Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review

Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino and Gilbert Caluya

Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre
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ABSTRACT

This report consists of a literature review and analysis of the existing research concerning ‘countering violent extremism’. This multifaceted report demonstrates the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism and best strategies to Countering Violent Extremism. This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism.

RELEASE LIMITATION

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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review

Executive Summary

This multifaceted report demonstrates the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism (VE) and best strategies for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism.

Part 1 of the report provides the foundations to understanding key concepts under review – terrorism, violent extremism, radicalisation and social cohesion. It also examines the theories and problems behind these concepts and how they in turn may assist in future policy initiatives and understandings of these areas of interest. The most significant critique that emerges from Part 1 of the report is the absence of universally accepted definitions for key concepts such as of terrorism, radicalisation and social cohesion.

Research of the post-2000 literature also suggests that not much has changed in the field of terrorism studies. A survey of the literature on terrorism generally highlights other deficiencies: first, a lack of primary source analysis; second, a continued general shortage of experienced researchers on this topic; third, the majority of authors who haven’t met with terrorists or undertaken any fieldwork in the area being written about; fourth, the reliance on limited methodologies and levels of analysis; and fifth, remarkably, little academic analyses is devoted to critiquing research into VE and terrorism studies. This is clearly shown by the limited number of relevant articles focusing on empirical research and the lack of seriously tested quantitative and qualitative field research or survey results.

Gaps that arise in the literature review include the lack of clarity as to how individuals move from simply being frustrated or disaffected towards accepting violence as a mode of political struggle. The problem again is that understandings of terrorism as set out in the literature still cannot explain why some people become terrorists whilst others do not. It is easy enough to show how radical ideas are internalised by terrorists post facto. But this does not explain why some people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised. In fact, the majority of people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised.

Part 2 of the report details the theories, debates and discussions arising within and among disciplines on the ‘root causes’ of VE/Terrorism. Responding to the ‘root causes’ of conflict means that approaches to countering violent extremism need to be embedded in consideration of the social, economic, political and historical contexts in
which violence arises and the applicability and transferability of strategies between nations. The literature has demonstrated over the years that root causes are not static rather they are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing.

Part 3 of the report examines the development of multifaceted approaches to countering violent extremism through capacity building and innovation to respond to ‘new’ and complex forms of contemporary terrorism and violent extremism. A key tenet in much of the writing on countering violent extremism is that multifaceted approaches are needed (S Atran, 2004; R. Crelinsten, 2009; J Mroz, 2009a).

Part 4 of the report examines Counterproductive CVE. To prevent “counterproductive counterterrorism”, Wilkinson (2001: 210) argues that “Above all, governments should try and avoid over-reaction and repression by their security forces”. The literature suggests that to do so hard power strategies for countering violent extremism must be carefully calibrated to be firm but never excessive, non-discriminatory, apolitical (Aly, 2008; Crelinsten, 2007) and adhere to established normative democratic frameworks and judicial processes (Crenshaw, 2010; Roth, 2008; Sabadia & Austin, 2007; Stohl, 2006; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009).

This report makes the following recommendations:

- **Develop an empirical research base**
  The majority of the literature in the field comprises commentary and critique and lacks an empirical research basis (Crenshaw, 2000; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). Given that some areas of inquiry face unique challenges in the collection of primary data, innovative and creative methods need to be developed. Ranstorp (2006) argues that researchers need to tap into available primary source data in national archives including policy documents and public testimonies, court records and reports, and terrorist websites.

- **Invest in social science and transdisciplinary research approaches**
  Much of the research within the field is event-driven, reactionary and technically oriented (Ranstorp, 2006). To develop an in-depth, comprehensive, and contextualised knowledge base for understanding violent extremism and countering violent extremism as complex phenomena requires investment in collaborative and transdisciplinary social science and field-based methodologies (S. Atran, 2010; Crelinsten, 2007; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006; Sinai, 2007). Case studies are one method useful for situating forms of violent extremism and for developing approaches to countering violent extremism within their historical, political, and social contexts. However, relational analyses within and between cases are also needed to develop knowledge in the field (Duyvesteyn, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). Phenomenological and ethnographic approaches would also enable researchers to capture the complexity of these phenomena and develop in-depth understandings of the experiences of those that participate in terrorist or violent extremist groups.

- **Develop scholarship and academic praxis in the field**
  Scholarship that conceptualises and theorises violent extremism and countering violent extremism as ontological phenomena that emerge in relation to particular contexts is required. Such approaches would move stagnant debates
in the literature beyond superficial issues focussing on lack of theory and agreement on conceptual definition. Contemporary research must also build new contributions to the knowledge base upon the foundations of previous research through comparison, critique and the synthesis of research findings (Ranstorp, 2006). In addition, there is a lack of literature that focuses on methodology and research methods which given the importance of developing an empirical base in this field is required to advance research (Ranstorp, 2006).

- **Develop cross-fertilisation of knowledge between the intelligence community, academic disciplines and professionals in the field to enhance the relevance of research and the translation of research findings into practice**

Resnyansky (2009: 52) writes that “There is an abyss dividing terrorism research from political, legal and national security practices”. Bridging this ‘research-practice’ gap therefore needs to be an object of methodological analysis and comparative research focussed on how other fields have approached this issue could be used to inform strategies. There are also divisions between different academic disciplines such as ‘intelligence studies’ and ‘terrorism studies’ (Ranstorp, 2006). To break down these ‘knowledge silos’ requires collaboration and inter-disciplinary communication through conferences and professional associations.

- **Research and scholarship is needed that focuses on ‘new’ forms of terrorism and violent extremism**

Given that ‘new’ forms of terrorism are assembled according to transnational networks, research is needed to explore how these organisational forms operate and evolve including processes of innovation within groups (Brimley, 2006; Crenshaw, 2000; Ranstorp, 2006).

A traditional focus on terrorism as an international phenomenon means that in the post 7/7 context there is a need to understand the emergence of what is dubbed ‘home grown’ terrorism and violent extremism.

Violent extremism is expressed through a multiplicity of forms and guises and so there is an urgent need to expand the research gaze beyond Islamism and Muslim communities to the broader phenomenon.

- **Research and scholarship is needed to understand why some radicalised individuals become violent and why others don’t.**

A current lack of clarity exists as to how individuals move from simply being frustrated or disaffected towards accepting violence as a mode of political struggle. The problem again is that they still do not explain why some people become terrorists and not others. In fact, the majority of people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised.

- **Research and scholarship is needed that specifically focuses on approaches and strategies for countering violent extremism**

As O’Neil (2007: 437) observes there has been a “shortfall of serious scholarly analysis of counter-terrorism”. Comparative research focussed on strategies for countering violent extremism would enable the development of best practice standards and enhance harmonisation and collaboration between nations and regions (Crelinsten, 2007; Guiora, 2009; O’Neil, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). New forms of terrorism characterised by decentralisation and dispersion of
'networks' requires research on “what kind of counterterrorism networks would best meet the challenges they pose” (Crelinsten, 2007: 224).

To avoid counterproductive strategies, Crenshaw (2000) argues that it is important to investigate how terrorist groups perceive government actions and whether policy makers anticipate the effects of their actions on terrorist beliefs and perceptions or appreciate the adversary’s construction of reality. He also argues that research should focus on how governments learn from past experiences and build intellectual capital in dealing with terrorism and violent extremism.

Given the increasing inclusion and responsibility of the private sector in approaches for countering violent extremism, “Research in this area should focus on the different agencies that have been incorporated into the counterterrorism effort and examine how they have adapted to working in an environment with conflicting and competing demands for secrecy, openness, impunity and accountability” (Crelinsten, 2007: 226).

- **Research and scholarship is needed on the role of the media and information technology in relation to violent extremism and countering violent extremism**
  
  In relation to the role of the media, research is needed to analyse the ways in which terrorists use the mass media and the mass media has been used in strategies for countering violent extremism (Cvrtiša & Perešin, 2009; Turk, 2004). In addition, the potential for media representation to contribute to tensions, conflict and potentially violence is a vast area for research (Crelinsten, 2007; Turk, 2004).

- **Research and scholarship is needed that focuses on pathways into and out of violent extremism**
  
  Long term sustainable and effective approaches to countering violent extremism require an understanding of the pathways into and out of violent extremism (S. Atran, 2010). Research is needed to explore the processes and drivers of individual and collective mobilisation and disengagement (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008; Crenshaw, 2000; Ranstorp, 2006). As Chowdhury Fink and Hearne (2008: 18) argue, this “will assist states in better understanding how these processes relate to their counterterrorism strategies and capacities”.

- **A diversity of cultural approaches and discursive frames are needed to inform research and scholarship on violent extremism and countering violent extremism**
  
  The literature in the fields of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are dominated by discursive frames that emanate from western and particularly US epistemology and culture (Jongman, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). There is an urgent need to enrich scholarship in these fields through alternative cultural and theoretical perspectives. This would include developing understandings of violent extremism from non-western cultural positions but also generating research on diverse language, religious, cultural, psychological, historical, political, and social backgrounds to inform culturally sensitive approaches and practices (Loza, 2007).
Executive Summary References


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1. Introduction

Violent extremism has become an area of interest to government and policy makers throughout the Western industrialised world. In Australia initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism are being led by the current Attorney General, Minister Robert McClelland MP. In May 2010 the government announced that violent extremism will be targeted by a $9.7million package of measures. This was based on the Counter-Terrorism White Paper (Australian Government, 2010) which acknowledged the risk of ‘home grown terrorism’ and highlighted the importance of ‘building a strong and resilient community to resist violent extremism and terrorism’. The government strategy to counter violent extremism draws on numerous programs. The brief for this project comes under the ‘improving responses to violent extremist messages and ensuring they are evidence-based and appropriate to Australian circumstances’ strategy. These measures complement a range of existing initiatives within the Government’s broader national security and social inclusion agendas. The government’s position is that, “An effective counter-terrorism strategy requires a combination of security and law enforcement responses, and broader strategies to enhance social cohesion and resilience that lessen the appeal of extremist ideologies that fuel terrorism” (May 11, 2010 Media Release).

This report reviews existing literature on violent extremism and terrorism, radicalisation, countering violent extremism and social cohesion and identifies gaps that need to be addressed through research or policy initiatives. The database provides access to references generated through the literature review for those working in policy and related areas. The key concepts researched and analysed in the review are violent extremism, terrorism, radicalisation, countering violent extremism, and social cohesion. The ways in which these concepts are defined, conceptualised and theorised in the literature are reviewed in Part 1 of this report.

Terrorism is part of the broader violent extremism phenomena and thus needs to be defined before countering strategies can effectively be planned by government and national security agencies. Like violent extremism, radicalisation is an emerging field of interest. Current research suggests that through the identification of radicalisation, strategies can be put in place to alleviate the problem of ideological extremism. Another emerging focus in the literature and policy is the role of social cohesion and resilience in preventing radicalisation, marginalisation and social exclusion which may lead to violent extremism.

A central problem within the literature is that definitions of the key concepts are diverse and contested. For instance, despite the fact that over one hundred definitions of terrorism were

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1 Programs include: identifying and diverting people at risk of violent extremism; supporting rehabilitation and de-radicalisation programs conducted by State and Territory police and correctional services; engaging with communities to improve social cohesion and resilience, including through local meetings and focus groups; developing mentoring programs for ‘at risk’ youth in partnership with relevant community groups; examining the role of the internet in the radicalisation process; and improving responses to violent extremist messages and ensuring they are evidence based and appropriate to Australian circumstance (Media Release May 11, 2010).
analysed in the 1984 edition of the journal, Political Terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988), a universal definition could not be agreed upon. The problem of definitional consensus has not been resolved post 9/11 even though terrorism as a phenomena has become a hotly debated topic (R. D. Crelinsten, 2009). In light of this ongoing debate the question arises as to whether an objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism can be agreed to.

Definitional disputes often reveal tensions. An inherent issue that plagues attempts to formulate a universal definition is that of who is a terrorist and which school this definition is derived from depends entirely on the subjective outlook of the definer and normative judgements concerning ill/legitimacy (Rubenstein, 1974 cited by Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). It is therefore important to unpack underlying assumptions vested in the way violent extremism is named, paying close attention to who does the naming, what this naming actually means, and whose interests it serves. For example, although ‘guerrilla’ has a positive connotation (Laqueur, 1999 cited by Schmidt and Jongman 1988), terrorism almost always has a negative meaning (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006).

Ganor (2002) argues however, that an objective definition of terrorism is possible and indispensable if any real attempt to combat terrorism is sought. It is by basing a definition on accepted international laws and principles on what behaviours are permitted in conventional wars between nations and non-government organisations (excluding guerrilla warfare) that this objective definition can be found. As Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) and others (Zines 1976, O’Brien 1998 cited by Schmidt and Jongman 1988) have argued, at some stage research on any topic must move forward from conceptual and definitional debates and into tested hypotheses.

1.1 Understanding the Research Problem

Terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation have been liberally used as concepts in the post-9/11 environment. However, assumptions within the use of these concepts has led to a reductive focus on Muslims and Islam. This causes tensions in terms of the role of government in producing national security initiatives that not only protect its borders but also protect the minority of Islamic adherents who are citizens.

The brief provided by the Attorney-General’s Department does not specify a focus on one particular ethnic or religious community. However, the literature on violent extremism, radicalisation, terrorism, countering violent extremism and social cohesion largely focuses on Muslim communities. It would be a mistake however, for government to take a narrow view of what violent extremism or terrorism might look like. For instance, in the various terrorist related cases heard in Australia it is worth noting that at least one of these cases (Vinayagamoorthy & Anor v DPP (C’th) [2007] VSC 265 (17 July 2007) was not related to Islam, Muslim extremism or jihadist networks. Thus, there is no reason to ignore that other ideological, ethnic or religious groups may also pose a threat to Australia’s national security.
1.2 Research Methodology:

The research team that conducted this project was made up of social scientists from the DSTO and the University of South Australia. All researchers have significant experience interrogating large bodies of research literature and metadata for the purpose of understanding various social phenomena relevant to countering violent extremism. This research team was coordinated by the DSTO and regular research meetings were organised to workshop key findings.

The literature was searched using internet search engines such as Google, Google Scholar, and electronic databases. The databases were both disciplinary (sociology, politics, history, psychology, criminology, policing, law and religious studies) as well as inter-disciplinary (security and terrorism studies, globalisation etc). Combinations of the key words ‘countering violent extremism’, ‘violent extremism’, ‘terrorism’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘deradicalisation’ were used for the searches. This process yielded over three thousand articles.

To select articles for the literature review, purposeful sampling strategies were used. The logic of this sampling approach is to deliberately select data sources that are information rich (Patton, 2002). Information rich articles were those “from which one can learn a great deal about matters of importance and therefore worthy of in-depth study” (Patton, 2002: 242). To determine whether an article was information rich, all the abstracts generated by the searches were read to ascertain the level of relevance according to:

- heuristic significance;
- currents, issues and discourses surrounding countering violent extremism;
- applicability to the Australian context;
- critique of existing literature and suggestions for future research;
- countering violent extremism strategies and policy implications.

Through this methodology 526 relevant articles were selected. The literature reviewed comprises unclassified material including academic journal articles, articles archived on websites, government policy and non-government reports and books. The majority however are academic journal articles.

1.3 Structural overview of the report

Part 1 of the report explores various definitions, conceptualisations and theorisation of violent extremism, terrorism, radicalisation, countering violent extremism and social cohesion. Problems arising from a lack of clarity and consensus in the literature are considered.

Part 2 of the report examines the root causes and consequences of violent extremism, terrorism and radicalisation. It addresses this by examining various disciplinary views and approaches. These include: politics and sociology, socio-economic approaches, psychology, and media and communications. In turn, within each of these disciplines various views and approaches exist which will be covered according to the literature review findings.
Part 3 of the report provides an overview of the literature on ways of responding to violent extremism. It does this by identifying and describing strategies that emerge from offensive, defensive, ideological, communicative, political and social policy frameworks for countering violent extremism.

Part 4 of the report examines literature that critiques approaches to countering violent extremism on the basis that strategies can be counterproductive by eroding democratic principles and social cohesion, increasing radicalisation and through the incitement of fear, conflict and violence. In relation to social cohesion, this part takes up issues surrounding perceptions of Muslims in Australian society. It looks at anti-Muslim sentiment, Islamophobia and the construction of the Muslim Other.

Part 5 will provide a number of research and policy recommendations that have emerged as a result of the literature review undertaken herein.
2. Part 1 Definitions, Concepts and Theories: Violent Extremism and Terrorism, Radicalisation Countering Violent Extremism and Social Cohesion Sample

2.1 Introduction

Part 1 of the report reviews the literature in terms of definitions and ways of conceptualising and theorising violent extremism and terrorism, radicalisation, countering violent extremism and social cohesion. The basis of understanding violent extremism and terrorism have largely developed over the years through scholarship, military and security institutions and experts, as well as government. This in turn has added to the rich diversity of the research problem and understanding violent extremism and terrorism today resulting in little consensus on reaching a universal definition. In certain disciplines, for instance in psychology, reaching a consensus in defining a key concept isn’t deemed crucial, within political science however consensus is usually more common as this provides an opportunity to theorise and provide understanding to why this problem has arisen. The literature written on violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism for instance are: largely focused on the problematic of not having an agreed to definition; based on some theories; and largely covers the root causes of why and how terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation have emerged.

2.2 Violent extremism and terrorism

2.2.1 Defining ‘terrorism’

No consensus has been reached on a definition of terrorism despite decades of research being undertaken in the area of studies of terrorism (Drummond, 2002; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). This is partly political, partly ideological, and partly an effect of multiple disciplines contributing to the study of terrorism (Sinai, 2007). Since October 2001 the United Nations has been debating the need to adopt a universal definition of terrorism. By July 2005 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged world leaders to agree to a universal definition. The proposed wording includes: “Terrorism...constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security”. It adds: "The targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance". The main sticking point that arose in previous discussions (1985 & 1996) and since have been linked to resistance; particularly resistance towards foreign occupation as a legitimate cause and therefore should not be considered as acts of terrorism, i.e. one side's terrorist is another side's freedom fighter. Often definitions of terrorism used by governments and security agencies are broadly defined to include all forms of subversion, violence and provide scope to counter and new forms of terrorism or terrorist activity.

Thus, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Hence the decision to call
someone or label some organisation ‘terrorist’ becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathises with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, an ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism (Hoffman 1998, cited by Newman 2006).

Academics from various disciplines, governments and commentators use a variety of definitions of terrorism more often than not, however, these definitions and theorisations are ‘drowned in complexity’ (Elzain, 2008: 10). Most definitions in the academic literature generally require two elements: ‘actual or threatened violence against civilians or persons not actively taking part in hostilities’ and ‘the implicit or explicit purpose of the act being to intimidate or compel a population, government or organisation into some course of action’ (Maogoto, 2003: 412). The usual generalisations made about terrorism are: it involves violence, the threat of violence (Laqueur 1999 cited by Schmidt and Jongman 1988); it may be ‘broadly construed as the unconventional use of violence against civilians for political gain’ (Ganor, 2002; Grimland, Apter, & Kerkhof, 2006; Knight, 2007: 157; Loza, 2007). Other definitions consider terrorism as ‘premediated’; a threat against persons or property (Winkates, 2006); designed to intimidate non-combatants, innocent bystanders, and with the aim to change public policy or give up something of value (Loza, 2007); rally support for the terrorist cause (Baliga & Sjöström, 2009; Winkates, 2006); and some focus on the group’s mode of operation, motivations, characteristics, modus operandi (Ganor, 2002).

In addition, there are numerous additional side discussions occurring on the issue of: what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ attack, i.e. is it acceptable to target “noncombatant” facilities and individuals or are state and military installations the only legitimate targets? (Ganor, 2002; Sinai, 2007); the difference between a terrorist and guerrilla/freedom fighter; the difference between insurgent political violence/terrorism and state sponsored or regime terrorism; and why some individuals and groups seek to achieve their political goals through violent extremism or acts of terrorism while others choose to attain them through peaceful means and political engagement. Despite these differences scholars largely agree that terrorism is highly effective; they also agree that each incident has peculiarities which make it incomparable; that terrorism is considered as the weapon of the weak; and terrorism is highly unpredictable (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

As a result of a lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, the international community has consequently taken a piecemeal approach by addressing the problem of international terrorism with particular criminal acts, inherently terrorist in nature, by preventing them or punishing them by domestic law (Maogoto, 2003). The legislative definition used by the Australian government and Australian states and territories is outlined in S100.1, Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as:

an action or threat of action that causes serious physical harm or death to a person, or endangers a person’s life or involves serious risk to public health or safety, serious damage to property or serious interference with essential electronic systems … It is an action or threat of action intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause and to coerce or influence by
intimidation an Australian or foreign government or intimidate the public or a section of the public.

A significant amount of the literature examined the US definition of terrorism, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition, which is often used as a standard and defines terrorism as:

the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).

2.3 Terrorism: A Brief History

History is important in understanding the trajectory of any problem and how it has evolved over the years. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon which emerged in the early to mid twentieth century but rather has a long and protracted history. However, most of the interest within the current literature is on contemporary understandings and future developments of violent extremism (VE) and terrorism in the form of cyber/eco/narco-terrorism. Duyvesteyn (2007) makes the argument that history should be incorporated more strongly into the study of terrorism, and most notably about the phenomena broadly as opposed to individual case studies. This is supported by Silke (2007) who found that a mere 3.9% of articles in the field examined non-contemporary terrorism and less than half of those examined a period prior to 1960. Consistent with Silke’s findings, the current review revealed a deficit of historical considerations in the research undertaken on terrorism in the past decade.

What makes the threat of terrorism more pronounced today is the accessibility of destructive tools of terror, the instantaneous global media coverage, and the means of communication available to the terrorists, whether directly or indirectly. These same tools were not available to terrorists of the past. Pre-19th century tools of terror evolved with time. Regicide, for example, was replaced by branching out beyond heads of states and targeting close associates and other political representatives in the nineteenth century. The rise of liberation ideologies such as democracy, through the French revolution, and nationalism and through Marxism not only had an impact on history and social movements but also on the development of terrorism. This further developed in the twentieth century with the Russian revolution, and the rise of state terrorism through the Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini regimes. The rise of the anti-colonial movement is also critical to understanding ‘the evolution and development of modern, contemporary terrorism’ (Duyvesteyn, 2007). This is especially so in the case of the development of guerrilla warfare.

By the 1960s terrorism and political violence took a new turn, aided by the accessibility of modern technology and armaments. This was also provoked by the birth of new nations, the Vietnam War and the internationalisation of issues such as the Palestinian question. Meanwhile, mass media was reporting to the world terrorist events as they unfolded. It is in this period historically that the discipline of psychology introduced into the study of terrorism the observation and analysis of signs of ‘deviant psychological behaviour’. This period was also marked by political violence, terrorism, counter-insurgency and fighting radical groups emerging as areas of research interest. This was largely US based and was supported by US government research funding. So much so, and according to the extensive research project
undertaken by Schmid and Jongman in 1988, ‘more than 85 percent of all books on the topic have been written since 1968’ (1988:177) and this reached a high point in the late 1970s. The literature during this period was characterised by the lack of ‘first hand’ experience with the subject or primary sources (Schmid & Jongman, 1988:xiii). This was largely mirrored in a post-2000 research analysis with only approximately 20% of the literature providing something new to the research knowledge to this field (Silke, 2007).

The 1970s witnessed a major resurgence of terrorism, largely characterised by nationalist separatist tendencies’ (Duyvesteyn, 2007:64). During the Cold War period the role of non-state armed groups were variously labelled ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’. The discourse at the time was focused largely on “freedom fighters” seeking independence from (European) occupation. Thus, the “fight” was considered “honourable” and “legitimate” (Beckett, 2008; Borum, 2003; Policzer, 2005). This was heavily debated in the post-colonial and Cold War period depending on who was being attacked, who was attacking and which of the two superpowers (USA or USSR) were supporting them. Of course, this influenced how they were perceived by civilians, domestic, regional and international governments, and the media. During the 1970s a series of debates arose questioning whether groups that took up resistance/acts of terror should be expected to respect the same humanitarian laws states were expected to abide to (Policzer, 2005). During this same period an increasing brutality of terrorist attacks began to evolve. The Palestinian attack on the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games illustrated this. The mid-to-late 1980s to the very early years of the 1990s showed a reduction in the number of terrorist related incidents. By the end of the Cold War the labels themselves were becoming dated and the discourse changed. These same “freedom fighters” (who may be fighting the same cause) are now labelled “terrorists”, with state sanctioned terrorism legitimised to varying degrees (Russia and Chechnya, Israel and Palestine, China and Urgers).

