WHAT ARE THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE?

by

Daniel P. Vardiman

March 2011

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A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine requires guaranteed security for both nations, as well as commitments from surrounding nations and a cooperation of effort to prevent radical elements within society from disrupting what the majority desire, peace. This thesis will attempt to review the security conditions, as spelled out in the Oslo peace process, and concludes that the greatest failure was the approach. Oslo attempted to build up to a final solution through "confidence-building measures." Because the final status was nebulous, both sides postured and set policies that worked against a two-state solution. Had the borders been set and agreed to from the start, the "confidence-building measures" would have worked in favor of a two-state solution instead of against it.

To prove the necessity of setting a border first, this thesis, through the use of geographic threat considerations, will conduct an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) analysis. An IPB is an intelligence tool used to figure out the strengths and weaknesses of any campaign. This thesis hopes to show that setting a border first, and then working backwards through the "confidence-building measures," will lead to a greater chance for peace.
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ABSTRACT

A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine requires guaranteed security for both nations, as well as commitments from surrounding nations and a cooperation of effort to prevent radical elements within society from disrupting what the majority desire, peace. This thesis will attempt to review the security conditions, as spelled out in the Oslo peace process, and concludes that the greatest failure was the approach. Oslo attempted to build up to a final solution through “confidence-building measures.” Because the final status was nebulous, both sides postured and set polices that worked against a two-state solution. Had the borders been set and agreed to from the start, the “confidence-building measures” would have worked in favor of a two-state solution instead of against it.

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<td>European Union</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>General Intelligence Service</td>
<td>GIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</td>
<td>IPB</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program</td>
<td>INCLE</td>
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<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
<td>IDF</td>
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<td>Israeli National Police</td>
<td>INP</td>
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<td>Jordan International Police Training Centre</td>
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<td>Palestinian National Council</td>
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<td>Presidential Guard</td>
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<td>Presidential Security</td>
<td>PS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventive Security Organization</td>
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<td>Regional Trade Organizations</td>
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<td>Supreme Council for National Security</td>
<td>SCNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unmanned Arial Vehicle</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>United States Security Coordinator</td>
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I. TWO-STATE SOLUTION

What are the security requirements for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine?

A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine has long been the dream for providing stability in the region. What are the security requirements needed for a successful realization of this objective? Security is more than a police force guaranteeing the rule-of-law or a military to protect the borders. It involves every aspect of life. To understand what a peaceful two-state solution would look like, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive study examining various segments for each nation as it relates to security. For example, geographically depicting each nation’s force structure will reveal their security priorities, while mapping economic concentrations will reveal where security is needed for economic stability. Understanding the structures, strengths, weaknesses, and agendas of the two parties and their security forces will give greater insight into where the friction points are that prevent a peaceful two-state solution from becoming established.

An in-depth analysis of the security sector will confirm the need for a comprehensive approach to solving the peace process and will ensure a greater likelihood of survival over time. The amount of literature on the Israeli-Palestinian security issue is immense. Much of the literature either is one-sided and attempts to justify the actions of one side over the other, or it tries to capture the facts of the events as they happened. What I hope to add to the literature is to identify with greater clarity what is preventing a peaceful resolution and to offer ideas on how to move the peace process forward, using a pragmatic analysis of the material and a military method known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, or IPB. Peace between Israel and Palestine in a two-state solution would rest in the hands of the more powerful member, in this case Israel. Israel holds all the advantages of a professional, well-equipped, modern military that dominates all warfare areas: land, sea, and air. It is preoccupied with short-term
security at all costs and fails to recognize opportunities that would lead to long- 
term stability and peace. Palestine, for its part, must transition from an identity 
based on a revolutionary movement to a national identity, one that holds to an 
open, freely elected government that keeps the rights of its citizens as its primary 
purpose. For there to be security for Israel and development for Palestine, both 
must compromise. The Oslo peace process attempted to bridge the divide and 
was very successful in many aspects but failed by not establishing the borders 
first.

If Oslo at the start, had established clear borders showing the final shape 
of both countries after the completed process, then both nations would have 
been working in concert toward the same goal. Instead, with the borders 
undefined, both sides used confidence-building measures as means to 
manipulate the process and establish facts on the ground, so that when it came 
time for the final status talks, they would have an advantage in the negotiations. 
Israel did this by building more settlements and infrastructure to support the 
settlements while cutting off Palestinian villages and population from the rest of 
the West Bank. Palestine attempted to build its security forces in a way that 
would allow it to hold on to its revolutionary identity and remain loyal to 
personalities within the leadership, while under the guise of nation building. 
Israel feared the Palestinian forces were being turned into a quasi army, and as 
proof, it points to conflicts that erupted between Israel and Palestinian forces in 
2000 at the collapse of the Oslo process.

Where Oslo succeeded was in showing that there is room for compromise, 
and that when an agreement is finally reached on establishing the borders, the 
mechanisms can be recreated to allow for a peaceful transition to Palestinian 
autonomy. By agreeing to set borders, the issue of Israeli settlements will 
disappear because they will either be incorporated into Israeli territory and no 
longer be an administrative concern for Palestine, or they will be given to 
Palestine for control. The refugee right of return will also disappear, as there will 
be a Palestinian state established to incorporate the refugees back into
Palestinian society. This is obviously easier said than done. Establishing the borders first through land swaps will allow these necessary compromises to become part of the equation and allow the peace process to get back on track.

It is in the interest of the United States to resolve this problem peaceably sooner rather than later. Attempting to achieve American interest elsewhere in the Middle East has been hindered because of this problem. Men and women in the armed forces, as well as at the embassies, put their lives on the line each and every day as long as this issue goes unresolved. Solving this issue will not solve all the issues in the Middle East, but it certainly can help in curtailing Iranian foreign policy and building confidence in Middle Eastern countries that the United States is an honest broker of peace. In addition, a resolution could assist with curtailing radical Islam and the spread of terrorism. One of radical Islam’s calls for action is against the injustice against the Palestinians, but if the issue is resolved, then radical Islam begins to lose a rallying cry that is a common cause across all levels of society.

Israel has set a policy of Security First for its negotiations, and they believe that they must maintain superiority in order to maintain security—at the cost of Palestinian autonomy. However, “security is not just an Israeli concern. Palestinians must believe that they will have a sovereign, contiguous, and economically viable state that will be free from continued Israeli controls and forcible interventions.”\(^1\) Only when Palestine is an equal in providing security for its citizens and its neighbors, as well as a developed economy that provides hope for a future to its citizens, will peace be viable. Palestinians must have hope in a better future for themselves and their children for them to trust in any agreements made with Israel. If Palestinians believe they will have a greater future with peace, rather than a life of uncertainty and poverty, then the Palestinian population will demand peace and protect it from the radical elements from within its own society. By defining a clear border, the Palestinians will be

able to understand and identify with the shape and territory that will be theirs at the end of the process. Understanding what Palestine will look like, and what areas Palestine will be responsible for, will give the Palestinian population the hope needed to push the Palestinian Authority towards peace while simultaneously creating a new national identity based on nationalism instead of revolution.

The IPB analysis will show that the security threat comes from outside forces equipping Palestinians with advanced weapons and rockets. This threat will greatly increase if the two-state solution is not handled correctly. This thesis will conclude that as part of the overall security situation, Palestine will require greater autonomy and an ability to develop its economy in relation to the world market. Limitations on Palestinian borders must simultaneously meet Israeli security needs while supporting Palestinian growth. These limitations should not be through Israeli military control. Instead, a third nation that holds the interest of maintaining security should provide security along any Palestinian border that is not connected to Israel. This third nation security force should only control the borders and provide oversight for the transit of goods and services. It should not be the provider of security within Palestine. Any security force attempting to provide security in Palestine will be seen as an occupying force and come to symbolize any failings by the Palestinian government.

Another key conclusion this thesis supports is the separation of economies. While growing economies lead towards peace and stability, the economy can only be supported in a secure environment that is established through the identifying of clear borders. The Israeli economy is more efficient; more technologically advanced, and far out produces its Palestinian counterpart. The Palestinian economy is labor intensive, agriculturally based, and has a large public sector with very little private investment. Currently, the greatest connection between the two is Palestine providing cheap labor to Israeli enterprises. Palestine is unable to compete in this environment and must be given the chance to build its own infrastructure and institutions. A simple
comparison between GDP per capita proves the imbalance. Israeli GDP per capita in 2010 was $28,393, and Palestinian GDP per capita in 2008, the last year the GDP per capita in Palestine was collected, was $2,900.\textsuperscript{2,3} For lasting peace to solidify, the two nations must work together economically. This will only come once Palestine is allowed to develop to a level that will allow it to build multinational corporations and participate in regional trade organizations. These types of institutions have the ability to tie the two nations economically together, forcing them to work together on security-related issues.

Water is a precious resource in the Middle East and, in many ways, more valuable than oil. Israeli and Palestinian water supplies are connected and, however the borders are shaped, this fact will always remain true. While this thesis concludes that the economies should be divided for a period of time, the water infrastructure, management, and oversight should be connected. Water drives the economy, and if mismanaged or polluted by one partner, the other is affected. Neither should one partner be given complete authority over the resources, potentially creating an imbalance in distribution. A joint approach to this problem would ensure the prevention of over pumping, provide the best quality of product to both peoples and help grow the economy. In addition, by being connected through this public utility, when the Palestinian economy is more fully developed at a later time, a reintegration through multinational corporations and regional trade agreements can better facilitate linking the two nations through peaceful means.

A two-state solution is achievable by defining the borders, with follow-on negotiations over the less contentious issues, while direct oversight of measurable benchmarks is monitored by the United States. The United States must be able to provide real incentives and penalties to facilitate the peace process while maintaining security for both Israel and Palestine.


Looking to the future at the desired end state of a two-state solution is confusing and complicated. Using a point-in-time to establish perspective, there are two methods of looking toward the end state. Method one uses the starting point of now and looks forward. Attempting to predict pitfalls, violent reaction, and needed policy changes is difficult when the desired end state is a nebulous concept of a peaceful two-state solution. There are a lot of unanswered questions as to what that two-state solution will look like, and trying to adjust as the process moves forward keeps all interested parties attempting to keep the balance of a peaceful resolution viable. The second method uses the end point as the starting point and looks backwards towards now. The problem with this approach is that it uses a lot of assumptions. However, by identifying a clear end state, all interested parties are on an equal playing field, and there is no question about different parties achieving different objectives than what is stated. By starting at the end point and looking back, we are more likely to see the path needed to reach the desired goal. Once that path is identified, one can then start to look forward from our perspective of today. For a visual representation of the two points in time perspective see Figure 1.

![Point in Time Perspective](image-url)
How does one identify what a two-state solution would look like? This thesis proposes to use the process known as IPB. This is a process designed to show a geographical point-in-time that allows one to identify strengths and weaknesses of the security sector. The IPB is doctrine approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)*. Not to be confused, the JIPOE is the same as the IPB but at the joint level.

(JIPOE) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) decision-making process. It is a continuous process that involves four major steps: defining the total operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action (COAs), particularly the adversary’s most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment. The JIPOE process assists JFCs and their staffs in achieving information superiority by identifying adversary centers of gravity (COGs), focusing intelligence collection at the right time and place, and analyzing the impact of the operational environment on military operations.4

The IPB will be conducted in Chapter VI, building on analysis of the issues surrounding negotiations, economic security, as well as analysis of the security institutions for both Israel and Palestine. While this thesis does not consider either Israel or Palestine an enemy, this method will allow analysis to be conducted from the perspective of both side’s point of view on what each nation’s strengths and weaknesses are as well as needs. The weakness of the IPB process is that, while it is a technical analysis of the physical environment, it is not able to account for the human element such as political policy, perceptions, and desire. To account for these missing elements, Chapters II through V will attempt to identify critical policies, intentions, and capabilities as they relate to security needs. Armed with this understanding, it will provide a complete picture

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of what security requirements are needed for each nation to mutually respect each other's boundaries. This method only provides a physical understanding; bridging the gap of trust will only come through cooperation, institution building, economic development, trade, and time.

Sourcing for the IPB process will derive from the Wye River agreement, the United Nations, think tanks, scientific publications, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Israel's national water company, and the Palestinian support unit. These sources were selected because they are the authority on geographical issues. Having a geographical picture of security requirements for a two-state solution will help with the peace process, but how that picture relates to current security objectives will provide the indications of potential conflict and potential reconciliation.

A. IMPORTANCE

This topic bears directly on ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, as well as informing U.S. foreign policy. Solving the conflict will build American credibility as an unbiased arbiter around the world and help alleviate pressure on American policy in the region. In testimony on March 16, 2010, as the commander of CENTCOM before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus confirmed the necessity for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict peacefully.

The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength
and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in
the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the
Arab world.5

In addition, by using the second point-in-time described above and using
the IPB process to identify policy weaknesses, this analysis may make a small
contribution to the vital issue of security guarantees. Countless lives can be
spared from continued violence, and a major advance can occur in this most
destabilizing location in the Middle East. By focusing on what the end state will
look like as compared to the failures of the Oslo process and current conditions,
this method of approach clarifies what actions need to be taken by all parties
involved.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

There is much debate about which approach will most likely provide the
necessary room for peace to be established and grow. There are three main
theories, in addition to each theory having subset views: Capitalist Peace Theory,
Democratic Peace Theory, and Security First.

Supporting Capitalist Peace Theory, Stephen Brooks in his book,
Producing Security, argues that the best approach for lasting peace is through
economic development and integration through regional trade organizations and
multinational corporations. Russett Bruce in his book, Grasping the Democratic
Peace, holds with the view of Democratic Peace Theory, that fewer wars are
fought between democracies, therefore lasting peace will be reached through the
creation and advancement of democracies that have open, free democratic
governments, accountable to their citizens.67 Dennis Ross in his book,

5 Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
Commander U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the

6 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the
The Missing Peace, explains that the Declaration of Principles achieved through the Oslo channel defined the peace process as Security First. The aim of achieving security by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho gave room for a Palestinian Authority to create a government and a security force. Security First theory argues that a safe and secure environment must be created first to give room for governmental and economic institutions to be established to provide stability. This thesis, while focusing on security, does not advocate a Security First approach, but rather argues that security is only one piece of a necessary comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach utilizing all three theories of Capitalist Peace, Democratic Peace, and Security First simultaneously is the only way to lasting peace. Capitalist Peace, while attempting to broaden an economy, does not provide the security needed for that economy to grow. Democratic Peace does not guarantee that peace will be pursued, as we saw with the 2006 elections that brought Hamas to power. Providing Security First does not ensure the development of a free society nor does it ensure the development of an economy that creates the jobs necessary to provide the stability needed for peace. Uniting all three approaches in concert will lead to a society both in Palestine and Israel that can live in peace side by side.

Capitalist Peace Theory and Democratic Peace Theory are dependent upon security to give room for development and reform, but lasting security can only be achieved through economic growth and political transparency. Under the Oslo agreement, the West Bank was divided up into three areas with varying degrees of Palestinian security under Israeli oversight. This approach was designed to allow Palestine greater responsibility over more heavily populated areas, and as Palestinian government efficiency grew, more areas were to be

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handed over. With Israel in the position to demand concessions, the Palestinian Authority provided security in the West Bank while protecting Israel from terrorism, this confidence building measure transformed into the protection of Israel becoming the benchmark for the success or failure of Oslo. As a result, the Palestinian population increasingly viewed the Palestinian Authority as a puppet of Israel, and it lost credibility and the ability to represent Palestine as a whole.

This thesis aims to show how cooperative security institutions can help bridge the gap and build trust; that security forces for both nations need to be adequately trained and equipped; and that while Israel will remain strong and capable of defending itself from other nations, because Palestinians will be working with Israel, it will not perceive Israel as a direct threat. In addition, this thesis aspires to identify a principle that both sides can agree on to reach the desired end state. By using the starting point of a definitive border for a two-state solution and looking back at the security failures of the Oslo process, a way forward can anticipate the failures of past attempts. It can be argued that the Oslo accords brought Israel and Palestine closer to a peaceful resolution than any other attempt. The Oslo accords were comprehensive in nature and focused on security requirements but failed to anticipate violent reactions against the process. These violent reactions were major contributors to the Oslo accord’s ultimate failure. Identification of security friction points will help solve the problems the Oslo process faced, such as failures to unify Palestinian security forces, counterterrorism missions conflicting with the desired end state, Israeli settlements, status of Jerusalem, borders, advancement of Hamas and its integration into the political process, security cooperation and ensuring both sides have the same goals and objectives, and considerations of a third nation security force. Solutions to security failures will be offered, hopefully helping to put the peace process back on track and begin to build trust between Israel and Palestine.

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Finally, Chapter VI of this thesis will attempt to identify the security strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and areas for compromise by looking at a series of overlays from a geographical perspective in the IPB process. The areas this thesis proposes to examine as individual overlays on a map are: roads, borders, water, terrain analysis (a detailed study of the landscape as it relates to military technology and position), and economic resources. The IPB process is unclassified but the results of any IPB conducted by the United States military is classified. It is classified because it shows what the military’s understanding is of a given situation as well as what their likely intention is to achieving their desired end state. In his book *Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism*, Major Troy Thomas explains the process an intelligence professional goes through when developing an IPB and provides a comprehensive set of asymmetric warfare examples of how IPBs are used.\(^\text{10}\)

This thesis will attempt to identify what the expectations are for each nation, where those interests complement a two-state solution, and where those interests conflict. Simple identification of interests is not enough; understanding how these interests are protected, their vulnerabilities, and aspirations will lead to greater opportunities for compromise. This thesis will be based on the heroic assumptions that sovereign authorities in Israel and Palestine will have agreed upon a two-state solution, both desire peace, and both can ultimately respect each other as neighbors if security conditions are met. Another assumption is that the United States will be the lead negotiator of a peaceful resolution. It is also assumed that a solution for peace would involve more areas than security, namely economic development and governmental reform. While this thesis will not deal directly with these other areas, it assumes that reconciliation will only come through a comprehensive effort by all parties in all areas. Security is key for peaceful reconciliation, but it is absolutely vital for the successful creation of

institutions that will create the economic stability and political reform that is necessary for a Palestinian state that is peaceful with its neighbors and is accepted as an equal by Israel.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review pertains to a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine and is divided into three areas: security, economy, and government. While this thesis deals with security issues, it is also important to understand that security impacts other areas of society and those areas in turn impact the nature of security.

