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CONNECTING THE SPOTS:

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

THROUGH LEVERAGING INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES

by

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Historical evidence shows that effective policing and intelligence have the greatest impact on defeating terrorist groups. Unfortunately, US efforts to develop and enhance indigenous security forces (ISF) to combat transnational terrorist groups have been uncoordinated and fragmented. The lack of an effective counterterrorism (CT) coordinating agency and the lack of a comprehensive interagency CT strategy have severely hampered US Government (USG) efforts to provide counterterrorism training and assistance to ISF. Antiquated Congressional legislation prohibiting the training of foreign police forces has further constrained the USGs ability to provide effective assistance and created an extremely fragmented USG approach to providing CT training and assistance. This paper proposes four key USG actions to develop, enhance, and leverage ISF abroad to combat transnational terrorist groups: (1) rescind or amend the legislative prohibition on training foreign police, (2) institute an interagency coordination group to synchronize and assess CT training and assistance globally, (3) improve information sharing with ISF, and (4) apply a global oil spot strategy to ISF development. These actions will allow USG agencies and international organizations to optimize resources in order to better leverage ISF worldwide. Additionally, through the combined development of ISF and information sharing networks in at-risk nations, oil spots of security can be incrementally expanded and connected to isolate and defeat transnational terrorist groups.

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Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER II

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS IV

ABSTRACT V

THE NEED FOR IMPROVED INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCE (ISF) DEVELOPMENT 1

FACTORS IMPEDING USG ABILITY TO ENHANCE ISF EFFECTIVENESS ABROAD 2
- Lack of an Effective Counterterrorism Coordinating Agency or Comprehensive Interagency Strategy 2
- Legislative Prohibition on Training Foreign Police Forces 6

ACTIONS TO ENHANCE AND LEVERAGE ISF EFFECTIVENESS ABROAD 6
- Rescind Section 660 or Approve Exemption for Counterterrorism Training/Assistance 7
- Counterterrorism Training and Assistance Coordination Group (CTACG) 9
- Improve Information Sharing with ISF 13
- Apply a Global Oil Spot Strategy to ISF Development 15

CONCLUSION 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY 24

List of Illustrations

Page

Figure 1: USG Organizations and Programs Involved in CT Training and Assistance 3

Figure 2: Organizational Structure to Enhance CT Training and Assistance Coordination.....12

Figure 3: Potential Increases in Security Levels Through Coordinated Global Oil Spot Strategy 17

Abstract

Historical evidence shows that effective policing and intelligence have the greatest impact on defeating terrorist groups. Unfortunately, US efforts to develop and enhance indigenous security forces (ISF) to combat transnational terrorist groups have been uncoordinated and fragmented. The lack of an effective counterterrorism (CT) coordinating agency and the lack of a comprehensive interagency CT strategy have severely hampered US Government (USG) efforts to provide counterterrorism training and assistance to ISF. Antiquated Congressional legislation prohibiting the training of foreign police forces has further constrained the USG's ability to provide effective assistance and created an extremely fragmented USG approach to providing CT training and assistance. This paper proposes four key USG actions to develop, enhance, and leverage ISF abroad to combat transnational terrorist groups: (1) rescind or amend the legislative prohibition on training foreign police, (2) institute an interagency coordination group to synchronize and assess CT training and assistance globally, (3) improve information sharing with ISF, and (4) apply a global oil spot strategy to ISF development. These actions will allow USG agencies and international organizations to optimize resources in order to better leverage ISF worldwide. Additionally, through the combined development of ISF and information sharing networks in at-risk nations, "oil spots of security" can be incrementally expanded and connected to isolate and defeat transnational terrorist groups.

The Need for Improved Indigenous Security Force (ISF) Development

In 2008, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency stated that, "al Qaeda remains the single greatest threat to the United States."[1] The 2009 Annual Threat Assessment by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) highlights that the transnational terrorist affiliate Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) "has expanded its target set to include US, UN, and other Western interests and has launched progressively more sophisticated attacks."[2] Despite more than seven years of concerted efforts by the US and other members of the international community to defeat transnational terrorist networks, terrorist attacks have increased worldwide since 11 September 2001, with al Qaeda attacks expanding across Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, average annual terrorist attacks linked to al Qaeda increased five-fold since 2001 (10 attacks/year) in comparison to attacks conducted in the six years before 2001 (2 attacks/year).[3] In 2008, the DNI assessed that Al Qaeda *improved* its ability to attack the U.S. homeland.[4]

US counterterrorism (CT) efforts have focused heavily on military "kill and capture" solutions to combating terrorist networks, with significantly less attention paid to improving security and policing capabilities worldwide. Numerous counterterrorism and counterinsurgency experts argue that *policing and intelligence* have the greatest impact on defeating terrorist networks.[5] Since 1968, only 7% of terrorist groups that have ended were defeated as a result of military force, while 40% were defeated as a result of policing.[6] Worldwide, police officers have "arrested five times as many suspects linked to al-Qaeda as military operations have captured or killed."[7] Because modern terrorist organizations are decentralized social networks with loose hierarchies, "direct-action" approaches to decapitating terrorist leadership have limited long-term impact on their own. However, terrorist social networks are quite vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by indigenous personnel working in the communities where the groups operate.