In more recent times, particularly the last decade, the literature has focused on ‘religiously inspired terrorism’ which has resulted in the label ‘new terrorism’. This in turn suggests ‘a break with all previous terrorist expressions’ (Duyvesteyn, 2007). More specifically, while ‘old terrorism’ used violent destruction as a means to a political end, ‘new terrorism’ aims at destruction as an end in itself; this ‘new’ destruction can come about through the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) while the ‘old’ destruction adopted tactics of minimal damage; the organisational structure of ‘new terrorism’ is decentralised and has many equally authoritative points (rather than hierarchical); and whilst most ‘old terrorism’ is rooted in political ideology today’s terrorism is seen to be justified on religious grounds (Zalman, 2008). Finally, whilst it was rare to have individuals undertake sole acts of terror in ‘old terrorism’ this is becoming more common, and/or being predicted as a new phenomenon in ‘new terrorism’ due to the radicalisation and shift towards violent extremism by individuals as opposed to groups/movements.

### 2.4 The emergence of violent extremism

Less than one month before the London bombings of July 7 2005, special force commanders and intelligence directors for the US and its closest allies were summoned to the Special Operations Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to discuss the new anti-terror
approach. US senior officials announced that the Global War on Terror, or GWOT, was over. Another acronym, SAVE, was to replace it. It stood for the Struggle Against Violent Extremism (Fox, 2005: 15). A year earlier the concept was used in the Australian context but more so in the post-2005 London bombings climate.

The Australian National Counter-Terrorism Committee Framework defines violent extremism as:

- a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature. This may include acts of terrorism.

There are several reasons given for adopting violent methods. Among them are: to create high profile impacts on the public with the goal of undermining public confidence in their own government; to make routine social activity difficult; to inflict as much damage as possible; to seek vengeance; and to create physical pain and paralysing psychological emotions such as panic, chaos, unrest, fear, paranoia, anxiety, anger, grief, and a sense of tragedy (Ardila, 2002; Furnish, 2005; Hudson, 1999; Lawal, 2002; McCauley, 2002; Reid, 2002; Thackrah, 2004).

This brings us to the difference between violent extremism and terrorism. The purpose of violent extremism is to provoke the target into a disproportionate response, radicalise moderates and build support for its objectives in the long term, while the purpose of terrorism is to endogenise the capabilities of both the terrorists and the target (Lake, 2002:26). Mroz (2009b) explains the difference between violent extremism and terrorism in the following way. Violent extremism is ‘violence in the absence of reason, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life. Violent extremism is homicide, genocide, fratricide, and, yes, it can also be terrorism’. According to Mroz (2009b), whilst terrorism can be countered, violent extremism cannot, as most forms of violent extremism are undertaken as ‘lone wolf attacks’ (whether as a one off operation or as an operation undertaken by one individual). Thus, an act that cannot be countered by governments and their security services are not terrorist attacks. This reflects the change in traditional conflicts – state versus state or state versus non-state actor. Today we are dealing with a paradigm shift where intelligence and law enforcement agencies are dealing with asymmetric and transnational environments. Therefore, due to the difficulty in intercepting communications and strange behavioural patterns of individuals which might indicate a threat little can be done to prevent ‘lone wolf attacks’. This is the challenge that intelligence and law enforcement communities have acknowledged that counter terrorism policies cannot necessarily predict or reach (J Mroz, 2009b).

As noted earlier the concept ‘violent extremism’ is often interchanged with terrorism, political violence and extreme violence. The literature covering ‘violent extremism’ employs the concept in a way that suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory. Often enough the need to ‘counter violent extremism’ is noted in the literature but no actual definition of what ‘violent extremism’ constitutes, is provided. The fact is, the terms violent extremism, political violence, political terrorism and terrorism have been used interchangeably in the Australian and international literature examined. Thus no real distinction between violent extremism and terrorism has fully evolved, in fact, it remains an evolving concept.
2.5 Theoretical frameworks for understanding terrorism and violent extremism

A number of theories have emerged in the literature which provide a set of hypotheses to explain radicalisation, social cohesion, violent extremism and terrorism phenomena. These have emerged from a variety of disciplines within the social sciences and humanities no one theory has a stronger basis then the next. Like most ‘theories’ in the social sciences, they are a reflection of the types of thinking and debates that are occurring within any given discipline rather than in terms of formal propositions that have been empirically and conclusively tested (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

2.5.1 Rational Choice Theory

According to rational choice theory, an individual decides whether or not to participate in an act of violent extremism, political violence or terrorism on the basis of a cost benefit analysis. The benefits of participation are weighed to the costs associated with participation. If the benefits are greater than the costs, then the individual decides to participate.

Within a group setting, ‘the benefits of success and group participation itself are often defined generally as selective incentives, or personal goods reaped only from participation in the movement, (Olson 1965 as cited by Eager, 2008) and collective or public goods, or goods that can be shared by the entire group including individuals who did not participate (Moore 1995, 424; Muller and Opp 1986 as cited by Eager, 2008). In the case of politically violent/violent extremist movements, the reward for success (the overthrow of the current regime) is a public good, available to all individuals regardless of whether or not they participated in the act itself. This description suggests that the theory relies on a number of assumptions: that is, humans are self-interested and make choices to suit their desired ends with minimal personal or material cost. One needs to question whether this can be adopted in all cases of terrorism and violent extremism.

Also a theoretical flaw arises when group behaviour is compared to individual choice. The rewards for collective action are present for everyone with an interest and individual participation is not a necessary prerequisite for receipt of the benefits. Eager (2008) argues that individuals recognise that their individual contribution to the group will not significantly increase the group's chances of success, and the likelihood of a group succeeding may serve as a disincentive for individuals not to participate (Eager 2008). Thus, either way, the individual who chooses to avoid all costs by participating in the act will still benefit from the outcome, hence becoming a ‘free rider’.

Therefore, rational choice theorists have reconsidered their position post-9/11 and now put forward the argument that by not choosing to participate in an act of VE or terrorism equates to adopting a less rational option and ‘selective disincentives increase the costs associated with non-participation’ (Eager, 2008). Eager does outline the further flaws in this argument ranging from: if the movement was successful in its objectives then it would be hard not to receive some benefit from the act; the individual who opts in or out will not necessarily be rewarded through promotion or financial benefit thus the personal disincentive will remain neutral or the same.
2.5.2 Structural or Societal Theory

A new theory has emerged modifying the above versions of rational choice theory with some structural variable focusing on the behaviour of groups. The Structural or Societal Theory states that ‘violent political groups choose political violence as a strategic method’ and that ‘the group possesses collective preferences or values and selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives’ (Eager, 2008 citing Crenshaw 1990; Gurr, 2006; Sinai, 2007). That is, similar to rational choice theory, structural theorists also claim that individuals have a rational choice but the free rider problem is not applicable here as individuals are aware that without their participation a group’s objectives are unattainable. Furthermore, structural theorists assert that psychological factors can act as limitations to an individual’s rational choice (Eager, 2008 cites Crenshaw 1990; Ranstorp, 2007).

2.5.3 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory is based on an individual believing that he/she is deprived of something when comparing him/herself to others economically, politically or socially. This model is mainly used by sociologists, some economists and psychologists. Viewing that individuals scoring poorly on socioeconomic variables are at risk of radicalisation or violence. It stems from the belief that poor socioeconomic performance (i.e. poverty, unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment) leads to frustration, which makes them susceptible to radicalisation (Al-Lami, 2009). Several authors rely on a concept of ‘susceptibility’ to radicalisation at which point such individuals are “ripe for exploitation” (Pargeter, 2006: 743). Pargeter (2006) suggests that young, male, North African illegal immigrants, who are already in precarious situations as a result of this status, coupled with increased religiosity and general radicalisation of opinion among North Africans make them a highly susceptible group to accepting extreme religious interpretation. Such people are deemed “highly unstable characters”, who are prone to violence and utilise Islam to justify their actions (Pargeter, 2006: 743).

But Pargeter offers no hard evidence for this claim, instead pointing to groups of such individuals committing acts of crime. Such criminal activity is not unusual among young, males of Western societies in similar economic and social positions except for the justifications used. This classical sociological model is taken directly from the sociology of crime, which posits that higher educational achievement and socioeconomic status as well as marriage are associated with decreased likelihood of criminal offending. While short-term goals of terrorism may include obtaining funding and resources, the long-term-goals are not financially motivated (Mullins, 2009).

2.5.4 Social Movement Theory/Collective Action Approach

The fourth theory commonly referred to in the literature is the social movement theory or the Collective Action Approach. Ultimately they share in common the belief that the underlying trigger of radicalisation is frustration. This has its roots in a psychological model known as frustration-aggression theory, which posits that when humans are frustrated they use aggressive means to negotiate the frustration (Rinehart, 2009). To become a ‘violent extremist’
will require the extreme manifestation of the social movement theory which in its original form referred to a peaceful, grass root social movements seeking change. At this advanced scenario VE/terrorist movements are engaging in radical forms of collective action - guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, and dissident movements. The flaw in this theory is based on the fact that only certain segments of social movements become radicalised and may endorse VE/terrorism whilst most do not. VE/terrorism is not the first resort for most individuals and/or movements (Eager 2008).

On the other hand, psychologists and psychiatrists have continued to expand on this theory and Moghaddam’s ‘staircase’ model is often referred to in the literature. According to Moghaddam (2005), political violence is the result of individuals' perceptions of "material conditions and the options seen to be available to overcome perceived injustices" (p. 161). Moghaddam utilises the analogy of an ascending staircase to illustrate this. Individuals begin at the bottom of the staircase, and based on their ascent, the number of options available is limited and will determine whether the individual exits the staircase or continues to go up the flight of stairs. The logic is that the higher the floor the fewer options of retreat are available to the individual and the more he/she becomes involved/entrenched in the violent political movement/organisation. Once the individual reaches the top of the staircase the individual is radicalised enough to either be motivated enough or willing to undertake an attack to harm others or harm one-self and others. According to Moghaddam the salient aspect of relative deprivation theory concludes that individuals are drawn to political violence due to their perceptions of their social and economic conditions.

2.5.5 Psychological Theories

Psychological theories of violent extremism, political violence and terrorism are primarily concerned with understanding and group factors contribute to radicalisation, violent political activity, and acts of terror. The main area of focus in the discipline and research on the psychological theories of terrorists is the mental functioning and personality of the individuals. Authors of this field are not necessarily psychologists or psychiatrists by profession but rather draw their conclusions on psychological responses to sociological influences or the result of individual mental illness and/or trauma (Brynjar and Katja 2005).

Further, psychological profiling attempts have failed to provide a consistent ‘terrorist profile’ (Al-Lami, 2009). Even looking at only ‘jihadist’ terrorism there is considerable diversity: some are well-off financially while others are poor; some are highly educated and others not; some are well-integrated and others live in the margins of society; some are single and others are married; some have traumatic childhoods and some come from loving, stable families; some have criminal records and others are law-abiding up until the terrorist attack. About the only thing ‘jihadi’ terrorists have in common is that they appear to be exceedingly ‘normal’ under most measures (Al-Lami, 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Brighton, 2007; Vidino, 2009; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). Simple socioeconomic explanations of radicalisation are unable to account for this variety. The problem is that this theory presumes that terrorism is instrumentalist and financially motivated. However, other factors such as perception of discrimination and Western government’s foreign policy with regard to Muslim countries and peoples can be triggers of frustration that lead to radicalisation, irrespective of economic conditions (see Vidino, 2009: 12).
2.6 Radicalisation

Defining what radicalisation is or who radicals are is as difficult as defining terrorism. Several authors argue that there is no single definition of radicalisation that is used across the field (Al-Lami, 2009; Mandel, in press). More often than not the terms ‘radicalisation’, ‘radicalise’ and ‘radical’ are employed in a way that suggests they are self-evident concepts. Even worse, the terms are often used in a circular fashion: a radical is someone who has radical ideas or who has been radicalised.

Some definitions of radicalisation are so broad as to criminalise legitimate political opinions whose only crime is that they differ from normative social opinion. For example, Hannah et al. define radicalisation as “the process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal, into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme” (Hannah et al., 2008: 2). Another example is Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definition of radicalisation as “a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order” (2010: 798). Similarly, Veldhuis and Staun define radicalisation as “the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goal” (2009: 4). These definitions of radicalisation stress difference from societal norms. For this reason, Dalgaard-Nielsen uses the term violent radicalisation as a subset of radicalisation, which describes “a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 798).

The literature implies that we know someone is radicalised because they have radical ideas and therefore are radicals. This sort of reasoning is unhelpful at best and at worst has the potential to criminalise individuals arbitrarily. When the terms are defined they are used so vaguely and variously as to seem arbitrary. For example, Githens-Mazer (2010) points out that ‘radicalisation’ and ‘radicalise’ are used to denote: revolutionary thought or actions; shifting from peaceful activity to violent ‘extremism’; becoming sympathetic to militant action; recruitment; becoming hyper-conscious of critical issues and willing to act violently; thinking that is at odds with social norms; thinking at odds with political norms of a society; becoming violent; becoming irritable or irrational. About the only thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process (Al-Lami, 2009). Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable. It is like comparing eggs to oranges and concluding that oranges, therefore, come from chickens.

Some sociologists contend that violent radicalisation arises from an identity crisis in Muslim youth living in the West (see Sageman, 2004; Warnes and Hannah, 2008;). In general, the stress on individualism and value relativism in Western modernity and democracy propels a search for meaning, identity and community. However, for second or third generation Muslim immigrants this is exacerbated since they no longer feel part of their parents’ home countries and, through various forms of discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage, they do not feel wholly to belonging to the host country. This results in a doubled sense of non-belonging, which intensifies the search for identity and meaning. Militant Islamism provides a fixed system of values (through Islam), a sense of belonging to a community (through the ummah),
and a sense of dignity and justice (by offering a framework to understand their frustration with everyday racism as part of a larger, global struggle for justice) (see Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010).

While marginalisation undoubtedly exists and feeds into existing prejudices and frustrations that can lead to radical politics it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of terrorism or political violence in Europe (Pargeter, 2006: 739). If this were the case there would be thousands of radicalised Muslims throughout the West not to mention many other ethnic, racial and religious minorities living under racism. Secondly, Muslims are not the only ones that face alienation and marginalisation. There are many communities suffering under conditions of racism in the West over a long period of time.

Although there are various perspectives on radicalisation, what they share is a focus on the mechanisms of radicalisation: namely, recruitment and indoctrination. That is how individuals move from simply being frustrated or disaffected towards accepting violence as a mode of political struggle. The problem again is that they still do not explain why some people become terrorists and not others. It is easy enough to show how radical ideas are internalised by terrorists post facto. But this does not explain why some people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised. In fact, the majority of people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised.

There have been attempts to combine the multiple factors into a series of stages. For example, Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) report Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat for the NYPD, perhaps the most influential document in terms of radicalisation, identified four stages or phases of radicalisation:

1. **Pre-radicalisation**: prior to exposure to jihadi-Salafist ideology. Many of these individuals have unremarkable or ordinary lives and jobs with no criminal record.

2. **Self-identification**: where individuals, influenced by external and internal factors, explore Salafi Islam. They begin to dissociate themselves from their previous lives and associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own.

3. **Indoctrination**: intensification of beliefs and the adoption of jihadi-Salafi ideology. Adoption of the belief that conditions or circumstances require militant jihadi action.

4. **Jihadisation**: acceptance of duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as ‘holy warriors’. The group will begin operational planning for a terrorist attack.

These four stages are repeated in several reports (eg. Precht, 2007; Al-Lami, 2009) but is not verified by empirical research. They identify personal traumas, economic deprivation, social alienation and discrimination as well as political consciousness of international conflicts with Muslims as some of the factors affecting the self-identification phase. However, as argued above, by limiting their sample of terrorists to Muslims, Silber and Bhatt (2007) by their own definition necessarily find that being part of an ethnic diaspora living in the West that is
facing forms of discrimination is one of the factors. As several instances of White supremacist and Christian terrorists show this is a political bias against ethnic minorities that serves to reinforce the association between immigrants, Islam and terrorism.

Even if we put that critique aside, as stated earlier the fact that these stages are not necessarily linear nor sequential suggests that they are in fact not stages (Al-Lami, 2009; Pargeter, 2006). Furthermore, this approach of ‘adding’ factors or models together only works if they offset the weaknesses of each other. For example, social identity theory may explain where frustrations come from, but indoctrination models can explain how people transform these frustrations into a political ideology. But all the models share one major weakness. They cannot explain why some people are radicalised and not others. This is not simply an academic problem of causation but a political issue. Failing to distinguish between terrorists and those who simply have opposing views to society can lead to the criminalisation of legitimate political dissent.

Increasingly, the trend of radicalisation research is to suggest that there are multiple pathways into terrorism and therefore multiple forms of radicalisation (Vertigans, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). This seems to reinforce the group indoctrination model that posits that there are different ‘terrorist personality types’, each of which have their own reasons for becoming involved in terrorist activity. However, while this certainly describes the different types of terrorists this is hardly an explanation of radicalisation, how it occurs or why people become radicalised. Acknowledging that there are multiple pathways into terrorism is tantamount to claiming that anyone can be a terrorist, which is clearly not the case.

For the most part ‘radicalisation’ is used to specifically denote processes for becoming Islamist terrorists. Silber and Bhatt’s famous study of radicalisation in the West for the NYPD defines radicalisation as the internalisation of an extreme belief system, which is “an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which legitimises terrorism as a tool to affect social change” (2007: 16). This ‘extremist religious/political ideology’ they identify as jihadi-salafist ideology. For Silber and Bhatt, terrorism is the ultimate consequence of this radicalisation process. However, this definition is politically biased. By limiting its sample to Muslims who are terrorists, the study leaves out militant Christians, for example, as well as other groups within the West that employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics in their campaigns. Thus, the study of Islamist terrorists unsurprisingly concludes that that jihadi-salafist ideology is the root of radicalisation in the West rather than Catholicism in the case of the IRA (see also Warnes and Hannah, 2008). Furthermore, as several authors point out Salafi ideology does not necessarily lead to terrorism: since it may be spread through peaceful means by adhering strictly to everyday discipline or through legitimate state reform or elections (Sageman, 2004; Al-Lami, 2009).

These definitions of radicalisation stress difference from societal norms, which can be traced back to psychological and sociological research on ‘deviancy’. The problem with this definition is that there are many people who hold ‘radical’ views with respect to society’s norms (such as feminist or anti-racist activists, white supremacists, anti-abortionists, environmentalists). It therefore establishes a definition that criminalises legitimate political differences and dissent (Githens-Mazer et al., 2010) and is therefore undemocratic. Furthermore, as several authors argue radicalisation does not necessarily lead to terrorism (see Al-Lami, 2009; Mandel, in press; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Warnes and Hannah, 2008).
fact, several authors point out that radicalisation does not necessarily follow a linear path, with some people drifting in and out of radical and more moderate groups (Al-Lami, 2009; Pargeter, 2006). As Githens-Mazer argues, “the mere [sic] presence of ideology, or even specific political attachments to an ideology, is not enough to explain why an individual commits a terrorist act” (2010: 899). However, Warnes and Hannah (2008) point out that even though radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violence it is a security concern since a radicalised population creates a ‘pool’ of alienated and excluded individuals for recruitment into terrorism or extremist violence. But this does not sidestep the issue, for by their own definition radicalised people are not terrorists and therefore it remains to be seen how radicalisation is related to terrorism or indeed whether radicalisation exists (Mandel, in press).

Overall, the research on radicalisation suffers from a selection bias, which is referred to as the ‘selection on the dependent variable’. This selects ‘successful’ cases of terrorists and tries to identify a pattern among the cases. Despite the fact that no identifying pattern has emerged, the problem is that this works backwards from successful cases to prove the outcome. Even if one were to locate a consistent theme this would not prove that this is a cause of terrorism. Using the same logic one could argue that since all terrorists are humans, therefore being human causes terrorism or being human makes one susceptible to radicalisation. Clearly this logic does not make sense, since we know that not all humans become terrorists. The same can be said for most of the ‘causes’ of terrorism that have been identified. In the worst studies, researchers specifically choosing terrorists who are Muslim to study, end up ‘finding’ that terrorism arises from specific Islamic ideology (see for example Silber and Bhatt, 2007). In such cases, the researcher blames the research subjects for their own selection bias.

2.7 Countering Violent Extremism

Given its basis in government policy rather than scholarship, the notion of ‘countering violent extremism’ is rarely defined let alone conceptualised or theorised within the literature. Rather, it stands as a phenomenon that is both self evident and taken for granted. The focus in the literature on countering violent extremism is generally on strategies that aim to respond to, or prevent violence, with recommendations for policy rather than on understanding how ‘countering violent extremism’ is constituted and emerges in particular ways. Despite a lack of scholarship in this area some general observations will be made in what follows by canvassing themes from the literature that reveal the prevailing ideation that underpins how ‘countering violent extremism’ is understood.

Understandings of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are mutually constitutive. What this suggests is that the ways in which violent extremism is conceptualised informs how counter strategies are developed and applied (Coaffee, 2006; Goldsmith, 2008). In addition, the ways in which countering violent extremism is understood reinforces and reproduces understandings of violent extremism. Understanding this relationship is important because it draws attention to the ways in which the conceptualisation of violence enables particular responses but also might reduce and exclude other possibilities. As Crelinsten (2009: 7-8) notes, “How people talk about problems, frame them, and conceptualise them often determines what they do about them...restricting their imagination and narrowing their options”.
The dominant frame for understanding the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, as presented in the contemporary literature, is that of transnational Islamist networks. This frame has largely become dominant in the context of the post 9/11 US led ‘War on Terror’ and is associated with ‘new’ forms of terrorism characterised by networks driven by extremist and political Islamic ideology of which al-Qaeda constitutes the exemplar (De Graaff, 2010; B.M. Jenkins, 2002). Much of the literature reviewed was explicitly oriented by this frame based on the rationale that such networks are currently perceived as the greatest threat to the security of western nations. However, as Kundnani (2009: 40) observes, this almost singular focus on what is considered ‘extremist Islam’ is reductive and excludes analyses “which focus less on religio-cultural ideology and more on terrorism as a manifestation of a political conflict over western foreign policy or as part of a general problem of youth violence”.

The focus on transnational networks positions contemporary violent extremism and terrorism as global phenomena. As Pollard (2007: 237) observes, “Modern globalisation resulted in modern terrorism”. Moreover, the ‘new’ transnational threats are characterised by “shifting networks, constantly mutating configurations and constellations” (B.M. Jenkins, 2002: 14). Accordingly, within the literature there are calls to “develop new and more effective diplomatic and other tools as well as nonconventional ways of dealing with this new form of terrorism” (Albini, 2001: 256). At the same time however, others question whether contemporary violent extremism departs sufficiently from older forms to constitute a ‘new’ form of violent extremism or require the development of ‘new’ approaches to countering violent extremism (e.g. Pickering, Wright-Neville, McCulloch, & Lentini, 2007).

What does seem to be agreed upon is that global forms of violent extremism and terrorism require an integration of domestic and international responses such that “the traditional separation between domestic and foreign policy can no longer be strictly maintained” (Crelinsten, 2007: 212). In addition, the ‘networked’ nature of contemporary violent extremism is seen to require a networked response. To counter networks with networks, the literature emphasises the development of partnerships and multilateral solutions (Ranstorp, 2006). This includes partnerships between governments of allied nations to cooperate in military, law enforcement, intelligence activities and regional governance and security (Byman, 2006; Huq, 2008; B.M. Jenkins, 2002; O’Neil, 2007; Ogilvie-White, 2006; Pollard, 2007; Ross, 2007). As Crelinsten (2007: 213) observes, such partnerships need to be supported by a “framework of international and regional cooperation and global governance”. However, issues of incongruence may arise in relation to states’ anti-terrorist laws, policies and practices in national security, political and social values and potential domestic constraints (Schmid, 2010; Shapiro & Byman, 2006; Stohl, 2006; Whitaker, 2008).

The literature also emphasises collaborative and multi-disciplinary approaches through partnerships within national governments and between governments, non-government organisations, industry groups and civil society (Huq, 2008; Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Wilkinson, 2001). As Crelinsten (2009) suggests, countering violent extremism has shifted beyond the realm of nation-states to function at the supranational, regional, national and subnational levels, including very local levels. In this context, the importance of “public-private partnerships” is increasingly highlighted in the literature (Kokoda Foundation, 2008: 174; Michaels, 2008; Pollard, 2007; Whitaker, 2008). The broadening focus to incorporate the private sector arises in part from uncertainty regarding potential targets for violent attacks
and certainty that not all attacks will be prevented (B.M. Jenkins, 2002). In this context, strategies for preventing and responding to violent attacks are framed in terms of risk management (Coaffee, 2006; Kokoda Foundation, 2008). Since the critical infrastructure that might be targeted by violent extremists “are about 90 percent owned by private sector providers” (Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Pollard, 2007) entails implications for corporate responsibility and therefore potentially accountability (Michaels, 2008) in relation to securing and protecting infrastructure. This includes preventing and responding to cyber-attacks (Pollard, 2007) and countering the financing of terrorism (McCulloch, Pickering, McQueen, Tham, & Wright-Neville, 2004; Napoleoni & Carisch, 2005; Ramraj, 2002; Winer, 2008). The private sector is also increasingly being viewed as an alternative source of intelligence (Kokoda Foundation, 2008). However, as Napoleoni and Carisch (2005: 29) observe, issues arise regarding “security and privacy risks when involving the private sector” in information sharing.

