating the scale of what he argues is a serious problem, he notes that “Of
immigrants from the top-20 sending countries to the United States in the years
1994-2002, an average of over 90 percent were dual-citizen immigrants.” He
proposes policy changes in the treatment of participation by dual citizens in their
“other home.” He would restrict and discourage dual citizens from voting in foreign
elections, serving as a public official in foreign countries, joining the armed forces of
foreign countries, or serving in public office in the United States. Since Renshon
does not grapple with the constitutional and legal revisions his recommendations
would require, he proposes adding discouraging statements about these activities to
citizenship applications and oaths of naturalization, and putting diplomatic
pressure on other countries to prevent dual citizens from engaging in these
transnational activities. He would couple these steps with deliberate efforts to bind
the citizenry more tightly together in an American national identity, with renewed
emphasis on teaching and celebrating the history of the United States (Renshon,
2005).

Some authors react to the potentially diluting impact of globalization on citizenship
by looking more closely at the whole basis of citizenship in the United States, that
is, birthright citizenship for anyone born on American soil. Their concern is with
“accidental citizenship,” the grant of American citizenship to children of noncitizen
parents living temporarily in the United States. With the increased transnational
migration of workers, this is becoming a more common situation, as is “birth
tourism,” in which noncitizens deliberately travel to the United States to have an
impending baby born as an American, or “instant citizens,” in which people living
across the borders of the United States cross just in time to have their babies here
(Nyers, 2006). Nyers considers the claims of those who label some persons
“accidental” citizens to be dangerous and undermining of an essential permanent
basis for citizenship. His example is the well-known case of Yaser Esam Hamdi,
who was born in Louisiana in 1980 to Saudi Arabian parents. Hamdi’s father was
in the United States working for a Saudi oil company on a 3-year contract. He
moved his family back to Saudi Arabia when his son was a toddler, and Yaser grew
CITIZENSHIP: ONE OR MANY?

up as a Saudi. He was arrested in 2002 in Afghanistan, held as an enemy combatant by the American military for 2 years uncharged and incommunicado, and therefore not granted the usual rights of American citizens to a lawyer, due process, or a trial. After the Supreme Court ruled in April 2004 that as a citizen Hamdi should receive a lawyer and a judicial hearing, in October Hamdi agreed to renounce his American citizenship and abide by restrictions on his movements in exchange for his release from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [Nyers, 2006]. Nyers argues that treating persons like Hamdi who are born on American territory to noncitizen parents as “accidental citizens,” and therefore as lesser or not really citizens at all, endangers the necessary fundamental basis of citizenship as a birthright:

[Declaring someone to be an] accidental citizen breaks the link between nativity and nationality, creating a potential catastrophe for birthright conceptions of citizenship. This is because the bond that is forged between the sovereign and subject at birth is revealed as arbitrary, and not at all natural or necessary. The accidental citizen also poses a problem for states because it renders indeterminate which country can be placed as “home” (Nyers, 2006).

On the other hand, John Eastman (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005) argues from the Hamdi case in testimony before a Congressional committee that persons like Hamdi are indeed accidental citizens because the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, if rightly understood according to Eastman, would not apply to those born to noncitizens who did not grow up in or reside in the United States. He urges Congress to reframe citizenship policy to exclude persons like Hamdi, but the Judiciary Committee has not found the political support to follow his recommendation with legislation.5

Vertovec (2004), in his review essay on transnationalism, sides with Spiro on the inevitability that dual citizenship will increase over time as globalization evolves. He argues that concerns about divided loyalties, security threats, impedance of immigrant integration, more international instability, and unfairness in giving dual citizens more rights than single citizens all have counterarguments that are equally telling. In Vertovec’s view, loyalties are often multiple without causing problems, and cites the whole point of the European Union. He claims that security threats

5 The September 29, 2005, hearing by the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, is instructive in its entirety. It was titled “Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty.” Three of the four witnesses, Stanley Renshon, John Eastman, and John Fonte, represented conservative perspectives while the fourth, Peter Spiro, sought to refute their views with a more accepting approach to dual citizenship. Spiro argued to the Subcommittee that “It is remarkable how little opposition has surfaced in this country to dual nationality in the face of the quiet explosion and the number of dual citizens. That indeed may be explained by the fact that dual citizenship is increasingly commonplace…This is not an immigration issue, this is a matter of how Americans, many of them native born, are living and connecting in a new world. The maintenance of additional citizenship ties is not a problem that needs fixing (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005).
develop and fester independently of loyalties more often than they are reliant on them. Dual citizenship may be boosting integration rather than hindering it given a recent increase in naturalization rates, and unfairness from additional rights for dual citizens are little more than what permanent residents already enjoy. He supports the claim that “there is an emerging international consensus that the goal [of state policies] is no longer to reduce plural nationality as an end in itself, but to manage it as an inevitable feature of an increasingly interconnected and mobile world” (Vertovec, 2004).
SEVERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALLEGIANCE TO A NATION

The lenses of national identity, globalization, immigration, transnationalism, and legal citizenship offer large-scale perspectives on how globalization may be changing the allegiance of individuals. Psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the question of how allegiance to a nation develops in the individual, and how that allegiance can change or expand in the case of multiple citizenships. To better understand how large-scale trends affect the person whose allegiance may be at issue, it is important also to hold up the small lens of the individual psychology.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

One instructive viewpoint among the many offered by social psychology is political socialization, that is, how people develop loyalties early in life. The psychological factor is critical for explaining contemporary espionage and other forms of adverse insider behavior among employees or personnel in positions of trust.