1. Security

According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, there are three areas in security that must be addressed to facilitate peace: Security First, training and equipping, and the use of an international peacekeeping force.\(^{11}\) The Palestinian perspective of security needs is for an effective response to specific threats, mutual recognition of each other as nation states, and the creation of mechanisms for ongoing cooperation, protection of human rights, and promotion of regional peace.\(^ {12}\) Area one, Security First, is focused on the fight against terrorism to provide a safe environment to allow peace to grow.\(^ {13}\) Security under the Oslo accords focused on counterterrorism principles to prevent suicide bombs by Palestinians and revenge attacks by Israeli settlers trying to establish facts on the ground. Dennis Ross in his book, *The Missing Peace*, under the Wye River agreements, refers to “normalization of relations, with full diplomatic relations” as a condition for security.\(^ {14}\) Dennis Ross’s approach is

\(^{11}\) J.D. Crouch II et al., *Security First*, 2.


\(^{13}\) J.D. Crouch II et al., *Security First*, 2.

\(^{14}\) Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 239.
comprehensive with a focus towards Security First. He contends that true and lasting security must start with negotiations, which is an element of Security First.\textsuperscript{15}

Area two is training and equipping a Palestinian security force.\textsuperscript{16} In his article, “Fixing Broken Windows,” Yezid Sayigh argues the Palestinian security sector must undergo reform. “To enable real reform, the West must adopt a comprehensive approach which treats security reform as only one part of a broader political strategy, and encourages governments and security commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen to buy into such a strategy.”\textsuperscript{17} Supporting this argument is Lia Brynjar, as paraphrased by Sarah Salwen in her book review of \textit{Building Arafat’s Police}. Brynjar shows the difficulty of, but the necessity for, security reform. When nations donate help that focuses on immediate needs to support the peace process versus providing the necessary equipment designed to build a stable and self-sustaining security force, such as an effective communications system, handcuffs, and uniforms, the force will be incapable of meeting the greater need of providing security and creating a safe environment.\textsuperscript{18} Reform on the Israeli side is also necessary, since the focus of the military is to provide a secure environment for its citizens in Palestinian territory, a mission that under a two-state solution must be handed over to the Palestinians. Relinquishing control of this mission will require strong guarantees by the Palestinians as well as a shift in attitudes in the military of seeing the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[15] Ross, \textit{The Missing Peace : The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace}, 238
\item[16] J.D. Crouch Il et al., \textit{Security First}, V.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Palestinians as allies in the peace process versus the enemy. The Israeli government sees this process being facilitated through disengagement and the building of the security wall.19

Area three, the use of an international peacekeeping force to provide security in Palestinian territory and act as a buffer between the two parties, is one of the more hotly contested issues. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy states, “No deployment of third-party troops, including NATO forces, will relieve the Palestinians from the requirement of securing their own territory.”20 They further argue that an international force would face significant obstacles, testing the resolve of the third nation support, and that this approach would only provide limited Palestinian sovereignty, creating an imperfect peace and continuing to drain the resources of a third party nation.21 Robert Hunter and Seth Jones argue the opposite, that the best method of instilling confidence and giving space for the Palestinians to take the responsibility for security is “stationing some form of international force along the Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan and Egypt as part of a peace settlement.”22 They argue that giving room for Palestinians to take on the responsibility, as well as proper training, can only come with an outside force providing this type of intervention.

I contend that, should a third nation force be employed within the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories, it would face numerous difficulties, from becoming the target by those who wish to see the peace process killed, to being the responsible party for building a nation. Any and all frustrations about the progress towards statehood by the Palestinians would be directed at the third


20 J.D. Crouch II et al., *Security First*, V.

21 J.D. Crouch II et al., *Security First*, V.

party nation. In contrast, if a third nation military was employed as border security, it would not face these security challenges, and instead, would simply act as an overseer to the peace process.

### 2. Economy

There are two components to economic security. First is security for people and their assets. Providing security for a Palestinian territory simultaneously provides security for physical processes of economic production. Second is security of economic development. By first providing security for economic process, you then allow the next phase of development to occur. Through the development process, creation of new industries and jobs will begin to bring stability to the region. As Palestine develops and becomes equal with Israel, their location and the necessity of sharing resources makes them natural trading partners. Once Palestine is developed, multinational corporations can work between the two nations and begin to cement the security gains through cooperative economic partnerships.

According to Rafael Reuveny, the Israeli–Palestinian economic relations debate centers on three positions within the capitalist peace construct: integration, partial integration, and economic separation. The integration view is, both sides will have mutual benefit leading to closer ties and preventing violent reaction. This view argues that separating the two economies would have dire consequences to the Palestinians. The partial integration view argues that, while both economies are not compatible, integration prevents long-term stability and separation will not allow for development of the weaker economy. The supporters of the separation view warn that any other model will continue a balance in favor of Israel, thus perpetuating Palestinian dependence.²³

Arguing for free market and integration, Charles Boehmer and David Sobek say,

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Developed states, are more reliant on services for their economic growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, decreasing their involvement in interstate conflict. Meanwhile, the poorest states, although they have more to gain through territorial expansion, have a decreased ability to pursue their objectives through military force.24

Erik Gartzke, along with Stephen Brooks, supports this view: free markets have the power to unite two economies for the benefit to greater security and economic growth through regional trade agreements:25

Free markets have the potential to free states from the looming prospect of recurrent warfare. Capitalism encourages cooperation among states by creating conditions that make war unappealing or unnecessary. Free markets create another venue to competition among countries, often containing minor conflicts below the level of military force.26

Arguing for partial integration, both Jacob Metzer and Rafael Reuveny counter the integration view and believe the best approach for a stable peaceful economy is the second approach, “a dual economic approach that permits interaction among the units while highlighting the dimensions that separate them.”27

Arguing for separation of the two economies, Arie Arnon and Sara Roy believe that since 1967, the Israeli policy towards Palestine is one of de-development, which prevents a separate, distinct, political Palestinian entity from establishing. They point to this policy as evidence that any form of integration will continue to undercut any ability of the Palestinian economy to grow.28

27 Tarik M. Yousef, “Reviewed Work(s): The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine by Jacob Metzer,” The Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (2001); 1128.
Economic reform and development for Palestine, if the economy is built on principles of free market, will provide the necessary revenue to run the state and provide resources for the security of a nation. The majority of Palestinian budget revenue comes in the form of foreign aid; creating economic independence will lessen the third party involvement in the Palestinian dispute and potentially provide greater regional stability. Security policies such as closed borders, de-development, and control of water rights each have the specific aim of limiting Palestinian economic growth.

I contend that for a lasting peace, security policies must aim at providing the greatest opportunities for Palestinian economic development, requiring as much of a separation as possible from each other’s economies until they are on equal footing. Then, at a later time, the nations can reintegrate in a regional agreement, thus solidifying security arrangements.

3. Politics

The perspectives, history, and motivations of the leaders in Israel and Palestine are complex and shape the outcome of peace negotiations and thus the security arrangements. Palestinians are fractured along ideological lines and are currently fighting a civil war. This inability to unite keeps the dream of obtaining a homeland from ever materializing. At the same time, the constant pressure to protect one’s interests pushes the leaders towards an authoritarian style of rule. On the Israeli side, there is less corruption due to the greater transparency of the government, however, there are equally as many challenges from social pressures. Israel’s history, born out of the Zionist movement and socialist in nature, conflicts at times and supports at other times a religious view of territorial claim promised by God. These territorial claims drive structure and attitudes of reconciliation within the peace process.

On the Palestinian side, Fatah and Hamas are waging an internal battle over control of territory and the institution of Palestinian government. Yezid Sayigh states, “The nature of the PLO as an exile entity attempting to unite a
disparate Diaspora has necessarily resulted in an authoritarian leadership wary of the administrative, civilian, and social organizations needed to form a state.”29 Mahjoob Zweiri argues that Fatah’s days are numbered due to rampant corruption and, in turn, people are seeking an alternative in Hamas.30 Amos Perlmutter makes a similar claim but states that Palestinian leadership is “authoritarian, non-inclusive and un-democratic.”31 Another claim to the Palestinian condition is Glenn Robinson, who argues that Palestinians are fractured not necessarily from their internal struggles for control but from outside influence. The political structure of Palestine makes it difficult to unite the security institutions under one ideological umbrella that is beholden to a constitution or system, not a party. Israel's policy of land confiscations, economic segregation, and tight control over Palestinian development keeps Palestine from uniting and hinders the ability of the security institutions to provide the rule-of-law necessary for a stable peaceful environment.32

On the Israeli side there are two main competing ideas about the geographic identity of Israel. Alan Richards and John Waterbury point to differences of identity based on secular socialism or religious nationalism.33 Charles Smith, in his book, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, clarifies the difference of identity. Smith charges that while the religious and Zionist movements both agree on the desire for a homeland in Palestine, the method is the distinguishing difference. The religious approach is to wait for the hand of God to move and re-establish a state for the Jews, while the Zionists reject the religious approach and the idea of assimilating into European culture and place


the responsibility of state building on the shoulders of the people. On both sides, how one chooses to identify oneself and apply one’s ideology either through secular or religious models plays out in radical, violent protest or the potential for reconciliation. This, in turn, determines how each nation approaches security and homeland defense. Due to Palestinian fractures, the security needs for Israel, and the religious view of divine rights for the land, Israel is driven towards policies of isolating Palestine instead of encouraging development in security, economics, and government reform. Palestinians, again, due to their fractures and inability to unite under one government free from corruption, creates frustration and vigilantism for the Palestinian cause against Israel.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis assumes that a key component to Oslo’s failure was due to a failure to anticipate security needs. More precisely, each side was able to identify what the security needs were, but it was lack of agreement on priority and method of approach that led to failed security. If you align the security requirements to accommodate the two-state solution, then Israel’s security objectives and concerns are more likely to be met than they are through continued occupation. Chapter II will look at the individual security concerns while Chapter VI with the IPB analysis will identify security threats. To help understand this aspect of the Oslo failure, this thesis will explore five security issues with three security policies and compare where each side put them in priority along with their desired objective. Knowing each side’s priorities and objectives will go a long way to providing an understanding of how to bridge the gap in security needs. The first security issue is terrorism with its three security policies being the security fence, policing the West Bank, and the blockade, the remaining four security issues are religious claims, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and Borders and Occupation. It was the failure to address these

issues adequately and a prolonged process that contributed to an impatience with the process that led to the start of the second intifada.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be divided into four sections: first, analysis of the issues surrounding the peace process as they relate to security concerns; second, a look at the security institutions both in Palestine and Israel; third, economic security; and fourth, the IPB analysis. Analysis of the security institutions is necessary to lay the foundation of understanding the mission, capabilities, and attitudes in each institution. Israel already boasts one of the most powerful military forces in the world and uses it to provide protection from both external threats as well as internal threats by Palestinian extremist groups. It is important to understand what is needed for reconciliation through analysis of how its force is structured, its mission, and its attitude towards Palestine. Palestine boasts no military but instead has multiple security institutions that are disjointed and pledge loyalty to different political parties. Their main focus is protecting the interests of the political party they are associated with, not the rule-of-law. Understanding how security functions in Palestine will provide better insight into their weaknesses and ultimately where opportunities exist to assist with encouraging the development of a modern, well-equipped security force that is focused on the rule-of-law.

Using the completed picture of the security environment built by the IPB process, this thesis will provide a point in time of the current security disposition, as well as the geographic vulnerabilities, to these force structures. Comparing the current security picture with the assumed security conditions of a two-state solution, will clearly show what is needed to reach a security environment to support the two-state solution. By understanding the current state of security institutions, compared with what they should look like in a two-state solution, this thesis then can start to provide recommendations and considerations for developing the security environment that both sides can agree on.
II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PEACE NEGOTIATION ISSUES

Oslo opened the possibility of a peaceful resolution to a two-state solution. At the beginning, cautious optimism led to direct negotiations. The United States and the European Union supported the process by encouraging the development and communication between government institutions from both sides. Differences were set aside to allow the negotiating teams to work through the difficult issues while confidence-building measures were instituted. Intelligence sharing and joint security patrols were conducted. However, the processes failed. Some argue the Oslo process was too ambitious, that the final solution requiring resolution on every issue simultaneously was impractical. Others argue that the West failed to push both sides on tough issues and hold each side to their commitments.\textsuperscript{35} The Oslo peace process did not fail because it was too ambitious or failed to provide accountability, rather it failed because both sides set separate policies that counteracted the two-state solution. Both sides set policy on individual issues to gain the best advantage when the time came for the final negotiations on borders, the right of refugees to return, water rights, and geographical control. Because the borders were to be the last thing resolved, the incentive to create the conditions on the ground that would give the greatest advantages in the final negotiations created an environment destructive to the peace process and confidence building. If borders were clearly agreed to, and the endstate identified at the outset of the process, the policies such as settlement growth and security cooperation would have been more inline with the peace process and the Oslo accords would have had a greater chance for success.

Establishing policy based on individual issues instead of the overall objective, provides an advantage for the short term but can complicate resolution

\textsuperscript{35} Melissa Boyle Mahle, "A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process," \textit{Middle East Policy} XII, no. 1 (2005), 80.
of issues in the future and leads to a failure of strategic objectives for a two-state solution. For example, the Israeli government built a wall along the West Bank to provide greater security for its citizens. The wall the Israelis view as a “security barrier,” is a counterterrorism tactic that prevents terrorists from entering Israel. The Palestinians see this tactic as a way to isolate and arbitrarily determine borders without their input into the process. Any future negotiations and trust will be harder to achieve when a policy seeks issue-based goals instead of compromise for a two-state solution. An example of Palestinian policy based on an issue instead of the desire for a two-state solution is the creation of a Palestinian security force that is not in line with the Oslo agreements and, instead, caters to individual aspirations within the PLO, Fatah, or Hamas. It takes time to create a professional security force that holds loyalty to a system of government instead of individuals. The Palestinian Authority, under Yasser Arafat’s direction, had to make concessions to numerous individuals in order to keep the Palestinians united. His policies allowed him the greatest amount of control but kept the security system from developing in a way that would allow modernization and unity of effort, thus conflicting with the goals of a two-state solution.

This thesis will focus more on Israeli policy while including as much of the analysis of Palestinian policy as possible. The reason for this lopsided approach is simply that Israel is the senior partner; they determine much of the timetable, security conditions, and agenda, while Palestine is weaker and is dependent upon Israeli good will. It is precisely this imbalance that keeps Palestine weak and prevents them from gaining any leverage that would allow them to be equals. Over the years, Palestinians have had only two forms of leverage: diplomatic stall tactics in the hopes of getting a better deal, and violence.

This thesis will review the background on each of the issues that hinders peaceful resolution and the policy perspective from both sides to determine the true objective as it relates to security considerations. By determining the focus and purpose of policy for each issue, we can start to determine if either side is
genuinely seeking a two-state solution and, if not, then recommend changes to policy that accomplishes the short-term concerns as well as facilitating a two-state solution. The information in this chapter is important to understand because it is the backdrop to the security situation and relates directly to the IPB analysis in Chapter VI on border location, conventional threat, and policy intentions that prevent compromise.

A. SECURITY ISSUE: TERRORISM

Under the issue of counterterrorism, since the start of the second intifada in 2000, Israel established a number of counterterrorism policies. These included building a security wall in the West Bank, policing Palestinian territories, and blockading the Gaza Strip, all with the aim of protecting its citizens and preventing access by terrorists to Israel. According to the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents in 2000, the year the second intifada started, only one civilian was killed by terrorist actions. However, in 2001, 110 were killed, and in 2002, 329 were killed. From 2001 on, pressure mounted for the Israeli government to take action against terrorism because the Oslo peace process was failing to deliver security. See Table 1 for year-by-year trends over the past decade for Israeli deaths from terrorist attacks.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
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Table 1. Israeli Deaths from Terrorist Attacks

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Under the issue of terrorism this thesis will explore three policies the Israeli government developed to combat terrorism; the security Wall, policing in the West Bank, and the Blockade.


Amid the rising death toll and civilians calling for a “Fence for life,” the Israeli government embarked on a plan in 2001 to build a wall entirely around the West Bank. The first section was completed in July 2003. The stated purpose of the fence by the Israel Ministry of Defence was to provide security. “The Security Fence is a central component in Israel’s response to the horrific wave of terrorism emanating from the West Bank, resulting in suicide bombers who enter into Israel with the sole intention of killing innocent people.”

Prior to the building of the fence, there were no clear borders between the West Bank and Israel. Cars were required to go through checkpoints, but pedestrians were able to walk across the border unimpeded. In 1996, while I attended university in Jerusalem, I had the freedom to walk back and forth across the armistice line in the West Bank around Jerusalem but when taking taxis, we were required to stop at checkpoints. The only recognized boundary was the “Green Line,” which was established in 1949 under the armistice agreements. Israel bases its legal authority for building a fence on the United Nations resolution 242, “… respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

Israel’s Ministry of Defence claims that the fence is not the creation of a border with Palestine because the nature of the fence is temporary and any borders must be agreed to through negotiations.