A key tenet in much of the writing on countering violent extremism is that multifaceted approaches are needed (S Atran, 2004; R. Crelinsten, 2009; J Mroz, 2009a). In one sense this is because strategies are increasingly oriented towards preventing rather than responding to violent extremism. In this context ‘traditional’ countering approaches involving military, policing, intelligence and legislation are seen as necessary but insufficient to establish an effective and sustainable long term strategy for preventing violent extremism (R. Crelinsten, 2009; Freedman, 2005). Responding to the ‘root causes’ of conflict means that approaches to countering violent extremism need to be embedded in consideration of the social, economic, political and historical contexts in which violence arises and the applicability and transferability of strategies between nations (Guiora, 2009; Richmond, 2003). Within the literature the development of multifaceted approaches to countering violent extremism are linked to calls for capacity building and innovation to respond to ‘new’ and complex forms of contemporary terrorism and violent extremism (e.g. Brimley, 2006).

Approaches to countering violent extremism are generally conceptualised and differentiated in the literature according to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power strategies. This distinction is translated from the broader international relations and politics literature. Within this framework, approaches to countering violent extremism can be understood in terms of the exercise of power to “affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” (Nye Jr., 2008: 94). ‘Hard’ power is conceptualised as “a means to achieve desired outcomes through the ostensible use of force” (Coronado, 2005: 322) and strategies include military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions for example (Wilson III, 2008). The term ‘soft’ power was proposed by Nye in 1990 and conceptualised in terms of power that “co-ops people rather than coerces them” (Nye Jr., 2008: 95). As Aysha (2005) observes, as an attractive force soft power operates in the pursuit of hegemony. Soft power encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power (Wilson III, 2008) and is associated with “intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (Nye Jr., 2008: 95). Strategies of soft power involve broadcasting these assets through public relations campaigns and building long-term relationships. In this context, credibility becomes “the crucial resource and important source of soft power” (Nye Jr., 2008: 100). The literature on countering violent extremism generally argues for multifaceted approaches that combine hard and soft power strategies (Bergin, Jones, & Ungerer, 2007; Cvrtila & Perešin, 2009).
2.8 Social Cohesion

The social cohesion literature engages issues surrounding immigration, community and infrastructure, civic engagement, social capital and social resilience, social exclusion/social inclusion, shared values and shared vision, community engagement, as well as identity formation. Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007 offer an important critique of the definitions of social cohesion within the literature and their key findings are taken up below.

Whilst there is no single definition of social cohesion that can be neatly applied across the academic literature, the ways in which the concept is defined is central to the kinds of research questions academics and policy makers pose, as well as any ensuing research and policy outcomes. Different scholars emphasise different aspects of social cohesion. Some for example stress the economic aspects of social cohesion, whilst others emphasise socio-cultural and/or political phenomena. Thus our understanding of social cohesion is greatly influenced by the disciplinary boundaries that are placed around the research.

Many academics see the economy as being of paramount importance to maintaining high levels of social cohesion. Within economic definitions much is made of the importance of high levels of employment vis-à-vis unemployment and poverty, income levels, social mobility, health care, security, and government policy which targets poverty and disadvantage. Whilst the economic sphere is viewed as important by some, other scholars have argued that the political, socio-cultural and ecological arenas are just as significant for the understanding of social cohesion (Makus & Kirpitchenko, 2007).

It has only been in more recent times that the socio-cultural aspects of social cohesion have been given more emphasis in the literature. Here the ideas of shared goals and values are seen as important to creating a cohesive society. However, some scholars have critiqued the blind acceptance of social cohesion as a positive societal force. Stanley for example, speaking of Nazi Germany posits that social cohesion can impact negatively on some individuals and groups by establishing a set of heterogeneous values and thus diminishing cultural differences. If social cohesion is to have a positive effect on communities and society as a whole, it must take into account cultural diversity (Stanley, 2003 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007).

As stated earlier, whilst consensus on the definition of social cohesion is difficult to attain through a reading of the relevant literature, there is some level of general accord that social cohesion relies on shared values between people, groups and societies and also relies heavily on how those values are interpreted, how those values help reduce inequalities brought about by wealth and income “and generally how those values enable individuals to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same community” (Maxwell 1996:13 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007). Related to Maxwell’s definition, Jane Jenson’s typology of social cohesion sets out the following binaries as relevant for understanding social cohesion:

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2 Jupp and Nieuwenhuysen’s (2007) edited collection titled Social Cohesion in Australia offer a number of chapters that summarise some of the key elements of the social cohesion literature.
Belonging - Isolation
Inclusion - Exclusion
Participation – Non-involvement
Recognition - Rejection
Legitimacy - Illegitimacy
Equality - Inequality (Jenson 1998 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007)

There are significant differences in the literature pertaining to whether social cohesion is viewed as emanating from the grass roots or resulting from government policy. For example, Forrest and Kearns 2001 (cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007) view social cohesion as being about the day-to-day relationships between people and groups that relate to the routine aspects of life. This way of defining social cohesion takes a bottom up approach. Other authors define social cohesion around the notion of ‘community’ as well as ‘social capital’, both of which have been used in policy debates in Australia. Indeed some authors use the terms social cohesion and social capital interchangeably (Chan et al: 2006 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007). This definition of social cohesion sees that understandings of shared values and community solidarity need to address social and economic inequalities. Such definitions also view social cohesion as linked to civic participation through democratic institutions and processes. Hence it is argued that cooperative social relations do not in themselves increase social cohesion (Beauvais and Jenson 2002 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007). This view places emphasis on the individual’s rights, either associated with citizenship and/or human rights as represented though public policy and legislation. This notion of social cohesion essentially advocates a ‘top down’ process and draws in part on the idea of social exclusion as a key issue that policy makers should responsibly address.

Bernard 1999 and Rajulton et al. 2003 (cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007) discuss three key areas of social cohesion which involve the economic, political and socio-cultural aspects of an individual’s life. These authors point to issues surrounding inclusion and exclusion which relate to an individual’s ability and or opportunity to participate in the economy, the extent to which they may be excluded from the economy and the underlying consequences. The way in which notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy are constructed by institutions and the level at which a person’s needs are represented by institutions is also important in the theoretical understanding of social cohesion. The amount of recognition or rejection that takes place within institutional practices that can support or undermine diversity and difference is also highlighted in the theoretical literature. Moreover, the level at which one feels that he/she belongs or how they might feel isolated from the “main stream” is seen to relate to the level of shared values and a sense of being part of a given community (Rajulton et al. 2003: 2 cited by Marcus & Kirpitchenko 2007).

Social theorists have long argued that there are numerous factors that can impede the cohesiveness of any given society. These factors include “…the distribution of income, wealth, employment and opportunity, as well as access to services, voting rights and citizenship among various segments of the population” (Nieuwenhuysen 2007:1). This being the case, Jupp argues that based on established social institutions, good standards of living, economic
prosperity and geographic distance from areas of conflict Australia is a very cohesive society (Jupp 2007: 9). Nonetheless he points out that societal anxiety surrounding social cohesion within Australia remains prevalent. In part this is due to our history of immigration that has ensured limited entry to those who best resembled the early white settlers. Against this backdrop of immigration and the White Australia Policy, the threat of home grown terrorism has in more recent times reinforced this cultural anxiety. Judd argues that societal perceptions of treats to a cohesive society in Australia have been largely based on what might happen rather than being based on any real evidence (Jupp 2007).

Various government funded programmes in Australia have been set up to minimise this concern over perceived threats to a cohesive society. Underlying many of these government initiatives has been the understanding that ethnic diversity has the potential to threaten social cohesion and harmony. However, ethnicity alone is not the only criteria for disrupting a cohesive society. Other criteria such as levels of income, employment, shared values and a common vision are just as relevant as ethnicity when it comes to creating a cohesive society (Jupp 2007).

The concept of social harmony has also been established though public policy as important to creating a cohesive society. Canadian policy makers for example, have used the concept of social harmony within a framework for establishing social cohesion. Some of the main concepts which have been attached to Canadian policy in relation to social cohesion include “…shared citizenship, cultural diversity, sustainable societal development, and citizenship values” (Markus and Kirpitchenko 2007: 24). Markus and Kirpitchenko have argued however, that the Canadian example tends to minimise or diminish the very real issues of inter-ethnic relations within receiving nations (2007: 24). Similarly in the United Kingdom frameworks for enhancing social cohesion within public policy posits social cohesion as pertaining to ethnic and cultural diversity. In the UK context the theoretical underpinning of social cohesion is developed along the lines of opposites. For example, social cohesion is seen as being the opposite of violence, class conflict or social conflict (Markus and Kirpitchenko 2007: 27).

2.8.1 Social inclusion and Social exclusion

The concept of social cohesion in part centres on social inclusion and social exclusion. While the theoretical understandings of social exclusion has been hotly debated within academic and public discourse (Hayes, Gray and Edwards, 2008:4; Yasmeen, 2008) it has nonetheless been largely viewed in terms of the limitations citizens have in participating in activities including consumption, production, civic engagement, social support and so on. Key aspects of social exclusion that can be identified in the literature concern ideas about: neighbourhood, social and civic engagement, access, crime levels, security, community identity and economic disadvantage (Burchardt, et al., 1999). For some authors the problem of social exclusion can be rectified through greater levels of civic participation by citizens and by reducing poverty and disadvantage that some communities experience (Hayes, Gray and Edwards, 2008).

2.8.2 Social capital

The concept of social capital is a key component of the theoretical literature on social cohesion. Edwards et al (2002) have argued that social capital is generally seen by researchers and
policy makers to be the phenomena that can restore cohesiveness and integration. Here the main arguments are about lessening the social inequalities that can bring about social isolation and exclusion and strengthening social connections within any given community. This particular slant of social cohesion usually includes the notion of social capital (Berger-Schmitt and Noll 2000: 15).

Social capital emerges alongside the literature on immigration and is defined as an individual’s ability to access resources through their social networks or institutions. Putnam (1995) speaks of the various types of social capital – bonding, bridging and linking social capital. The literature on social capital exists in parallel with understandings of social inclusion/exclusion particularly in establishing the social conditions that reduce the threat of violent extremism (Orton 2009). Creating communities and environments where people can network, build bridges and attain support, according to Orton (2009), helps reduce inequality and encourage social cohesion. Putnam considers social capital; which relates to networks and norms of reciprocity and trust as being about ‘a just, equitable, tolerant and well integrated society’. (2004: 3). For Putnam social capital relates to social cohesion in so far as helping governments think through creating an effective welfare state and developing anti-discrimination policies. In this sense social capital is about developing better policies that can help communities more towards more robust levels of social cohesion.

Some researchers link social capital and social cohesion to economic factors. For example, Economou (2007) argues that economic indicators along with social capital indicators are essential for measuring the level of social cohesion in any given community. Whilst economic indicators such as employment, income, and property ownership are readily measured, some social capital indicators, such as notions of well being are more difficult to assess. This presents a gap in the literature that if addressed could help future policy makers.

Finally, the literature generally considers social capital as a normative concept (Putnam 2000); That is, the more social capital one has, the better off one is. Edwards et al (2001) contest this view. First, they argue that viewing social capital for its positive attributes can tend to minimise issues of conformity, exclusion and inequality. The ‘more is better’ argument can also mean that resources associated with social cohesion can be monopolised by a few rather than shared around. Groups that are more socially and politically aware, with higher levels of education and stronger networks are more likely to attain increased social capital than those who are less integrated within society. These theorists argue that there is an uneven distribution of social capital in society based on gender, class, age and ethnicity (See Campbell & Wood,1999; Ferlander & Timms, 2001).

### 3. Part 2 Root Causes and Consequences of Violent Extremism: Thematic Analysis of the Literature

#### 3.1 Introduction

In order to address the problem of radicalisation, VE and terrorism, governments and policy makers need to be aware of the root causes which lead individuals to make the choices that
they do. The literature has demonstrated over the years that root causes are not static. Rather they are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing (Sinai, 2007). This is the case within and between groups, as well as the changing political paradigm in which terrorism is viewed (Cold-War versus post-Cold War; pre-9/11 versus post-9/11; post-9/11 versus post-7/7), and the changing disciplinary approaches to viewing and understanding violent methods, for instance the impact of poverty versus the impact of globalisation.

As noted earlier there is a causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist activity relationships (E. Newman, 2006). The following section will detail how endogenous they are which makes them difficult to identify empirically. The problem on the empirical side is that everything seems to have a causal effect, and yet despite what some may consider as methodological limitations (root causes refers to a broad range of issues which can’t be contained within a single social category e.g. social exclusion) it is an important area to consider. Proponents argue that there is a causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist activity. According to this proposition, certain underlying conditions and grievances help to explain how, where, and why terrorism occurs. By failing to understand the linkages between these underlying conditions and terrorism may result in inadequate counterterrorist policies. Many of the scholars referred to below go as far as arguing that ignoring this relationship may contribute to the exacerbation of the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism and in turn intensify the terrorist threat (Mani, 2004). Some scholars, led by many governments in the past, are reluctant to consider root causes because ‘they refuse to accept that there may be any legitimate causes or grievances behind terrorism’ (Mani, 2004; E. Newman, 2006).

3.1.1 Political-Sociological

Religious influence and ideologies

As will be shortly detailed there are several tenets that underlie the ‘religious’ portion of the terrorist ideology. In sum, Western civilisation with its democracy and modernity is viewed as morally corrupt. It is espoused that only Islam possesses the values that are needed for a good and just world. It also notes that Muslim societies have decayed, become morally corrupt themselves, and become vulnerable to Western intrusion because Muslims have strayed from their religion. It is invoked that a just world will only be achieved by going back to ‘true Islam’. On the face of it these tenets do look, sound and feel religious in nature. However, the movements and organisations which adopt these ‘religious’ tenets outwardly are ultimately aspiring to achieve their political aims and objectives within a different ideological framing. The failure of past political ideologies – Marxism, socialism, pan-Arabism - and what is considered as the corrupting nature of liberalism have led to a notable shift towards religion and particularly religious symbolism of invoking past historical glories of the Islamic empire. However these views take a considerable shift from the original message of Islam and its principal tenets. Instead, these movements and organisations have used ‘religion’ and past memories, focusing on the moral decay of societies by tapping into the vulnerabilities of socially excluded individuals as a rallying point to attract, motivate and seek commitments from potential constituents.
Sociological theories reason that this is the case because of the interplay between social movements and societal responses. Khan and Azam (2008) have raised the importance of theology, religion and philosophy, arguing that religion has been utilised as a tool by terrorists to deceive believers into a militant interpretation of the religion in question. Historically religiously violent events and practices can be found to ‘justify’ future operation. Religion can be used as a cover to serve the self interests of terrorist leaders and individuals who are mentally unstable and/or psychotic (M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008).

Corrupted ‘religious’ ideologies play a central role in radicalising young Muslims, recruiting and indoctrinating them into terrorist ideology, and eventually asking them to commit acts of violent extremism or acts of terror (Ibrahim, 1980, 1988; Isam, 2006; Loza, 2007; Schwind, 2005). The common theme among these movements is the notion that Islamic states were no longer purely Islamic and Muslims are living in *jahiliya* (the age of ignorance which prevailed in the Arabian peninsula before the revelation of Islam to the Prophet Mohammed) (Ibrahim, 1980; Loza, 2007). Extremists’ ideologies is not a new phenomena and nor is it exclusive to Islam. In the case of Islam it grew stronger around the second part of the 19th century, particularly in the Islamic world and has gained momentum in contemporary times.

Extremists and terrorists generally have strong religious beliefs that:

1. Are personally viewed as symbols of Islam (Monroe & Kredie, 1997);
2. Serve the cause of Islam and consider Islamic beliefs are being far superior to others (Ibrahim, 1980, 1988);
3. Terrorist actions are an execution of the will of God (Ellens, 2002) and that they have a mandate from God to punish the West (Hudson, 1999);
4. Fire and punishment are reserved for the infidels whereas paradise is reserved for the faithful (Schwind, 2005);
5. View Muslims as being at war between ‘believers’ and the ‘unbelievers’ (Drummond, 2002); and
6. View the duty of every Muslim is to struggle to build and maintain a righteous community (Ibrahim, 1988; Thackrah, 2004), to fight their secular rulers and the what is deemed as ‘infidels laws’, that eventually they will be able to bring down the ‘sinful’ ruling elite (Ibrahim, 1988) and start applying Islamic laws (Ibrahim, 1980);
7. The world today is as bad as the world was pre-Islam (Kepel, 2002);
8. The adherence to the purity of the Islamic religious practice as the road to salvation and will bring the Islamic world to the “golden age” of Islam (Ibrahim, 1988);
9. Western culture will overwhelm Islamic culture (McCauley, 2002) and is trying to undermine Islam (Orbach, 2001);
10. Western style governments caused their deterioration, and that the Muslim world has been the target of attacks by European occupations (Shalaan, 1993) thus they call for the rejection of modernity and the return to past glories (Mazzar, 2004);
11. Muslim countries have decayed because they have strayed from their religion and because of this they now live in subjugation, humiliation, division, and fragmentation (Ibrahim, 1988);
12. Islam is the only permissible religion (Drummond, 2002);
13. They are nobler, morally superior, more sensitive, and the best nation sent to humanity. They have the better culture, religion, morals, freedom fighters, and sacrificial victims (Thackrah, 2004);
14. They are soldiers, liberators, martyrs, and legitimate fighters for a noble social cause (Crenshaw, 1988);
15. Violence will weaken their governing regime which will encourage the public to take up revolutionary acts (Thackrah, 2004).

French terrorism expert Olivier Roy argues that religious inspired terrorist could arise for two reasons. The first, he refers to as 'diasporic radicalism' which can occur in a community that retains strong ties with its country of origin; and the second is through 'universalist' or 'ideological' (in the case of) Islam, whereby a supranational community or umma is the key objective. Both groups are unmoved by traditional Islam and those who are feeling socially excluded are more prone to be attracted to this new revamped ‘modern’ style of Islam and its objectives. In many cases this newly aspired form of Islam is communicated virtually and is shaped through the Internet through a web of virtual networks and ideas. Roy describes them as 'born again Muslims'. These points will be explored further in the section on ‘Social Exclusion’.

**Political justifications**

Political theories behind terrorism are related to a form of governance. Another set of beliefs believed to be underpinning radicalisation and/or violent extremism/terrorism is related to political systems which the terrorists believe are corrupt and inept. Extremists blame their governments for being defeated by the enemy of Islam: the Christian West, Jewish Zionism, atheist communism, and capitalism. Also, they blame their governments for not employing Islamic law. They believe that: a) the “official” religious leaders are employees for the system who have abdicated their duties toward Islam (Ibrahim, 1980); b) that as a result political corruption moral decay, poverty, disease, and illiteracy are prevalent in the Islamic world; and the world is now living in infidelity, decadence, and ignorance, similar to that prevailed in pre-Islamic Arabia (Ibrahim, 1980; Tanveer, 2005); c) and that America will soon collapse and thus it is important to attack the US more frequently and with more strength (Mazarr, 2004)

Terrorism that has emerged from the Middle-Eastern or Muslim dominant countries rests upon more than religion and for that matter the ‘clash of civilisations’. The literature demonstrates that this version of terrorism is based upon current and historical cultural experiences within the Islamic world and many former colonised states. These experiences include political and racial conflicts both within and between these nations, the historical relationships between the Islamic world and the West, as well as the economic disparities between countries and within them. Terrorism is thus maintained through several ideologies, environmental pressures, and ideological justifications.

In the broader literature on violent extremism and terrorism the causes related to political and sociological perspectives are varied as outlined in the list below. It is important to note however that these points are not just about grievances justifying or resulting in violent activities, but it is also about conceptualising radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. They include:
1. The lack of political openness and accountability. Political oppression leads to civil unrest, and insurgent terrorism (Mao, Lenin, Guevara);
2. Terrorism is caused by political oppression and poverty. This leads to civil unrest and state terrorism arises to curtail civil unrest (Marighela, Hayden) (Laqueur, 1987);
3. Terrorism is left wing and revolutionary in character (Laqueur, 1987);
4. Terrorism appears whenever people have genuine, legitimate grievances;
5. Political terrorisms aims to produce chaos;
6. All insurgent violence is political violence;
7. Terrorism is exclusively a problem relating to internal political conditions;
8. Political terrorism is a strategy of futility;
9. Terrorism is a response to the violence of institutions (Bonate);
10. Terrorism is choice of those who lack the patience of revolutionaries (Bonate);
11. The disintegration of society or a failed state provokes the formation of terrorist groups (Bonate);
12. Terrorists need to gain recognition or attention for a particular cause or grievance (Bell, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981; B.M. Jenkins, 2002). Jenkins uses the metaphor of ‘terrorism-as-theatre’, that is, ‘terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead’;

The existing literature suggests that the goal of Islamic extremist/terrorist organisations is to politicise religion or a particular ideology (Ardila, 2002; El-Saeed, 1996; Ibrahim, 1993; Moaddel & Karabenick, 2008; Piazza, 2008) by toppling secular governments (El-Saeed, 1996; Hafez, 2003; Ibrahim, 1980, 1988; Phillips, 2005; Reid, 2002) as well as establishing authentic Islamic governments and implement Islamic laws and its world view (Ali, 2006; Foudah, 1988; Jacoby, 2010; Kepel, 2002; Manji, 2003; Mazarr, 2004; Piven, 2002; Sageman, 2004). These observers suggest the following as the causes for the surge of Islamic extremism/terrorism in Islamic countries:

- The undemocratic political systems that exist in Arab countries (Ahmed, 1993; Ghadbian, 2000; Isam, 2006). These governments are seen as either stooges of the West or authoritarian regimes which are no longer representative of the people’s will or reflecting the ‘true path of Islam’.

- The political exclusion and repressive political environments in which the vast majority of Muslims have been living (Hafez, 2003; McCauley, 2002) such as deprivation of freedom, incarceration, suffering under repressive regimes and other poor human rights conditions (Ameen, 1993; Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006; Mazarr, 2004; E. Newman, 2006; Summy, 2002).

- The decline of the Muslim world from a strong civilisation into a marginalised region of the world (Harvey, Sullivan, & Groves, 2005; Kepel, 2002; J. M. Post, et al., 2009; Vaillancourt & Boyd, 2007). This is because it is seen as ‘losing its way’. It can only be recaptured by returning to the true message of Islam.
• The portrayed discrepancy between the rich West and the poor Islamic world (Aggarwal, 2009; Borum, 2003; Campain, 2006; de Kadt, 2005; Dingley, 2010; Feldman, 2009; Pratt, 2007; Shalaan, 1993; Vaillancourt & Boyd, 2007; K Von Hippel, 2002) as well as the clash of values and ideology (Cronin, 2002/03; Hirst, 2007; E. Newman, 2006; Richmond, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

• The history of occupation of Arab/Islamic countries by Western countries, Western expansionism and colonialism, imperial domination, eurocentricism and ongoing political interference (J. Bartlett; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Cronin, 2002/03; Hassan, 2008; Jones & Smith, 2010; M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008; Mullins, 2009; Pape, 2003; Wilhelmsen, 2009; Winkates, 2006; Wintrobe, 2006).

• The history of conflict between Israel and the Arab world (the Israeli–Palestinian conflict) and the humiliating defeat of three Arab countries by Israel in 1967 (Ameen, 1993; Pape, 2003; Summy, 2002). The Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and the failure of Arab socialism, pan-Arabism and other political ideologies witnessed a political vacuum. This exposed the impotency of Arab regimes to the extent that the Islamic population felt hatred, alienation and handicap, particularly against the Americans and Israelis (Mobasher, 2006).

• The extra efforts by Islamic governments to show that they are also religious. This has been manifested in the substantial increase of religious programs on television, radio, and in newspapers and books. This allowed Islamic extremists to penetrate the educational system and spread extremism (Bendle, 2008a; Ghadbian, 2000; Hinkson, 2005; Isam, 2006).

• The surge in Islamic extremism/terrorism is used by ruling governments to fight communism or other political opponents (Ameen, 1993; Ghadbian, 2000; Moghadam, 2006; Richmond, 2003). In today’s climate it is about the division of the world into two camps, ‘you are with us or against us’, the good and evil; a similar dichotomy as in the past but a different player. Pre-9/11 for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, presence of American troops – who are referred to as infidels by Islamic extremists – in the holy land of Islam (Saudi Arabia) during the Gulf war, the USA’s invasion of Iraq (Al-Zawahiri, 2005; Camilleri, 2002; Drummond, 2002; Ghadbian, 2000; Jacoby, 2010; Maogoto, 2003).

