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**INFLUENCING THE BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL CHANG
WANQUAN TO PROTECT UNITED STATES SPACE ASSETS**

by

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Preface

A recent deployment motivated me to pursue this type of research. In early 2007, I deployed to Iraq to lead an effort to train young Iraqi men how to be officers in the new Iraqi Air Force. This mission was startlingly difficult because of our lack of understanding of the Iraqi culture. From that experience, I learned what a powerful factor foreign culture plays in US military operations and had a desired to understand better the phenomenon. Through this research effort, I was able to delve into a particular culture and attempt to appreciate how culture shapes the thinking of individuals. I wish I had this type of knowledge before my mission in Iraq.

This research followed the analytical methodology used by the Behavioral Influences Analysis Center at Air University, Maxwell AFB, which considered the psychological, organizational, and cultural realms in which an actor operates. It includes analysis of the actor's worldview, behavioral history, perceptions, motivations, capabilities, decision process, and situational factors. Following next in the workflow, an assessment was made of the actor's probable intent and likely behavior and their influence vulnerabilities and susceptibilities. The culminating objective of this research was to develop recommendations to influence behavior to meet US interests.

This research draws on open source literature only and primarily uses writings, websites, and assessments made in English or translated from Chinese to English by the Open Source Center. Additionally, this research draws on Chinese blogs for insight. Due to the complexity of the Chinese language and technical inadequacies, this research never depended on machine translations to draw conclusions.

Abstract

In January 2007, the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile that threatened US space assets and weakened Sino-US ties. A second successful test would further damage those ties and place more debris in Low-Earth Orbit, rendering that critical space passage less usable. The US must attempt to engage General Chang Wanquan, the Director of the General Armament Department, and influence him not to attempt a second test. This study recommends an influence strategy after studying General Chang's culture, organizations to which he refers, and psychological dimension. The psychological dimension considers the perceptions, cognition, emotions, reasoning, judgment, and decision-making process of Chang Wanquan; information gleaned from General Chang's background, public speeches, and writings available from open sources. In an attempt to influence the decision to launch a second ASAT missile, the US needs to immediately engage General Chang and offer limited cooperation on technical aspects of training, education, or anti-terrorism by using formal or informal avenues.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OF

METHODS OF INFLUENCING A CHINESE LEADER TO PROTECT US SPACE ASSETS

- A second successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test would further damage Sino-US ties and place more debris in Low-Earth Orbit, rendering that critical space passage less usable
- It is possible for the US to influence a single Chinese leader to prevent or delay future ASAT testing
- Influence target is General Chang Wanquan
 - Member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the key decision-making body of PLA, and Director of the General Armament Department (GAD) since November 2007
 - GAD has charter to develop and research weapons for PLA and contracts with commercial aerospace companies
 - GAD facility was the location of ASAT missile test in Jan 07, and Director of GAD recently named mission director for Shenzhou VII manned space mission
- General Chang's culture, organizations to which he refers, and psychological dimension
 - Born 1949 in Nanyang City, Henan Province, home of ancient strategist, Zhuge Liang
 - Spent most of career in Lanzhou Military Region and served as a trainer, Division Commander, and Group Army Commander
 - Earned degree by correspondence from Weinan Teachers College and was instructor at PLA's National Defense University
 - Rise to power is likely due to President Hu Jintao and anti-terrorism background
 - One of three newest CMC members, but the only one not a "princeling" (prominent child of former high-ranking officials)
 - Writings and speeches demonstrate support for President Hu's "scientific development" effort, Confucian in nature, and a heavy emphasis on training
 - Travelled to Cuba, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam, and Rwanda in last four years

- In an attempt to indirectly influence the decision to launch a second ASAT missile, the US needs to immediately engage General Chang and offer limited cooperation on technical aspects of training, education, or anti-terrorism by using formal or informal avenues

Introduction

The US should attempt to prevent China from performing further anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests by influencing General Chang Wanquan, who has sway over the development and employment of Chinese ASAT weapons using kinetic kill warheads. Already, the Chinese have endangered US assets by littering space with debris from an anti-satellite missile test performed in January 2007. Other tests would continue to add debris in Low-Earth Orbit and hinder its use for international space flight. Further testing also has the potential to escalate the existing security dilemma between China and the US into an arms race or armed conflict. By preventing or disrupting future ASAT missile tests, the US can lessen the potential for war due to misunderstood intentions. The US can achieve this effect through a well-crafted influence strategy that selects an appropriate target to influence; examines how culture, organizations, and psychology shape or control the life of the target; and develops recommendations by considering vulnerabilities and susceptibilities to influence.

This paper has three areas of focus. First, it seeks to demonstrate why General Chang Wanquan is the appropriate target to influence. The organization of the People's Liberation Army and various decision-making processes in Chinese government are considered. Next, this paper examines General Chang's culture, organizations to which he identifies, and psychological dimension. The understanding of the psychological dimension includes learning the perceptions, cognition, emotions, reasoning, judgment, and decision-making process of Chang Wanquan. As many conclusions as possible in this regard are drawn from his writings, speeches, and vitae. The third thrust of this research is to determine General Chang's influence vulnerabilities and susceptibilities. Ultimately, this paper recommends a US course of action, which may provide

planners another option to consider. Before proceeding with this analysis, a discussion about the scope of the problem is required.

The Intrinsic Problem

China currently has an active ASAT program that, when reviewed in its entirety, exceeds the ASAT investments made at the zenith of the Soviet Union.¹ On 11 January 2007, China proved to the world its ASAT capability when a kinetic kill vehicle launched on top of a ballistic missile successfully destroyed the Feng Yun 1C polar orbit weather satellite.² Before that event, “the Director of the US National Reconnaissance Office Donald Kerr confirmed a Chinese laser had illuminated a US satellite in 2006.”³ Furthermore, a recent survey of Chinese writings revealed 30 ASAT and space warfare proposals that China could pursue, which included technologies involving electromagnetic guns, lasers, and jamming.⁴ Clearly, the Chinese have the capability to threaten US space assets and are further developing that capability.

The Chinese pursuit of ASAT weapons and the US position that space assets are vital to its national interests, presents a security dilemma that could develop into an arms race or potential war. The Bush administration made clear the importance America places on its space resources in August 2006, “The United States considers space capabilities--including the ground and space segments and supporting links--vital to its national interests.”⁵ Contributing to the tension between the United States and China is the rhetoric of Chinese officials that is contrary to the actions of their country. China conducted the January 2007 ASAT missile test while simultaneously Chinese officials were advocating for the peaceful use of space.⁶ China’s 2008 National Defense White Paper expressed hope that a draft treaty banning weapons in space be approved, which was first proposed by the Chinese and Russians in 2002 to the UN Conference

on Disarmament.⁷ Consequently, many are struggling to understand how China intends to use its developing capability, since Chinese oratory and actions are dissimilar.