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40 Israeli Ministry of Defence, *Israel’s Security Fence*. 26
The establishment of the route of the fence is complicated. Israel is building the fence along the Green Line with deviations for considerations to Israeli settlements, environmental concerns, and social impact. If Israel were to stick strictly to the “Green Line” this fence could, in effect, recognize the 1967 boundaries as legitimate and, international pressure would force Israel to make this the border, losing any claims to settlements in the West Bank. By deviating from the Green Line, Israel maintains its ability to adjust boundaries in the future. To Israel's credit, people affected by the fence have opportunities to appeal the proposed route and request its path be altered based on humanitarian concerns. However, according to Usama Halabi of the BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, by November 2006, the Palestinians brought 64 petitions before the Israeli Supreme Court. Of the 64 petitions, 47 were rejected, 9 were resolved, and 8 were still outstanding.\textsuperscript{41} This shows only a 12 percent success rate of Palestinians requesting an alteration to the location of the fence. While individuals have the ability to appeal, little evidence shows an open dialogue between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority on the location of the fence. Rather, the Palestinian Authority uses the issue of the fence as a political lightning rod for its purposes. By looking at chart 1 and the decline in the number of Israeli deaths through the latter part of the decade, the trend suggests that the development of a security fence is achieving its security aims.

But, what about the unintended consequences? Do the Palestinians view the fence as a border that protects them from radical Israeli settlers or as another way to control their daily lives? In Stephen Lendman’s article “Israel’s Separation Wall: A Health Hazard,” he describes the impact on the daily life of the Palestinians and how they must adapt. He states that the amount of territorial difference between the location of the security fence and the green line is about 12 percent of the West Bank with 33,000 Palestinians residing in the seam.

\textsuperscript{41} Usama Halabi, “The Israeli High Court Approves the Legality of the Wall and its Associated Regime,” \textit{Al-Majdal}, no. 33 (Spring 2007, 2007), \url{http://www.badil.org/al-Majdal/al-Madjal.htm}.
zones, the space between the green line and the security fence. He goes on to describe how a total of 187,000 Palestinians are surrounded, need special identity cards to live in their own homes, or must take a tunnel or special road to reach their communities. With the Palestinian population at 2.5 million in the West Bank as of 2010, this means that 13.2 percent are affected every day in their livelihood, ability to receive medical treatment, and ability to get consumables for living. The Palestinian Liberation Organization sees the security fence as Israel attempting to legitimize settlements in the West Bank. “In particular, the route the Wall takes is designed to capture as much land and incorporate as many Israeli settlers as possible west of the Wall, while shutting out and ‘walling in’ as many Palestinians as possible east of the Wall.” While Israel built the fence for security reasons, simultaneously the fence is able to isolate and constrain the Palestinian economy even further.

The fence is contentious to say the least. For Israel it provides some of the security it has been seeking since its creation in 1948, but for the Palestinians it serves as a physical reminder of being occupied. In the game of peace making, perceptions are important and can sway a populace to support the peace process or reject it. For the Israeli population, the perception is that the fence is achieving the security policies and is therefore supported, even though the existence of the fence is a detriment to lasting peace. The Palestinians view the fence as a way to apply greater pressure on them collectively and force an agreement to terms favoring the Israelis and an attempt to put them under conditions that would drive them out of Palestine and into other nations. While the fence has worked for security means, it has failed to assist with bringing negotiations closer to resolution and, if anything, has made negotiations more


43 PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, Barrier to Peace: The Impact of Israel’s Wall Five Years After the ICJ Ruling (PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, 2009), http://www.plomission.us/uploads/Anniversary%20of%20ICJ%20Ruling%20on%20Wall%2009June09.pdf.
difficult because the Palestinians have more reason to question the intentions of the Israelis in relation to the existence of a Palestinian state. In July 2009, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas questioned the Israeli president’s intentions in regards to the fence and stated “The racial separation wall as well as settlements are both illegal… and the wall must be removed.” Thus, this thesis concludes that the policy of security through the building of a security fence is designed with the intention of short-term Security First and the development of a leverage point in negotiations at the expense of long-term peace. In the IPB analysis I will take into account the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy border recommendations, which follow along similar lines as the security fence.

2. Security Policy: Policing the West Bank

Under the Oslo accords, backed by the United States, Dennis Ross, under guidance by President Bush and President Clinton, pursued a Security First agenda. This agenda called for the creation of a Palestinian security force working in concert with Israeli security. It was believed that by creating a secure environment, civilians would demand their leaders finish the rest of the tasks of permanent peace because the citizens would not want to go back to the days of violence. It was also assumed that once this secure environment was achieved that all the other issues, economics, borders, status of Jerusalem, etc., would be easier to solve due to the mutual respect and trust that was built by the process of Security First. To this aim, under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement in Article XI, Land; both sides, along with the United States, agreed to divide the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three types of areas of responsibility. Areas A, B, and C are the geographical representation of the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces and the handing over of responsibility for self governing to the Palestinian

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Authority.\textsuperscript{47} Area A was to be administered by the Palestinian Authority and contained much of the Palestinian population, area B was under joint control, and area C was to be under Israeli control.\textsuperscript{48}

Contentions arose between the negotiation teams when both sides expressed different expectations based on the Oslo accords on meeting the agreed timetables. The Oslo accords stated in Article XIII, Redeployment of Israeli Forces, paragraph 1; “After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition, a withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.”\textsuperscript{49} The Palestinian delegation, interpreted this paragraph as an agreement that prior to Palestinian elections, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would be handed over to the Palestinian police for security and autonomy.\textsuperscript{50} Because the Israelis interpreted the very next paragraph in the Oslo accords as open to creating security boundaries, the Israeli negotiators demanded Israel control much of the West Bank beyond the agreed timeline, “In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.”\textsuperscript{51} In terms of security, the Oslo accords spelled out detailed timelines for negotiations, however, the accords also left things open to interpretation. This approach was intended to give the negotiators room to maneuver and at the same time, reach a political agreement to start the

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{48} Uri Savir, \textit{The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East}, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1998), 178.
\item\textsuperscript{49} Oslo Accords: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993, (September 1993, 1993).
\item\textsuperscript{50} Savir, \textit{1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East}, 180.
\item\textsuperscript{51} The United States of America and The Russian Federation, \textit{Oslo Accords: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993}
\end{footnotes}
process. This created a problem later when both sides interpreted the language of the framework with their own bias and expectations of what the language meant.

In the mid- to late 90s, through the Oslo peace process, cooperation between Palestinian police and Israeli military was contentious but forced. Abu Ala, a chief Palestinian negotiator, in one of the negotiation sessions acknowledged the need for security cooperation but offered his observations of the relationship as follows:

But you continue to behave like our masters. It seems to me that a good part of your army is not aware of the partnership implied by the agreements. Each time we must pass through a checkpoint—and there are many of them—your soldiers try to trample on our dignity by making us wait for hours or by throwing our identity cards on the ground so that we have to stoop before them in public view. I have no complaints about you; we sit here as equals. But out there, on the ground, your people behave as if nothing has changed.52

Even though the Oslo process collapsed, an expectation persists that Israel will withdraw from the West Bank according to the Oslo Accords, and give Palestine autonomy. This gives room for optimism and an ability to return to the process even after a time of violence and protest. However, differences in expectations and interpretation keep the two sides divided with little ability to bridge that divide. Maybe it’s time to attempt a different approach, one that puts both sides at the same starting point for negotiations. Starting any peace initiative with a defined border will achieve this aim and geographically confine each issue. The IPB analysis will hopefully prove this point.


In 2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to implement a plan of disengagement. The plan was born out of the idea of attempting to pressure the Palestinians toward peace while ensuring greater security for Israel. Four years

52 Savir, 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East, 167–168.
after the peace process collapsed at the end of President Clinton’s term and with
the second intifada in full swing, the peace process was going nowhere. The
world was waiting for the Palestinian internal political climate to change, namely
through the death of Yasser Arafat. Shortly after Yasser Arafat’s death, speculation
that Israel conducted an assassination surfaced. In 2009, doctors
were asked to look into the evidence to conclude whether he was poisoned.\textsuperscript{53}
This highlights the continued distrust between both sides over negotiations and
intentions of resolving the dispute peaceably.

Justification for the disengagement plan states, “Israel has come to the
conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can
make progress in a bilateral peace process. Accordingly, it has developed a plan
of unilateral disengagement.”\textsuperscript{54} The plan called for the isolation of the Gaza Strip
and the removal of all Israeli settlements, in effect, the blockade of Gaza was
underway. Israel maintained that it had the authority under self-defense to
establish a security perimeter. Ariel Sharon stated, “Israel will guard and monitor
the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive
authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the
sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.”\textsuperscript{55} Two years after this plan was adopted,
Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections. Much analysis about why Hamas
won the elections points to the corrupt nature of the Palestinian leaders under the
PLO and Fatah.\textsuperscript{56} While Hamas made overtures of peace through the use of
hudna, a temporary armistice, it gained popularity through its stance on
confronting Israel and rejecting the current peace process. Israel’s blockade and
isolation of the Gaza strip was a major factor directly contributing to Hamas’

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\textsuperscript{54} Ariel Sharon, The Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (April
2004)Government of Israel, 2004),
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/disengagement.html#plan.

\textsuperscript{55} Ariel Sharon, The Disengagement Plan,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/disengagement.html#plan.

\textsuperscript{56} Yezid Sayigh, “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine,” Survival 49, no. 3 (Autumn 2007,
2007); 16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564786.
increase in popularity. Hamas’ victory was a surprise to everyone including Hamas. It was possibly Israel’s blockade that propelled them to victory.

In Palestinian politics, 2006 was a watershed year. Hamas took control of the Palestinian government, which exposed the fissures and vulnerabilities in the Palestinian political structures. Hamas is the polar opposite to Fatah in all aspects, political, religious, social, and even in its approach to a Palestinian identity. The purported goal of Hamas is to reorient state and society toward a more thoroughgoing “piety-mindedness.” That is, to say, a more profound sense of Islamic identity rooted in the reformation of cultural practices, legal structures, and governing institutions according to the religio-legal ethic of the sharia.\(^{57}\) Control of government services becomes the battleground between competing political ideologies, and how one identifies oneself in relation to a Palestinian state. One can choose a secular avenue in Fatah or a religiously leaning government structure as found in Hamas. How one identifies oneself determines one’s loyalty.

The Israeli disengagement plan correctly identified the failure of a Palestinian partner in the peace process. The disengagement plan isolated Hamas, exposed Palestinian public opinion towards its government, and pushed Palestinian society to the brink of civil war. In June 2007, Hamas took control of Gaza and effectively divided the Palestinian people along political and religious lines between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By the time the dust settled, Fatah was in control in the West Bank, recognized by western powers as the only authority to represent Palestinians in the peace process. Hamas was in control of the Gaza Strip as a radical element bent on the destruction of Israel. Since 2007, Palestinians have been living under a fractured government, or rather, two separate governments, there is no one voice capable of uniting the people in one direction that can achieve the peace, stability, and land they desire for a nation.

The blockade has achieved its goals of isolating the Gaza Strip, provided greater security for Israeli citizens and destroyed any chance of a central Palestinian political entity. A two-state solution requires a unified Palestinian approach to peace because a three-state solution keeps the Palestinians disjointed and working against each other. Only time will tell if Palestinians can first set aside their differences long enough to build a unity government and then engage on a peace plan.

B. SECURITY ISSUE: RELIGIOUS CLAIMS FOR THE LAND

Understanding the dispute between Palestinians and Israelis requires an understanding of identity based on religious tradition. While many Jews in Israel are not religious and the Palestinian population is divided between Islamic and Christian religions, religious history and tradition is perhaps the greatest underlying influence on identity and claims for territorial rights.

From an historical perspective, the land on which Israel and Palestine now reside, the people have been conquered, re-conquered, exiled, repopulated, and claimed as territory by one country or another more times than can be counted. The archeological record proves this violent trend. Using one of the monotheistic religions to assert one’s claim as justification for possession assumes legitimacy and authority of one’s religion and de-legitimacy over others. Simultaneously, one’s identity becomes synonymous with God’s/Allah’s promises and to compromise on His promises is turning your back on your religious convictions and identity.

All three religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, agree that God promised to Abraham that his descendants would receive the land as an inheritance. This promise is part of the Abrahamic covenant found in Genesis 17:8: “The whole land of Canaan, where you now reside as a foreigner, I will give as an everlasting possession to you and your descendants after you; and I will be
their God.” In ancient times, inheritance was passed on to the first male child; the rest of the children got nothing or very little. Abraham had two sons of significance. His first born, Ishmael, was from his wife’s maidservant Hagar. Abraham’s second born, Isaac, was from his wife Sarah. Where the narrative differs is to whom the inheritance was passed. In Genesis 22, Abraham is commanded to offer his son as a sacrifice to God as a way of showing his obedience. Abraham offers his son, and in the last moment, the angel of the Lord stops him and is pleased that he was willing to be obedient to the point of sacrificing his own son. In Genesis 22:15-18, God reconfirms His covenant with Abraham and his son after the test of obedience:

Because you have done this and have not withheld your son, your only son, I will surely bless you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and as the sand on the seashore. Your descendants will take possession of the cities of their enemies, and through your offspring all nations on earth will be blessed, because you have obeyed me.

Both the Jewish and Christian religions believe that the son placed on the altar for sacrifice and to receive the blessing from God was Isaac. The Islamic religion believes the son to be Ishmael. In the biography The Life of Muhammad, Qisas al Anbiyd’, Shaykh `Abd al Wahhab al Najjar bases his conclusion of Ishmael being the one chosen for sacrifice on the Qur’anic description of the sacrificial son as unique. In this context, Ishmael is only unique as long as Isaac is not born yet. For the Islamic narrative the debate centers on the timing of the event to claim Ishmael as the son along with a belief that Jewish theologians changed the scriptures at a later date to suit their needs.

Why is understanding the significance between these two religions important? Judaism traces their lineage to Abraham through Isaac. If Isaac is

the correct son, then the covenant with Abraham is extended to the nation of Israel and therefore they are the legitimate owners of the land and the correct path to a relationship to God. Any other territorial claims based on religious views not in accordance with this narrative would be considered false. Equally, the Islamic tradition traces its lineage to Abraham through Ishmael. The same logic applies that any territorial claims based on religious views not in accordance to Islam would be false. Thus, Israel's territorial claim of the land becomes part of receiving the inheritance and blessing of God as well as proof of the legitimacy of their religion. If Israel is allowed to exist on this land, then the whole of Islamic identity and legitimacy is called into question.

How does the significance of this event that occurred 4,000 years ago relate to security today? In the West Bank reside 300,000 Israeli citizens known as settlers. The settler movement is based on the idea of expanding Israeli territory to achieve the promises of God. While the government of Israel is secular in nature, or partially, as the state supports religion in various ways, it uses this idea to assist the settlers with their agenda and, in turn, provide greater control of the West Bank, creating greater security for the nation as a whole. Settlements are a double-edged sword. From one perspective, the greater the amount of territory and key terrain under Israeli control, the greater security Israel has. By holding key terrain in the West Bank, Israel holds strategic dominance over the Palestinians, as well as preventing any direct threats to Israel proper. Simultaneously, control of water is key to the economic survival and development of both Israeli and Palestinian agricultural segments of the economy, at least until desalinization is more universal. On the other hand, the more settlers in the West Bank, the more targets of opportunity there are for terrorists to attack Israeli citizens and, thus, the greater the burden on Israeli security obligations. See the next section on settlements for more details.
C. SECURITY ISSUE: SETTLEMENTS

The status of settlements in the West Bank is one of the biggest obstacles to peace negotiations. Settlements not only represent territory the Palestinians feel they are losing, but they are also a security challenge to the Israeli government. As discussed earlier, to meet the security challenges, Israel is building the security fence to provide protection for its citizens. According to Chaim Levinson from an article in Haaretz, an Israeli Defense Force report in June 2009 states that approximately 300,000 Jewish settlers live in the West Bank.61 The Israeli government maintains that the West Bank and Gaza Strip “were not under the sovereignty of any state and came under Israeli control in a war of self-defense.” 62 Currently, no sovereign state other than Israel holds claim to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority, while claiming the 1967 “Green Line” as the defacto border for a Palestinian state, is not recognized internationally as a state and, therefore, cannot claim sovereignty over any territory. From the Israeli perspective, at best, the land in question is disputed territory under the sovereignty of Israel. Since Israel, in effect, owns the land, any settlements built would not be considered illegal.

In a study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, *Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?*, a team of legal researchers and lawyers attempt to define the status of Israeli activities in Palestinian territories according to international law. Using the International Humanitarian Law and the Fourth Geneva Convention of which Israel ratified in 1951, the study defines the difference between invasion and occupation finding that Israel is indeed an occupier.

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Invasion is the marching or riding of troops—or the flying of military aircraft—into enemy country. Occupation is invasion plus taking possession of enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any rate temporarily. The difference between mere invasion and occupation becomes apparent from the fact that an occupant sets up some kind of administration, whereas the mere invader does not.63

Israel vehemently rejects this interpretation of the Geneva Convention even though a UN resolution that was unanimously passed on July 15, 1999, states, “the Fourth Geneva Convention does apply to Israeli settlements in the “occupied territories””.64

While the international law favors Palestine in regards to settlements, it is in Israel’s interest for peace to limit the scope and purpose of the settlements to accommodate Palestinian self-rule. If the Israeli policy on settlements is, indeed, what Ariel Sharon said to Winston Churchill III in 1973, then peace is not the objective but domination and territorial control.

We’ll make a pastrami sandwich of them. We’ll insert a strip of Jewish settlements in between the Palestinians, and then another strip of Jewish settlements right across the West Bank, so that in 25 years, neither the United Nations, nor the U.S.A., nobody, will be able to tear it apart.65

A simple analysis of the trend in settlement construction should point to what the true objective is. If peace and security with a two-state solution is truly the objective, then the trend of new settlement construction would be on the decline. If the objective is to expand Israeli borders or achieve a demographic


monopoly then the trend in new settlement construction would show an increase in settlements. Figure 2 shows the trend in construction of new housing units in the West Bank.

As we can see from Figure 2, settlement development is holding even between 1,500 and 2,000 new units a year since 2001. This represents a constant increase in settlements in the West Bank and puts Israel on a policy towards demographic manipulation.

