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14. ABSTRACT Joint force commanders (JFC) are responsible for military stability operations in all phases of joint operations. This requires knowledge of what host nation institutions to include social, government, economic and diplomatic, among others, are the source of power. These institutions may be strong or weak. In order for the JFC to apply the proper military power to reinforce strong and build up weak institutions, a careful analysis of these institutions should be conducted in phase zero. PMESII analysis is the structure from which to build knowledge of the interconnectedness of these institutions. Currently, the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) doctrine does not have a framework to consider the stability centers of gravity (COG). This paper describes the current scope of phase zero stability operations and JIPOE analysis. It then explains the importance of objectives, PMESII analysis, and COG analysis in combat operations, defining these items in terms of an enemy. It explains how the threat-based analysis does not work for stability operations with specific stability objectives. Finally, it proposes a new structure, centers of stability analysis, that runs concurrent with the COG analysis that uses PMESII to provide the commander valuable insights into the host nation to support JFC decision-making.					
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**Centers of Stability Analysis – The Missing Framework in Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment Doctrine**

by

Matthew J. Acanfora

LCDR, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Joint force commanders (JFC) are responsible for military stability operations in all phases of joint operations. This requires knowledge of what host nation institutions to include social, government, economic and diplomatic, among others, are the source of power. These institutions may be strong or weak. In order for the JFC to apply the proper military power to reinforce strong and build up weak institutions, a careful analysis of these institutions should be conducted in phase zero. PMESII analysis is the structure from which to build knowledge of the interconnectedness of these institutions. Currently, the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) doctrine does not have a framework to consider the stability centers of gravity (COG). This paper describes the current scope of phase zero stability operations and JIPOE analysis. It then explains the importance of objectives, PMESII analysis, and COG analysis in combat operations, defining these items in terms of an enemy. It explains how the threat-based analysis does not work for stability operations with specific stability objectives. Finally, it proposes a new structure, centers of stability analysis, that runs concurrent with the COG analysis that uses PMESII to provide the commander valuable insights into the host nation to support JFC decision-making.

INTRODUCTION

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) knowledge and insight about the enemy and is a tool to assist in developing courses of action to defeat the enemy. Increasingly, military forces conduct stability operations in the phase zero shaping environment. JIPOE doctrine in Joint Publication (JP) 2.01-3 dictates how to support military operations in all phases of warfare, but lacks contextual support to phase zero stability objectives as shaping is treated as a preparatory phase.¹ This implies that phase zero operations will not work and all stability operations conducted therein will not effectively shape the environment.

Joint doctrine defines stability operations (STABOPS) as various military missions, tasks, and activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.² Forces conduct these operations throughout all phases of operations with the goal of building the capacity of the host nation. In the shaping phase, activities focus on preparing for future stability operations and interagency coordination needed in follow-on phases. Stability operations may be required to restore essential services to dissuade further adversary actions.³

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) currently operates in east Africa conducting stability operations in order to assist the building capacity of our partner nations. The operations conducted are not in anticipation of any specific military conflict, but an effort to assist Africans in building a stable Africa to avoid an increase in transnational

¹Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), III-13-14.

²Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 2, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), V-3.

³Ibid., V-4.

threats, in line with President Obama's vision for Africa.⁴ USAFRICOM has committed operating forces to move throughout the combined joint operating area (CJOA) responding to demand signals from both ambassadors and host nations.⁵ In order to support these demand signals and ensure successful end-states to these operations, an accurate analysis of the operating environment is necessary. JIPOE doctrine fails to provide this for phase zero stability operations.

Resident to the JIPOE doctrine are the solutions to the lack of analytic structure for phase zero STABOPS. Joint Publication 2-01.3, JIPOE, should be amended to include a center for stability analysis construct, similar to center of gravity analysis, in order to provide a framework for stability operations across the phases of joint operations. This will provide intelligence analysts guidance for preparing analysis of the operating environment for phase zero STABOPS.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Stability operations conducted in the shaping phase are the responsibility of the Department of State.⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will have significant responsibility in conducting stability operations during this phase. The goal of these activities in phase zero is to build capacity of the fragile state in order to avoid conflict internal to that state or among states in that region, and if conflict ensues, to prevent lengthy post-conflict intervention.⁷ U.S. agencies conduct stability activities in areas that are critical to national interests; therefore, successful stability operations will create an environment to

⁴ William E. Ward and Thomas P. Gavin, "'Africa's Future is Up to Africans': Putting the President's Words into Action." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, July 2010, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ Elizabeth A. Medina, "Integrated Planning for Unified Action in Phase Zero" (research paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), 17.