Despite historical evidence[8] and doctrine[9] emphasizing the impact effective policing has on CT operations, US and international efforts to integrate indigenous policing into a comprehensive CT plan have been haphazard and ad hoc. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stressed "building the capacity of foreign partners in all areas of counterterrorism activities, including strengthening their ability to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and military counterterrorism operations,"[10] and the Obama administration's 2009 defense agenda emphasizes creating "a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats."[11]

Unfortunately, national strategy has not been translated into coordinated action by United States Government (USG) agencies. While indigenous security force (ISF) development has gained significant momentum in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, USG efforts to develop ISF and improve security abroad in at-risk nations has been wholly fragmented and uncoordinated. If defeating transnational terrorist groups is truly a top national security priority for the USG, and developing effective ISF abroad is a supported and proven strategy to counter these groups, the USG should significantly improve its focus on ISF development and institute substantial changes with respect to CT training and assistance to foreign nations.

Factors Impeding USG Ability to Enhance ISF Effectiveness Abroad

Lack of an Effective CT Coordinating Agency or Comprehensive Interagency Strategy

In various operating environments, different organizations and personnel are better suited to work with and/or train ISF in CT operations. In some areas, indigenous police forces already exist that only need additional training to be effective in combating terrorist groups, while in other areas indigenous military forces or militias may be the only forces capable of CT operations.[12] Political or legal constraints may limit the types of personnel or resources to be

used in a given environment. Personnel ranging from special operations forces to municipal police officers may be the most appropriate personnel to work with or train indigenous forces to improve counterterrorism capabilities. These personnel and resources would likely come from various departments/organizations and need to operate in a coordinated fashion to be effective. Remarkably, there are over 20 different USG organizations and associated programs involved in training and assisting ISF in CT operations. These organizations and programs exist in the Department of State (DoS), Defense (DoD), Justice (DoJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Figure 1 provides a listing of USG organizations involved in CT training and assistance of foreign personnel, along with associated CT programs run or led by the department. Unfortunately, the efforts of these numerous organizations are not coordinated and lack an integrated strategy.

DoS

Organizations
- Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)
- Ambassador Country Teams
- Bureau for Diplomatic Security
- Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Associated Programs
- Antiterrorism Assistance Program
- International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)
- Rewards for Justice Program
- Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
- Trans-Sahara CT Partnership (TSCTP)
- Terrorist Interdiction Program

USAID

Organizations
- Office of Democracy & Governance

Associated Programs
- Rule of Law and Governance Programs

DoD

Organizations
- USSOCOM
- USEUCOM
- USAFRICOM
- USCENTCOM
- USPACOM
- USNORTHCOM
- USSOUTHCOM
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Associated Programs
- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Joint Combined Exchange and Training
- Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)

DHS

Organizations
- International Programs Division
- Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
- Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Associated Programs
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Ctr
- Border Control Training

DoJ

Organizations
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)
- Legal Attachés
- Criminal Division
- US National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization
- Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

Associated Programs
- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
- Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT)

Figure 1: USG Organizations and Programs Involved in CT Training and Assistance[13]

The Department of State (DoS) formally has the lead role in coordinating CT strategy abroad. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) "coordinates and supports the development and implementation of all U.S. Government policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism overseas."[14] Unfortunately, S/CT lacks the resources and authority necessary to effectively coordinate CT assistance by the multiple USG departments.[15] While S/CT has been given this crucial responsibility, it lacks the requisite authority to task other departments or prioritize other departments' CT funding. Even if additional resources were provided to DoS, it would not necessarily be advisable to vest additional tasking authority in DoS. As discussed by Bruce Pirnie of RAND Corporation, "State Department's qualifications to be an honest broker among the agencies are suspect because it normally will be, and of course should be, an interested and active participant, vigorously promoting its own policy preferences."[16] State also has a considerable array of responsibilities that dilute its ability to coordinate actions across the large number of disparate USG organizations involved in CT training and assistance.