The Palestinian perspective of legality or illegality on settlements, hinges on defining Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza as an occupier. The

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Palestinian authorities have defined the Israeli presence as an occupying force since 1967 as has the world. Under this perspective, the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department points to the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49 (6) as proof of the illegality of settlement development.67 “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”68 In addition, Palestinian authorities point to approved United Nations Security Council Resolutions as confirmation of international law identifying Israel as an occupying force and its activities as illegal. UNSCR 452 states,

Considering that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories has no legal validity and constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August, 12 1949.69

UNSCR 465 also states,

... determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity and that Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.70

Justification for and definition of Israeli presence in Arab territory rests on international law. While international commissions or individual countries may condemn one side or the other for their actions on this issue, in practice, the


world is pushing for a solution to come from agreement instead of a verdict from an outside force. In the meantime Israel is setting conditions on the ground that are favorable to its outcome.

D. SECURITY ISSUE: STATUS OF JERUSALEM

The significance of Jerusalem lies in its religious preeminence to all three monotheistic religions. It is the location where Abraham offered his son as a sacrifice; where the Dome of the Rock now stands on the Temple Mount, where the Jewish Temple, the center of Jewish faith was located; where Christ’s death and resurrection occurred, and where Mohammad departed for his Night Journey to meet Allah face to face. The Temple Mount is the epicenter for the significance of Jerusalem for all three religions. To the Jews it is their connection to history and devotion to God. For Christians, the Temple Mount is a representation of the Temple in Heaven and for some Christians the location for the fulfillment of future prophesy. For Muslims, the Temple Mount is the third holiest location on earth and is the starting place where Mohammad went to meet Allah.

Originally a Jebusite city, King David conquered the city and established it as his capital in 1004 B.C.E. For nearly 1100 years, Jerusalem was the capital of Israel or Judah. In 70 A.D., Rome conquered Jerusalem, destroyed the Second Temple, expelled the people and ended the nation of Israel until 1948. In 638 the city was brought under Islamic rule. With the exception of approximately 120 years, from 1099 to 1187 and from 1229 to 1244 under Christian rule, Jerusalem remained under Islamic rule approximately 1190 years. In international law there are no statutes of limitations and both Israelis and Palestinians have justifiable historical claims to the city.

The status of Jerusalem is inked to the religious concept of the physical inheritance along with historical justification. The Israeli government officially states, “There has always been a national consensus in Israel on the status of Jerusalem. Since the reunification of the city in 1967, all Israeli Governments
have declared their policy that united Jerusalem, Israel's eternal capital is one indivisible city under Israeli sovereignty and that free access to holy places and freedom of worship will continue to be guaranteed to members of all faiths."\textsuperscript{71} The PLO states that Israel has no legal authority over East Jerusalem; however, they are in agreement over the unification of Jerusalem. "Within Jerusalem, irrespective of the resolution of the question of sovereignty, there should be no physical partition that would prevent the free circulation of persons within it."\textsuperscript{72} With both sides saying similar things, it would seem on the surface that there should not be an issue with Jerusalem. The unspoken dilemma is not over how the city should be run but who should run the city. Neither side is willing to partition the city and neither is willing to live under the other’s rule.

Israeli policy on Jerusalem is linked to the policy on the security fence in the West Bank. The path that the fence takes incorporates East Jerusalem into the city and allows Israel further developments as well as sets conditions on the ground favorable for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control.

E. SECURITY ISSUE: BORDERS/OCCUPATION

The victors of the Six Day War in 1967 found themselves in control of Arab lands. To the north, Israel took possession of the Golan Heights from the Syrians, to the West, they took the West Bank from the Jordanians, and to the South they took control of the Gaza Strip along with the Sinai Peninsula from the Egyptians. The current borders between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan were set in place through peace negotiations. Most notably, the Camp David agreement on September 17, 1978, set the framework for negotiations and the process that later was used in the Oslo accords. Through negotiations, Egypt gave up any claim to the Gaza Strip and established a border with Israel that remains in effect today. Jordan gave up claims to the West Bank and established the Jordan

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Palestine Liberation Organization, \textit{Core Issues}, \url{http://www.plomission.us/index.php?page=core-issues-3}.
\end{itemize}
River in the Jordan valley as the border with Israel. The border in the north along the Lebanon border is relatively undisputed; the only contention is the Shebaa Farm area and the Golan Heights. It is likely this border will remain unchanged unless readjustments to the agreements are made between Israel and Syria. While Hezbollah is a terrorist group with an anti-Israeli agenda, their dispute is not over the location of the borders but with the whole existence of Israel. Recently Hezbollah’s focus shifted to internal politics in Lebanon and gaining power more than fighting a war with Israel. However, they gain legitimacy for their hard-line stance against Israel and will use this as platform when it suits their agenda as long as their survival is not threatened. The security concern in the north derives from the fear that Hezbollah is acting as Iran’s proxy and threatens Israel to achieve Iranian objectives.

The Camp David Accords, while achieving peace between Israel and Egypt, attempted to resolve the Palestinian problem. “Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”73 After achieving peace with Israel, Egyptians and Jordanians had little incentive to push negotiations for a resolution to the Palestinian issue. The Camp David Accords placed the responsibility in the hands of the Palestinians to achieve a government that could govern its people and, once this was achieved, the Camp David Accords called for Israel to withdraw, giving room for a Palestinian government to stand up and begin the process of negotiations over territory as stipulated in UN Resolution 242.

UN Resolution 242 set two principles for peace. First, “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and second, “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political

independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”74 The Camp David Accords state under the Framework, “they therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.”75 Additionally the Camp David Accords under the Framework section A, West Bank and Gaza, paragraph A states, “In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.”76 The Camp David Accords, being tied to the UN Resolution 242, changes the status of the land the Palestinians live on. As long as Egypt and Jordan had claim to the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the land fell under international laws of occupation. Israel occupied land that rightfully belonged to a nation state. The Camp David Accords abolished Egypt and Jordan’s claim to this land and instead gave the responsibility of negotiations for the land to the Palestinians. The Palestinians must establish a State first in a legal framework while agreeing to the peace process before they are able to negotiate borders. Since no state claims authority over the West Bank and Gaza Strip the land is not occupied by Israel and instead falls under the legal framework of disputed territory. Using this logic, Israel disagrees with the UN resolution and the interpretation by the international community on the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The issue over occupation of disputed territory, while interesting, is not the focus of this discussion. The Palestinian Authority uses the framework of

74 United Nations, Resolution 242 (1967).
occupation as a way to describe the plight of the Palestinians. This keeps them in the position of the victim and gains sympathy and support from the rest of the world. By remaining in the position of the victim instead of establishing a state under the confines as laid out in the peace processes, Palestine is incapable of negotiating in good faith. Since there is no Palestinian state, the only legal framework the Palestinians have in dealing with border issues is the pre-67 Green Line. The PLO’s official stance on the border is, “The PLO has accepted that Israel’s 1967 Pre-Occupation borders (the “Green Line”) shall serve as the international border between the states of Palestine and Israel.”\(^{77}\) However, there is a problem with using the Armistice Agreement written February 24, 1949, as the basis for the Green Line. Article V, paragraph 2, states, “The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.”\(^{78}\) As long as the Palestinian Authority remains just a representative of the Palestinian people instead of an internationally recognized state, the Palestinian Authority has no legal redress for actions taken by the Israeli government and no ability to determine its borders.

F. SECURITY ISSUE: REFUGEES, RIGHT OF RETURN

At the end of World War II, Britain found itself in control of Palestine. Due to Great Britain expending too many men and too much material in an area that no longer held any strategic significance, Great Britain decided by 1947 to give the responsibility of maintaining peace to the United Nations. The United Nations on November 29, 1947 passed resolution 181, which took a course of partitioning Palestine and establishing a two-state solution. Between December, 1947 and May 14, 1948, violence erupted and both sides committed acts of terrorism. Victims included women, children, and noncombatants from all ethnicities. Due

\(^{77}\) Palestine Liberation Organization, Core Issues.

to the violence in the run up to the creation of Israel, approximately 15,000 Arabs fled to safety either to Palestinian areas in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or other Arab states. The Muftis called for Arabs to stay and requested Arab states not to grant entry.\textsuperscript{79} According to Charles Smith, in his book, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, through the course of the war that started on May 15, 1948, an additional 400,000 to 450,000 Palestinian refugees were expelled or fled.\textsuperscript{80}

In preparation for the establishment of the state of Israel, David Ben-Gurion authorized a military plan designed to defend Israel. There is much debate over the Hagana Plan Dalet and what its true intentions were. The Israeli government claims that the Hagana Plan Dalet was defensive in nature and that “Israel does not bear any culpability for the creation or perpetuation of the Palestinian refugee problem.”\textsuperscript{81} They go on to say that “The immediate source of the refugee problem was, in fact, the Arabs’ rejection in 1947 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 181. Resolution 181 would have partitioned the British Mandate area into an Arab state and a Jewish state.”\textsuperscript{82} According to the Hagana Plan Dalet, as translated by Walid Khalidi, under section (b), Consolidation of Defense Systems and Fortifications, the plan calls for “Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force.”\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} ‘Charles D. Smith’, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents}, 197.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Charles D. Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents}, 203.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Israel, the Conflict and Peace: The Peace Process with the Palestinians} (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009), \url{http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/FAQ/FAQ_Peace_process_with_Palestinians_Dec_2009}.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
One method to be employed was “Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.”

Whether the plan called for the forced removal of Palestinians from their homes or not is immaterial. The Palestinian movements claim Israeli aggression as justification for resistance to an Israeli government and tie the Palestinian identity to the land that Israel controls. The fact is that before the creation of Israel, Palestinians lived on some of the land that is now controlled by Israel. How individuals became refugees is too difficult to assign culpability to any one party. Arab armies are just as guilty as the Israeli militias for creating the problem. War always causes difficulties and devastation for the innocent and civilian populations. The question is not how they became refugees, but how do we end the refugee problem today?

As stated earlier, Israel’s policy is one of denying any responsibility, therefore, it claims no obligation for restitution or inclusion of Arabs into the state of Israel. Most recently Benjamin Netanyahu said “he would renew a temporary halt of settlement construction in the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.” Should the Palestinian Authority agree to this precondition it effectively gives up its claim for the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees. By affirming the State of Israel as a Jewish nation, the Palestinians would agree that the land belongs to the Jews and, therefore, they have no claim on the land from that point on, not including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

There is no Palestinian government, only organizations attempting to lead and dictate the terms of Palestinian identity according to their objectives.

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Palestinian Authority is charged by the international community to build a
government and provide for the welfare of its population. Fatah and Hamas are
involved in a fight over control and it is the will of the people that will determine
which organization will be the representative of the Palestinian people. According
to the United Nation’s 2007 census, 1.55 million refugees live in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.\(^{86}\) With a total population size of 2.35 million, this means that
65 percent of the Palestinian population are refugees.\(^{87}\) With the high percentage
of the Palestinian population in refugee status, any leader or organization that
compromises on the issue over the “right of return” will soon find themselves out
of a job.

The Palestinian refugee problem was created when war broke out
between Arab nations and the newly created State of Israel in 1948. All sides are
guilty for creating the conditions that led to refugees leaving their homes. With
two peoples claiming ownership of the same piece of land, for peace to succeed,
one group must be willing to forgo its claim to the land to achieve peace.
Restitution and compensation, as well as compromise, must be part of the
equation to resolve this issue. Neither side will be completely happy with the end
result, but the final arrangement must be acceptable to both sides for peace to
succeed.

G. DISCUSSION

Israeli policy towards Palestine is one focused on providing security for its
own citizens while keeping the Palestinians weak. Palestinians have very little
leverage or ability to influence negotiations except through the use of stalling
diplomatic negotiations, in the hopes of gaining a better deal or through the use
of violent protest. Looking at Israel’s policies to combat terrorism through the
construction of a security fence, continued policing, and blockading the Gaza

\(^{86}\) Salem Ajluni, *West Bank & Gaza Strip Population Census of 2007UNRWA*, 2010),

\(^{87}\) Salem Ajluni, *West Bank & Gaza Strip Population Census of 2007UNRWA*, 2010),
Strip, it is clear that at this time Israel is not interested in a two-state solution but rather keeping the status quo. Their policies isolate, limit Palestinian capabilities, and attempt to gain a demographic monopoly over the West Bank. As shown, Israel's policies effectively divided the Palestinian population and prevented the development of a strong partner interested in negotiating peace. The Palestinian population is fractured and unable to unite in an effort to establish one government. The unifying factor for the Palestinian population is the hatred for Israel. If they are ever able to agree on a unified front, then they would be able to either confront Israel or unite behind a government that is strong enough to be their voice and achieve peace. The fear that Israel has for a united Palestine is that it would be united in its endeavors to destroy Israel instead of united in its desire for peace. This is the reason Israel pursues policies that keep the Palestinians weak and controls Palestine in a way that is acceptable and compatible with Israel's security needs. Israel is certainly willing to live with a peaceful Palestine but a peaceful Palestine must develop on Israel's terms. Israel currently uses the security fence, policing in the West Bank, and the Blockade of the Gaza Strip as methods to prevent terrorism, of which the trend in the attack data demonstrates success. However, at what cost are these methods employed? These methods provide security but also prevent a two-state solution from maturing. The Palestinian people view the relationship with Israel as one of jailor and prisoner instead of as equal partners desiring the same end. Religious views from both Jewish and Islamic perspectives push the political dynamic away from resolution over their inability to reach common ground over the right of inheritance and legitimacy. Both hold the view that they are right and the other is not just wrong but is a false religion and worthy of destruction.
III. ECONOMICS

What is the cost of security in Israel and Palestine? Each entity spends a high percentage of its GDP to guarantee its security. Are these two entities getting their money’s worth or, if they were to invest in markets, would they be more secure in the long run? Conversely, what is the best approach to assist a developing country? Should the international community encourage the reform of government institutions, or through the development of free markets and Regional Trade Agreement? One side of the spectrum says that you must install a government that is able to provide the democratic processes and security in order for a free market to develop. The other side believes building a free market system and international trade will lead to a government that is democratically focused due to the demands of society. By exploring the Palestinian Authority and Israeli economies as they relate to each other, we will be able to see if capitalist peace theory is applicable to the current status of the prospects for a peaceful resolution.

Could development of a free market under the control of the Palestinian Authority with the principles of the Washington Consensus, responsibly implemented, lead to a lasting and secure two-state solution? Would consolidation of regional economic integration enhance the prospects for peace within the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region? How might this be explained to Israel and its Arab neighbors?

This section will look at the Palestinian Authority through the same lens as any other state even though the Palestinians do not exist as a state. However, they have governmental institutions, hold elections, and have an economy that can be used to compare consumption and defense spending. By exploring the two spectrums of capitalist peace theory in greater detail, this thesis hopes to explain why it would or would not work in these conditions. While economics are independent of the security considerations for a two-state solution and only play a minor role in the IPB analysis, the structure and capability of the economy will
greatly assist with a stable environment or prevent real peace from materializing. The Palestinian economy must have access to markets outside Israel to give it the ability to compete on a global market, in turn giving it the ability to lower unemployment and meet the demands of Palestinian society. There can be no lasting security without a developed Palestinian economy that gives its citizens the ability for advancement. The IPB analysis in Chapter VI will complement the analysis from this chapter and lead to the conclusion that Palestinian economic development is critical to greater security and long-term peace. Achieving this will require Palestine to have autonomy and direct control of its markets and ability to get goods to the world market. Israeli security of the West Bank runs in opposition to this view, taking short-term security requirements as the first priority. Palestinian eventual control of its borders is necessary for its economic growth.

According to Rafael Reuveny, the Israeli-Palestinian economic relations debate centers on three positions within the capitalist peace construct: first, integration; second, partial integration; and third, economic separation. The integration view holds that both sides will have mutual benefits leading to closer ties and preventing violent reaction. It also argues that separating the two economies would have dire consequences to the Palestinians. The partial integration view believes the two economies are not compatible, which is causing an imbalance in the relationship. The supporters of the separation view warn that any other model will continue a balance in favor of Israel, thus perpetuating Palestinian dependence.88

Arguing for free market and integration, Charles Boehmer and David Sobek say “developed states, are more reliant on services for their economic growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, and decrease their involvement in interstate conflict. Meanwhile, the poorest states, although they have more to gain through territorial expansion, have a decreased ability to pursue their

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objectives through military force.” 89 Erik Gartzke, along with Stephen Brooks, supports this view: free markets have the power to unite two economies for the mutual benefit of greater security and economic growth through Regional Trade agreements. 90 “Free markets have the potential to free states from the looming prospect of recurrent warfare. Capitalism encourages cooperation among states by creating conditions that make war unappealing or unnecessary. Free markets create another venue to competition among countries, often containing minor conflicts below the level of military force.” 91

Arguing for partial integration, both Jacob Metzer and Rafael Reuveny counter the integration view and believe the best approach for a stable peaceful economy is the second approach, “a dual economic approach that permits interaction among the units while highlighting the dimensions that separate them.” 92

Arguing for separation of the two economies, Arie Arnon and Sara Roy believe that since 1967 the Israeli policy towards Palestine is one of de-development, which prevents a separate, distinct political Palestinian entity from establishing. They point to this policy as evidence that any form of integration will continue to undercut any ability of the Palestinian economy from growing. 93

The standard capitalist peace theory and integration will not work between Israel and Palestine. One major premise of the capitalist peace theory is that the two or more economies that integrate for greater economic cooperation are mutually developed, can individually more or less stand on their own, and each

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82 Tarik M. Yousef, *Reviewed Work(s): The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine by Jacob Metzer*, 1128.
country is considered an equal partner. Israel is a developed economic powerhouse; Palestine is undeveloped and is hampered from developing due to both inside and outside influences. Due to the imbalance between the levels of development in each economy, capitalist peace theory is not applicable in this situation. In order for capitalist peace theory to be applicable and integration between Israel and Palestine to occur, there must be a period of separation that allows Palestine to develop and become an equal economic partner.

A. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Stephen Brooks in his book, *Producing Security*, postulates that multinational corporations (MNC) act as a stabilizing force between nations and help unite them through economic means. He argues that the MNCs build a network that creates an environment of inter-dependency between nations, thus making it less likely they will go to war against each other. This environment can only be created in developed nations who participate in economic globalization. Non-developed nations have not participated in globalization, have very little means to do so, and lack the ability to develop the institutions and economy that would be attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Brooks concludes, “that while the geographic dispersion of multinational corporations (MNC) production is stabilizing among the great powers, it will not promote peace elsewhere in the world.”

Brooks also considers the growth of a second type of institution. Regional trade agreements (RTA) help lead to security and cooperation between two or more nations. These agreements help a collection of nations to attract FDI that they could not do otherwise on their own. The agreement helps bring together resources, manpower, and technology with fewer trade barriers. Brooks states that simply establishing an RTA does not improve security, rather, it is the consolidation of the nations involved. For an RTA to be successful, true

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integration with key dynamics must take place, “an enhanced network of transactions between citizens; deeper links of communication between policymakers; the creation of strong economic ties; spillover from dense economic cooperation to security cooperation; or a shift toward a more collective sense of interests.”95 These dynamics are not likely to develop under the current conditions with Israel and Palestine. The economic balance favors Israel too much for fair trade to develop between the two economies.

Both the use of MNCs and RTAs as a method to help create security cooperation through economic means assumes that the nations involved are relatively equally developed, have similar economies, and are equal partners. Due to the imbalance of the economies between Israel and Palestine these two methods will not work and, in fact, if attempted will perpetuate violent protests against integration. Rafael Reuveny expands on this idea of imbalance and argues, “Least Developed Country (LDC’s) economic dependence generates forces that act to eliminate its own existence, as the dependent country becomes obsessed with breaking the dominating link.”96 To further understand the imbalance between the two nations we must look at their economic structures and trade policies as they relate to each other.

The Palestinian economy is currently controlled by Israel. Palestine is incapable of running its own institutions and developing a robust economy without the aid and approval of Israel. George Abed argues, “External trade and capital movements between the occupied territories and the Arab countries were severely restricted and replaced by free Israeli access to the territories’ markets. Restrictions on Arab use of water resources and lack of access to external

96 Rafael Reuveny, The Political Economy of Israeli-Palestinian Interdependence, 655.
markets (including Israel) stunted agricultural growth while Israel’s administrative powers (such as its licensing authority) were used to suppress industrial development.”

Imbalance in the Palestinian economy suffers from the lack of development of manpower, infrastructure collapse, lack of access to Arab markets and is characteristically a dependent relationship with Israel. This imbalance is enforced by Israel as a method for ensuring a more peaceful coexistence. If Palestine does not have the resources to wage war, then they will be relegated to a less violent armed struggle. If this assumption is correct, one must ask, does a weak Palestinian economy prevent violence or perpetuate it?

According to The Heritage Foundation, in 2008, the last year data was collected for the West Bank and Gaza, the per capita income was $2,900 while the latest figures for Israel in 2010 per capita income was $28,393. In addition, as of 2008 figures, unemployment in the Palestinian territory is 26 percent while in Israel it is 6.2 percent. This imbalance, coupled with desperate living conditions, leaves little alternative for Palestinians to coexist with Israel, and instead push for violent protest against the structures of their economic dependency on Israel.

Under the Oslo accords, through the land for peace initiative, Palestine would receive greater autonomy on the condition of ending violence. Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority were placed under immense pressure from Israel to reign in militant attacks. At the same time, rebellion by his constituents, over the fear that the Palestinian Authority had become nothing more than an

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98 The Heritage Foundation, 2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Israel,
operational arm of Israeli security, sparked a cycle of support and violent protest to the Oslo peace process.\textsuperscript{101} This cycle of support and violence made the peace process unattainable.

In 1994, an agreement was reached on economic compromise at the Paris Protocol. The protocol was to give Palestine an independent trade policy and greater access to Israeli labor and markets. In effect, Palestine was given a chance to build their own economy outside the direct influence of Israel. Implementation of the Paris Protocol stalled due to lengthening of the negotiations and a response by Israel to violence by extremists.\textsuperscript{102} Instead of an opening of economic relations, Palestinians saw their economy under tighter control due to the collapse of the peace negotiations and the start of the second intifada. According to George Abed, Israel’s use of “occupation policies and practices have had the effect of generally directing all resource exploitation activities to accommodate Israel’s geopolitical requirements.”\textsuperscript{103}

The Palestinian Territories were, until quite recently, practically incorporated into Israel, and therefore, could not trade with other countries in the region. The only exception was Jordan, which allowed some imports from the West Bank and Gaza, and exported a few goods to the Palestinian Territories in the token quantities allowed by Israel, which did not exceed one percent of all Palestinian imports in recent years. Although the Israeli trade regime also applied to them, exports of farm produce from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel were severely restricted by administrative means. The extensive discretionary powers held by the Israeli military authorities often were used to prevent the establishment of industrial plants by Palestinians that would have competed with existing Israeli firms. The uncertainty regarding the political future of these territories and Jordanian restrictions on competing Palestinian imports greatly restricted the production of goods that

\textsuperscript{101} Rafael Reuveny, \textit{The Political Economy of Israeli-Palestinian Interdependence}, 654.

\textsuperscript{102} Hisham Awartani and Ephraim Kleiman, “Economic Interactions among Participants in the Middle East Peace Process,” \textit{Middle East Journal} 51, no. 2 (Spring, 1997), 215–229, \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329054}.

\textsuperscript{103} Abed, \textit{The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State}, 9.
might have been exported to either Israel or Jordan and, hence, limited the trade of the Palestinian Territories with these countries.¹⁰⁴

B. ECONOMIC SEPARATION

Capitalist peace theory of integration is not working in Israel and Palestine due to the imbalance in development and the restrictiveness in nature of Israeli economic policy towards Palestinian territory. Another approach must be attempted, one of separation that gives room for a Palestinian state to develop. Only when Palestine’s economy is developed, globalized and similar to Israel will the use of MNCs and or RTAs be effective and hopefully bring the two nations to a true and lasting peace. Rafael Reuveny argues separation “will decrease Palestinian vulnerability to Israeli policies, thereby reducing Israel’s ability (and drive) to influence Palestinian policies.”¹⁰⁵ A Palestinian government able to deter Israeli punitive measures will gain in public support, weaken Hamas’ support, and create the room for institutional building. Hamas builds its support on the ability to provide welfare services that the Palestinian Authority is incapable of providing due to the weak economic structure. A strong economy under the Palestinian Authority weakens Hamas and their extremist ideals and gives the Palestinian Authority the credibility to run the government and provide for its citizens.¹⁰⁶ Katherine Barbieri summarizes the conclusion on the situation between Israel and Palestine. “Economic linkages have a dramatic influence on whether or not dyads engage in militarized disputes, but no influence on the occurrence of wars. Rather than inhibiting conflict, extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads will engage in militarized interstate disputes. Peace through trade is most likely to arise among dyads composed of mutually dependent trading partners.”¹⁰⁷

One key factor why it is important for there to be a period of economic separation is due to the growing imbalance in economic types. The top four Palestinian economic sectors are: first, agriculture and fisheries, of which the share of GDP in this sector is dropping due to land issues and water right restrictions and is at 4.8 percent of the 2009 GDP; second, mining, water, and electricity, has stayed relatively at the same share of GDP from 2008 to 2009, at 14.7 percent; third, construction, which grew in 2009 to 7.4 percent; and fourth, the service sector, by far-and-away the largest sector at 38.2 percent of GDP. These sectors are underdeveloped and show a low level of technological advance. Palestine is unable to compete in the world economy and is dependant on Israel with 90 percent of its exports and 70 percent of its imports going to and coming from Israel. According to CIA world fact book, Palestine’s GDP in 2009 was $12.79 billion.

In comparison, Israel’s economy is developed well beyond Palestine, Israel’s GDP is 16 times larger than Palestine’s at $206.4 billion. While Israel boasts a robust agriculture sector, construction, and public sector, Israel is also greatly diversified and modernized. According to Alan Richards and John Waterbury in their book, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, “Israel has gone the farthest in the development and sophistication of its military industries. Israel’s technical expertise is without equal in the region.”

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The appropriate economic peace model to apply when there is a gap between a developed and undeveloped nation is separation. Until two nations mutually respect each other and can work in an environment of collaboration, then and only then can the principles of economy peace theory build the bonds that prevent war.
IV. PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES

Lasting peace between Israel and Palestine will require more than a secure environment with both groups free from fear; it will require an attitude of cooperation and partnership to ensure the relationship remains peaceful. Under the Oslo accords, Israeli and Palestinian security institutions worked with each other while the CIA provided the bridge for cooperation, training, and trust. These relationships ultimately fell apart due to an inability to develop common objectives, loyalty to rule-of-law, common training practices, or an ability to communicate effectively. A successful two-state solution requires a stable environment for peace to develop that is only brought about through professional, well-trained and equipped security institutions that can work with each other for a common goal. This common goal is an agreed-upon agenda by the leadership of each nation and must be rigorously protected from competing ideas, with oversight to ensure goals are met. This chapter and the following one will begin with the start of Oslo, exploring the Israeli and Palestinian security institutions. By exploring their mission, the ideology governing the motivations and loyalties in each institution, and lastly, the professionalism and training of each security force, this thesis will identify Israeli failure in adjusting to the correct method for counterinsurgency operations, as well as the difficulties the Palestinian Authority faces with building a national security force that is loyal to the rule-of-law and one the population will trust to turn to in a time of need. The IPB analysis generated in the last chapter looks at the technical aspects and limitations of security, and the next two chapters will attempt to bridge the social connection gap in this analysis. It is combining the social science analysis and the IPB analysis that gives the greatest understanding.

Palestinian structures within the security institutions prevent a modern government capable of governing through the rule-of-law from developing, simultaneously preventing both the Palestinian and Israeli populations from placing increased confidence in Palestinian security. A defined border is the first
step in changing the Palestinian identity from revolution to national pride. Nationalism can only come about with a definition of the state, and this nationalism leads to a confidence in the system, which reinforces the security structures to work within the oversight of the legislative body and civil authority.

A. PALESTINIAN SECURITY OVERVIEW

Paragraph Three of Article III, in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement establishes the structure and composition of the Palestinian Police. The force structure consists of four branches: Civil Police, Public Security, Intelligence, and Emergency Services and Rescue. Each of the four security services is to report to the district authority within their respective districts. The district authority in turn is to report to a national civilian control authority, with the Palestinian Authority President providing direct oversight. The total force for all Palestinian Police is not to exceed 9,000. The agreement was designed to give the Palestinian state the ability to start policing its own population without Israel fearing the creation of a hostile army within its boundaries of responsibility.

The Oslo Accords expanded from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, laying the ground rules and guiding principles to establishing peace and security. Under these accords, Palestine was to create a centralized police force that was capable of providing security once Israeli military redeployed. Paragraph C under sub section C Withdrawal and Redeployment in Section two: Security Issues of the Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area states, “Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents

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issued by Egypt. Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.”

To accomplish this task, as well as provide control for the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat went beyond the agreement and created twelve different security institutions. These institutions held overlapping jurisdictions while operating in the West Bank and Gaza. “Instead of relying upon a unified command headed by a director general as stipulated in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, or delegating supervisory powers to a minister of the interior, Arafat formed in 1994 the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS).” “The Council was considered relatively inefficient in providing coordination, guidance and unity of command.” In 1994, the total number of security personnel was 10,000; by 1997, the security force quadrupled in size to 42,000. According to an article by Reuters in 2008, entitled, U.S. Sees Palestinian forces needing billions in aid, the force will ultimately reach 50,000. Why did Arafat expand the security forces beyond the agreement? To answer this question, first we must understand the structure of the PLO to see why it was necessary for Arafat to create so many institutions.

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118 Brynjar, A Police Force without a State, 310.
B. THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

The PLO was created as a way to unite multiple Palestinian movements into one focus of effort, to cut down on competition for resources, and to create a Palestinian identity. While the PLO is a political organization, its leaders have direct impact on the structure, purpose, and loyalty of the security institutions within the Palestinian Authority. To provide structure and allow each Palestinian movement a voice, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) was created. “Although the number frequently changes, at last count the PNC had 430 members, representing various segments of the Palestinian community, including armed militias and terrorist organizations.”121 While each organization is a member of the PLO, they have their own leadership, funding, and agenda. They choose to adhere to the direction of the PLO as long as it suits their goals. The position of Chairman was created to oversee the day-to-day operations of the PLO and give guidance and direction for the organization as well as keep the movement from fracturing. Without Yasser Arafat, it is likely the movement would have collapsed. The security of the position of the Chairman rests on the continuous loyalty of the various movements and components. While the chairman is voted into position, the individual movements and components are free to follow as they desire. Their loyalty to the chairman is gained more through patronage and continued agreement of vision rather than through authority given for a period of time through a vote or through fealty given for a lifetime. According to Neil Livingstone, “If enough component organizations sever their ties to the PLO or choose, for a period of time, not to recognize the leadership of the chairman and his allies, they can have a profound impact on the direction and policies of the PLO.”122 At the same time, however, it was Yasser Arafat who held the PLO together. If he lost enough support from other movements, the Palestinians would be even more divided on their approach for achieving the

121 Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War Against Israel and the United States (New York: William Morrow and Company, INC., 1990), 70.

122 Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the PLO, 71.
desire of a homeland. On September 13, 1993 Yasser Arafat as the Chairmen for the PLO, on the White House lawn, signed the Oslo Accords, officially making him responsible for security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Competing expectations put him in an impossible position. The West expected Yasser Arafat to abide by security force structure as laid out in the agreement, while internal PLO politics forced him to find ways to accommodate competing rivals and keep the Palestinians united.

According to Brynjar Lia in *A Police Force without a State*, “self-policing by non-state actors in a hostile environment is an almost impossible mission, as guerrilla warfare and its requirements prevent the rise of permanent institutions with physical infrastructure.”123 The PLO had the task of transitioning its militancy groups into a cohesive security force. Individual loyalties were given to an organization dedicated to the revolutionary creation of a Palestinian homeland. Oslo expected individual loyalties to be given to rule-of-law under the Palestinian Authority, a not yet fully recognized state capable of employing a monopoly of force over its own citizens. For decades individual identities were tied to the revolutionary movement and Palestinian land. The West expected identity to be based on Nationalism and a secular democratic governmental system. “Palestinian self-policing also included tribal or customary mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement of social order, based on kinship or village allegiances.”124 For an individual to abandon their loyalty of the organization or movement they were a member of, and pledge their loyalty to a system that was still in the making and had no guarantee of being recognized by the international community as the Palestinian state, was tantamount to turning their backs on their own identity.

The key to transitioning the security force identity and loyalty from a revolution movement to a state system is to undercut the need for a revolution. In

this case the establishment of the state serves as the objective of the revolution, an accomplishment thus ending the need for a revolution. Only when there is a true Palestinian state can a transition start to achieve the desired results of unified identity in a governmental system and, in turn, result in belief in the rule-of-law.

The Bush administration on April 30, 2003, along with the UN, EU, and Russia, known as the “quartet” in an attempt to put the peace process back on track, established the roadmap; it is under these guidelines that the obligations for each side currently exist. The roadmap is a three-phase performance-based plan to stop the violence and bring the two sides back to the negotiating table and put the process back on track with the Oslo Agreement. “Currently, there are five separate organizations that constitute the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF): the National Security Forces (which includes an autonomous military intelligence branch), the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventive Security Organization, the Presidential Guard, and the General Intelligence Service.”\(^{125}\)

These are the institutions this thesis will explore in greater detail.

Corruption is affecting security agreements and institutions within the Palestinian security structure. Due to the rampant corruption within the Fatah and PLO, Hamas won the 2006 elections. Hamas’ victory resulted in a change to power sharing within Palestine as well as control of security forces. During the 2006 election, Hamas directed the campaign towards social issues, just resistance against Israel, and anti corruption.\(^{126}\) Fatah attempted to acknowledge corruption within the ranks but blamed the conditions set by Israel as the cause.\(^{127}\) It is the corruption within the Palestinian leadership that helped give Hamas greater power and, in turn, gave them control of the security institutions in


\(^{127}\) Ibid., 677.
the Gaza Strip that led to a coup in June 2007, thus changing the Israeli security calculus and views of the Palestinian Authority as a viable partner for peace. Figure 3 is a diagram of the security structures under the Palestinian Authority.

Figure 3. PA Security Organizations and Command Structure

C. NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (NSF)

The National Security Force (Al-Amn al-Watani) is the largest of all the Palestinian Authority security institutions. Academic literature shows the size of the force in 1997 between 16,500–18,000, with a Congressional Research Service report dated January 2010, placing the current force structure at 8,000.\(^{129,130,131}\) It is structured around a military style and serves in the capacity of a gendarmerie-type force while supporting civil police.\(^{132}\) The NSF is currently


\(^{131}\) Zanotti, *U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority*, 13.

commanded by Diab al Ali, who describes the mission of the NSF as, “We’re building a force to defend our people, and also to help the Palestinians build a nation.”\textsuperscript{133} Before Hamas took over Gaza, its officer core was recruited from Palestinians living outside Palestine mainly in Jordan and Egypt, while its rank and file were recruited from within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{134} Its area of responsibility covers “policing outside the cities, public order maintenance, patrolling along the borders of Area A (see Figure 4). As the most army-like branch, it was the body most deeply involved in the September, 1996, clashes when the Palestinian Police engaged the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in pitched gun battles.”\textsuperscript{135}

After the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, the Israeli military control authority would not allow the NSF to operate due to security concerns to its own citizens and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, with the implementation of the November, 2007, Annapolis Agreement, the force was reconstituted, and funding for training was provided from the United States International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program (INCLE).\textsuperscript{136} In 2009, the United States Congress appropriated $184 million to develop a security force capable of providing basic security services within Palestinian controlled areas in the West Bank after the departure of IDF soldiers.\textsuperscript{137} The training program is run through the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), currently headed by General Dayton through 2010.\textsuperscript{138} The training is provided by an international team of contractors and consists of an “intense 1,400-hours of instruction specifically called for in the curriculum for human rights law, defensive tactics, first aid, urban and rural small-unit tactics, firearms, mounted and foot-patrol

\textsuperscript{133} Zanotti, \textit{U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority}, 13.