Western analysts have provided multiple interpretations about Chinese intent, but a consensus does not exist about the true nature of the threat nor how America should respond. The lack of transparency by the Chinese government and lack of knowledge of how specific Chinese individuals operate contribute to the wide range of opinions in western literature. The Department of Defense expressed this same observation in a 2006 report to Congress, “China’s leaders have yet to adequately explain the purposes or desired end-states of their military expansion...The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting PLA modernization.”⁸ In 2005, some of the most venerable experts on China’s space program recognized a basic difference in opinion on how the United States should formulate its policies regarding China’s space program.⁹ Opinions vary on this topic because analysts do not understand the motivations, priorities, and perspectives of Chinese decision-makers.¹⁰ Western analysts must attempt to understand the intent of specific Chinese leaders and find ways to influence them in an effort to avoid heightened conflict over the use of space.

Target Identification

Considering China's lack of transparency about their space and counterspace organizations (if there are such organizations), a significant challenge exists in determining whom to influence. The likelihood that a single military commander controls the country's counterspace capability is low. However, some commanders are more influential than others, and an abbreviated examination of key military organizations and their relationships can help reveal who those individual commanders are.

General Organization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the PLA's unified command authority for all of China's armed forces, and provides guidance for China's military strategy and war efforts.¹¹ The total number of people assigned to the CMC is eleven, which includes the dual-hatted Chairman and President of the PRC, Hu Jintao.¹² Subordinate to the CMC are four general departments. These departments (General Staff, Political, Logistics, and Armament) are responsible for developing policies for the PLA, and their leaders are members of the CMC.¹³ The "services" are also subordinate to the CMC and include the Air Force, Navy, Ground Forces, and Second Artillery Corps. Chinese ground forces are divided amongst seven military regions (MR). The "service" leaders are also members of the CMC. The other two members of the CMC are Vice Chairmen of the CMC, and standing members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo.¹⁴ These two individuals are likely more influential than others because of their membership in the Politburo.¹⁵ Finally, other organizations report directly to the CMC like the Academy of Military Science, National Defense University, and National Defense Science and Technology University.¹⁶ Western analysts credit the PLA responsibility for space and

counterspace programs to either the Second Artillery Corps or General Armament Department (GAD).

The Second Artillery Corps is the strategic ballistic missile force of the PLA, and it maintains China's nuclear arsenal. Over the history of the Second Artillery Corps, a number of subordinate research academies existed in various forms to develop rocket, satellite, and navigation technology. The DF-21 is one of many rockets in the Second Artillery Corps' inventory, which some western analysts assume to use the same booster that launched the ASAT missile in 2007.¹⁷ Some have noted that the Second Artillery Corps has much to gain from a Chinese manned space program, such as increased satellite payloads and advances in guidance and control.¹⁸ Perhaps due to these connections, many have associated the Second Artillery Corps with Chinese space activities.¹⁹ The Second Artillery Corps may have been the primary PLA agency for space activities before 1998, but organizational change in the last ten years suggests the GAD is the agency most responsible for the ASAT missile test in January 2007.

In 1998, China formed the GAD to revamp its defense industrial complex. The GAD allowed the PLA to have control over its own procurement process and made the Chinese defense industry quicker to respond to PLA needs.²⁰ It manages weapons development and production for the PLA in a centralized fashion.²¹ Many GAD units have been associated with various space and missile activities, and the GAD seems to direct all Chinese space and missile events to include space exploration and commercial satellite launch.²² The organization contracts space-related research and development with universities and aerospace companies, but also has its own organic space-related research facilities.²³ China launched the ASAT missile tested in 2007 from Xichang Satellite Launch Center, which is a GAD facility.²⁴ Because the GAD has the launch facilities, a charter to develop new weapon systems, access to civilian

companies, and organic research facilities, it is the most likely organization responsible for the ASAT test.

Key Decision-Making Processes

Open source literature does not reveal how the Chinese leadership made the decision to test the ASAT missile in 2007. Some have conjectured that Chinese national leadership did not unanimously support the decision to fire the missile, since the test was not coordinated with the international community and it took almost two weeks for China's Foreign Ministry to officially acknowledge the test.²⁵ Furthermore, the Chinese Defense Ministry claimed to have no knowledge of the test, and denied the print in foreign newspapers.²⁶ In another instance of a perceived lack of coordination, the Chinese government turned away the USS Kitty Hawk from Hong Kong in November 2007 only to reverse its decision hours later.²⁷ From this circumstantial evidence, it appears one hand does not know what the other is doing. Compartmentalized decision-making within the Chinese government is the most plausible explanation for the seeming lack of coordination in these two events. Regarding the decision to launch the 2007 ASAT missile test, the CMC or an unidentified Leading Small Group were the most probable key decision-making bodies.

The Chinese government implements many important decisions from within groups or committees called Leading Small Groups. The Constitution of the Communist Party of China authorizes the establishment of Leading Small Groups and they "may be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit."²⁸ Chinese leadership has used these bodies to advise the Politburo on policy and to work the implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo.²⁹ Leading Small Groups can be at any level of government down to the county, and they can be in the

PLA.³⁰ A long-standing Leading Small Group is the Foreign Affairs Work Leading Small Group, and most recently, China established the Leading Small Group for the Lunar Probe Project for the 2008 launch of a probe to explore the moon. Western analysts do not fully understand the decision process inside Leading Small Groups, since PRC media rarely refer to them.³¹ Another decision-making body to consider is the CMC.

The eleven-person CMC meets once a month for routine matters and twice a year for meetings that include the seven military region commanders. The CMC determines operational policy for military strategy; develops plans; approves weapons development and purchases; determines the PLA's organizational structure, roles and responsibilities; makes personnel decisions; and coordinates the PLA's budget with the State Council.³² CMC members only vote on major policy decisions in CMC meetings, where one person has one vote and the "minority yields to the majority."³³ If there is a tie vote, the membership tables the topic for later discussion and further research. Only in rare circumstances will the decision be elevated to higher authorities for resolution.³⁴

A single decision-maker does not decide upon military strategies, policies, and weapons development. Instead, these decisions are made by committee and likely put to a vote where a simple majority rules. Therefore, it is unlikely that a single military commander has total sway over strategic decisions. Nevertheless, the objective is to find a member of key decision-making bodies that can influence internal discussions.

Considering the evidence found through open sources, General Chang Wanquan is the most important person to influence in order to prevent another ASAT test. Although General Chang did not launch the first missile, his organization is most responsible for the ASAT program. He is a member of the CMC and Director of the General Armament Department. If a

Leading Small Group exists concerning space or counterspace, he would be a member. In September 2008, China launched a manned space mission named Shenzhou VII. General Chang Wanquan was the commander of that mission and led a seven-member team.³⁵ To begin to understand General Chang, the national and military strategic culture of China must be examined. These broad national and institutional perspectives would certainly shape the worldview of General Chang.