With limited staff and resources, DoS has attempted to improve interagency coordination in CT assistance abroad. However, DoS has been hampered by various issues that degrade its ability to manage the numerous USG organizations providing CT assistance. The following cases illustrate the issues related to the lack of coordination and directive authority in CT training and assistance.

A 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report showed extensive deficiencies in the ability of US law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to assist foreign countries in disrupting and prosecuting terrorist groups. The GAO report illustrated that LEA efforts were significantly impeded by a lack of: clear roles and responsibilities, funding priorities guidance, performance measurement systems, and assessments of countries' CT needs.[17] While some LEAs increased

and improved their efforts to assist foreign nations, these efforts were often accomplished independently. This was primarily due to the lack of a single LEA with authority to direct the efforts of all US LEAs abroad.[18]

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has been hailed as a DoS-sponsored benchmark in interagency cooperation to eliminate terrorist safe havens by strengthening indigenous CT capacity in northwest Africa.[19] While the TSCTP has been successful at bringing together strengths from multiple departments (DoS, DoD, and USAID), a 2008 GAO report highlighted factors significantly hampering TSCTP activities, to include the lack of a comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide program implementation, disagreements in authority between DoD and DoS, fluctuating distributions of department funding, and the lack of effective performance measures. [20] A 2008 report by the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance noted that the programs funded under TSCTP, "have been a collection of initiatives cobbled together from various accounts, with little consideration of their strategic integration, sustainability, and long-term developmental impacts."[21] This report concluded that in the area of CT capacity building, the USG lacks "coherent vision and authoritative plans to guide identification of critical [CT] capabilities, rationalize resources across agency boundaries, and integrate target country activities."[22]

Overall, two main factors have contributed to the deficiencies in CT training and assistance programs provided through USG departments abroad: (1) lack of key national strategy elements to establish joint interagency strategies, performance measures, funding priorities, and agency responsibilities,[23] and (2) lack of an effective coordinating organization to synchronize actions of multiple departments.[24] While improving the CT capabilities of partner nations has been a stated national priority, these factors have impeded significant efforts by departments to develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive strategy to develop ISF

through CT assistance. Unfortunately, this has created an interagency system obstructed by departments' parochial agendas and strongly reliant on informal relationships developed between agencies.

Legislative Prohibition on Training Foreign Police Forces

Section 660, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, prohibits "the use of security-assistance funds to train, advise, or offer financial support to foreign police forces."[25] Passed in 1973, this amendment was designed to stop USG support and training for repressive regimes committing human rights abuses. At the time, the lack of effective policy guidance led to extensive police force training abroad with little accountability for the long-term impacts.[26] Over time, numerous exceptions to the amendment were implemented for certain USG organizations, post-conflict environments, and other specific purposes.[27] These exceptions were granted on a case-by-case basis to limit and strictly monitor police training provided to foreign forces. Unfortunately, the issuance of piecemeal exceptions to Section 660 has created an extremely fragmented USG approach to providing effective CT training and assistance to police forces abroad.

Actions to Enhance and Leverage ISF Effectiveness Abroad

The concept of developing, enhancing, and leveraging ISF abroad to combat terrorist groups has numerous unique aspects which impact the types of actions that realistically will be effective. First, transnational terrorist groups operate in decentralized global networks that cut across regional boundaries and USG areas of responsibility. Effective solutions must include the coordination of resources/activities and the sharing of information on a global basis, not just regionally. Second, various types of support must be provided by numerous USG departments to develop and leverage ISF abroad. Effective solutions must address the previously discussed

interagency deficiencies and work to enhance interagency coordination. Lastly, developing ISF should be a long-term strategy in which USG support and information sharing continues for an extended time while ISF incrementally improve. Limited USG resources must be optimized for their best use at the outset and be committed to provide the needed assistance over an extended period. The following proposals work to address these key aspects of developing ISF and should serve as viable actions to combat transnational terrorist groups.

Rescind Section 660 or Approve Exemption for Counterterrorism Training/Assistance

Section 660, the legislative prohibition on training police forces, has created a fractured interagency framework poorly designed to develop and enhance ISF capabilities to combat transnational terrorist groups in key nations abroad. In a situation where DoS and DoJ have insufficient resources to train police forces in CT operations for a given country, DoD (which has significantly more assets and personnel) would not likely be legally able to provide this assistance without a Congressional mandate.[28] These restrictions seriously hinder agencies' abilities to provide CT training and assistance to indigenous police forces based on the best available assets and forces, even though historical evidence shows terrorist groups are best defeated through the use of police forces. Additionally, numerous other safeguards, such as the Leahy Amendment,[29] have been passed to restrict USG support to nations that commit human rights abuses.[30] Ironically, these legislative safeguards negate the overall purpose of Section 660.