⁷ U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), 1-3.

which the U.S. and its allies will not need to commit large numbers of combat forces. They are ‘pre-deterrence’ activities and are distinctly different from stability operations in the deterrence and follow-on phases because a specific military problem has been defined.

In general, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency in the shaping phase because there is no need for offensive or defensive military operations. The environment is generally considered permissive. This means, however, that despite specific military objectives to shape the operating environment to avoid the need for combat operations, the demand signal for the military forces comes from places other than military intelligence analysis. Ambassadors may have reasons to suggest or use the military for host nation support because there is political benefit in developing the relationship. Although the actions may not be directly in line with the military objective for the specific task force in that country, the DOS and DOD team has met the overall national objective of developing access during phase zero.⁸ The military objective should directly link to the DOS nation specific objective. In this case, since the DOS is the lead agency, phase zero JIPOE is either not necessary or will not make a major impact because the lead agency is not the DOD.

The DOD engagements support DOS regardless of the DOS lead. In CJTF-HOA, military-to-military (mil-to-mil) engagements are designed to build capacity of host nation military services in order to inspire confidence in government from the population and to support the general African desire of ownership of the solutions to their problems.⁹ The military partnership between U.S. and various African forces is beneficial in that it does not interfere with the political relationships that American embassies are building. In fact, in

⁸ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 2, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), V-2-3.

⁹ William E. Ward and Thomas P. Gavin, “‘Africa’s Future is Up to Africans:’ Putting the President’s Words into Action.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, July 2010, 8,10.

many cases, it supports that relationship. Although these support missions are phase zero stability operations, the Department of Defense plays a critical role in supporting the DOS to achieve U.S. diplomatic objectives.

Writers of JIPOE doctrine have already defined support to military stability operations. As described in chapter IV, the framework of JIPOE for conventional approaches is easily adjustable to stability operations and a center of gravity that is population based requiring a shift in focus to more sociocultural factors and infrastructure analysis.¹⁰ The adjustment of focus to these two areas of intelligence analysis provides the flexibility for adjusting the JIPOE as necessary and relies, correctly, on the fact that intelligence analysts must be creative in their approach to developing a situation template that best meets the commanders needs. A specific framework for phase zero is not necessary because intelligence analysts are trained to be creative in applying JIPOE principles and templates.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) have developed a draft interagency document titled USG Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (R/S Framework) to provide a foundation for civil-military planning for stabilization efforts.¹¹ This framework identifies an assessment of the operating environment as the first element necessary to develop proper response plans for USG stabilization efforts.¹² The DOS intends to use this framework in conjunction with other agencies in order

¹⁰ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), IV-1, IV-7.

¹¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Termination*, J-7 Pamphlet (Suffolk, VA: CDRUSJFCOM, 1 December 2005), 4-5.

¹² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Termination*, J-7 Pamphlet (Suffolk, VA: CDRUSJFCOM, 1 December 2005), 7.

to obtain unity of effort in the execution of U.S. government (USG) activities to stabilize situations in support of USG objectives. For stability operations, the level of analysis necessary for the operating environment is not as in depth for the inter-agency effort and any necessary military analysis can be conducted resident to military doctrine and operations.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

JIPOE doctrine and the R/S Framework both identify the need to assess the operating environment for potential USG actions in a given stability environment. JIPOE lacks the focus on support to phase zero stability and its effort to determine intelligence support to stability operations focuses on post-conflict operations. The R/S Framework identifies the need for a proper assessment of the operating environment prior to any stability operations, but assumes that there is an emergency. Phase zero stability operations will occur in non-emergent and pre-conflict environments to achieve U.S. objectives.

Despite the DOS effort to provide a framework and rudimentary assessment of the operating environment, military intelligence analysts still have a responsibility to provide the commander with a full spectrum analysis of the operating environment in order to determine the best instrument of national power to use in certain situations regardless of the lead agency. It is incumbent on the commander to use or recommend those instruments depending on his authority in that environment. Phase zero stability operations present a particular challenge due to the lack of guidance on the development of the operating environment and the current doctrine assumptions on adversary analysis post-conflict situations. JIPOE doctrine contains the elements needed to conduct proper analysis of the operating environment prior to the commitment of USG assets in order to ensure unity of effort in inter-agency operations.

What is Phase Zero Shaping?