Chinese Strategic Culture

At the National Level

There is a great debate amongst western scholars regarding the exact nature of the China's strategic culture. The debate revolves around three key issues that include China's history, dominant philosophy, and future intent. China's long history has seen evidence of both a defensive and offensive culture. Additionally, the writings of Sun Tzu and others offer a method of statecraft that is secretive and deceptive. Furthermore, past and present religions within China suggest peaceful and harmonious living that could appear to contradict militant periods of the country's history. Finally, and because of reviewing China's history and religious preferences, analysts have come to diverse conclusions about the level of aggression in China's strategic goals. Shifting through these arguments is important in deciphering the world General Chang Wanquan lives in.

China's ancient and modern history has demonstrations of great violence; however, Chinese rhetoric today promotes peace in the world and a defensive posture. After reviewing literature from China's Warring States Period, Ralph Sawyer concludes that China today has sinister intentions:

Even in the unlikely event that the PRC's current leaders are truly committed to a benign course rather than simply dissembling, hiding their intentions, and biding their time; severe internal pressures or perverse external circumstances may compel them to adopt a more belligerent orientation.³⁶

On the other hand, Huiyun Feng performed a study of China's leadership during modern times and considered China's modern conflicts with India, Russia, and Vietnam. After examining the speeches, writings, and decisions of modern Chinese leaders since Mao, Feng created

psychological constructs influencing the behavior of individuals called operational codes. He concluded these modern Chinese leaders are Confucian leaders:

"An operational code analysis of six key Chinese leaders' belief systems and their changes across contexts and over time reveals that these Chinese leaders are not simple Parabellum realists [under influence of offensive culture and aggressive]. A comparison of these leaders with the average world leader further indicates that (except for Mao) they are either close to the average world leader in their major beliefs about cooperation and conflict (Deng and Zhou) or more cooperative and friendly than the average world leader (Jiang, Hu-Wen)."³⁷

Much dispute amongst western analysts revolves around whether China is an offensive or defensive culture. A theory by Andrew Scobell explains that the Chinese subscribe to the Cult of the Defense. That cult influences China to wage offensive wars in pursuit of national goals, while justifying these actions as being defensive.³⁸ This version of China's strategic culture is a combination of Confucianism and Realpolitik. The difference in conclusions between Feng and Scobell appears to be a matter of Chinese intent. For Feng, his conclusion implies Chinese leaders have internalized the teachings of Confucius, which sincerely motivates the behavior of those leaders. However, Scobell suggests that Chinese leaders merely use Confucianism as a means for greater ends.

Confucianism has shaped the strategic culture and history of China. Confucius died in 478 B.C. and lived during the Warring States Period. The philosophy that emerged from Confucius, and later Mencius, was an attempt to encourage society to stop the brutal violence of the period by valuing virtue over war. The original purpose for Confucianism was a rationalism of order via its pacifist character.³⁹ Confucius and Mencius argued that by living out the tenets of propriety and faithful allegiance to officials, China could realize civil order and put an end to centuries of violence. Moreover, Confucius opposed the hoarding of material things, which is a

source of social unrest.⁴⁰ Chinese officials are revitalizing Confucian teaching within government today.⁴¹

Regarding Chinese strategic goals, the Chinese have not articulated its grand strategy in a single source as the US does through its National Security Strategy. Based on the Chinese military writings alone, recurring strategic goals emerge and include regime security, territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and regional stability.⁴² The US Department of Defense concluded that the strategic priorities for China are the continuation of CCP rule, continued economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and securing China's status as a great power.⁴³ Territorial integrity and national sovereignty extends beyond the Taiwan Straits, and includes the disputed territories in China's west and south, key shipping lanes, and various islands in the South China Sea. The US State Department concluded that China's strategic modernization is driven by three primary goals: (1) regime survival; (2) dominance in the Asia/Pacific region, together with growing influence on a global level; and (3) prevention of Taiwan's *de jure* independence. This modernization is partially motivated by the goal to checkmate US military power, while expanding China's own influence in the region.⁴⁴ In general, these three independent assessments are congruent with each other.

At the Military Level

China's military acquisition efforts may be a means to verify western assessments of the country's strategic goals. China appears to be investing in the appropriate equipment to develop a limited force projection capability in the region, which is consistent with assessed national strategy. Additionally, China's acquisition of weapons to deny an adversary the area around the periphery of the country is also consistent with its stated strategic goals.⁴⁵ This capability can

support a number of strategic goals, but specifically it can deny the US the ability to intervene in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. At present, the Chinese kinetic kill ASAT weapon is best suited for area denial since it can only strike a limited number of US satellites in Low-Earth Orbit. “Even under the worst-case scenario, China could only reduce the use of precision-guided munitions or satellite communications into and out of the theater of operations.”⁴⁶

Another perspective, provided by Mott and Kim, explains the importance of *Shih* in Chinese military strategy. "Instead of using military force to subjugate another society or to defeat an enemy's army, *Shih* operates to convince an opponent to yield without battle. Instead of using weapons of strength to destroy an enemy, *Shih* prefers to threaten, manipulate, or deter. *Shih* can cause an enemy to accept compliant terms without fighting."⁴⁷ “In the near term, Beijing focuses on developing all possible means of defeating the superior US conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan”⁴⁸

China’s strategic culture at the national and military level aid in understanding why it pursues the policies it does. The Director of the GAD, General Chang, operates in this framework and his behaviors are likely constrained to be within the bounds of this framework. To summarize the likely influences on General Chang due to culture, the ancient history of China does not necessary imply an aggressive nation with imaginings of world domination. The last two-hundred years have been just as influential on Chinese culture as its ancient past.⁴⁹ In regards to religion or a guiding philosophy for life, Confucianism is deeply rooted in China and its government, much like the Judeo-Christian tradition influences American governance. This fact does not indicate a reluctance to fight by China, as some people have associated Confucianism with Pacificism. Finally, China’s future intentions, determined from US government assessments, official Chinese writings, and China’s weapons acquisition activities,

do not appear to be contradictory. The development of an ASAT weapon can serve Chinese national objectives as they have publicly stated in various forums. China's history, religion, and future intentions shape the worldview and subsequent behaviors of General Chang.

General Chang Wanquan

Origins

General Chang was born in 1949 in Nanyang City, Henan Province. Henan Province is historically significant because it is the “cradle” of Chinese civilization due to its proximity to the Yellow River. However, maybe more importantly, many in Nanyang City consider it the home to the greatest military strategist and public official during the Three Kingdoms Period, Zhuge Liang (181-234 AD).⁵⁰ Zhuge Liang is a source of pride for the people of Nanyang City today. The Memorial Temple to Zhuge Liang is located in Nanyang City, and the local Chinese government’s website described it as a “world-famous place of interest.”⁵¹

Zhuge had a reputation for being sincere, his central honorific quality.⁵² He wrote numerous essays on leadership and organization that direct generals to respect and care for the people under their command and maintain the highest integrity. By doing this, “...people will be willing to fight when they [generals] give the orders, and the enemy will be defeated before any blood is shed.”⁵³ Zhuge Liang often quoted Confucius and reflected an undercurrent of Taoist thought in his attitudes toward life and work.⁵⁴ He stressed the importance of military preparedness, training, and the need for strong allies as consultants. Zhuge believed the corrupt, arrogant, and unfair general would be defeated. Although not verified in open source media, General Chang would most likely know of the teachings of Zhuge Liang, which may influence his thinking.