Congress should either rescind the legislative prohibition on training foreign police forces or approve an exemption which allows all departments to provide training and assistance to police forces for CT purposes, with strict oversight. Rescinding Section 660 would break down the legislative barriers that have fragmented training and assistance provided to police forces abroad; however, a full repeal of this amendment would be difficult politically. An exemption

for CT purposes would be more politically feasible, but would add to the long list of exemptions already made to this amendment. Either change would allow many more USG resources, particularly those of the DoD, to be made available to develop police forces abroad.

DoD forces are equipped to operate in non-permissive or poor security environments. Also, various DoD forces, particularly special operations forces and military police, are well-suited to provide training in area security, weapons/equipment use, patrol/checkpoint operations, small unit tactics, and other skills critical for an effective CT force. Combining assistance in these areas with core skills sets provided by other departments, such as community policing and criminal investigative procedures by DoJ, would greatly enhance CT assistance provided.[31]

Authority to approve training of police forces for CT purposes should be vested in the DoS, which already has established guidelines for screening human rights records of countries that receive anti-terrorism assistance. The DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor works directly with US missions abroad to ensure countries with "human rights abusers or foreign officials involved in corrupt practices"[32] are not provided assistance.

The coordination of CT training and assistance programs, along with the oversight and assessment of these programs, should be conducted through a separate interagency organization with representation from all of the departments providing CT assistance abroad (including DoS). This interagency organization would match the most appropriate departmental resources and programs to the CT needs of a given country and ensure long-term strategies are implemented to help prevent future human rights abuses by ISF. DoS would remain the authoritative agent determining if countries continue to qualify to receive assistance; however, the oversight of potentially sensitive training and assessment of the impact and effectiveness of programs would be centrally managed through an interagency organization. This interagency organization will be explained in more detail in the following sections.

Counterterrorism Training and Assistance Coordination Group (CTACG)

A Counterterrorism Training and Assistance Coordination Group should be formed to serve as a permanent, interagency working group to coordinate assistance programs and activities of the numerous agencies involved in foreign nation CT training and assistance. The CTACG would act as the coordinating organization to ensure that CT assistance programs and activities are effectively synchronized to best meet national strategy objectives, meet the CT needs of partner nations, and optimize the use of US and international resources. The CTACG would be responsible for: 1) reviewing and prioritizing CT needs of partner nations, 2) setting CT training and assistance priorities, 3) delineating departmental roles and responsibilities in given countries, 4) developing and tracking progress measurements, 5) monitoring use of CT training and assistance funding, and 6) assessing the effectiveness of assistance programs. These responsibilities would not extend into geographic areas of major combat operations or post-conflict, which would likely have specially-established training and assistance coordination organizations (such as for Iraq and Afghanistan). Properly fulfilling these responsibilities would lead to coordinated actions by the departments to fulfill national strategy/guidance and address the main factors that have impeded effective interagency coordination, as discussed earlier.

Since funding for CT training and assistance programs originates from a complex array of accounts of the various departments, the CTACG should also assist in developing joint CT training and assistance funding requests that can be presented to Congress by the respective departments for upcoming budgets. These requests would reflect coordinated plans by the departments, rather than separately developed funding requests that lack integration with other departments. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should have representation in the CTACG to assist in monitoring fund use and developing joint funding plans/requests.[33]

The CTACG would best be created as part of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in McLean, Virginia. Established in 2004, the NCTC acts as the primary USG organization for "integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism . . . [and] serves as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information."[34] More importantly, the NCTC acts as the USG's primary strategic planning organization for counterterrorism.[35] "NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the War on Terror, through a single and truly joint planning process."[36] In the CT planning role, the NCTC acts as a "full-time interagency forum . . . to plan, integrate, assign lead operational roles and responsibilities, and measure the effectiveness of strategic operational counterterrorism activities . . . applying all instruments of national power to the counterterrorism mission."[37] This NCTC mission corresponds directly with the proposed responsibilities of the CTACG, allowing NCTC to serve as an exceptional organizational foundation to house the CTACG.

The Director of the NCTC has a "unique, dual line of reporting: (1) to the President regarding Executive branch-wide counterterrorism planning, and (2) to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) regarding intelligence matters."[38] With the inclusion of the CTACG in NCTC, the Director of the NCTC would be responsible for elevating significant departmental disagreements in CT training/assistance to the President or to the National Security Council (likely via the Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism). This direct connectivity with executive leadership would allow key disagreements to be resolved in a timely manner.