National loyalty may be seen as the instrumental or behavioral dimension of national identification that carries with it intense emotional content (Mack, 1983; DeLamater, Katz & Kelman, 1969). Social scientists who have studied the formation and development of national identity as a political value or attitude and as a critical component of a nation’s political culture conclude that ethnic, communal, or national identity is formed early in life as part of the political socialization process, typically between the ages of four and 11. This has been called the primacy principle by some authors (Easton & Dennis, 1967, 1969); and by anthropologist Edward Brunner, the early learning hypothesis:

That which is traditionally learned and internalized in infancy and early childhood tends to be most resistant to change in contact situations....That which persists, i.e., kinship, role conceptions and values, was learned early, and the primary agents of cultural transmission were members of ego’s lineage (Brunner, 1956).

A similar endorsement of the early learning model is offered by Sears (1969) who uses the term symbolic politics:

According to this theory, people acquire in early life predispositions which involve their adult perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, then they respond in a highly affective way to symbols which resemble the attitude object to which similar emotional responses were conditioned or associated in early life. Whether or not the issue has some tangible consequence for the adult voter’s personal life is irrelevant. One’s relevant personal “stake” in the issue is an emotional, symbolic one; it triggers long-held, habitual responses (Sears, Hensler & Speer, 1979).
In an earlier publication, Sears (1969) reported that in the United States nationalism (national identity) develops first as highly favorable feelings or affection without supporting cognitive content or understanding. When several agents of political socialization reinforce what is learned from the primary (parental or family) agent, the identity retains a strong emotional or affective content and as such it is relatively indelible throughout life. Secondary agents include early schooling, religious institutions, mass media, and peers (Davis, 1949; Brunner, 1956). The content of early political socialization may include patriotic messages, positive references to national symbols and leaders, and group rituals such as pledging allegiance to the flag. These reinforcing communications and experiences instill in a child emotional attachments and feelings that are seen as extensions of affective attachments to parents and family members and other more immediate groups (Greenstein, 1965; Easton & Hess, 1962; Druckman, 1994).

The general consensus among researchers regarding the formation of national identification among American children was articulated by Hess and Tourney (1970). It follows that the same could be said about national identification by children in other national communities:

> The young child’s involvement with the political system begins with a strong positive attachment to the country; the United States is seen as ideal and as superior to other countries. This attachment to the country is stable and shows almost no change through elementary school-years. This bond is possibly the most basic and essential aspect of socialization into involvement with the political life of the nation. Essentially an emotional tie, it grows from complex psychological and social needs and is exceedingly resistant to change or argument. It is a powerful emotional bond that is particularly important in time of national emergency (Hess & Tourney, 1970).

By the mid-1970s and 80s, however, the view that political socialization, which conveyed such values as party affiliation and respect for national figures, was virtually complete by the age of 11 or 12 was seriously challenged or rejected by scholars who found sharp generational differences in interviews and surveys of high school students and young adults (Niemi & Sobieszek 1977; Somit & Peterson, 1987). However, early learning as a source of affective group or national identity formation has not yet been disputed. What still remains in question was exactly how identity and loyalty to a group or nation is affixed in the mind of new societal members.

Druckman (1994) provides a helpful overview of this process that leans heavily on the much earlier findings of DeLamater, Katz & Helman (1969), Terhune (1964), Piaget (1965) and other social psychologists. As described by Druckman, the development of loyalty to a group, and then to a nation, is an extension of human needs for belonging, security, and prestige or self-worth, which echoes the argument made by Kelman. According to Piaget’s stages of intellectual development,
about the age of four, individuals begin to move from egocentrism to sociocentrism—the ability to form attachments to others in their immediate surroundings. The attachments are both cognitive and affective. With time these attachments are extended to wider groups and ultimately to the nation. Therefore, the establishment of national identity is part of the natural process of early intellectual development.

According to Terhune (1964), what “binds the self to the nation” is a function of three factors: affective involvement, emotional or sentimental attachment to the homeland, goal involvement, motivation to help his country, and ego involvement, the individual’s sense of identity with the nation linked with self-esteem and personal pride. Druckman concludes that “these theories highlight the importance of self-identification and emotional identification with objects in early learning [as] gradually, individuals develop sensitivity to the needs and interests of others.”

Given the formidable and lasting effects of early political socialization that inculcates identity and loyalties, we should not be too surprised that among 37 individuals arrested for espionage between 1990 and 2007, 35% were foreign-born, 58% had foreign attachments (relatives or close, long term friends abroad) and 49% had foreign cultural ties (Herbig, 2008). We may hypothesize that the early political socialization experience of these individuals likely was (1) characterized by ambiguous, conflicting, or nonexistent content on national or communal identity in which the agents of socialization were nonreinforcing, or (2) unambiguously oriented toward loyalty and affection for a national entity other than the United States. Apparently many of these adult espionage offenders emerged from their formative stage of development without the clear affective attachments to the United States, the country that had placed them in a position of trust responsible for information supporting national security. This is not to suggest that naturalized citizens or Americans with cultural ties to another country are necessarily less loyal to the United States or that individually they are less trustworthy. However, findings on how early political socialization shapes loyalty and commitment to political communities provide added understanding on how foreign-born employees or service members in critical positions (or those who have spent their early childhood in a foreign environment) may be less resistant to compromise, to collaboration with foreign interests, or given other contributing motivations, to the temptation of espionage.

**FOSTERING LOYALTIES TO GROUPS**

Druckman’s review article provides useful discussion of several other bodies of social psychological research relevant to allegiance and globalization since his focus is on “how individuals develop feelings about and attachments to groups—how they build loyalty to groups. The nation is viewed...as one type of group that fosters loyalty” (Druckman, 1994). In addition to his overview of political socialization, other valuable insights include the impact of competition on patriotism, sources
and effects of in-group bias, the impact on loyalty of being a representative of a group, and the challenges of multiple group loyalties.