Military Service⁵⁵

In February 1968, General Chang Wanquan joined the Army, where he began working in the Lanzhou MR as a squad leader. By November 1969, he was elevated to platoon leader.

From 1970 to 1974, General Chang worked on the training staff at a division headquarters within the 47th Field Army, Lanzhou MR. After that assignment, he moved to the training section of the general staff at the headquarters of the 47th Field Army and remained in that position from 1974 until 1978. In 1978, General Chang began a two-year stint as the Secretary within the Office of the Secretary, Lanzhou MR. He then became the deputy director of the 47th Field Army Training Command and ultimately director from 1980 until 1983. General Chang was the Chief-of-Staff of the 140th Division, 47th Field Army, from 1983 to 1985. Then he served as the deputy division commander of the 140th from 1985-1990. While on the job and from 1985 thru 1987, General Chang pursued and earned a degree by correspondence from Weinan Teachers College in Shaanxi Province. From 1990 to 1992, he was the director of the operations department for Lanzhou MR.

The first command that General Chang received was from February 1992 to November 1994 as a Division Commander of the 61st Division of the 21st Group Army in the Lanzhou MR. He returned to the 47th Group Army (restructured Field Army) and served as its Deputy Commander from November 1994 to June 1998. During that assignment, General Chang attended the PLA's National Defense University from March 1994 to January 1995. After his tour as a deputy commander of a Group Army, he left the Lanzhou MR for the first time in his career and served as the Director of the Campaign Teaching and Research Office at the National Defense University from June 1998 to October 2000.

In October 2000, General Chang returned to the Lanzhou MR to assume command of the 47th Group Army, an organization he had served in for more than 30 years. He left that command in January 2002 to serve as the Chief-of-Staff of the Lanzhou MR, but only stayed in that position until December 2003 when he moved to the Beijing MR to serve in the same

capacity. These quick moves may have been an attempt to broaden the experiences of General Chang before he assumed command of the Shenyang MR from December 2004 until November 2007. It was then that President Hu promoted him to full general and Director of the General Armament Department, which is where he serves today.

On 10 Sept 2008, General Chang became the mission commander of the Shenzhou VII manned space launch, which flawlessly launched and returned later that month.⁵⁶ Additionally, his Political Commissar, General Chi Wanchun, was the deputy mission commander. These developments suggest the military leads the Chinese space initiative.

The suitability of General Chang as the Director of the GAD is a point to ponder. The GAD is a very technical organization and chartered with the development and acquisition of the latest weaponry for the PLA arsenal. Furthermore, China's Defense White Paper for 2008 conveys an intense interest in "leap-frog" technology, which skips generations of scientific development. The GAD is the primary organization responsible for this endeavor within the PLA. However, General Chang's credentials are not technical; instead, he is a trainer. On the other hand, the Political Commissar for the GAD, General Chi Wanchun, has perfect technical credentials for the GAD.⁵⁷ This raises an interesting question about the relationship between the Director and Political Commissar of the GAD.

General Chang may be qualified to command the GAD because of his training and education credentials. As China strives to transform its military with "leap-frog" technology to operate in an "informationalized" environment, the rapid fielding of new equipment requires significant training, which is the responsibility of General Chang's organization.

GAD personnel at all levels are intimately involved in the preparation for and integration of new weapons and equipment into PLA units... Before new equipment is introduced into units, transformation training is emphasized. The PLA leadership acknowledges units will take time to develop proficiency to operate and maintain new equipment after it

arrives. Unit combat readiness, which is evaluated in training exercises conducted according to centralized standards, may take up to several months or years to achieve after new weapons are introduced.⁵⁸

Additionally, China is making large strides to have better combined-arms and joint operations. On countless occasions, General Chang has spoken of training and the need for more realistic exercises. His role is likely not the technical management of the latest weapon systems in the PLA arsenal, but instead, is to make the PLA qualified to operate in an “informationalized” environment with high-technology equipment.

Military and Political Connections

In the past, the strongest influence on the promotion of senior officers in the PLA has been the Group Army connection.⁵⁹ “A number of top ranking military officials have risen together, in part likely owing to the sponsorship of prominent members of the military whom they have worked for in the past.”⁶⁰ The *South China Morning Post* stated that General Chang is a protégé of Guo Boxiong, who is one of two CMC vice-chairs and a standing member of the Politburo, because they both commanded the 47th Group Army in the Lanzhou MR.⁶¹ Although this may be true, General Chang never worked directly under General Guo, even though the paths of these men crossed repeatedly from 1982 until 1999 when General Guo left the Lanzhou MR for higher positions in the PLA.⁶² Instead, the relationship between the Chairman of the CMC, President Hu Jintao, and other members of the CMC needs further examination to appreciate General Chang’s connections.

General Guo has been a member of the CMC since the time when President Jiang Zemin was its chairman, who preceded President Hu Jintao. General Guo may still be loyal to Jiang while reluctantly following Hu. Jiang was the Chairman of the CMC for fifteen years and effectively controlled the military through his personal involvement in determining CMC

appointments and removals, which is a tenet of Leninist leadership and key to policy implementation.⁶³ On the other hand, Hu commands little respect from senior military officers because he has no military background.⁶⁴ In an effort to take control of the military and consolidate power like Jiang, Hu Jintao has made efforts to promote the ranks and fill the CMC with members loyal to him. President Hu promoted General Chang in 2007, and then placed him as the Director of the GAD, which by default grants him membership to the CMC. In 2002, President Hu first recognized General Chang and granted him membership to the 16th Communist Party Congress (CPC), along with two other officers from the Lanzhou MR. Therefore, it is more likely that General Chang is a protégé of Hu Jintao rather than General Guo.

At the time of his election to the CPC, General Chang was the Chief-of-Staff of the Lanzhou MR, which was responsible for the security of northwest China. The terrorist group, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, is active in this portion of the China, and since the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, China has increased action against ETIM.⁶⁵ With over 30 years in the Lanzhou MR, General Chang has most likely developed an expertise in fighting terrorists to secure the homeland. One possible explanation for General Chang's rise to political power could be his knowledge of how to fight terrorists and China's expansion of anti-terror campaign.⁶⁶ Additionally, internal security and anti-terrorism appear to be an interest item for President Hu after his personal experience as the Party Leader in Tibet from 1988-1990, a region prone to social unrest.⁶⁷

The distinct lack of political connection also makes General Chang unique. Of the eleven members in the CMC, President Hu promoted General Chang and two other officers to full general in November 2007. These three officers are the junior ranking members of the

prestigious commission by at least three years.⁶⁸ They are also the newest members of the CMC. The other two fledging CMC members besides General Chang are “princelings” (prominent children of former high-ranking officials).⁶⁹ There is a general public feeling that many “princelings” have not earned their way into power nor demonstrated the competence necessary. Clearly, there are differences in the newest CMC cohort that make General Chang stand out.