Phase zero or shaping operations are actions taken by the military commander before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations.¹³ The general considerations for shaping operations are to organize and train forces, rehearse for future actions, maintaining operational area access, maintain space superiority, and conduct stability operations as necessary.¹⁴ Shaping STABOPS remain ill-defined because the DOS is the executive agent for phase zero and the DOD focuses on phase four STABOPS.

Joint operations during the shaping phase are executed in order to gain access to the operating environment and to develop relationships with the host nation as well as other potential coalition partners. The phase focuses on preparation for future operations. Implicitly in the doctrine is an assumption that all actions that take place in the shaping phase are bound to fail. The plan for stability operations in phase zero is to set the stage for potential STABOPS that will need to be conducted in phase four vice determining the requirements for successful phase zero STABOPS.

The major implication is that military forces will be committed to phase zero stability operations without a clearly defined operational stability objective and one that might not be nested with DOS objectives. Every other phase of joint operations is described in the context of what is needed for success, and supporting doctrine is in line with this. A shift in the mindset of those conducting JIPOE is needed in order to support those forces conducting stability operations in phase zero so that the objective of the stability operations is achieved

¹³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 2, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), V-3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, V-3-4.

or the JFC has all of the information necessary to be successful within the inter-agency approach. If JIPOE is not complete, commanders risk committing the wrong forces to achieve a shaping objective.

Range of Stability Operations

As defined by JP 3.0, stability operations are “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹⁵ The U.S. Army uses the joint definition of stability operations, but throughout FM 3-07, “Stability Operations,” it describes STABOPS as using U.S. military power “to set the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict transformation.”¹⁶

Operators conducting stability operations in phase four should have an understanding of the operating environment. Even if the individuals do not, the U.S. has institutional knowledge about the area because of the time spent conducting operations in previous phases. A major issue with stability operations in phase zero is that a specific military problem has not been defined at the operational level. A problem may be identified at the strategic or theater strategic level to define the area of operations. At the operational level, all joint operations doctrine allows for is gaining access for the USG in those identified areas in order to prepare for follow-on operations if necessary.


¹⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 2, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), GL-26.

¹⁶ U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), 2-2.

Stability operations must be conducted in the fragile state within a strategic construct otherwise there is no U.S. national interest in sending troops to that area.¹⁷ If the USG is going to commit forces for a strategic problem, then the stability operations conducted should have some effect on the host nation security by building capacity in the necessary institutions. The strategic problem may be framed correctly; however, at the operational level, an assessment of the operational environment is necessary outside of the current threat and adversary construct required for combat operations led by the DOD. JIPOE currently does not provide this framework.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment – The JIPOE

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the analytic process used by intelligence analysts to produce the necessary products and assessments for the JFC to make decisions.¹⁸ As depicted in figure 1, it is the framework from which intelligence analysts operationalize the intelligence process as a joint function in order to support



operations. Although the main goal of the JIPOE process is to support the JFC, the products developed are critical for task force component commanders and operating forces as the initial, operational level intelligence assessment of the

Figure 1: JIPOE – The Process

¹⁷ Douglas D. Lilly, “Strategic Framing of Stability Operations” (research paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 2009, 4.

¹⁸ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), I-1.

operating environment, enemy forces, and any other threats or environmental issues in the battle space. It utilizes an all-source approach, incorporating information from all disciplines of intelligence and any other information that can help define the environment.

The current emphasis of JIPOE doctrine is to begin preparing the operating environment during phase zero in order to support follow-on operations. The shape phase considerations include development of target lists, target materials, identification of adversary centers of gravity (COG), decisive areas, and other threat or adversary based products.¹⁹ The doctrine fails to address development of the intelligence picture for phase specific objectives. Theoretically, there should be no threat or adversary COG development because the operational problem set has yet to be framed to a point where we can accurately determine the operational threat.

In reality, however, a prudent intelligence organization will begin to develop these products as indications develop that the shaping phase is not working and potential threats, whether violent extremist organizations (VEOs), other nations, or the host nation begin to act in such ways that warrant them to be considered such. In order to determine whether the shaping phase is working, there must have been initial assessment of the host nation operating environment to develop a baseline for determining effects of operations on host nation institutions. In general, the desired effect for phase zero is to conduct actions that build the operating area to a point where U.S. forces do not need to be committed in order to meet U.S. national interests. Despite a cursory list of considerations in JIPOE doctrine, considerations of a framework for phase zero are absent from the doctrine.

¹⁹ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), III-3.