The CTACG would join the disparate agencies together in a common forum and then connect these agencies with embassy country teams resident in nations that receive CT training and assistance. The country teams would be directly involved in the process of selecting, coordinating, and assessing appropriate CT training and assistance programs for their countries.

While security assistance coordination has improved in recent years, US ambassadors have sometimes been unaware of assistance programs being proposed to Congress for approval or programs being actively conducted by other agencies.[39] Country teams' direct involvement in the process through connectivity with a centralized coordination group should alleviate most of these instances.

Additionally, the CTACG would work directly with the eight Strategy Groups that are part of the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), a DoS effort to create flexible regional networks of ambassadors and interagency representatives.[40] Connectivity with these Strategy Groups, which essentially serve as networked country teams, would help to identify regional CT issues and better coordinate assistance programs impacting multiple nations. CTACG processes would also be coordinated with DoD Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) established by Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). Through GCC representation in the CTACG, TSCPs involving CT assistance would be better coordinated with other agencies and with country teams directly impacted by the plans.

Coordination of US CT training and assistance with programs of international organizations and partner nations could be conducted through the CTACG as well. Numerous international organizations have instituted CT task forces or action groups to improve regional and global coordination of CT activities. Such organizations include the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),[41] United Nations (UN),[42] Group of Eight (G8),[43] Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),[44] and Organization of American States (OAS).[45] Improved US coordination through these international organizations and with partner nations possessing well-established CT assistance programs would greatly enhance international capability to leverage resources to improve ISF development in at-risk countries. A centralized US CTACG would significantly enhance collaboration with partners abroad and provide effective coordination and

delineation of appropriate organizational roles/responsibilities through a single focal point versus disparate US agencies.

Of the multiple USG departments, DoD controls the largest amount of resources and personnel. Managing these vast resources effectively for appropriate CT assistance would likely require a special coordinator and lead agency for DoD. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) would best act as the central DOD coordinator, since one of its core tasks is Foreign Internal Defense (FID).[46] Special operations forces specialize at working by, with, and through indigenous forces in austere environments and bring critical expertise to coordinating and implementing ISF development plans.



Figure 2: Organizational Structure to Enhance CT Training and Assistance Coordination

Figure 2 depicts the proposed organizational structure with the implementation of the CTACG to foster effective CT training and assistance coordination. The departments involved in ISF development would provide representation to the CTACG from their respective

organizations that conduct CT training and assistance. The CTACG would coordinate with various international CT organizations involved in ISF development and would operate in the NCTC. The Director of the NCTC reports to the President for CT planning matters and to the DNI for intelligence matters. The Director of the NCTC also coordinates with the Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism.

Improve Information Sharing with ISF

Information sharing is paramount to the effectiveness of a global strategy to combat transnational terrorist groups. Improving USG information sharing has been a top priority of the intelligence community for a number of years.[47] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 specifically assigned NCTC the responsibility of ensuring USG agencies have access to critical counterterrorism information.[48] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) implemented an Information Sharing Strategy specifically to transform the legacy information sharing model from "need to know" to a new mindset of "responsibility to provide."[49] This new approach emphasizes the need to create systems and processes that foster rather than restrict information sharing. Unfortunately, while information sharing between many USG agencies has improved significantly since Sept 11, 2001, information sharing with ISF in partner nations has not meaningfully improved. Current compartmentalized and stovepiped USG information systems continue to inhibit information sharing with key partner nations.[50]

As was discussed in the first section, effectively trained ISF are generally the best suited forces to penetrate and defeat terrorist groups resident in their countries. With knowledge of the local culture, people, language, and terrain, ISF have a marked advantage over outside forces in gathering human intelligence (HUMINT) on terrorist activity. In contrast, the US has a distinct advantage over most countries with regard to access to technologically-based forms of

intelligence such as signals and imagery intelligence. Sharing CT intelligence between partner nations and the US is paramount to success in implementing an effective CT strategy.

The ODNI must work to further improve its information sharing processes and architecture such that USG agencies can provide necessary CT intelligence to enhance the ability of ISF to defeat transnational terrorist groups in their own countries. These improvements should include the streamlining of processes to release CT-related intelligence to partner nations as well as the increased development of compatible information systems accessible by partner nations. Focusing primarily on improving USG information sharing has limited impact on enhancing ISF capabilities abroad. Understandably, improvements in information sharing must be made in steps, and internal USG information sharing still has substantial room for improvement. However, at the same time, more attention must be paid to developing frameworks for improved partner nation information sharing.[51]

Additionally, the NCTC must further improve its information sharing processes so that it can benefit from CT intelligence gained directly from ISF, including foreign law enforcement, constabulary forces, military forces, and intelligence organizations. In fighting transnational terrorist groups, intelligence gained by ISF in one country can be used to locate or exploit cells in other areas. Without an effective framework to share this information, critical CT intelligence could easily be held by partner nation ISF and never be shared with the US or its allies.