Public Comments

In comments made by General Chang as the Shenyang MR Commander in 2006, he stated that the PLA should have respect for qualified personnel and recognize their values:

In the process of selecting, recommending, and using personnel, we should regard talent as the only criterion for the selection and use of personnel, treat everyone equally without discrimination, not go by academic credentials or experiences alone, pay no attention to connections, not engage in balancing, not nitpick, but strive to create a relaxed and harmonious environment that enables qualified personnel to display their talents to the greatest extent and allows us to make the best use of qualified personnel.⁷⁰

These comments are similar to beliefs expressed by Zhuge Liang almost two thousand years earlier. Perhaps his comment of “pay no attention to connections” is a reference to nepotism and his lack of support for the practice. This insight into General Chang’s idea of how to pick and use personnel reveals much about his character.

Next, from comments made a month later, General Chang reveals the importance of studying warfare. “He pointed out that military personnel should pay more attention to the serious aspects of the current situation. The sense of crisis is the fundamental motivation of the party's innovation theory. To research how to fight battles, it is necessary to proceed from formulating appropriate plans, giving priority to matching and connecting various plans, adding more details to the plans, and taking more effective measures to ensure the implementation of the operation plans, including effective training and continuous improvement.”⁷¹ Clearly, General

Chang views the “current situation” as driving the need for innovation. The situation referred to may be US-Taiwan relations or border security.⁷²

Chang Wanquan addressed a group of senior officers at a conference to discuss military training in 2006. He laid out five ways for leaders to set a good example in regards to training: (1) personal study and enhancement, (2) stay up-to-date with the latest concepts, such as “informationalized” warfare, (3) innovate and develop, (4) personally participate in training, and (5) set strict demands for training.⁷³ In the same speech, he concluded with these thoughts:

In short, party committees at all levels should properly control the political direction, development direction, main effort direction, and value direction of military training, comply with the requirements of the scientific development concept, clarify the thinking on the handling of military training in connection with the practice of the military units, arouse dynamism, overcome resistance, enhance vigor, form a joint force, and strive to create a new situation in military training.⁷⁴

General Chang took this opportunity to provide a push for President Hu’s “scientific development concept” and joint training. He appears to appreciate the need to make training realistic and purposefully in line with the latest thoughts on warfare.

Two years later as the Director of the GAD, General Chang discussed the need for finding new breakthroughs in outstanding problems and quickly developing weapons and equipment.⁷⁵

Foreign Travel

General Chang has never studied abroad or spent a significant amount of time away from China in the last ten years. However, he has participated in a number of high-level visits to foreign countries. In April 2004 and as the Chief-of-Staff of the Beijing MR, General Chang visited Cuba and met with Fidel Castro as part of General Xu Caihou’s entourage.⁷⁶ Currently, Xu Caihou is a vice-chairman of the CMC and standing member of the Politburo.⁷⁷

In April 2006, General Chang visited North Korea⁷⁸, Vietnam⁷⁹, and South Korea⁸⁰ as part of General Cao Gangchuan's entourage. Cao Gangchuan is also a member of the CMC and Minister of National Defense for the PRC. The state-run news agencies suggested that the reason for all three visits was to increase cooperation and ties between China and each country. General Chang led his own four-day foreign mission trip in May 2007 to Rwanda to promote friendly cooperation between the two countries.⁸¹ One specific agreement made during that visit was an increase in scholarships for Rwandan soldiers; currently 30 Rwandan Defense Force soldiers are attending various courses in China. Additionally, "the Chinese army has offered five million Yen [sic Yuan] to the RDF for procurement of military equipment."⁸²

Publications

General Chang is known as a "scholar-warrior" perhaps due to his time as an instructor at the National Defense University, his teacher's education, and published works. In January 2009, General Chang published an article that was widely disseminated in China, titled "Looking Back over Three Years Participation in Northeast Border Defense Building." The article is a reflection of his time as the commander of the Shenyang MR. General Chang laid out his strategy during that time to secure the borders in the northeast portion of China in the article. He articulated a five-pronged approach to border security called "five borders." It is defined as "using politics to make the border safe, enriching the people to make the border flourish, having the military strengthen the borders, using diplomacy to make the borders friendly, and using science and technology to control the borders."⁸³ In the article, General Chang delves into the specifics of how his command accomplished each component of the "five borders."

There are at least four published works written by General Chang in the last five years. Translations of all published works are not yet available. One such article by General Chang

written in 2004 and titled “Ancient Thought of Military Management in China and Its Inspiration” is said to be a work designed to revitalize Confucian teachings and thinking.⁸⁴ The purpose for such an article is arguable. Ralph Sawyer believes that the PRC has recently attempted to bring back Confucianism for both internal and external viewing. Internally, the PRC can use Confucianism to force the ideas of submissiveness and self-discipline upon an increasingly turbulent populace. Externally, the PRC can continue to feed a Western perception of Confucianism as a benign, pacifist oriented doctrine. Ultimately, Sawyer concludes that the PRC’s effort to revitalize Confucianism are “window-dressing” to hide more sinister motives.⁸⁵ It is very possible that General Chang did write this article on Confucianism for internal consumption and before taking command of the Shenyang MR in December of the same year. As he wrote about in 2009, General Chang needed to “use politics to make the border safe,” by strengthening border frontline grassroots political power and ideology.⁸⁶ In other words, General Chang needed to instill proper party ideology amongst the population in the region through training, specifically Confucian training. However, if Zhuge Liang is a hero of General Chang, a hero who values sincerity, respect for people, and integrity, then perhaps General Chang’s writings about Confucianism are more than for population control. It is possible that General Chang has internalized Confucianism and sincerely believes it is a way of life versus a tool to manipulate people.

Familial/Personal

General Chang claims that he comes from a poor family. He has at least five siblings, and General Chang is neither the oldest nor youngest of the children. He still has family in Nanyang City, and visits the town on holidays. He is married and has at least one daughter. He likes basketball and fishing.⁸⁷

Future Prospects

Since the formation of the GAD in 1998, it has had at least four different directors. The first director, Cao Gangchuan, became a vice chairman of the CMC and Minister of National Defense. General Li Jinai, moved over to become the Director of the General Political Department, considered a more prestigious position. General Chen Bingde moved on to become Chief of the General Staff, the most senior military member of the PLA. Some reports have predicted that General Chang Wanquan will move up to replace General Bingde as Chief of the General Staff.⁸⁸ Consequently, General Chang would remain a key decision-maker for at least the next five years or longer. There is no mandatory retirement age for CMC members, but members typically retire between the ages of 65 and 70.⁸⁹

Recommendations

Influence vulnerabilities are any grievances, animosity, unmet needs, or other conditions that other individuals could exploit. General Chang has three influence vulnerabilities. First, General Chang does not understand US culture. He has had little exposure to US personnel, probably does not know English, and his multiple trips overseas have often been with opponents of the US. He likely has a distorted view of US intentions. Next, within the CMC, General Chang is notable for not being a “princeling.” Based on his place of birth, speeches, and writings, General Chang likely subscribes to Confucius philosophy and values meritocracy over nepotism. The success of “princelings” in the PLA most likely disturbs General Chang, considering he began his career as a squad leader and achieved every successive promotion in the Army. Finally, as a non-technical leader of a very technical organization, General Chang may not appreciate the significance or severity of space debris in Low-Earth Orbit; therefore, he may not have enough incentive to refrain from future ASAT missile tests.