While exploring differences between patriotism (positive love of country) and nationalism (that love of country plus a negative evaluation of other countries) suggested by attitude research, Druckman suggests that it may be qualities of situations, rather than the dispositions of individuals, which arouse one attitude toward the nation rather than the other. In noncompetitive situations, simple patriotism often prevails, but in competitions between nations this shifts toward nationalism, which combines commitment to one's own group with hostility, even denigration, of other groups. This sense of how competition affects attitudes is played out in common experience: in times of threat to a nation, or during the ultimate threat of a war between nations, demands for allegiance are heightened and suspicion of betrayal by those with lesser allegiance grows. Druckman discusses several theories about how belonging to groups affects patriotic attitudes. These are based on experiments with in-group bias, that is, with how the “mere classification of people into groups evokes biases in favor of one’s own group.” Mere membership in one group shapes its members’ perceptions to prefer that group and to evaluate it as more worthy than others. Since according to social identity theory, a person’s self-evaluation is based partly on the groups to which one belongs, higher status groups have been demonstrated to confer more satisfaction on their members. People feel better about themselves when they belong to important groups, and they feel their fortunes are tied up in the fortunes of the group. “In effect,” Druckman claims, “nationalism links individuals’ self-esteem to the esteem in which the nation is held. Loyalty and identification with the nation become tied to one’s own sense of self” (Druckman, 1994). This helps to explain why citizens demonstrate personal attachment to and a willingness to sacrifice themselves for an abstract group such as a nation.

Another suggestive observation in Druckman’s article is that when a person is designated as the representative for a group, his or her loyalty to that group shapes and constrains the person’s behavior. Research showed that designated representatives were less willing to compromise and more competitive with other groups when they no longer felt they were acting on their own behalf, but were accountable to their group’s goals. The more responsible they felt for what their group wanted, the less flexibility they felt to maneuver in negotiating with others. In such a setting, “Their loyalty was always in question and they could do hardly anything without undergoing scrutiny. They had to prove that the group was important to them through their behavior...[and] they report stronger loyalty and commitment as the pressures on them mount” (Druckman, 1994). This would describe the situation of a person who passes information to help his or her preferred group, such as an insider spy with divided loyalties, while betraying the trust of a less-preferred group.

Druckman’s discussion of multiple group loyalties is his most relevant contribution to the focus of this study. When people have multiple and potentially competing or
overlapping loyalties to groups, how do they decide among them? He suggests two bodies of research offer clues: the scaling hypothesis and reference group theory. The scaling hypothesis posits that people designate the various groups competing for their loyalties on a continuum from bad to good and associate intensities of their feelings for the groups along the same scale. In studies that gauged subjects’ ratings on such a continuum, people rated their in-groups highly and out-groups poorly, but also reflected how cooperative or conflictual the relations were between the groups. In studies that evaluated how subjects responded to persons within their group who took roles of either “heretic” or “renegade,” reactions were mild toward “heretics,” who took deviant positions but never renounced the group, but were more strongly negative toward “renegades,” who renounced both the group’s positions and membership in it. “Thus, individuals who question or challenge the group’s core values—the renegades—are considered deviant and not loyal. They are no longer good members and are assigned roles that befit their expressions of dissent” (Druckman, 1994).

A related study looked at how a group viewed potential members based on whether the potential recruit wanted to join them or not, was eligible to join or not, or had already resigned from the group. This researcher found that the most threatening potential members were those who had already left the group, and “the more negative the orientation toward the group [on the part of the potential member], the more concerned group members became about what the non-member could do to undermine group confidence and loyalty.” Druckman sums up research on the scaling hypothesis as “In effect, perceived similarity appears to be the most important dimension for scaling other groups. ‘We only want to interact with groups like us.’”

Reference group theory considers how people decide to which of their multiple groups they will give most allegiance, and to which lesser allegiance. Positive feelings about a particular group are not enough for it to function for an individual as a reference group—the person must move toward adopting that group’s values or wanting to join that group. “…Where people place their loyalty depends on how they perceive and array the various groups in their environment. The first cut at differentiating among these groups appears to depend on whether one has positive or negative feelings toward the group. Groups toward whom one has positive feelings may be reference groups—that is, potential in-groups; toward those whom one has negative feelings become out-groups and potential targets for bolstering positive feelings toward one’s in-group….It is interesting to conjecture what happens when people have multiple reference groups which, in turn, each has a set of out-groups…what if the reference groups differ in whom they see as out-groups and in the criteria they use for defining themselves vis-à-vis others? How do individuals resolve these contradictions?” (Druckman, 1994). Having raised this most relevant question for predicting the choice of allegiance among competing possibilities, Druckman admits social psychology cannot yet provide an answer.
The bias toward one’s own group that comes with loyalty appears critical to defining who one is and occurs in both cooperative and competitive intergroup situations. In fact, people have been shown to favor their own group even when they could lose substantially in the process. This in-group bias, however, generally is more extreme in competitive situations where there is incentive to favor one’s own group (Druckman, 1994).

The questions probing national allegiance in a personnel security investigation are trying to determine which nation is the applicant’s in-group—the nation into which one was born, the nation to which one immigrated and naturalized, or some other nation that offers rewards valued more highly than patriotism. Political socialization theory, discussed earlier, suggests that it is difficult to completely transfer allegiance that was formed early in development.

Dowley and Silver (2000) compared “pluralist, melting pot, and ethnic dominance models of ethnic attachment and overall levels of patriotism” in the United States and four other multiethnic countries. The question they addressed was: if a person strongly identifies with his or her ethnic group, does that lessen the attachment to the larger national group? Is ethnicity a diversion from national patriotism? They reported mixed results, in which some studies showed minority groups felt less patriotism than dominant groups, but other studies demonstrated that those with strong ethnic identification actually felt stronger patriotic attachment to the nation than those who had weak ethnic identification. “That blacks who feel strongly attached to their own group first are also those most likely to express lower levels of overall patriotism should not lead us to assume that where strong subnational identities are allowed to flourish, loyalty to the larger state will erode. In fact, our evidence suggests that the opposite may be true.”