• The availability of funds from the extremely wealthy Arab countries to control the political agenda through religion in the Arab world (Ameen, 1993). This includes Saudi Arabia’s immense financial support of the Islamic movement and exporting its extreme Islamic ideologies and teachings in Islamic countries (Stern, 2003) and around the Western world. One manifestation of this is the Saudi government’s financing of many Muslim schools and mosques in the West. It has been argued that this has resulted in the deterioration of moderation in some Arab countries in the last five decades and introduced radicalised Muslim views (Wahhabism) in Western institutions, such as American prisons and university campuses (Husain, 2005; Kanany-Minesot, 1995).
• The Iranian Islamic revolution and Khomeini’s use of rhetoric such as Islam is the defender of ‘the weak, dis inhalerited, the oppressed’ (Kepel, 2002). This in turn was the catalyst, which spurred political Islam on the international spectrum in modern times and influenced regional and domestic politics in countries such as Lebanon and the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

• The frustration of the masses in the Muslim world against their own governments because of the unequal distribution of power (Lawal, 2002), corruption with the prevalence of nepotism, unrepresentativeness and inefficiency of government; the enormous police and military powers that lack large-scale public support; political deficits, while the masses are left struggling under totalitarian regimes (Campain, 2006; Dalacoura, 2006; Hafez, 2003). This includes the perception among the masses that Arab governments are influenced by Western governments (McCauley, 2002).

• The constant propaganda of the extremists and the anti-Government slogans in the Islamic world. Some of these slogans advocate that ‘Islam is the solution’ and that the creation of an Islamic state is the solution to the problems of the masses (Borgu, 2004; Foudah, 1988; Harvey, et al., 2005; Ibrahim, 1988; Manji, 2003; Tanveer, 2005). The people are told that Islamic states that use Islamic law will guarantee them a better society with respect to employment, housing, and marriage (Ameen, 1993; Feeney, 2002).

3.1.2 Socio-Economic causes

Several sociological and economic reasons have been suggested as the causes for the surge of Islamic extremism in the Islamic world; among them is poverty (Ahmed, 1993; Ameen, 1993; Ardila, 2002; Orbach, 2001). This includes: the enormous discrepancy between the rich and the poor (Ibrahim, 1980; McCauley, 2002), the government control of the sources of wealth (McCauley, 2002), the general economic decline (Mazarr, 2004), the high rate of unemployment (Sageman, 2004), the cultural insulation and sense of being disenfranchised from communities, and a culture of feeling hopeless and ineffective (Feeney, 2002; Orbach, 2001). The extremists’ strategy (Hamas, FIS of Algeria) of spreading their views and developing a support base takes advantage of these socio-economic conditions. They achieve this by raising the profile of the political and humanitarian wings of their organisations. Backed by finances from Arab oil rich countries some extremists have offered free social services to the poor and needy at the grass root level, in effect becoming a quasi state within a state, as an alternative to the poor services provided by legitimate Governments (Ahmed, 1993; Ameen, 1993; Stern, 2003).

Successful movements will often provide public goods to their members while imposing significant barriers to entry that exclude all but the most committed. De Mesquita (2008) provides empirical evidence that terrorist groups organised along these lines are more deadly and effective. Thus, the argument goes, the economy matters to the extent that a failed economy and failed government produce demand for social services not provided by the government, creating a (de Mesquita, 2008:3) niche for extremist factions to fill. In this model, governments can curtail religious extremists by increasing religious competition and by providing public goods to substitute for those offered by violent groups. As discussed above,
on both the empirical and theoretical sides, the literature lacks a thorough understanding of
the relationship between a variety of structural and strategic features of the political economic
environment (e.g., the economy, democracy, political freedom, counter-terrorism) and
terrorism.

This has largely been encapsulated in the literature of the last decade and more specifically
three positions have dominated government, policy officers, and academia. These positions
suggest that the economic implications of terrorism are grouped in the following arguments:

1. Poverty: the reasons for terrorism
2. The Relationship between Globalisation and Terrorism
3. Blame the market system - leading to the division between the haves and have-nots

3.1.3 Poverty: The Reasons for Terrorism?

‘We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror’ – Pres. George W Bush

Immediately following the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 US President George W
Bush led the pack in claiming that poverty leads to terrorism and it was the world’s obligation
to eliminate poverty to make the world a safer place. He said: "We fight poverty because hope
is the answer to terror . . . We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of
education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize"
(Spoken at the U.N. Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, 22 March
2002 quoted by M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008:67). This view is based on the assumption that
poverty and ignorance are the roots causes of terrorism and that by dealing with poverty will
lead to a significant drop in the support for terrorism.

Poverty in many developing nations remains heartbreaking and wretched. A great deal of
attention post 9/11 was placed on the human development indicators of the Arab world, the
broader Middle East, and Muslim dominant countries found in the sub-continent,
Afghanistan, Indonesia and elsewhere. This is also reflected in the available literature.
Depressed economic conditions included – high malnutrition, low life expectancy, high
unemployment, low levels of education and literacy, low levels of health care, widespread
poverty.

The reasons for poverty in a number of developing nations range from: domestic and external
influences; internal political processes and practices - particularly institutionalised forms of
corruption, clientalism and mismanagement; corrupt and authoritarian regimes (Camilleri,
2002; Summy, 2002).

Returning to President Bush’s thesis, that there exists a link between terrorism and poverty,
economic and political theories have emerged stating that this proposition is not largely
supported (Abadie 2006). Although in some circumstances, the link between terrorism and
poverty, such as among the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Gurr, 2006) or the case of Kashmir
(Stern, 2003) can be seen. This is not the case for the Palestinians, Saudi Arabians, Egyptians or
Lebanese – despite the generous compensation offered to families of ‘martyrs/suicide
bombers’ (R. Hassan, 2009).
In Krueger and Laitin (2003, cited by de Mesquita, 2005) empirical research findings suggest that among countries with similar levels of openness and civil liberties, ‘poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries. Conversely, among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, richer countries seem to be preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks. Much of modern-day transnational terrorism seems to generate from grievances against rich countries’ (Abadie 2006:50). In contrast, Collier and Hoefler’s (2004), findings suggest that the lack of political freedom explains terrorism, thus countries with low to intermediate levels of political freedoms are more prone to terrorism than those countries which have high levels of political freedom (Abadie 2006 cites Collier and Hoefler 2004). Whilst Li and Schaub (2004, cited by de Mesquita, 2008) find no relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment (FDI) or other forms of portfolio investment. They do find however, that ‘economic development in a country, or in its top trading partners, reduces terrorism in that country’.

Vaillancourt and Boyd (2007) dispute the causal relationship between poverty and extremism/terrorism arguing there are more poor people than there are terrorists or acts of terror. David Keen’s research suggests that poverty contributes indirectly towards political violence and/or terrorism (Gurr, 2006). Research also suggests that historically as well as among contemporary movements socioeconomic marginalisation and social inequalities are some of the grievances raised publicly as opposed to poverty per se (Gurr, 2006). This is seen in the cases of Hezbollah, Provisional IRA, and the Tamil Tigers.

Another concern raised by the Bush Administration when considering the poverty debate is the role of education. In reality many Islamic associations and organisations provide access to goods and services which governments have failed to deliver. Most of these organisations are charity associations with the objective of meeting the needs of the poor and needy. On the other hand there are some associations or organisations that do have ulterior motives, usually political. In both cases, the schools available through these organisations are heavily subsidised or free. Children, especially in poorer countries such as Somalia, Pakistan or parts of Indonesia and Egypt, are provided books, food, and clothing at no or minimal cost to the family. In some of these schools or madrasas (Qur ‘anic schools) children are taught to despise 'corrupting Western influences' from an early age, and gain few practical skills for modern society (K Von Hippel, 2007:96-97).

Krueger and Maleckova (2003, cited by de Mesquita, 2008) argue that, since terrorists are neither poor nor poorly educated, the economy and education are not important determinants of terrorism. Indeed, in a recent book, Krueger argues, “there is not much question that poverty has little to do with terrorism” (Krueger 2007, cited by de Mesquita, 2008). This is backed by Sarwono (2008) who presents a formal model to argue that, although the evidence regarding the socio-economic status of individual terrorists is of considerable interest, it does not entail the conclusion that poverty is an important determinant of terrorist mobilisation. The key assumption in Bueno de Mesquita’s (2005) model is that terrorist organisations screen potential recruits on a “terrorist ability” dimension that is positively correlated with socio-economic status (i.e., better educated people make better terrorists). Benmelech and Berrebi (2006, cited by de Mesquita, 2008) present empirical evidence showing that better educated terrorist are indeed more effective in carrying out difficult tasks. But it does suggest that the data presented thus far do not settle the question.
De Mesquita (2005) and Iannaccone & Berman (2006) take a somewhat different approach, embedding a model of terrorism and mobilisation within a club model inspired by the literature on the economics of religion (Iannaccone & Berman, 2006). They argue that religions are likely to succeed at creating violent factions because their organisational structure is well suited to solving the fundamental problem that terrorists face—mobilising supporters while weeding out low-commitment types.

Research undertaken by the US Federal Research Division finds that during the Cold War period, US terrorists had above average levels of education. The study showed that approximately two thirds of those identified terrorists were individuals with some university training at the graduate or postgraduate levels (Hudson 1999, cited by M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008). Hussan (2001) reinforces these findings in her interviews of nearly 250 terrorists and their associates: "None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires" (Hussan 2001:55 quoted by M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008). Newman (2006) cites Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova (2003) who have also investigated the link between poverty and lack of education and participation in terrorist activity. After investigating biographical information of 129 Hezbollah members killed in paramilitary actions they found that this clearly casts doubt on the theory that by eradicating poverty or promoting educational opportunities is a means of fighting terrorism directly.

Finally, macro studies have demonstrated that terrorism can occur anywhere but is more common in developing societies as opposed to developed nations. It is also more than likely to emerge in societies that are characterised by rapid modernisation and limited political and civil liberties (Abadie, 2004; Gurr, 2006). The Club de Madrid series on Democracy and Terrorism addressed the causes of terrorism in March 2005, and concluded on this point that ‘structured inequalities within countries are breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically’ (Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 2005).

The Relationship between Globalisation and Terrorism

The current body of literature on economic theory and terrorism delves into the relationship between globalisation and terrorism. Globalisation is a contentious topic among political scientists, cultural and post-colonial theorists. For some, globalisation epitomises domination, polarisation, and control by strong markets.

Some argue that globalisation is a two edged sword. On the one hand, economic globalisation opened markets and the free movement of ideas, products, investment, trade and people; but on the other hand these same benefits have generated dire conditions for some regions, countries and groups. Such nations will face political instability, cultural alienation and economic stagnation which are a recipe for the emergence of extremist movements, instability, conflict’ (Sandbrook & Romano, 2004). Cronin (2002/03) argues however that analysing terrorism as something separate from globalisation is ‘misleading and potentially dangerous’. 
The perceived corruption of local customs, languages, religions, and economies are blamed on the international economic system and American cultural and political influence. There is also the perception that modernisation places developing nations in a worse moral situation than prior to its spread with the increased availability of drugs, addictions, crime and psychological problems (Ameen, 1993). Frustrated populations and international movements are inclined to react negatively to US-led globalisation (Cronin, 2002/03:51). This frustration is felt in countries or regions that are experiencing low to poor measures of human development; and where failed expectations and heightened resentment and antipathy of the perceived US dominant hegemonic system dominate thinking of locals or eloquent leaders. Mixed into this is the resentment and anger towards US foreign policy in the Middle East and its perceived areas of interest, together this concoction creates a dangerous and explosive mixture. Government officials, violent extremists and terrorist alike strategically tap into these grievances among those most affected in order to build a support base.

3.1.4 The market system is at fault leading to the division between the have and have-nots

Another school of thought that has emerged links the current market system as the reason why there is a divide between the have and have-nots. Most refer to the imposed IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank conditions on developing markets\(^3\). The pressure to restructure existing markets in exchange for funds has placed considerable pressure on governments and its citizens. This restructuring is usually in the form of market liberalisation (i.e., removal of subsidies and other protectionist policies; deregulation of the financial markets). Economic insecurity, inequality and alienation could foster radicalisation and extremist movements in the following manner: in a highly subsidised agricultural economy when subsidies are removed production costs increase which results in the insolvency of many small farmers; subsidised wheat and rice imports from larger markets (EU, USA) may flood the markets and on the one hand lower food prices but on the other impact on the ability to be self sufficient which contributes to the growing insecurity and inequality of those citizens affected. Unskilled workers are directly affected by these reforms and suffer; unemployment and underemployment increase, the growing insecurity fosters anger, intolerance, radicalisation and violent extremism (Sandbrook 2010).

With the domestic and external liberalisation comes a sharper division in society, domestic and regional inequalities which in turn may exacerbate ethnic tensions. The worsening income distribution is directly related to neo-liberal policies. Forced privatisation of public utilities and some services concentrate public assets in the hands of wealthy elites and foreign investors which further exacerbates inequality and political turmoil. Political turmoil may develop into political strife or disintegration once growing inequality, by class, region and community increase.

Equally damaging is the fact that globalisation not only has an impact economically but threatens entire ways of life. With it comes the breakdown of communities and extended family networks with the promotion of individualism which burns into the fabric of tightly

knit communities. As Sandbrook (2010) states it: ‘propagate(s) consumer tastes that influence the dress, language, food and attitudes of young people; popularise notions of sexual, gender and authority relations that often clash with local notions of virtuous behaviour; and reflect a secular, narcissistic outlook usually in conflict with sacred worldviews defended by local elites’. Sandbrook adds, the homogenisation, secularisation and materialistic nature of society leads to a backlash and a reversion to: ‘a world defined by religion, hierarchy and tradition’ (Sanbrook 2010:1013). This in turn places pressure on societies and states. Thus it can be argued that poorly equipped governments often make for weak states. In turn, this may result in governments inability to prevent terrorist activity or recruitment, or to introduce educative programs to counter radicalisation, VE and terrorism (E. Newman, 2006).

3.2 Psychological

In the past it was a commonly drawn conclusion that a link between personality traits and terrorist acts were a given. However, among contemporary researchers these conclusions are mixed. Some scholars suggest that the terrorists have abnormal personalities with clear identifiable character traits. For example, Thackrah (2004) suggests that terrorists suffer from a disturbed relationship with their own identity and their emotions which leads them to choose violence. Orbach (2001) identifies an inferiority complex as being pertinent to the make up of terrorists, and other authors include a lack of independence, assertiveness, low self-esteem and feelings of humiliation, lack of empowerment, absence of empathy and/or harbouring feelings of guilt and loneliness (Ardila, 2002; Bell, 2005; Goertzel, 2002; Lawal, 2002; Piven, 2002). Others again identify narcissism, paranoid tendencies, and a pre-occupation with power (Goertzel, 2002; Hudson, 1999). Feeney, (2002) notes terrorists behave in an altered state similar to hypnosis, and this state enables them to relinquish their general reality orientation and have their conscious, critical faculties suspended. The following section will examine factors that are associated to the psychological understanding and implications of radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism.

3.2.1 Personality traits

Some research has argued against the idea that extremists/terrorists possess particular abnormal personality traits, or that they possess traits that prompt them to become extremists/terrorists (Crenshaw, 1981; Horgan, 2007; Hudson, 1999; Ibrahim, 1980; Laqueur, 1987; Merari, 2000; Reid, 2002; Sageman, 2004). They believe that terrorists emerge out of a normal psychology of emotional commitment to a particular cause and to their comrades (McCauley, 2002). The conclusions drawn from this research indicate that terrorists were normal and well educated young men (Ibrahim, 1980; Sageman, 2004). They are, however, rigidly devout in advocating *jihad* against non-Islamic believers. They get involved in terrorist acts because it provides them with a sense of self-actualisation, fulfilment, status, power and direction to their lives (Sageman, 2004; Thackrah, 2004); a way out of their routine life (Orbach, 2001); a highly honoured glorious name and camaraderie that is usually impossible to achieve for people of ordinary and unremarkable status (Mazar, 2004; Schwind, 2005).

Some authors have suggested that terrorists are mentally ill and have used labels such as psychopathic or sociopathic (Piven, 2002; Taylor, 1988; Thackrah, 2004), narcissistic (Pearlstein, 1991), paranoid (Juergensmeyer, 2000), suffer from borderline mental deficits, are
schizophrenic types, or passive–aggressive (Berkowitz, 1972). However, interviews with terrorists from different sites have not found evidence of mental illness (Bell, 2005; Ibrahim, 1988; Sageman, 2004). Other research findings have demonstrated that although terrorist actions may seem irrational or delusional to society in general, terrorists in fact, act rationally, and there is no evidence to indicate that they are mentally ill/disordered (Crenshaw, 1988, 1990; Hafez, 2003; Ibrahim, 1988; McCauley, 2002; McCauley & Segal, 1987; Sageman, 2004; Silke, 2007), psychopathic (McCauley, 2002), or otherwise psychologically abnormal (Merari, 2000; J. Post, 2001). In support of this argument, some have suggested that terrorist must be sane to carry out their duties successfully as acts of terror require a level of group effort within which the mentally ill are incapable of functioning. The careful, detailed planning and well-timed execution of operations are not typical of mentally disturbed individuals (Reid, 2002; Sageman, 2004).

3.2.2 Thinking

The thinking of extremists, terrorists, and their leaders is considered as ‘rigid’, ‘primitive’, and ‘unsophisticated’ (Loza, 2007). Some of the literature suggests these individuals over-simplify complex issues (Ahmed, 1993; Foudah, 1988; Shalaan, 1993; Thackrah, 2004), and terrorists’ thinking is extreme (Ameen, 1993; Isam, 2006). The choice is limited to right or wrong or dividing the world into good and evil; exploitive rich and exploited poor; the believers and the unbelievers. Their analytical thinking is not fully developed (Loza, 2007). The actions of extremists and terrorist organisations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. They like to enforce their political views on others and whoever disagrees with them becomes an infidel. They like to convince their audience to see the world as they do (Ibrahim, 1993). They are utopian in their thinking (Thackrah, 2004).

On the other hand the research also suggests there is an element of adventure in getting involved in violent extremist movements. For instance, Bartlett (n.d.:5) suggests that one reason people are attracted to violent jihadi movements is because of the ‘excitement and glamour’ it supposedly offers, whether they be in the form of, ‘glamorous trips around the world to meet some of the world’s most infamous men or running around with an AK-47 in mysterious locations. Violent jihadi movements offer the chance to become a hero who wins respect and admiration amongst peers’ (J. Bartlett, , n.d.:5). Bartlett argues that young men go to these training camps ‘looking for excitement’ becoming radicalised along the way. It is also noted that 7 of 10 European militants that go to al-Qaeda training camps return home ‘because it is too tough, too demanding, and ‘not like they’d seen on TV’’, despite this Bartlett argues it ‘won’t stop them boasting to impressionably friends that they traded blows with some of the world’s most infamous men’ (J. Bartlett, , n.d.:5).

3.2.3 Feelings/emotions

Extremists have been described as filled with disappointment, frustration, fear, disgust, anger, and hatred toward all other faiths other than their own (Feeney, 2002; Goertz, 2002; Hudson, 1999; Husain, 2005; Ibrahim, 1988; Littman, 2005; Manji, 2003; Mazarr, 2004; Piven, 2002; Reid, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Sayyed, 2005; Thackrah, 2004). In the case of political Islamists these negative feelings/emotions are against the outside non-Muslim world, their own rulers and whoever disagrees with their views. Others have suggested that the causes for joining a
terrorist organisation include the need for feelings of excitement and adventure (Goertzel, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Stern, 2003) and the feeling of being powerful and belonging to a close net of friends which they cannot achieve through other avenues (Ibrahim, 1980; Stern, 2003).

The link between negative feelings that promote extremism and radicalisation among some Muslim immigrants to Western countries have been cited as: a) feelings of alienation and being excluded as well as perceived discrimination against them because of their faith as Muslims in their newly adopted country (Sageman, 2004; Tanveer, 2005; Thackrah, 2004); b) rejection of Western culture and carry over hatred for Western values from the original country (Tanveer, 2005); c) the overwhelming effect of adapting to their new country; d) the feeling of being victimised when they see other Muslims on TV being humiliated, insulted or attacked in Palestine, Iraq and other Muslim dominant countries (Sageman, 2004); e) negative emotions making them ready to rise up in anger as ‘commanded’ by God (Goertzel, 2002; Ibrahim, 1980); f) negative emotions and siege mentality that prevailed among Muslim/Arab communities in the West after the Western government took unprecedented security measures to protect its citizens; this in turn, has created a breeding ground for these negative feelings against non-Muslim societies (Mobasher, 2006).

3.2.4 Belief system

Violent extremists and terrorists hold a set of beliefs about martyrdom. They believe that: a) their acts are a religious and a cultural duty (Reid, 2002); b) that it is an honour to sacrifice their lives for God (Sageman, 2004) and that they would receive extraordinarily great rewards for their fight and sacrifices (Ellens, 2002); c) martyrdom is the highest religious fervour and devotion in Islam (Schwind, 2005) and martyrs are promised an elevated position in God’s eyes (Littman, 2005); d) the death of the martyr for God is the most honourable and happiest of deaths (Piven, 2002); e) the martyr immediately goes to the garden of Eden as soon as he is martyred (Piven, 2002; Schwind, 2005) where he will enjoy all what is available in heaven; in addition, for every martyr there dozens of eternal virgins awaiting him (Fiaad, 1994; Stern, 2003).

3.2.5 Mindset

There is no unique “terrorist mindset”. Psychologists have been unable to adequately define the terrorist mindset (Hudson, 1999) because there is as much variation among terrorists groups as there are groups. The chief assumption underlying most of the ‘theories’ around the terrorist mindset is that terrorists are unusual somehow and that the insights and knowledge of psychology and psychiatry (both focused on abnormality) are an adequate discipline to understanding the causes of terrorism and/or political violence. However, other authors hold that the search for a clearly defined ‘terrorist personality’ is a fruitless (Laqueur, 1987; Wilkinson, 2001).

3.2.6 Conformity and/or Belonging

Most of the current research suggests that peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics helps members to remain in the group (Hudson, 1999; Stern, 2003).
Terrorists tend to submerge their own identities into the group, resulting in a kind of ‘group identity’ and group ‘moral code’ that requires unquestioned obedience, dedication and commitment to the group and its objectives (Stern, 2003). By joining a radical movement and contributing to the creation of the Islamic entity it not only provides the individual with a sense of accomplishment but also status accomplishment within the community (Malik, 2005: 15).

3.2.7 Media and Communications

The role media and communications play in responding to and contributing to terrorism, violent extremism and the countering aspects is manifold. First, the media – whether in its negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims or the uncensored images of Arab satellite channels Al-Jazerra or Al-Arabiya - have contributed to the anger and radicalisation of the affected communities, as well as forged further distrust of the media and Western foreign policies. With more independent news channels emerging, and countering dominant narratives of conflicts and crisis, the reality is that media and presentation of political developments will vary according to region, culture and affiliation. This in turn, has considerable consequences on ‘how the general public perceives and experiences terrorism and how it affects their personal lives’ (Jongman, 2007: 263).

Second, caution and distrust in the media by members of the Arabic speaking and Muslim communities are a result of years of experience when their views were misrepresented when aired or printed (Campain, 2006). The dominant frame of understanding violent extremism and terrorism through the lens of Islam and Muslim identity plays out in terms of concerns regarding media representation (Ansary, 2008; Dreher, 2007; Pickering, et al., 2007; Zalman, 2008). These concerns relate to the demonisation of Muslim identities in the mainstream media through easy assumptions linking Islam and terrorism (Pickering, et al., 2007). There is further scepticism towards the media’s agenda, for example, the lack of good news stories on the day-to-day services provided by religious charity groups - instead media focuses on the negative socio-political and religious tensions and conflicts (Ghadbian, 2000). It suggests that the media are ‘the means by (which) contemporary conflicts are literally being played out’ (Knight, 2007). These discursive links constitute a racialised frame of reporting on terrorism, which Dreher (2007) goes on to argue, generates an essentialised and reductive ‘Arab Other’ which is used to explain complex events in terms of Arab or Muslim ‘cultures’. Such a framework operates to exclude “alternative frames of social and political explanation” for conflict and violence (Dreher, 2007: 219).

