THE RISING INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN WEST AFRICA: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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General Studies

by

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The Rising Influence of China in West Africa: Analysis of the Effects on Economic Development, Governance and Security

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This paper argues that the degree of damaging effects associated with China’s influence on a West African country depends on the level of democratic governance reached by that specific country. It also argues that despite popular perceptions, China is still a small player in Africa, compared to the US and the European Union.

China, Africa, Economic development, Governance, Security, the West, West Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Win-win cooperation, Non-interference
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
THE RISING INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN WEST AFRICA: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY, by CPT Ismael Kiswendsida Souampa Diaouari, 126 pages.

While western countries appear to be gradually turning their back to Africa and looking at the leaders of African countries with much criticism, China is stepping in to increase its involvement with many countries. More specifically, China is becoming actively engaged in West Africa, one of the poorest regions of the world, and one where civil wars are spreading quickly. As China is becoming deeply engaged in that sub-region, what could be the consequences of its influence on the future of West Africa? If certain circles already show their optimism by viewing the new China’s Africa policy as the last chance of the continent to get out of its chronic underdevelopment, others see Beijing’s economic offensive as the expression of a new colonial adventure from which Africa could possibly suffer more than benefit from.

This paper argues that the degree of damaging effects associated with China’s influence on a West African country depends on the level of democratic governance reached by that specific country. It also argues that despite popular perceptions, China is still a small player in Africa, compared to the US and the European Union.
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All the information presented and analyzed in this research is accurate up to June 2011, date of publication of the study. People must bear in mind the fast evolving China-Africa cooperation in reading this document.
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
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<td>DGDP</td>
<td>Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>EXIMBANK</td>
<td>Export and Import Bank</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-African Cooperation</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Graduate Degree Programs</td>
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<td>GIPC</td>
<td>Ghana Investment Promotion Center</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa Development</td>
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<td>ONGC</td>
<td>Oil and National Gas Corporation</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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<td>SGA</td>
<td>Small Group Advisor</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

China is both a tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat.

— Moeletsi Mbeki

We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our will on them.

— President Hu Jintao

Background

After half a century of self imposed political and economic isolation the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly emerging as the twenty-first century’s newest power. Although not yet a superpower, China has been set on a course that will both challenge the existing status quo and bring her into direct competition with the world’s remaining superpower. Spectacular economic growth allied to cautious but effective transformation plans have ensured that China is well placed to maximize the opportunities afforded to her by a rapidly globalizing world. Once considered to be little more than a Cold War relic, China is now assuming the mantle of a regional leader, and has aspirations to develop an Asian trading system that will challenge both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). With the potential to rival the US in economic terms within the next 20 years, China’s impact upon a mono-polar world cannot be underestimated (Heyworth 2004, 1). China is now the second largest economy in the world and has a fast technological development. Indeed, it is the world’s workshop, not only for toys and garments, the first stages of export manufacturing, but for laptop computers, iPods and
digital medical devices. China’s new position shows the world the revolution of the
dragon (Brautigam 2010, 2).

How did China emerge? The country began to conduct reforms and open its society in the early 1980s, hence the “Four Modernizations” – modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology being set as the highest priority of the national agenda. The economic reform began in agricultural production in 1978 and was later expanded into industry following the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s tour of South China in 1992 that provided the launch for the known economic growth. Its gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of about 8.8 percent during the following 10 years (Xie 2004, 9).

The late 1970s was marked by a drastic change in China’s foreign policy and its opening to the international scene. Under the stewardship of Deng Xiaoping, then Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China adopted a new diplomatic policy with two major objectives: peace and development. But it’s not until the late 1990s that the Chinese economic diplomacy was fruitful. Having drawn lessons from the past, marked by the extreme politicization of its diplomacy, China seems to have chosen the option of a pragmatic position resolutely turned to the opening of its economy. As stated in the White Book of the Chinese government published on December 22, 2005, China aims at “creating a peaceful environment and gaining access to other parts of the world” (Gadzala and Hanusch 2010, 2). It is from this strategic vision that Beijing turned towards Africa. As it has been pointed out:

With a large population and recent high economic growth rates, estimated at 9.5%, China now comes only second to the United States of America (USA) in its consumption of oil. Based on current projections, Chinese demand for and
consumption of mineral resources is expected to grow exponentially in the foreseeable future, so in an attempt to diversify its source of supply, China has set its sights on Africa as a natural partner. (Rocha 2007)

This come back, from a diplomatic and economic standpoint after the Taiwanese tidal wave of 1990s, drew the attention of analysts of China-Africa relations. These analysts gave warning about major confusions on the future of the continent. Indeed, to face up to the inherent needs in its growth, Beijing intentionally profiled its diplomatic and economic tools. It turned towards new opportunities that resulted from the end of the Cold War among which, the opening of markets and the process of economic globalization. In effect, the end of bipolarity coincided with the emergence of China as a new inevitable potency and set the reconfiguration of the worldwide geopolitics. A new epoch which China inaugurated, under the sign of “harmonious development,” with an opening to all people of the world, particularly to those of the South, according to its new diplomatic strategy. “Although an emerging economic superpower, China portrays itself, at least to African audiences, as a developing nation in order to underline the quasi-natural convergence of interests between China, the largest developing country and Africa, the continent with the largest number of developing countries” (Alden et al. 2008).

With a peaceful approach, in opposition to the colonialist models, China took the role of "elder brother" of the countries of the South. It then made of Africa a favored partner in the building of a new worldwide order in which the China-African relations would be synonymous to mutual progress. Thus, “China seeks to establish and to develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, characterized by equality and reciprocal trust from a political standpoint” (Tull 2008, 115).
China’s statement of good intentions provokes questions in several African circles. If certain circles already show their optimism by viewing the new African-Chinese policy as the last chance of the continent to get out of its chronic underdevelopment, others see Beijing’s economic offensive as the expression of a new colonial adventure from which Africa could possibly suffer more than benefit from. China’s strategy in Africa may just be driven by its sustained appetite to secure resources, especially gas, oil and minerals rather than to develop a clear cooperation with African governments (Rocha 2007, 16). Others are showing concerns in the new China’s policy in Africa. Such a policy is granting diplomatic ties to countries, while focusing in non-interference in domestic affairs. Chinese leaders are therefore actively dealing with dictators shunned by many other governments, as in Sudan and Zimbabwe (Brautigam 2010, 2). Linked to that is an alarming concern that the rising influence of China in Africa could ruin attempts by the international community to foster good governance and development on the continent. People argue that because China does not insist on commitment to democracy, good governance and respect for human rights as a precondition for development, Western pressure to that effect is diluted (Manji and Marks 2007). The purpose is not to review this binary perception. On the other hand, the intent is to put to the test and undertake the validation of the following working hypothesis: The “new honeymoon” announced by Beijing is in a dynamic perspective of a resurgence of China’s African policy which sets the continent as a key link of its diplomatic and economic radiance.

Contrary to the political activism of the seventies, the new commitment of Beijing to Africa is deliberately centered on the economic development of China with a single
purpose: make a strong state of China that is an important actor on the African continent, consequently raising Africa as a strategic zone of influence.

China is presently deriving a quarter of its oil imports from Africa through its oil interests in four countries: Algeria, Angola, Chad and Sudan. It is also increasing stakes in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria (Rocha 2007, 21). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) established oil exploration rights in Sudan in 1995 through ownership of a 40 percent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company where it is pumping over 300,000 barrels per day.

But others argue that China is becoming a major development partner of Africa. During the past few years China has indeed multiplied its investments on the continent. It has invested in a multitude of construction projects across Africa, diversifying in recent years beyond its initially narrow focus on the continent's oil and mining industries (Gadzala and Hanusch 2010, 3).

This requirement conditioned, to a great extent, by the pursuit of an energy security, puts Africa and its raw materials straightaway in the middle of Chinese concerns. Therefore, the new Chinese offensive may be a source of major confusion which will shape the African environment already deeply marked by its colonial past, and political elites who lack vision in search of new answers to underdevelopment. It is in this period of questionings about its future that Africans sign a new lease with China for a strategic partnership.

What are the facts and characteristics of Chinese policy in Africa? It is characterized by the promotion of a model of collaboration, in contrast to the western colonial model which structured the relations of Africa until then with the rest of the
world. In effect, even if nothing predisposes China to maintain favored relations with the African continent, owing to geographical distance and absence of common cultural determiners, the re-evaluation of the China African policy registers in a tradition founded by a triple legitimacy. To the first pillar constituted by the historical legitimacy, born in the involvement of China in the conflicts of decolonization of several African countries, China has two other principles. They are: the ideological inheritance of the Cold War and especially the principle of non-interference and neutrality which is the bedrock of the partnership with Africa.

In fact, most African countries did not experience early relations with the People’s Republic of China. Until the last ten years, many did not even embrace diplomatic ties with China, but with Taiwan. In reality, China’s main goal on the continent had been for a long time, particularly between 1960 and 1970, to secure diplomatic support against Taiwan. But China’s diplomacy has evolved, taking into account its economic needs. In effect, Africa nowadays, accounts for one third of China’s oil imports. This is even likely to expand along with the annual 11 percent increase in the energy needs of China, leading to an enlarging Chinese footprint on the continent (Brooks and Shin2006). China is even gaining ground in diversifying oil partners. After dealing with Sudan, its client since 1996, China has set sight to Chad where the CNPC has built an oil refinery. Presently, Beijing is administrating 27 major oil and gas projects in more than 14 African countries (United Press International 2007). Additionally, Beijing is using very good financial incentives at the service of its strategy of charm on the African continent. Trade between Africa and China increased by more than 700 percent in the 1990s and doubled between 2002 and 2004 (Shin 2005). China has now
overtaken the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in lending to African countries. Since 2005, it has cancelled $10 billion in debt for 31 countries and lent $8 billion to Nigeria, Mozambique, and Angola alone. The same year the World Bank’s total loans for all of Africa was less than $2.3 billion (Danna 2007). Moreover, China’s Africa offensive is well embraced by the African political leadership in general, because it relies on China’s noninterference policy in the internal affairs of African countries (Kirchick 2007) and is not subordinated to democratic, human rights, or good governance considerations (Blair 2006). Also, China is a good lobby for African countries at the UN. For instance, it sold $240 million worth of military equipment to Mugabe’s Zimbabwe in 2004 and has blocked several resolutions of the United Nations Security Council against the genocide policy of Sudan in Darfur (Kagan 2006).

Moreover, China represents a way of social and economic revolution. Indeed, many ordinary Africans have been captured by the idea of China as a model for economic development. Despite the prevalence in other African circles of the fear of competition from the Chinese industrial juggernaut, and the rise of Chinese traders competing at the entry level in local African markets, some Africans see enthusiasm and hope. On the other hand, others have apprehensions about Chinese aid and state sponsored economic engagement. Yet overall, many Africans express excitement just like a Nigerian diplomat in Beijing who stated that: “The Chinese have an advantage of not having a colonial hangover. Whatever the Chinese do for Africa is very credible in our eyes. You have to understand this. We think maybe we can learn something from the Chinese” (Brautigam, 2010, 10).
What is the framework of Chinese expression on the continent? Beijing expresses herself first of all at the political level, by the installation of the Sino-African institutional frames by which China gives means for a structured intervention. Apart from Chinese government officials’ tours in African countries, China has put in place a diplomatic tool in dealing with African countries: the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). If the meeting of this forum in Beijing in November 2006 was a major event in the Sino-African relations, it had a specific meaning for both Chinese and Africans (Rocha 2007, 17). On the African political leadership side, there was the need to end the persistent marginalization of African countries and change the development abyss between Africa and the rest of the world. From Beijing’s standpoint, it was adopting the current global offensive aimed at setting opportunities for foreign investments in China as well as embracing new markets for Chinese investments in a globalized world. A main characteristic of both initiatives is an ardent aspiration to improve South-South relations in order to strengthen the role of developing countries in international affairs (Manji and Marks 2007).

In spite of the international community’s commitment to double total overseas development aid to Africa by an additional US$25 billion by 2011, the composition, degree and slow pace of release has generated a certain feeling of disillusionment with Africa’s habitual development partners. There is also a growing realization that traditional relations and partnership with the West have not helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic marginalization. Indeed, rather than develop, Africa is hemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural
resources and the enforcement of distorted international economic system. Logically, strengthened cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these structural imbalances (Obiarah 2007, 38).

During the first meeting of the FOCAC, the World realized how deeply China was getting involved in Africa. Deborah Brautigam echoed the picture that Western countries had after the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing:

Chinese aid and other forms of economic engagements were sharply on the rise in Africa. China was on track to become the African continent’s largest trading partner, outpacing Britain and the United states. Nearly 900 Chinese companies had invested in Africa by then – in factories and farms, retail shops and oil wells. Li Ruogu, head of China’s Export Import Bank (Eximbank), predicted six months after the summit that his bank would commit $20 billion over the next three years to finance Chinese exports and business in Africa. By comparison, World Bank loan commitments to countries in Africa over a similar three-year period (2006-2008) totaled just over $17 billion. (Brautigam 2010, 2)

While most of the West only began to focus on it after the Beijing Summit, China’s accelerated move into Africa was by then, already a decade long, building on 45 years of aid that the Chinese promised almost from the start would be based on “mutual benefit.” China has given aid to every country in Africa save one: Swaziland, which alone has never switched allegiance from Taiwan (Brautigam 2010, 2).

To intensify its presence, and to preserve the total character of its strategy, military and cultural collaboration are also subject of a particular attention and constitute other significant fields affirming the return of Beijing to the continent.

What are the pillars of China’s new strategy? In this domain, the Chinese offensive creates numerous questions. On the political plan, principles put forth by Beijing turn a back to the liberal model offered by previous colonial powers and might open the way to a regression of the democratization of the African States. In the
economic domain, the step of Beijing is in the process of changing the framework of socioeconomic development profoundly at the time when collective strategies such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were making progress. Indeed China’s framework extols the virtues of African self-reliance, ownership and leadership as well as good governance as the bedrock of its development agenda. Due to that, it raises with acuteness the question of given opportunities, but also risks incurred by the African economies. Last but not the least, the implementation of China’s African policy may result in important mutations in the security architecture of the continent and could, eventually, affect the domain of peace and stability due to rivalry between external powers which may be retriggered. It may also create tensions between Chinese settlers and Africans.

If China has been deeply involved in other regions in Africa, its intervention in the sub region of West Africa is particularly raising concerns. Indeed, Beijing’s recent oil deals with Nigeria and its engagement in Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia, just to mention a few countries, are signs of its rising influence in that region. While western countries appear to be gradually turning their back to Africa and looking at the leaders of African countries with much criticism, China is stepping in to increase its involvement with many countries. More specifically, China is becoming more and more engaged in West Africa, one of the poorest regions of the world, and one where civil wars are spreading quickly. As China is becoming actively engaged in this sub-region, what could be the consequences of its influence on the future of West Africa?
Primary Research Question

The increase of the presence and influence of China in West Africa will undoubtedly impact upon the stability of governance and economic development in the region. How will China’s economic and physical presence in West Africa affect the governance, security and economic sectors in the region?

Secondary Research Questions

The following secondary research questions are important in order to answer the primary research question:

1. What is the history of the Sino-African relations?
2. How is the current situation of trade and economic relations between China and African countries?
3. What is the framework of the Sino-African cooperation?
4. What are the governance issues related to the Afro-Chinese relations?
5. What are the Military and security issues related to the growing Chinese influence in Africa?