Finally, to ascertain the potential for success of efforts at deliberate acculturation, that is, to replace one national allegiance with allegiance to another, we turn to the French Foreign Legion. Lyons (2004) considers the mechanisms by which the Legion inculcates intense loyalty among its disparate members, and the effect on that loyalty of serving in areas of ethnic conflict where some members come from the local ethnic groups. Because the Legion insists that “the Legionnaire must forget his past and deny his previous national and ethnic allegiances,” the example serves as a concentrated microcosm that illustrates the transfer of feelings and attachments that immigrants undergo when they move to and become citizens of another country.

Founded in 1831 as a means of ridding France of undesirables while at the same time creating an adventuresome colonial arm of French foreign policy, the Legion has kept its goals and its reputation intact ever since. It “constructs” soldiers whose allegiance is to the “band of brothers,” fellow Legionnaires, rather than to France itself. Men join the French Foreign Legion to escape from their pasts—from a personal or family crisis, or from an upheaval in social or political life at home.
Waves of enlistments into the Legion over time reflected the political crises of Europe and its colonies, such as

the mass enlistment of Alsatians after 1871, of White Russian émigrés after the Bolshevik revolution, of Spaniards in 1939, of German Wehrmacht and fugitive SS recruits in 1945, Vietnamese in 1955, Hungarians in 1956, Algerians in 1963, ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, following internecine disintegration, and of periodic waves of economically migrant eastern Europeans from 1945 to the present day (Lyons, 2004).

In 2004, the 7,800 Legionnaires, all volunteers, represented 117 nationalities, even though all instruction and interaction with officers takes place in French. The organization offers to all comers the chance to start over again: “…A man who has left behind his past, his social and family background, transfers to the Legion his need for an ideal, his affection equating the Legion with that of a homeland, to the point of sacrificing everything to it…This transfer…seeks to instill in the Legionnaire an unswerving loyalty to his superiors and to other Legionnaires” (Lyons, 2004).

The Legion accomplishes this indoctrination by ruthlessly suppressing individuality and any expression of a past cultural heritage by recruits. A “rigid code of behavior” and discipline is instilled through “repetitive exercises and rigorous punishment.” The sense of a past identity is immediately diminished by assigning a new volunteer to a French-speaking Legionnaire who becomes his language taskmaster, guide, and enforcer of Legion customs. Both classroom instruction and immersion in the French language ensure rapid learning of the language, and along with soldiering skills, facility in conversational French is an equally important part of the evaluation of a recruit. Secrecy heightens this immersion: Legionnaires are forbidden to talk to outsiders and must not reveal the rituals and activities of the Legion (Lyons, 2004).

Despite the allegiance to the Legion and to fellow Legionnaires that this regimen creates, occasionally tensions based on ethnic group histories break out. For example, during the conflicts that marked Yugoslavia’s disintegration in the 1990s, incidents of ethnic attacks between Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Legionnaires forced the Legion to transfer these combatants away from each other, and to decree that no Legionnaire of any of the local ethnic groups would serve as peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia. Lyons rates the French Foreign Legion’s molding of new identities and loyalties as a partial success, and explains it in terms of socially constructed group boundaries, which he describes as the “outcome of dynamic, ongoing, and potentially contested processes of inclusion/exclusion” (Lyons, 2004). When the tensions of warfare in a birthplace compete with a created identity as a Legionnaire, the old identity may emerge to challenge even the Legion’s draconian indoctrination.
The Legion is an extreme example of deliberate acculturation and language immersion meant to achieve a sharp break with a past life and to force adoption of a new life, in its case, a rigid all-male military life. That the early attachments to a birthplace exert themselves even against its program in contexts of war would seem to support the claims discussed above that political socialization in early life remains potentially powerful against a new allegiance that competes with it. American nationalists urge the federal government to commit to sponsoring assimilation programs and classes in English to deliberately hasten adoption of traditional American culture and language by newcomers, but these demands are often countered by those who argue for multicultural appreciation and the “natural” course of assimilation—typically, in an immigrant family, the third generation has become indistinguishably American in culture and language without any intervention (Brulliard, 2007; Fonte, 2004). Whether to inculcate “Americanism”—and who would define it—in this period of global migration, transportation, and communications is a sharply divisive political issue that is not resolved by the offerings of social scientists.
Several researchers have studied allegiance and specifically how it may be evaluated in personnel security background investigations and adjudications for federal employment or access to classified information. One set of studies comes from the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), and a second set from various other agencies.

A technical report by Kramer, Heuer, and Crawford (2005) documents 10 trends in “the domestic and international environment” that could increase or decrease the incidence of espionage by insiders in government agencies and private companies. When an insider betrays the trust placed in him or her by committing espionage, that act also betrays the national allegiance expected of citizens. Many of the trends identified by Kramer, Heuer and Crawford have been discussed here as well, including the expansion of the global market for information, the internationalization of science and commerce, increased international travel, increased foreign ties and relationships across borders, and the global reach of the Internet. While the discussion here has pointed to these trends as relevant to an argument about the impact of migration, transnationalism, and dual citizenship that may undermine national allegiance, the same trends can be seen to support increased risk of insiders selling sensitive information.

THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND GLOBAL LOYALTIES

Two of the trends in Kramer, Heuer, and Crawford (2005) relate specifically to difficulties in evaluating allegiance: diminishing organizational loyalty, and an increasing “global orientation in world affairs” rather than a primary focus on national values. Pointing to the need to adapt to rapidly changing conditions in a global business environment, the authors note that businesses are more likely to “downsize, automate, transfer jobs overseas, and lay off personnel who are no longer needed.” The “psychological contract” between employer and employee has been strained to the breaking point by business decisions that leave workers without jobs, severance, or benefits, and that assume employees will move on to new employment frequently as they seek to optimize their careers. Absence of the previous standards of loyalty in the workplace has become commonplace in American business. The loss of allegiance to one’s employer is one more undermining of the net of obligations and support that also had defined allegiance to the nation-state. Obviously they are not the same, or even on the same plane, yet losing obligations of loyalty in the workplace may diminish the expectation of larger loyalties to the nation.