Technological developments, instant transmission of information and the ongoing question of what the role of media is (neutral, unbiased, factual or promotes or opposes particular positions), make up the new equation in a post-2000 politically charged and technologically advanced environment (Knight, 2007). Making it a broader battle of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ‘captive’ audience, and how best each of the two camps is best communicating key messages. On the whole the media plays a significant role in providing a moral compass of what is deemed as important, right, and wrong (Tester 1994, Campain, 2006). For instance, the recent development of embedding journalists among allied troop deployments, have raised the ire of the targeted communities. Few reporters chose not to take up this opportunity. However, with it came a form of censorship, providing viewers with a one-sided perspective
of the conflict. For example, it soon became clear post-9/11 that journalists covering this terrorist event and the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions adopted ‘dominant’ Western values as part of their reportage, many did not question America’s ‘war on terror’, and few channels or newspapers gave serious undertakings of reporting Osama bin Laden’s speeches, let alone the causes of terrorism or violent extremism (Knight, 2007). On the other hand, bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have equally used modern technology and the media to their advantage and the spread of their respective messages.

Terrorism may also be viewed as a means of communication by the terrorists (Tuman, 2003; Turk, 2004), albeit a bloody message. This theory states that terrorist groups use these tactics to forewarn state or foreign intervention and/or meddling; to polarise the conflict; and to politically communicate its position, aims and objectives (Gurr, 2006).

The importance of the effectiveness of communications is also verified by Stern when she posed the question that the perceived humiliation and the sense of fear they were living were ‘just sloganeering and marketing’. The terrorist leader she was interviewing responded: ‘This is exactly right. Sometimes the deprivation is imagined, as in America. In Kashmir, it’s real. But it doesn’t really matter whether it’s real or imagined’ (Stern, 2004). For members of the Muslim diaspora who turn to violence, this shame could be civilizational, or linked to cultural ideas of honour and manhood (Tobias, 2006). Bendle (2008b) is of similar thought stating that religiously motivated terrorism has little to do with the religion it is purportedly endorsing. In the case of terrorism undertaken in the name of Islam has nothing to do with the religion. According to Bendle (2008b) it has everything to do with global injustice, global domination of the economic and military power of the West and specifically the US.

This argument is further developed with the consideration of the use of the internet by terrorists and as a tool to recruit radicalised individuals. Today it has been acknowledged that the internet plays a crucial role in the recruitment, indoctrination and training of future violent extremists and terrorists. Moghadam (2006) and Weimann and Von Knop (2008) argue that many terrorists incite would be recruits by tapping into their sense of humiliation and anger, as well as offering them the opportunity to “make a difference”, and to work towards contributing to a transnational entity –whether it be a transnational ‘Muslim’ nation or otherwise. It has been noted that since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there are an estimated 5000 terrorist related websites now available (Jongman, 2007; Moghadam, 2006). It is a concern that with the fast paced evolvement and accessibility of technology that future terrorist attacks may be more lethal (Jongman, 2007).

The theory that Joseph S. Tuman (2003) puts forward is a simple model stating that humans are both senders and/or receivers of messages, a process of encoding a message, sending it and the receiver decodes the message. For example, a terrorist acts as a sender of a message, the recipient being the public, the government, an organisation or a nation-state. This in turn, according to Tuman (2003), allows the definition of terrorism to be better grasped. As it is not the act of violence or destruction which is the message that is being communicated, but rather, it is encoded within this activity. Or as Tuman argues, ‘terrorism as a communication process has a rhetorical dimension that is independent of the simple coercion associated with violence for its own sake’ (2003:18). The recipients of this message (government/organisation) decode the communication, create its own sense of reality and understanding of the situation with the
adoption of particular discursive language, word choice and interpretation. The broader
public in turn are recipients of this communication through a mass-mediated message and
particular view of what has transpired. Tuman argues that the encoding and decoding forms
of communication continues directly and indirectly among recipients of the message and the
senders of the message, the terrorists. At this point, Tuman argues, terrorism becomes ‘the
business of persuading’, that is, with persuasion rational arguments and logic are used to
allow a decision to be made according to one’s own free will. Tuman argues ‘those targeted
can still use rational choice to decide whether they will give in, fight back, or simply suffer
their punishment’ (2003:23).

Others researchers focus on the role of extremist media in influencing the radicalisation of
Muslims. They stress that the War on Terror is an ideological battle (Payne, 2009). Some
studies argue that Al Qaeda’s reliance on the internet means that there is a virtual war
between terrorists and counterterrorism forces (Hui, 2010; Weimann & Von Knop, 2008).
These authors tend to use variations of media, communications and literary theories. For
example, Ryan (2007) uses rhetorical analysis to isolate four keywords or themes that define
Islamist militants rhetoric: persecution, piety, precedent and perseverance. Payne (2009),
based on narrative analysis, comes to similar conclusions, but also adds vengeance and justice
and two further key themes.

Some authors suggest that claims about the internet being a site of radicalisation are
overblown. Ryan (2010) for example, points out that the same qualities that make the internet
easy to exploit (namely, the democratisation of media through user-generated content) is also
precisely what makes it difficult for Al Qaeda to control its message.

3.3 Social Exclusion in Western industrialised multicultural societies

The previous sections have focused on definitions, theories and concepts of radicalisation,
violent extremism and terrorism, this short section will examine some of the main points
concerning these aspects within a Western industrialised multicultural context as opposed to a
general synopsis of the above.

In mid-October 2010 German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced at a Christian Democrats
(CDU) meeting for young members that the integration of different cultural backgrounds had
not succeeded, "This (multicultural) approach has failed, utterly failed" (Reuters, 2010). This is
a noted sentiment that has arisen post-9/11 and particularly post-London bombings. This is
not only the case in Germany but throughout Europe and in other Western industrialised
countries which have adopted multiculturalism. These sentiments were present prior to 2000,
in fact with the growth of globalisation and the ease of people movement around the globe,
these anti immigration sentiments only strengthened in some countries. The lack of
integration, questions about immigrant loyalty and the role of multiculturalism was
heightened during this period. These concerns were somewhat confirmed in 2005.
What the London bombings of 2005 also demonstrated was that not all religiously motivated
radicalised movements are directly linked to global movements such as al-Qaeda, and most
information suggests that this group was in fact ‘home grown’. This in turn dismisses the
notion that all forms of new terrorism have clearly structured cells with fully developed
international connections. That is, the London bombing operation emerged as ‘an idea rather
than an organisation’ and one based on ‘shared values, common socialisation, effective bonds and modern communication’, making it far less rigid than a traditional organisation and a lot more fluid, organic and decentralised. This challenges the traditional approach government and security apparatus’ take which assumes organisational hierarchy, top-down command structures filled with jurisdictional complexity and bureaucratic layering (Lynch, McGarrity, & Williams, 2009:39).

This point has risen in the literature on violent extremism, radicalisation and social cohesion - particularly when it comes to youth and individuals from migrant communities living marginalised lives. It is because of these concerns and the continued push towards the periphery that the research suggests marginalised individuals become more readily accessible to violent extremists and terrorists. The key is to recruit and radicalise these disenfranchised people.

Before this argument is detailed however it is important to state from the outset that the literature and anecdotal evidence suggests that those who are prone to become violent extremists are not exclusive to the Muslim populations. Rather they are typically young men, affected by the broader social and cultural phenomena (J. Bartlett). And contrary to earlier research low levels of education and poverty are not precursors to terrorism (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003). Esposito and Mogahed (2007) found that the politically radicalised, on average, are more educated than moderate Muslims (67% of those with radical views have secondary or higher educations versus 52% of moderates); and the politically radicalised are more affluent than moderates (23% of the politically radicalised say they have low or very low incomes versus 28% of moderates’ (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007:31).

Isolation, marginalisation, perceived humiliation, relative deprivation, a sense of personal and/or cultural fear, and the individual’s response to Western society are repeatedly cited as the main drivers behind the radicalisation process (Stern, 2003; Tobias, 2006). Stern observed that: ‘Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation make death and paradise, seem more appealing’ (Stern quoted by J. M. Post, et al., 2009:19) than living. Sarwono (2008) believes that potential recruits lie among 15-25 year olds who bear a number of inferiority complexes, a lack of a developed personality, impressionable idealists and who in some parts of the world could easily become addicts (drug, gambling) but not criminals. Others note that ‘adolescence and youth is a period of experimentation, of identity formation, of a struggle for autonomy, and a time of dealing with issues of intimacy. In addition Bauman (1997) argues that ‘insecurity about belief and cultural rootlessness breeds fanaticism and extreme fundamentalism’ (cited byCampain, 2006:57). Individuals enter a path of radicalisation and subjects interviewed noted that they are empowered after a life of powerlessness, significance for the insignificant and the importance of peer culture (J. M. Post, et al., 2009). This is also backed by Raphael Israeli (2003) who argues that individuals attracted to extremism are a shadow of their former selves. That is, what was once an individual with low self esteem gained a sense of self importance through their newly acquired comradeship (J. M. Post, et al., 2009).

Some studies suggest that young people initially attracted to the ‘global jihad’ may not necessarily be religious when they first join as they may have been recruited through social networks and it is within this network that radicalisation takes place. Petra Akesson’s work on Muslim integration in Sweden highlights that the ethnic tensions between native Swedes and
immigrant groups, particularly young Muslims, come down to the need to feel power, to overcome harassment, to reverse the humiliation felt by these youths. Tobias in turn puts forward the proposition that young people in France may be ‘taking up religion as a badge of rebellion’ as a consequence of urban frustration reflected in poor employment opportunities, lack of social integration and France’s response to this problem through its anti-immigrant and anti-religious legislation. Fanned by global militant ideologies and technologically enabled terrorists can potentially be problematic (Tobias, 2006:38).

Roy argues that the long existing root causes of terrorism (US imperialism, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, abject poverty, western cultural insensitivity, or the break-up of colonial holdings) have existed for decades and aren’t new. What he believes is new, is that Al-Qaeda and its supporters use these root causes as part of a ‘motivational or marketing call’ (Roy cited by Tobias, 2006:38). These individuals are culturally resistant yet technologically enabled which allows them to put forward a particular world view on the web and through other means of communication. Thus the contemporary message becomes one that reads as follows: ‘you cannot be a ‘true’ Muslim unless you are violently opposed to the West, and if you act on that ideological violence you are the more dutiful Muslim’ (Tobias, 2006). Thus the belief system starts to become more widespread than the violence itself. Moreover, ‘born again’ Muslims and Western converts are more zealous, and eager to prove both their worthiness and dedication to their newfound ideological community. This is despite the fact that the religion itself is being corrupted as a consequence of these approaches. Terror groups are succeeding in recruiting young angry men through violence, crime and illegal activities and their message may in fact be resonating. The terrorists charged since 2001 in Australia, the UK, and North America indicate that many individuals became radicalised or affected by foreign policy decisions of their respective governments, particularly in the areas of Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine.

4. Part 3 CVE

4.1 Introduction

The focus of Part 3 of the report is on the discursive frameworks in which countering violent extremism (CVE) is understood and the particular strategies that emerge in those frameworks. In this part of the report, the review of literature is broadly structured according to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power approaches. The first two sections are concerned with hard power strategies that can generally be understood within offensive and defensive frameworks for countering violent extremism. The first section is oriented by an offensive framework and includes military, legislative and policing approaches. The second section focuses on what can be framed as defensive approaches including intelligence, infrastructure protection, crisis planning, and border security. The remaining sections address soft power approaches structured according to whether they can be considered ideological, communicative, political or social. The section on ideology reviews strategies to address radicalisation and extremism and critiques of ideological approaches to countering violent extremism. Following on from this, the section on communicative approaches is contextualised within the ‘war of ideas’ and examines strategies oriented to disruption, censorship and monitoring of media, counter narrative approaches, and language and rhetorical strategies. Political approaches to
countering violent extremism are the focus of the next section which reviews approaches oriented towards addressing grievances through political processes, state building, activism and political support of civil society groups. The final section in this part of the report addresses social approaches in terms of foreign policy, disengagement strategies, alternative pathways, the role of civil society and approaches that aim to enhance social cohesion.

Whilst the conceptual divisions outlined are useful to structure the report it is important to note that approaches to countering violent extremism do not present such clear boundaries of distinction. For example, whilst policing is addressed within the section on offensive approaches within ‘hard power’, the literature differentiates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing and the increasing emphasis on community policing has synergies with social approaches to countering violent extremism. In addition, ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ approaches overlap in the context of countering Islamism which presents as a political ideology in the context of Islam. As a final example of the blurring of these boundaries, the section on social approaches is linked to political approaches through social policy development and implementation. Despite this conceptual and practical complexity however, the delineation of the sections according to the characteristics described is a useful mechanism for conceptualising how strategies for countering violent extremism are framed and for structuring this report.

4.2 Offensive approaches to countering violent extremism

Within a hard power framework, this section addresses what might be considered ‘offensive’ approaches to countering violent extremism including military, legislative and policing approaches. A dominant theme in the literature pertaining to these areas is that new forms of violent extremism and terrorism require new forms of response.

4.2.1 Military

The literature suggests that ‘traditional’ military forms of warfare designed for state conflict present an inappropriate response for countering asymmetrical, stateless and increasingly virtual networks of violent extremists (Arquilla, 2007; Franck & Pierce, 2006). Drawing on the logic of countering networks with networks, a new discourse of ‘network centric warfare’ or ‘netwar’ is emerging in the literature (Arquilla, 2007; Dillon, 2002). As Dillon (2002: 72) elaborates, “In network-centric warfare, information, speed, self-synchronisation and flexibility are said to be at a premium just as they are in the global economy”. According to Dillon (2002) this new form of warfare has four characteristics: an information network rather than a weapons platform as the key military unit; a continuously adapting military system in a constantly changing battlescape with reduced influence of individual military actors; military operations conceived in biological terms such as evolution, ecological adaptation and ecosystem; and, a central emphasis on information as the basic constituent in military affairs.

Given the intractability of waging war on a constantly mutating and regenerating network, a discourse of ‘long war’ has also emerged in the context of the post 9/11 war on terror (Cordesman, 2006; Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin, & Glasius, 2008; B.M. Jenkins, 2002).
Military strategies to counter violent extremism in the form of insurgency are designed to disrupt the operational capacity of terrorists (Franck & Pierce, 2006; Frisch, 2006). As Freedman (2005: 24) argues, “All successful strategies for dealing with terrorism require that the terrorists be isolated – from their potential source of recruits, supplies, finance and targets”. Disruptive military strategies can be conceived in terms of two approaches termed ‘search and destroy’ and ‘hearts and minds’ (Freedman, 2005). Search and destroy involves those hard power strategies that aim to dismantle terrorist networks by eliminating terrorists, their support structures and weapons (Brimley, 2006; Busch & Weissman, 2005). The hearts and minds approach uses soft power and “requires that the military gain the trust of the local people by promoting good works in order to leave the militants isolated, bereft of recruits and practical support” (Freedman, 2005: 22).

Whilst a military response may be appropriate in some circumstance it was certainly not considered sufficient for countering violent extremism but rather a ‘back up’ for criminal justice approaches led by law enforcement and intelligence (Kokoda Foundation, 2008).

4.2.2 Legislation

Following the violent attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 many countries moved swiftly to develop and refine anti-terror legislation with the aim of criminalising certain groups and activities and extending investigative powers. Prior to 9/11, political violence was dealt with under ordinary criminal law in Australia and since then a myriad of new anti-terror statues have been introduced (MacDonald & Williams, 2007; Ramraj, 2002; Reilly, 2007). Developments included the proscription of ‘terrorist organisations’, the specification of ‘terrorism offences’ according to the ‘terrorist act’ and enhanced powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) (Hocking, 2004; Reilly, 2007). The new legislation also contains provisions for executive detention of suspects without charge or trial through preventative detention and control orders (Hocking, 2007).

4.2.3 Policing

Policing approaches to countering violent extremism are shaped by the frames of criminal justice and crime prevention and thus offer a combination of offensive and defensive strategies (G. R. Newman & Clarke, 2007; Storbeck, 2005).

A dominant theme in the literature is that policing within a countering violent extremism framework needs to develop ‘new’ and ‘softer’ forms characterised as intelligence-led, community and homeland security policing (e.g. Bettison, 2009; B. Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006). As Pickering et al (2007: 17) observe:

While community policing and counter-terrorism policing have traditionally been seen at opposite ends of the policing spectrum there is an emerging approach, evident particularly in the United Kingdom, that seeks to import the principles of community policing into national security.

Central to this emerging discourse is the emphasis on intelligence whereby the contact between police and community is considered a key link for generating local intelligence to assist in early intervention and prevention or the application of law enforcement (Bettison,
Good relations between the police and community are considered central to the success of such approaches which incorporate elements of public diplomacy to increase public support for countering violent extremism initiatives (Bettison, 2009; B. Brown, 2007; Keelty, 2008). Within the UK strategy for countering violent extremism, community engagement officers have been introduced to raise awareness of violent extremism, develop and deliver intelligence in the form of neighbourhood mapping and facilitate the work of schools liaison officers, interventions and local forums (Bettison, 2009).

To develop the community relations and intelligence aspects of policing in these styles, the literature suggests capacity building in cultural literacy (Pickering, et al., 2007), long lasting and far reaching investigations (Storbeck, 2005), and intelligence gathering, processing and dissemination (Oliver, 2006). The literature also suggests developing police ‘preparedness’ for responding to mass casualty events and anti-terrorism methods (Oliver, 2006).

Policing also has a role to play in approaches to countering violent extremism that aim to arrest the function and capacity of terrorists and terrorist organisations. Through a combination of intelligence and law enforcement strategies, policing operates to starve terrorist groups “of their freedom of action through denial of space, finances and safe havens and prevent their growth by acquiring an intimate knowledge of their local environment and out-manoeuvring them politically within that space” (Kokoda Foundation, 2008: 171). In this context, policing in countering violent extremism overlaps with other areas of policing by addressing issues such as money laundering, drugs, smuggling networks and international groups involved in organised crime (Brimley, 2006; Gakhokidze, 2001; Mepham, 2002; Winer, 2008).

Reflecting themes within the broader literature on countering violent extremism, the literature focused on policing emphasises the development of networks and partnerships at national and international levels. Storbeck (2005: 11) for instance argues, “it is necessary to foster partnerships among different police services as well as between the police and judicial agencies, security services, the financial sector and private business”. The sharing of intelligence, cooperation in initiatives and capacity building are considered central aims of these networks and partnerships (Brimley, 2006; Crelinsten, 2007; Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Palmer & Whelan, 2006; Storbeck, 2005; Winer, 2008).

4.3 Defensive approaches to countering violent extremism

What might be considered ‘defensive’ approaches to countering violent extremism aim to deter and reduce vulnerability to attack as well as respond to and contain an attack once it has occurred (Freedman, 2005). This includes intelligence and strategies oriented to infrastructure protection, crisis planning, and border protection. Dominant frames shaping the understanding and application of these approaches are those of ‘risk management’ and ‘preparedness’.
4.3.1 Intelligence

According to Lazarus (2005: 25) “From a defensive standpoint, the most powerful weapon available in the struggle to prevent terrorist attacks themselves and dismantle the networks behind them is intelligence”. Through the identification and assessment of ‘threats’ intelligence plays a pre-emptive and preventative role in countering violent extremism (Gakhokidze, 2001; Brian Michael Jenkins, 2005; Omand, 2006).

In the context of countering contemporary violent extremist networks, Jenkins (2005: 14) argues that intelligence services “must be agile, capable of rapidly creating their own new networks for the collection, analysis and exchange of intelligence”. Similarly, Rudner (2006: 201) emphasises “collaboration, networking and information sharing” on a ‘need to share’ rather than a ‘need to know’ basis. Domestic and international partnerships within and between governments as well as the development of intelligence centres according to a ‘hubs and spokes’ model are seen as a necessary platform to enhance multilateral sharing and integration (Aldrich, 2009; Deutch & Smith, 2002; Brian Michael Jenkins, 2005; Lazarus, 2005; Omand, 2006; Rudner, 2006; Sloan, 2002).

The perceived failure of intelligence services following the 9/11 attacks led to calls within the literature for capacity building and innovation within intelligence services to respond to new forms of contemporary terrorism and violent extremism. Rudner (2006: 195) for example argues that:

Contemporary terrorism is amorphous, elusive, random in its targeting, and unpredictable in its tactics. The challenge for intelligence assessments of terrorism is to develop new analytical methodologies that can offer a measure of comprehensiveness, prediction and strategic warning, even though the information available may be diffuse, partial, fragmented, buried in masses of data without well-defined links, and fraught with deception.

Some of the areas identified for attention include the development of information technology to enhance analysis and collaboration (Popp, Armour, Senator, & Numrych, 2004), knowledge management (Rudner, 2006), expertise in relation to foreign societies, languages and culture (S. Atran, 2010; Betts, 2002; Rudner, 2006), the internal culture of intelligence organisations (Betts, 2002; Brian Michael Jenkins, 2005), the professional education and continuing development of intelligence analysts (Brian Michael Jenkins, 2005; Rudner, 2006) and the translation of research into practice (Ranstorp, 2006).

4.3.2 Infrastructure protection

The literature on infrastructure protection is shaped by a discourse of creating defensible and resilient spaces – both physical and virtual – that act as deterrents and can ‘bounce back’ following a violent attack (Coaffee, 2006; Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; Frey & Luechinger, 2008; Kokoda Foundation, 2008). This literature also emphasises ‘preparedness’ and ‘risk management’ (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; K. James, 2008). Coaffee (2003, 2006) argues that the emphasis on infrastructure protection emerged after 9/11 and has altered understandings of space and architecture, with the development of concepts such as the defensive city, defensible space, and security zone. It is not only physical spaces and infrastructure that are
targeted in this approach, increasing emphasis is being placed on virtual spaces and the potential threat of a ‘cyber attack’ (Beggs & Warren, 2009). In addition, this approach places increased emphasis on “how individuals and a broad range of local communities might become more responsible for their own risk management” (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008: 102).

Buildings, infrastructure and public spaces are considered ‘soft targets’ for violent attacks (Then & Loosemore, 2006). To counter the risk of attack thus requires ‘target hardening’ which involves “measures seeking to reduce the opportunities for crime and the attractiveness of targets while increasing the likelihood of apprehension and thus the chances that a perpetrator will fail to act on his or her intentions” (Fussey, 2007: 174). Infrastructure protection approaches to countering violent extremism aim to embed security features in public spaces through urban planning and design. The development of the ‘ring of steel’ that protects the central London business district is an exemplar of this approach and is characterised by an overt policing presence, traffic management, security checkpoints, police operated CCTV, private building security measures and alert systems (Coaffee, 2003). Such approaches emphasise the deployment of surveillance technologies and techniques and as Coaffee (2006: 393) observes, in the post 9/11 climate of increasing securitisation, the “creep” of surveillance is starting to “surge”.

A number of authors have raised concerns regarding the emphasis on and investment in surveillance and technological security measures in approaches to countering violent extremism. One concern relates to the effectiveness of surveillance technologies for improving security (Baldaccini, 2008; Coaffee, 2006; Fussey, 2007). Fussey (2007: 179) for instance, argues that in the context of the 7/7 bombings in the UK, “the cameras has no impact on the actual terrorist events and had only the most marginal of roles in the posthumous identification of its perpetrators”. A key issue that undermines the effectiveness of surveillance is that whilst a vast amount of footage is routinely collected there are often insufficient resources for analysing the footage and generating intelligence (Fussey, 2007). This points to the limitations of technological approaches and the importance of human agents in security systems (Donaldson, 2010; Fussey, 2007). The issue of adequate human interaction with surveillance systems in order to determine the significance of what is observed is amplified through uncertainty regarding what is being looked for. Fussey (2007) observes that the context of uncertainty regarding potential threats and targets creates dilution effects through a widening of the surveillance net and gaps created by fiscal and human constraints. Another concern is that the dominant emphasis on the necessity of technological approaches and corresponding fiscal investment in technological innovation may also reduce possibilities for other approaches to countering violent extremism including ‘soft’ approaches and may result in an “undermining of politics through technology” (Bonditti, 2004: 465).

4.3.3 Crisis planning

Crisis planning entails developing response strategies to mitigate and contain the effects of an attack. This requires the generation of hypothetical scenarios across a diverse range of possible targets, methods of attack, ways of responding and response actors. Cherry, Kainer and Ruff (2003) for example, address the role of physicians in responding to a biological weapons attack and argue for developing ‘biopreparedness’ in Australia. Bartholomew and Wessely (2007) describe the signs of mass psychogenic illness (mass hysteria) and offer planning
suggestions for responding. In a more general vein, Posner (2002) argues that following an attack containing fear and mass panic are concerns for governments who need to develop tactics for calming the population and normalising the threat of attacks.

4.3.4 Border security

Border security approaches to countering violent extremism are based on deterrence and detection of possible threats to national security and aim to prevent terrorists from entering state territories. Whilst policing and intelligence are key aspects within this approach (Storbeck, 2005), the emphasis is generally on technological innovations and solutions. Particular foci in the literature were travel documentation and the development of biometric features in passports (Baldaccini, 2008; Downey & Menzies, 2002; Ucko, 2005) and technologies for detecting explosives (V. J. Brown, 2006; Davis & Prosnitz, 2003).