\textsuperscript{134} Brynjar, \textit{A Police Force without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza}, 317.

\textsuperscript{135} Brynjar, \textit{A Police Force without a State}, 317.

\textsuperscript{136} Zanotti, \textit{U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority}, 14.

\textsuperscript{137} Zanotti, \textit{U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority}, 14.

\textsuperscript{138} Zanotti, \textit{U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority}, 14.
techniques, and crime scene investigations." The recruits are vetted through various databases in Washington, Israel Security Agency, Shin Bet, Israel Police, and the Jordanian government for any criminal activity or terrorist associations. The training is located at the Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC). By the end of 2009, five battalions completed the training, totaling 2,600 men, with another 1,000 expected to complete the training by the end of 2010. See Table 2 for a breakdown in units trained. “General Dayton envisions ten NSF battalions can be trained in Jordan, one for each of the nine governorates designated for official PA security purposes, and one as a strategic reserve.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Training Dates</th>
<th>Unit Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Guard 3rd</td>
<td>Feb-Mar 2008</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 1st</td>
<td>Dec 2009</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 2nd</td>
<td>Feb-May 2008</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 3rd</td>
<td>Sep-Dec 2008</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 4th</td>
<td>Feb-Jun 2009</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 5th</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF 6th</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 7 Battalions</td>
<td>Total, 3 years</td>
<td>Total, 3,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Palestinian Security Force Trained by the United States

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140 Zanotti, *U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority*, 17.


D. PALESTINIAN CIVIL POLICE (PCP)

The Civilian Police (al-shur tah), came into existence in May 1994, with a handful of trained officers from exile. “Headed by an experienced police officer, Brigadier Ghazi al-Jabali, who in contrast to the leaders of the other branches was not a former guerrilla, a street fighter or a PLA general, the Civilian Police grew into one of the largest and most important branches.” \(^{144}\) It is estimated in 1997 to have a force size of 10,500 with 4,000 in the Gaza Strip and the remaining 6,500 in the West Bank. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, the force strength in May 2010, of the PCP was around 7,300 personnel.\(^ {145}\) The PCP is trained for riot control, traffic police, criminal investigations, and anti-drug ops.\(^ {146,147}\) “An important sub-branch was the Public Order and Rapid Intervention Unit, which was established in January, 1995, and expanded to a relatively professional force of about a thousand men by late 1996.” \(^ {148}\) The PCP received training from the British and the Dutch through the European Union (EU) assistance programs; however, the assistance was suspended after Hamas won the election in 2006.\(^ {149}\) The training was halted because of the fear that the EU would be arming and training a terrorist organization.

The Civilian Police had a special Female Police Department with about 350 policewomen in 1997, headed by Colonel Fatima Barnawi. They were also employed at checkpoints and border crossings where searches of female individuals required their

presence, in female prisons or during the apprehension of women. Female officers were found mostly in the Civilian Police, but a small number were also employed in other branches, including the GIS, the PSA and the PNSF.\footnote{150}  

**E. PREVENTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION (PSO)**

The Preventive Security Organization (jihaz al-amn al-waqa’i) is a special plain-clothes unit styled after the FBI with loyalty to Fatah. Prior to Hamas’ coup in December 2007, the organization was two separate organizations located in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. One of its primary missions is to deal with dissident Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.\footnote{151} In the mid 90s the PSO was run by two outspoken figures with political ambitions and they were part of the reason Arafat structured the institutions in such a way as to ensure no one leader of a security institution gained too much power and authority. However, “the PSO reportedly controlled a number of import-export monopolies, which invited hard-to-refute charges of economic corruption and malfeasance.”\footnote{152} 

“Being the only truly homegrown inside-based police branch, the PSO commanded considerable respect and credibility on the Palestinian 'street', as nearly all its officers had been jailed by Israel for security offences.”\footnote{153} The last reliable figures placed the size of the force between 3,000 and 5,000 prior to the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000. The PSO participated in the security coordination with Israel over exchange of intelligence.

\footnote{153} Ibid., 312.
F. PRESIDENTIAL GUARD (PG)

The Presidential Guard is an elite unit with roots in Fatah’s guerrilla forces from the 60s and later transformed into Force-17 in March 1990, and merged with Presidential Security (PS) in November 1993. Force-17 was a commando style militant group established in the 70s and was loyal to the Chairman of the PLO. Its mission is to protect the Palestinian President, VIPs, and important PA facilities and officials. In June 1994 a “PS/Force-17 commander, Colonel 'Adil Salih, resigned in protest after an armed confrontation in the West Bank between his forces and the more powerful PSA. The West Bank departments of the Presidential Security were temporarily closed down in order to restore order, and some 27 PS/Force-17 members were jailed for indiscipline.”

Under Yasser Arafat the PG styled itself similar to the “Republican Guard,” centered in Gaza City. “Its armored units deployed throughout Gaza and in the West Bank cities in the aftermath of several suicide bombings in February-March, 1996, to enforce the martial law declared by the PNA.” As of May 2010, the force strength is around 2,300, divided into four battalions, and reports directly to the Palestinian President through the Minister of the Interior. The Presidential Guard 3rd battalion received Palestinian Security Force Training from the United States.

G. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (GIS)

The General Intelligence Service is a combination of various intelligence organizations that were merged in late November 1993, after Oslo. The two main agencies, the Unified Security Agency, directed primarily by Colonel al-Hindi was merged with the Central Intelligence, headed by Hakam Bal'awi, a wealthy businessman, a Fatah Central Committee member, the PLO's ambassador to


155 Brynjar, A Police Force without a State, 315.

156 Brynjar, A Police Force without a State, 315.
Tunisia and widely considered to be the head of the PLO’s internal security.”\textsuperscript{157} A tripartite leadership of Amin al-Hindi, Tariq Abu Rajab and Fakhri Shaffurah, ran the new GIS. “In September 2009, Major General Majid Faraj was appointed head of the service, a long-time activist who has spent six years in Israeli prisons.”\textsuperscript{158} At the time of the merger in 1993, the organization consisted of around 800 experienced intelligence officers mainly from Tunis, but grew to 3,500 by 1997 with 1,500 in Gaza and 2,000 in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{159}

The mission and responsibility of the GIS is to arrest suspected terrorists and dissidents who oppose the Palestinian Authority. It is also responsible for the collection of intelligence both within the Palestinian territory as well as from foreign countries. It is the primary interface with foreign intelligence services and reports directly to the Palestinian President.\textsuperscript{160}

H. GAZA STRIP SINCE 2007

Until December 2007, security was the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority. In an attempt to assert its authority and control within the Gaza Strip, Hamas successfully conducted a coup against the Palestinian Authority. The security institutions in the Gaza Strip fell to Hamas along with all their equipment and resources. Hamas was able to outfit a small army with the weapons and ammunition they seized from the security forces. While Hamas has created security organizations, there is little understanding of the current force structure and capabilities in the academic literature. Analysis of Hamas’ security institutions is outside the scope of this thesis, as any relevancy of these security institutions will only be valid when Hamas is brought in line with a two-state solution, something Hamas is actively working against. If a two-state solution is

\textsuperscript{157} Brynjar, A Police Force without a State, 311.
\textsuperscript{159} Brynjar, A Police Force without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza, 312.
to be successful, the Gaza Strip, specifically Hamas, either needs to abandon its call for the destruction of Israel and re-unite with the Palestinian Authority, falling under its security structures, or it needs to be isolated from the solution and be dealt with in a separate manner.

I. POLICE REFORM

For police reform to be successful, Rama Mani in his article, *Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule-of-law and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, argues a de-linking between the military and the police must take place to clearly define the roles that each institution plays in providing for the security of its nation.161

The need for clearly delineating the distinction between the roles and doctrines of the police and military and making a radical separation between the two institutions in the transition to peace was recognized by peacemakers as early as 1990-92 in the context of El Salvador's lengthy peace negotiations. The El Salvadoran Peace Agreement specified:

The doctrine of the armed forces is based on a distinction between the concepts of security and defense. National defense, the responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat. Security, even when it includes this notion, is a broader concept based on unrestricted respect for the individual and social rights of the person. It includes, in addition to national defense, economic, political and social aspects, which go beyond the constitutional sphere of the armed forces and are the responsibility of other sectors of society and of the state.

The maintenance of internal peace, tranquility, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces... [who] play a role in this sphere only in very exceptional circumstances, where the normal means have been exhausted.162

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J. DISCUSSION

In Palestine, the separation between the two spheres of security is exceptionally difficult. While the need for the transition to occur is critical for the establishment of a Palestinian state, to give up the military aspect of national security is equivalent to giving up on the revolution and one’s identity as a Palestinian. The Palestinian identity is directly tied to the land and the Revolutionary movement of establishing a Palestinian homeland. Without a recognized Palestinian state, all security forces will retain an associated identity of militancy to one day establish a state. As long as this condition persists, any Palestinian security force will not be able to make the transition into a legitimate police force solely focused on internal security and will remain a potential threat to Israel’s security. True and lasting peace will only come when Palestine is allowed to change the revolution into nationalism and pride for the state they desire. With the security institutions divided, along with a lack of real central authority pulling them together, combined with the analysis of the IPB chapter, this thesis can conclude that the way the West Bank was broken up into three areas of control was a detriment to developing peace. The intent of the Oslo accords was to give room for Palestine to develop its police force into a cohesive unit, however, the geographical division prevented coordination, unity of effort, or the development of a professional force. The better approach would be to determine the borders first with no ambiguity of territorial control at the completion of Israeli withdrawal. In addition, all Palestinian territory should fall under what the Oslo accords called as area B, Palestinian autonomy with Israeli conducting joint security patrols, and over time Israeli presence lessen and Palestinian take more and more responsibility.
Figure 4. The West Bank and Jerusalem under Oslo 2, Showing Areas A, B, C as Controlled by Israel and Palestine

V. ISRAELI SECURITY

A. ISRAELI SECURITY OVERVIEW

Understanding Israel’s security needs as they relate to its internal concerns, as well as internally with the Palestinians, requires knowing the focus and mission of each branch of service, how they relate to each other, and their relationships to civil-military institutions. Israeli defense structure and equipment acquisition is based on its interpretation of the geographical threat. Before analyzing the threat through the IPB process in the next chapter, it is first important to understand its counterterrorism approach. The missions of the various Israeli security institutions cannot be mapped, but it is critical to understand them when considering alternative solutions to past peace process failures.

The history of Israeli authority in Arab territories, how it is structured, and its policies are key to understanding the friction between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the Israeli civilian authorities, and between the Palestinians and the Israeli government. The governing body over the Arab territories meant to ensure security for Israeli citizens is the institution responsible for implementation of any agreement for a two-state solution. If the governing authority is implementing an agenda other than the peaceful agenda of Israel’s Prime Minister, then no amount of talks and agreements will result in a two-state solution. While the governing authority will say its foremost and primary mission is guaranteeing the safety and security of Israel citizens, while in a hostile environment, its approach of treating the Palestinian Authority as an enemy instead of a partner for peace is a primary reason why the conflict persists.

At the end of the six-day war in 1967, Israel was faced with a dilemma: should they trade Arab territories for peace or maintain occupation? If they decided to occupy, how should they govern? The newly acquired territories held over a million Arabs. What was Israel’s responsibility for their well-being as well
as security needs for the state of Israel? Ultimately, Israel chose to occupy the territories and established the Military Government to administer the area. “The structure of the military government in each of the four occupied regions had a Military Governor enjoying full legislative and executive authority in the area. The Military Governor is at the apex of the government within the district and operates under the law virtually as a head of state.” 164 Within each governor’s staff, various Israeli ministries were represented to provide the full spectrum of governance. “Although these staff officers are professionally responsible to their parent ministries, they are also subject to the authority of the IDF’s district military commander.” 165 The relationship between the military and the agencies was complicated through the competing agendas of good governance and security. Within the military government the most important position is that of the coordinator. “He heads the military government division in the General Staff, and is the Chief of Staff’s senior adviser on issues relating to the occupied territories. At the same time, he is head of the Defense Ministry’s unit for the coordination of activities in the territories and responsible to the minister.” 166 Because the position is responsible for the security within the territories, as well as governance, the IDF became a key figure within Israeli politics assisting with policy in regards to the Palestinian territories.

“Although the IDF is undoubtedly subordinate to the democratically elected government, its exceptionally large influence over policy-making clearly deviates from Samuel Huntington’s model of ‘objective’ civilian control.” 167 Huntington clarifies his model in his book The Soldier and the State. “Objective civilian control must rely not on direct subordination of the military to civilian pressures but on a military ethic of professional expertise and political


166 Peri, “Political-Military Partnership in Israel,” 309.

The IDF had the monumental task of governing the territories while ensuring security; at times the two objectives clashed, always resulting in the priority given to security. While this approach was necessary for the survival of Israel, it resulted in violations of human rights. The Israeli soldier on the street under command of the military governing authority became the epitome of everything the Palestinians hated and feared. Israel’s military became an occupying force with an objective not to develop a lasting solution but to keep violence to a minimum. Israeli objectives in the Arab territories are directly influenced by its relationship to its neighbors, fear of violence from Palestinians, and by posturing of the political parties within Israel.

B. COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINSURGENCY

Israel is currently engaged in two types of counterterrorism strategies. First, in the West Bank, they are conducting direct engagement and policing while setting the conditions for nation building. Second, in the Gaza Strip and partially along the Lebanon border, they are engaged in quarantine and reprisal attacks. This split approach is attempting to deal with the objectives by the different Palestinian elements as they relate to Israeli security. However, this approach may have unforeseen complications in trying to build a trusting relationship with any Palestinian representative.

Before the current split approach, the Israeli government viewed all Palestinians as a problem and prescribed collective punishment for any violence. Contemporary wisdom on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency states that to end conflict one must integrate society into the political process, therefore undercutting the social support for radical elements. According to Stuart Cohen in a study about the Israeli army commissioned by Routledge, “It is generally agreed, the IDF’s counter-insurgency operations prior to the mid-1990s were noticeably inept. Instead of making a coherent and concerted attempt to win

over “hearts and minds” in either southern Lebanon or the occupied territories, the IDF resorted to unimaginative roundups of what it termed “terrorists” and their affiliates, who it then corralled in enormous detention camps.”\textsuperscript{169} In a study aimed at identifying where the strategic focus of priorities for the IDF, Avi Kober compared the articles published in Ma’arachot, IDF’s principal public forum for discussing military matters, and found that between 1948 and 2000 only 3 percent of the articles dealt with subconventional conflict while the overwhelming majority, at 94 percent, dealt with conventional warfare tactics.\textsuperscript{170} This seems to indicate by the lack of discussion, that as late as the year 2000, 13 years after the start of the first intifada, the IDF either refused to adapt its strategic objectives to counter an insurgency or it miss-identified the emerging threat. Israel put considerable effort into the Oslo Accords through the 90s, however, its approach in dealing with radical elements that were opposed to the peace process, was one based on collective punishment. It was the collective punishment tactics that contributed to a breakdown in relations between both peoples.

Currently, the relationship between Israel and Palestine in the West Bank is starting to show signs of turning to incorporation into the political process, but with the backdrop of collective punishment, it will take years for Palestinians to see the Israelis as committed to a peaceful resolution that establishes a Palestinian state. With Israel conducting collective punishment in the Gaza Strip, members of Fatah may be grateful that they are not in that situation but fear that conditions could change that would result in the isolation of the West Bank again.

C. INTERNAL SECURITY

The short history of Israel has had profound impact on the IDF’s approach to dealing with an enemy threat. The geography and conditions in which Israel gained its independence laid the foundation for institutional thinking as well as a national outlook of always being in a position of survive or die. The wars of ‘67

\textsuperscript{169} Cohen, \textit{Israel and its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion}, 47.

and ’73 only served as reinforcements for this attitude with the Arab armies collectively marshalling against Israel. When the Palestinian revolution resulted in two intifadas, which called for the destruction of Israel, there was no need to consider a different approach to dealing with what seemed to be a continuation of the same Arab problem. Today’s counterinsurgency strategy of winning the hearts and minds is counterintuitive given the history and direct threat that violent actions by various Palestinian groups were perpetrating. To put down violent protests in both intifadas, the IDF rolled out the tried and true tactics of collective punishment, house demolitions, deportations, destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, small-scale expeditions by special forces, and large-scale incursions under control of the Palestinian Authority, to name a few.\(^{171}\) While these tactics are effective in limiting violence and establishing a relative temporary calm, it comes at a high cost, not just with blood and treasure, but also in terms of true and lasting security.

By undercutting the Palestinian Authority and collectively punishing the Palestinians, it is more likely the Palestinians will continue to fight for independence rather than view Israel as a partner for peace who has earned their respect. No matter how accommodating Israel could be, there will always be radical elements that will call for the destruction of Israel and are willing to sacrifice their lives and others to accomplish their goals. But the mark of a good counterinsurgency strategy is finding a way that can foster a professionally mutually respected relationship between the two parties while isolating and targeting individual terrorists without compromising the majority’s sense of nation building. If a successful counterinsurgency strategy is found, the indigenous population is more likely to prevent radical elements of society from disrupting the prospects for peace.