Significance of the Thesis

China’s influence is on the rise worldwide. It has just become the world’s second largest economy and the first largest trading partner of Africa. At a time when the Western powers seem to forsake the African continent and are only maintaining a minimum level of presence, China is seeking to show its ability to assume its new role as an economic power. Demonstrating an impressive level of dynamism, China has implemented a comprehensive strategy to find new frontiers for its people and its
economy. Being a big player in the process of globalization, China has realized the benefit it could derive in using Africa in its desire to be one of the most powerful economic powers of the post Cold War era. This power at work across the African continent has not yet revealed all its intentions. Beyond the questions that continue to rise, this new situation calls on Africa's ability to take charge of her destiny and to consider foreign involvement, whatever its source, as an adjunct, not the main resource of her development.

As China is gradually taking charge of the vacuum left by other developed countries, its influence is rising across the continent, to include the countries of West Africa. Indeed, China is dealing with countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal, among many others. These countries have gone a long way to try to implement democracy as a political system and the free market as their economic system.

The goal of this research is to analyze the level of involvement China has demonstrated thus far in West Africa and to determine the effects of that involvement. The conclusion could well find both positive and negative effects of this involvement. The significance of this research could assist one in identifying ways to maximize the positive impacts on West Africa, while minimizing the negative ones at the same time.

The research method to be used is the qualitative method with case studies being Ghana and Nigeria.

Assumptions

China will continue to be engaged in West African countries and increase that engagement in the years to come.
The West, for many reasons, will remain concerned about the breadth and depth of China’s involvement in West Africa.

**Hypotheses**

In order to gain a good insight of the rising Afro-Chinese relations, the research will be conducted against the backdrop of two hypotheses:

1. Despite the increase of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in West African countries, standards of human developments are not improving, nor will they measurably improve.

2. Because of their own economic interests, the US and the EU countries will attempt to counter Chinese growing influence in Africa in general and in West Africa specifically.

**Limitations**

This research will be conducted concurrently with the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) of the US Command and General Staff College. Therefore, due to time constraints, it will not be possible to travel out of the college in search of additional sources. Furthermore, the research will be limited to unclassified information. Another limitation is the ever changing nature of China’s engagement in Africa. It makes it hard to track some of the changes that might occur in the course of the study and that might influence our findings by the time the data collected are processed and published.

**Delimitations**

The completed thesis will remain unclassified. The research will only focus on the sub-region of West Africa and will not address the influence of China in other parts of the
continent. The research looks at the effects of China’s influence on governance, economic development and security. Therefore, the research will not discuss the influence of China on other sectors of activities in West African countries.

**Definitions**

**Beijing Consensus**: It is another model of economic growth or even social development inspired by the Chinese economic development. Jashua Cooper Ramo view of the Beijing Consensus is a summary of China’s experience in social and economic development. It emphasizes sovereign independence, prudent economic liberalism, fast economic growth, etc. (Jashua Cooper Ramo 2004).

**Democracy**: There is no universally accepted definition of democracy and countries that have been practicing democracy for more than two hundred years continue to debate various interpretations of key democratic precepts. Recognizing that the practice of democracy around the world is culturally and contextually embedded, it is important to highlight several essential features that help distinguish democratic societies from those that are not. At its foundation, democratic society is one where the people are able to exercise civic and political rights and elect government officials to represent their interests in local and national political structures. A democratic system of government can take many forms and is fundamentally based on the principles of participation, representation, rule of law, protection of citizens' freedoms and liberties, limitations on the government's power in the private and public spheres, free and fair elections and an independent and transparent judiciary system (Coexistence International 2007, 7).

**Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)**: The most agreed definition of FDI is this one: an investment made to acquire a lasting management interest (normally 10 percent of
voting stock) in a business enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor
defined according to residency (World Bank 1996). There are differences between the
various investments. Some may take the form of either “Greenfield” investments
(“mortar and brick” investment) or merger and acquisition, which entails the acquisition
of existing interest rather than new investment.

In corporate governance, the ownership of at least 10 percent of the ordinary
shares or voting stock is the criterion for the existence of a direct investment relationship.
The ownership of less than 10 percent is considered a portfolio investment. In reality,
FDI not only encompasses merger and acquisition and new investment, but also
reinvested earnings and loans and similar capital transfer between parent companies and
their affiliates (Ayanwale 2007, 1).

**Governance:** The concept of “governance” means: the process of decision-making
and the process by which decisions are implemented or not. Good governance has 8
major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent,
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It
assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and
that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also
responsive to the present and future needs of society (UN economic and social
Commission Website ND).

**Washington Consensus:** It is a concept that was formed during a review of
experiences in South America in the 1980s. In 1989, US economist John Williamson
advocated Washington Consensus, which he summarized in the following way: finance
and trade liberalization; establishment and reinforcement of a legal framework that protects private property right; strengthening budget control and cutting fiscal deficits.

According to William Finnegan, Washington Consensus can be assimilated simply to “free trade.” It is disseminated directly though US foreign policy, or indirectly though such multilateral organizations as the World Bank, IMF, WTO (Finnagan 2003).

The West: for the purpose of this thesis, the West will refer to the countries of the European Union and the United States of America. This view is borrowed from Robert Kaplan’s definition of the West as given in his book The Coming Anarchy (Kaplan 1994).

West Africa: also known as western Africa is the western most region of the African continent. Geopolitically, the United Nations (UN) definition of Western Africa includes the following 16 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The area of West Africa is approximately 5 million square km. In geographical terms, the boundaries of West Africa are hard to define because of the non-existence of natural barriers marking off this part of Africa from the rest of the continent (Kwabiah 2010, 1).

Summary

This chapter introduced the background of the study. It argued the significance of examining the effects of the rising influence of China in Africa in general, with a particular emphasis in West Africa. The main focus was to explain how China is gradually gaining ground on the African continent and increasing its economic and trade volume with the Dark Continent (Africa).
This background set the basis to look at the effects of China’s inroads in West Africa, especially on governance, economic development and security with the view of assessing whether China is just the latest in line of exploiters of Africa’s natural resources or is engaged for a fruitful South-South cooperation. This chapter further outlined the secondary research questions, assumptions, hypotheses, limitations and delimitations.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review gives an opportunity to understand the opinion voiced by various researchers. The objective is to lay out what research has been by others in relation to our research questions. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature on the involvement of China in Africa, especially the implications of its rising influence on the future of the poorest continent on the earth. Within this influence, the effects on governance, development and security sectors in West Africa will receive a particular emphasis.

A significant number of documents and books exist on the relations between China and Africa. The themes and quality vary widely, ranging from pictorial general overviews to those more specific in topic. China’s recent political and economic inroads into Africa have generated much excitement in the current literature, with scholars and policymakers endeavoring to assess the merits and risks implicit in this renewed engagement. But this literature is becoming more and more polarized.

In order to gain insight into the topic, unclassified sources will be used. These sources are books, monographs, theses of various degree programs, magazines, journals and other materials accessed on the internet.

The literature review will be done, looking at the involvement of China in Africa from 1950 to 1970: (1) current trade and economic relations between China and Africa; (2) the framework of the current Afro-Chinese interactions; (3) governance; (4) security; and (5) issues regarding the inroads of Beijing on the continent. The themes of the literature review will provide a better understanding of the contours of the new embrace
between the Asian dragon and the African continent. Indeed, the review aims at exploring how China is gradually becoming an important partner by setting up a strategy based on a peaceful rise but that has proved to be an effective —soft power.”

History of the Sino-African relations

The History of the Sino-African relations follows many stages of the Sino-African complex interactions. Relations between China and Africa have existed for centuries but have been more reinforced since the Cold War era (Spitz 2009). Many authors provide a good understanding of the China-Africa relations and therefore gives foundation to grasp the reasons and extent of changes in these relations. It is important to note the shift between Mao and Den Xiaoping’s era.

In China in Africa: Plunder or Co-Development, Dominic Spitz highlights the reasons for the closer Chinese embrace of the African continent in the early 1950s. According to him, China’s political will of exporting its revolution, undermines Western and Soviet influence on the one hand and the quest of independence by African countries on the other hand, led Beijing to provide support to nationalistic movement across the continent. The author described the relations between China and various African countries in chapter 1.


During the first stage, Chinese and African leaders made contact at the Bandung Conference in 1955. In January 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Mali and announced
the following eight principles in China’s economic and technical assistance to foreign
countries, which fully demonstrated China’s eagerness to offer moral and material
support to Africa and help independence and liberation of the African continent:

1. Assistance to foreign countries according to the principle of equality and
   mutual benefit

2. Respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries, no strings attached and no
   privilege required

3. Provide interest-free or low interest loans

4. Help recipients of aid to enter the path of self-reliance and independent
   economic development

5. Achieve quick results through small investments

6. Provide top quality Chinese equipments, goods and materials

7. Help recipient countries to master the technology

8. Experts (who are dispatched by the Chinese government) should receive the
   same treatment as experts of recipient countries.

By the end of 1979, China had established diplomatic ties with 44 African countries.
During this period, China and African countries united as allies in the Third World in
their fight against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony. Because of the Cold War,
cooperation during that period was based on ideological concerns (Yu and Wang 2008).

The period between 1980s and 1990s was the second stage of China’s relations
with Africa. During this period, pragmatic economic cooperation replaced ideological
concerns as the dominant factor in the interactions between the two sides. Indeed, most
African countries had just gained independence and China was also starting to implement
the reform of trade openness policy, focusing on economic development. It was against this background that Sino-African relations became more pragmatic. Yu and Wang observe that at that time, “National interests instead of internationalism, pragmatism instead of ideology, have gradually become the major themes in China-Africa relations and the political justifications of China’s foreign policy towards Africa” (Yu and Wang 2008). The two authors also note that during this second stage, economic and trade relations between China and Africa grew dramatically from US$1.66 billion in 1990 to US$6.48 billion in 1999. In the last stage that started in 2000, the Sino-African relations, Beijing made strategic adjustments to focus more on equal strategic –mutual benefit and win-win outcome” (Yu and Wang 2008).

In Comparison of China-Africa and Europe-Africa relations, Shu Yunguo echoes the evolution of the Sino-African relations as described by Yu and Wang. According to Shu, the contemporary relations between China and Africa have gone through the same three stages. He describes the early China-African relations as political in nature, owing to polarity and the Cold war. Shu sees the second stage as the adjustment period and asserts that even if it was marked by sound political ties, the period saw an emphasis on trade. The last stage is described by Shu as the mature stage of China-Africa relationship. The author observes that during this last stage, China and Africa have decided to strengthen friendly cooperation in order to face a complex globalization of the international economic system. There are similarities of analysis and views between the researches of Yu, Wang and Shu.

He Wenping in China-Africa Cooperation: Partnership and Global Implications stresses on the same subdivisions in the development of the China-Africa interactions.
But this author has a more pertinent analysis. He asserts that the China-Africa relations went from political support to economic cooperation and then to comprehensive development. The author notes that during the stage of the Sino-African relations, China gave a mental and physical support to African people despite its own domestic difficulties. For He, the evolution of the China-African relations during the second stage can be attributed to two main factors: China’s implementation of the economy oriented reform and open-door policy on the one hand and the restructuring in African economy on the other hand. But unlike Yu and Wang who state that the second stage of the Sino-African relations was characterized by a drastic shift from political to economic concerns, He has a different opinion. Indeed, the latter thinks that though the focus of the relations was economic, the friendly political relationship was rather strengthened than abandoned. The time was also suitable for a shift to a multiple fronts such as culture and education.

In a Congressional Research service paper, titled *China’s Influence in Africa*, Michael Ranneberger divides the evolution of the China-African relation into two phases, instead of three. For him, China’s official relationship with Africa in the 20th century can be sorted out into two phases; 1949 to 1979 and 1979 to 1999. The author reveals that during the first 30 years under Mao, Beijing policy in Africa was based on its position during the Cold War. China’s involvement in Africa was due to its ambition to get out of its international isolation. China was therefore only interacting with African countries to expand its sphere of influence. Indeed, Moscow had severed ties with China, while Washington had placed the country under embargo. With the support of its African partners, Beijing was able to replace Taiwan in the UN Security Council in 1971. Mao Zedong even said that — entered the UN owing to the support of our poor brothers of...
Asia and Africa who supported us” (Zhang and Hongming 2000). According to Ranneberger, efforts to isolate Taipei are some of the reasons why China continues to embrace the African continent.

According to Dr. Donavan C. Chau in his monograph, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa, U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya Nigeria and South Africa, the PRC became involved in African countries’ issues as early as 1955. At the Bandung Conference (1955) on Afro-Asian solidarity, delegations from Egypt introduced the PRC to the independence movement in French Algeria. From that point onward, the PRC started a sustained support for Algerian independence and used Cairo as a central stepping stone from which to conduct operations around the continent. Dr. Chau argues that from the very beginning Beijing’s offensive was multifaceted, from amity visits to economic assistance to arms’ transfers. The PRC’s relations with Africa were constantly more than support for liberation movements and more than an ideological opposition with the Soviet Union. Chau notes that throughout this period, Beijing had a grand strategy about its relations with the African countries. This grand strategy’s objective was to build a new strong a prosperous PRC. Figure 1 shows the multifaceted support of China to Africa between 1949 and 1987.
Figure 1. Chinese involvement in Africa between 1949 and 1987  

In *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Deborah Brautigam notes that in supporting African countries' struggle for independence, Beijing sent modest amounts of covert funding, materials, and advisers to several independence movements. But for its initial official assistance project, China built a cigarette and match factory just in Conakry, the capital of Guinea. Brautigam argues that Guinea was the only one out of 14 Sub-Saharan African countries to forge diplomatic relations with the PRC.
immediately after independence. The others either followed the lead of the United States and recognized Taiwan, or were too distracted by other internal problems to make a decision right away. Brautigam also notes that China’s first official aid recipients in Africa were selected according to ideological interests. Indeed, alongside Sekou Toure of Guinea, socialists’ leaders took power in Ghana (Kwame N‘Krumah) and Mali (Modibo Keita) and both countries promptly received economic assistance from China.

In the *Economy Series, China in Africa* edited by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Chinese relations with West African countries are analyzed. The summary explains how ECOWAS’ countries kept switching recognition of PRC or the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) for either economic support reasons or as tensions between East and West were easing up.

As a whole, Chinese involvement in Africa, after the support to independence movements, soon aimed at countering Taiwan on the continent. Princeton Lyman in *China’s Rising Role in Africa* states that “In those early days, China’s intentions were primarily diplomatic, i.e. to counter recognition of Taiwan as the representative of China and thus to shore up votes for the eventual rejection of Taiwan’s China credentials in the United Nations. China’s other objective was to compete not only with Western influence but Russia’s.”

**Economic Relations between China and Africa**

Economic relations between China and Africa have risen exponentially within the last decade. Indeed, Beijing is now Africa’s most important economic partner ahead of the US and the UK (Taylor 2009). In 1997, official trade between China and Africa was only worth US$5 billion. But trade value in 2010 hit US$100 billion (Taylor 2009).
In *China-Africa Strategic Partnership Ushered in a New Era*, Yu Jianhua describes the evolution of the economic cooperation between Beijing and Africa. He situates the beginning of the economic embrace in China’s adoption of economic reforms and open-door policies in the 1970s. The author notes that trade value between the two parties grew from US$177 million in 1970 to US$1.19 billion in 1980, and then to US$1.66 billion in 1990 and US$6.484 billion in 1999. It surpassed US$10 billion for the first time in 2000 (Yu, 2008). Yu reveals that Beijing’s FDI on the African continent grew up from US$440 million in 1999 to US$6.64 billion in 2000. Analyzing the reasons of an economic embrace between China and Africa, Yu states that there are complementarities between the two sides: Africa is not only rich in natural resources; it also constitutes a vast market, providing an important strategic zone for China to adjust its industrial structure.