The use of PMESII²⁰ system of systems analysis (SoSA) to analyze the operating environment is an element of JIPOE that is useful for determining the interconnectedness of enemy institutions and their relationships in the area of operations (AO) and area of interest (AOI). Although useful in developing the operational picture for a threat-based adversary, it can be used to help develop the operating environment for a shaping phase operation.

There is a need for a specific way to conduct phase zero COG analysis. Although national or theater strategic level analysis has determined this operating area is of interest for certain reasons, an operational level COG must be focused on building host nation capacity - not analyzing a threat. This implies that the current COG structure, although appropriate for determining adversary COGs and critical vulnerabilities (CV), is not appropriate for stability operations.

Many JFCs use a threat centric model for their objective and use the lines of effort construct for stability operations. This is also inaccurate if the operation is in phase zero or four, as the objectives should be focused on stability or peace operations. The concepts used in COG derivation and deconstruction are applicable, but, new terms and definitions must be used in order to avoid confusion with force application and distinguishing the enemy COG. Before describing a proposed new construct, a discussion of objectives, PMESII, and COGs is necessary to see the new construct in light of the current.

The Objective

Although PMESII is essential for the commander to understand the environment to which he will commit forces, the objective of his mission is of the utmost importance to the commander, as well as the analysts constructing the JIPOE analysis. Since phase zero is led by the DOS, unity of effort is essential in accomplishing the mission. The DOS may not be

²⁰ Political, military, social, economic, information, infrastructure.

given the same objectives as the military on the strategic or even theater strategic level. These levels are also defined differently and pertain to different echelons of ‘command’ in each organization. For example, the DOD may define more than one nation in the AO at operational level, while if the DOS had an operational level, it would most likely be the host nation. The JFC who is charged with conducting stability operations in phase zero must have a clearly defined objective from his military higher headquarters (HHQ) and one that nests with the DOS objectives in each area to achieve unity of effort in successful stability operations.


The PMESII construct must then be constructed for phase zero in order for those forces to be successful at stability tasks. In order for the JFC to make good judgments on committing his forces for the desired effect, the objective for the stability actions must be defined in phase zero. The objective is defined as the “‘purpose’ of the actions one carries out within a specific space and time.”²¹ Success is contingent on being able to commit the force that best fits the solution to the weak institutions, institutions that are not currently required to be identified in a phase zero JIPOE. In addition, the lack of stability objective causes intelligence ‘vacuuming’ of the environment to collect any information it might think is useful.²² The additional, often useless, information takes more time to process and analyze, and will take precious time away from the analysts attempting to define the environment for the commander. JIPOE does not support a JFC in achieving his phase zero stability objectives.

²¹ Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), II-3.

²² William E. Harmon and Richard B. Webb, “Evolution and Progress: The All Source Analysis System/Enemy Situation Correlation Element,” *Signal*, (December 1987): 25-30 as quoted in Gerald D. Casper, “Intelligence Support to the Operational Level of War” (research report, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air University, 1988), 23.

PMESII

The use of PMESII began with the development of U.S. doctrine for effects based operations (EBO). Effects based operations or effects based approach to operations is an approach to analyzing the environment in order to assist the commander to put the right amount and type of force or effort to a specific problem to achieve the desired effect.²³ As



depicted in figure 2, PMESII is simply a framework for determining the interconnectedness of systems. It helps to determine key nodes within a given construct, in this case, the host nation of a fragile state. These key nodes are then determined to be decisive points.²⁴

Analysts use PMESII as a list of topics to discuss within a given AO or problem set.

Many intelligence analysts will 'give a PMESII

Figure 2: Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

brief' which describes each individual category, often in detail, but lacks the systems analysis. The key to providing the JFC the ability to see and react to the environment for stability operations hinges on the analysts ability to tie the categories together. The JFC will then be able to decide the best force to apply to the most important area of the host nation

²³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) Pamphlet 7*, (Suffolk, VA: CDRUSJFCOM, 17 November 2004), 2, 4 quoted in Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), XIII-65.

²⁴ Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), XIII-79.

society to build its capacity. Simply assuming the government or education system must be the most important is mirror-imaging U.S. values at least, and challenges stability at worst.

Centers of Gravity – The COG

Many analysts stumble conducting centers of gravity analysis. There is no generally agreed upon definition of a center of gravity, despite a joint doctrine definition: “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.”²⁵ The Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS) defines the COG as “the primary sources of moral and physical strength, power, and resistance that have the most decisive impact on one’s ability to achieve a given objective in relation to an enemy.”²⁶ This will be the definition used for the remainder of this discussion although the joint definition does provide some leeway in that it is not threat specific. This fact, however, might make defining the COG more confusing. Separate frameworks for friendly institutions and enemy forces will present a clearer picture for the JFC across the phases of operations, thus the use of the MAWS definition of a COG.