A second relevant trend described is “a deepening global consciousness among U.S. citizens and a greater appreciation of other cultures, religious beliefs, and value systems” which results in a “growing allegiance to a global community” (Kramer, Heuer & Crawford, 2005). Who could be unhappy about that? An appreciation of
global needs and values is desirable in many ways. Yet the report points out that becoming “bicultural,” that is, holding “citizenship” in both a nation-state and in a conception of world culture, “rooted in an awareness of, and sense of belonging to, a larger global culture,” can provoke actions that mimic allegiance to a competing nation-state. In several extreme instances, it has led to betrayal. Espionage by Americans that they rationalized by claiming a global mindset can be found as far back as the mid-1940s, when several idealistic scientists decided that the best way to guarantee world peace was to share nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. Theodore Hall, for example, passed designs for making a nuclear weapon to the Soviets in 1944 (Albright & Kunstel, 1997). A more recent example is Ana Belen Montes’ espionage for Cuba that started in the 1980s and continued until 2001. Montes stated that she helped Cuba for the greater good of the “world-homeland” and all the world’s “nation-neighborhoods” (Kramer, Heuer & Crawford, 2005). As globalization undermines the political and economic bases of earlier assumptions about nation-states, this trend toward cosmopolitanism may be a natural, even an inevitable result. The question here is how policymakers who are charged with evaluating the allegiance of others to the nation-state should and can respond to this trend.

EVALUATING RISK

Heuer (2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007) has written a series of reports and studies for PERSEREC on the impact of globalization on personnel security policies and procedures. His goals include improving the Adjudicative Guidelines and the personnel security processes that follow from them, in order to better identify and respond to foreign influence and foreign preference in applicants for security clearances. Heuer grapples with many of the implications of globalization on allegiance, and develops means to apply them to the “nuts and bolts” procedures of the personnel security process, which makes him among the most useful sources in the field on these questions.

Heuer documents the fact that persons with foreign ties apply for and receive security clearances and eligibility for access to classified information. In 2004 he reported on an analysis of 175,000 applicants in 2003 for a standard background investigation for Confidential or Secret access, the National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC). Among them were the following categories, which are not exclusive:

- Naturalized citizens, 4.6%; persons born outside the U.S., 6.5%;
- persons who had relatives with foreign citizenship, 8.1%; relatives living in a foreign country, 2.9%; at least one immediate family member is a foreign citizen living in a foreign country, 1.8%; history

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6 Theodore Alvin Hall and his wife Joan “were passionately loyal to broader principles of political life—justice and equality, for example—that they believed weren’t being observed in their native country [America]. Ted Hall always believed that the breaking of the atomic monopoly was in the best interests of Americans, even if it meant breaking American law” (Albright & Kunstel, 1997).
of foreign residence, 6.3%; possess foreign passport, 1.2%; foreign schooling, 1.3%; spouse is not a U.S. citizen, 2.0%; listed any foreign travel, 27.3% (Heuer, 2004a).

In a related study, also in 2004, he cites research on applicants for security clearances for whom a background investigation has identified potential foreign ties. The rate of applicants with possible foreign ties ranged from 4.3% to 9.9%, depending on the government agency (Heuer, 2004b). The purpose of citing these figures is not, as Heuer’s was, to explore the reasons for inconsistencies between agencies, but rather to note that across government agencies persons with possible foreign ties are applying for and, in some instances, being granted access to classified information.

The Adjudicative Guidelines were revised in December 2005 on the basis of recommendations made to the National Security Council by the Personnel Security Working Group (PSWG) (The White House, 2005). Changes in the “Foreign Influence” and “Foreign Preference” guidelines followed recommendations in Heuer’s study titled “Investigation and Adjudication of Foreign Influence Issues.” These changes included: (1) equal weight to all types of foreign contacts maintained by an applicant, not just immediate family members (as had been the earlier emphasis); (2) focus on the risk of voluntary cooperation with foreign interests, or “susceptibility to inducements to cooperate,” rather than on vulnerability to coercion; and (3) focus not only on foreign contacts who work for governments, but on a broader array of persons working for those interested in sensitive information, including those in positions in “military service, foreign affairs, intelligence, law enforcement, science and technology, defense industry, or the media that report on any of these matters” (Heuer, 2004a). Reflecting on the rising importance of nongovernmental groups in global politics, including transnational nonstate terrorist groups, Heuer has warned that

We must also deal with the fact that the issue of loyalty is not confined to a choice between loyalty to the United States versus loyalty to a foreign country. Conflicting loyalties may be triggered by an individual’s belief system. The Subject may have feelings of loyalty to an individual or group, based on ethnic, religious, or political beliefs. These beliefs may not be tied to a specific country, or they may reflect a desire to create a new country or regional power structures where none currently exist (Heuer, 2007).

In 2006, Heuer began serving as a member of a foreign associations working group of the PSWG. He prepared a working paper for the group that explores the implications of globalization, which he calls the “changing threat environment.” It contrasts two approaches to evaluating national allegiance: (1) “the assessment of an individual’s loyalty to the United States,” and (2) “an assessment of the risk that an individual may be motivated or persuaded at some future date to compromise protected information to a foreign individual, organization, or country, or to support
terrorist activity” (Heuer, 2006). He argues that efforts to determine a person’s loyalty to the nation are difficult and prone to error: looking at whether a person is a dual citizen, has foreign relatives, has served in a foreign military, has a foreign spouse, and the other factors now taken into account by adjudicators as indicators of potential issues with allegiance lead to many mistakes. Although these factors have the advantage of being concrete and more objective than subjective, the nexus between them and the degree and permanence of a person’s allegiance is imprecise at best (Heuer, 2006).