In *China’s Emerging Role in Africa: A Strategic Overview*, Jerker Hellstrom agrees with Yu on the reasons behind the increase of trade between China and Africa. According to him China’s industrial growth of the last decades created an industrial overproduction in sectors like electronics, textiles and footwear. This rapid expansion saw the need not only for exports markets of Chinese manufacturers, but also and foremost for import of energy and raw materials. It’s from that standpoint that Chinese companies discovered opportunities in Africa’s vast resources and untapped markets.

China’s investments in Africa, and trade with the continent, are growing at a breakneck pace. Between 1990 and 2006, its FDI stock grew from less than US$50 million to US$2.6 billion according to official data (Xinhua News Agency 2009). Pillay, Nehru and Davies, Martyn J. in *Unlocking Africa’s Promise: China and African Mining*
note that the Sino-African trade is dominated by Chinese demand for natural resources. The authors reveal that oil, iron ore, wood and diamonds account for 80 percent of Africa’s export to China.

Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing situate the importance of Africa to China from an economic standpoint. They see Africa as the only opened door for oil resupply at a time when the West has secured oil deals with the other parts of the world. Isaac and James in *The Impact of Chinese Presence in Africa* write that:

Industry experts suggest that while the development of oil deposits in the Middle East are expected to peak in the near future, Africa’s deposits are now being developed and are expected to out-compete supplies from the Middle East. The US Energy Information Authority suggests that Chinese refineries face capacity problems with the heavier crude oil from the Middle East. While Western powers have succeeded in encircling Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe through a number of regional security arrangements, Africa remains strategically open and China may become even more dependent on African oil. (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008, 9-10)

The two authors argue that China is not only interested in oil in Africa, but in many other natural resources. They assert that the extraction of non-oil resources like metal ores, essential in the electronics and electrical industries, and timber has also seen Chinese growing interests. China being the world’s largest consumer of copper, has invested in the Zambian copper mining sector which is currently the largest Chinese mining operation on the continent. The figures below show Chinese oil companies’ investments between 1995 and 2006 (figure 2) and Chinese imports of Crude oil in 2007 (figure 3).
Figure 2. Chinese Oil Companies’ investments 1995-2006

Figure 3. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Region, 2007
In *China’s Growing Economic Activity in Africa* by Hany Besada, Yang Wang and John Whalley, after underlining that Chinese expansion is worldwide, sets out to explain why and how economic cooperation between the black continent and China is booming. The authors explain that in an effort to promote trade with Africa, Beijing removed tariffs on 196 imports from 28 least developed African countries in 2005. Two years later, i.e. 2007, China expanded the number of products exempt of tariffs to 454 items. The authors reveal that currently most African products destined for exports to China receive a duty-free transaction. The authors argue that after the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) from 1974 to 2004 which was detrimental to China’s exports, China put a lot of incentives to boost African exports to Beijing.

In *Atlas on Regional Integration, the ECOWAS Report* suggests that China, being the second oil consumer in the world after the US and ahead of Japan, is becoming active diplomatically and economically in the petrol sector. The report notes that since September 11, 2001 and the American offensive in Iraq, China is looking at diversifying its sources of oil supply and Africa is therefore becoming a strategic partner. The report states that with African oil being of higher quality and with new countries entering the oil production (Chad, Mauritania, Ghana, Mali, etc.) West Africa may see an increase in Chinese economic interests.

In the *Economy Series, China in Africa*, edited by ECOWAS, trade between Beijing and West African countries is specifically analyzed. According to the report, if Southern and Central Africa are important trading partners with China, the most important exports between West Africa and Beijing consist mostly of oil and cotton. The report argues that even these two commodities do not have the same status in the export
balance: West African oil is a marginal supply source for China even if cotton is a strategic source for the Chinese textile industry. In the cotton trade China does business even with countries it does not have diplomatic ties with. In West Africa, China is the leading partner for exports of major cotton producers: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. Furthermore West African imports from China increased at a rapid pace. The table below shows China’s position in West African countries’ foreign trade from 2000 to 2005. It illustrates how China is becoming an important trade partner to many of the countries.

The same report asserts that West Africa is by far the most populous region in Africa with a population above 300 million inhabitants, representing 4.6 percent of the world population (OECD 2007). The ECOWAS report notes that with its sizeable population, West Africa is an attractive consumer market for Chinese products. Nigeria alone represents 45 percent of the regional population and imports 42 percent of Chinese exports to West Africa (ECOWAS report 2007). The other destinations of Chinese exports are Benin (15 percent), Ghana (9 percent), Togo (8 percent), Cote d’Ivoire (7 percent), and the Gambia (3 percent). The report emphasizes the fact that Chinese FDI flow to West Africa remains marginal compared to its investments in Central and Southern Africa.
Table 1. China’s position as an economic partner for ECOWAS countries

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<td>Benin</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>The Gambia</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
<td>43</td>
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The Framework of the Sino-African Interactions

This section discusses the various views of the Chinese love story with Africa and the various tools set up either by one side or by both sides to engage each other. But the section is only going to look at specific Sino-African interactions tools. Those that will be discussed here are: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Chinese Charming diplomacy, Chinese African Policy and Chinese Aid to Africa.

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

In China-Europe-Africa Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects for Development and Good Governance, Garth Le Pere asserts, that since its establishment in 2000, FOCAC has become the main institutional vehicle for shaping and managing Afro-Chinese cooperation, notably in fields like technical, economic, social and political arenas. The author explains that FOCAC ministerial meetings take place every three years and are check points of China-African cooperation. Garth situates the importance of the China's Export-Import Bank (Exim bank) in the practical implementation of FOCAC resolutions. According to the author, the bank is Beijing's official credit agency and assists in financing infrastructure required for extracting and transporting energy and mineral resources (Garth 2008).

Jerker Hellstrom writes that the FOCAC is the most accomplished efforts of Beijing to foster closer relations with Africa, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The author sees in FOCAC a comprehensive effort set by China to foster a mutually beneficial economic development.

In African Perceptions of Afro-Chinese Relations Dorothy Mc Cormick gives an overview of FOCAC. Indeed, the author explains that the first FOCAC held in 2000 was
aiming at affirming the consensus between China and Africa on certain international issues. The second FOCAC in 2003 in Addis Ababa consolidated the Afro-Chinese relations and gave the contours of new areas of cooperation, to include trade, economic assistance, and cultural exchange. Mc Cormick explains how Africa obtained from China the removal of import tariffs on some 190 items and the development of a Special Preferential Treatment Program (SPTP). The author notes that during the third FOCAC in Beijing, China revealed a new policy towards Africa. This policy set mechanisms and principles guiding the Sino-African cooperation in the economic and political fields, in education, science, culture, health and social arenas. The 2006 FOCAC is also, according to Mc Cormick, the meeting during which Beijing set up to go beyond bilateral relations with African countries and engage with African multilateral organizations (NEPAD, AU, ECOWAS, etc.). The last FOCAC in Egypt in 2009 reinforced the decisions of the third meeting. Table 2 outlines the major decisions taken during the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing.
Table 2. China’s Pledge to African Countries

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<td>1</td>
<td>Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Provide US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa in the next three years</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Set up a China-Africa development fund, which would reach US$5 billion, to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic ties with China</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increase from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa with diplomatic ties with China</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa, and provide a grant of RMB 300 million for providing malaria medicine and build 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools and increase the number of Chinese scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009.</td>
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China’s Africa Policy

In *China-Africa Strategic Partnership Ushered in a New Era*, Yu Jianhua notes that the China’s Africa Policy revealed during the third FOCAC in Beijing in 2006 is the new strategic tool for China in engaging with African countries. Yu states that China wants to establish with African countries a new strategic partnership based on equality, mutual trust and win-win cooperation. According to the author, this was the first time for the Chinese government to produce a white paper on what it intends to do in Africa (Yu 2008).
In *China’s Emerging Role in Africa: A Strategic Overview*, Jerker Hellstrom sees the China’s Africa policy as the milestone for China’s relations with the black continent. He sees the Chinese policy towards Africa as the filter through which various issues regarding the Afro-Chinese relations are discussed. Jerker highlights the fact that the paper released by Beijing in 2006 as the new China African policy and outlines the PRC’s goal of creating a new type of strategic partnership. If the document reiterates the one-China policy of Beijing, it also appears as a political foundation for the interactions between the two parties. The author explains that the document itself seeks to increase high level leadership visits and pledges PRC cooperation with the African countries in international meetings (Jerker 2009).

**Active and Charming Diplomacy**

Many authors notes that Chinese economic offensive in Africa is also accompanied by an active and charming diplomacy. Jerker Hellstrom, for instance, thinks that China’s Africa strategy is implemented by an extensive network of Beijing’s diplomats in Africa. The author writes that:

China maintains embassies in every African country (apart from Somalia) with which it has diplomatic ties, i.e., 43 of 48 Sub-Saharan countries. It also maintains commercial counselor offices in 40 of these countries and seven consulates-general in five of them. These posts are manned by teams of diplomats who are reportedly conversant in local languages. Another mechanism for its bilateral engagement are frequent, high level leadership exchange visits, notably including regular annual trips to Africa by top PRC authorities. . . . Such leadership visits are used to build personal leadership ties and cement bilateral relations in diverse areas. Visiting PRC political VIPs, typically accompanied by large delegations including business representatives, sign major agreements that underpin and structure such ties and announce or witness the signing of large commercial commodity or construction contract deals, many financed by PRC state agencies at preferential rates. (Jerker 2009, 10)
Jerker also mentions African leaders’ visits to China and frequent reciprocal lower-level exchange visits. He also states the fact that China takes every opportunity to train African businessmen travelling to China. Beijing’s offensive of engaging with African journalists, who are receiving more and more invitations to China, is also mentioned by the author.

Harry C. Marson V. in his monograph *Wooing the Dark Continent: US and China Engagement Strategy in Africa, Is it Complementary or Competition*, qualifies Beijing’s Charming diplomacy as a “prestige diplomacy” or “charm policy.” The author explains how China cultivates a special relationship with African leaders, a technique that differs from the approach used by Western countries. He also puts an emphasis on the increasing number of Chinese leadership visits to Africa since 2000. He calls it the centerpiece of Chinese soft power. Figure 4 gives a picture of the increase of these visits.

Figure 4. Chinese Diplomatic Visits in Africa 1963/1964 vs. 2006

There is abundant literature regarding China's aid to African countries. It might even be the topic about which the whole literature on the Sino-African cooperation is more polarized. Jerker Hellstrom in *China’s Emerging Role in Africa: A Strategic Overview*, emphasizes that aid is the most important tool, even more vital than direct investment, used by China in engaging with African governments. Jerker sees the Chinese approach with aid to Africa as pernicious because Beijing has strategically aligned its official development assistance (ODA) with its outward FDI policy to support Chinese enterprises investing in Africa (Jerker 2009). According to the author, the malicious aspect of this approach can even be realized in the fact that the amount of Chinese aid in a specific African country is hard to pin down due to lack of transparency. The aid package comes in various flavors, such as zero-interest loans and congressional loans, technical assistance, medical missions, scholarships, and labor cooperation programs. The author reveals that there is currently more than 800 Chinese aid projects across the continent and China has almost given aid to any African country.

In *China’s Aid to Africa, Achievements, Challenges and International Cooperation*, Xue Hong traces the history of the Chinese Aid that started in Africa back in 1956. The author states that China has built many projects in 53 African countries in areas like agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, light textile, transportation, broadcasting and communication, hydraulic power, machinery, public and civil engineering, education and healthcare, handicraft, and food processing. Xue explains how Chinese Aid projects are always identified through bilateral consultation and how aid programs have gradually won the acclaim of African people. The author cites Senegal’s
President Abdoulaye Wade who said that—Chia’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations. In fact the Chinese model of stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa” (XUE 2008).

Deborah Brautigam may be the author who has the best understanding of Chinese Aid in African countries. In The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, she provides a global understanding of China’s approach in Africa, beyond myths and stories. She explains how Chinese aid has different characteristics, telling the failed Chinese projects and the success stories of the Chinese aid system. Above all, Brautigam thinks that in order to understand how much aid China gives to African countries and how this aid works, one should really think outside the box and leave aside all the biases that the media has created. She explains how aid is contributing to China’s rising influence in Africa. Finally, in an in-depth explanation and presentation of data, the author shows how China’s new “Peace corps,” a group of young Chinese volunteers, working in various fields of development, are helping improve living conditions of African people.

**Governance Issues Related to the Sino-African Relations**

Afro-Chinese relations are based on China’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries. Many authors, journalists and politicians see in this principle an open gate for African leaders not making any efforts towards democracy, good governance, and transparency. For many, China’s principle of non-interference and strings attached aid is fueling bad governance practices in Africa.
In *The Political Consequences of China Returns to Africa*, Denis M. Tull stretches on the principle of non-inference of China in the domestic affairs of the African countries. Tull argues that given the increasingly ambivalent relations between African countries and their former colonial powers, China makes a point of stressing its distinctiveness from Western countries and their policies towards Africa. He notes that this pertains to China’s non-interference in internal African affairs, a policy based on unconditional respect for national sovereignty which makes any attempt to interfere into the domestic affairs of a state illegitimate. But Tull also argues that this issue does not specifically pertain to Africa. Rather, the notion of sovereignty and its corollary, non-interference, is a cornerstone of China’s conception of statecraft and international relations as a whole. However, Tull discusses the particularity of this issue in Africa. He notes that what makes the Chinese stance on sovereignty so specific in regard to Africa is the fact that perhaps nowhere else in the world has state sovereignty been more eroded than on the continent. This was largely the result of Western-prescribed policies over the past two decades, first in the guise of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s, then in the 1990s with demands for democratization. According to the author, by tying development assistance to economic and political reform, well intentioned western donors sought to impose or support structural change in Africa’s aid-dependent countries. Unsurprisingly, these demands for reform were not well received by African state elites who developed numerous strategies to evade them (Tull 2007).

Tull argues that in opposition to the West, China sticks to its state-centered orthodoxy. This is reflected in the fact that apart from the Taiwan issue, no political condition like respect for human rights are attached to the development assistance it
provides to African countries. Tull quotes Premier Wen Jiabao who thinks that ―African countries have the right and capability to solve their own problems.‖ Tull notes the adherence by African elites to the Chinese policy of non-interference. He cites a Djibouti’s ruling Party’s politician who thinks that China shows esteem to African sovereignty and freedom, therefore African people will always keep a friendly feeling towards China. (Tull 2007). On the other hand, a spokesman of the Kenyan government observed: ―You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to tackle corruption. If they are going to build a road, then it will be built.”

In Who’s Afraid of China in Africa? Towards an African Civil Society Perspective on China-Africa Relations, Ndubisi Obiarah, echoes all the fears about the principle of non-interference on African domestic affairs. If he underlines the fears of mismanagement of resources and the rise of corruption, he also notes the potential for authoritarian regimes, and abuse of human rights. Obiarah even argues that there is the possibility that some authoritarian regimes in Africa will seek to utilize China’s economic success to rationalize avoiding further political liberalization and genuine democratization. And Obiarah states that if human rights advocates and democratic actors in Africa may increasingly promote their traditional arguments of respect for human rights and political liberalization, they might be challenged by some African governments that will point to China as the poster-child for development sans democracy. Obiarah cites Sudan and Zimbabwe as examples of the bad implications of the Chinese overt principle of non-interference.
Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing also express their fears in *The Impact of the Chinese Presence in Africa*. Indeed, they note that Beijing may be countering the international efforts of better governance in impoverished and conflict-ridden communities on the Dark Continent, by providing funds to pariah regimes. Idun-Arkhurst and Laing state that — China’s success in lifting millions of its population out of the poverty line in the last three decades without electoral democracy and free press may offer an irresistible model of development for African governments who are chafed by donor pressure for western-style political reforms (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008, 3).