In an effort to cultivate an alternate view in Chinese decision-making forums within the CMC or any leading small group that exists, the US must immediately engage General Chang and offer limited cooperation in specific areas. This should be the primary influence operation. The US should not directly engage on ASAT testing, but use an indirect approach. He is likely an expert at training, education, and anti-terrorism. The US must appeal to General Chang’s Confucian tendencies and must consider his likely respect for positions of authority over him. A secondary influence operation is to exploit any grievance General Chang has with “princelings” rising to positions of power. Classified research is required to confirm the suspected grievance and its severity.

General Chang's degree of susceptibility to influence is not known. If engaged by the US, would General Chang be interested in learning about the US perspective? He is loyal to President Hu and is not likely to deviate from Hu's policies. Although, if Hu continues to promote "princelings" into positions of power, as he did in January 2009 with Lt Gen Chen Xiaogong, deputy commander of the People's Liberation Army Air Force, General Chang's loyalty to President Hu may diminish.⁹⁰ Accessibility to General Chang can be through formal and informal channels.

Formally, the US may engage General Chang using military-to-military visits through the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. Recently, General Chang met with Lt. Gen. Freyo Apfalter, head of the Armament Department of the Austrian Defense Ministry.⁹¹ It is interesting to note that the Chinese published the details of this visit in the English version of the *PLA Daily Online*, and apparently was an event the Chinese wanted the US to know about. A US Army officer, not a full general, associated with technical aspects or the acquisition of equipment as it relates to training or anti-terrorism, should engage General Chang.

An informal engagement strategy is possible due to General Chang's well-published writings in China. Currently, engagement through any state-run media outlet would be difficult, but there are limited opportunities through Mandarin speaking media outlets that are free from CCP influence throughout East Asia and even in the US. However, as China moves into the realm of global strategic communications and General Chang continues to publish, the US can engage him through more media outlets.⁹² Additionally, General Chang's schedule can be easily determined by knowing the CMC schedule, which has routine meetings and appears frequently with President Hu. Finally, to engage him alone, it may be possible to determine the next holiday General Chang will visit his home in Nanyang City.

Conclusion

In January 2007, the Chinese tested an ASAT missile that threatened US space assets and weakened Sino-US ties. A second successful test would further damage those ties and place more debris in LEO, rendering that critical space passage less usable. The US must attempt to engage General Chang Wanquan, the Director of the General Armament Department, and influence him not to attempt a second test. Although General Chang did not launch the first missile, his organization is most responsible for the ASAT program. The decision-making processes in the PLA, place General Chang at a critical crossroads to the decision of testing a second ASAT missile. Influencing him to behave in a manner conducive to US interest would create an important advocate in these decision-making processes.

General Chang's background, public speeches, and writings provide insight into his worldview, motivations, and possible intent. General Chang is a Confucius leader, who rose from the bottom rung of the PLA to its pinnacle over 40 years of service. He is loyal to President Hu and advocates "scientific development" in an attempt to meet China's strategic goals, but General Chang could possibly be dissatisfied with the frequent promotion of "princelings" within PLA ranks. In an attempt to indirectly influence the decision to launch a second ASAT missile, the US needs to immediately engage General Chang and offer limited cooperation on technical aspects of training, education, or anti-terrorism. The approaches can be formal or informal.

General Chang has had limited direct exposure to US personnel. At a minimum, he needs to have a face associated with the adversary that his country is developing military capability to defeat. This engagement strategy should be long-term since General Chang will likely move into higher positions within the CMC and become more influential.

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- ¹ Tellis, "China's Military Strategy," 60.
- ² Covault, "Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon," 17 January 2007.
- ³ Pillsbury, *An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines*, 3.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ *US National Space Policy*, August 2006.
- ⁶ Logan, *China's Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation*, 4.
- ⁷ *China's National Defense in 2008*, 80.
- ⁸ *Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, 2006.
- ⁹ Cheng, *China's Space Program: Civilian, Commercial, and Military Aspects*, 23.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 21.
- ¹¹ Allen, "Introduction to the PLA's Administrative and Organizational Structure," 7.
- ¹² http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/16/content_921750.htm.
- ¹³ Allen, "Introduction to the PLA's Administrative and Organizational Structure," 7.
- ¹⁴ Bios of CMC vice-chairmen found at http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/16/content_921750.htm.
- ¹⁵ Nan, "The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China," 73.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 96.
- ¹⁷ Sinodefence, 11 Feb 09.
- ¹⁸ Forney, "Great Leap Skyward," 22 Sept 2003.
- ¹⁹ Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset*, 210-211. As an example, Dr. Johnson-Freese claimed the Second Artillery Corps directed the Chinese space program. Gill Bates reference China's "strategic rocket forces" as the responsible party for the ASAT test in Jan 07 in Foreign Affairs, "China's Space Odyssey," 2.
- ²⁰ Cliff, "Advances Underway in China's Defense Industries," Mar 06.
- ²¹ Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military*, 143.
- ²² Jencks, "The General Armament Department," 294.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Sinodefence, 24 Aug 08.
- ²⁵ Johnson-Freese, "America's China Worries - Part I," 6 Feb 07.
- ²⁶ Mulvenon, "Rogue Warrior? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test," 1.
- ²⁷ Reuters, "China Blocks USS Kitty Hawk from Hong Kong," 22 Nov 2007.
- ²⁸ *Constitution of Communist Party of China*, Article 46.
- ²⁹ Miller, "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups," Fall 2008.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Allen, "Introduction to the PLA's Administrative and Organizational Structure," 7.
- ³³ Nan, "The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China," 79-81.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 79.
- ³⁵ "Chang Wanquan heads the commanding team of Shenzhou-7," 10 Sept 08.
- ³⁶ Sawyer, "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections," 62.
- ³⁷ Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, 121.
- ³⁸ Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*, 15.
- ³⁹ Weber, *The Religion of China*, 169.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 156-159.
- ⁴¹ Sawyer, "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections," 11.
- ⁴² Fravel, "China's Search for Military Power," 127-129.
- ⁴³ *Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, 9.
- ⁴⁴ *China's Strategic Modernization*, 15 Oct 08.
- ⁴⁵ Fravel, "China's Search for Military Power," 131-132.
- ⁴⁶ Forden, "Viewpoint: China and Space War," 151.
- ⁴⁷ Mott and Kim, *The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture: Shih vs. Li*, 15.
- ⁴⁸ Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," 45.
- ⁴⁹ Samovar et al., *Communication Between Cultures*, 61.
- ⁵⁰ "Chang Wanquan Promoted to Rank of General," 2 Nov 07.