A COG is developed by determining the strengths and weaknesses of a force in order to achieve its objective. Analysts must first determine what the enemy objective and then list out strengths and weaknesses. The COG will be determined through discussion of the enemy strengths. This is called COG derivation. COG deconstruction is breaking down the COG into critical capabilities, which are the “primary abilities which merit a COG to be identified as such in the context of the scenario, situation or mission.”²⁷ Critical capabilities are then

²⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), II-65.

²⁶ Michael R. Croskrey, “Centers of Gravity Analysis” (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 27 April 2011).

²⁷ Joseph L. Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*, Perspectives on Warfighting 4, (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps University, 1996) ix.

broken down into critical requirements, which are the essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be operative.²⁸ Critical vulnerabilities are critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable in their abilities to support the objective.²⁹

Intelligence analysts play a key role in COG derivation and deconstruction (see figure 3). As the individuals have built and analyzed the operational environment from a systems perspective, they are often the ones best suited to determine the enemy COG. The intelligence establishment is also in the best position to determine what information is missing in order to identify the COG properly.³⁰




Figure 3: Center of Gravity Analysis³¹

Critics of the effects based approach to operations challenge that the key nodes in a PMESII construct for a given situation are not COGs, but decisive points. Planners should always link COGs to the objectives. This is the difference between objective based operations and

assessments based operations. The concept that the COG is the primary strength for the MILITARY to conduct operations should not be challenged otherwise it threatens the way to derive a COG in a threat or adversary based environment. This strict COG definition presents a problem in the shaping phase - the goal is not to achieve military objectives in the

²⁸ Joseph L. Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*, Perspectives on Warfighting 4, (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps University, 1996) ix.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Gerald D. Casper, "Intelligence Support to the Operational Level of War" (research report, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air University, 1988), 25.

³¹ Contents of COG graph derived from Dr. Joe Strange and Dr. Milan Vego.

strict adversary sense, but to achieve effects in the nation about the most important institutions for stability. The COG definition references enemy forces and is not applicable to phase zero stability operations or stability operations across the phases of operations. The lack of a stability COG structure prevents analysts from accurately defining the operating environment and prevents the commander from making an informed decision on force allocation.

CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

As written, JIPOE doctrine does not provide a solution for defining the operational environment for phase zero stability operations. The determining factors are that the JTF has not been in theater long enough to have already established relationships with the host nation and that the intelligence analysts do not have a structure around which to base their analysis. Center of gravity analysis is conducted for military operations designed to defeat the enemy and achieve political and military objectives. Within joint doctrine, stability operations are conducted simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations.³² There exists a COG analysis for the enemy in offensive and defensive operations, and so there must be for stability operations.

A possible solution is centers of stability analysis (COSA). As already described, doctrinally and theoretically, COGs do not help to determine the necessary functions in a nation that provide for stability, however, the analytic technique to derive them can assist in developing a parallel structure that can be used from shaping through stability and transition phases. This COSA develops centers of stability that are defined as functions or institutions that are a power base for the legitimate government in a nation that provide for stable

³² Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 2, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), V-2.

government, economic, military, diplomatic, and social operations among others. COS analysis should be conducted in phase zero to prepare for stability operations in subsequent phases as directed in JP 2-01.3.³³

Centers of stability analysis is conducted in a similar fashion to COG analysis except that terms used are all different and have slightly different meanings in order to avoid confusion between COS and COG. First, the team that will conduct the COSA must be identified. As operations become more complex, the use of inter-agency and international partners becomes more prevalent and necessary. This team should consist of many of the traditional whole of government agencies: DOS, USAID, all services, combat support agencies, all staff entities and if able, representatives from components. This list is not all-inclusive, but represents the point that this planning should not be conducted in a DOD vacuum. This does not look much different from the way current stability planning is conducted, but this team will have a framework from which to work its course of action development.

The primary operational objective for phase zero must be defined in terms of stability, and for COSA to be effective, there must be at least one clearly defined stability objective. Analysts begin with PMESII analysis. As depicted in figure 4, PMESII is the anchor for all analysis. Controversy exists on the applicability of systems analysis; however, the use of systems analysis provides a useful tool in order to determine the interconnectedness of various areas in a nation. The nodes that are connected should be seen as decisive points, not

³³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 16 June 2009), III-13.

as the centers of gravity or stability.³⁴ Although the nodes do not identify the COS, the academic examination of the interconnectedness provides a more useful analysis than a listing of various entities within each section.