**Military and Security Issues in the Sino-African Cooperation**

The effects of China’s influence on security are looked at under the auspices of China’s arms deals and military cooperation with Africa. There is abundant literature on China’s arms trade with Africa, but not specifically with West African Countries. In *China’s New Role in Africa*, Ian Taylor writes that as Chinese engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa has increased, so has criticism aimed at Chinese enterprises that sell arms to African regimes. He notes that because the continent has since the 1960s been beset by conflicts and unstable regimes, such critics are condemnatory. Taylor notes that China’s arms deals with African countries are not transparent at all, making any analysis of Beijing arms trade very difficult. Lack of transparency poses particular problems for analysts of China’s arms industry where energy sources (such as oil) are involved. It makes . . . the scope of activity hard to detect and the direct responsibility of Chinese state authorities hard to pin down. It is exceedingly difficult to establish conclusively that proliferation by a given Chinese company is linked to access to energy. Yet, while an energy-for-arms link can neither be simply assumed nor easily proven, what gives cause
for concern is that serial proliferators, besides having poor records on proliferation, are at least nominally under direct supervision of the State Council” (Taylor 2009, 116).

Taylor notes that a critical result is the fact that Chinese arms show up across the continent from Liberia to Somalia. “These seem to be mostly small arms sold to middlemen who in turn sell to Africans, both governments and rebels” (Taylor 2009).

Taylor also notes the fact that China sells arms to governments even under embargoes. In this vain, he quotes the French Defense minister Michele Alliot-Marie who told the upper house of France’s parliament that there was a more sinister side to what she said was Beijing’s effort to gain a share of mineral wealth and win political influence in Africa:

It does not bother us that a big country comes to help Africa’s development, which needs it . . . provided that happens in clear conditions . . . that encourages the development of democracy. We therefore draw the attention to the fact that too often we see Chinese arms intervening in conditions that are sometimes contrary to embargoes. (Taylor 2009)

The author argues that sales to Sudan and Zimbabwe are probably the most controversial. Khartoum has used hard currency generated by Chinese investments in Sudanese oil fields to finance its conflict in the southern part of the country, stoking criticism that China has transferred military, security, and police equipment to armed forces and law-enforcement agencies in countries where those arms are used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights. The level of criticism over such exports is linked to China’s non-interference policies. Specifically to West Africa, Taylor observes that China sold four K-8 trainer/combat aircraft to Ghana in 2006, two AS-365 Panther helicopter to Mali in 2000, two Y-twelve transport aircrafts to Mauritania, twelve F-7M fighter aircrafts and 20 Short-range air-to-air missile system to Nigeria in 2005, and one patrol craft to Sierra Leone (Taylor 2009, 121).
In *China’s Emerging Role in Africa: A Strategic Overview*, Jerker Hellstrom analyzes the extent of the Sino-African military and security cooperation. He notes that China provides training to African military and police forces both in China and in Africa. Beijing also provides military equipment to African and other capacity-building and has offered to help Africa fight crime by providing judicial training and setting up a channel for intelligence and information exchange. Jerker states that China has only 9 out of its 107 military attaché in Sub-Saharan Africa and that no African state has ever participated in a joint military exercise with PRC. The author explains that Beijing has also sold light assault rifles, tanks and other military equipment to African countries. The fact that this equipment is simple, rugged and inexpensive makes it attractive to Africans. He also mentions that International peacekeeping is an emerging area of Chinese engagement in Africa. On the other hand, the author states that there is no transparency in Chinese arms deals to African countries. Amnesty International has accused China of breaching UN arms embargo on Sudan.

Buckley, Chris in *China urges Sudan to seek compromise in Darfur*, explains how China’s arms deals’ policy evolved in the case of Sudan. Indeed, the author reveals how Beijing put pressure on Khartoum to resolve what it calls a “humanitarian crisis.”

In *China comes to Africa*, Wendell Minnick emphasizes that there is no direct correlation between China’s efforts to protect its interests in Africa and China’s growing support of peacekeeping operations in Africa. The author thinks that China’s aim is only to contribute to a healthy and stable global economic development which will in turn serve its economic interests. Minnick underlines the fact that Beijing, contrary to the US
that set up AFRICOM to protect its economic interests in Africa, China relies on host
teams for the security of Chinese companies involved in Africa.

For Yu Jianhua author of *China-Africa Strategic Partnership Ushered in a New Era*, China is supporting security and stability in Africa. He cites Chinese involvement in peacekeeping operations, active cooperation with African countries in security areas like military technology exchanges, military training, military aid, fight against terrorism, cross-border economic crimes and weapon trafficking. The author also mentions Chinese aid to the African Union to support its autonomous peacekeeping missions. Figure 5 gives an overview of Chinese military involvement in Africa.
Summary

This chapter discussed various implications of increasing Chinese influence in Africa and established reasons for concerns in many areas. It pointed out the implications of Chinese influence in Africa in general and in West Africa in particular. It looked at the
history of the Sino-African relations in the early 1950s, and also checked trade and economic cooperation between China and Africa in the current environment. The framework of the Afro-Chinese interactions has also been reviewed.

Regarding peace and security, various books and articles reveal that there is an increasing embrace between China and African countries in military, security and peacekeeping arenas.

Finally, it must be stated that the whole literature on the Afro-Chinese relations is polarized with a great amount of biases either against or in favor of Chinese growing influence on the Dark Continent. Indeed, Many Western scholars systematically see China’s growing influence to be spreading to the detriment of Africa’s development. On the other side, some Chinese scholars are praising the ever closing embrace between the Dragon and Africa. Caught in the middle, African scholars are coming up with mixed sentiments.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The first chapter was an introduction and set the general background of China’s growing influence on the African continent with an emphasis on West Africa. That chapter included many perspectives on contemporary Sino-African relations, aimed at highlighting the background of the effects of rising Chinese influence on governance, economy and security in the sub-region. This was in view of enhancing a common picture about the topic.

The second chapter was a review of literature about the subject of the research. The literature review was conducted following the key research questions of the thesis. Therefore, the focus was on China’s involvement in Africa in the early 1950s; The Sino-African trade and economic relations; the framework of the Afro-Chinese interactions and governance and security issues related to the rising influence of China in Africa.

The literature review was conducted using mostly secondary sources: published articles and papers, books, newspapers, monographs and thesis, policy documents and websites, dissertations, etc. The nature of the study and the parties involved, made it imperative that African, Chinese and western sources all be used to provide a balanced view. But because of the ever changing character of Afro-Chinese relations, particular attention was paid to the most recent sources available.

This third chapter explains the research methodology for analyzing the impact of the China’s rising influence in West Africa and uses Ghana and Nigeria as case studies. The research method used is the qualitative method of research and aimed at evaluating the case studies by means of both primary and secondary sources of data and information
to depict the situation of current Chinese influence in the African sub-region. Through the research, this thesis aims to identify and analyze answers to the secondary questions that will assist in finding responses to the thesis' main research question.

Research methods can be divided into two main approaches: qualitative research methods and quantitative research methods. As put forward by Creswell, “the selection of which approach is appropriate in a given study should be based upon the problem of interest, resource available, the skills and training of the researcher and the audience for the research.” Despite the fact that some researchers use a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods, in their authentic form there are major differences in the assumptions pertaining to these approaches, as well as in the data collection and analysis procedure used (Creswell 1994). As emphasized by Creswell, the quantitative method is an examination of a social or human problem, based on testing a theory composed of variables, calculated with numbers, and synthesized with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive generalizations of the theory hold true. On the contrary, he defines the qualitative method as a process seeking to understand a social or human problem from multifaceted perspectives. Qualitative research is therefore conducted in a natural setting and involves a process of building a complex and holistic picture of the phenomenon of interest (Creswell 1994).

Both of these two research methodologies have strengths and weaknesses. Patton argued that the advantage of a quantitative approach is the possibility of measuring the reactions of many subjects of an entire population to a limited set of questions, thus facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation of the data (Patton 1990). The advantage of such a research approach is the provision of a strong basis for generalization
of the results to the entire population. Patton argued that on the contrary, qualitative methods typically produce a wealth of detailed information about a much smaller number of people and cases. Therefore qualitative research increases understanding of the cases and situations studied but reduce the possibility of generalizing (Patton 1990). This is echoed by Anne-Marie Ambert. According to her, “qualitative research seeks depth rather than breadth. Instead of drawing from a large, representative sample of an entire population of interest, qualitative researchers seek to acquire in-depth and intimate information about a smaller group” (Ambert 1995). Some researchers give a warning on the caveats of the qualitative research method. Ellen Taylor-Powell for instance insists on the fact that the researcher must have a thorough knowledge of the material and use specific themes and patterns to build coherent groups. The researcher must also be able to overcome his personal bias on the topic (Taylor-Powell 2003).

Having considered the qualitative and quantitative approaches, the researcher decided to choose the qualitative research method. More specifically, the method used to conduct this study was the qualitative method using case studies. This method is a subset of the qualitative methodology. In this method, the researcher explores a single entity of a selected phenomenon (the case) bounded by time and activity and collects detailed information through a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Creswell 1994).

After the review of the two main research methods, it is important to give an overview of the theoretical framework used for this specific research. The methodology embraced is a combination of input and output variables to see how they interact to provide a better grasp of China’s influence on the selected case studies. The imput
variable retained is FDI as it provides not only the trend of investments from China, but also allows to grasp the degree of China’s involvement in that country.

The output variables selected are tied to the areas in which we seek to measure China’s influence. Therefore three output variables have been selected: economic development, governance and security. The aim is to see how increasing FDI flow from China, which is a sign of Chinese involvement, is affecting the issues of economic development and to some extent, democratic governance and security. But because of the complexity related to analyzing these large areas, specific aspects of each variable have been selected to drive the analysis in chapter 4. The aspects analysed in each variable are underlined below

1. Economic development (Impact of China on local industries)
2. Governance (Absence of participation and human rights and their impact on democracy)
3. Security (arms trade with China and anti-Chinese sentiments and their impact on internal security)

The variables are assessed and analysed vis-à-vis the two countries selected for the research: Ghana and Nigeria.

**Theoretical Framework and Input Variable**

The theoretical framework used is the causal relationship between FDI and economic growth, especially the relationship between increase of China’s FDI inflow into Ghana and Nigeria and growth of their respective economies. Additionally, the increase of FDI may lead to economic development and that will also have potential impacts on governance and security.
Raphael Kaplinsky provides a framework for the analysis of the channels through which China’s rise impacts on other countries. He makes a distinction between complementary and competitive impacts with each of them characterized by direct and indirect effects. When the relation with China supports development strategies of that country, then the relation is considered complementary. On the other hand, if the relation works as an impediment to development policies of the host nation, then the relation is seen to be competitive. Kaplinsky takes a close look at the impact of Chinese FDI inflow into different countries (Kaplinsky 2008).

This study investigated an empirical relationship between non-extractive FDI and economic growth. Many influential studies on FDI and growth in Africa are multi-country studies. Recent literature suggests that the relationship between FDI and growth may be country and period specific (Asiedu 2001).

As portrayed by Adeolu, “the impact of FDI on economic growth is more contentious in empirical studies, hence the need to examine the relationship between FDI and growth in different economic dispensations. There is a further problem of the effects of the local environment, which has not been consciously tackled, and FDI may have a positive impact on economic growth leading to an enlarged market size, which in turn attracts further FDI” (Adeolu 2007, 2).

Caves (1996) notes the positive effects of FDI inflow that can lead to a growth of the economy. Among these are productivity gains, technology transfers, the introduction of new processes, managerial skills and know-how in the domestic market, employee training, international production networks and access to markets (Adeolu 2007, 3).
Borenstein et al. (1998) argue that FDI is an important vehicle for the spill-over of technology, contributing to economic growth in larger measure than domestic investment. Findlay (1978) reveals that FDI increases the rate of technical progress in the host nation through a “contagion” effect from the more advanced technology and management practices used by foreign enterprises and companies (Adeolu 2007,3).

The findings of research on the relationship between FDI and economic growth can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, FDI is considered to have direct impact on trade through which the growth process is assured. On the other hand, FDI augments domestic capital, therefore stimulating the productivity of domestic investments. As pointed out by Adeolu, these two arguments are in line with endogenous growth theories and cross country models on industrialization (Adeolu 2007).

Based on the above assertions, a subjective correlation is established between an increase in FDI inflow into a country and predictable economic growth. For the purpose of this study, the impact of FDI on economic growth will be analyzed looking at the increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Therefore the aim is to find a probable empirical causal effect between the increase of FDI from China and the increase of GDP of Ghana and Nigeria. The data collected postulate that FDI from China has substantially increased in the two countries. Hence, subjectively an increase of the GDP of these two countries will be attributed to the increase of China’s FDI.

Output Variables

The output variables are economic development, governance and security. The selection of each variable and the sub-variables (if any) used, are justified as follows.
Economic Development Output Variable

At the economic level, the research was set up to measure the possible impact of Chinese FDI inflow into West Africa's economic growth. Indeed, the variable shows the trend of Chinese investments in that country. Additionally, if FDI is increasing, it reveals a growing Chinese investment for the period (2000-2010). The sources from which FDI are drawn are the UNCTAD and the World bank. The data collected attest to an increase of Chinese FDI influx in both of our case studies over the period covered by the research. If there is an increase of FDI, there should be positive effects associated with that (economic growth, better governance and a more secured environment). Will Chinese FDI, trade, and corporate social responsibility help reduce West Africa’s poverty and drive growth?

The impact of Chinese FDI on the economic growth of our case studies was measured by looking at the changes of GDP over the period covered by our study. Subjectively, if there was an increase of GDP and an increase of Chinese FDI into the country, the increase of the former will be attributed to the increase of the latter. In the matrix used to analyze the results of the study, an increase of FDI and GDP will be symbolized by a plus (+) and a decrease will receive a minus (-), while a non noticeable growth will receive a zero (0).

Governance Output Variable

The impact of increased Chinese involvement on governance in West Africa will be analyzed through the findings of the Freedom House Report 2011, with the document “Freedom in the World 2011” being the baseline of our analysis.
Freedom House is an independent institution, considered to be the watchdog of democracy and human rights in the world. It supports the expansion of democracy and freedom in general. Therefore, using various tools, the institution supports democratic change, monitors freedom and advocates for democracy and human rights. As stated on their website, “Since its founding in 1941 by prominent Americans, concerned with the mounting of threats to peace and democracy, Freedom House has been a vigorous proponent of democratic values and a steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the far left and far right.” Freedom House postulates that freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedom of expression, association and belief, as well as respects for the rights of minorities and women, are guaranteed (Freedom House website).

The “Freedom in the World” survey provides an annual evaluation of democracy and human rights in 194 countries. Using analytical reports and numerical ratings, the survey measures freedom based on two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings are based on an evaluation of three sub-categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of four sub-categories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House website).

“Freedom in the World” applies one of the three broad category designations to each of the countries or territories included in the index: Free, Partly Free and Not Free.

A Free country is one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A
Partly Free country is one in which there is limited respects for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free countries frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism. A Non-Free country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied (Freedom House website).