\(^{171}\) Cohen, *Israel and its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion*, 149.
D. CONVENTIONAL MILITARY

Israel does not possess the largest military in the Middle East, but it does possess the most technologically advanced. The military’s first mission is to protect the nation from external forces, however, the military provides all the security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under military rule. The Israeli military is broken up into three arms: the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The focus of this thesis is on internal security as it relates to the Palestinian issue: the important element in understanding the military is their counterterrorism approach and Security First.

E. MASSAD

Recognizing that the Massad plays a key role in the Israeli military government in the West Bank and understanding its importance with critical scholarly sources is difficult. Most of the literature available rests in two areas. The first is the Palestinian perspective, of which there is no scholarly work and which is presented more like conspiracy theory. This criticism is not to degrade the feelings and perceptions that the Palestinians feel they endure under a secretive organization but rather to point to the need for further research and validation. The second body of literature mainly comes from retired Massad agents as memoires from 1948 up until the late 80s. Again, while this literature is important in its own respect, it provides one perspective of what the agent in question was tasked to complete and provides little insight into the policy, purpose, and mission of the Massad in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Oslo Accords. It is not surprising that finding the mission details and agenda of an Israeli intelligence organization at the unclassified level is difficult. Rather than engaging in speculative analysis this thesis will be content with acknowledging that the Massad is active but remains largely an unknown factor.
F. DISCUSSION

The differences in the security institutions between Israel and Palestine both at the individual level and at the policy level are profound. Much work is needed to bridge the gap between the vision for peace and the tactics used to ensure security for both sides. Israel’s policy of countering terrorism with group punishment, while effective at limiting violence, only serves to prolong the confrontation and prevent any application of a two-state solution process from materializing. For there to be any success, Israel needs to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy that strengthens moderate elements of society and gives room for grievances in a political system and hope at the prospect of building a Palestinian nation.

Israel’s military is unmatched in the region technologically and is unlikely to engage in a conventional state on state war for the foreseeable future. However, it is unable to eradicate all violent threats, indicating that while the military is key to providing security, its role and mission needs to be integrated into a diplomatic solution.
VI. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB)

In my IPB analysis of the Israeli Palestinian security considerations for a two-state solution, I based my overlays on unclassified scientific data drawn from past geographical boundary agreements, current Israeli settlement locations, Israeli military closure areas, fresh water aquifers, Iranian missile and man portable air-defense system (manpad) ranges, roads, and terrain analysis. Each overlay relates directly to security either as a resource or geographic location needing protection and desired acquisition, or as a direct conventional threat. It is my intention to show what the Israeli intentions are in the West Bank, how even with current recommendations by David Makovsky of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Israel will face continued Palestinian opposition, and that the starting point for any peace negotiations must begin with a clearly identified border that both sides will recognize when the Palestinian state is created.

What is IPB? An IPB is an analytical method employed by the United States military that analyzes geographic data to find strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, decision points, key infrastructure, lines of communication, best approaches for friendly forces as well as most likely approaches from enemy forces, resources, and strategic terrain, etcetera. Analysis is only limited to the creativity of the analyst, their capability to draw causal relationships, and availability of data that is geographically based. For example, an IPB can analyze the relationship of an aircraft’s capability with range of motion, its ordinance, and where it will cause the greatest amount of damage, but it cannot take into account if the pilot will or will not drop a bomb.

How is an IPB made? Starting with a map, a series of overlays is created on an electronic media like Google Earth. Each overlay contains the specific data related to the geographical features of the chosen map. As more and more

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172 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, I–1.
overlays are built on top of each other, a snapshot in time will show the causal relationships begging to emerge and give a better understanding of the environment. Questions can begin to be answered such as why holding some terrain is more valuable than holding other terrain, what are the threats and capabilities of an enemy's ability to affect defensive forces. Knowing this allows one to posture his forces with greater defense and efficiency. Knowing and understanding the strengths and capabilities of the defensive forces as well as the enemy forces in relationship to the environment gives one an advantage in making better, more informed decisions and hopefully creating the desired conditions.

The maps and overlays used in this analysis were created by hand on Google Earth. In the interest of allowing others to recreate the same process and analyze for themselves, the overlays can be downloaded at https://sites.google.com/site/IsraelPalestinesecurity. Sourcing for the data used to create the overlays is the best unclassified data available and taken from unbiased sources. The data was translated into KLM format used by Google Earth and then was able to be displayed as an overlay. Some desired information is not available that would have helped with this analysis, for example, the location of all Israeli military bases, security checkpoints, and the availability of more potent weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank than small arms.

One key assumption as a baseline for analyzing what the final borders for Israel and Palestine could be was one taken from David Makovsky’s analysis at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a new proposal for Israeli Palestinian borders. His work, while coming from a pro-Israeli organization, holds merit because it attempts to take geographic considerations into account for the proposal of a new border. In his proposal, he offers five options. My analysis will use his Triangle Land Swap proposal because it gives the greatest amount of land to the Palestinians in exchange for Israeli settlements in the West
Bank.\textsuperscript{173} This border only represents a starting point and confines the analysis since it is impossible to predict at this time what the final border of a Palestinian state would look like since negotiations are on-going. The other two possible starting points are to use the borders the Palestinians prefer from 1948 or what the Israelis typically use from 1967. Using either of these lines as the final border for the two-state solution is unrealistic, as neither side would agree to the other’s demands on this issue. David Makovsky’s border represents the most current likely possibility given the current geographical demands for peace.

Typically the analysis generated from an IPB is classified due to its identification of one’s opponent’s intentions as well as one’s own. One of the arguments against peace negotiations is that by dragging them on, Israel is able to settle more and more land, thus expanding its borders and asserting their control over greater resources. A second assumption is that Israel’s intention is to provide a security buffer between the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors. Palestinian intentions are unclear. Since 2006 Palestinian elections, the population has been divided between Fatah and Hamas each with a differing agenda towards Israel. Because the society is divided, any arrangements agreed to beg the question of whether they can be applied to all Palestinian territories. The IPB process aspires to shed some light on the security issues that face both sides and allow better insight into why past deals were not acceptable and hopefully help future deals take into account these failures as well as offer better compromises.

\textbf{A. IPB ANALYSIS}

In 1948, Israel was broken into three main sections, one on the west side of the sea of Galilee, the second one along the coastal plains next to the Mediterranean, and the third in the southern desert reaching down to Eilat, (see Figure 5). The Palestinian land was to be the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the

\textsuperscript{173} David Makovsky, “Imagining the Israeli-Palestinian Border,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/interactiveMaps/index.html}. 

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areas shaded in green. In 1967, Israel pushed its borders out to what they are today, the red lines representing Palestinian territory minus Israeli settlements. It is the difference between the green shaded areas and the line drawn in 1967 that keeps any permanent borders from being agreed to. It is also the green shaded areas that Palestinians are calling for their “right to return.” The maximalist view for Palestinians is to recover as much of the green area as possible, however, they have shown the desire to compromise and move the borders closer to the 1967 line. At issue is the ability of the Palestinian Authority to promote any agreement to its constituents in a way that gives them the greatest security and autonomy, and guarantees that Israelis will honor the agreement. For Israelis, security from Palestinian acts of terrorism as well as safety from neighboring Arab armies are their first and primary concerns with any security arrangements for a two-state solution.
Figure 5. Map 1, Borders

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174 Map created by the author.


The white shaded areas within the West Bank are the Israeli military closure areas. According to Major General Uzi Dayan of the Israeli Defense force, “Defensible borders will provide the optimal topographical conditions for Israel’s active-duty forces to withstand a ground assault by numerically superior enemy forces while the mobilization of the reserves is completed.”\(^{179}\) Israel views this area as necessary for the defense against foreign threats, as well as necessary to maintain control to prevent weapons funneling into Palestinian territories. Israel maintains early warning stations in this area to give them time to react to any developing threat.\(^{180}\) These closure areas, and more specifically, the one that runs from the Dead Sea north continuously along the Jordan River is a way for Israel to maintain positive control of what material transits through the border. This allows Israel to prevent illegal arms shipments into the West Bank as well as control the Palestinian economy. It is unlikely that Israel would be willing to negotiate on giving up this part of the West Bank unless substantive security measures were put in place that gave them confidence that Israel’s security could be maintained. As long as Israel maintains control along the Jordan River, Palestine’s autonomy will be in question. A nation that does not have control of its own borders does not have control of its own territory, autonomy, or economy. For Palestine to be a functioning state, it must be allowed to act with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of a state. One idea that has been considered for separating the Israeli security forces from the Palestinians and giving Palestinians greater autonomy without the loss of security, is to introduce a third nation security force as the overseer for a transition period. While this concept has major problems and is an unlikely solution to lessening the security situation, it might be possible to employ a third-nation security force along the Jordan River allowing the Israelis to depart the


\(^{180}\) Ibid.
eastern portion of the West Bank while still having security guarantees. This type of arrangement has worked well in the Sinai Peninsula since 1981. As part of the Camp David Accords, the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) was created to oversee and ensure the terms of the peace treaty were maintained.\textsuperscript{181} The issue of early warning could be dealt with as well. If a third-party security force is employed along the West Bank and maintains early warning systems, they, in turn, can provide the data necessary to the Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, and other nations, if agreed to. By building a common radar picture that all can see, greater trust between neighbors could be built and security cooperation could lead to cooperation in other areas like economics.

David Makovsky’s Triangle Land Swap proposal is an attempt to move 80 percent of Israeli settlements in the West Bank directly under Israeli control and territory.\textsuperscript{182} He does a good job of defining a border along natural geographical features such as ridgelines and valleys. For their cooperation, the Palestinian Authority would recoup some lands where Palestinians are currently living under Israeli rule back into the West Bank. The areas proposed are in the northwest portion of the West Bank, the southwest portion of the West Bank, and in an increase in the size of the Gaza Strip. See Figure 5 for differences between the 1967 line and the Triangle Land Swap proposal.

Logically this makes sense. However, from a security perspective there are several issues at stake. First, the locations of the Israeli settlements are significant. Looking individually at the settlements it is apparent that the settlements were selected not because the land was available and no one was living there, but rather, for two very specific reasons: the locations selected were of strategic importance and they occupied high ground. Israeli settlements typically occupy the high ground overlooking Palestinian villages. The reason for

\textsuperscript{181} Multinational Force & Observers, “Multinational Force & Observers,” Multinational Force & Observers, \texttt{http://www.mfo.org/}.

occupying the high ground allows the settlement to have the best defensible position. In addition, Israeli history points to the significance of occupying the high ground in the West Bank.

One of the lasting scars from the Israeli war of independence of 1948 took place along the corridor from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. For five months before the British mandate ended in 1948, the Arab irregular forces occupied the high ground along the corridor, establishing a blockade. 183 Running the blockade and getting supplies to Jerusalem became a source of national pride and encouragement in the face of opposition to the young Zionist movement. Today, Israel maintains burned out shells of vehicles that were destroyed attempting to run the blockade as a memorial and a reminder of the lessons learned from their experience. Israel learned early on that holding the high ground, occupying the villages around Jerusalem and the lines of communication are the keys to a strong defense. Israel applies these lessons by choosing strategic high ground in positioning its settlements in the West Bank.

The second security problem with the Triangle Land Swap proposal is the sizable increase in the length of the border. In this proposal, the West Bank border length almost doubles in size. While the Israelis are more than capable of providing security along the length of the border, it would have some unintended effects on the Palestinian society. The road system and lines of communication in the West Bank, built by the Israelis, would fall in Israeli territory, isolating and severely limiting Palestinian movement. From an antiterrorist perspective, this makes good sense. However, from a desire to have peaceful neighbors, this perspective keeps tensions inflamed. Currently, Palestinians are not allowed to use the Israeli-built roads in the West Bank, so this would not change the current situation much. 184 Under a two-state solution the desire for Palestine to be

economically self-sufficient is mandatory. Part of that self-sufficiency requires infrastructure development, which allows the free flow of goods and services around the country in the most expedient way possible.

As part of a land swap, Israel should be required to pay for building a modern, efficient road system in the areas adjacent to the affected areas swapped. It is reasonable that all Palestinian villages within a half-mile of the agreed-upon areas should be connected via a modern road system to prevent any isolation and to encourage development and goodwill. In addition, the roads must be under Palestinian control upon completion. Israel will certainly see this as a security threat, however, if Palestine is ever to be its own nation it will require the infrastructure to do so. The greater economic development and the more employment, the less violence from Palestinian territories against Israel will occur. Over time, it is in Israel’s security interest for Palestine to thrive economically.

One of the biggest problems preventing a two-state solution are Israeli settlements. The Wye River agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three separate areas. Area A (as depicted by red shaded areas on Figures 6 and 7) was to be handed over to the Palestinians for both administrative control and security.\textsuperscript{185} Area B (as depicted by yellow shaded areas on Figures 6 and 7) was to be handed over to the Palestinians for administrative control and security was to be conducted jointly.\textsuperscript{186} Area C (as depicted as the rest of the area on Figures 6 and 7) was to remain under Israeli occupation, for both administrative and security control.\textsuperscript{187} Figure 7 shows the location of Israeli settlements in relation to the areas and types of control under the Wye River agreement and the land swap recommendation. East Jerusalem, indicated on the map, as contention area 1, is the most contentious, followed by Bethlehem, contention

\textsuperscript{186} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 448.
\textsuperscript{187} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 448.
area 2, then Ramallah in the north as contention area 3, and finally, further south as contention area 4. Each of these areas highlighted on the map shows where under previous agreements the Palestinians had either direct control or minimum administrative control, but the Israelis have built settlements. All four of these areas have the strategic high ground and have religious significance. For East Jerusalem it boils down to control, both sides desiring Jerusalem for their capital. Maintaining the high ground around Jerusalem gives Israel the security advantage and direct control of the city.

Figure 6. Map 2, Security Zones\textsuperscript{188, 189, 190, 191, 192}

\textsuperscript{188} Map created by the author.
Figure 7. Map 3, Security Zones around Jerusalem\textsuperscript{193, 194, 195, 196, 197}

\textsuperscript{190} David Makovsky, “Imagining the Israeli-Palestinian Border,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/interactiveMaps/index.html}.


\textsuperscript{193} Map created by the author.


\textsuperscript{196} Map created by the author.

It is likely that the Palestinian Authority could make an agreement that allows many of the current settlements to fall under Israel control. However, it is important to note that many of the settlements can affect security and control beyond their boundaries. Whenever the borders are firmly established, any incidents of border violation, such as shooting across the border, must be adjudicated. Both sides must be willing to deal with these types of incidents within the confines of the rule-of-law. Maintaining the rule-of-law, as it relates to border issues and holding each society accountable for its actions, will serve to maintain the peace agreement. Without this assurance, the citizens on both sides will demand action by their government to guarantee their safety. With both sides living in close proximity to each other, there will be continued confrontations even after any peace agreement, and both sides must take steps ahead of time to deal with situations accordingly.

One of Israel’s demands to deal with security is for a demilitarized Palestine.\textsuperscript{198} A similar approach worked in Northern Ireland. As part of the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, there was a period of “decommissioning.” Various factions were to turn in their weapons as signs of good faith for moving towards peace.\textsuperscript{199} A similar process needs to take place in Palestine. This process will tackle two key problems. First, by forcing Palestinians to give up their individual weapons, Israeli security concerns can start to be addressed, making it more likely for Israel to continue to pursue peace. Second, by forcing Palestinians to give up their arms, there will be less competition for control in the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority needs to have the monopoly on security to ensure that the rule-of-law is enforced. If the governing authority is in control,


then there will be room for a Palestinian society to unite behind a peaceful administration. Any process of demilitarizing must also include Israeli settlers. They do have the right to self-defense; however, if individual Israeli settlers are allowed to remain armed while Palestinians are disarming, the agreement will fall apart. As part of any border agreement, the security of Israeli settlements should be in the hands of Israeli security forces, not the settlers themselves.

As part of the Oslo agreement, internal Palestinian security was addressed. As shown in Figure 6, Palestinians were given areas for maintaining security. Palestinian security forces were armed and required to maintain the rule-of-law. As described in Chapter IV, Yasser Arafat created a convoluted and, at times, a counterproductive security force. In 2000, at the start of the second intifada, these same forces were armed and engaged in fights with the Israeli military. For there to be a two-state solution, Palestine must have a security force to police its own that has legislative oversight and civil society involvement. There will always exist the threat that these forces could be used as a vanguard against Israel. To prevent this, the United States is conducting paramilitary training for the Palestinians in the hopes of creating a professional police force interested in protecting internal security loyal to the Palestinian Authority instead of personalities within the Palestinian government. This program is necessary for the continued development of this force and to ensure that the rule-of-law is the focus of loyalty. These forces also are being used to ensure the survivability of the Palestinian Authority in the face of Hamas’ challenge to their rule. As long as Palestinian society is fractured along ideological lines, security forces will hold allegiances to personalities instead of the rule-of-law or a constitution.

The Palestinian society as a whole needs to be pushed in a direction that holds loyalty to a constitution and provide checks and balances over its leadership. Checks and balances are also crucial to the survivability of the Palestinian Authority. Speculation as to why Hamas achieved victory in the 2006 elections is due to the rampant corruption of the officials within the Palestinian Authority. An open government confined by checks and balances will provide the
necessary assurances to the Palestinian population and start to gain their trust. A security force that is bound by legislative rules with civil society involved in the process reinforces the system and builds trust between the people, the political leaders, and the security structure. It takes time for this type of system to develop but continued oversight, encouragement, and aid will assist Palestine to head in this direction. Only when Palestinian citizens have a government that truly represents all of its citizens, is professional, not corrupt, and holds a monopoly of force, will Palestinians be able to work together to provide the security needs Israel demands and Palestinians deserve.