Heuer suggests instead taking a counterintelligence approach to allegiance, in which risk of compromise of information rather than the level of a person’s allegiance is the focus of assessment. Four factors would be assessed in this risk approach: (1) the degree to which a person identifies with another country, setting him or her up for divided loyalties, (2) the access to sensitive information the person will have, (3) the country in question and whether it targets citizens of the United States for information, and (4) adverse information about any of the other Adjudicative Guidelines about the person (Heuer, 2006). He advocates making a commonsense judgment about the increasing numbers of persons who do have some foreign ties that reflects the likely risk of compromise of the information they will be using.

MEASURES OF ASSIMILATION

Two studies by researchers not affiliated with PERSEREc offer additional useful perspectives on the problem of how to assess national allegiance. Krause (2002), writing for the Personnel Security Managers’ Research Program,7 looked specifically at the issue of divided national loyalties and their implications for personnel security. She documented trends of increased immigration, cited research showing that assimilation by immigrants into American life and culture is the foundation of allegiance, and explored sociological measures of assimilation, including the following factors: the decision to naturalize, acquisition of English, exposure to American culture over a long period of time unrelieved by visits and contacts with home, self-identification as an American, consumption of American culture in gender roles, parenting styles, friendships and relationships maintained outside the ethnic community, voting, and expressions of patriotism and civic nationalism. She then develops a series of questions for subject interviews with applicants and references that apply these findings to background investigations. Her goal is to broaden and enrich the information about foreign influence and foreign preference that investigators could develop (Krause, 2002).

A second study focusing on national allegiance and how it can be evaluated in personnel security procedures was developed by Krofcheck and Gelles (2005) as an appendix to a training manual for personnel security professionals. These authors

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7 This organization has been disbanded and its personnel absorbed into the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
conceive of persons with the potential for divided loyalties to be struggling with competing identities. As this formulation suggests, their approach applies psychological categories to the problem of assessing national allegiance and the risk of insider betrayal of sensitive information. They have developed a computerized program that poses a series of questions to applicants for positions with access to sensitive or classified information, and performs rankings and interpretation of the results.

Based on a description of the questions and the underlying concerns they reflect, Krofcheck and Gelles’ program appears to offer a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of the factors typically associated with potential divided loyalties, plus, the program adds important and distinctive dimensions of its own to them. Among the distinctive contributions of their program are the following. First, the program assumes that immigration to the United States from another country will be experienced differently depending on various circumstances, including the age at which a person immigrates, the type of culture and religion of the country of origin, the reason for immigrating, the political, social, and cultural events that were occurring in the country at the time of immigration, how the family and the individual immigrant were received in the new country, and the political, social, and cultural events that were going on in the United States at the time of immigration. This sensitivity to historical factors in the immigration experience is a welcome advance in sophistication about issues with which naturalized citizens often struggle: people have had different experiences depending on the time and place of immigrating, and one size does not fit all in describing those experiences.

Second, the importance of early learning in the formation of national allegiance, discussed above in the section on political socialization, is captured well in Krofcheck and Gelles’ treatment of identity conflict among trusted employees who have foreign origins. Speaking of foreign-born individuals, they describe the concern that “many find themselves in conflict both in terms of their loyalty to their culture and to the family that they left behind. Although they profess loyalty to the United States, the influence of family, culture, religion and the early imprint of identity development (italics added) often moderate that pledge of allegiance” (Krofcheck & Gelles, 2005).

Third, their program incorporates an analysis of espionage by American citizens who demonstrated divided loyalties. It recognizes common patterns that have led to a personal crisis that some have resolved by betraying a trust. A person who has comfortably balanced his or her allegiances to a country of origin and to the United States, and who believes allegiance to the adopted country is whole-hearted, finds in a family or political upheaval back home, or in a shift in personal or professional status, or in a life crisis, that balance is upset. It throws open the possibility of their betraying information for an advantage that did not exist before. This awareness of how divided loyalties may lie dormant and come to the surface in a foreign-born citizen’s life informs the competing identities program and provides a depth of insight based on both psychological and historical insights.
Fourth, Krofcheck and Gelles demonstrate cultural sophistication in their questions. They ask about the individual’s family, religious and cultural expectations about loyalty in their upbringing, and how they extend support to family members not living in the United States. They probe what positions family members who were left behind in the country of origin may hold in government, military, religious, or cultural institutions. In this, they demonstrate awareness that in a globalized context with real-time communications readily at hand, the web of family relationships may hold and influence an immigrant even long after the person has immigrated.

Fifth, Krofcheck and Gelles’ program explores in sensitive ways the degree of assimilation to American culture and values of the foreign-born. For example, the program asks about whether the individual maintains friendships outside an ethnic community; whether the spouse comes from the same country of origin; whether there was an arranged marriage and whether it was the result of a return to the country of origin. It asks whether the person worships exclusively within an ethnic community, and whether the person actively participates in a professional organization that supports the fortunes of the country of origin. Issues that have been carefully described by Heuer and applied by Krause in her set of interview questions, including financial ties to the country of origin, prior military service there, and criminal history, are also explored by Krofcheck and Gelles’ competing identity program. By developing cultural and historical issues more fully, their program offers an even more inclusive structure for eliciting information that helps to assess the risk an applicant may veer toward divided loyalties and a consequent betrayal of sensitive information. Their approach provokes a question, however: has the assessment of allegiance in a globalized context become so individualized as to defy application to procedures that must screen several million applicants each year, a prospect faced by the Department of Defense?
DO WE NEED TO IMAGINE A DIFFERENT PARADIGM?