4.4 Ideological approaches to countering violent extremism

Within a soft power framework, this section addresses what might be considered ideological approaches to countering violent extremism. Ideology is considered a driver of violence through radicalisation and extremism (Bergin, et al., 2007; Jacobson, 2010). Many radicalisation models and therefore de-radicalisation strategies stem from the underlying assumption that thought comes before action, i.e. it displays a cognitive bias. They thus focus on preventing people from developing anti-democratic views and belief in the usefulness of violence, or from developing a particular ideology.

The UN Secretary-General’s ‘Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force’s Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Leads to Terrorism’ distinguishes between ‘counter-radicalisation’ and ‘de-radicalisation’. Counter-radicalisation refers to “policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism” and is used broadly to refer to “social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists” (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, n.d.:3). De-radicalisation refers to “programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence” (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, n.d.:3).

As noted previously, Islamism, also variously referred to as “revolutionary Islam” (Gregg, 2010), “violent Islamic extremism” (Dyer, McCoy, Rodriguez, & Van Duy, 2007), “Islamic extremism” (Zalman, 2008), and “radical Islamist ideology” (Ramakrishna, 2005), is the dominant framework for understanding ideological drivers of contemporary violent extremism (Baran, 2008; Bergin, et al., 2007). Such is the current conflation of Islamism and terrorism that Cordesman (2006: 101) claims “The real war on terrorism can only be won within Islam and at a religious and ideological level”.

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4.4.1 Normative religious practice

Islamism presents a complex fusion of religious and political ideology but the literature on ideological approaches to countering violent extremism tends to focus on its religious dimensions. As Zalman (2008: 9) observes, ‘Islamic extremism’ is not “positioned in relation to any social or geopolitical reality, but primarily against normative religious practice, as a form of worship gone deeply awry”. The counter-ideology is therefore ‘normative’ religious ideology which is constituted as ‘progressive’, ‘modern’, ‘mainstream’ and ‘moderate’ Islam (Ramakrishna, 2005). This has led to an emphasis on selected leaders and organisations within the Islamic religious community as having a central role in countering violent extremism (Bergin, et al., 2007; Cordesman, 2006; Gregg, 2010; Qureshi & Marsden, 2010; Ramakrishna, 2005). Ramakrishna (2005: 360) for instance, suggests that governments should assist “moderate, progressive, Arabic-speaking scholars” to “engage in ideological combat with radicals” and “ensure that the teaching of progressive Muslim Ulama and intellectuals are given greater airing in the print media, on television, radio, cyberspace, and in the mosques, universities, and Pesantren of Southeast Asia”. Religious leaders are encouraged to publically denounce the use of violence (Bergin, et al., 2007) and discuss “appropriate and non-violent responses to the issues of concern based on the Quran” (Qureshi & Marsden, 2010: 135). Given the emphasis on religious leadership, the training and ideological positions of leaders has come under scrutiny with calls for encouraging the training of imams in the host country and raising the qualifications of existing Imams (Precht, 2007).

Ideological strategies to countering violent extremism include religious dialogue, counselling, education and mentoring to challenge “maladaptive beliefs” (Qureshi & Marsden, 2010: 136). Saudi Arabia’s ‘Advocacy and Advisory Strategy’, within their overall approach to countering violent extremism for example, focuses on countering the “radical ideologies that foster violent extremism” (Ansary, 2008: 111) and is implemented through counselling programs and dialogue, advisory and advocacy campaigns (Ansary, 2008; Cohen, 2009). The campaigns in this strategy aim to counter “deviant” ideology and spread “correct views regarding Islam” (Ansary, 2008: 123). These campaigns are undertaken in prisons to rehabilitate convicted extremists or their sympathisers, in public media including the internet, and in schools and mosques (Ansary, 2008; Cohen, 2009).

4.4.2 Multiplicity of interpretations

Rather than promoting normative religious ideology, another ideological approach to countering violent extremism is based on liberal democratic ideals and advocates promoting alternative interpretations amongst a multiplicity of possibilities (Harchaoui, 2010). Gregg (2010: 292) for instance, argues that ideological approaches to countering violent extremism need to foster “a marketplace of ideas - the space and culture of questioning and debating – in order to challenge the grievances and solutions proposed by revolutionary Islam”. According to Gregg (2010: 308), such an approach needs to present “an uncensored spectrum of opinions, ranging from the modern to the extreme and the right to agree and disagree with various opinions”. As Quiggin (2010: 91) argues, ideological approaches to countering violent extremism “should not try to convince the target audience that ‘their view’ is wrong, while ‘our view’ is right. In rehabilitation programs that have been successful, the approach has generally been to demonstrate to the individuals concerned that there are more ways of...
looking at a certain issue”. Such approaches to countering extremism emphasise that “Individuals need to be taught how to think, not what to think” (Gregg, 2010: 308).

4.4.3 Critical and deconstructive approaches

Another approach suggested by the literature employs a critical or discursive deconstruction of Islamism (Gregg, 2010; Schmid, 2010). The idea is to expose tensions, contradictions and weaknesses within the ideology in order to undermine and subvert its credibility. Such an approach, as Schmid (2010: 54) suggests, could be used to “challenge the assumptions underlying al-Qaeda’s ideology, expose its fallacies and dismantle its conspiracy theories”. Gregg (2010: 307) suggests that “Challenging the vision for a better world promised by revolutionary Islam is the best means for fighting the ideology”. He suggests this can be done by demonstrating the ways in which “Revolutionary Islam cannot live up to its promises” and “helping to magnify the divisions and inconsistencies within revolutionary Islam”. Schmid (2010) argues that such a critical and deconstructive analysis can be undertaken by academics and government analysts well grounded in Islamic politics, history and theology but dissemination of the ideological critique should be delivered by Muslims.

4.4.4 Moral approach

A further approach to countering violent extremism focuses on morality and values rather than religion per se (J Mroz, 2009a; Salij, 2005). Mroz (2009a: 7) argues that “values, rather than religion, are the most appropriate counter to violent extremism, since religion, like extremism, is a subjective and arguably Western construct”. Such approaches entail a tighter focus on the use of violence which is constituted as morally reprehensible regardless of ideological justification. Value based approaches to countering violent extremism also seek to establish ‘inclusion’ by evoking similarities and shared values between religious and cultural groups (J. Mroz, 2008). A danger here is that this moral discourse on violent extremism operates to exclude consideration of the broader social, political or historical contexts that may result in the emergence of political violence (Resnyansky, 2009; Zalman, 2008). It also traverses difficult ethical terrain with a simplistic moral prescription that fails to acknowledge the many ways in which violence is deployed by states and ‘freedom fighters’ to address what may be perceived as legitimate grievances.

4.4.5 Critique of ideological approaches to countering violent extremism

An inherent issue with counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies is the inability to evaluate their success. Firstly, there are no explicit criteria for success and even if there were there is no data that could verify this success (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The issue relates to determining whether the absence of terrorist activity in a given period of time is an indication that the strategy was successful or that a violent event was not imminent. Secondly, even if one could prove that a certain strategy was successful in de-radicalising an individual this does not guarantee that they will not re-radicalise.

Another problem with de-radicalisation programs is that many require having intense contact with the person being de-radicalised. But this requires locating and capturing the radical first and potentially conducting the program within a prison context where incentives may
compromise ‘successful’ de-radicalisation. The second problem is that many reasons for de-radicalisation are independent of any action of the government. For example, some cases of de-radicalisation occur when group members feel disillusioned by the leaders (especially when leaders have special privileges over rank and file members) or due to a desire to live a normal civilian life or develop a romantic relationship (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008). Further, Gunaratna and Bin Ali (2009) describe the de-radicalisation of two militant Islamist organisations, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad Al-Islami, in Egypt. Unlike other de-radicalisation programs, this de-radicalisation was not a direct result of government initiatives. Rather it was the effect of specific leaders in these organisations revising their understanding of jihad and coming to view terrorism as unsustainable political activity that was damaging their presentation of Islam. However, as others note, collective demobilisation is less effective than individual disengagement (Fink & Hearne, 2008).

A number of commentators in the literature critique the breadth and appropriateness of ideological strategies for countering violent extremism (Baran, 2008; Bettison, 2009; Qureshi & Marsden, 2010; Resnyansky, 2009; Taylor & Ramsay, 2010; Zalman, 2008). This is because the inclusion of ideological dimensions blurs the focus on violence and the field of countering violent extremism becomes “nearly breathtaking in its potential sweep” (Zalman, 2008: 19). As Qureshi and Marsden (2010: 133) observe, “debate has often confounded acceptable, non-violent, ‘radical’ attitudes, with the behaviour of a minority who carry out illegal acts of violence”. Bettison (2009: 3) argues that “We should not overreact to radical thoughts or teachings. Radical ideology has shaped the world, and the democratic world, throughout our history. It is violent attacks - intended, planned and executed - that are our focus in law enforcement”. Despite being undemocratic, countering ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ ideology with a normative ‘moderate’ position also undermines the open discussion of radical ideas and political issues (Kundnani, 2009). Rather than counter ‘radical’ ideologies Qureshi and Marsden (2010: 135) suggest approaches should be directed “towards countering the belief that violence is a legitimate response and natural corollary of such attitudes”.

4.5 Communicative approaches to countering violent extremism

‘New’ forms of violent extremism are understood as having entered into communicative, information and symbolic terrain and action (Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010; Richmond, 2003; Schmid, 2001) and the relationship between the media and terrorism is often characterised as symbiotic (Cvrtila & Peresin, 2009; Frey & Luechinger, 2008). Following a violent attack, the media is a strategic tool that terrorists depend on for generating publicity and creating and spreading an atmosphere of fear (Cvrtila & Peresin, 2009; Frey & Luechinger, 2008; Kalu, 2009; Shapiro, 2002) (Also see part 2: Media and Communications). However, violent extremists and terrorist organisation also use the media for “critical processes such as recruiting, training, propaganda, planning, surveillance, and coordination and communication” (Pollard, 2007: 236).

Communicative approaches to countering violent extremism aim to disrupt the narratives and representations generated by terrorists and promote counter-narratives and representations of the ‘west’ through public diplomacy strategies to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of real and potential constituents and sympathisers. In this ‘war of ideas’, states and violent extremists struggle over legitimacy and credibility upon a communicative terrain (Chowdhury & Krebs,
This communicative terrain is situated within the context of what is understood as an ‘information society’, characterised by global communication networks and new media. As a result ‘new’ approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism are increasingly oriented to networked communication technologies such as the internet and World Wide Web (T. Stevens, 2010). In the UK for example, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) is “actively exploring the potential of new media platforms like blogs and social networking sites to propagate counter-narratives as part of the broader countering violence extremism project” and have “commissioned specific research on audience segmentation, online behaviours of young British Muslim youth, media consumption patterns amongst British Muslims, and the role of blogs in radicalisation” (T. Stevens, 2010: 117-118). Saudi Arabia’s ‘Advocacy and Advisory Strategy’ also incorporates media based strategies with television series and documentaries featuring terrorist confessions and Muslim scholars, including interviews with scholars who have recanted fatwas that support terrorists (Ansary, 2008). In addition, their ‘National Solidarity’ campaign features posters and signs that broadcast anti-terrorism slogans and messages and art exhibitions that promote moderation (Ansary, 2008).

4.5.1 Disruption, censorship and monitoring

One approach to countering the communicative aspects of violent extremism is the use of strategies to disrupt or censor media online through technical or legal restrictions or monitor the use of media by terrorists in order to gather intelligence on ideology and motivation (Kohlmann, 2006; Shapiro, 2002). Brimley (2006) suggests that hate speech laws can be brought to bear on internet sites to prevent the message of violent extremists from being disseminated and that the online presence of terrorist figures can be monitored or attacked. Cvrilia and Perešin (2009) argue that counter-measures need to be directed towards the ‘flow’ of information and should aim to create disturbances that interrupt the flow or generate disinformation to confuse and subvert the message of violent extremists. To effectively generate intelligence from online media, Kohlmann (2006) argues that governments need to develop IT capacity to learn how to monitor terrorist activity online and also develop cultural and linguistic capacity for assessing online content. In terms of media coverage following a violent attack, a number of commentators in the literature have made calls for or have offered recommendations for media guidelines to inform ‘responsible’ coverage (Cvrtila & Perešin, 2009; Schmid, 2001).

Censorship approaches to countering communicative and media based aspects of violent extremism are beset by issues of control due to the open, fluid and constantly mutating nature of contemporary online media. As Stevens’ (2010: 117) observes, “Due to the ‘perpetual beta’ nature of online environments and the recombinant social media concept, total message control is both impossible and unwise”. Evidence that supports this point comes from research that discovered a large portion of ‘terrorist’ media utilises content from western media sources:

An analysis of a hundred threads culled from the ‘politics, jihad and current affairs’ section of the former of these forums at three periods over the past year reveals that, far from being a major conduit of the propaganda of terrorist groups, the majority of leading posts in this forum come from
mainstream, Western media sources such as the BBC, CNN, Reuters and the Associated Press. (Taylor & Ramsay, 2010: 105)

According to Taylor and Ramsay (2010: 105) the terrorist forums used this content to “present a discourse in which Muslims are perceived as relentlessly persecuted both by non-Muslim powers and by hypocritical pseudo-Muslim rulers, who act in collusion with the outside forces”. Given that media content can be reinscribed to suit different agendas, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to prohibit or censor media on the basis of content. Moreover, Stevens’ (2010) argues that if governments are seen to repress content through censorship, such actions could result in user backlash and thus, be counterproductive. Given the nature of global media realities, which enable the proliferation of multiple, contextual and dynamic meanings, Zalman (2008) argues a better approach would be to work with rather than against these realities. Such an approach would entail identifying and disseminating a variety of interpretations for events. Similarly, Frey and Leuchinger (2008: 109) suggest that rather than a policy of regulation, governments can “divert attention from terrorist organisations and their goals by supplying more information to the public than desired by the terrorist group responsible for a particular violent act”. A tactic associated with such a strategy would be to attribute a violent event to more than one group and thus diffuse the opportunity for publicity and propaganda and render terrorism as a communicative strategy less effective (Frey & Leuchinger, 2008).

4.5.2 Counter-narrative approaches to countering communicative aspects of violent extremism

Rather than censorship and disruption, the literature is increasingly emphasising the deployment of a diverse range of counter-narratives (Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010; De Graaff, 2010; Harchaoui, 2010; Jacobson, 2010; Kessels, 2010; Kokoda Foundation, 2008; Qureshi & Marsden, 2010). Similar to the ‘democratic’ approach to countering ideology discussed previously, Harchaoui (2010: 129) suggests that “the counter-narrative that is formulated as a response to violent (jihadist) extremism should be a heterogeneous one. In this way, counter-narratives will express the democratic discourse”. Narrative suggestions offered in the literature include: representing the ‘west’ as offering life whereas violent extremists champion death and destruction (De Graaff, 2010); emphasising Muslim and civilian suffering caused by terrorists and violent extremists (Jacobson, 2010; Kessels, 2010); delegitimising terrorists by portraying them as immoral criminals who transgress Muslim principles (Jacobson, 2010; Kessels, 2010; Kokoda Foundation, 2008) or as destructive interlopers or the ‘puppets’ of foreign powers who lack the right to levy claims on the polity (Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010); emphasising the non-violent nature of Islam and the rejection of violence as a strategy for addressing grievances (Qureshi & Marsden, 2010); and, depicting life as a member of a terrorist group as difficult, financially unstable and filled with fear (Jacobson, 2010; Kessels, 2010). Kessels (2010: 8) also suggests the value of silence or a non-response, arguing that “it must at the same time be stressed that not taking any action and /or refraining from communicating a certain message or counter-narrative is also a narrative in itself”.

Another approach suggests that rather than countering the narratives deployed by terrorists and violent extremists, western democratic nations need to construct their own narratives
(Kokoda Foundation, 2008). Such an approach speaks to traditional public diplomacy campaigns (Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; O’Neil, 2007). O’Neil (2007: 483) for example, argues that “more effort needs to be expended in promoting an image of Australia that emphasises tolerance, open-mindedness and a commitment to overlapping values help widely in many Asian states; that is, the central role of family, economic prosperity, cultural respect and education”. Desker and Ramakrishna (2002) suggest that the west should present and disseminate images and narratives of amity between western and Muslim societies. In terms of representation of foreign policy positions, Kessels (2010) argues that a political narrative is needed that emphasises the values of western political processes and investments in the developing world to oppose narratives of a western global agenda to oppress Islamic nations.

4.5.3 Counter-narrative considerations

In light of the increasing emphasis on counter-narrative approaches within strategies for countering violent extremism, a number of concerns and issues for consideration have been raised in the literature. Taylor and Ramsay (2010: 109) for instance assert:

Until we can be sure what the counter-narratives should be addressing, and how we can identify the content and actors they should target, we will not be able to judge whether what we do either works, or even influences behavioural outcomes. This must raise serious policy questions, which, given the extent of public attention to this area, is a source of concern.

Similarly, Harchaoui (2010) and Kessels (2010) suggest that counter-narrative considerations must include the scale of the narrative, whether global, national or local, a definition of the recipient, whether the entire Muslim population, a certain group with particular religious beliefs or solely the radicals and extremists, and the content of the narrative in terms of the use of violence or religious interpretations and concepts for example. The presumed effectiveness of promoting democratic principles to Muslim communities is questioned by some commentators on the basis that “poll after poll of Muslim populations has revealed, no mainstream populations contest either the value of civil liberties in the United States or the value of freedom of worship and they do not need convincing of their virtues” (Quiggin, 2010; Zalman, 2008: 10). The author or source of the counter-narrative was another dimension raised for consideration and Kessels (2010) suggests that local communities, religious leaders, social workers, young Muslims and their families, and former violent extremists are the best sources for counter-narratives since governments are not perceived as credible or trustworthy. To improve credibility the literature argues that governments must align the rhetoric of their policy with their actions (De Graaff, 2010; Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; Kokoda Trilogy Proceedings: Towards an Effective Strategy for Countering Islamist Terror,” 2008; Schmid, 2010; Zalman, 2008). As Zalman (2008) suggests, “Communications must be crafted in which actions, policies, and rhetoric are mutually reinforcing activities”.

4.5.4 Language and rhetorical strategies

A concern with language is evident in the literature on countering violent extremism (Armstrong, Chin, & Leventer, 2008; Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010; Confronting Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 2005; Thomas, 2009; Zalman, 2008). These
concerns are based on the insight that communicative practices of language and representation shape experience and action and have the potential to create tensions, conflict and violence. As Chowdhury and Krebs (2010: 126) argue language is a “matter of both semantics and some consequence”.

In a policy paper on language strategies for countering violent extremism written for the EastWest Institute, Zalman (2008) recommends correctives in three areas in response to US government statements on religious extremism: to refrain from reductive statements that suggest religious ideology is the sole source of contemporary violent extremism and geopolitical generalising of the ‘West’ and ‘Muslim World’ or ‘us’ and ‘them’, and that substituting ‘extremism’ for ‘terrorism’ is not sufficient to address the issues that arise from indiscriminate use of terms such as ‘terrorism’.

In light of the perceived importance of language, a number of governments including those in the EU, UK, US and Australia have invested in projects to develop language guidelines. These projects have recommended the adoption of the term ‘violent extremism’ and refrain from using aggressive rhetoric such as the ‘war on terrorism’ or ‘clash of civilisations’ and reductive, misrepresentative language such as ‘Jihadist’, ‘Islamist extremism’ or ‘moderate Muslim’. Given that the media cannot be pressured into adopting an alternative lexicon for reporting on violent extremism the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), that delivered the UK’s project on language, recommends that national leaders and governments must make the language shift and this will subsequently translate into media reporting (Armstrong, et al., 2008). The effectiveness of this language based strategy for preventing violent extremism is yet to be determined but early reports from Muslim leaders in the UK indicate that the changes have been noticed and appreciated by Muslim communities (Armstrong, et al., 2008).

4.6 Political approaches to countering violent extremism

Many violent extremist movements are galvanised by political grievances (See Part 2: Political-Sociological ) and according to Frey and Leuchinger (2008), “A growing body of cross-country studies is providing evidence on the relationship between political rights, civil liberties, and terrorism”. Political approaches to countering violent extremism are therefore oriented towards resolving grievances through engagement with mainstream politics and political processes (Confronting Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 2005; Crenshaw, 2010; Frey & Leuchinger, 2008; S. A. Hassan, 2009; Kessels, 2010).

4.6.1 Conflict resolution through peaceful political processes

One approach to countering the ‘root causes’ of violent extremism is to address grievances by engaging groups in conflict resolution and peace processes. As Biggs (2010: 273) argues, “our experience of terrorism tells us that it is best handled through democracy, not in spite of it”. Such an approach entails working with and negotiating with activists in relation to their grievances to develop “strategic planning aimed at achieving goals either totally or incrementally” (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 239). As Chowdhury and Krebs (2010: 125) assert, “Defeating terrorism in the long run requires both undermining the legitimacy of political violence and its purveyors and opening space for the pursuit of a less violent but still
legitimate politics”. A number of historical case studies indicate the value of pursuing a political resolution to conflict. Frey and Leuechinger (2008) for example, draw on the example of the peace process undertaken in Northern Ireland with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) to argue for lowering the costs of a non-violent strategy for pursuing political goals.

4.6.2 State building

Given that violent extremism is associated with ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states (See Part 2: Political-Sociological), one approach to preventing violent extremism is to engage in state-making and build national political capacity (Cordesman, 2006; R. Crelinsten, 2009; Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; K. Von Hippel, 2008). In this regard the ‘west’ is seen to have a key role in assisting developing nations to improve quality of governance through strong central administration, social welfare, national security and economic growth (Cordesman, 2006; Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; Mepham, 2002; K. Von Hippel, 2008). Such approaches are generally framed through democratic principles. Nodia (2005) however, points to a number of considerations that complicate approaches to promoting and developing democratic states. He argues that:

In supporting local democracy groups or by using conditionality in foreign aid, democracy promotion can be made to look like ‘meddling’ in internal affairs and thus help local autocrats to use notions of ‘local culture’ and ‘values’ against the forces of democracy. (Nodia, 2005: 23)

In this way approaches to democracy building in other states might prove counterproductive. Moreover, he questions when democracy promotion might become an illegitimate imposition since “democracy is about choice and freedom, and these cannot be imposed”.

Political activism

Another approach to preventing violent extremism is to build the capacity of individuals and groups to participate in existing democratic political processes. Briggs (2010) points to increasing political activism among Muslims in the UK as an indication of political engagement and healthy radicalisation rather than a threat of violent extremism. She argues that:

The best way to address both the angered and alienated groups and the violent tiny minority of young Muslims is to create a different set of opportunity costs, where terrorism pays less and engagement pays more, and where safe spaces for dissent allow individuals and groups to work through their differences and build respect for one another in the process. (Briggs, 2010: 277)

In this way Briggs (2010: 277) claims that “(Non-violent) radicalisation is part of the solution to violent extremism, as well as being a desirable outcome in a thriving democracy”. Similarly, Bartlett and Birdwell (2010: 27) suggest that “political and social protest and activism acts as a safety valve” and that “New research is starting to suggest that this could be an important outlet for individuals considering violence”. The importance of Muslim groups as a platform for social and political activism is pointed out by Huda (2006: 200) who argues that these groups deserve recognition for their contribution to “conflict resolution, interfaith dialogue, peace-building, education, political activities, civic work, human rights, and women’s rights, advocacy, legal expertise, and humanitarian efforts”.

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4.6.3 Political support for ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ Muslims

Muslim communities and religious groups have been identified as key stakeholders within approaches to countering violent extremism and a number of governments have developed policies to actively engage selected leaders and groups. Those typically selected for partnerships with government are considered ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ and thus consistent with normative religious identity and practice in the west. Baran (2008: 15) for instance argues that “The Muslims that need active support are non-Islamist people who understand the inherent incompatibility between Islamist’s desired imposition of Shar’ia law upon society at large and Western society’s pluralism and equality”. Similarly, Desker and Ramakrishna (2002: 167) argue that “the West must assist moderate, progressive Muslim leaders and intellectuals who want Islam to makes a successful transition to modernity”. Within the ‘Prevent’ strand of their overall approach for countering violent extremism, the UK government implemented local level strategies to engage Muslim groups and individuals under the banner of ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (Local Government Association, 2008). According to Stevens (2009: 517), the idea was to counter radicalisation and extremism by supporting the voice of moderates to articulate “a relevant mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic, proactive and relevant to young British Muslims”.