DoD has begun some key initiatives to develop secure information networks to assist in sharing CT intelligence. A $6.2 million assistance program was implemented in FY06 with six Trans-Sahara African countries to create "a secure multinational information sharing network [enabling] countries to act on information…to disrupt and attack terrorist networks."[52] Projects such as these must be expanded to more countries. More importantly, effective architectures and processes must be developed to allow effective information sharing with partner nations.

Apply a Global Oil Spot Strategy to ISF Development

Oil spot strategy traditionally applies to a method of countering terrorism and insurgency through providing effective security and stability in an area and then continually expanding that security outwards to neighboring areas, much as oil spots expand outward in porous material.[53] An oil spot strategy to establishing security has proven effective in conflicts in the past. One of the best historical examples is the British Malayan Emergency (1948-1957) in which communist terrorists waged a violent revolt against the Malayan government. British forces trained indigenous security forces and created "oil spots of security" through the establishment of well-policed New Villages, which isolated communist terrorists from their source of power: the populace.[54] Over time, the terrorists were weakened and eventually defeated, leading to the establishment of a stable, democratic government in Malaya.[55]

With respect to combating transnational terrorist networks, oil spot strategy can also be applied to the development of effective ISF worldwide. Terrorist groups thrive in areas of inadequate security where government forces are unable or unwilling to identify, disrupt, or neutralize them. Through a comprehensive strategy of focusing CT training and assistance on countries that can benefit most, security can be improved incrementally on a global basis. As security improves in one country or area, CT intelligence gained through improved security and information sharing can assist in disrupting terrorist activities and improve security in other areas. The CTACG would serve as an excellent forum to optimize limited USG resources and focus CT training and assistance on key qualified countries.[56] The CTACG could also coordinate assistance with international organizations and partners to avoid duplication of effort and match the best CT resources to the associated assistance goals.

"Coordinators for Combating Terrorism" should be placed in embassy country teams to aid in improving interagency coordination and developing ISF in partner nations.[57] These

coordinators would help to enhance agency coordination in-country, assist in assessing CT capabilities and weaknesses of ISF, and improve synchronization between the country team and the CTACG. They would also work closely with embassy security assistance officers to optimize CT training and assistance programs being employed in-country and assess the effectiveness of these programs. Additionally, these coordinators would work in conjunction with legal and defense attachés to develop ties with law enforcement and military intelligence officials in order to foster and develop a strong information sharing relationship. Coordinators may help manage assistance projects to develop electronic CT information sharing networks in-country or may develop an information sharing network through frequent communications with officials to discuss the latest CT intelligence gained. Coordinators could also work directly with international organizations like INTERPOL to enhance CT information sharing. Essentially, these coordinators would serve to ensure security is improving in selected countries (i.e. the oil spots are expanding) and information is being shared to better combat terrorist groups in-country and abroad.

Figure 3 depicts the potential impact of a global oil spot strategy for ISF development coordinated through the CTACG, international organizations, and partner nations. Larger spots denote countries with greater levels of security, which inhibit local terrorist activity. These spots and relationships are only *symbolic* and are not necessarily reflective of actual/predicted security levels or partnerships with any specific countries. The CTACG would coordinate CT training and assistance programs globally with partner nations and international CT organizations. The NCTC would provide the framework to enable information sharing with and between countries.



Figure 3: Potential Increases in Security Levels Through Coordinated Global Oil Spot Strategy

By systematically enhancing ISF counterterrorism effectiveness in various countries, the multiple agencies coordinated through the CTACG and international organizations would help to develop "oil spots" of effective local security across the globe. At the same time, the NCTC could serve to "connect" these spots of security by enabling effective information sharing networks among countries and agencies. With continued assistance, these secure spots would expand and stabilize as security improves, allowing US and other countries' resources to eventually focus on other needed areas. To be most effective long-term, ISF development efforts should be combined with parallel efforts by US/international agencies to improve civil services and economic opportunity in at-risk nations, in order to reduce the root causes of terrorism derived from poverty and inequality. As part of a long-term, multi-faceted approach, an oil spot strategy for ISF development and information sharing could be central to neutralizing many transnational terrorist groups worldwide over time.