- ⁵¹ “Wolong District of Nanyang City,” http://www.wolong.gov.cn/eng_qqjj.htm.
- ⁵² Zhuge et al., *Mastering the Art of War*, 38.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 63.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 37.
- ⁵⁵ Unless other noted, this section is a compilation of three separate sources to verify accuracy of General Chang’s vitae. These sources were *China Vitae*, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chang_Wanquan/career; *Baidu Encyclopedia*, <http://baike.baidu.com/view/325385.htm>; and *Xinhuanet*, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/15/content_8549424.htm.
- ⁵⁶ “Chang Wanquan heads the commanding team of Shenzhou-7,” 10 Sept 08.
- ⁵⁷ Chin, “The CPC’s Key Figure for Combating Taiwan,” 58-61.
- ⁵⁸ Blasko, “Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System Part II,” 13 Oct 2004.
- ⁵⁹ Li et al., “China’s New Military Elite,” 79.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Choi, “Hu Promotes Rising PLA Star to General,” 3 Nov 2007.
- ⁶² “Guo Boxiong,” 16 Mar 08.
- ⁶³ Shambaugh, *Modernizing China’s Military*, 35.
- ⁶⁴ Shambaugh, *Modernizing China’s Military*, 32.
- ⁶⁵ Wo-Lap Lam “China expands anti-terror campaign,” 16 Nov 2002.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Reuters, “Chinese Replace Leader of Tibet,” 7 Dec 1988.
- ⁶⁸ Li et al., “China’s New Military Elite,” 83.
- ⁶⁹ Li et al., “China’s New Military Elite,” 77.
- ⁷⁰ Chang, “JFJB Carries Excerpts of Speeches Delivered at All-Army Theoretical Seminar,” 20 May 06.
- ⁷¹ Xiong, “Shenyang MR Holds Headquarters Construction Work Conference,” 31 May 06.
- ⁷² This same phrase has been used by President Hu.
- ⁷³ Chang, “JFJB: Excerpts of Speeches by Leading PLA Officers on Military Training,” 27 Jun 06.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
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- ⁷⁶ “Cuban leader Fidel Castro meets visiting Chinese general,” 23 Apr 04.
- ⁷⁷ “Xu Caihou,” 16 Mar 08.
- ⁷⁸ “Chinese defence minister pays tribute to North Korea’s Kim Il-sung,” 5 Apr 06.
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- ⁸⁰ Zhang et al., “South Korean president holds talks with Chinese defence minister,” 17 Apr 06.
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- ⁸³ Chang, “Looking Back Over Three Years Participation in Northeast Border Defense Building,” 7 Jan 09.
- ⁸⁴ Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections,” 11-12.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Chang, “Looking Back Over Three Years Participation in Northeast Border Defense Building,” 7 Jan 09.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Choi, “Hu Promotes Rising PLA Star to General,” 3 Nov 2007.
- ⁸⁹ Kamphausen et al., *The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military*, 249.
- ⁹⁰ Hsiao, “Personnel Changes in PLA Ranks: Chen Xiaogong,” 4 Feb 09.
- ⁹¹ Zhao, “Chang Wanquan Meets Austrian Guests,” 28 Oct 08.
- ⁹² Lam, Willy, “Chinese State Media Goes Global: A Great Leap Outward for Chinese Soft Power?,” 22 Jan 09.

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ANNEX A



Behavioral Influences Analysis Center: Individual Behavioral Profile

General Chang Wanquan

Prepared by: Scott E. Bergren

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1. (U) Chang Wanquan Main Profile

General Chang Wanquan is a key decision-maker in the development of China's offensive counterspace capability. As the Director of the General Armament Department, General Chang has the resources at his disposal to affect future ASAT tests. By indirectly engaging General Chang on technical aspects of training, education, or anti-terrorism, the US can indirectly influence future ASAT missile testing to the benefit of US interests.



(U) Name

- 常万全
- Standard Telephonic Code (STU): 1603/8001/0356

(U) Age: 59

(U) Nationality: Han

(U) Position: Director of General Armament Department, member of the Central Military Commission, member of 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

(U) Familial/Personal

- Marital Status – Married¹
- Children – At least one daughter²
- Significant others – Five siblings (one is a brother); Uncle, nephew, and niece in Nanyang³
- Birthplace/date – Nanyang City, Henan Province in January 1949
- Language fluency – Not known, but unlikely to know English. Since working in Lanzhou MR for most of his career, he may know some Russian.
- Health – Good (plays basketball)
- Acquaintances/relationships created: Large extended family in Nanyang, Henan.

(U) Cultural/Social

- Ethnicity – Han
- Religion – subscribes to Confucianism philosophy
- Economic status – Came from poor family.⁴ Salary is likely over \$2,000 per month.⁵ Gross national income per capita in 2006 was \$2,010 per month.⁶

(U) Politics

- Member of the 16th and 17th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party
- Highly committed to CCP. Attends all appropriate meetings and publicly carries the party message of “scientific development.”
- Likely a protégé of President Hu Jintao, who promoted him to full general and elevated him as the Director of the GAD in November 2007. As the Director of the GAD, he gains membership to Central Military Commission.

(U) Military Experience

- Assignments⁷
 - **February 1968** he joined the Army in Lanzhou MR and quickly promoted to squad leader
 - **November 1969** served as platoon leader
 - **July 1970** Director of Combat Training Section, 47th Army, Lanzhou MR **1974-1978** 47th Army Command General Staff Department for training
 - **1978-1980** Secretary in the Lanzhou MR Office of the Secretary
 - **1980-1981** Deputy Director of the 47th Army Training Command
 - **1981-1983** Commander of the Training Command with the 47th Army
 - **1983-1985** Chief-of-Staff of the 140th Division with the 47th Army
 - **September 1985-September 1990** Commander of a division in the 47th Army
 - **September 1990-February 1992** Minister of Operations Lanzhou MR Command
 - **February 1992-November 1994** he was the first division commander of the 61st Division of the 21st Group Army in the Lanzhou MR
 - **November 1994 – June 1998** Army Chief-of-Staff of the 47th Group Army
 - **June 1998** Director of the Campaign Teaching and Research Office at the National Defense University
 - **October 2000** Commander of the 47th Group Army, Lanzhou MR
 - **January 2002** Chief-of-staff for Lanzhou MR
 - **December 2003** Chief-of-staff for Beijing MR
 - **December 2004** Commander of Shenyang MR
 - **2007-present** Director of General Armament Department
 - **September 2008** Mission Commander for Shenzhou VII manned space flight that launch on 25 September
- Education
 - September 1985-July 1987: Weinan Teachers College by correspondence Shaanxi Province
 - March 1994-January 1995: National Defense University
- Acquaintances

- Worked with General Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), for a period of fifteen years in Lanzhou MR.⁸
- Travelled to Cuba with Xu Caihou, vice-chairman of the CMC, in 2002.