Figure 4: Proposed Phase Zero Stability Functions Analysis

In COG analysis, analysts derive the strengths and weaknesses for a particular nation or force from which it tries to achieve an objective. For stability operations, the objective is generally similar from one operation to the next. For COSA, analysts derive essential working functions and essential dis-functions for the host nation.³⁵ These functions should

³⁴ Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), XIII-60.

³⁵ Essential Working Functions - Essential functions that are a power base for the government or social institutions that are run smoothly, corruption free and seen as legitimate in the eyes of the populous.

span the PMESII spectrum. Once the working and dis-functions are derived, the COS(s) should be determined from both lists. This is a difference from COG derivation in which the only the strengths list is used. It is necessary to use both in this case because a country may become stable if its weaknesses are strengthened as much as if its strengths are reinforced. In essence, COSs that are essential working functions should be supported by U.S. actions if necessary to keep these functions active or improve them. The U.S. should apply effort to COSs that are essential dis-functions in order to improve its ability to assist in governance and stability in order to inspire the confidence of the people.

The COSA framework is further broken down into stability tasks, stability requirements, and liabilities.³⁶ These are similar to critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities. The purpose for COS deconstruction is to determine what elements are required to perform tasks to support a COS and where each is a liability to stability.

JIPOE doctrine dictates that actions that support stability be derived in phase zero and executed throughout the phases of operations. This framework should be further developed as the operation progresses and as the host nation leadership dynamic changes throughout the course of the operation. The same core group of people should analyze COSs continuously. Manpower permitting, this might be an appropriate task for what MG Flynn calls for in a stability operations information center (SOIC).³⁷

Essential Dis-functions - Essential functions necessary for effective governance, social stability, and confidence of the populace that are functioning at less than effective capacity or non-existent.

³⁶Stability Tasks - Those tasks which must be performed by the institution in order to support or gain the confidence of the population.

Stability Requirements - Physical or moral elements needed in order to perform stability tasks.

Liabilities - Stability requirements vulnerable to corruption and other destabilizing elements, functioning less than optimal or inactive.

³⁷ Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, Voices from the Field (Washington, DC: United States Center for a New American Security, 2010), 19-20.

The SOIC concept is to support operations in a stability/counter-insurgency environment (MG Flynn specifically writes about Afghanistan); however, the development of the center of stability and a stability analysis team from phase zero through follow-on phases would provide the framework for post-conflict STABOPS before the end of combat operations. This allows an easier transition as the commander is aware of the essential functions and can request appropriate forces to be in place prior to the end of combat operations. COS analysis provides a framework for the operational commander to ensure that all of the effort and actions in his AO are being used on what has been analyzed as the center of stability and that those actions will support long-term stability.

The COS analysis is a tool for the joint force commander to determine the appropriate instrument of national power to enforce or reinforce stability in a specific area. In addition to being a tool to support military operations, this analysis helps the JFC achieve unity of effort with the DOS and other agencies in the same AO. Absent this analysis, commanders have no leverage in discussing potential actions to achieve the objective and have no basis for arguing against suggestions from other agencies. This analysis is the academic backbone to successful employment of U.S. instruments of national power in support of strategic and operational objectives. An accurate JIPOE can be developed based on the addition of this framework thus allowing the JFC to employ his forces more effectively.

FINAL REMARKS

Center of stability analysis is not a direct replication of center of gravity analysis for stability operations, nor is it the final solution to determining the proper force for stability operations. This analysis does provide a framework to use for all phases of operations in order to build host nation capacity by analyzing the institutions that most help to provide

stability. It is a tool for the JFC to provide recommendations to HHQ and other agencies on the appropriate actions to build stability, specifically in environments when the DOS is the lead agency.

Stability operations are not just post-hostilities actions as much of U.S. doctrine dictates. The use of forces in phase zero should not be simply to prepare the AO for follow-on actions. While preparing the AO and the relationships necessary for follow-on actions is important, the U.S. and other nations are committing significant effort across each respective DIME - the actions should have positive effects. Phase zero is not a throwaway phase of operations to prepare for combat. All doctrine should be written to support the objectives in all phases. JIPOE is no different and should incorporate centers of stability analysis to ensure the JFC has an accurate picture of the host nation situation in order to support it. These stability operations may provide an opportunity for future cooperation and mitigate the need for combat.

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