The collection of data about China’s FDI inflow into Ghana and Nigeria already attests to an increasing Chinese footprint in these two countries. On the other hand, “Freedom in the World” 2011 ranks these two countries as Free and Partly Free respectively, with Nigeria scoring better this year than it did last year. Therefore the aim in analyzing governance in these two countries was to assess how the relation with China is affecting the socio-political system of these countries.

In the matrix of the analysis the following subjective rating will be used in assessing governance: a country rated a Free will receive a plus (+), country rated as Partly Free will receive a zero (0) and a country rated as Not Free will be graded with a minus (-).

**Security Output Variable**

To assess the impact of China's rising influence on security in West Africa, the researcher developed his own sub-variables after reviewing the pattern of the threats on security due to China’s presence on the continent. The sub-variables retained by the author are:

1. transparency in arms trade,
2. participation in capacity building and
3. participation in stability operations.

Transparency in Arms Trade

China is becoming a major player of arms trafficking to Africa. Many authors remark on the lack of transparency in Chinese arms trade with African government or warring parties. Small arms trafficking was a major source of instability in some instances. The lack of transparency in the way China conducts arms deals may fuel insecurity in countries affected by tribal or civil wars.

This variable seeks to establish a relation of cause and effect between this trade and an increase of security issues in Ghana and Nigeria.

Participation in security forces’ capacity building

In a sub-region ruined by years of instability due to civil wars and coup d'états, it is expected that significant Chinese economic involvement will be followed by a participation in the capacity building of the security forces. This action will better equip security forces in becoming more professional in dealing with instability and contribute significantly to a more secure environment. That capacity building may take many different forms ranging from military training to providing a legal training for the police and legal services.

Participation in Stability Operations

West Africa is a conflict-troubled zone and many western countries are participating in stability operations in the area in order to positively impact on the safety of the populations. Is China’s economic presence in the sub-region accompanied by any type of involvement in stability operations?
For each sub-variable, a positive impact due to China’s policy, will receive a plus (+). On the other hand, a negative impact of China on this sub-variable will receive a minus (-). A non noticeable impact will be graded zero (0). The matrix below shows how the scores will be awarded in assessing each case study (see table 4).

Overall assessment and display of results

From the assessment of economy, governance and security in each of our case studies, the overall assessment for each country should be easily deducible.

Table 3. FDI input variable by country

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Table 4. Three output variables by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Sub-variables</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency in arms trade</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in security forces capacity building</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in stability operations</td>
<td>(+) or (-) or (0)</td>
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Source: Created by author.
Aspects of Each Output Variables Driving the Analysis

The input variable that has been selected was Chinese FDI flow into a specific country. Indeed, this variable shows the trend of Chinese investments in that country. The output variables were governance, economy and security. These three variables are the factors that would impact either positively or negatively the future of African countries and their populations. However, the overview of only the output variables as a whole does not allow a real grasp of China’s influence. Therefore to be able to gain a better insight some aspects will be analyzed in each output variable.

The initial phase in the development of the hypothesis was to review available background literature on the rising influence of China in Africa in general and in the sub-region of West Africa in particular. This way of proceeding has allowed the identification of a set of characteristics. Indeed, many contemporary authors on Sino-African relations, using various analytical frameworks and citing different sources developed a pattern of characterizations of China’s recent inroad in African countries. Taking these characteristics into consideration, some aspects of the output variables were identified and will be used for the analysis:

1. Impact on local industries
2. Absence of participation, abuse of human rights and decline of democratic principles
3. Arms trade with China, anti-Chinese sentiments and their impact on internal security.

Each aspect is explained below.
Economic Development: Impact on Local Industries

As put forward by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), undeveloped countries are countries that haven’t reached a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations and which have, in most cases, medium to low standards of living (UNDP Report 2007). This is a characteristic of most West African countries. A development process should be seen in the diversification of local economies and an increase in industrialization. This variable looked at a correlation between a growing Chinese economic footprint and the degree of diversification of economies in the countries. Indeed, many authors note that the arrival of Chinese firms and companies has led to a deindustrialization of many African countries. The aim of this variable was to look at the correlation between the presence of Chinese firms or Chinese products and the increase in development or decrease of industries in the country.

Governance: Absence of Participation, Abuse of Human Rights and Decline of Democratic Principles

Respect for human rights and participation are characteristics of western style democracy and a criterion of good governance. Taking into account the fact that China itself has poor human rights record, it is highly probable that the increase in embracing Beijing will lead West African countries to make no further gains in improving their human rights practices. This variable looked at the possible connection between Chinese influence and the level of respect for human rights in the country.

While many West African countries have overwhelmingly subscribed to most international and regional human rights norms and standards and have ratified numerous major human rights treaties and enshrined these norms and standards in their
constitutions and laws, a significant gap remains in their realization. In this situation China can have an influence on the bad practices.

Security: Impact on Arms Trade with China and Anti-Chinese Sentiments on Internal Security

Small Arms trafficking has severely impacted on stability and therefore on the development of West African countries. In many cases, small arms have created a situation of total instability (Taylor 2009). Ian Taylor revealed that China is selling weapons to African countries, sometimes with total opacity. Not only does China sell arms to autocratic governments, but it is also involved in arms trade with groups of rebels or insurgents (Taylor 2009).

On the one hand this variable seeks to establish a relationship between the Chinese arms trade and the effects between this trade and a rise of insecurity in a country.

Finally, the growing Chinese involvement in Africa has led to anti-Chinese sentiments and riots against Chinese interests in some countries. This variable tries to determine the presence and frequency of these riots and protests due to anti-Chinese resentments in each case study.

Case Study Selection

The next step of the research is to test the identified variables of the areas of concern against the known facts of the relations between China and West African countries. To provide a reliable test of the hypothesis, two case studies (Ghana and Nigeria), representing a medium and a large country respectively by size and population, were selected. Though it is recognized that these countries may not have similarities in their interactions with Beijing, they provide a suitable base line to test the hypothesis of
the thesis. Indeed, both countries are former British colonies and have heavy involvement with the UK and the US. Additionally both have economies and resources that China has focused upon. Finally, both countries have received the largest Chinese investments over the last five years and have China as the number one country they are importing products from.

But more specifically, the selection of Ghana responds to several criteria. The former colony of Gold Coast established early relations with PRC. The country received Chinese guerilla warfare experts to train Ghanaians in their struggle for independence and was also among the first to experience the shift in China’s African engagement from political (ideological) to economical. On the other side, China is the second largest exporter to Ghana, behind Nigeria, and ranked 6th in terms of FDI flow into the country as of 2008 (GPIC report 2008). But Chinese investments in Ghana are mostly infrastructure oriented, so it will be interesting to assess the impact of those projects both on economy and on social development.

Furthermore, Ghana has long enjoyed relative stability in a sub-region known to be devastated by long civil wars. This gives reason to counter the cliché that China only engages with pariah regimes or war lingering states. Ghana may also constitute a counter example that China only engages with countries rich in natural resources. Indeed, Ghana can be considered only an average player when compared with other resource-rich African countries.

Nigeria, on the other hand, is well endowed with natural resources, especially oil, and is a major player in the socio-economic and geopolitical arenas in sub-Saharan Africa. It is the leading country in West Africa and one could even opine that as Nigeria
goes, so goes the sub-region. Moreover, even if Nigeria enjoys relative stability, the oil rich region of the Niger Delta is known for recurrent violent conflicts over land and resources.

Lastly, the selection of these two cases studies are motivated by the fact that the researcher is from a country within the sub-region (Burkina Faso) and is acquainted with many of the subtleties and realities of West Africa.

Summary

This chapter discussed the research method used in this study. In particular, the researcher defined and explained the difference between quantitative and qualitative research approaches. The researcher also justified the selection of the qualitative research technique used to analyze the various variables. Chinese FDI constitutes the input variable, while governance, economy and security are the output variables. These variables will provide the extent of China‘s influence in West Africa vis-à-vis the two case studies.

The next chapter will analyze in detail the selected case studies in order to see the effects China is having upon West Africa‘s stability and development and make recommendations on what needs to be done to capitalize on the positive influence of China in West Africa, while mitigating the bad effects.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effects of the rising influence of China in West Africa using Ghana and Nigeria as cases studies. In doing so, the variables identified in the previous chapter will be analyzed in relation to evidence produced in each of the two countries with a view to ascertaining any emerging trends which can substantiate or invalidate the hypotheses of our thesis.

Economics and politics do not constitute clearly distinct spheres in Africa and this affects the outcomes of relations between China and African countries (Bates 2001).

**A Case Study of the Effects of China’s Rising Influence in Ghana General Background**

Present day Ghana is a merger of two former colonies: the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland trust territory. It is bordered by Ivory Coast to the West, Burkina Faso to the North, Benin and Togo to the East and the Gulf of Guinea to the South (see map below). Ghana achieved Independence from the United Kingdom in 1957, and became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to do so. It has a total land area of 238,533 square kilometers (including a water body of 11000 square kilometers). The population is about 23 million with thirteen ethnic groups, and over hundred languages (CIA World Fact book, 2010). As a former British colony, English is the official language used in both educational and governmental institutions.

The country has an agriculture based economy. Indeed, this sector accounts for 60 percent of the total work force. The mineral resources of the country include gold and the country was the top gold exporter of the region for a long time. The other natural
resources are timber, diamonds, bauxite and manganese. The agricultural sector represents 37.3 percent of Ghana’s GDP, the manufacturing sector only accounts for 17 per cent (Ghana government Home Page 2010). But the country remains poor with more than 30 percent of its population living below the international poverty line. It is therefore highly dependent on foreign aid and investments.

In the early years of independence, the country went through a long period of political instability due to rampant corruption and mismanagement by political leadership. In 1960, a new constitution changed the political system from parliamentary to republican with a powerful president, but this did not prevent the country from falling
into successive coups d''états. The first one was conducted in 1966 and the second in 1981, led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. The country then experienced more than 10 years of mostly military rule under a socialist system of governance. Rawlings was eventually elected president in 1992 when a constitution allowing for multi-party system was approved in a referendum, leading to the embrace of democracy (Country watch 2011).

Ghana possesses a soil rich in natural resources such as gold, diamonds, timber and cocoa. The economy is mostly based in agriculture with cocoa beans and cocoa products being the dominant exports, as Ghana is the second largest cocoa producer in the world, after Ivory Coast. The economy has started to become diversified with the discovery of offshore oil reserves in 2007 (Country watch 2011). With the beginning of oil production this year (2011), the country may experience an unprecedented growth.

Since 1992, Ghana has leveraged all factors and has become an example of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, attracting two American presidential visits. Indeed, President George W. Bush (2008) and Barack Obama (2010), visited the former colony of Gold Coast and invited all other African countries to follow the path of the country in peaceful and democratic political transitions.

China’s Historical Economic Ties with Ghana

This section explores the Afro-Chinese relations from a historical perspective. It is worth noting that the Gold Coast (Ghana) was one of the six African nations represented at the Conference of Bandung in Indonesia in 1955 (Larkin 1971). Beijing and Accra established diplomatic ties on July 5th, 1960, respectively under the leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai and President Kwame Nkrumah. The latter visited China in 1961.
and in return, Premier Zhou Enlai led a Chinese delegation to Ghana in 1964 and a concessional loan was granted by Beijing to Accra the same year. Since that time, the two countries have enjoyed high level reciprocal leadership visits. Additionally, Ghana campaigned for the reinsertion of China in the United Nations and supported the PRC in the Indo-China conflict of 1962. Additionally, Beijing continued to provide technical support to Ghana during the administration of Kwame Nkrumah. The Sino-Ghanaian relations took a different turn when Nkrumah was overthrown and the country fell under various military governments that gradually turned their backs to Beijing. But when he came into power, President Jerry John Rawlings and John Kufuour strengthened the relationship between the two countries again (China.org.cn). From that point forward, Accra has continuously received support from Beijing under various forms of assistance. If the early relations between the two countries were mostly politically oriented (ideologically), they have largely evolved today to include aid, increased investments and trade. These three vectors were present in the initial stage of their cooperation, especially aid, it was because China was seeking to ideologically influence Ghana and gain international support from Accra. However, the actual economic relations (aid and trade) are much more significant. Indeed, several infrastructural projects were built by the Chinese or using funds from Beijing such as: the National Theater, the Bui Hydro-Electric Power Dam, the Afevi Irrigation Project, the Dangme East District Hospital, the Police and Military Barracks, the Kumassi Youth Center, the Office Block of Ministry of Defense and three rural schools (Wenran Jiang and Jing Jing 2010).

The current shift in China’s African engagement from ideologically focused to economic focused has affected Sino-Ghanaian relations. Indeed, when the governor of
the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xianshuao visited Ghana in 2005, accompanied by a number of Chinese businessmen, they were in search of economic opportunities between the two countries. Moreover, bilateral trade and economic exchanges were the centerpiece of the agenda of Jian Qinglin, a top Chinese political advisor, when he visited Ghana. When Chinese premier Wen visited Ghana in 2006, the final communique of his trip emphasized the necessity of deepening bilateral economic relations between the two parties (China’s embassy in Ghana). Recently the chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Wei Zhang, paid a visit to Accra with several Chinese entrepreneurs. During their visit, the Vice President of Ghana, John Mahama welcomed the Chinese willingness to take advantage of the Ghanaian friendly investments environment (Ghana News Agency 2009).

There are clear indications that the current Ghanaian government is taking the Sino-Ghanaian relations a step further with leaders of both countries brokering trade deals and praising the cooperation between the two sides (The Daily Graphic 2009).

Trade between China and Ghana

Ghana and China have had trade relations since Dr. Kwame Nkrumah became the first president of the former colony of the Gold Coast. According to official statistics released by Chinese media, trade between Beijing and Accra hit over 189.395 $US million in 2010 (ghanabusinessnews.com 2010).

Ghana exports the following items to China: timber, cocoa beans, metal ore and scrap. In return, it imports manufactured products such as automobiles, electronics, bags, shoes, apparel and textile. Considering this big picture of the Sino-Ghanaian trade where Ghana exports raw materials and imports finished goods, it can be argued that it follows
the pattern of North-South economic relations (Goldstein et al. 2006, 46-50). Indeed, North-South relations are characterized by a situation where raw resources are extracted from a country and finished goods are imported in return.

China is the second exporter country to Ghana, behind Nigeria, mostly because of the supply of crude oil by the latter to the former. But the recent drilling of Ghanaian oil may influence the course of the Sino-Ghanaian cooperation. Indeed, Beijing is collaborating in the drilling process through a joint venture between the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and the China National Oil Offshore Corporation (CNOOC). The Chinese company has provided initial financial and technical support for the project (Accra Daily Mail, 2009). It is worth pointing out that the importance of China and Nigeria for Ghana has relegated Ghana’s other important trade partners (US, UK, and South Africa) to the background.

Table 5. Ghana and China Export and Import 2000-2006 in $US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports to China</th>
<th>Imports from China</th>
<th>∆%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25 million</td>
<td>93 million</td>
<td>3.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>32 million</td>
<td>180 million</td>
<td>5.625%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39 million</td>
<td>504 million</td>
<td>12.923%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5 shows the increase in volume of the Ghana-China trade. It is however important to notice that China exports more to Ghana than the latter exports to China.
This might explain why in terms of balance of payments in the trade between the two partners, it is overall weighted against Ghana. Furthermore, as already underlined previously, while Ghana imports finished goods from China, it only exports raw material to it.