The viewpoint in the work of most of the authors discussed here is firmly embedded in the nation-state paradigm. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise. Nation-states have defined the basic political unit in the international context for hundreds of years. Many historians claim that nation-states have characterized the highest aspirations for self-determination of the world’s peoples since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War in central Europe and where the sovereignty of states over princes and the territorial definition of that sovereignty were first asserted (Newman, 2004). Such an ancient and useful construct may properly be called a paradigm. Social scientists and popular culture have appropriated the notion of “paradigm” and broadened it beyond the strictly scientific definition that its creator, Thomas Kuhn, preferred. It is now common to think in terms of a paradigm as a world view or a mindset, that is, a set of experiences, beliefs, and values that affects the way one perceives reality. In that sense, nation-states currently define the dominant paradigm in international relations.

Globalization, however, challenges that paradigm and its appropriateness to the conditions explored here. Some authors, including Vertovec, Spiro, and Waldinger, suggest that globalization may be tipping us into a paradigm shift, during which symptoms of novelty accumulate, until suddenly the old perception of reality reorganizes itself into something new, and new perceptions become possible. Rahn suggests that “There are many who argue that the myriad facets of globalization pose clear challenges to the nature of state autonomy and sovereignty, and that the nation-state system as we know it is being transformed in fundamental ways” (Rahn, 2005). Her research, using an international dataset on attitudes, demonstrated “substantial ‘denationalization’ in many of the world’s democracies” as a result of cross-border movement of goods, people, and information, the decoupling of citizenship from territory, global organizations’ increasing power to challenge national control, and international travel and communications that extend mobility to users worldwide. She concludes that “Globalization reduces the benefits of national membership at the same time that its processes make it increasingly difficult to construct a compelling national story” (Rahn, 2005).

The personnel security policies that require an evaluation of allegiance, both current and continuing, date from the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower in the early 1950s, when the nation-state paradigm was confidently ascendant. Six decades later, attempts to evaluate allegiance in a time of globalization by applying those same policies, albeit using revised techniques, have led to approaches such as Heuer’s work that led to revision of the Adjudicative Guidelines in 2005, or Krofcheck and Gelles’ computerized program to assess competing identities. Their program peers into an applicant’s psychology, history, culture, travel, finances, family, business and professional contacts, and computer use for clues about divided loyalties. While thorough, so individualized an assessment may well be too expensive for the large numbers of annual eligibility decisions that agencies such as
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the Department of Defense face. And times have changed. In 1953, foreign-born applicants for federal jobs or access to sensitive information were rare; foreign travel by applicants was unusual; maintaining business, professional, or extended family ties with people overseas was difficult. Now that globalization has both shrunk and knit the world together, more and more applicants are naturalized citizens born elsewhere, or they are dual citizens of the United States and another country. Most people have traveled abroad, and many do so often. More people have multicultural and multilingual families, and they bring cosmopolitan backgrounds that make sorting out, tracing, and documenting ties that could suggest foreign influence or foreign preference a nightmare for background investigators.

If we were framing policies afresh, using a new, globalized paradigm to think about international relations, would we choose to evaluate allegiance and the potential for foreign influence or foreign preference in the same way, or would our focus differ from that which developed within the nation-state paradigm, leading us to different policies? It is in the nature of a paradigm to be self-referential, so that one can hardly imagine stepping outside it and seeing things differently. Yet perhaps the symptoms of globalization are demanding that we make the effort to see things afresh, in order to prevent the possibility of wasted time and money spent investigating what may be increasingly irrelevant concerns, while we ignore threats that we do not see.
INSIGHTS ON ALLEGIANCE FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

This literature review should serve as a stimulus for research on issues of allegiance and foreign influence and foreign preference, and it should provoke a needed discussion of these issues among the wider community of security professionals and public officials. Agencies are engaged in responding piecemeal to the challenges that globalization imposes on their own goals, but coordination and consensus across communities are lacking. Many of the studies described here offer insights that suggest changes are needed in personnel security policy and procedures in a time of globalization. Some of these insights are briefly summarized below.

1. Measuring allegiance. Kelman claims that for an individual to incorporate a national identity into his or her concept of self, three components are necessary: knowledge, affect, and action. In his view, a person must know about the elements of the nation’s identity, must feel those elements as meaningful values, and must put them into concrete practice. This schema suggests directions to explore in gauging a person’s allegiance to the nation during a background investigation.

2. Impact of transnationalism. Vertovec reports that people living a transnational life, with real-time contact with family and associates back home and frequent travel back and forth between the country of origin and the adopted country, report a duality of consciousness, a sense of having a personal stake in multiple places, a sense of being “above” the identification with one nation-state. It may help adjudicators if they are aware of this byproduct of a transnational style of life in which people report a muffled sense of allegiance.

3. Patterns in transferal of allegiance. Portes, Escobar and Radford call into question the assumption that an immigrant’s allegiance shifts steadily over time from attachment to his or her country of origin to attachment to the adopted country. Their study of immigrant voluntary associations demonstrates that new immigrants are too busy surviving in a new place, but that settled immigrants, even a decade or two after moving, and even after naturalizing, have the resources and the interest to devote themselves to helping their country of origin and participating in its politics.

4. Varying patterns of maintaining ties with home. Waldinger reports that based on his study of Latino immigrants to the United States, patterns of involvement with people back home vary among recent immigrants: many devote themselves to maintaining their ties, but another significant proportion let their ties lapse. Whether they keep up with those back home or not, most immigrants they studied professed themselves determined to stay in their adopted country and become Americans, and they live in an “in-between” condition of allegiance to both places to do so.
Second-generation immigrant reactions. Rumbaut points out that his survey of second-generation immigrant teens showed they often displayed a “reactive ethnic consciousness” and a determination to reclaim the ethnic identity of their parents, despite the fact that they themselves had grown up in the United States and appeared to be acculturated as Americans. This adds another dimension to Portes, Escobar and Radford’s finding that the steady shifting of allegiance over time is too simple a model of the immigrant experience.