Conclusion

Combating and defeating transnational terrorist networks is a top national priority requiring significant, coordinated efforts from numerous USG agencies. While effective policing and intelligence are proven to have the greatest impact on defeating terrorist groups, USG actions to develop and enhance indigenous capabilities in these areas have been hampered by antiquated legislation, ineffective coordination, and fragmented program implementation poorly integrated with national strategy. Significant organizational and legislative changes must take place to empower USG agencies to implement synchronized CT training and assistance programs that effectively develop and leverage ISF worldwide. Rescinding legislation prohibiting the training of foreign police forces, creating a CTACG to coordinate CT training and assistance, improving CT information sharing with partner nations, and applying a global oil spot strategy to ISF development will greatly enhance the capabilities of ISF to combat transnational terrorist groups in their own countries.

With limited means and resources, the US cannot hope to defeat transnational terrorist networks alone. It will take the combined efforts of partner nations and international organizations to isolate and defeat these persistent groups. If USG agencies and international organizations can effectively synchronize their efforts, they will be able to empower many nations to improve security and deny terrorists sanctuary in their countries. Incrementally, the US can help expand "oil spots of security" around the world and develop information sharing networks that connect the spots, allowing multiple countries to benefit from CT information gathered outside of their borders. Future global security will be dependent on how well nations can share and work together to defeat a common enemy.

Notes

[1] Walter Pincus, "CIA Chief: Iraq Not Main Front But Hayden Says Al-Qaeda Remains Greatest Threat to U.S.," *Washington Post*, November 14, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/13/AR2008111303959.html.

[2] Dennis C. Blair, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," February 12, 2009, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.

[3] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 110.

[4] Michael J. McConnell, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," February 5, 2008, http://intelligence.senate.gov/080205/mcconnell.pdf, 6.

[5] See Mark Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 175; Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 125; Thomas Dempsey, *Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 27.

[6] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 19.

[7] Alan Boyd, *Fighting the Global Insurgency*, (May 3, 2007). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IE03Ak03.html.

[8] A 2008 Rand Study assessing how terrorist groups ended found policing to be the "most effective strategy to destroy terrorist groups" with law enforcement agencies responsible for defeating 40% of the 268 terrorist groups that have ended since 1968. See Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 27 & 19.

[9] US Army counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the importance of policing when it states that the "primary frontline COIN force is often the police—not the military." FM 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, Headquarters Department of the Army, 6-19.

[10] National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (September 2006).

[11] The White House, *Agenda-Defense*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/.

[12] While not an optimal security force, militias are sometimes the best option for establishing security and rooting out terrorist networks. See Glenn R. Thomas and Terry Hodgson, "Militias: Is there a role for them in U.S. foreign policy." *Special Warfare*, (November-December 2007),18.

[13] Derived from: U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-03-165 Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat," (May 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031365.pdf. Full descriptions of many of the listed organizations and programs are provided in this GAO report.

[14] Department of State Website, *Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* http://www.state.gov/s/ct.

[15] Numerous reports, including those by State's Office of Inspector General (OIG), have identified extensive staffing and resource problems impeding DoS ability to coordinate CT

assistance. The Deputy Director for S/CT noted that the office lacks the "staff, resources, and authority necessary to meet the national security goal of using [law enforcement agencies] to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists." See U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO 07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," (May 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf, 17-19.

[16] Bruce Pirnie, "Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination," (1998), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1026/, 45.

[17] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO 07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," (May 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf, 21.

[18] Ibid, 29.

[19] TSCTP is a "State-led interagency initiative to assist traditionally moderate Muslim governments and populations in the Trans-Sahara region to combat the spread of extremist ideology and terrorism in the region. The initiative is an integrated, multi-year approach that draws resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. Government, including the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense." U.S. Africa Command, *Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara*, http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp.

[20] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-08-860 Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," (July 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf, 1-3.

[21] Robert Andrews and Mark Kirk, "Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance." (January 2008), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080118-andrews-integrating21stcentury.pdf , 3.

[22] Ibid, 37.

[23] The GAO identified 6 "key elements of strategic plans and interagency collaboration" not identified in US national strategies for foreign nation CT assistance: "common/joint strategy, roles and responsibilities, performance measures, funding, policies to operate across agency boundaries, and mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results." U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO 07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," (May 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf, 17.

[24] Numerous reports and articles highlight the lack of an effective coordination agency for CT assistance abroad: see Ibid, 17; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-08-860 Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," (July 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf, 23-24; Wesley J. Anderson, *Disrupting Threat Finances*, (Florida: JSOU Press, 2008); Heritage Foundation, "The War of Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Developing Law Enforcement," *Backgrounder No. 1720*, (January 22, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/54909_1.pdf ; Nina M. Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

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[25] Center for International Policy. Prohibitions on Security Assistance. (September 2, 2003). http://ciponline.org/facts/eligib.htm.