**Chinese FDI inflow into Ghana**

Just like many other African countries, in 1980 Ghana embarked on a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) initiated by the World Bank. This was the World Bank attempt to cut inefficiency and boost productivity. Ghana, with the support of international financial institutions, made pledges to donor countries and encouraged the inflow of FDI. Between 1988 and 1998, Ghana carried out the privatization of over 100 State Owned enterprises (SOE) (UNCTAD report 1998). It also tried boosting the investments of its private sector. The implementation of these amendments led to the establishment of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), an institution aiming at promoting investments, especially in the non-extractive sector. The new environment, favorable to business that resulted, attracted many countries, among which China. Beijing stepped in to increase its engagement with Ghana and quickly became one of the top ten investor countries in Ghana (see table 6). China embraced many different sectors in Ghana, diversifying its investments. They range from investment in the extractive sector, non extractive, manufacturing, construction and general trading and agro-processing.
Table 6. Top 10 investor countries to Ghana according to number of projects 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-China</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-India</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Lebanon</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Nigeria</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Britain</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-USA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Korea</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7. Top 10 investor countries to Ghana according to value 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of Projects (US$ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Britain</td>
<td>4,676.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-China</td>
<td>152.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-India</td>
<td>23.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Lebanon</td>
<td>14.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Canada</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Italy</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Nigeria</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-USA</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Netherlands</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Korea</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic Development: Impact on Local Industries

This section argues that Chinese companies are not responsible for the decline of industrial capacity in Ghana and attributes the reasons to the SAP engaged in the 1990s, alongside a weak industrial policy.

Ghana engaged in an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in the late 1960s, in its objective to industrialize the country. The rationale behind such a policy was the belief that industrialization can be the gateway towards economic growth. This policy led to the establishment of many industries ranging from those of soap to textile industries, among others (Mustapha 2010, 43). After flourishing and contributing substantially to the GDP growth of Ghana, this sector of industries started to decline between the 1990s and 2000. The period also coincided with deepening Sino-Ghanaian cooperation in such a way that the following questions can be asked: Is China’s interaction with Ghana stifling local industries in the country? The evidence collected suggest to the contrary and argue that the bad performance of Ghanaian industries lately can rather be attributed to past and present ineffective government policies. The findings further suggest that the Ghanaian government was able to set up rules in order to reap benefits from the Sino-Ghanaian cooperation (Mustapha 2010).

The Ghanaian industrial situation was aggravated by the SAP in which the Ghanaian government was forced to engage the country in the 1990s, as a precondition for financial aid from international institutions. This led to an upsurge in the industrial sector as Ghanaian firms were not prepared for such an open competition with foreign companies (Quartey 2006, 138). Therefore, it should be stated that the industrial sector started experiencing a decline before Ghana’s close embrace with China. Additionally,
there are domestic factors that militate against the performance of the industrial sector. In the sub-sector of the textile industries, if it could be stated that the influx of Chinese textiles into Ghana has exacerbated the poor performance of the sector, the same argument cannot be used on other industries (Baah and Jauch 2009).

Chinese companies are claimed to be the reasons why local firms close because most products from China flowing into Ghana use the patent designs and even logos of the local industries and are sold at lower prices (Mustapha 2010, 45). If cheap garments are welcomed by the consumers, it renders the local industries counterproductive. While it is a fact that Ghanaian industries suffer from the competition with the Chinese firms (and also other foreign firms), it is superficial to postulate that China alone is stifling local industries in Ghana. Mr. Abraham, cited by Ab, states that the government of Ghana has always had a defeatist behavior towards the decline of the sector when realizing that local industries were outrun by foreign firms. The government statement that —if you can’t beat them, join them is a well known survival strategy” (Klutse 2008). After this statement the efforts by the government to try to save the sector were feeble. Efforts of local industries to win subsidies from the government did not meet any satisfaction (Mustapha 2010, 55).

The collapse of the sector and the employment levels in the industry started earlier than the settlement of Chinese industries or increased imports of Chinese goods. Indeed, trade between Ghana and China started increasing substantially only in early 2000, meanwhile the peak of the industrial decline in Ghana has been observed between 1975 and 1995 (Mustapha 2010, 57). Therefore, as put forward by Ab, focusing too much on the Chinese effects on the local industries of Ghana makes people loose sight of other
foreign firms and the effects of the SAP on the whole country in general. Other cases in Africa attest that many factors, other than China or liberalization are reasons for industrial decline on the African continent. For instance, industry in South Africa was able to adapt to the important market liberalization experienced by the country in the 1990s. Ineffective government policies could therefore provide a better explanation to the decline of the industrial sector in Ghana over the years. This is because most of the government policies are only curved with short term considerations (Chad 1994).

The environment of the implementation of the SAP is another important issue in the decline of the industry sector in Ghana. Because the SAP started under a non-democratic regime, the objective of gaining international legitimacy worked against weighing the effects of such programs on the local industrial sector. As a consequence no measure was put in place to help domestic firms absorb the shock caused by the implementations of the IMF programs (Kwame 2009).

Additionally, the recent focus by the government on the mineral and oil industries is playing out against the support to the other industries that were former boosters of the economy.

According to a survey by Peter Quartey, only 15 percent of the 40 industrial respondents mentioned China or foreign products as the reasons of the decline in their production or closing of businesses. The majority mentioned low demand for local products and high production costs (Mustapha 2010, 61).

If China is not to be blamed in the decline of the manufacturing sector of Ghana, on the contrary, China has been a contributor in boosting the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, Ghana is among some countries, along with South Africa that are claiming to be in a win-
win situation in their cooperation with China. Most of Chinese FDI inflow into Ghana is in the non-extractive industry and that could provide an explanation for the positive Chinese economic involvement. Indeed, many countries where China’s FDI inflow is important in the extractive industry, effects of the China syndrome has been criticized (Obiarah 2008).

Ghana is known to be one of Africa’s top economic reformers of the last decade. The country has therefore become one of the most extraverted states with privileged participation in global institutions like the G8. As noted by Idun-Arkhurst and Laing, Ghana is a model of development in sub-Saharan Africa, has become a “fighting ground” for the West and China. While the West focuses on Ghana to demonstrate the effectiveness of economic reforms, China focuses on Ghana to give visibility to its Africa policy (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008). Competing with China in Ghana, the World Bank is expressing its wish to participate in energy projects funded by China (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008).

China improves infrastructure in Ghana when Western countries are switching to other priorities. The role played by the Ghanaian government in canalizing cooperation with China to make sure Ghana really reaps the benefits from it, is important.

G. D. Boateng, Executive Secretary at Ghana’s Secretariat of the Chinese-funded Bui Dam Project, is cheerful about the Chinese investments in Ghana. He notes that:

With Chinese assistance, old development plans that were jettisoned at the insistence of development partners are now being revived and are being executed at much lower costs.” Before the Chinese came, the Bui Dam project had been on the shelf since the 1960s. We had expressions of interest from a number of Western companies in the 1990s and in 2001, but they all fell through because those companies didn’t see the project as bankable. Now with Chinese assistance, the project has gone off the shelf to the ground and this time it is an integrated
project that includes the building of a new city around Bui and the idea came from previous projects in China.” (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008, 17)

In the same project, if Sino hydro brought in 500 Chinese workers, it also created 2,500 local job opportunities (Ghananewsagency.org 2006). Commenting on China’s intervention on this project, a GIPC report states that Ghana is benefiting from Beijing’s help with interest-free loans and local infrastructure developments (Wanran and Jing 2010).

Furthermore, by providing the most diversified FDI, coupled with the sustained efforts of the Ghanaian government in improving transparency, China is contributing to the creation of basic industrial capabilities. Finally, the sustained growth in Ghana’s GDP of 6 percent and 7 percent respectively in 2007 and 2008 is a sign that the country is able to benefit from the inflow of FDI from China and other donors.

If the Sino-Ghanaian relations are yielding overall good results for Ghana, it is because the Ghanaian government is relentlessly seeking to set up and enforce rules that will keep China in line with good economic practices. It is also because China's investments in the country are mostly in the manufacturing sector and that is boosting the economy (see table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Local Equity ($US million)</th>
<th>Foreign Equity ($US million)</th>
<th>Local Loan ($US million)</th>
<th>Foreign Loan ($US million)</th>
<th>Total Cost ($US million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>97.52</td>
<td>518.07</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4,390</td>
<td>5,155.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>104.44</td>
<td>5,382.79</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>7,200.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>724.13</td>
<td>15,006.15</td>
<td>236.95</td>
<td>148,615</td>
<td>164,582.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>699.51</td>
<td>3,824.05</td>
<td>261.34</td>
<td>7,951.2</td>
<td>12,736.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>299.90</td>
<td>3,264.34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>613.42</td>
<td>4,197.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Yet, it is worth noting that trade between China and Ghana remains uneven and increasingly favors China more than Ghana (table 5). Therefore, while China’s involvement could weigh heavily in Ghana’s future, presenting opportunities for the Ghanaian government to accelerate growth and develop Ghana’s own industrial capacities, it also presents challenges. It remains to be seen whether the Ghanaian government continues to take adequate measures to reap more benefits from this cooperation.

Overall, considering the inflow of Chinese FDI into Ghana and the fact that it is alleged to be improving infrastructure and living conditions, a plus (+) is accorded to the impact of China in the Economy of Ghana.

Governance: Absence of Participation, Abuse of Human Rights and Decline of Democratic Principles

Measuring the level of political engagement is more difficult than assessing the scope of economic involvement; especially the extent to which political engagement has
an impact on governance issues in the host nation, it is hard to identify a direct
correlation. That was particularly true in the case of the Sino-Ghanaian relations where
the visible impact of China on the country’s politics was hard to trace.

Ghana constitutes an example of stability in war torn West-Africa sub-region. The
country was able to organize five successful elections and three peaceful changes of
governments. The opposition party won two times and the incumbent president has
stepped down out of this respect for the rules of democracy. This really makes Ghana a
specific case when only a handful of African countries have reached such a level of
democratic consolidation (Ross 2010).

The country is also a host of a strong civil society and the media offers a critical
voice without any fear of reprisal, two factors which leads one to conclude that
democracy in Ghana has become well situated.

The institutional reforms conducted by the government of Ghana have paid huge
dividends in setting up the country as an example of nation where the rule of law is
effective. The Mo Ibrahim index report 2010 ranks Ghana 8th out of 53 states in matters
of accountability and corruption. The same report ranks the country 4th in rule of law, 6th
in Human rights and participation and comments on the efforts on human development
within the country.

At the same time, the Freedom House 2011 report qualifies Ghana as a free state
which means a country where there is an open political competition, a climate for the
respect of civil liberties, a significant independent civil life and a free media (Freedom in
the world 2011).
In this context, it is very unlikely that China’s policy of non-interference or its practices of propping up bad governments will not have negative effects on the democratic governance of the country.

Ghana is scoring high on surveys regarding the improvement of the rule of law in the country. At the same time, there is no evidence that Ghana had a bad impact on governance in Ghana. Therefore, a score plus (+) is recorded.

Security: Impact of Arms Trade with China and Anti-Chinese Sentiments on Internal Security

China has not yet been alleged of being a source of insecurity in Ghana, whether related to anti-Chinese sentiments, arms deals or simply violence directed at Chinese citizen by militia groups or a growing demand for Chinese made weapons. As emphasized by Ian Taylor, “We should remember that African arms purchases are symptomatic of African problems surrounding the construction of states and the political cultures therein. The Sino-African arms trade cannot be blamed simply on irresponsible Chinese exporters; the demand side equation is equally important” (Taylor 2009, 125). From that standpoint, it is appropriate to say that Chinese bad business practices will have more damaging effects in countries still struggling for democracy and not be apparent in countries where the political system is strong enough to set up rules to prevent perverse effects. Ghana stands as an example where there has not been, so far, any violence or protests attributed to anti-Chinese resentments. This might be explained by the fact that policymakers in the country have so far been able to set rules that regulate Chinese business practices. Meanwhile military and security cooperation between the two countries is growing. China supplies Ghana through direct sales Ghana with military
aircraft, light armored vehicles, military communication equipment and lights weapons. China has also been active in building military barracks in the country and has provided the Ministry of Defense with a brand new building in 2008 (Baah and Jauch 2009, 35). Furthermore, China is engaged in providing military training to the Ghanaian military and police forces both in China and in Ghana and visits of high military leadership have been intensified lately (Cisse 2008). For instance, in 1997, the Ghana Minister of Defense visited China. In 1998, a military delegation headed by General Fang Zuqi, political commissar of Nanjing Military zone, paid a friendly visit to Ghana and in August of that year the Ghana Army Commander, Major General J.H. Smith, visited China. In 2000 the Defense Minister of Ghana was again invited to China (China.ord.cn).

Considering the fact that China is participating in the capacity building of Ghanaian police and military forces, alongside the absence of anti-Chinese sentiments in Ghana, a plus (+) is recorded.

For the overall assessment of Ghana, see tables 10 and 11.

**Summary**

The assessment of the Sino-Ghanaian bilateral relations reveals that China is becoming a major investor in Ghana. Vivid Chinese involvement in Ghana is yet to produce its results because of the fact that China’s deep economic involvement in Ghana is recent. Nevertheless, it can be argued that overall, China is a major partner of development for Ghana, notwithstanding the concerns related to negative effects on labour practices and uneven trade between the two countries. Even though China is one of the major investors in Ghana, the Ghanaian GDP growth may be related to the increase of China’s FDI inflow into the country.
As far as governance is concerned, it must be stated that China does not seem to have any type of effect in Ghana. Finally, China is increasingly participating in the capacity building of police and military forces in Ghana.

A Case Study of the Effects of China’s Rising Influence in Nigeria

General Background

Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a former British colony that gained independence from Britain in 1960. The country is located in West Africa and shares land borders with Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. The coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea and on the Atlantic Ocean (Country Watch 2011).

Figure 7. Map of Nigeria
The colony of Nigeria was controlled through the 19th century and in 1914 the area was known as a British protectorate. Two military coups were experienced by the country due to ethnic clashes and led to the country falling into a three-year civil war period in 1967-1970. Subsequent years were marked by instability and military rule until the adoption of a new constitution in 1999, resulting in a peaceful transition to civilian government. Still today, this country of about 150 million inhabitants continues facing ethnic and religious tensions. Nigeria is a country known for its mismanagement of resources from its petroleum based economy. The country also has inadequate infrastructure and faces corruption that impedes the increase of living conditions for the large majority of the population. Despite being the largest fifth world’s oil producer, more than half of the country’s population still lives below the poverty line (Nigeria Country Watch 2011).

Despite the fact that the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections were marked by significant irregularities, the country is experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since its independence. The April 2007 elections marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country’s history (CIA factbook).

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the largest Muslim country in sub-Saharan Africa. There are more than 250 ethnic groups but the most influential are: Hausa and Fulani 29 percent, Yoruba 21 percent, Ibo 18 percent, Ijaw 10 percent, Kanuri 4 percent, Ibibio 3.5 percent and Tiv 2.5 percent. The religious indentities of its populations are comprised of 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian and 10 percent of indigenous beliefs (CIA factbook).
Nigeria can claim to be an African hegemon. With a population of 150 million Nigerians, out of an African total of around 781 million, 17.7 percent of the African population is Nigerian (Sparks, 2008). The second most populous African country has just 84 million people, which represent 60 percent of Nigerian total. Nigeria's GDP in 2008 was estimated at $216 billion, representing the fourth highest in Africa after South Africa, Egypt and Algeria (IMF, 2008). Nigeria produces 1.8 to 2.3 million barrels of oil per day, depending on the level of security in the Niger Delta (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 4). Additionally, the country is among the most richly endowed on the planet in terms of natural gas, with an estimated 100-188 million cubic feet of reserves (Munyama 2009, 5). Furthermore, the country plays a prominent role in continental politics through the African Union and mostly its sub-regional organization of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has deployed troops in both Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast as the lead contingent in the Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force, to restore peace and order.