(U) Geographical

- Travel
 - **Rwanda:** On 17 May 2007 as the Commander of the Shenyang MR
 - **North Korea, Vietnam, and South Korea:** From 4-18 April 2006 with Cao Gangchuan as the Commander of the Shenyang MR
 - **Cuba:** On 22 April 2004 with Xu Caihou as the Chief-of-Staff of the Beijing MR

(FOUO) Occupational

- Authored –
 - Chang Wanquan and Yu Guohua, “PRC PLA Analysis of 20th-Century Combat Theory,” *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 26 January 2000, as translated by FBIS reference FTS20000225000004.
 - “Ancient Thought of Military Management in China and Its Inspiration” (“Zhongguo Gudai Zhijun Sixiang ji qi Qishi”), *JSKS* 2004:1, pp. 127-136.
 - “Strategies of the Successive Chinese Central Dynasties in Safeguarding State Security” (“Zhongguo Lidai Zhongyang Wangchao Weihu Guijia Anquan de Fanglue”), *JSKX* 2005:1, pp. 98-108.
 - Chang Wanquan, “Strategies Of Cultivating Combat Spirit In Ancient Chinese Armies And Revelations,” *Chinese Military Science Journal*, April 2006.⁹
 - Chang Wanquan, “Looking Back Over Three Years Participation in Northeast Border Defense Building,” *People’s Liberation Army Daily Online*, 7 Jan 2009, as translated by Open Source Center reference CPP20090107710004.

(U) Other

- Loyalty Loop – General Chang is loyal to President Hu.
- Decision Making – The structural environment of the CMC and perhaps any Leading Small Group drives how General Chang makes decisions. As a member of key decision-making bodies, General Chang’s vote has the same weight as any other member of those bodies.

2. (U) Influence Vulnerabilities and Susceptibilities

(U) Influence Vulnerabilities

- Little or no exposure to US, which leads to misunderstood intentions
- Factions within the CMC
 - Between “princelings” and “non-princelings”
 - Between Jiang Zemin supporters and Hu Jintao supporters
- Lack of technical background in space or counterspace to direct operations for the GAD, but GAD political commissar does have a technical space/counterspace background

(U) Exploitable Vulnerabilities (Influence Susceptibilities)

- Indirect US engagement and limited cooperation with General Chang on topics he has expertise using formal or informal approaches
- Any grievance General Chang has with growing number of princelings in PLA senior leadership

(U) Human Target Accessibility

- General Chang will attend CMC meetings held in top floor of recently built Ministry of Defense building located in west Beijing on Chang’an Boulevard.
 - Meeting times are every Thursday for weekly work conferences.¹⁰
- General Chang occasionally returns to his hometown of Nanyang for holidays.¹¹
- General Chang communicates to the PLA through various media outlets.

3. (U) Influence Operations Recommendations

(U) Vulnerabilities with Potential for Exploitation

- **Primary** - US engagement with General Chang on topics he has expertise and limited cooperation in those areas
 - General Chang appears to have had little interaction with US personnel and may have a distorted perception of US intentions/policy; direct US engagement can mitigate misperceptions
 - Other nations are currently engaged with General Chang (e.g., Austria)
 - Little impact if exploitation fails
 - Exploitation is a long-term endeavor due to need to develop relationships
- **Secondary** - Any grievance General Chang has with growing number of princelings in PLA senior leadership
 - A secondary versus a primary potential vulnerability for exploitation due to a lack of verifying open source intelligence of the existence or intensity of any such grievance
 - If a strong grievance exists, this exploited vulnerability could potentially influence decision-making quickly assuming appropriate inducements are found

(U) Degree of Susceptibility to Influence Operations (By Vulnerability)

- **Primary**
 - Not known
- **Secondary**
 - Not known

(U) Best Available Mechanisms for Access (By Vulnerability)

- **Primary** - US engagement with General Chang on topics he has expertise and limited cooperation in those areas
 - Use military-to-military contacts to collaborate on the technical aspects of anti-terrorism and/or training
 - Respond to General Chang's writings through China's burgeoning global media
- **Secondary** - Any grievance General Chang has with the growing number of princelings in PLA senior leadership
 - While at home in Nanyang
 - Electronic mediums at work office in the Ministry of Defense

4. (U) Levels of Confidence in Achieving Desired Behavior, Assuming Effective Access

(U) Primary - US engagement with General Chang on topics he has expertise and limited cooperation in those areas

- Medium-high level of confidence that a well executed US engagement strategy will work to affect General Chang's decisions

(U) Secondary - Any grievance General Chang has with the growing number of princelings in PLA senior leadership

- Unknown

5. (U) Potential for Unintended or Deceptive Behavior by Vulnerability

(U) Primary Vulnerability

- Medium likelihood that Chinese (Ministry of Defense and/or General Chang) will consider US engagement as insincere. If this is the case, the Chinese will block engagement efforts.

(U) Secondary Vulnerability

- Unknown

6. (U) Conclusions

- In an attempt to indirectly influence the decision to launch a second ASAT missile, the US needs to immediately engage General Chang and offer limited cooperation on technical aspects of training, education, or anti-terrorism using formal or informal means.

7. (U) Intelligence Gaps

- Location and translation of following articles written by General Chang:
 - “Ancient Thought of Military Management in China and Its Inspiration”
 - “Strategies of the Successive Chinese Central Dynasties in Safeguarding State Security”
 - “Strategies Of Cultivating Combat Spirit In Ancient Chinese Armies And Revelations”
- Issues requiring further classified research
 - Through HUMINT
 - Understanding of relationship between General Chang Wanquan and General Chi Wanchun, political commissar of GAD
 - Confirm if General Chang has a grievance about promotion of princelings in PLA and intensity of grievance
 - Verification of existence of a Leading Small Group for space or counterspace activities
 - Confirmation of CMC meeting times
 - Specific holidays that General Chang returns home to Nanyang

8. (U) Point of Contact

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Country:	China
Derived from:	

¹ Liu Hailin, “Shenzhou VII Commander, Wanquan, from Nanyang,” *Henan Network*, September 23, 2008, Translated by Gary Ho, ACSC AY09.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Liu Hailin, “Shenzhou VII Commander, Wanquan, from Nanyang,” *Henan Network*, September 23, 2008, Translated by Gary Ho, ACSC AY09.

⁵ Corps Commanders get at least \$1,025. Kamphausen, *The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's Military*, 214. Additionally, promotion to full general is another \$1,000.

⁶ From the World Bank website,

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAEXTN/>.

⁷ Unless other noted, this section is a compilation of three separate sources to verify accuracy of General Chang’s vitae. These sources were *China Vitae*, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chang_Wanquan/career; *Baidu Encyclopedia*, <http://baike.baidu.com/view/325385.htm>; and *Xinhuanet*, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/15/content_8549424.htm.

⁸ Choi Chi-yuk, South China Morning Post, "Hu promotes rising PLA star to general," November 3, 2007 Saturday.

⁹ "China: Table of Contents of Military Journals 01-30 Apr 06," CPP20060531478003 *Defense Department* in English 30 May 06. Complete source is classified *For Official Use Only*.

¹⁰ Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, 118.

¹¹ Liu Hailin, "Shenzhou VII Commander, Wanquan, from Nanyang," *Henan Network*, September 23, 2008, Translated by Gary Ho, ACSC AY09.