[26] U.S. General Accounting Office – National Security and International Affairs Division, "GAO/NSIAD-92-118 Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance," (March 1992), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat7/145909.pdf, 1-2.

[27] For a list of police training exceptions to Section 660, see Ibid, 8-11; and Center for International Policy. Prohibitions on Security Assistance. (September 2, 2003). http://ciponline.org/facts/eligib.htm.

[28] In 2007, DoD provided a request to Congress to expand its authority to train police and constabulary forces through Section 1206 financing, provided that DoS grant permission; however, this request was denied by the House Armed Services Committee due to the absence of an "established record of success." See Nina M. Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 14.

[29] The Leahy Amendment is a provision included in the 1997 Foreign Operations bill which "prevents a unit of a foreign security force from receiving U.S. assistance if: [1] Credible evidence exists that the unit's members have committed gross violations of human rights; and [2] Effective measures are not being taken to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice." Center for International Policy, *Prohibitions on Security Assistance,* (September 2, 2003), http://ciponline.org/facts/eligib.htm.

[30] Robert Andrews and Mark Kirk, "Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance." (January 2008), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080118-andrews-integrating21stcentury.pdf , 10.

[31] James Corum of the Strategic Studies Institute recommended an "interagency approach to police training" through the combined training of foreign police by DoJ and DoD personnel (in their respective skills sets) and through highly improved coordination of DoJ and DoD resources. See James Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies,* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 40-41.

[32] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-03-165 Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat," May 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031365.pdf, 107.

[33] A 2008 MIT Security Studies Program recommended that DoD and DoS draft joint budgets for security assistance with oversight by the Office of Management and Budget. See Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, "Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation." June 2008, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/OccasionalPaper6-08.pdf, 73.

[34] National Counterterrorism Center, *What We Do*, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/what_we_do.html.

[35] Ibid.

[36] National Counterterrorism Center, *About the National Counterterrorism Center,* http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html.

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[37] National Counterterrorism Center, *What We Do*, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/what_we_do.html.

[38] National Counterterrorism Center, *About the National Counterterrorism Center*, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html.

[39] A 2007 GAO report highlighted improvement in coordination between DoD and country teams for Security Assistance programs, however in FY07 at least five programs were proposed to Congress by DoD before they were coordinated with the associated country teams. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-07-416R Section 1206 Assistance," (February 27, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07416r.pdf, 17.

[40] The ambassadors and interagency representatives of the RSI collectively "assess the [terrorist] threat, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations." U.S. Department of State, *Regional Strategic Initiaitive*, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/104103.htm.

[41] INTERPOL, *Fusion Task Force*, http://www.interpol.int/Public/FusionTaskForce/default.asp.

[42] United Nations, *Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)*, http://www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml.

[43] U.S. Department of State, *G8 Counterterrorism Actions*, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/45454.htm#g8.

[44] Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, *Counter Terrorism*, http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_economic/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism.html.

[45] Organization of American States, *Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism*, http://www.cicte.oas.org/Rev/En/.

[46] Foreign Internal Defense is "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 April 2004), GL-7.

[47] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy," (February 22, 2008), http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf, 3.

[48] National Counterterrorism Center, *NCTC and Information Sharing - Five Years Since 9/11: A Progress Report*, (September 2006), http://www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf.

[49] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy," (February 22, 2008), http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf, 9.

[50] Based on personal communication with a former member of NCTC.

[51] Some published reports provide worthwhile detailed methods to develop more effective information sharing systems. See Wesley J. Anderson, *Disrupting Threat Finances*, (Florida: JSOU Press, 2008).

[52] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO-07-416R Section 1206 Assistance," (February 27, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07416r.pdf, 25.

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[53] The term "oil spot strategy," also known as *tache d'huile*, is originally attributed to French military commander Joseph-Simon Gallieni, who developed a strategy of establishing security through combined military forces and civil services in the late 1800s. This strategy was meant to foster the spread of civilization like "a pool of oil." See Encyclopedia Britannica, *Guerrilla Warfare*, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/248353/guerrilla-warfare/53111/Counterguerrilla-warfare#ref=ref511680.

[54] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 75 & 98.

[55] Ibid, 103.

[56] CT training and assistance provided would be limited to qualified countries with governments conforming to established standards of human rights and able to prevent corruption in ISF that could lead to human rights abuses.

[57] In a 2007 GAO report, US ambassadors reportedly suggested that a "coordinator for combating terrorism" could help embassies develop law enforcement efforts and integrate LEA capabilities. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO 07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," (May 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf, 33.

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