Despite its status as an African giant, Nigeria still had a very low GDP per capita of $792 in 2009, ranking 154th in the Human development index of 2008 (UNDP 2009 report). The mismatch between Nigeria's earnings and its human development can be attributed to long-standing governance issues and its endemic corruption.

China’s Historical Economic Ties and Trade with Nigeria

China-Nigerian relations are marked by decades of cooperation. The contemporary developments of the relationship between the Dragon and the African giant are indicative of this renewed China-African adventure.
When Nigeria gained its independence in 1960, even though the Nigerian government was supportive of Taiwan, it did not establish any diplomatic ties with China, owing to a pro-western policy. Two major facts support this view. On the one hand, the 10 African country tour undertaken by Premier Zhou En Lai in 1963 did not include Nigeria (Utomi 2008, 40). On the other hand, a Chinese delegation that visited Nigeria in 1964 seeking to establish diplomatic ties left without any results (Bukarambe 2005, 236).

After years of unsuccessful attempts to establish diplomatic ties with Nigeria’s federal government, China finally decided to back up the Ibo-dominated Biafra region to secede in 1968 (Porter 1986, 109-111). Formal diplomatic ties between the two countries would not be established until 1971 when Nigeria was ruled by General Yakubu Gowon. Trade cooperation was also established, marked by two-way commercial exchanges between the two countries (Bukarambe 2005, 233-234). When Olesegun Obasanjo came into power in 1976, he became worried of the trade imbalance between the two countries as Chinese manufacturing and export capacity increased to the detriment of Nigeria. Discussions to solve the issue were held between the leadership of the two countries, but this did very little to solve the trade imbalance (Ogunsanwo 2008, 194). In 1993, General Sani Abacha seized power in the country and installed a very repressive and brutal regime thereby, loosing support from western countries. He then turned east towards China and increased cooperation between the two countries. The Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1994, and the China Civil Engineering Construction Cooperation (CCECC) won a $529 million contract to rehabilitate the Nigerian railway system in 1995 (Bukarambe 2005, 251). In 1997, former Premier of
China’s State Council, Li Ping, visited Nigeria and signed protocols relating to power

In reality, the CCECC never rehabilitated Nigeria’s railways and Ping’s protocols
were barely implemented. It’s not until Obasanjo’s return to power in Nigeria in 1999 as
a civilian elected president that renewed partnership between the two countries would
take place. China deepened its economic ties with Nigeria, especially investing in the oil
sector. Indeed, out of $10.5 billion of Chinese investments commitments in the SSA oil
sector in the period 2001-2007, $4.8 billion were made in Nigeria (Foster et al. 2008, 35).
Chinese firms won many major contracts in the country, mostly in construction,
telecommunications, power and transport, and the volume of Chinese exported goods
rose substantially. By the end of 2006, Chinese investments in the African giant was
worth $6 billion (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 7).

President Obansanjo’s attempts to change the constitution that would allow him a
third term in office failed and Yar‘Adua was elected president in 2007. His
administration, and the following led by Goodluck Jonathan, continuously reviewed the
Obasanjo’s administration contracts with China, while signing other ones at the same
time (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 8).

Although Beijing established diplomatic ties with Nigeria in 1971, the last decade
has seen unprecedented renewed developments (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 3). In fact,
between 1999 and 2006 diplomatic visits at the highest level were recorded: two visits by
the president of each country to the other country, and many visits at other levels (Utomi
2008).
At the diplomatic level, signed agreements and Memorandums of Understandings (MOU) are signs of an increasingly friendly relationship. The agreements are multifaceted and cover a long range of activities. They feature mutual political trust, mutual economic benefit and mutual support in international affairs. Nigeria is also receiving China’s technical assistance in various fields: military, education, technology and health. For example, Nigeria recently received an aid of 46 million yuan to purchase anti-malaria medicine and to train Nigerian health personnel on malaria control and prevention (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 18).

Scientific and technological cooperation between the two giants is also flourishing. Indeed China has shouldered Nigeria in launching NIGERCOMSAT 1, Nigeria’s first communication satellite in early 2007. Increase in economic cooperation is noticed both in trade and investments both in the public and private sectors. As pointed out by Ogunkola, “the recent waves of diplomatic relations appear to be, to a great extent, mutually beneficial. Nigeria was on an aggressive campaign for FDI and the Chinese government was also seeking markets for inputs, especially raw materials, as well as markets for finished goods” (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 3).

Chinese FDI Inflow into Nigeria

The approach in this section was to review Chinese FDI inflow into Nigeria with a view to describing its size, composition, trend and significance. Data collected point out to a general increase of FDI from China into Nigeria. The table below presents a general picture of FDI inflow to Nigeria from different regions of the world between 1999 and 2006. As the table suggests, there has been an upward increase of FDI from all regions during the concerned period.
### Table 9. FDI in Nigeria 1999-2006 in US$ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. America</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>36.16</td>
<td>40.34</td>
<td>4354.14</td>
<td>5166.32</td>
<td>1601.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. America</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>60.04</td>
<td>24.56</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>32.12</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>39.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle/Far East</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>10.92</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>23.27</td>
<td>21.22</td>
<td>13.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>164.95</td>
<td>136.46</td>
<td>98.86</td>
<td>200.24</td>
<td>293.66</td>
<td>2624.30</td>
<td>3084.68</td>
<td>2441.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>91.41</td>
<td>173.62</td>
<td>169.04</td>
<td>56.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>190.61</td>
<td>168.47</td>
<td>137.35</td>
<td>271.22</td>
<td>440.88</td>
<td>7268.00</td>
<td>8514.99</td>
<td>4169.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A further analysis of FDI inflow from China shows how China gradually overtook other countries of Asia/Pacific (India, Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan) in flowing FDI into Nigeria. This is worth noting that given the fact that Chinese FDI inflows into Nigeria grew substantially from an average $0.55 million in 1999-2000 to about $5.5 million in 2006. This represents a tenfold increase compared to 9-fold increase by the whole West African sub-region (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 4).

Information about Beijing’s investments in Nigeria attests to an increasing economic cooperation in various fields: trade, commerce, health, education and technical assistance. The composition of Chinese FDI is therefore fragmented with Chinese firms investing in either private or joint ventures. According to the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, Chinese private FDI is composed of agro-allied industry, manufacturing and communications sectors. Many of these investments are joint ventures.
between Chinese and Nigerian investors (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 4). On the other hand, some of the investments are totally foreign, be they privately owned by Chinese or by Chinese with other foreign investors. Some Chinese investments have fully benefited from local investments incentives (Mthembu-Salter 2009).

In 2005, the official record of Chinese FDI into Nigeria was only $1.88 million, far from the impression given by the media on Chinese investments in the country. According to Ogunkola, two explanations are possible. Either Chinese FDI grew substantially after 2006, which is not shown on the previous table, or promises by China were not materialized. An example is the Chinese investment of the Kaduna Refinery announced in January 2006 that was supposed to be a $2.3 billion worth of investments by CNOOC. Because of unfulfilled promises, the Nigerian government was considering a review of the deal (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 5).

Chinese firms and the Chinese government are also investing on the “public” sector. Some of the public investments are in the oil and gas sector and construction, especially the building of infrastructure. But as some authors point out, data on Chinese investments into Nigeria should be manipulated carefully, due to the total opacity of Chinese adventures in the country (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 5).

**Economic Development: Impact on Local Industries**

Nigerian trade unions have continuously blamed Chinese exports for the loss of 350,000 Nigerian manufacturing jobs, mainly in the textile sector; and Nigeria is cited as one of the countries where employment and domestic production have been substantially affected by Chinese influence (Kaplinksky et al. 2006, 6). Contribution of manufacturing
to Nigeria’s GDP is an estimated 4 percent, which is low, compared to the 16 percent of the share of manufacturing in South Africa’s GDP (OECD and Frame 2008, 1094).

Chinese companies were established in Nigeria as early as 1970, but were hampered due to an unstable business environment and a lack of resident overseas Chinese community (Brautigam 2003, 447-467). Nigeria, which was a leading country in textile manufacturing, has experienced a setback in the sector, with only Mozambique and Uganda suffering more in SSA. In recent times, international competition, particularly from Beijing, is blasting domestic textile manufacturers. Many textile factories have been forced to close, exacerbating the level of unemployment in the country. There are strong allegations that Chinese firms in Nigeria often employ unfair and illegal business practices, especially smuggling. The issue has been discussed in many bilateral meetings and has always gotten the same response from the Chinese leadership: it is Nigerian consumer demand for ultra-low-priced goods and the country’s weak economic regulatory environment that are the causes. While this is certainly true, it is also certain that China is not implementing any international control on exports to Nigeria. Many factors are involved in the explanation of the phenomena. The low cost of Chinese textiles, Nigeria’s high tariffs for imported textiles, Nigeria’s long and highly porous borders and its strong domestic demand which local supply is unable to satisfy, are factors increasing the smuggling of Chinese goods into the country. (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 19).

The number of Chinese companies and retail stores has seen an increase in number. But the quality of Chinese imported goods has attracted a growing criticism, like commented by a Lebanese retailer in Kano:
I used to sell Chinese goods in my shop, but I stopped because they are so low quality. It is bad for my image. I haven’t actually seen any good quality Chinese material coming into Nigeria. The irony is that a lot of what I sell in this store actually comes from China, but it is high quality material, which we source, not from China, but from Europe. China sells higher quality material to Europe because of the standards they impose, whereas here in Nigeria, we are just a dumping ground of any kind of crap.” (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 21)

Another issue in Nigeria about Chinese-owned manufacturing companies has been the poor labour conditions and salary levels of local nationals. According to the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), “There have been complaints about Chinese attitudes to labor. They take all the managerial positions themselves. They have discouraged labor unions, but in some cases they have been forced to accept them. But then, they try to fight it.” (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 20). This raises the question of human rights associated with Chinese business practices in Nigeria. But much can not be reasonably expected from a country known from its poor human rights records and its repressive practices on its own citizens.

There is evidence that Chinese companies and Chinese imported goods are having a damaging effect on the industrial sector of Nigeria, therefore, a minus (-) is recorded for the impact of Chinese FDI on the economy of Nigeria.

**Governance: Absence of Participation, Abuse of Human Rights and Decline of Democratic Principles**

China has become a model of development for many Nigerian policymakers. But the issue in the Nigerian case is the quick amalgam made by many Nigerians in willing to embrace the Beijing consensus without critical analysis. A senior leader of the Nigerian legislature, Senate President Ken Nnamani, in a welcome address entitled “China: A Partner and Example of Development and Democracy” during President Hu’s April 2006
visit to Nigeria. He praised China's economic performance exclusive of western
democracy as the "paradox of development and democracy." Nnamani states that —China
has become . . . a good model for Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable
development ideology . . . China (is) a lesson to Nigeria on the enormous good that a
focused and patriotic leadership can do to realize the dreams of prosperity and security
for the citizens" (Thisday 2006).

The increasingly closer embrace between Nigeria and China has led many
politicians to think that development is possible without democracy. President Hu's 2006
visit to Nigeria coincided with a crisis within Nigeria's ruling People's Democratic Party
(PDP). A faction started trying to amend the constitution, in particular the prescribed
term limits, so as to allow the then President Olusegun Obasanjo to remain in office for at
least a further term of four years. The faction was even seeking a possibility for another
three terms of four years each. That would have been a life presidency for the then
incumbent president (Obiarah 2007). The efforts of the Obasanjo faction led to a serious

crisis in the environment of politics in Nigeria and nearly paralyzed the whole country.
Among the main justifications mentioned by the advocates of the amendments was the
success story of modern China and Singapore. The factionists claimed that the absence of
stability and a policy of continuity by a visionary leadership were the causes of
underdevelopment of African countries and suggest that Obasanjo should remain in
power to create stability and development for Nigeria (Obiarah 2007). The supporters of
a life presidency by Obasanjo argued that human rights and democracy are irrelevant for
the country's development, citing China as an example of development without
democracy (Obiarah 2007).
In May 2006, the Nigerian senate rejected the proposals of constitutional amendments aimed at allowing Obansajo’s life presidency. This occurred, despite Obasanjo’s administration and supporters having spent a colossal amount of cash to persuade the National Assembly members to vote for the change. It was also widely alleged that Chinese oil companies contributed generously to support this cause (Wong 2009, 3).

China has also had a counterproductive effect on good governance in Nigeria, especially in combating the endemic corruption. For instance, in 2007 the World Bank offered to fund a railway construction project with the view of combating corruption. Before the $5 million project was signed with the bank, the Chinese offered $9 billion to renovate the entire railway system with no bids or strings attached. The Nigerian Government jumped on the deal (Naim 2007). Obviously Chinese business practices in Nigeria are undercutting attempts to improve transparency and good governance.

Corruption is endemic in Nigeria and is seriously affecting governance and transparency. As reported by Brautigam, “it is like breakfast, very popular” (Brautigam 2010, 1999). Even though corruption in Nigeria was not created by Chinese companies, it is alleged that Chinese business practices are exacerbating the issue.

Corruption remains an endemic problem in Nigeria, especially in the oil industry. In 2009 an official of the Shell Oil Company estimated that 100,000 barrels of oil were being stolen or smuggled every day from the country (Times of Nigeria 2009). The systemic nature of corruption, has led some commentators, to openly question whether Nigeria still has a public sector worthy of the appellation ‘state’ (Ogunsanwo 2008, 196).
It is this environment of corruption, poor governance and weak institutions that Chinese companies, and even Chinese officials, are taking advantage of using various ways (bribery and kickbacks) to influence commerce, trade and policy in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the embrace with Beijing is appearing to be counterproductive to democracy as many Beijing consensus policy supporters are advocating for a “Nigerian-Asianism political system” (Obiarah 2007). It is not surprising if “Freedom in the World” 2011 report rated Nigeria as a “partly free country.” Indeed, the lack of transparency, the rising Islamic extremism, the government incapacity to improve human rights and the living conditions of the lower class, the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, despite huge revenues from the oil industry, the weak institutional framework are factors that are impeding good governance in Nigeria (2011 Freedom in the World report).

In summary, there is evidence that China’s close cooperation with Nigeria presents a negative influence on the quality of governance, that is counterproductive to peace and democracy (Taylor 2006, 99). The Chinese government has done very little to engage Nigerian leadership to conduct reforms in order to enhance democracy, because of the sacrosaint principle of non-interference. For these two reasons, a minus (-) is recorded, regarding China’s impact on governance in Nigeria.

Security: Impact of Arms Trade with China and anti-Chinese Sentiments on Internal Security

Chinese practices have led to massive anti-Chinese sentiments and exacerbates security issues in Nigeria. For instance, militant groups in the Niger Delta have always had a negative view on the Chinese way of doing business in the sub-region. They issued
threats against Chinese interests and nationals after a Chinese company signing of oil and gas deals during President Hu's April 2006 visit to Nigeria (Washington Post 2006). In an email to news institutions, the spokesperson of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), criticized China for buying a US$2.2 billion stake in a Niger Delta oil field in 2005. In their email the militant group stated: “We wish to warn the Chinese government and its oil companies to steer well clear of the Niger Delta . . . Chinese citizens found in oil installations will be treated as thieves. The Chinese government, by investing in stolen crude, places its citizens in our line our fire” (Obiarah 2007).