B. WATER SECURITY

Water in Israel and Palestine is a security issue. Control of water resources is a primary concern for Israeli involvement in the West Bank. According to Mark Zeitoun in his article “Avoiding a Mideast Water War,” Washington Post, 4 February 2004, “A critical natural resource that is both scarce and unfairly distributed is a catalyst for conflict.” Two thirds of all fresh water used comes from Palestinian territory. According to Marq De Villiers in his book Water: The fate of our most precious resource (1999), states that by 2010, Israel will be running an annual water deficit of 360 million cubic meters, Jordan will be running a 200 million cubic meter deficit, and the West Bank will be at a deficit of 140 million cubic meters. This deficit translates into less water for each individual, the destruction of aquifers due to over pumping, and heightened tensions over control of the remaining water.

The source for most surface water begins at the headwaters north of the Sea of Galilee supplying all the needs down the Jordan valley to the Dead Sea, the lowest point on dry ground in the world. The Jordan River is geographically a

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202 Villiers, Water: The Fate of our most Precious Resource, 189.
natural divide between countries and is a security concern for both Israel and Jordan. It cannot be overstated that one of the main reasons Israel occupies the Jordan rift valley is for control of the water in the Jordan River. The Mountain Aquifer (in the West Bank) provides one-forth of Israel’s water. “At present, Israel controls all the aquifers in the West Bank.” Highlighting the seriousness of the issue over control of the aquifers in the West Bank, in 1997 the Minister of Agriculture Refael Eitan stated on national radio “the country would be in mortal danger if it lost control of the Mountain Aquifer.” Control of the West Bank and location of settlements is not just about strategic defensible positions but also about what is under the West Bank. Aaron Wolf in his book *Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River* describes the calculations the Zionist movement considered when designing a homeland in Palestine.

Economic security was defined by water resources. The entire Zionist programme of immigration and settlement required water for large-scale irrigation and, in a land with no fossil fuels, for hydropower. The plans were “completely dependent” on the acquisition of “the headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani River, the snows of Hermon, the Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the Jabbok.”

Without water, agriculture in both states would literally dry up and drag down the rest of the economy. Israel’s agriculture sector is about two to three percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) while the agriculture sector for Palestine is between 24 to 30 percent of Palestine’s GDP. Local access to water for farmers is critical to continued economic survivability and for peace and stability. Israel controls 80 percent of all aquifers in the West Bank and the average Israeli consumes 350 cubic meters of water per year while the average

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204 Villiers, *Water: The Fate of our most Precious Resource*, 200.
Palestinian consumes 87 cubic meters a year. Because Palestinians have very little access to water and Palestinian villages are isolated by Israel security measures, they are forced to buy the water taken from the West Bank from the Israelis. “At a price between five to 15 times that charged by the Israeli government, there is always a settler willing to make the deal.” Control of water is directly tied into where the border should be placed as well as where Israel settlements are located. Lack of access to water will continue to fuel conflict between both sides or greater cooperation and access will help to alleviate security concerns.

The flow of water in the West Bank flows into three drainage basins: north towards the Sea of Galilee, west towards the coastal plains, and east towards the Jordan River and dead sea, see Figure 8. The darker shaded areas on Figure 8 are designated as critical regions in proximity to the green line for aquifer access.

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Figure 8. Map 4, Water Resources\textsuperscript{210,211,212,213,214,215}

\textsuperscript{210} Map created by the author.


\textsuperscript{212} David Makovsky, “Imagining the Israeli-Palestinian Border,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/interactiveMaps/index.html}.

Israeli settlements located within this area are strategically placed to control the Mountain Aquifer. Water is crucial not just for daily consumption but also for continued economic support of the agricultural sector. Israel’s economy is diversified but holds a large agricultural sector that consumes most of the water diverted from the Jordan River. The Palestinian economy is almost completely agriculturally based with very little diversification. A key component to a two-state solution is the fair division of water resources. In 1998, “Palestinian wells could not exceed a depth of 140 meters, though Jewish wells could go down 800 meters.” In addition, the authorities “may search and confiscate any water resources for which no permit exists, even if the owner has not been convicted.” It is these types of policies and the location of Israeli settlements in key locations that allow Israel to maintain control of all water resources within Israeli and Palestinian territories.

The coastal aquifer has been over-pumped and is in danger of seawater intrusion contaminating the drinking water beyond safe levels. Israel’s national water company is bringing a desalinization plant on line in 2011 that will provide an additional 100 million cubic meters of water a year, reducing their deficit to 260 million cubic meters. The rate of consumption and demand will only get worse as population increases.

The definition of borders relates directly to control of water sources. However, even if a border is agreed to, access to clean water is not limited to border constraints. Any establishment of a Palestinian state will require an agreement of access to water; limitations that allow water consumption, as well

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216 De Villiers, *Water: The Fate of our most Precious Resource*, 201.
217 De Villiers, *Water: The Fate of our most Precious Resource*, 201.
as waste water management. Since the two-states are interconnected on this issue, proper management is required to ensure each side does not take advantage. This thesis concludes based on geographic analysis that it is in the interest of both parties to have one unified water system over which both sides have control as well as a voice in future developments. The argument that allowing Palestine to retain control of their water rights will result in contamination and over-pumping as espoused by Joshua Schwarz would be nullified in this type of an arrangement.220 By building a unified water distribution system under which Palestine would receive the infrastructure needed for economic development, the joint system would be able to monitor the health of the water supply more accurately, and neither side would be able to argue that the other is over-pumping and mismanaging its water resources.

C. CONVENTIONAL THREATS

Israel’s military is the most advanced in the region. In terms of force-on-force engagements against Palestine, Israel dominates all three combat areas: land, sea, and air. Because of this dominance and Palestine’s lack of any conventional force, the conflict naturally developed into an insurgency/terrorist style. Looking for inspiration, Yasser Arafat modeled the early Palestinian revolution after the Algeria revolution in the 60s.221 Israel more or less has freedom of movement to go where it wants and when it wants to in the Palestinian territories. An IPB with an overlay of this fact is not necessary. Israel’s military is geared to combat foreign militaries and is a factor for maintaining a large military, but in terms of peace with Palestine the conflict will come at the negotiating table when attempting to decide the size and capability


of forces. Israel must maintain a large force due to external threats. Palestine will always see this force as a direct threat to their sovereignty. However, as long as Israel maintains a large army, Palestine will not need to fear any invasion by other neighbors. Should the occasion arise for another Arab army to invade Palestine, Israel, out of self-defense will prevent this from happening. This is an unlikely event but it does demonstrate the point that Palestine, as a nation, will be able to bandwagon in terms of security from external threats. This would allow Palestine to focus on internal security for policing its own citizens.

Because Palestine does not have a conventional force it currently has only four real threats against Israel: rockets, manpads, suicide bombs, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). One of the security concerns of a two-state solution is the introduction of Iranian-made rockets into the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Figure 9). Iran has shown the intention of arming radical groups in the Palestinian territories. In January 2002, Israel intercepted a shipment of Iranian weapons bound for Palestine aboard the ship Karina A. The weapons shipment contained 122mm and 107mm Katyusha rockets with a range of 8 to 20 kilometers. Israel is fearful that Iranian support in the Palestinian territories will be similar to support Iran has provided for Hezbollah in Lebanon. In southern Lebanon resides a large Shi’ite population. Because of the permissive environment, proximity to Israel, and ideological similarities, Iran’s export of fundamentalism and terrorism to Lebanon makes sense. “In mid-1982, the Guards Corps' Muhammad Rasulullah brigade was dispatched to Lebanon. Two thousand Revolutionary Guards stayed in Lebanon when the brigade returned to Iran,” The purpose of the Guards Corps was to provide logistics, manning, and training, which resulted in the creation of the Hezbollah organization known as

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the Party of God. “Iran and Syria share credit for sponsoring these revolutionaries, although Iran certainly played the leading role. For Iran, the creation of Hezbollah was a realization of the revolutionary state's zealous campaign to spread the message of the self-styled “Islamic revolution.” 225 In 2006, Israel fought a war with Hezbollah that started due to Hezbollah killing eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two. 226 One of the objectives of the war was to eliminate Hezbollah’s stockpile of Iranian missiles. 227 Because Iran’s foreign policy aims to destroy Israel it supplies Hezbollah with weapons and rockets. There exists a real security threat that Iran will also arm Palestinian militant groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with rockets. Map 5 shows what that threat would look like. Forty-six miles south of the West Bank all the way to Eilat is the only place in Israel that would not be under direct threat should Iran be successful in importing rockets into the West Bank and Gaza Strip


227 Ibid.
Figure 9. Map 5, Missile Threat\textsuperscript{228, 229, 230, 231, 232}

\textsuperscript{228} Map created by the author.


\textsuperscript{230} David Makovsky, “Imagining the Israeli-Palestinian Border,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/interactiveMaps/index.html}.
The second threat to Israel from Palestinian territories as indicated on Figure 9 as a red line, is a shoulder-launched, man-portable surface-to-air missile (MANPAD). Manpads are plentiful around the world but do require specialized training. Currently there are no indications of the presence of these types of missiles in the West Bank, but there is a good possibility they are there or could quickly be moved there. Manpads are not a threat to the sovereignty of Israel but they do represent an air defense against Israel’s air dominance. If Palestine were able to militarily establish an air defense system, Israel’s ability to assert its security protocols would be severely limited. This is all hypothetical, but constitutes a very real threat if Palestine is given direct control of its borders with Jordan and if Palestine allows the import of these types of weapons. The distance on the map is based on an approximate range of 5,000 meters or about 3 miles.

The third and fourth threat are real threats but cannot be applied to a geographical analysis at this time as they are not limited to geography and are determined by the individual conducting the attack at the time and there are currently no trend data. Hamas has a history of conducting suicide bombings, but has given up the practice, and it seems that this threat may have disappeared. But, given that there is a history of this tactic it cannot be ruled out for future use. Israel’s security wall seems to be an effective measure against this tactic (see Chapter II for discussion about the security wall). The threat of IEDs is only speculative. There is no evidence of the use of IEDs being imported to Palestine; however, given that the technology and procedures were transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan it is a likely possibility of this occurring in Palestine.

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D. DISCUSSION

For there to be a two-state solution, security for both sides is a requirement. The reason Oslo failed is because it got the process backwards. It attempted to bring both sides together through incremental steps and hope they would begin to trust each other and see each other as partners for peace. The assumption was that by building trust, some day, both sides would be able to sit down and negotiate the difficult issue of the final status (mutually recognized borders). To this end, confidence-building measures of joint security patrols, withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and lessening of Israeli control over the economic structures of Palestine were implemented. Agreements under Oslo were able to tackle some very difficult issues, but the final status always loomed on the horizon.

Both sides approached the final status from different perspectives on where to start: Palestine believed the borders should be the 1948 UN mandate and Israel started with the 1967 armistice agreement. This difference in starting points led both sides to position their forces and posture in ways that would give greater influence in the final status negotiations. Instead of working together, this approach had the unintended consequences of creating an environment of competitive positioning. By establishing policies in ways to give greater leverage, the true intentions on either side became questionable and untrustworthy. Since many of the issues preventing peace are connected with location of borders, when the final status was attempted the agreements under the incremental approach under Oslo became threatened and the whole process collapsed. Working towards an unknown outcome along with posturing by the Israelis increased the fears of Palestinians of never reaching an acceptable peace and contributed to the start of the second intifada. However, if the starting point (of defining borders) is also the end point, then between the agreement on borders and Palestine as an independent state, working on the individual issues can succeed where the Oslo process failed.
Defining the borders at the beginning of the process provides a common perspective of how the end results will look. This will allow for freedom to act within the confines of the end result. If Palestine knows what territory will be theirs in the end, then fears of Israeli settlement expansion are alleviated because any settlements agreed to would be on Israeli territory and free to expand to the border. This assumes that through the border negotiations, both sides are willing to compromise on the precise location of the border. Instead of working their way toward a final status, they should start with the final status and work their way backwards. This will be difficult, but by defining the borders first, both sides will be working towards a concrete end state instead of a nebulous moving end state.

Based on the IPB, security recommendations are to first define a border that both sides recognize and are internationally accepted. This prevents either side from expanding beyond their agreement and prevents miscommunication about intentions and desires. By defining borders, Israeli settlements are free to expand within the confines of the borders and the Palestinians will be able to rely on international oversight to guarantee the borders are maintained. Real consequences must be applied to violation by either side, if they do not maintain the borders agreed to. Such consequences can come in the form of aid being cut. If this is applied, the United States Senate must build it into the law that is outside the control of a vote. In other words, Israel and Palestine will continue to receive the aid specified so long as they maintain the borders, but if any violation occurs, the aid will be automatically stopped until such time as the violation is resolved. Restoration of aid should rest in the hands of the President, not congress.

Secondly, both Palestinians and Israeli settlers must be disarmed. Palestinian security must be in the hands of a professional Palestinian security force. Israeli settlers potentially represent a challenge to their ability to provide security for their citizens. In addition, by both sides laying down arms and leaving security to the security forces, both sides are signaling a desire for
peace. This measure has a chance to create an environment that will allow the rule-of-law under the Palestinian Authority to assert its authority. The Palestinian Authority needs the time and space to gain the confidence of its own citizens through the protection of their individual rights.

Thirdly, a third nation must maintain the border between Palestine and Jordan. Palestine’s economy is tied directly to Israel and has not been allowed to develop independently. For Palestine to develop economically, it needs the opportunity to engage the international market outside the control of Israel. Opening up Palestinian markets will allow the potential for Iranian weapons flow into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The analysis from this IPB suggests that there needs to be a time when a third nation acts as the conduit between Palestine and the world markets to ensure the continued security of Israel while allowing the development of Palestine. If there is a third nation along the Jordan rift valley, Israel’s strategic calculations will change and they will no longer need to maintain a presence in the West Bank.
VII. CONCLUSION

Security for a two-state solution requires compromise and a clear definition of borders. It is only with the designation of borders between Israel and Palestine that a Palestinian identity can transition to one of nationalism instead of revolution and opposition. A clear boundary means greater security for Israel in the form of fewer requirements for policing a population that it has no desire to police. In addition, Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is an inflammatory against peace. With an Israeli withdrawal, the Palestinian population is less likely to be incensed against Israel. By defining and providing international recognition of the borders at the beginning of a peace process, both sides will be on equal footing and working towards the same goal, instead of trying to work the peace process to get the best conditions for a final solution. It was this condition that lead to Oslo’s failure. By not designating the borders in the beginning of the process, both sides manipulated the process in the hopes of getting the best outcome. This approach worked against the process of confidence-building measures and led to the collapse of Oslo. Alternatively, by agreeing to set borders, the issue of Israeli settlements will disappear because they will either be incorporated into Israeli territory and no longer a territorial concern for Palestine, or they will be given to Palestine for control. Israeli settlements that remain within Palestinian territory surrounded on all sides works against the security conditions necessary for peace.

By the end of the process, the settlements that do not have direct attachment to Israeli territory through rededefining of borders should either be given over to Palestine or removed. In addition, the refugee right of return will also disappear, as there will be a Palestinian state established to incorporate the refugees back into Palestinian society. Compromising on the borders first through land swaps will allow these necessary compromises to become part of the equation, and then confidence-building measures have a greater chance of success.
Currently, Israel’s policy on negotiations is Security First. It believes that granting Palestine greater autonomy will compromise Israel’s security and lead to greater violence. While it is true that certain elements of society will take advantage of more relaxed restrictions as a way to import weapons, if Palestine is given the ability to develop its economy and provide jobs to its population, greater economic prosperity is likely to lead to a population that will demand peace instead of returning to a time of no hope or living in poverty.

“Palestinians must believe that they will have a sovereign, contiguous, and economically viable state that will be free from continued Israeli controls and forcible interventions.”\(^{233}\) It is only when Palestine is on even footing with Israel in providing security for its citizens and its neighbors as well as in developing an economy that provides hope for a future to its citizens that peace will be viable. Palestinians must have hope in a better future for themselves and their children for them to trust in any agreements made with Israel. If Palestinians believe they will have a greater future with peace than a life of uncertainty and poverty, then the Palestinian population will demand peace and protect it from the radical elements from within its own society.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace analysis showed that the greatest threat exists from external elements providing weapons to radical elements within the Palestinian population. If the Palestinian borders are opened to Arab neighbors without security guarantees, it is likely that violence will erupt. To combat this from happening, an option is stationing a third nation security force along the border to act as the border security force, protecting the peace and ensuring that the free flow of goods is not compromised by illegal weapons. This third nation security force could be the security guarantee that Israel needs in order to withdraw from the West Bank and protect its citizens. This type of arrangement has worked well along the Israeli–Egyptian border. This third nation

\(^{233}\) J.D. Crouch II et al., *Security First*, 1.
force should not provide the internal security for Palestine, as any force attempting to provide security will become the target of dissidents and be drawn into conflict rather than policing and stability operations.

The key to lasting peace will be the development of a Palestinian economy that is capable of competing on the world market and increasing the standard of living in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The imbalance between Israel and Palestine is too great for there to be an equal distribution of wealth and resources. Palestine simply is not able to compete with Israel and must be given a chance to develop independently. With few exceptions, the two economies should be separated and autonomy given to Palestine free from influence and oversight from Israel. When the two economies are more balanced and similar in nature, then Stephen Brooks’ idea of integrated economies through regional trade agreements and multinational corporations will work to provide the economic ties to security cooperation. While this thesis concludes that the economies should be divided for a period of time, the water infrastructure, management, and oversight should be connected. Water drives the economy, and if mismanaged or polluted by one partner, it affects the other. Neither should one partner be given complete authority over the resources, creating an imbalance in distribution. A joint approach to this problem ensures the prevention of over pumping, providing the best quality of product to both peoples and helping to grow the economy. In addition, by being connected through this public utility, at a later time, when the Palestinian economy is more fully developed, a reintegration through multinational corporations and regional trade agreements can better facilitate linking the two nations through peaceful means.

A two-state solution is achievable by defining the borders with follow-on negotiations over the less contentious issues while direct oversight of measurable benchmarks is monitored by the United States. The United States must be able to provide real incentives and penalties to facilitate the peace process while maintaining security for both Israel and Palestine.
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