A body of literature has emerged that critiques political approaches to countering violent extremism that aim to engage ‘moderate’ Muslims. By supporting those considered ‘moderate’ or ‘progressive’, as Maira (2009: 650) observes, states are playing “an active role in constructing “a ‘moderate’ acceptable Islam” that would endorse its neoliberal vision” and are “reforming Islam from within”. Such actions work towards constituting a ‘state sponsored religion’ and transgress the division between religion and state in secular societies. An investigation into ‘Prevent’ by the House of Commons (2010: 4) stated that “There is a sense that Government has sought to engineer a ‘moderate’ form of Islam, promoting and funding only those groups which conform to this model. We do not think it is the job of government to intervene in theological matters”. Finally, the almost singular focus on Muslim community engagement in political approaches to countering violent extremism demonstrates a preoccupation with a religious basis for violent extremism. The House of Commons’ (2010: 3) investigation also concluded that such a preoccupation may be misguided since “the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors”.

4.7 Social policy approaches to countering violent extremism

Social policy approaches to countering violent extremism are those oriented to the socioeconomic, social group membership and social citizenship dimensions of violent extremism (See Part 2: Socio-economic Causes; Social Exclusion). Such approaches aim to prevent violent extremism by addressing the social conditions that give rise to violence or generate support for violent extremists and by assisting members to disengage from extremist or terrorist organisations and provide alternative pathways.
4.7.1 The role of foreign policy in countering violent extremism

The role of foreign policy in terms of conflict resolution and social welfare aid plays a central role in countering violent extremism internationally. As discussed in part 2 of the report, national foreign policies can be a source of grievance underlying violent extremism within domestic borders and abroad. Within the countering violent extremism literature a number of commentators call for much greater effort to be invested in resolving major regional conflicts (S Atran, 2004; Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; Mepham, 2002) and assisting in the political and social development of states emerging from conflict through the provision of foreign aid (Albini, 2001; Crelinsten, 2007; R. Crelinsten, 2009; Desker & Ramakrishna, 2002; Ramakrishna, 2005). A number of terrorist and violent extremist organisations provide social services and supports to the community (e.g. Hamas), often in the absence of government social welfare provision or services of comparable quality (Ross, 2007; Siqueira & Sandler, 2006). As Atran (2004: 84) notes:

Radical Islamic and other terrorist groups often provide more and better educational, medical, and social welfare services than governments do; democratic nations that fight terrorism therefore must discretely help others in these societies to compete with, rather than attempt to crush, such programs for the bodies, minds, and hearts of people.

One approach to undermine the community support of these organisations is to improve the social conditions of communities by assisting nations to invest in social welfare policies and programs (Ferrero, 2006). However, bringing foreign aid and development into the ‘countering violent extremism’ agenda is problematic. Drawing on a US context, Hills (2006: 629, 642) raises concerns that “The Bush administration has broadened the remit of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in such a way as to make it a quasi-security agency” and that “Washington sees developmental assistance as a legitimate tool for enhancing US national security, rather than as a means to promote freedom or mitigate poverty per se”.

4.7.2 Disengagement strategies to countering violent extremism

Understanding why individuals decide to leave a violent extremist group or organisation or why such groups come to an end are areas that have received little attention (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008; Jacobson, 2010). Chowdhury Fink and Hearne (2008: i) however, cite evidence of “common patterns which arose among the factors encouraging disengagement from violent extremism”. These included “familial and social influences; frustration with the group’s leadership or tactics; and longing for a “normal” civilian life separate from clandestine activities and the threat of punitive actions by law enforcement” (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008: i). Jacobson (2010) also cites low wages, fear and wanting to have calm in life as factors associated with disengaging from a violent extremist group. In addition, Jacobson (2010: 75) states that:

there is no one clear overarching reason why individuals have walked away from terrorist organisations. The reasons for a change of heart can be strikingly prosaic: family, money, petty grievances. But they can also revolve around shaken ideology or lost faith in a group’s leadership.
Whilst Jacobson indicates that ‘shaken ideology’ can influence a member’s decision to leave a group or organisation, a number of commentators point to evidence that those who have disengaged from violent activity are not necessarily ‘de-radicalised’ (Jamie Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; D. Stevens, 2009; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Approaches to countering violent extremism oriented towards assisting existing members of violent extremist or terrorist groups to leave the group are termed ‘disengagement strategies’ (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008). Disengagement programs target obstacles to radicals leaving terrorist organisations as well as provide possible exit strategies for people that want to defect. Authorities should consider providing practical assistance such as helping defectors to find accommodation away from former friends, help them in moving and possibly even pay their home deposit, helping them find a suitable job or embarking on education (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Horgan and Braddock (2010) review a number of disengagement strategies including: Northern Ireland’s Early Release Scheme, Colombia’s Disengagement and Reincorporation Program, Indonesia’s Disengagement Program, Yemen’s Religious Dialogue Committee and Saudi Arabia’s Counselling Program. They conclude that the potential benefits across these various programs range from:

- full amnesty, partial amnesty and reduced sentencing, improved prison conditions, serving in prison with other ex-members, job training and education for reintegration, ideological dialogue and redressing of core beliefs deemed conducive to engagement (and possible re-engagement in risky behaviours), economic subsidies to participants and their families, assistance at forming a new family, developing social networks, attaining a job, and cultivating the development of a new identity. (Horgan & Braddock, 2010: 280)

The resources required to implement these programs include qualified practitioners, reformed terrorists, financial backing, and establishing networks between agencies, NGOs and civil society, and participants’ families (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The importance of engaging and supporting the families of violent extremists within disengagement strategies was also emphasised by Jacobson (2010) and Chowdhury Fink and Hearne (2008). In terms of violent extremist groups or organisation, as Chowdhury Fink and Hearne (2008: 2) observe:

- the willingness of key participants to turn states witness against violent groups,
- the reduction in numbers of potential recruits through media campaigns featuring ex-participants, and the reduction in size of violent groups through defections can have a significant impact on the capacity and durability of an extremist or terrorist movement.

So whilst these programs focus on supporting individuals to disengage they can also contribute to the contraction or dissolution of violent extremist or terrorist groups.

4.7.3 Alternative pathways to joining violent extremist groups

The notion of generating ‘alternative pathways’ for individuals in society to prevent support for violent extremists is emerging in the literature on countering violent extremism. As Ferrero (2006: 874) states “any policy that raises the utility of alternative opportunities will,
other things being equal, decrease the attractiveness of any benefits that group membership may confer and hence undercut the people’s willingness to join the group”. Some of the benefits of being a member of a violent extremist or terrorist group cited in the literature include a sense of belonging, solidarity, companionship, social interaction and self-worth (S Atran, 2004; D. Stevens, 2009). Indeed Atran (2010: n.p) points out, “A reliable predictor of whether or not someone joins the Jihad is being a member of an action-oriented group of friends” which speaks to an “understanding that the ties binding terrorism networks today are more about social connections than political or ideological”. Social strategies to counter violent extremism, Atran (2010: n.p.) suggests, need to: provide “hopes and dreams of achievement, and plausible means to realise such hopes and dreams” rather than simply financial support; focus on peer-to-peer programs and not just elders preaching from Koran; discredit idols and give youth “new heroes who speak their hopes”; and, must be implemented from the ‘bottom up’ rather than a ‘top down’ approach. Qureshi and Marsden (2010: 136) suggest that social approaches to countering violent extremism need to aim towards both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ outcomes:

Hard outcomes are those related to skills development, training and education, as well as help with issues like housing or social welfare which project leaders should also be equipped to assist with. These are targeted to help beneficiaries move towards employment and integration into the mainstream economic environment. Soft outcomes involve such aspects as self-confidence, motivation, promoting social-inclusion and pro-social attitudes, as well as trying to develop a sense of belonging in the local and wider community.

Frey and Luechinger (2008: 110) argue that “Isolation from other social entities gives strength to a terrorist group because it has become the only place where a sense of belonging is nurtured” and so an “effective way to overcome terrorism is to break down this isolation”. This can be achieved by developing and promoting other social bodies that can satisfy this need and thus provide alternative pathways.

### 4.7.4 Role of civil society in social approaches to countering violent extremism

Increasing emphasis is being placed on the role of civil society to counter violent extremism within the literature. Kaldor and de Oliveira (2005: 34) for instance argue that, “Non-state actors in all their diversity – non-governmental organisations, social movements, the media, the private sector, the academic community, spiritual leaders, the artistic world, global public opinion – need to play a more active role”. As a place and space for expression and negotiation:

Civil society ensures the existence of public spaces of debate and deliberation, where divergent and conflicting demands can be argued and negotiated without resorting to violence. It is civil society that gives a voice to different social groups and causes, that provides a channel of expression for the minorities and the dissenters, that promotes by its very diversity a culture of tolerance and pluralism. (Kaldor & de Oliveira, 2005: 34)

The role and intervention of government in civil society Mroz (2009: 6) argues, needs to be balanced such that on the one hand governments “take a step back and allow religious communities to engage each other in a free and open atmosphere” whilst on the other “it
needs to actively ensure that liberty, freedom, and prosperity create the conditions for civil society to take root, grow and develop where it does not exist”.

5. Part 4: Counterproductive CVE

5.1 Introduction

In this part of the report the literature review focuses on critiques of approaches to countering violent extremism that illustrate the potential for strategies to be counterproductive. A dominant theme in this literature is that strategies for countering violent extremism can erode democratic principles and social cohesion, increase radicalisation and incite conflict and violence.

That approaches to countering violent extremism can create the very violence they are intended to prevent suggests an element of circularity within the phenomenon of violent extremism. In some cases violent extremism may be understood as a reaction to approaches to countering violent extremism. Within the literature reviewed, De Figueiredo and Weingast (2001) suggest that government crackdowns radicalise moderates, and therefore leads to an increase in violence. In addition Borgu states that ‘terrorism evolves in reaction to the counter-terrorist measures taken against it’ (Borgu, 2004:3; Lake, 2002) and that countering policies can effectively drive terrorists to become ‘more daring, innovative, desperate and resourceful’ (Borgu, 2004:3).

This section begins by exploring how security strategies can be counterproductive by evoking the insecurity and fear that they are intended to counter and by compromising civil liberties and democratic principles. The review of the literature then explores the ways in which preventative approaches to countering violent extremism have tended to incorporate a discriminatory and reductive focus on Muslim communities that constitutes and stigmatises them as ‘suspect’. By generating communities of suspicion approaches to countering violent extremism can undermine cooperation with security authorities and generate tensions and potentially violent backlash. The ways in which policies to engage ‘moderate’ Muslims may have counterproductive effects through increased radicalisation is then pursued. This is followed by discussion of the ways in which approaches to countering violent extremism may undermine social cohesion focussing on anti-Muslim sentiment and the ‘Othering’ of Muslim identities. To enhance social cohesion government policies have been oriented towards building community and infrastructure. However, a large body of literature raises concerns and issues regarding social policy framed through a countering violent extremism framework. Finally, recommendations for preventing counterproductive strategies are outlined.

5.1.1 Insecurity and the politics of fear

Paradoxically, responding to perceived threats within the framework of security creates insecurity (Kessler & Daase, 2008). This occurs because the deployment and application of security measures evokes the threat to which they are considered a required response. According to this logic, Huysman and Tsoukala (2008: 134) argue that:
insecurities are politically, and technologically constructed, hence dependent on the political, social and economic contexts in which they are contested. The political significance and effects of violence depend on the logics, stakes and methods of securitizing, rather than the acts of violence itself. Therefore, the meaning of insecurity and danger is always a question rather than a given.

In terms of the securitisation of city spaces through urban planning for example, Coaffee (2003) argues that visible security methods can increase rather than decrease fear and create a quasi siege mentality. Kessler and Daase (2008: 214) far as to argue that ‘security’ is “an empty concept” and that “As much as we strive for it, it appears to be an unreachable ideal”.

If the aim of violent attacks is to create terror, then according to the security paradox, it seems governments might contribute to the terrorist’s agenda through policies to counter violent extremism. Crenshaw (2010: 7) for instance asks, “Do governments wittingly or unwittingly contribute to an exaggerated public perception of acute risk? How can governments respond to terrorism without stoking public apprehension and raising the salience of terrorism and the groups that practice it?” A perceived threat however, is required to legitimate a response. As Dillon (2002: 77) states, there is “No legitimate use of force without a corresponding discourse of danger”. By orienting the public to a perceived threat and thus generating fear, the government engages in a “politics of fear” (Sivanandan, 2006: 1) to engender public support for policy decisions. The question then becomes how to ensure balance and proportionality of threat and response.

5.1.2 Trading off safety and democracy in anti-terror legislation

As previously noted in section 3 of the report, following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks many nations responded by creating and refining anti-terror legislation. Jahangir and Azzam (2005: 28) observe that the need for new legal provisions was justified by the argument that “the existing legal framework is inadequate in combating new forms of global terrorism, and that special or exceptional measures are needed to carry out the ‘war on terrorism’”. They argue however, that “It is important to note that terrorist attacks do not occur because of gaps in substantive law. All acts of terrorism are already criminalised under existing national penal offences and under international law” (Jahangir & Azzam, 2005: 28). This raises questions as to why specific anti-terror legislation was promoted and developed as a central feature of many countries’ response to the attacks.

In terms of the Australian government’s legislative response, Reilly (2007) critiques four principle features of the development of new anti-terror laws including: political opportunism in the rush to legislate in order to be seen to be responding; lack of transparency in developing new laws; successive escalation of powers in each phase of reform following an international terrorist attack; and, the use of a plethora of legislation. Reilly (2007: 100) argues that:

The relevant point about this escalation is that in none of the four phases had there been a terrorist attack on Australian soil. Nor had any inadequacies in Australia’s Counter-terrorism laws been revealed as likely to be ineffective against the terrorist attacks beyond our borders, the very attacks that prompted the development of the laws.
In general, governments have been critiqued for failing to provide sufficient justification for the development of new laws (MacDonald & Williams, 2007), the apparent overbreadth and redundancy of legislation (Ramraj, 2002) and the effectiveness of anti-terror legislation (Crenshaw, 2010; Douglas, 2008; Lynch, et al., 2009). As Douglas (2008: 99) argues in relation to proscription legislation, “The laws probably do little harm but it is unlikely that they do much good. Arguably, their main significance is as symbols of the extent to which these five countries [Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States] are concerned about terrorism and are willing to resort to unusual measures to combat it”.

In terms of ‘unusual measures’, the legislative response of nations such as the UK and Australia following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks have also been critiqued on the grounds of generating urgency with which to circumvent normative democratic processes for developing legislation. This includes established judicial processes and legal protections of the criminal justice system (Aly, 2008; Carne, 2008; Hanlon, 2007; Hocking, 2003, 2004, 2007). Not only was the legislation considered to have been developed outside normal processes but it also introduced measures that transgressed normative criminal law frameworks. In Australia for example, new anti-terror legislation provided for two types of executive detention without charge or trial by granting preventative detention and control orders which were seen to breach the rule of law (R. Crelinsten, 2009; Hanlon, 2007; Ramraj, 2002; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009). In addition, these measures were designed to be implemented based on intelligence that predicted an imminent attack and thus the legislation creates offences of future crime (Aly, 2008; R. Crelinsten, 2009; Guiora, 2009; Hocking, 2007). Hocking (2007: 186) for instance, draws attention to many of the judicial issues with executive detention in her statement that:

Those held will have been charged with no offence and cannot know the evidence against them, being able only to obtain a summary of the grounds on which the order is made and unable to access independent legal counsel. Those grounds will in turn have been supported by the security service, blurring the line between security intelligence and judicial evidence and enabling what Paye describes as the ‘primacy of suspicion over face’ in the implementation of an executive, non-functional, detention regimes.

These criminal justice issues surrounding preventative detention and the development of anti-terror legislation raise broader concerns regarding the primacy of executive power over judicial process and the impact of this on democracy, individual rights and civil liberties (Carne, 2008; Guiora, 2009; Hanlon, 2007; Hocking, 2007; McCulloch & Tham, 2005; McLoughlin, Noone, & Noone, 2009; O’Neil, 2007; Pickering, et al., 2007; Ramraj, 2002; Tsoukala, 2006).

The extension and concentration of executive power in approaches to countering violent extremism is informed by a discourse of ‘trading off’ between national security and civil liberties (Hanlon, 2007; Michaelsen, 2006; Ramraj, 2002; Tsoukala, 2006). This discourse “presupposes that the long-term goal of respecting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms may be a price to pay for short-term security considerations” (Jahangir & Azzam, 2005: 27). The erosion of freedom and democratic principles is therefore considered necessary for enhanced national security. Commentators question whether such a trade off is justified in relation to the threat posed (Ramraj, 2002) and the relative costs and benefits to security of responding in a way that erodes freedom and democratic principles (Crenshaw,
2010). It addition, it is counterproductive for governments to argue that counter measures for responding to violent extremism are deployed in the defence of democratic freedom and rights whilst simultaneously limiting these right and values through policy and practice (De Graaff, 2010; Sivanandan, 2006; Turk, 2004).

A related issue emphasised in this literature is that trading against civil liberties and democratic principles in the name of security undermines credibility and moral legitimacy (De Graaff, 2010; Ramraj, 2002; Sabadia & Austin, 2007; Schmid, 2001; Sivanandan, 2006; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009). As de Graff (2010: 41) states, this is a question of “how one can maintain to export democracy and the rule of law to far-away-places, if one simultaneously limits civil rights at home”. Moreover, this inconsistency between rhetoric and practice may become fuel for terrorist propaganda (Schmid, 2001) and subvert claims to moral superiority (Tsoukala, 2006; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009). Ultimately, as Jahangir & Azzam (2005: 28) point out, “In the final analysis, such policies – if continued – would leave an impression that human rights and democratic values have failed the test in a critical period”.

5.1.3 Generating communities of suspicion

The increasing spread of surveillance in approaches to countering violent extremism generates concerns pertaining to civil liberties (Amoore, 2009; Coaffee, 2003; Fussey, 2007). This relates to impingement upon the civil liberties of the whole population being surveyed, which blurs distinctions between violent extremists and citizens by constituting citizens as ‘potential threats’. As Troyer (2003: 272) elaborates:

Prevention techniques take aim at suspects to be monitored, infiltrated, undermined, apprehended, and engaged, relying on and in turn reifying stereotypes and other methods of social sorting. Importantly, generalized preventative surveillance frames citizens as potential threats to the state and the political system managed on their behalf. As such, contemporary counterterrorism in the United States is poised to become the regulatory regime par excellence in potentialities.

In terms of methods of ‘social sorting’ commentators point to a disproportionate focus on particular groups. Profiling is often used in surveillance approaches to try and reduce the field of gaze according to characteristics correlated with ‘risk’ and focus the security gaze on individuals and communities rendered ‘suspect’. As Pickering (2007: 52) argues:

Profiling becomes problematic in terms of its effectiveness, and also morally and ethically, when it is not statistically correlated to risk and is ineffective in substantially narrowing a pool of potential suspects. In these cases profiles cross the boundary between professional law enforcement, consistent with human rights, and the territory of prejudice and discrimination. Profiles based on race, ethnicity or religion cross this boundary.

There are no predictive profiles for the purposes of countering violent extremism (Pickering, et al., 2007). In this context democratic and ethical accountability give way to “defeating perceived risks of terrorism” (Coaffee, 2006: 393).
Much political, academic and community discourse raises ethical issues relating to prejudice and discrimination by framing the problem of countering violent extremism as being concerned with Muslims. This discriminatory and reductive focus stigmatises entire Muslim communities as ‘suspect’ (Hassain, 2008). As James (2005: 116) observes, the “apparent shift in focus away from right-wing extremist groups and towards terrorist groups associated with Islam has resulted in dramatic interventions into Muslim communities”. Aly (2007) reports on empirical research conducted with Australian Muslims in relation to the outworking of counter-terrorism law and policy in Australia. This research revealed that Australian Muslims object to the approach the Australian government has taken to countering violent extremism due to “fear that racial and religious profiling was at work in these operations” and “a very keen sense that these provisions will fall disproportionately on them” (Aly, 2007: 201). Similarly, Hocking (2007) notes a growing sense of alienation among Muslim Australians against whom anti-terror laws have been directed in practice. The concern with ‘suspect communities’ has also been extended to refugees and asylum seekers (Baldaccini, 2008; Jahangir & Azzam, 2005; Nezer, 2006).

That “Some groups may find themselves catalogued within samples of suspicion and hence ‘overpoliced’”, can have two effects as Fussey (2007: 188) outlines:

In the first instance, the prospects of community cooperation may be diminished, thus replicating errors made in the war on drugs, whereby entire communities become suspected and marginalised (see Lyons, 2002). One significant consequence of this is the potential loss of viable intelligence. In addition, such practices may contribute towards levels of exclusion that stimulate and legitimate the conditions of grievance underpinning terrorist activity.

James (2005) and Roth (2008) also note that community profiling on racial and religious grounds for the purpose of countering violent extremism can undermine government-community relations with implications for cooperation. This is supported by empirical research enabled by an Australian Research Council Linkage grant which revealed: a concern voiced by many Muslim respondents that the tendency by politicians and journalists to equate Islam with terrorism was deeply hurtful, and had dented Muslim confidence that they were regarded as Victorians / Australians of equal value to those of different belief systems. In some cases this had eroded their confidence in dealing with the police on terrorism matters. (Pickering, et al., 2007: 107)

In addition, the targeting of a community can generate tension, dissonance and grievances potentially leading to violent action thus rendering such approaches counter-productive (Reilly, 2007; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009).

Authors concerned with the erosion of civil liberties and democratic principles and discriminatory practices that generate ‘suspect communities’ cite the potential of approaches to countering violent extremism to be counterproductive and either invigorate sympathy for the use of violence or generate violent backlash (R. Crelinsten, 2009; de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Hanlon, 2007; Hocking, 2007; Kaldor & de Oliveira, 2005; Michaelson, 2006; Pickering, et al., 2007; Roth, 2008). For instance Pickering et al (2007: 33) write:
There is also ample evidence that laws granting police and security agencies broad powers to investigate and prevent terrorism are unlikely to be effective in minimising terrorist threats. If such powers are used in ways that are repressive or discriminatory, or in ways that are perceived to be repressive or discriminatory, they risk creating an environment conducive to the spread of terrorist sympathies and in some instances terrorist networks.

Moreover, it is widely understood that terrorists use violence as a strategy to induce the enemy to respond with disproportionate and indiscriminate counterterrorism responses in order to radicalise a population and mobilise support (Aly, 2008; Briggs, 2010; Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010; de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Wilkinson, 2001).

5.1.4 CVE and radicalisation

A number of commentators critique the presumed effectiveness of engaging ‘moderate’ Muslims. Stevens (2009: 520) argues that state intervention in religion may be counterproductive since research has shown “a corresponding rise in fundamentalist groups and a decline in moderate mainstream groups”. In addition, Krebs (2008) argues that Western nations will not help Moderate Muslims by reaching out to them but will in fact do them a disservice and might be counterproductive. This is because government partnerships with or support of Muslim groups undermines their legitimacy in the community (K. Khan, 2009; Krebs, 2008; Kundnani, 2009; Ross, 2007). Groups that collaborate with the government may be perceived as “willing to join hands with the government against the interests of the majority of Muslims” (Yasmeen, 2005: 39). Yasmeen (2005: 39) suggests that in this context “it is often easier for the radicals and orthodox groups to claim that their views are more authentic than those held by the moderates” and so this might create an environment in which radical ideas gain greater support. Finally, Pargeter (2006) observes that elevating the status of select ‘moderate’ groups serves to further exclude those most susceptible to radicalisation and thus exacerbate their marginalisation. In light of these political issues, Krebs (2008: 346) suggests that:

Ties with moderate Muslims need not be severed, but they also must not be unusual if moderates are to escape the political costs of such associations. The more extensive U.S. ties are with Muslim elites and masses, regardless of orientation, the less ties with moderates will stick out and the less they will raise questions about moderates’ loyalties.

Similarly, Yasmeen (2005: 40) argues that groups representing Muslim interests to the government need to be “more inclusive and reflect the demographic nature of the communities living in different states”.

5.1.5 Anti-Muslim sentiment

The literature on social cohesion has focused on the impact of the Anti-terrorism Act 2005 and the increase in the level of alienation experienced by Muslims living in Australia (see for example Hocking, 2007). Some scholars view the anti-terror laws as impacting negatively on Muslims, their communities and their sense of belonging. (Hocking, 2007). Some academics have looked at the Muslim experience through the concept of social inclusion/exclusion
relating this to understandings of social cohesion (See for example Yasmeen, 2008). Social exclusion is featured in the Australian literature focusing on the negative ways in which Muslims have been received upon their arrival as well as the continued discrimination that continue to experience (Yasmeen, 2008).

In Australia, the ‘White Australia Policy’ has had a significant impact on shaping our migration history. This policy targeted migrants whom it was believed would more readily assimilate and who would pose the least resistance to dominant Anglo Australian culture. (Jakubowicz, 1989). By the early 1970s the ‘White Australia Policy’ was replaced with multiculturalism which opened the doors for a more inclusive recruitment process for immigrants. Nonetheless the literature highlights that multiculturalism in Australia has focused on assimilating migrants and for Muslim migrants, this has often been through processes of secularisation and individualism.