Impact of diaspora experience. Clifford’s survey of diasporas suggests that individuals who see themselves as part of a diaspora, that is, as individuals from a group which has been displaced from its origins and cannot return to them, and which has been mistreated along the way, may need a cautious assessment of allegiance, since it may be especially difficult for them to shift allegiance away from the previous attachments that form a core of identity.

Transnational entrepreneurs as sojourners. Saxenian and her colleagues studied recent Asian immigrant entrepreneurs in the United States and their ties to their countries of origin. Their studies demonstrate that these transnational entrepreneurs illustrate the “above it all” quality of allegiance that was also noted by Vertovec. A significant portion of the immigrant entrepreneurs saw themselves as temporary sojourners, who chose not to put down roots in their new country, and who gauged their self-interest to make the best of their options as they straddled multiple countries. Differences in the reactions of Latino immigrants, as reported in the studies cited above by Waldinger and by Rumbaut, contrast with those of Asian immigrants studied by Saxenian, Motoyama and Quan.

The reactions of nation-states. Waldinger and Fitzgerald caution that the actions of nation-states must be considered alongside the actions of immigrants to understand recent transnationalism. Nation-states are hardly powerless against the tide of globalization: A state can choose to control its borders, may specify who enters and who settles within, sets foreign policies toward other nation-states even if those policies override the interests and wishes of immigrant groups resident there, and attempts to demand the exclusive allegiance of its citizens. Thus a nation-state can choose to be more or less encouraging of transnational activities by immigrants, and how it chooses depends on historical circumstances. Times of conflict or war provoke stronger self-protective actions by states than do times of relative peace. Historical circumstances and the particular experiences of an ethnic or national group also need consideration.

Impact of globalization on citizenship. Spiro argues that globalization is irretrievably changing the meaning of citizenship in ways that dilute its relevance as an expression of allegiance. Dual, or even multiple, citizenships are becoming the international norm, making citizenship no longer unitary
and no longer expressive of a single national community. Place of birth is becoming detached from personal identity in a globalized context. He maintains that the dilution of the meaning of citizenship, and changes in the assumptions about allegiance it implies, are inevitable, that the impact of globalization on citizenship is inevitable and therefore should be actively managed rather than resisted or ignored.

(10) Resisting the impact of globalization on citizenship. Renshon and Fonte contest Spiro’s claim that globalization’s impact on citizenship is inevitable. Renshon argues for controlling immigration, discouraging multiple citizenships, and developing federal programs of citizenship education and English classes. Fonte protests the constitutional interpretation that persons born on American territory are automatically citizens, and he argues that when parents are merely temporary sojourners in the United States, their children should not receive automatic American citizenship.

(11) Political socialization in childhood. Sears and Brunner, among numerous others, studied political socialization in childhood and suggest that the associations made with national identity early in life influence adults later in ways that they may not even recognize. These ties are strong and can be resistant to change. Deliberate shifts of allegiance have to take place across childhood socialization in allegiance to the country of origin, and in situations of conflict, competition, or personal distress, political socialization may reassert itself.

(12) Measuring allegiance. Terhune offers a formulation of three factors that “bind the self to the nation” that contrasts with Kelman’s three factors noted above. Terhune’s version includes affective involvement, goal involvement, and ego involvement; in other words, a person feels sentimental attachment to the nation, feels a desire to help the nation, and has a sense that his or her self-esteem and pride are bound up with the nation’s fortunes. Again, testing these factors may help to frame more effective means for assessing allegiance.

(13) Group processes. Druckman surveys various bodies of psychological research that are potentially relevant to assessing allegiance, including the impact of competition on patriotism, sources and effects of in-group bias, the impact on loyalty of being designated the representative of a group, and the challenges of juggling multiple group loyalties. He reports a consistent preference across various studies for one’s designated in-group and for those “like” oneself.

(14) Efforts to deliberately shift allegiance. Lyons studied methods used by the French Foreign Legion to deliberately extinguish the past allegiances of their multinational volunteers, and to inculcate in their place a strong new allegiance only to fellow Legionnaires. He reports mixed results, in that even using draconian discipline, early attachments to a homeland have been
provoked by serving in conflicts located there, forcing the Legion to transfer natives out of the area.

(15) Corporate loyalty and cosmopolitanism. Kramer, Heuer and Crawford surveyed 10 trends, including many that describe aspects of globalization, which may underlie an increase in rates of trust betrayal, espionage, and crossing allegiances. Among these trends are a decline in corporate loyalties and the earlier ties between employer and employee, and a “global consciousness” in which national allegiance is replaced by cosmopolitanism. For some persons this “global consciousness” may serve as a competing allegiance and become a rationale for betrayal.

(16) Applications to personnel security procedures. Heuer applies insights into globalization and the changes it has brought to personnel security policy within a nation-state paradigm. His policy suggestions, along with the targeted interview suggestions offered by Krause, and the automated program for assessing competing identities developed by Krofcheck and Gelles, provide the most complete and searching approaches available to assessing allegiance.

Difficult as it is to imagine a new paradigm of international relations while operating within the old one, it is impossible to ignore the fact that globalization is challenging assumptions about national allegiance derived from the nation-state paradigm. Is allegiance changing so that it needs to be assessed in a different way than it has been since the early Cold War? What would be lost and what could be gained by reformulating this line of inquiry? Through research into these challenges, dialogue within the security and policy communities, and an effort of imagination, it will be possible to come closer to fitting our mental maps to the terrain we can already see lies ahead.
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8 Some of the references listed in this paper are designated For Official Use Only (FOUO), but the material from these FOUO sources used in this paper is not FOUO.
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