In January 2007, five Chinese telecom employees were taken hostage by Nigerian gunmen in the oil city of Port Harcourt in Southern Nigeria. Two weeks later, nine Chinese oil workers went missing after being attacked by an armed group in Bayelsa state (Jerker Hellstrom 2009, 18).

China-Nigerian security cooperation is especially problematic. The Nigerian government is increasingly turning to Beijing for weapons supplies to deal with the worsening insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta. Nigerian Military officials have made clear that they will rely on China for weapons to quell the rebellion in the Niger Delta, in the reluctance of western partners to sell arms to Nigeria. Meanwhile, commenting on the situation in the Delta region, the International Crisis Group (ICG) gave warnings that “any attempt at a military solution would be disastrous for residents and risky for the oil industry” (ICG 2006).

The security issue in Nigeria is also created by the fact that the local population feels that China is backing up the country's corrupt leadership. This is the reason for a
growing anti-Chinese sentiment. Local populations express their grievances by attacking Chinese not only in the Niger Delta, but across the country (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2008, 17). The spread of violence in Nigeria due to anti-Chinese sentiments is not only the soledomain of militia groups, but also by local traders in the country. The police have been forced several times to either provide security to China-towns in Nigeria or quell riots of Nigerians who feel abused by Chinese retailers (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 20).

Beyond the issue of security related to anti-Chinese resentment there is a close military and security cooperation between China and Nigeria. This cooperation is characterized by the provision of slots to Nigerian officers in Chinese military schools and by the provision of military equipment to the Nigerian Armed forces (Cisse 2007).

Despite the fact that China is providing slots to Nigerian officers, Chinese sold weapons have consistently been used to quell the insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, this did not lead to a more secured environment. Therefore a minus (-) is recorded about the impact of China on the security sector of Nigeria.

Display of the Results for Both Case Studies

A summary of the analysis of both case studies is as displayed in tables 10 and 11.

Table 10. Composite assessment of input variable for Ghana and Nigeria

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author*
Table 11. Final composite assessment of the three output variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Sub-variables</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency in arms trade</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in security forces capacity building</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in stability operations</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Summary

The two case studies considered in the research led to similar results on one side and to divergent outcomes on the other side. Indeed the most common feature of Beijing’s cooperation with these two countries was the fact that despite China’s claim of win-win cooperation, there is an imbalance of trade in favor of the Dragon. In both cases, the findings reveal that the economic relations between China and each country reflect that of North-South cooperation: Ghana and Nigeria supply China with raw materials and in return, China exports manufactured and finished goods to these countries. Moreover, China exports more in terms of finished products than it imports from these two countries. But the similarities between the two case studies do not go beyond that. Indeed the data collected suggest that Ghana is reaping benefits in its cooperation with China and that Beijing’s influence is having damaging effects on economy, democracy and security in Nigeria.
As an undiverse commodity-based economy, that is a weak democracy, Nigeria
has never been able to leverage its relations with China. That is because Nigeria does not
have in reality any structured policy towards China. This view is corroborated by a senior
member of the Foreign Affairs committee of Nigeria’s House of representative who
stated: “I don’t think [that] there is a China policy. The government is very inward
looking and there is a serious foreign policy vacuum. The foreign minister . . . lacks the
skills for the job. . . . We lack a functioning foreign policy think-thank., and the foreign
ministry is a kind of joke. It is like we only have the ministry because other countries do”
(Mthembu-Salter 2009, 8). This lack of coordinated foreign policy towards China has
been the source of damaging effects on Nigeria’s economy, democracy and security.

On the other hand, Ghana constitutes an interesting case in the Sino-African
relations. The case defies the assertion that China scrambles for resources in unstable
resource-rich countries and produces damaging effects on stability. Ghana is a counter
case because of the level of democracy achieved and the fact that it is a relative peaceful
country in the sub-region. This fact had rendered the nation able to leverage its
cooperation with Beijing.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 1 was an introductory chapter and set the stage of the research alongside the importance and the primary research question and subsequent secondary questions that were supposed to help elucidate the central one. With regard to that, the research was set up to answer the issue about the extent to which the rising influence of China affects governance, economic development and security in West Africa. For the research, Ghana and Nigeria are used as case studies, with the first representing a small non resource-rich country and the second a commodity-based economy, rich in oil and gas, but with a weak institutional democratic system.

The second chapter was a thematic review of available literature on the Sino-African relations with an emphasis on the history of the relations, trade, the framework of the relations and governance and security issues associated to these relations. Meanwhile, the third chapter set up the contours of the methodology. After reviewing both the quantitative and qualitative research methods, the latter was selected to allow for a better understanding of the phenomena. Moreover, the qualitative method based on case studies was preferred as it allows generalizations despite basing the data collection on a small population.

The fourth chapter was the analysis of the Sino-West-African cooperation, applied to Ghana and Nigeria. The aim has been to check how China is influencing the state of democracy, industrial and economic development and how it is impacting on security at the same time.
The findings about the two case studies were different as far as China's influence is concerned. Indeed, the most important revelation of this research is that China is exploiting the weaknesses of the economic and political systems of the countries it deals with. In countries with a very weak democratic and regulated economic system, Chinese influence may potentially have more damaging effects. It is worth noting that this does not only pertain to China, because other countries are also taking advantage of weak economic systems of African countries.

The second realization of the study is that it is not really Chinese FDI or policy that matters, but the system of governance in place which is the key in explaining the level of Chinese influence. Therefore, the Chinese are having as much damaging effects as the locals allow them to have. In that regard, if this study had considered any other country in West Africa than Ghana, the research would have revealed how China is instrumental to the weakness of the local environment and the results would have been close to those of Nigeria, given the fact that most West African countries present a very high level of corruption.

Transparency International Report of 2009, lays out how Ghana and Nigeria are different on the level of corruption. While the Ghanaian government is continuously implementing policies in order to achieve a corruption-free environment, Nigeria is struggling to make the smallest gain in fighting corruption. Meanwhile Chinese companies are alleged by Transparency International to be on top of the list of companies using bribes in economic practices. The level of corruption and the political and economic system in the two countries provide an explanation on why China presents a unique impact on each of them.
Ghana is known to be one of Africa's top economic and political reformers of the last decade. After setting up a good governance system, the country is progressively becoming one of the privileged states of global institutions like the IMF or the G8. In relation to that, it must be stated that if the Sino-Ghanaian cooperation is yielding good results for Ghana, it is because of the strong institutional system set by the local government.

On the opposite, Nigeria is an example of Chinese bad influence on African countries. On top of bad effects on the socio-economic environment of Nigeria, China's practices have revealed to have damaging effects on governance as Chinese firms have been alleged to have backed up President Obasanjo when he tried constitutional changes aiming at a life presidency. In the capital city of Nigeria, growing anti-Chinese sentiments have led to systematic protests against Chinese businesses and many police interventions. Additionally Chinese business practices have exacerbated the security issue in the Niger Delta where militia groups treat Chinese citizen as thieves and have organized crimes against Chinese oil companies. The Government of Nigeria is not hiding its intentions of using Chinese delivered weapons to quell security issues in the Niger Delta.

Chinese business activities in West Africa cannot be risk free in the absence of peace and stability which cannot be effective in the absence of democracy and respect for human rights. More specifically, the uncontrolled exports of Chinese arms into Africa may be a factor of conflict exacerbation on the continent. Meanwhile, during the first FOCAC, China pledged to stop the illegal production and trafficking of small arms in
Africa. In that regard, as pointed out by Obiarah, China needs to have a more responsible approach in arms deals if it does not want to suffer from the same weapons.

But despite what can be said regarding security issues in West Africa, the responsibility does not lie anywhere else than within the sub-region. Indeed as argued by David Smith —ultimately, it is African leaders and civil society that hold the key to addressing conflicts and guiding the international community, including China, to show how support is best delivered to these ends” (Smith 2011).

The other issue on the rising influence of China in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, is associated with the posture of western states. Indeed, the interests of the US in Nigeria’s oil industry cannot be denied and America may be in the process of seeking to protect its economic interest on the sub-region. A rivalry between economic powers trying to protect their spheres of influence has already exacerbated security issues on the African continent where powers were supplying weapons to political factions and overthrowing or supporting ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’ during the cold war. The need to secure economic interests may lead to the same effects. Therefore, there is a high tendency for proxy war between China and the US on the sub-region specifically and across Africa in general. Indeed, as revealed by Laing, behind the rhetorical of Chinese irresponsibility in Africa is perhaps a growing western and US discomfort that as Western alliance gets stuck in the Middle East, Beijing will gain even stronger foothold on the continent that will become the centre of the coming global competition for resources.

Bernado Mariani, Safeworld’s China program thinks that —given its deepening stake in African stability and development, China can play a critical role in promoting
peace and security on the continent. Western states and China must work co-operatively in their approach towards Africa.”

**Recommendations for More Beneficial Sino-West African Relations**

For Ghana and Nigeria and West Africa in general to yield better results in their engagement with China, there are four main recommendations: first a more active civil society’s implication in the Sino-African relation, second, a more adapted institutional framework and policy driven by African governments, third a more active role by regional organizations and fourth tripartite cooperation Africa, China and Western countries.

**A More Active African Civil Society**

Ghana and Nigeria and West Africa in general can derive useful lessons from Beijing’s experience in lifting millions of its population out of poverty in a very short time. The issue remains the ability of African policy makers, government, and civil society to identify the suitable lessons from the Dragon’s experience and adapt theirs with respect to their own specific socio-politic environment. In that regard Obiarah states that: –Given the sad trajectory of economic decline and political repression in much of Africa since 1960, African leaders, civil society and intelligentsia should endeavor to learn from China’s success in economic management especially public-private partnership, visionary leadership and a home-grown economic reform agenda” (Obiarah 2007).

But copying the economic success story of China does not mean avoidance of political reforms towards democracy. In that regard, defenders of democracy and human
rights activists in Africa must be watchdogs and pressure their governments not to invoke economic success to rationalize avoiding political liberalization.

The rapidly deepening engagement between China and West African countries present immense opportunities, but also comes with challenges. At the time when Western countries cannot afford larger economic support, Ghana and Nigeria should embrace the opportunities offered by China, while seeking to promote their own self-interests. Human rights organizations and trade unionists tend to focus on the (potential) downsides of greater Chinese engagement, citing the experiences of Sudan and Zimbabwe. Indeed, in these two countries, repressive governments have turn towards China to avoid western donor’s pressures for Human rights, labor or environmental standards (Obiarah 2007). Missing in this thought process in the success story between South Africa and China or Tanzania and China. In that regard, the civil society’s role in Ghana and Nigeria is critical.

African civil society should even go beyond the Sino-African relation to engage all countries that are engaged on the continent, indeed, –China is not the only nation that puts its own interests ahead of moral concerns. Nor is it the only one to turn a blind eye on abuses and/or to craft relationships with questionable regimes in exchange to access to natural resources‖ (Taylor 2009, 128).

A More Adapted Institutional Framework and Policy Driven by African Governments

The lack of African governments’s ability to properly deal with China has created a trade imbalance and damaging effects on their economies. Meanwhile for West African countries rapid growth effects may lead to complementary positive effects by increasing
demand for, and revenues from Africa's resource exports. But Chinese export
competitiveness in manufacturing and finished goods may continue to have damaging
effects on local industries, and consequently job creation, possibilities, especially in
textiles industries, if serious policy measures are not taken to address trade capacity
issues in Africa (Mustapha 2010, 123). With their current capability levels, African
countries cannot stand the competition with China. In that regard, South Africa's case
should inspire other African countries. Indeed, the country has been able to negotiate a
quota system that limits Chinese exports to South Afria.

African governments need to take the initiative to evolve policy responses to the
negative aspects of their cooperation with China, including problems associated with
technology transfer and labor and environmental standards. African policymakers must
take a leading role in setting up the rules of engagement and make sure Chinese
companies play by the rules.

A More Active Role by Regional Organizations

Regional organizations should also be used as stepping stone to engage China for
a more responsible intervention in Africa. Since ECOWAS and the AU all claim far-
reaching prerogatives in interfering in internal affairs of African countries so to bring
peace and stability, they should play a more active role in getting China abbey by the
rules of transparency and Human rights.

Ultimately, China's future role in West Africa will be determined by African
actors themselves who are the direct stakeholders of the embrace with Beijing. In that
regard, institutions like the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), the
African Union, ECOWAS, can play a great role in engaging China in a way of leveraging
the benefits of African nations. Recently, these last two organizations have adopted procedures and protocols which disregard the cornerstone of Chinese policy of state sovereignty. Denis Tull notes that ‘‘The progressive path taken by the AU and ECOWAS in regard to the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts is particularly at loggerheads with Beijing’s political concepts, for both organizations claim far-reaching prerogatives, including military intervention, to prevent or terminate large-scale human rights abuses and crimes against humanity’’ (Tull 2008).

As far as NEPAD is concerned, the so-called African Peer Review Mechanism is an instrument of political interference that aims at promoting development and democracy in Africa (Tull 2008). Overall, if these organizations put their policies into practice, they would be able to lobby and get China adopt a more responsible attitude towards African countries.

A Tripartite Cooperation Africa, China and Western Countries

Considering the rising influence of China in West Africa today, and given also the interests of Western countries in the sub-region, a tripartite cooperation is necessary in order to address the challenges of development encountered by African countries. This tripartite cooperation will also allow to quell frictions and prevent an eventual proxy war between China and the West, fighting over African natural resources. At the same time, a trilateral cooperation will provide a basis for Africa, China and the West to work collectively towards the achievement of the goals of Millenium Development Goal (MDG). The MDG aims at combating poverty, disease, hunger, environmental degradation that are all problems that West Africa is currently facing.
Recommendations for Further Studies

There is a need to clearly admit that the study of China and West Africa and even Africa in general, is in its infancy and therefore the analysis presented in this research is merely a tentative assessment and might be very superficial. To really grasp the long-term economic and political impact of China’s rise, future research need to pay more attention to cases other than those used to criticize China’s attitude towards Africa. Indeed, Sudan and Zimbabwe have long been the lenses through which China’s cooperation with African countries are analyzed and generalized. A study on countries like Benin, Ethiopia or Rwanda which are nations with fewer natural resources, may lead to different outcomes.

Further studies should also aim at monitoring how China reacts to the 2011 unrests in North Africa. Indeed if the trigger to these protests and subsequent overthrow of governments is attributed to the populations’ will for better living conditions, this unrest might trigger Chinese policy evolution in Africa.

There is also a need to research the impact of the other countries of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) on African countries. Indeed, China is not the only player, nor the most influential one in all African countries. Further studies on the BRICS in Africa, might reveal similarities of differences on policies towards Africa and help leverage damaging effects of all these nations on Africa.

This research was focused on the sub-region of West Africa and stressed on the differences between that sub-region and other parts of the African continent. It is therefore important to conduct a research on the effects of China’s involvement in those
other areas of Africa. This will allow to compare and contrast in order to see if China’s policy varies according to Africa’s sub-regions.

Additionally, it is recommended that further studies aim at researching how China influences countries it is deeply involved in. In that regard, the study should aim at selecting a number of countries with a high level of corruption and others with a very low level of corruption and compare and contrast the impact of China on them. That should allow to determine if, in fact, China is the driver of negative influence or whether China is merely leveraging poor levels of governance to its advantage.

Finally, it is worth researching the impact of China’s current Africa policy on the evolution of the agenda of other economic powers in Africa. Indeed, will China’s Africa successful application of non-interference drive other Western democracies to review the way they envisioned democracy and business in Africa?
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