Against the backdrop of the White Australia Policy has been the development of an anti-Islamic sentiment which some scholars argue has prevailed since the early arrival of Muslims in Australia. Since 9/11 this anti-Muslim sentiment has been exacerbated through media representations and public discourse that in turn contributes to Australian Muslim’s sense of social exclusion. (Dunn et al, 2004, Yasmeen, 2008). In relation to this, Dunn et al look at the ways in which Islam is commonly understood in Australia. They concede that “…constructions of Islam are important means through which racism is reproduced.” (Dunn et al 2007, p.446). To this line of argument, the anti-Muslim sentiment is exacerbated by public policy, media discourse and dominant public opinion. Language and its use by government and the media has also become a major focus in the Australian literature post 9/11. Words such as “extremist” and “fundamentalist” used to describe Muslims or Islam reproduce negative understandings of Muslims in general and in turn impact on how Muslims are treated in Australian society.

5.1.6 ‘Othering’ Muslim identities

In terms of the overall strategy of Muslim community engagement, whilst Yasmeen (2005: 38) acknowledges that “the underlying rationale for the strategy is not to implicate all Muslims as terrorists”, she claims such an approach:

unintentionally perpetuates the myth of an antagonistic relationship between Islam and the West. The very act of identifying Muslims as the “other” that needs to be engaged creates the space for those who are predisposed to viewing Islam and Muslims in negative terms.

In this sense, government policies to engage Muslim groups in strategies to counter violent extremism reproduce the discursive frame that constitutes violent extremism through the reductive racialised and religious lenses. Viewing Muslims through a ‘countering violent extremism’ framework also produces a binary formation of legitimate/illegitimate identities “where those individuals considered to be radical are automatically linked with extremism and thereby consigned to the category of the Illegitimate, thus preventing their participation as active citizens” (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007: 185). The constitution of Muslim identity through the framework of countering violent extremism may therefore create tensions and divisions within the community and be counterproductive (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007).
A growing fear towards Muslims has also featured in the Australian literature on social cohesion. Poynting et al (2004) argue that the rising fear towards Arab Muslims in Australia is based on the construction of the Muslim Other which has little bearing on empirical evidence. Some refer to this fear as Islamophobia which is based on an unfounded hostility towards Muslims and Islamic traditions (Rudiger 2001). Boul (2003) argues that since 9/11 Islamophobia has been played out through direct attacks on property (i.e. mosques) and people (i.e. Muslim women wearing the hijab), as well as in the media. In part, the literature on Islamophobia focuses on the ways in which popular understandings of Muslims, Muslim culture, Muslim identity and Islam are homogenised with little or no consideration that the Muslim population in Australia is relatively small and is ethnically diverse. Humphrey (2001: 35) for example, makes the argument that multicultural policy in Australia produces a homogenised Muslim identity ‘as a shared immigrant experience and as a representational identity’.

5.1.7 Community and infrastructure

Building community and infrastructure has been a response by governments both at the Federal and State levels to minimise the vulnerabilities of Muslims and to bolster social cohesion. In 2005-2006 the Federal, State and Territory Governments developed the National Action Plan (NAP) to build social cohesion, harmony and security. The NAP ‘...addresses marginalisation, promotes understanding and dialogue among all Australians and builds on existing government programs, focusing on four key areas: education, employment, integration and security’. (http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/a-diverse-australia/national-action-plan/ Accessed 6 June 2010). Several research and community projects have been commissioned since the inception of the NAP in 2006. Much of the research has focused on Muslim communities in relation to their socio-economic standing in Australia (Akbarzadeh 2009a), their hopes and aspirations (Akbarzadeh 2009b), their civic participation (McCue 2008) and their social identities (Yasmeen 2008).

Since 2006 various grass roots community projects have been funded through the NAP for Muslims focussing on the arts, sports, women and youth. These programmes have been broadly aimed at engaging marginalised Muslim groups throughout Australia. To-date there is very little evidence to show what effect these grass roots community projects have had in enhancing the social cohesion of Muslim groups.

5.1.8 Social policy framed through CVE

In terms of social policy approaches to countering violent extremism a number of issues have arisen from approaches that incorporate community development within a countering violent extremism strategy and a body of literature is emerging that specifically critiques the UK government’s Prevent program (Jamie Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010; Briggs, 2010; Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010; Kundnani, 2009; Malik, 2008; Thomas, 2009). Whilst administered as ‘community development’ by local councils in the UK the funding for projects within the ‘preventing violent extremism’ strategy were distributed, without community engagement or transparency of process, to areas with a relatively high proportion of resident Muslims rather than according to any indicator of risk for violent extremism or on the basis of social needs (Kundnani, 2009). Such action constituted Muslims as a ‘suspect
community’ and posed the danger of being counterproductive by negatively influencing broader social perceptions and alienating British Muslims (Kundnani, 2009). It also undermined the social cohesion agenda through a singular focus on one community group that would reinforce the boundaries of this group and generate animosity and ‘backlash’ from other groups who were excluded from the allocation of funding and resources (Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2009). As Thomas (2009: 285) points out, a community cohesion agenda with a specific Muslim focus constitutes a “self-defeating contradiction”. Finally, an exclusive focus on Muslim communities neglects violent extremism in other communities (Malik, 2008; Thomas, 2009).

The blurring of government agendas through the securitisation of community development programs also led to a perception and some evidence that covert surveillance and intelligence gathering were embedded within the programs (Jamie Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010; Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010; Kundnani, 2009). Such perceptions undermine credibility and trust and any requirement to provide information to security authorities compromises the professional ethics of teachers and community workers (Kundnani, 2009).

As already noted, government policy to engage ‘moderate’ Muslims, as undertaken within the Prevent program, is problematic in terms of normalising a state preferred version of Islam and undermining the legitimacy of those considered ‘moderate’. In addition, within the ‘preventing violent extremism’ strategy, groups risked losing community funding if labelled as ‘extremist’ which could include being critical of the government’s approach to countering violent extremism or foreign policies. Kundnani (2009) argues that this would have the effect of undermining “radical discussion of political issues leading to a depoliticising of young people and restriction of radical dissent that strengthens claims of those who argue democracy is pointless”. Moreover, he points out that the promotion of ‘moderate’ Islam and its congruence with ‘British values’ undermines multiculturalism.

The issues arising from the British experience with the ‘preventing violent extremism’ programme suggest that community development and social cohesion should not be conceptualised and pursued through the framework of countering violent extremism (Jamie Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010; Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010; Thomas, 2009). Reporting on the conclusions of the recent House of Commons Investigation, Bartlett and Birdwell (2010: 10) write:

Prevent risks undermining positive cohesion work by blurring the boundaries between security and social policy and stigmatising British Muslims. Indeed, labelling projects that traditionally would have been considered social programmes as part of a new securitised prevention agenda has led to a number of organisations in the UK boycotting the programme entirely.

Bartlett and Birdwell (2010: 4) propose “replacing the current broad approach to prevention, which targets all Muslims, with a more precise focus on individuals that have the intent to commit criminal acts”. Kundnani (2009: 41) suggests that rather than a state-centric agenda, community engagement with Muslims needs to address them as citizens with their own ideas about violence and violent extremism for “In the end, community participation cannot be faked and, in democratic societies, genuine trust can only come from the bottom up”.
As Bartlett and Birdwell (2010: 10) observe, “Using Prevent to address social problems within Muslim communities has led to the perception these problems are only a concern because they contribute to terrorism”. What is needed therefore is to reinstate community development and social cohesion programmes within a framework of social justice (Briggs, 2010; K. Khan, 2009). Rather than support ‘moderate’ discourse on religion and politics, Thomas (2009: 288) suggests that youth programs need to provide space for the discussion of sensitive issues stating that, “a significant number of Muslim young people, especially those aged 15 years and older, do want to debate and explore Muslim identity, extremism and Islam’s treatment in the media, and in wider geo-politics”. He goes on to emphasise the importance of professionals who are “confident and ready to undertake such work within an explicit context of community cohesion and citizenship activity” (Thomas, 2009: 289). In addition, as previously noted, fostering political development and social activism within Muslim communities has the potential to contribute towards countering violent extremism. Briggs (2010) argues that such development is important given the social justice issues faced by Muslims in the UK and their heightened relevance in foreign policy and politics between the so called ‘Muslim and non-Muslim worlds’. Similarly, Malik (2008) argues for the need to maintain civil liberties including democratic processes and political activism through debate and Bartlett and Birdwell (2010) assert that the government needs to maintain commitment to the principle of freedom of expression by sending the message that it is countering terrorism rather than extremism.

5.1.9 Preventing counterproductive strategies for countering violent extremism

To prevent “counterproductive counterterrorism” (Flint, 2003: 167), Wilkinson (2001: 210) argues that “Above all, governments should try and avoid over-reaction and repression by their security forces”. The literature suggests that to do so hard power strategies for countering violent extremism must be carefully calibrated to be firm but never excessive, non-discriminatory, apolitical (Aly, 2008; Crelinsten, 2007) and adhere to established normative democratic frameworks and judicial processes (Crenshaw, 2010; Roth, 2008; Sabadia & Austin, 2007; Stohl, 2006; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009). The literature also emphasises government transparency and accountability to enhance credibility and legitimacy (Crelinsten, 2007; O’Neil, 2007; Roth, 2008; Wilkinson, 2001). Finally, the need for oversight and capacity building of the security community is highlighted to ensure approaches are well calibrated and implemented with full respect for human rights (Jahangir & Azzam, 2005; Wilkinson, 2001).

The literature in relation to Muslim communities in Australia highlights their social disadvantage. Anti-Islamic sentiment, negative media representation of Muslims and Islam and a tendency to homogenise Muslim identity through public discourse have a negative impact on the experiences of Australian Muslims. However, the literature suggests that strategies for building community and infrastructure and social policy to address inequality disadvantage need to be undertaken outside the framework of countering violent extremism.
6. Conclusion

This multifaceted report has demonstrated the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism and best strategies to Countering Violent Extremism. This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism.

Part 1 of the report provides the foundations to understanding key concepts under review – terrorism, violent extremism, radicalisation and social cohesions. It also examines the theories and problems behind these concepts and how they in turn may assist in future policy initiatives and understandings of these areas of interest. The most significant critique that emerges from Part 1 of the report is the absence of universally accepted definitions for key concepts such as of terrorism, radicalisation and social cohesion. As a result this demonstrates that the international community and academia have consequently taken a piecemeal approach by addressing the problem of international terrorism and acts of violence with particular criminal acts, inherently terrorist in nature, by preventing them or punishing them by domestic law. The problem with trying to determine universally accepted definitions of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation falls on that fact that no one definition to date has captured every essential criteria that has covered studies of VE/terrorism to date. Instead what we do witness is that the terms are both ambiguous and subjective. It is an extremely difficult and complex process that does not necessarily follow a linear path. Indeed, people drift in and out of radical and more moderate groups depending on a variety of factors, circumstances, and influences. For instance, the literature implies that we know someone is radicalised because they have radical ideas and therefore are radicals. This sort of reasoning is unhelpful at best and at worst has the potential to criminalise individuals arbitrarily.

Part 1 also demonstrates the importance of looking at CVE beyond the confines of security, policing and intelligence and that in fact a whole of government approach is needed. Social inclusionary policies are part of this solution. It is argued that such policies can assist in creating higher levels of social cohesion through increased opportunity, reduction of poverty and disadvantage and increased civic participation. The report demonstrates how some academics have looked at the Muslim experience through the concept of social inclusion/exclusion relating this to understandings of social cohesion. Social exclusion is featured in the Australian literature focusing on the negative ways in which Muslims have been received upon their arrival as well as the continued discrimination that continue to experience.

Research of the post-2000 literature also suggests that not much has changed in the field of terrorism studies. A survey of the literature on terrorism generally highlights other deficiencies: first, a lack of primary source analysis, second, a continued general shortage of experienced researchers on this topic, third, the majority of authors who haven’t met with terrorists or undertaken any fieldwork in the area being written about; fourth, the reliance on limited methodologies and levels of analysis; and, fifth, remarkably, little academic analyses is devoted to critiquing research into VE and terrorism studies. This is clearly shown by the
limited number of relevant articles focusing on empirical research and the lack of seriously tested quantitative and qualitative field research or survey results.

Gaps that arise in the literature review also included the lack of clarity as to how individuals move from simply being frustrated or disaffected towards accepting violence as a mode of political struggle. The problem again is that current research still does not explain why some people become terrorists and not others. It is easy enough to show how radical ideas are internalised by terrorists post facto. But this does not explain why some people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised. In fact, the majority of people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised.

Part 2 of the report details the theories, debates and discussions arising within and among disciplines on the ‘root causes’ of VE/Terrorism. Responding to the ‘root causes’ of conflict means that approaches to countering violent extremism need to be embedded in consideration of the social, economic, political and historical contexts in which violence arises and the applicability and transferability of strategies between nations. The literature has demonstrated over the years that root causes are not static rather they are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing. This is the case within and between groups, as well as the changing political paradigm in which terrorism is viewed (Cold-War versus post-Cold War; pre-9/11 versus post-9/11; post-9/11 versus post-7/7), and the changing disciplinary approaches to viewing and understanding violent methods, for instance the impact of poverty versus the impact of globalisation.

This part of the report considered the root causes from a political, socio-economic, psychological and media/communications perspective. It highlighted how within disciplines a range of views exist in relation to explaining radicalisation, VE, and terrorism. The pre-9/11 research identified the following as contributors to terrorism: corruption and political illegitimacy of post-colonial regimes which were largely seen as puppets of their former colonisers and/or new regional power(s); poverty; the strategic use of poverty by supplying basic provisions to significantly broaden an organisation’s political appeal and power base; the ability to fill state functions and therefore realign community loyalty; and, the creation of a world or ideological view (Borgu, 2004; Chertoff 1981; Crenshaw, 1981). It seems that pre-9/11 research focused largely on socio-political factors that might motivate some to engage in violent extremism.

Post-9/11 research concludes that religious fanaticism, revenge, avenging occupation and its long term consequences, and dealing with the “West’s moral deficiencies” are primary motivators. The focus, however, has shifted towards religious fundamentalism, and in particular, “religious fanatics” causing havoc and terror in Western developed countries (Ghadbian, 2000; Pratt, 2007). In this research the (pre-9/11) regional context and connection that can provide crucial foundations to the understanding and appreciation of the concerns, grievances and motivators of ‘home grown’ terrorists and others, is often overlooked. Rather, research focuses on understanding the ideological and religious mindset of fanatics, despite some authors repeatedly emphasising that suicide bombing, as one instance, is not carried out by brainwashed, mentally ill, religious zealots (Borgu 2004; Pape, 2005; Silke, 2003). Differences between the pre and post-9/11 literature show a disconnection between the local and global political environments.
Part 3 of the report examines the development of multifaceted approaches to countering violent extremism through capacity building and innovation to respond to ‘new’ and complex forms of contemporary terrorism and violent extremism. A key tenet in much of the writing on countering violent extremism is that multifaceted approaches are needed (S Atran, 2004; R. Crelinsten, 2009; J Mroz, 2009a). Whilst the conceptual divisions outlined are useful to structure the report it is important to note that approaches to countering violent extremism do not present such clear boundaries of distinction. In one sense this is because strategies are increasingly oriented towards preventing rather than responding to violent extremism. Numerous countering strategies were examined ranging from: policing within a countering violent extremism framework in ‘new’ and ‘softer’ forms characterised as intelligence-led, community and homeland security policing; contact between police and community is considered a key link for generating local intelligence; Good relations between the police and community; Border security approaches to countering violent extremism are based on deterrence and detection of possible threats to national security; emphasis on selected leaders and organisations within the Islamic religious community; engaging ‘moderate’ Muslims; communicative approaches; language strategies; and the importance of history and political developments overseas and how they impact on migrant communities in Australia.

Part 4 of the report examines Counterproductive CVE. To prevent “counterproductive counterterrorism”, Wilkinson (2001: 210) argues that “Above all, governments should try and avoid over-reaction and repression by their security forces”. The literature suggests that to do so hard power strategies for countering violent extremism must be carefully calibrated to be firm but never excessive, non-discriminatory, apolitical (Aly, 2008; Crelinsten, 2007) and adhere to established normative democratic frameworks and judicial processes (Crenshaw, 2010; Roth, 2008; Sabadia & Austin, 2007; Stohl, 2006; van Ginkel & Westervelt, 2009). The literature also emphasises government transparency and accountability to enhance credibility and legitimacy (Crelinsten, 2007; O’Neil, 2007; Roth, 2008; Wilkinson, 2001). The need for oversight and capacity building of the security community is highlighted to ensure approaches are well calibrated and implemented with full respect for human rights (Jahangir & Azzam, 2005; Wilkinson, 2001). The need to allay fears of insecurity and the politics of fear among ethnic and religious groups who feel targeted, as much of the political, academic and community discourse raises ethical issues relating to prejudice and discrimination by framing the problem of countering violent extremism as being concerned with Muslims. This discriminatory and reductive focus stigmatises entire Muslim communities as ‘suspect’ (Hassain, 2008)

The literature that emerges in the post-7/7 period largely focuses on the marginalisation of Muslims and Muslim youth. Many of these research findings are arrived at by undertaking interviews, surveys and analysing a country’s statistics bureau. Finding that discrimination, marginalisation, lack of acceptance, rejection, alienation, unemployment, lack of opportunity, and an uneasy sense of not belonging all contribute to the violent extremism and radicalisation of these individuals. It is argued that as a result of this marginalisation the appeal of well organised religious groups becomes more attractive. Many of these groups/organisations have a tendency to accept an individual regardless of his or her past faults and mistakes. These groups/organisations provide the disenfranchised an outlet where they are nurtured, provided a sense of security and belonging, resulting in loyalty and solidarity with these groups and their ideology. Thus whether it is the radicalisation of
youth/individuals into these religious groups or the encouragement of conversion these are the areas of current research development.

Marginalisation in the host country undoubtedly exists and may feed into existing prejudices or fuel frustrations that can lead to radical politics. Pargeter (2006) is of the view that it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of terrorism or political violence in Europe. Otherwise thousands of radicalised Muslims throughout the West would be involved in VE or terrorism (Pargeter 2006:739). Similarly, Vaillancourt and Boyd (2007) note that in the 1970s social alienation which was a dominant feature of the youth movement demonstrated not all socially alienated youth at this time become terrorists.

Thus what this research demonstrates is that many gaps do continue to exist in the current literature and do require further research and consideration.
7. Research recommendations

- **Develop an empirical research base**

The majority of the literature in the field comprises commentary and critique and lacks an empirical research basis (Crenshaw, 2000; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). Given that some areas of inquiry face unique challenges in the collection of primary data, innovative and creative methods need to be developed. Ranstorp (2006) argues that researchers need to tap into available primary source data in national archives including policy documents and public testimonies, court records and reports, and terrorist websites.

- **Invest in social science and transdisciplinary research approaches**

Much of the research within the field is event-driven, reactionary and technically oriented (Ranstorp, 2006). To develop an in-depth, comprehensive, and contextualised knowledge base for understanding violent extremism and countering violent extremism as complex phenomena requires investment in collaborative and transdisciplinary social science and field-based methodologies (S. Atran, 2010; Crelinsten, 2007; Loza, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006; Sinai, 2007). Case studies are one method that is useful for situating forms of violent extremism and for developing approaches to countering violent extremism within their historical, political, and social contexts. However, relational analyses within and between cases are also needed to develop knowledge in the field (Duyvesteyn, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). Phenomenological and ethnographic approaches would also enable researchers to capture the complexity of these phenomena and develop in-depth understandings of the experiences of those that participate in terrorist or violent extremist groups.

- **Develop scholarship and academic praxis in the field**

Scholarship that conceptualises and theorises violent extremism and countering violent extremism as ontological phenomena that emerge in relation to particular contexts is required. Such approaches would move stagnant debates in the literature beyond superficial issues focussing on lack of theory and agreement on conceptual definition. Contemporary research must also build new contributions to the knowledge base upon the foundations of previous research through comparison, critique and the synthesis of research findings (Ranstorp, 2006). In addition, there is a lack of literature that focuses on methodology and research methods which given the importance of developing an empirical base in this field is required to advance research (Ranstorp, 2006).

- **Develop cross-fertilisation of knowledge between the intelligence community, academic disciplines and professionals in the field to enhance**
the relevance of research and the translation of research findings into practice

Resnyansky (2009: 52) writes that “There is an abyss dividing terrorism research from political, legal and national security practices”. Bridging this ‘research-practice’ gap therefore needs to be an object of methodological analysis and comparative research focussed on how other fields have approached this issue could be used to inform strategies. There are also divisions between different academic disciplines such as ‘intelligence studies’ and ‘terrorism studies’ (Ranstorp, 2006). To break down these ‘knowledge silos’ requires collaboration and inter-disciplinary communication through conferences and professional associations.

• **Research and scholarship is needed that focuses on ‘new’ forms of terrorism and violent extremism**

Given that ‘new’ forms of terrorism are assembled according to transnational networks, research is needed to explore how these organisational forms operate and evolve including processes of innovation within groups (Brimley, 2006; Crenshaw, 2000; Ranstorp, 2006).

A traditional focus on terrorism as an international phenomenon means that in the post 7/7 context there is a need to understand the emergence of what is dubbed ‘home grown’ terrorism and violent extremism.

Violent extremism is expressed through a multiplicity of forms and guises and so there is an urgent need to expand the research gaze beyond Islamism and Muslim communities to the broader phenomenon.

• **Research and scholarship is needed to understand why some radicalised individuals become violent and why others don’t.**

A current a lack of clarity exists as to how individuals move from simply being frustrated or disaffected towards accepting violence as a mode of political struggle. The problem again is that they still do not explain why some people become terrorists and not others. In fact, the majority of people exposed to radical ideas are not radicalised.

• **Research and scholarship is needed that specifically focuses on approaches and strategies for countering violent extremism**

As O’Neil (2007: 437) observes there has been a “shortfall of serious scholarly analysis of counter-terrorism”. Comparative research focussed on strategies for countering violent extremism would enable the development of best practice standards and enhance harmonisation and collaboration between nations and regions (Crelinsten, 2007; Guiora, 2009; O’Neil, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006).
New forms of terrorism characterised by decentralisation and dispersion of ‘networks’ requires research on “what kind of counterterrorism networks would best meet the challenges they pose” (Crelinsten, 2007: 224).

To avoid counterproductive strategies, Crenshaw (2000) argues that it is important to investigate how terrorist groups perceive government actions and whether policymakers anticipate the effects of their actions on terrorist beliefs and perceptions or appreciate the adversary’s construction of reality. He also argues that research should focus on how governments learn from past experiences and build intellectual capital in dealing with terrorism and violent extremism.

Given the increasing inclusion and responsibility of the private sector in approaches for countering violent extremism, “Research in this area should focus on the different agencies that have been incorporated into the counterterrorism effort and examine how they have adapted to working in an environment with conflicting and competing demands for secrecy, openness, impunity and accountability” (Crelinsten, 2007: 226).

- **Research and scholarship is needed on the role of the media and information technology in relation to violent extremism and countering violent extremism**

In relation to the role of the media, research is needed to analyse the ways in which terrorists use the mass media and the mass media has been used in strategies for countering violent extremism (Cvrtila & Peresin, 2009; Turk, 2004). In addition, the potential for media representation to contribute to tensions, conflict and potentially violence is a vast area for research (Crelinsten, 2007; Turk, 2004).

- **Research and scholarship is needed that focuses on pathways into and out of violent extremism**

Long-term sustainable and effective approaches to countering violent extremism require an understanding of the pathways into and out of violent extremism (S. Atran, 2010). Research is needed to explore the processes and drivers of individual and collective mobilisation and disengagement (Chowdhury Fink & Hearne, 2008; Crenshaw, 2000; Ranstorp, 2006). As Chowdhury Fink and Hearne (2008: 18) argue, this “will assist states in better understanding how these processes relate to their counterterrorism strategies and capacities”.

- **A diversity of cultural approaches and discursive frames are needed to inform research and scholarship on violent extremism and countering violent extremism**

The literature in the fields of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are dominated by discursive frames that emanate from western and particularly US epistemology and culture (Jongman, 2007; Ranstorp, 2006). There is an urgent need to enrich scholarship in these fields through alternative cultural and theoretical perspectives. This would include developing understandings of violent extremism from non-western cultural positions but also generating research on diverse language,
religious, cultural, psychological, historical, political, and social backgrounds to inform culturally sensitive approaches and practices (Loza, 2007).
8. References


# Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review

This report consists of a literature review and analysis of the existing research concerning ‘countering violent extremism’. This multifaceted report demonstrates the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism and best strategies to Countering Violent Extremism. This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism.