EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: STONEWALL JACKSON AT CHANCELLORSVILLE: THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA AT THE BURTON FARM

Author: Major Jeremiah D. Canty

I. Thesis: The Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863 and particularly the Flank March and Attack under Jackson served as a metaphor for the operational victories the South gained while at the same time signifying why the South could not hope to win strategically based on a policy of accepting greater levels of risk than its Northern opponent.

II. Discussion: In the spring of 1863 the Federal cause had just recovered from the disasters of the previous year with a resurgent army and leadership. In consonance with the Federal policy of all out attack and relief of command if not successful, General Hooker headed south to try his hand against the nemeses of the North; General Lee and General Jackson. Initially, Hooker was very successful and essentially "turned" Lee's position at Fredericksburg and south of the Rappahannock by maneuvering across the river before Lee could react. Lee, facing defeat in detail as he attempted to hold off two possible Federal thrusts, was galvanized into action that seemed to defy the military principles of the day. Dividing his already heavily outnumbered army Lee attacked the eastern most elements of Hooker's army that was south of the river. The unexpected thrust unnerved Hooker who withdrew back into the Wilderness to fall back on defensive positions in anticipation of further Confederate attacks. Lee and Jackson realized they had no choice but to attack the Federals and decided on yet another division of the army, in further defiance the principles of war. Even though Hooker correctly appreciated Lee's intent he failed to take adequate precautions against a Confederate move from the west. In spite of being observed on several occasions the Second Corps of "Stonewall" Jackson arrived on the flank of the Federal army and delivered one of the most crushing blows of the war. Lee and Jackson's ability to absorb levels of risk that were not feasible for Hooker to accept gave them a distinct advantage over the Federal commander and thus acted as a significant force multiplier. By using tempo to compensate for inferior numbers and to move progressively faster inside Hooker's decision making cycle they achieved a notable success, but one that did not have any great strategic impact.
Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville: The Principles of War and the Horns of a Dilemma at the Burton Farm

United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Conclusion: The relentless pursuit by the Confederacy of operational victories in the hope of forcing the North to give up the attempt at reunion saw its last, but ultimately Pyrrhic victory at Chancellorsville. The predictable assumption of risk would no longer pay off. After Chancellorsville the waging of operational conflict on the margin, that is to say leaving no room for error, came to its predictable conclusion on the fields of Gettysburg two months later.
INTRODUCTION

One of the great debates about the military art has centered around whether great leaders are made or, as the great Marshall Saxe believed, they are born. While unable to positively determine one way or the other, given the present state of knowledge of the human mind, evidence and intuition indicates that certain factors contribute to the effective leading of men in stressful situations such as intense combat. The Marine Corps, like the other services, has demonstrated a clear preference for the analytical method of decision making, which in many ways reflects the American Way of War—the search for a more prescriptive method of arriving at decisions. The challenge of transforming the citizen into the soldier, is the primary cause for the American tendency to conduct war by the numbers. The prescriptive method of war then, is an attempt to reduce the time it requires to turn the inexperienced volunteer or recruit into a veteran, the aim of which is fewer casualties and speedier conflict resolution. This desire to formalize war, through the search for certain fundamental principles on which to build combat insight, goes a long way to explaining the tendency of warriors to fight the next war, at least initially, the same way they fought the last one. Only when the old lessons proved too costly were they rejected, and the whole process began again, using the old war as the base line for the new. As unfortunate as this cycle is, history, and the insight it provides, is one of the most important guide posts for the future. Invariably, history offers some insights, which military institutions distill into principles of war, so general that their utility is often called into question. However, these principles do have worth when templated over case studies in order to examine the decision-making processes in the context of the times those decisions were made.
The Marine Corps has made some progress in the field of behavioral applications to real time, non-analytical decision making in doctrinal publications such as FMFM-1, *Warfighting*. While avoiding formal acknowledgment that certain principles exist, FMFM-1 uses historical examples to illustrate concepts of maneuver warfare that resemble, to a large degree, the old principles of war couched in different terms. The value of a historical perspective, coupled with an analysis of the vicarious experiences of great leaders, provides unique insight into the decision making process.

The opportunity for the American soldier to practice his or her craft in real life is limited, primarily due to the American reluctance and deeply embedded tradition, perhaps even mistrust, to maintain large military forces. The lack of a viable threat close to mainland United States explains to a large extent the United States' historical lack of readiness in times of conflict. This lack of military preparedness manifested itself most strongly in a traditional American reliance on militia and then volunteer forces in all of America's wars up until the present day. The attempt to compromise between the need to maintain a large military commensurate with the nation's status in relation to the world and the fear that a large military structure is inherently dangerous to republicanism, created the American concept of "pooled" expertise. If a large professional officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps could be maintained relative to the number of enlisted personnel, yet to be called up, then in time of war, the nation's ability to tap into its huge industrial and manpower resources would be accomplished with maximum effect on warfighting capabilities with minimum effect on the peacetime social, industrial and political infrastructure. The cadre of officers and NCOs trained with meticulous care in peacetime would then form the nucleus of professionalism around which the vast enlisted
manpower resources formed for combat. Once the war was fought and presumably quickly won, the mass of men were demobilized while the officer corps remained to carry the torch for the next conflict. This tradition created a lopsided weighting of professionally trained officers and NCOs to the raw material needed to perfect the art—the enlisted man. The Prussians, for example, chose conscription and national service as the vehicle to provide their officer and NCO corps "hands on" experience of leadership. The American military in order to compete with a strong cultural distrust and fear of a large military's perceived threat to personal liberty, had to seek an alternative solution to giving their professionals the requisite leadership skills. The solution was to emulate the European model by creating an array of military schools, where a small group of men could be trained to varying degrees in the martial art, and in their turn became the trainers for the great mass, should the need arise.² According to one of Jackson's biographers, Byron Farwell, at the time Jackson attended The United States Military Academy it was more a school that produced "good engineers who were also officers, rather than good officers who were also engineers."³ Modeled after L'Ecole Polytechnique in France the United States Military Academy at West Point reflected, to a large extent, an American military unsure of itself, and a nation unsure of what it wanted of its professional military. Looking for a model, it was natural to select the French military establishment, the perception being that Napoleon Bonaparte had rewritten the book on military science (science rather than art). A fascination with a prescriptive method of war was only to be expected in a young nation that had no real military tradition of its own in the European sense of the word.⁴ The relative newness of the Academy gave it a certain insecurity and this being the case it was only natural to choose from the talent of those that had for so
long laid Europe's finest low. The result was a clear tendency, academically at least, to think about fighting the next war in America as the Napoleonic Wars had been fought in Europe five decades before.

Amidst such ingrained dogma came battlefield decision-making skills that had stood the test of time. Certainly, there was nothing concerning decision making processes analysis that measures up to the standard of today, and yet military genius emerged on both sides in the Civil War. Their experiences and actions still provide insight into the human psyche for the modern warfighter and decision maker. That their decisions can still give utility to the modern decision maker provides testament to the enduring character of the Principles of War. The story of the Civil War generals, epitomized by General Thomas J. Jackson, is one of men taken from a vast array of backgrounds, mostly civilian, with limited military experience, and thrown into the cauldron of war. Tested in war, the ultimate proving ground, these men experienced meteoric promotion, with few years or even months as a soldier, rising from the control of sometimes no more than themselves to the control of tens of thousands of men. The most successful leaders were those like Jackson, who experienced the tempest of war, survived its vagaries, and went on to perfect, as far as possible, the operational art. Two years of intense warfare allowed Jackson to make decisions based on his experiences as to what he and his men could accomplish. As importantly, that same experience base gave Jackson insight into what his opponents could, could not and would, would not do in their attempts to defeat him. To a far higher degree than he is given credit for, Jackson understood (though he would hardly recognize the term) the Clausewitzian concept of friction.
Today it has become fashionable to think in terms of gaining perfect knowledge of the battlefield. In his book *Command in War*, Martin van Creveld cites the lament of Moshe Dayan who longed for the good old days when command on a battlefield was a relatively simple thing, because the commander could look to his right and left and see his host and the enemy's all at the same time and in a quick glance. Of course, even then, certain knowledge of the battlefield did not exist, because the greatest variable in war is not force ratios but rather man's mind. Jackson understood, because he had experienced it, that decision making in modern war was not about the attempt to gain perfect knowledge of the expanding battlefield—it could never be achieved—but rather, to recognize when the critical mass of useful information had been reached, making a judgment and then acting with alacrity on what was surely *imperfect information*. The greatest leader then was one who had the character and will to operate in this environment of uncertainty while others feared to proceed. This then, is Jackson's great gift to the military student. His understanding of the inherent friction in war combined with a powerful will to create a leader in combat who could create a victory where before there was only defeat. General Jackson's greatest skill was to become not the master of the impossible, but rather master of the possible. It was this quality, imperfect at first, but honed to a fine edge by his experiences, that at his moment of greatest glory made Jackson so indispensable to Lee and ultimately the Confederate cause, while contributing to the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. No other Confederate leader, perhaps not even Lee, realized the power of the individual to accomplish the achievable. Jackson knew intuitively as the result of his accrued experience what his men could and could not do, what the enemy was capable of and the measures he would
have to take to ensure, as much as any man could, success on the battlefield. It was this self knowledge, not certain knowledge, that Jackson brought to the bloody fields of Chancellorsville on 2 May 1863, and which so confounded his enemies.

The ultimate utility of using Jackson's actions at Chancellorsville on 2 May 1863 as a model for decision making analysis is that to a large degree, he and the American Civil War serve as a metaphor for the American Way of War, a way of war that many believe is at the end of its usefulness in a world of non-state terrorism and asymmetrical warfare. However, with change comes the realization that perhaps things are not that different after all.
THE SITUATION PRIOR TO CHANCELLORSVILLE

By the spring of 1863 much of the romance of the war was gone. The amateurish execution of Bull Run in the summer of 1861, that reduced the defeated Federal army to a crazed mob intent only on escape while also preventing the disorganized Confederates from conducting an effective pursuit, gave way to the bloody execution of the battles of Shiloh, the Seven Days, Stones River, Antietam, Fredericksburg and others. Now the armies replaced their raw jingoism, amongst both men and officers, with a mixture of burgeoning professionalism salted with pragmatic experience. This gave the battles and skirmishes a particularly sanguinary quality that with increasing frequency rose to crescendos, where men were too proud and stubborn to quit yet not strong enough to endure. The war took on elements of totality, that would have been unthinkable in the first year of the war. Men like Jackson realized this was a fight to the death and were determined to apply all their resources in pursuit of complete victory.7

For the South, early 1863 promised hope amidst an array of disasters that gave an increasingly desperate air to Confederate ventures. The Federal blockade was slowly but inexorably tightening its grip around the South. The Confederacy was being methodically cut into pieces, isolated from itself as Union naval and military power exploited the rivers and railways to dominate the communications networks that were the lifeline of the Confederacy. In the west the Federals captured more and more of the bread basket of Tennessee, while closing in on Vicksburg from both north and south, and threatening to close the Mississippi to the Confederacy altogether. At the same time Federal forces poised for a move against Chattanooga which, if captured, would open up vulnerable avenues of approach into the southern heartland of Georgia. The grinding down of the
Confederate cause in the west was the backdrop for the political and military disasters that the Confederacy had recently had inflicted upon it.

The Antietam campaign, designed to advance the cause of the Confederacy, only acted to compound its difficulties. Instead, strategic defeat, operational stalemate and the burden of heavy Southern casualties were exacerbated by Lincoln's capture of the moral high ground with the declaration of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on 22 September, only 5 days after the disaster at Antietam. In the aftermath of the Antietam campaign many realized there would not be any substantive aid from France and more importantly, none from Great Britain. The stand alone military catastrophe, in my opinion, became a stand alone political catastrophe as well.

On balance, the great, but costly victories for the Southerners in the east were more than offset by Union victories in the western theater and in the political forum. Each new battle, under even the best Southern leadership, only acted to hasten the Confederacy towards its doom. Even conscription, in place in the Confederacy since April of 1862, could not staunch the loss of men as the South continued to hemorrhage away the flower of its armies to sickness, casualties and desertion. Time and again, Federal armies, hurled against the Army of Northern Virginia, were sent reeling back, only to reform under a new leader to try again. Successes to Confederate arms appeared to take on a temporary quality, the overriding sense being that the whole bloody process, in spite of Southern tactical victories, would have to be repeated.

In a seeming paradox however, the desperate situation of the South's military affairs worked to increase the likelihood of Confederate operational victories while their strategic hopes declined. Strategically moribund, the South's lack of long term vision and
inability to focus served to enhance the rewards of extreme risk taking at the operational level. This policy at first negated, and then overrode altogether, the logical strategy for the South of a fighting withdrawal (at least in the east) and defense along interior lines that would have created extreme social and political pressures in the North. By sacrificing ground for time, the South could have extracted from the Union's social fabric a price to high for the North to be successful. Instead, early Southern victories in the east created a false sense that the armies in northern Virginia could always win against the Federal forces. While the Confederate cause evaporated in the west, all hope began to focus on men like Lee and Jackson. Believing their men could accomplish anything, it was only natural for them to think that the seemingly impossible was possible, that their men's courage could compensate for even disastrous mistakes in generalship and that the desperate state of Confederate affairs justified the most outrageous gambles. As a consequence, Confederate generals like Lee and Jackson saw that extreme risk taking was rewarded with dramatic operational victories. However, the victories that resulted also tended to be Pyrrhic. Faced with an enemy of seemingly inexhaustible resources, the Confederacy was driven, over time, to even more extreme gambles in order to push the Union over the edge between continued war and negotiated settlement. They were in a trap. Each success demanded the need for even more dramatic success as the Federal forces became more accustomed to the Confederacy's methods. Strategically bankrupt, but operationally resourceful, the empirical lesson learned for Jackson and Lee was that risk meant victory for the South and that operational victories, if not strategically decisive, at least promised some hope of future sovereignty for the South. Strategically adrift, operationally brilliant, yet increasingly predictable, the litany of glory had to end
somewhere. The result was that the Battle of Chancellorsville was to be the last great Southern success based upon extreme risk taking.

Such was the case in the spring of 1863 as the Army of the Potomac, stealing a march on the Confederates crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, placing the Army of Northern Virginia between a Union force in the west and another in the east.
PRELUDE

General Thomas J. Jackson left the United States Army as a Brevet Major having experienced the trauma of the war against Mexico as part of an volunteer army that was centered around, for the most part, a professionally trained corps of officers. Having survived the travails of Mexico he eventually went back, after a short stint as a peacetime soldier, to civilian life as a professor at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, Virginia. When war came in 1861, Jackson, hitherto an ardent Unionist, became the embodiment of the Southern diehard attitude to the War between the States. Rising quickly in rank, gaining notable and very public successes, Jackson was the cause célèbre of the Southern cause and the implacable foe of the Federals. His remark to Doctor Hunter McGuire as they gazed upon the masses of Union troops at Fredericksburg in December 1862 summed up Jackson's commitment to the Southern cause and the need to, as Jackson put it, "Kill them, sir! Kill every one." Nothing in particular indicated early on that Jackson could rise to command a corps under Robert E. Lee, become that general's most trusted lieutenant and be credited with saving the Confederacy in the dark days of the spring and summer of 1862. Jackson was the hope of the Confederacy because his daring and his managed risk taking created opportunities for the South where none existed before. He struck blow after blow against the Union with tired, ragged and half fed troops that were, for the most part outnumbered and poorly equipped. As the epitome of the underdog none could match Jackson. Jackson's military education was not extensive; about average for the period. Jackson, a major based on his rank at VMI, was promoted to colonel in April 1861 based on his connections and professorship at the Institute, and in a relatively short period of time
Jackson was promoted to Major General. He quickly went from a Major, in charge of a few score cadets, to a general in command of the Army of the Valley and then a large corps. The only criteria for promotion was success, and when the Confederacy reeled under Federal hammer blows in the summer of 1862, Jackson appeared as the sole source of promise for the future.

Because victory in the field was the sole criterion for advancement for men like Jackson, opportunities came fast, but the margin for failure was small and many who started out with Jackson were lost along the way. Jackson made many mistakes, but he always learned from them very quickly, while the intense pressure under which Federal generals fought, at least in the east, often meant they were quickly replaced after any failure.

From every engagement he gained some new insight into his men, himself, his enemy and the Art of War. His short but devastating career can be examined against a backdrop of experiences from which he advanced his knowledge of himself, his commander, his men and his enemies, so that by the time of the Flank March he was at the acme of his operational skills.

But to complete the second part of the metaphor we must recognize that the desperation of the South's situation called for nothing less than audacity in the face of overwhelming Federal resources. Without that element of desperation Jackson, and even Lee, would never have been justified in the risks they took. The very element that denied Union forces and leadership in the east the psychological will to win all or lose all gave to the Confederacy their strongest weapon.
CHANCELLORSVILLE

LEE SURPRISED

On the morning of 1 May 1863 General Robert E. Lee faced his greatest challenge yet. Having been completely outmaneuvered, he faced a Federal army that was across the Rappahannock and was growing in size with each minute while Lee's meager forces were spread very thin. Lee had never been in such danger before but it was for entirely that reason that he and Jackson could be expected to be at their most dangerous.

Having conducted a reconnaissance early on 1 May Lee and Jackson were faced with the prospect of "inglorious retreat" or a stand on ground of Hooker's choosing. When someone among a gathering of Jackson's staff suggested, in light of their predicament, that the Army of Northern Virginia would have to fall back toward Richmond, Jackson characteristically said; "No sir! We shall not fall back! We shall attack them!" Lee decided to stay and fight it out.

On receiving intelligence late on 29 April that the Federal army was crossing the Rappahannock, Lee divided his already small force and dispatched Anderson's division, with McLaws' division in trace, to Chancellorsville. Arriving at Chancellorsville on 30 April, Anderson found that the brigades under Posey and Mahone, assigned to cover the United States Ford had fallen back in the face of vast numbers of Federal troops. Anderson, under orders from Lee to "select a good line and fortify it," fell back approximately three and a half miles to the vicinity of the Zion Church, which sat upon a ridge on the eastern edge of the area known as the Wilderness. The church was between the Orange Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike, about three quarters of a mile from the point where the roads joined before heading east into Fredericksburg.
Anderson's men began to chop trees and dig entrenchments to oppose the Union move east. To assist in what was for that time in the Civil War the novel concept of entrenching, Lee sent engineers to assist in the lay down of defensive positions.\textsuperscript{17}

Hitherto unsure as to where Hooker's main blow would fall, Lee, probably by 30 April but certainly by 1 May, had little doubt that the main attack would come from the north and that the Union forces facing him at Fredericksburg were merely a deception to cover the Federal crossing of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan.\textsuperscript{18} Accordingly, while Lee left Jubal Early to cover the approaches to the high ground west of Fredericksburg, with 9,000 men and 56 guns,\textsuperscript{19} he ordered Jackson west towards Chancellorsville to join the divisions of Anderson and McLaws.\textsuperscript{20}

Jackson's Corps, less Early's division, reached the vicinity of the Zion Church at 0800 on 1 May. Refusing to go on the defense, Jackson immediately stopped the work on the earthworks and abatis and prepared to attack.\textsuperscript{21} By midday Anderson was attacking along the Orange Plank Road and McLaws along the Orange Turnpike, against a far superior enemy force.

That morning, 1 May, Hooker had been full of confidence. Many on the Union side, however, believed that a supreme advantage had been lost on 30 April when the maneuver across the river that caught Lee's Confederates flat footed was not exploited by a continued move east. Instead, the army bivouacked at Chancellorsville. When the Federal army began to move again on the morning of 1 May morale rose anew—until, that is, the meeting engagement with Jackson's men on the Plank Road and the Turnpike.

If the morale of the Union troops and officers was high the same could not be said for General Hooker. Unsure of the number of Confederates he faced\textsuperscript{22} and puzzled by their
aggressiveness, especially against Sykes' division of regulars, who thought they were being flanked, Hooker began to have doubts about the likelihood of success. Dependent upon balloon observation for his distant reconnaissance because his cavalry was off on a raid under General Stoneman, Hooker had no way of confirming the Confederate numbers or the accuracy of the balloonists' observations. Although his army was large, not all of it was south of the Rappahannock/Rapidan river network and though he still had more men across the rivers than Lee's entire army, they were spread over a considerable area. The thought that Lee had gained a local numerical superiority over his forces began to plague Hooker. With the ridge at the Zion church almost in their grasp, and the open fields beyond the Wilderness beckoning, Hooker ordered the Federal forces to fall back on Chancellorsville. With that Hooker surrendered the initiative to Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. At 1330 Union forces started pulling back. When they did, they also did something they certainly did not intend. The Union retreat from near Zion's Church to Chancellorsville uncovered a road that cut into the Plank Road and the Turnpike. The road led to an old iron smelting furnace. It was called the Furnace Road.
THE INITIATIVE GOES TO LEE

As the Federal forces fell back towards Chancellorsville, they began to entrench north from Chancellorsville to the river and, initially south in order to defend against a perceived line of Confederate advance from the east. However, the Confederates of A.R. Wright's brigade began to infiltrate an unfinished railway cut approximately 1 mile south of Chancellorsville that ran east and west, roughly parallel to the Turnpike. This move would have crossed the "T" of a Federal entrenchment going north and south. To prevent an enfilading fire down the entrenchments the Federal line was reoriented so as to run parallel and east to west along the Turnpike. In so doing, this maneuver caused considerable disorientation to the Confederates themselves. In the thickly wooded area, in the heart of the Wilderness it was easy to get disoriented even if the area was somewhat familiar. Based on initial resistance it was natural for Jackson and Lee to make the assumption that the Union line was oriented roughly northeast to southwest with Chancellorsville at the center. This was born out by the general direction, southeast to northwest, of the fighting on the morning and early afternoon of 1 May and the difficulty of conducting adequate reconnaissance in the thick undergrowth.

Accordingly, Jackson and Lee believed that the Union right flank was beyond Hazel Grove to the southwest, not along the Turnpike and Plank road west of Chancellorsville. In the meantime Jackson and Lee were puzzled by the sudden retirement of Hooker's forces towards Chancellorsville. Unbeknownst to either of the Confederate leaders Jackson's precipitate attack on the morning of 1 May unnerved Hooker, causing him to re-evaluate his courses of action and seek the protection, as he viewed it, of the Wilderness. Regardless, Lee tried to find a way to hurl the Union army back across the
river. The next series of pushes towards the Federal lines by the Confederate forces met ever increasing resistance as the Army of the Potomac attempted to pull back to the vicinity of Chancellorsville.

While the struggle along the pikes continued, Jackson, ever mindful of his commander's intent, sought a way to reconnoiter the situation with a view to attacking. Seeing that the Confederate cavalry were halted in the vicinity of the Catherine Furnace, Jackson persuaded General Stuart to accompany him on a reconnaissance in the direction of the southern cavalry near the furnace and to bring some guns into play against the suspected Federal positions that were near the furnace. With a sizable portion of their staffs the two generals proceeded down the road toward the Union positions. The undergrowth in some places limited visibility to 30 yards. In addition to the possibility of coming across Union skirmishers, Jackson and Stuart both became targets for masked Federal batteries. The large party, making a considerable racket, was quickly and accurately engaged by the Northern artillery, inflicting several casualties among the personnel in Jackson's and Stuart's party.

The danger cut the reconnaissance somewhat short. Other reconnaissance, on the other hand, had better luck, less casualties and were more effective. The determination was that Hooker's position centered around Chancellorsville, went north to the vicinity of the United States Ford, and west two miles from Chancellorsville along the Orange turnpike.

By now night was approaching and as the fighting for the day faded away, Lee took stock and halted his men in line of battle perpendicular to the Plank Road with his left in the vicinity of the Catherine Furnace and his right reaching toward the Mine Road.
Reconnaissance was continuous. Fitzhugh Lee, with a brigade of cavalry and two guns, had spent his afternoon "feeling" for the Federal outposts to the west. Around 1600, after putting some shots into the vicinity of the Carpenter Farm, Fitzhugh Lee's men were unceremoniously driven off by a Federal regiment from Howard's XI Corps. Combined with the bloody reconnaissance of Stuart and Jackson, Fitzhugh Hugh Lee's sortie west and General Robert E. Lee's last impression of where his men were formed in relation to the day's combat, it is clear that Lee and Jackson concluded that the Union right flank was west or west-north-west of the Catherine Furnace. This would place the Federal position, in Lee's and Jackson's minds, in the vicinity of Carpenter's Farm or the junction of the Brock Road and the Orange Plank Road, making the Union line run roughly parallel to the Confederate line. By now the sun had set and Jackson's Second Corps went into bivouac on or near the Plank Road in the vicinity of Aldrich's Tavern. With this the substantial fighting stopped for the day and, around 1900, Jackson and Lee, met "at a spot where the road to the Catherine Furnace turned southeastward from the Plank Road."
THE RECONNAISSANCE

The situation at the close of the fighting on 1 May 1862 was this. Having been outmaneuvered by Hooker, Lee's army was divided in the face of a vastly superior force. The Army of Northern Virginia was effectively sandwiched between two strong Federal forces: that of Hooker to the northwest and by Sedgwick's Corps to the east opposite Fredericksburg. To meet this contingency Lee had divided the Army of Northern Virginia into two parts both separated by a considerable distance. But then, Hooker's army also was widely separated. The western wing of the Army of the Potomac had come dangerously close to clearing the Wilderness--the tangled undergrowth acting as a force multiplier for the outnumbered Confederates--and reaching the more open ground to the east which would suit the Federal masses more than the confines of the woods.

The danger to the Army of Northern Virginia was serious. The chances of being destroyed in detail were high. A retreat to the south, with its effect on Southern morale, was a disastrous notion that Lee could not realistically contemplate. The logic of the situation demanded that Lee either attack Hooker's entrenchments or retreat toward Richmond, either of which could be considered a victory for the Federal army. Neither was time on Lee's side, because every minute that passed meant Hooker got stronger while Lee's available options, already narrow, diminished even further. Lee's only option, as he saw it, was to attack Hooker's army. The only question remaining was how were Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to get at the enemy.38

Jackson, lucky to still be alive after leaving several members of his and Stuart's staff dead or wounded in the vicinity of the Catherine Furnace, was coming around to the idea that further attacks in the same direction that they had already proceeded that day would
be prohibitively costly. But that did not deter the single mindedness of the two men that the enemy must be attacked somewhere. Reflecting on the situation, Lee was heard to say aloud, "How can we get at those people?" To which Jackson supposedly answered, "You know best. Show me what to do, and we will try to do it." The deliberations continued as the results of an earlier reconnaissance of the Federal left, ordered by Lee, came in. The results were not promising and confirmed a reconnaissance he had himself performed earlier. The Federal forces there, under Meade, had skillfully entrenched themselves along the Mineral Springs Road with the Mineral Springs Run in front. Even though Lee had wanted to attack the Federal left in order to cut the Federals off from the United States Ford, an attack there would be extremely costly. In spite of the experience of Jackson's earlier staff ride Lee still entertained the thought that an attack to the front down the Orange Plank Road and the Turnpike might still be executable. While Lee and Jackson essentially discounted the frontal attack they ordered still another reconnaissance of the Federal positions to the front toward Chancellorsville, even though Jackson believed the Federals would be back across the river by the morrow. Regardless, around 2000 Lee ordered T.M.R. Talcott, an aide, to conduct a reconnaissance of the lines. Lieutenant James Boswell, a Jackson staff member, volunteered to go with Talcott on the mission. The mission took two hours and confirmed that another attack down the same roads as the day's attack was not practical. Even though Talcott asserts that the two generals had not yet determined upon a flank attack, it is clear that from very early on their options were shrinking. Officers arrived all the time with a continually expanding vision of what the battlefield looked like to the west. At the same time Talcott and Boswell were briefing Lee and Jackson of their
reconnaissance, Fitzhugh Lee arrived\textsuperscript{46} with news that he had found the Federal left wing "in the air."\textsuperscript{47} This information, based as it was on Fitzhugh Lee's earlier clash with Federal units from the vicinity of the Carpenter Farm, was incorrect. The darkness, the wildness of the woods and the confusion from the earlier combat gave the cavalryman a false impression of where the Federal's right flank was.\textsuperscript{48} Fitzhugh Lee "represented the Federal right flank as resting somewhere in the angle formed by the Orange Plank Road and the Brook Road."\textsuperscript{49}

What was even less clear at that moment than the location of Hooker's right flank was a route to get around the supposedly exposed flank of the Union army. Therefore, the only courses of action by 2200 on 1 May, when Talcott and Boswell returned from their reconnaissance, were either to retreat or now to launch a flank attack on, or turning movement of, the Federal right wing.
THE PLAN

With a frontal attack and an attack against the Federal left wing out of the question, all hope for victory turned on attacking the Federal right. The problems were that the available maps of the area were not very good,\(^5^0\) and the locals in the Army of Northern Virginia did not appear to have good recall of their old stomping grounds.\(^5^1\)

Rudimentary maps of the area were made, while Lee and Jackson talked to locals see if a way could be found by the local roads to get behind Hooker's army. Reverend Dr. Lacy, chaplain in Jackson's Corps, who was from the local area, told Lee and Jackson that troops could be taken around the Federal right by way of the Wilderness Tavern.\(^5^2\)

Combined with the presumption of Fitzhugh Lee as to the whereabouts of the flank "in the air," this convinced Lee to execute what is known to posterity as the Flank March. In fact it began, at least in Lee's own words, as a turning movement.\(^5^3\) Stuart was dispatched to elaborate on the nature of the terrain, as was Hotchkiss, Jackson's topographical engineer.\(^5^4\)

The situation for the Confederate commanders was complex and fraught with risk. Their primary concerns were threefold. First, the army, small as it was, and already divided,\(^5^5\) would have to be divided once more, an evolution seemingly in violation of the principle of war known as mass. Secondly, and directly resulting from the first consideration, was the security of the force as it moved through the woods until it was behind the army of Hooker. The last consideration, tied to the first two, was the length of time that the force would be conducting the march and thereby exposing the Army of Northern Virginia to destruction in detail.
Various agents were sent out and about in order to find suitable roads for the attack. Jackson, now certain he was given the mission, said to Lee, "My troops will move at four o'clock."\(^{56}\)

Because Jackson, and most of the Confederate officers except Lee believed Hooker's army would be gone in the morning,\(^{57}\) Lee authorized what would be termed in modern parlance a "reconnaissance by fire," to determine if the Federals were still in the vicinity the next day.\(^{58}\) The proximity of the route for the flank march to the Federal positions clearly bothered Jackson, and when he was working out the route in more detail he remarked that the route so far proposed was observable to the Federals or actually went inside their picket lines.\(^{59}\) The route that Lacy was familiar with went from Catherine Furnace, directly due west to the Brook Road. (The route was used the next day by the Confederate cavalry to screen the movement of Jackson's Corps and keep the Federal pickets back).\(^{60}\) Jackson was not completely satisfied with this but, an indication that he was preparing at least mentally for the flank march, was the recall of Wright's brigade at about 2300 into a position near the Catherine Furnace, presumably to cover the route of march as it passed that exposed position.\(^{61}\)

The time was unclear, but Jackson went to sleep apparently still unsure of the details, while Lee, waiting for Stuart and presumably Hotchkiss, stayed up poring over maps, attempting to refine the course of action.\(^{62}\) To reduce exposure time for the column and to give it more time with which to effect the attack, Lee sought information about a shorter route around to the rear of the Federal flank from Dr. Lacy.\(^{63}\) At daybreak, (0514 according to Turner's Almanac for 1863)\(^{64}\) Jackson woke up Hotchkiss\(^{65}\) and told him to go to the Welford house to use Mr. Welford, a local, as a guide if required. On talking to
Welford, Hotchkiss discovered that Welford had recently constructed a haulage road through the area, and that troops could be moved along it all the way to the vicinity of the Wilderness Tavern, if required. The haulage road roughly paralleled the Brock road as it veered northwest of the Furnace road toward the Orange Plank Road. This was important because at the point where the "Private Road," as Hotchkiss called it, went northwest the corresponding portion of the Brock Road was observable to Union forces at Fairview and at the Carpenter Farm (The Confederates still being believing that Federals were there at the farm) while the "Private Road" was not. With this information about the "Private road," Jackson, who had been harassing the good Dr. Lacy for even more details about the proposed route, now had enough information with which to act. With Hotchkiss's map before them, Lee laid out the plan to hit Hooker in the rear. Jackson stated his intention to execute the mission with his whole Corps, leaving Lee with only Anderson's and McLaws' Divisions to hold off any Federal thrusts toward Fredericksburg or to thwart attempts to cut Jackson' column as it moved west. Orders for movement were issued, with the heavy trains to make their way via the Catharpin Road to Todd's Tavern and then proceed north, while the main body, with the artillery, was to move via the route covered by Stuart's cavalry to the attack position. The divisions of Anderson and McLaws would prevent the Federals interdicting the column as it marched, while also preventing the Federals from attempting to join up with Sedgwick's Corps near Fredericksburg. Lee approved the plan, and Jackson, well past the intended movement time of 0400, began issuing his orders for the movement.
THE FLANK MARCH

The order of march had Rodes' division in the lead followed by Colquitt's with A.P. Hill's division bringing up the rear. A total of 112 pieces of artillery from all sources were to go on the march, with the whole column covered by Stuart's cavalry screening to the north. Jackson had under his command 31,000 men and 112 guns. To hold the Confederate center and right Lee had approximately 13,000 men and 24 guns. A passage of lines between Jackson's men and the men of Anderson and McLaw's divisions took place at an early hour, while the reconnaissance by fire, authorized the previous night, confirmed Lee's judgment that the Federals were still there. However, the resulting delay of several hours for the conduct of the reconnaissance by fire robbed Jackson of valuable daylight, daylight that may have meant the difference between a Pyrrhic victory and a decisive one. At 0800, 2 May, much later than expected, the column snaked its way toward its objective, starting from just east of the Catherine Furnace. At the furnace Jackson ordered the 23rd Georgia to provide flank security and deny the Federals any opportunities to cut the column. The commander, Col. Best, was given the authority to detach any units from the column deemed necessary to accomplish his mission.

The pace of the march, as usual for any of Jackson's enterprises which hung precipitately between disaster and glory, was furious. The distance to cover from the vicinity of Aldrich's Tavern, Rodes' starting point, to the Line of Departure was 11 miles.

The day was oppressively hot and many fell on the roadside from exhaustion. Gen. Jackson rode up and down the column telling "the boys" that every moment was a fortune and they rushed forward throwing away blankets, knapsacks everything but their guns and ammunition. I blessed my stars that i (sic) had a horse to ride. I passed hundreds on the roadside perfectly unconscious, and poured water on the faces of many who never knew when they received assistance. Many must have died from sunstroke.
Always conscious of the cost of straggling, Jackson, who according to Captain and Assistant Adjutant General James P. Smith was the master of marching, had issued his famous General Order Number 26, dated 13 April 1863. "On the march, the troops are to have a rest of ten minutes each hour. The rate of march is not to exceed 1 mile in 25 minutes, unless otherwise specially ordered." The problem of straggling was so worrisome that Henderson states that orders were issued for stragglers to be bayoneted on the spot. And plenty of opportunity to straggle there would be in a column that was 10 miles long from head to tail and would take 4 hours for the column to pass a point.

Conditions could certainly have been worse than they were. A recent rain made the ground soft which also prevented the huge column, marching four abreast, from sending up telltale clouds of dust from which the Federal observers could mark its progress. The length of the column meant that the "accordion effect" would sap much of the men's strength, an effect whose repercussions were exacerbated the further to the rear of the column an individual was.

The march was not under way very long, about one hour, before the long column was spotted by many in the Federal camp, including Hooker, crossing the Union front, heading east to west. By 0930 Hooker transmitted a message to General Howard, commander of the XI Corps on the Federal extreme right, warning him that Confederates were moving west and that he should prepare his defense accordingly. Hooker guessed, based on his knowledge of Lee, that a retreat did not make sense, and that an attack was imminent. Even when Jackson's trains turned south on the Furnace Road and it looked as though the Confederates were in retreat, Hooker stated aloud, "It can't be retreat; retreat without a fight? that is not Lee. If not retreat, what is it? Lee is trying to flank
me." Even with this remarkably accurate insight into his enemy, Hooker was unable to instill in Howard or himself the requisite sense of urgency to enable his subordinate to adequately prepare for the onslaught that was to come. Lee through Jackson had gotten inside Hooker's decision cycle. That a sense of urgency was all that was required is evident from the fact that Howard sent a message to Hooker at 1050 stating that the Confederates could be seen along a ridge to the south that paralleled the XI Corps position along the road, and that Howard was preparing to receive an attack from that direction--preparations that were of course, of only the most desultory nature. Sickles at least correctly gauged the danger, if only because he reasoned that the movement, seen by so many in the Federal army, could as easily be an attack on the flank as a retreat toward Gordonsville. Sickles requested permission to attack the vulnerable column, and at noon he received authority to conduct what can best be described as a cautious attack upon the column. The Union attack, though dilatory, drove down towards the furnace so successfully that Lee was forced to dispatch a brigade to resist Sickles' effort while the rear cavalry party of Jackson's column called for infantry reinforcements to hold the road until the column's artillery trains were clear. The Northern attack drove the marching Confederates off the road east of the furnace and forced the Confederates to improvise a rough road through the woods for the trains. But most importantly, Jackson did not miss a step, demanding of himself and his men that they press on in spite of this incursion into their rear. A lesser general might have hesitated to drive on towards the objective given the disconcerting circumstances of an attack on the rear of his column. Unfortunately for the Union cause however, Sickles' attack was too little, too late. By the time the Sickles attack was in full swing the majority of Jackson's Corps had
passed and with it the chance to punish Lee and Jackson for their predisposition for
extreme risk. Additionally, Sickles, in order to cover any gaps on his flanks as he moved
south, requested the support of a brigade from Howard's Corps. Barlow's brigade,
considered the best in the corps, and hitherto the corps reserve positioned on the far
right, was, with some reservation on Howard's part, sent to assist Sickles' move. This
move at once created a salient in the Union position, while simultaneously weakening
Howard's corps at just about the moment when the hammer was to fall in the west.
Meanwhile, when the Confederate cavalry, screening the northern flank of Jackson's
force, reached the Plank road, the hitherto perceived axis of the Confederate attack, they
intuitively turned north in the belief that they were tracking behind the Federal positions.
Instead, having proceeded down the road some distance they realized that the Federal
works were in front of them and that the flank they sought to turn was actually some
unknown distance still to the west. Fitzhugh Lee went to the Burton Farm and
surveyed the scene. The Federal right flank, only partially extended to the north, was not
anchored on any defensible piece of terrain, nor was it refused. The position, not
covered by defensive works of any substance, only went north about 500 yards, and thus
was "in the air." Fitzhugh Lee, nearly right this time, reported immediately to Jackson,
who was at the front of the column encouraging his men on, and guided him to the top of
a hill in the vicinity of the Burton Farm. From this position, Jackson realized his hopes
were gone of cutting in behind the Federals and turning the flank along the axis of the
Plank Road. The best he could hope for, whether he knew it at that point or not, was a
flank attack and for that, time was rapidly running out. Jackson committed to the
westward movement and the Confederate column crossed the Plank Road, while the
Stonewall Brigade, some artillery and cavalry were detached to take up positions to screen and guard the northern flank of the column from the Federals.\textsuperscript{105}

The column continued its advance west even as the fight at the Catherine Furnace reached its climax and Lee's diversionary attack in the east pressed the Federals' left and center.\textsuperscript{106} The column continued to be observed by the XI Corps and many others.\textsuperscript{107}

Regardless, Rodes' division turned onto the Turnpike off the Brock Road at about 1400\textsuperscript{108} and marched east, toward the Federal positions in the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern. At 1500, along the Turnpike, in the vicinity of Luckett's Farm, Jackson penned his last message to Lee as his first division began to form for the attack.\textsuperscript{109} The wording of the message indicates that Jackson believed the Federals had fallen back from the position he and Lee had supposed was the Federal right flank in the morning, that is, somewhere in the vicinity of the "V" formed by the juncture of the Orange Plank Road and the Brook Road, or near the Carpenter Farm.\textsuperscript{110} The lead division had plenty of time to form and the first of what was intended to be three lines of battle began dressing at 1430,\textsuperscript{111} the rest of the time between then and the attack being spent standing on their arms waiting for the other units to arrive.\textsuperscript{112} Orders were issued that there was to be no cheering or discharging of fire arms,\textsuperscript{113} though the heavy skirmishing line was already fighting as various Federal units came out to investigate the various reports of sightings.\textsuperscript{114} The double lines spread north and south of the road, a mile on either side,\textsuperscript{115} taking anywhere from one to one and three quarter hours per division to form.\textsuperscript{116} The distance between the lines, intended no doubt to give some shock value to the inherently more unstable line formation, was probably 150 yards,\textsuperscript{117} a compromise between the need for shock and rapid support, against the desire to ameliorate casualties.\textsuperscript{118} That the Confederates were
discovered long before the attack took place, as was inevitable with so many Southerners sitting on their arms so close to the enemy, can not be doubted. Indeed, Jackson was so concerned about betraying his position anymore than it was, that he ensured his skirmish line was particularly heavy to prevent men leaving the ranks or deserting and further warning the Federals. Besides the forces arrayed to the Federal's west, the Stonewall Brigade was still in position on the Plank Road with a cavalry screen thrown forward of them about three quarters of a mile. A.P. Hill's division was arriving on the battlefield, steadily but slowly as a result of the skirmish at the Catherine Furnace. The first line, from north to south, consisted of the brigades of Iverson, O'Neal, Doles and Colquitt; all in Rodes' division and totaling some 7,800 men in a double rank. The last brigade from Rodes' division, Ramseur's, formed the right flank of the second line. The rest of the second line was made up of Colston's division with two brigades under Warren and Jones. The third, partially formed and still forming line when the attack started, was made up from Nichol's brigade, Colston's last, and the first of A.P. Hill's under Heth and only formed north of the Turnpike. The 23rd North Carolina of Iverson's brigade formed a line parallel to the Turnpike and perpendicular to the Second corps in order to prevent surprise from the north. Finally the 2nd Virginia Cavalry screened Jackson's Corps to the north beyond the 23rd North Carolina. A strong skirmish line was flung 400 yards ahead of the main body. Therefore, the Second corps was about to kick off its attack with one third of its force, and the preponderance of Hill's division--three brigades--still marching toward the jump off point. The result was that Jackson would begin the attack on the Federals to the east with about 20,000 men.
Jackson's orders were typically specific. In addition to the security measures already taken, Jackson, understanding that momentum was all important, told his brigade commanders that if they ran into heavy resistance they were authorized to draw on reinforcements from the following brigades without going through divisional commanders. Only if resistance was extremely stiff was a pause allowable and then only to allow the artillery to come into play. Under no circumstances was the attack allowed to break down. Once the Union forces began to fall back, they were to be pushed from one position to another, collapsing any Federal attempt to stem the tide by their own mass of panicked humanity. The enemy Jackson feared now was time. The sun would set at 1846. The men had to cover a half mile through thick scrub just to carry the first Federal works. From there it was another mile to Dowdall's Tavern, all of which would be strongly opposed by the enemy and/or the inherent friction in war. To attempt to go further, to the fords over the Rapidan or the Rappahannock, as was clearly his intent judging by his orders to Stuart and subsequently to Hill, would be beyond the capabilities of anyone, perhaps even in the daytime never mind the night. The extra two miles of marching to get into position from the Plank Road, the late start and the need to wait for Hill's division to catch up proved fatal to Confederate designs. As the skirmishing grew heavier to the front, Jackson realized he could not wait any longer. He needed all the daylight he could get and with or without Hill he prepared to launch the attack.
Map Reproduced from:
John Bigelow Jr., *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*.
(New York: Smithmark, 1995), Map 17.
THE ATTACK

With Rodes' division in the vanguard, Colston's following and Hill's not yet deployed for battle, Jackson turned to Rodes and uttered, "Are you ready?" When Rodes answered in the affirmative General Rodes gave the signal to his men and amidst some initial confusion the whole mass of over 18,000 men lurched forward on one of the most famous attacks in the history of war.

The unsuspecting Federals that faced to the west were echeloned right from south to north over a frontage of perhaps 500 yards, aligned on the road and numbering in total perhaps 5,000 out of a total corps strength of 11,000. Consequently the Confederate mass, approaching at right angles, overlapped their position on both sides, but most importantly on the northern side where they were not tied into any substantial terrain feature. The appearance of Jackson's Corps sparked a fledgling Union resistance, the warning of the approaching men being sufficient to allow defensive positions to be occupied, but the fact that the XI Corps was continually overlapped by the broad front of the Confederate battle line meant any stand was only temporary. It is doubtful that any corps in the Army of the Potomac would have stood up to the crushing blow that befell Howard's men. The ferocity of the attack paralyzed many of the officers who saw the line approach and initially resistance turned to panic among some elements in the XI Corps.

However, with or without officer help the line of Union resistance stiffened as the Confederate advance reached its culminating point, and as the attack met fresh elements from adjacent Union units dug in on earthworks. Confederate forces, especially the
first two lines, began to intermingle amidst the confusion of battle, and intuitively sought operational pauses, the whole effort exacerbated by approaching darkness.

Two key delays may have confounded Jackson's plan. The first was a mistaken delay by Colquitt, despite Jackson's very explicit orders to the contrary, regarding stopping the attack. Colquitt's hesitation at a crucial moment because he mistook Confederate cavalry or a thin line of Union skirmishers for a Federal counterattack on his right flank, essentially removed 13 regiments or 5000 men from the extreme southern flank of Jackson's line for nearly one hour. Therefore, the Second corps carried through the attack--already trailing Hill's corps--minus Colquitt's brigade which, in turn, blocked Ramseur's men in the second line from passing. To compound the problem Colquitt moved some of his men by the right flank to cover the non-existent threat he perceived there which only served to block in Paxton's Stonewall brigade which was positioned along the Plank Road. In total then, Jackson probably executed the attack, at least initially, with around 13,000-14,000 men, less than half of the men he took on the march. What Colquitt should have done was to continue the attack in compliance with Jackson's orders. Instead the delay allowed Federal soldiers to retreat further east to consolidate their defenses when they should have been cut off by the far right of Jackson's line which moved over more favorable ground and against less enemy resistance.

The second "Fatal Delay," with XI Corps quickly fracturing before the gray onslaught and hopes for Union reinforcements reaching the scene in time to save the line looking bleak, came when Colston and Rodes persuaded Jackson to stop the advance and reorganize. The usual reasons were cited for the need to stop. After the long march and struggle through the undergrowth in the face of growing resistance, the men were
exhausted, tired and disorganized. Jackson, perhaps uncharacteristically, allowed the halt. At the moment the stop was made Sickles' corps was in danger of being cut off from the main Federal force as Jackson's men threatened to cut the Union III Corps line of retreat. Had the Confederates been able to continue the attack a substantial portion of the Union army could have been isolated in a salient south of the Plank Road.

Three other factors militated against a Confederate success that might have swept the Federals away from the fords and allowed Jackson's men to trap the Union forces on the south side of the river. The first was the difficulty of conducting night operations during the Civil War. The command and control system was visual, and, though some attacks would be successful at night later in the war, night attacks in the Civil War were for the most part overwhelmingly confusing in an age where commander's intent rarely permeated peoples actions, least of all when someone like Jackson was involved. The second factor that doomed the Flank Attack to enter the annals of history's Pyrrhic victories was that this was not the same amateur Federal army that ran at Bull Run. The days of the Army of the Potomac running from the field were over. This tendency to resist was compounded by the fact that as Federal elements fell back they fell back on constructed defense works of increasing strength and on men who were increasingly less affected by the initial shock of the attack. Finally, the reason the attack did not achieve more than local success was the infeasibility of reaching the fords and trapping the Federal army. Having performed demanding feats of endurance and courage the Confederates arrived too late to roll back the Federal forces sufficiently to uncover the fords. Delays for the reconnaissance by fire, delays by Colquitt, Rodes and Colston and delays caused by having to march another two miles to reach the jump off point.
foredoomed the enterprise to accomplish less than it might otherwise have. The distance to Ely's Ford from Chancellorsville was at least 5 miles and from Chancellorsville to the U.S. Ford another 4 miles. To reach these positions after all the men had been through, at night, given the difficulties of command and control, even if they could have found the fords, was impossible. At worst the Federal army would still possess one ford at least, and would fight on ground they knew, taking benefit of defensive works to inflict appalling casualties on Lee.\textsuperscript{138} The Confederate attack ran out of steam due to time, distance and resistance. Though individual units might be beaten the Federal army was sound and strong, and though generals could be beaten, this was something the Federal Army in the east was familiar with and as a result could cope with. There were no more cheap victories.

In a desperate attempt to reorganize his confused lines and effect a divisional passage of lines by moving Hill's men through Rodes' division at night, Jackson was wounded by his own men, ironic testimony to the difficulty of what he was attempting to do.
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND JACKSON'S FLANK
MARCH SIMPLICITY

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.\textsuperscript{139}

Considering the apocalyptic effect that the attack had upon the Army of the Potomac it is worthwhile to note how very simple Jackson's and Lee's plan was. The simplicity of the plan, in the face of heavy odds, contributed significantly to the plan's success, allowing Jackson to exhibit great flexibility when he realized that the Federal flank was not where he supposed it to be.

Using one element to hold or fix the Federals in place in the east while a large body of the army moved west meant that there were few moving parts and therefore less likelihood of failure due to misunderstandings and confusion. The fact that the whole body of men moved essentially as one along the Brock Road, enabled Jackson to maintain tight control over the force and keep the situation uncomplicated. Along the route of march Jackson only had to concern himself with the location of the lead and rear unit instead of trying to coordinate the movement of separate columns, except of course the heavy trains along the Catharpin Road. Only detaching forces to prevent interdiction of his column at the Catherine Furnace and in the vicinity of the Burton Farm retained for Jackson complete control because his command and control system contained few layers with which to coordinate. In modern command and control parlance Jackson's system was "flat."

At the Burton Farm Jackson was presented with a dilemma which gave him several options. The first was to attack down the Orange Plank Road obliquely into the Federal
line. This would mean an oblique attack into the prepared Federal breastworks in a
location where, even if surprised, they would have time to man the defenses and inflict
severe if not disastrous casualties on the Confederates. Even though this option would
have saved Jackson valuable time he rejected it as too costly. Another option was to
leave a division, Hill's,140 at the junction of the Brock Road and the Orange Plank Road
while the rest of the corps continued west. By some prearranged signal the two wings of
the separated corps would attack from west and south west simultaneously. This option
too was rejected. A converging attack was very difficult to conduct under the best of
circumstances, and still is even today. During the Civil War the difficulty was magnified,
primarily because of the command and control problems associated with operating
separate units aimed at a common goal with converging fires.141 The likelihood of
friendly fire hitting other Confederate forces would have been very high and the lateness
of day, even then, must have been on Jackson's mind. Even if Hill's division did join in
successfully with the attack along the Orange Plank Road, in order to follow the attack
the division would have to pivot right upon its right flank to realign itself with the main
attack axis along the Turnpike. Further, Jackson's attack from the west was a mile north
of the Turnpike and would have collided with a force positioned on the Plank Road, as
happened with the Stonewall Brigade.142 A converging axis night attack for Jackson had
disaster written all over it.

The last option, and the one chosen, was to leave the Stonewall Brigade with a body of
cavalry to screen the column's movement and then have them join the attack after it
passed to their front from west to east along the turnpike. Even though Hill's division
was left out of the attack, the simplicity of using a single axis attack was the best given
the traditional difficulty in coordinating the attacks from different axes. Hill's division was subsequently used as a reserve and exploitation force. Because "simplicity is especially valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired," and Jackson and his men were reaching the end of a long tiring march after combat the previous day, Jackson used simplicity as a force multiplier that focused his attack on the weakest part of the Federal line. The corps in column and divisions in line along a road axis eased the command and control problems immensely and allowed brigade commanders to draw on reinforcements when they needed them. The simplicity of the plan could have allowed the execution to continue unabated even with the loss of Jackson.
OBJECTIVE AND UNITY OF COMMAND

Direct every Military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.144

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.145

Lee's objective was to force the Union Army back across the Rappahannock. Given the strength of Hooker's position in broken, heavily wooded terrain, a flank attack—the alternative being retreat or frontal attack—was the most logical solution. In this manner Lee's numerically inferior army could fall as a locally superior force upon the weaker Federal flank. That Jackson and Lee together derived the who, the what (perhaps), the where (approximately) and the when between them is clear, but the how was left up to Jackson.146 The why, given their predicament, was also all too clear. Unfortunately it appears that the what, even if Lee and Jackson understood it between themselves, did not make it to the subordinates of Jackson's staff with the same imperative or clarity of vision that Jackson had received from Lee.

The plan was daring—it had to be—and that certainly gave Jackson a measure of leverage should he encounter with unknowns or unforeseen variables along the way. If the amount of unforeseen circumstances that are successfully overcome to accomplish the objective are indications of the understanding of that objective and the strength of the unity of command then Jackson and Lee must get high grades. The first of these unforeseen variables was Sickles' attack on the rear of his column near the Catherine Furnace. Jackson's determination to carry on with the march, and not be distracted by the Union attack, indicates great force of will, born of a clear understanding of the objective
to be achieved and great trust in Lee and his concept of unity of command to accomplish what needed to be done to ensure safe passage of the Second corps. Another of these variables cropped up at the Burton Farm when Jackson realized that the Federal flank was somewhere other than where he had envisioned it to be. Jackson believed that the Federal army had retreated from the vicinity of Carpenter's Farm, pivoting about Chancellorsville, north to the road, as his 1500 message to Lee makes clear. Not deterred, Jackson had enough latitude in his orders to proceed further north in the attempt to find the flank of the Federal army. He had nothing to lose by going on, and a possible retreat to Gordonsville was still possible once he reached the Turnpike near Lucketts.

Admirable though this concept of a nineteenth century mission type order was, the latitude Jackson thought he had actually endangered the whole army beyond even Lee's expectations of acceptable risk. Lee envisioned turning the Federal flank and forcing them, by operational necessity, to retire to the fords and eventually to cross back to the north. When the Union right was not at the Carpenter Farm nor somewhere in the angle of the Orange Plank Road and the Brook road the situation changed radically. Now, instead of the two wings only being separated by about a mile and a half, Jackson, in order to get behind the Federals, would separate the Confederate wings by nearly four miles, with the Union army between the two! Jackson, as is clear from his, "Press them; cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; press them,"\textsuperscript{147} statement, shortly before his wounding, was intent on trapping the whole or part of the Federal army south of the river.\textsuperscript{148} That this would have precipitated a "catching a tiger by the tail" scenario for the Army of Northern Virginia, even if it had been feasible, did not occur to Jackson. But, judging by the concerned messages from Lee to Stuart, when Stuart assumed Jackson's
command after the latter was wounded, Lee definitely was concerned that his army, was in danger of never being united again. Lee's idea of forcing the Union army back was far more limited than the mercurial Jackson's. The end state Lee envisioned for the Flank Attack was a rendezvous around Chancellorsville. Jackson, on the other hand, meant to crush the Federal army entirely. In the vicinity of Luckett's farm Jackson instructed Stuart to send the 2nd Virginia Cavalry to the Ely Ford road, in order to prevent Federal reinforcements hitting his exposed left flank as Jackson's Corps attacked and to deny the fords to the retreating enemy. The frenzied, almost desperate efforts of Jackson in the moments before he was wounded suggest he knew that his corps, and as a consequence the whole Army of Northern Virginia, was in extremis, and that a night attack, difficult at the best of times, was the only thing that could save the situation. That so desperate a venture as a night attack using Hill's division was even contemplated indicates that the objective had been lost or dangerously exceeded in the rush of combat, and Hill's division was required to put the situation back on track by conducting a night assault. Once Jackson had the Federal forces running he knew he could not allow them to stop and regroup. However, the cost of keeping them on the run may have been too high.

Ironically, the loss of Jackson may have been fortuitous for the Southern cause on 2 May. The high command of Jackson and Lee had a clear objective in mind, but the how, left up to Jackson, was nearly the undoing of Lee's venture. When Jackson was wounded as he attempted to organize a night attack several of Jackson's leadership faults came home to roost. The very flatness of Jackson's command structure meant that Jackson's staff had little to no idea of what exactly needed to be accomplished next. Hill, subsequently wounded himself, had a limited objective for his division, the continued night attack, but
was unable to pass much information to Rodes, nor through him, to Stuart. The fact that Stuart did not get very much guidance from Rodes is indicative of how tightly Jackson controlled information about his intent. When Jackson was finally asked for intent, his injuries rendered him incapable of guidance.

When Stuart finally took over command from Rodes the attack forces and the battlefield were a complete shambles. As if to underscore the irony of the "great what might have been," a night attack by Sickles, confused, desperate and uncoordinated as it was, threw Jackson's commanders and staff into confusion, and they in their turn counseled Stuart against conducting their own night attack. A night attack, in all likelihood, would not have been very successful in terms of reaching a tangible objective. But it might have contributed significantly in psychological terms just as Sickles' attack had so radically unsettled the Confederates.

And yet, what are most commendable and understated are the selfless sacrifices made by McLaws and Anderson's men in the east that enabled the attack in the west to be so successful.

Yet, although operationally spectacular, the lack of a statement of a clearly defined objective to Jackson's subordinates amidst the rapidly changing situation meant the attack could not be fully exploited.

It is hard to judge whether the objective was attainable because it is difficult to determine, as Jackson's replacements found to their befuddlement, exactly what the next step was supposed to be after the Federals were hurled back from their initial positions. If the objective was clearly formed in Jackson and Lee's mind, the lack of understanding
of Jackson's staff leaves the impression that after the initial success no one had a vision of the end state, and though successful the attack was not decisive.
OFFENSIVE

*Seize, Retain and exploit the initiative.*

Jackson epitomized the aggressive combat leader, and reflected the same attitude his men held. Unfortunately, this manifested itself in an offensive spirit of the kind that bled the south white. A like spirit however, was unlikely to drain the North's resources to the same degree, though the process was undoubtedly painful. A palpable impatience with the more mundane character of war may have driven some of the war's greatest leaders to order attacks that were, even at the time, considered unwise. A reluctance to surrender the initiative meant, to Jackson and Lee, attack at all costs. Consequently these two generals automatically defaulted to an attack scenario as the best and quickest solution to their nation's problems. Neither Lee, Jackson nor Grant were impervious to this sentiment if only because they understood the psychology of their men. The same mentality would almost bring France to her knees in 1917. If anything can be said about the psychology of the fighting man with any certainty of truth it is this: The soldier, if believing in some chance of success, is a far better soldier, in terms of morale, on the offensive than on the defensive. Jackson understood this and the reports of his staff, witnesses to the march and attack, bear witness that the morale of the men was very high once on the march, knowing they were on some great adventure, and also in the attack, even though they were tired and hungry. In effect, the maneuver and advance of the Second Corps was a force multiplier, something Jackson was fully aware of. The psychological impact of switching from the offense to the defense damaged the psyche of the Union forces considerably, even if this is reflected only through the words
of some of Hooker's staff and officers. On the other hand Lee's aggressive resumption of the offensive, essentially through the attack by Jackson on 1 May, caused Hooker to hesitate and eventually withdraw into defensive positions and into a mindset only barely offset by the possibilities of attacking the tail end of Jackson's column around the Catherine Furnace. Because Lee and Jackson correctly deemed Hooker's ability to resume effective offensive action unlikely, Lee and Jackson were given the opportunity to choose the place of attack, relatively secure in the knowledge that Hooker would not exploit the risks the Confederates had to take in order to effect a daring offensive action. Lee's and Jackson's experiences with Union higher level leadership, based on many months of observing the conservative Federal approach to warfare (in the east at least), enabled them to take risks that would have been thought unwarranted by the North. Hooker quite rightly estimated that Lee, always the risk taker, would always take the offensive given even the slimmest of opportunities. Unfortunately for the Union cause, the trouble with being on the defensive is that the defense has to be strong everywhere, or at least capable of receiving reinforcements in the threatened place quickly. Because the Federal army was not tied into a strongpoint on its western flank such as the Rappahannock River, the flank should have been correspondingly reinforced with other units. The fact that neither of these things ever happened allowed the Confederates, almost by default, to exploit a fatal flaw in the Union defense. Had Hooker and his staff been more diligent in the west, Hooker, even though traumatized by the events of 1 May, could still have accomplished a great victory by allowing Lee to dash his men against an enemy strongly dug-in. Further, on the morning of 3 May, Lee was in dire straits. His army was split into three parts, outnumbered on all fronts and each part barely in contact
with the other. If Hooker could have mustered up the situational awareness to begin
attacking either one or both of Lee's and now Stuart's Corps on 3 May, the Confederacy
could have been dealt a blow on that Sunday from which it might not have recovered. For
the Confederacy a blind faith in the attack, moderated only by men like Longstreet, but
based in large part in the victory at Chancellorsville, would lead to the disaster at
Gettysburg.
MASS AND ECONOMY OF FORCE

*Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.*\textsuperscript{160}

*Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary effort.*\textsuperscript{161}

The *Mobile (AL) Advertiser and Register* of 8 Jan 1863 lambasted General Burnside in the wake of the Union debacle at the First Battle of Fredericksburg for supposedly believing Lee had divided his forces in the Union's presence thus:

The Yanks do not seem to profit by experience, or Burnside, with the rest of them, would never have given Gen. Lee the credit of so little sense as to divide his forces in the face of a powerful enemy.\textsuperscript{162}

Lee, with forces holding back Sedgwick's Corps around Fredericksburg, had already divided his army once, and now in order to attack the vulnerable Union flank he did so again. The *Advertiser's* verdict on this move would be interesting to note, but it is unlikely that it would have referred to the concept of mass and the division of forces in the context of time and space. One possible view to take is that Lee and Jackson, by knowing the rule of not dividing forces in the face of the enemy, knew when the rule of maintaining mass could be broken. However, the Confederate commanders realized that all principles have context and it is in the context of Hooker's inertia beginning on 1 May, and the dangerous Confederate situation, that the division of the Army of Virginia for the second time must be seen, and seen not as a violation of the principle of Mass.
Assuming that Hooker would have a difficult time in turning his forces back from the offense to the defense, it was logical to assume that the displacements would take a considerable time to effect. Additionally, one of the prime factors in establishing new lines was the slow command and control system both sides possessed.\textsuperscript{163} To coordinate the actions of disparate units around the battlefield absorbed considerable time, while the flat organization that Lee possessed and Jackson executed with was not so encumbered and could react faster.\textsuperscript{164} Once Jackson waved good-bye to Lee for the last time, the matter was essentially out of Lee's hands and into Jackson's. Hooker, on the other hand, had much coordination to do with the different elements within his army because he retained such centralized control. To Hooker's subordinate commanders the crises were to their front. Hooker had to respond to each one and thus spent much time traveling up and down his line trying to coordinate matters when some initiative would have simplified matters. To compound Hooker's problems, Lee's diversionary attack on 2 May was so effective that Hooker's initial belief that Lee was trying to flank him, reflected in his 0930 message to Howard, was replaced by a confidence that Lee was retreating south as reflected in his 1430 message of the same day.\textsuperscript{165} The intelligence gathering capability of the Federal army broke down, not in gathering information, but rather in processing the available information into tactical intelligence. Hence Jackson was virtually given a free hand to take two thirds of the available forces on his march to the Federal flank. One of the criticisms aimed at the force apportionment was that Jackson's Corps was too "heavy," and that some of the over 30,000 men that went with Jackson could have been used to attack towards Chancellorsville, thereby mitigating some of Lee's concerns over his divided command, possibly effecting an earlier reunion of the two wings, or even
moving on the river fords. Further, the non-utilization of at least one third of the corps points to a misuse of available assets, when the 18,000 men who actually participated in the attack easily overwhelmed the roughly 5,000 of Howard's corps available to resist. However, the delay by Colquitt for instance, which caused a pile up of Confederate soldiers on the southern flank of the line and removed to all intents and purposes 5,000 men from the attack force, even excluding the Stonewall Brigade, suggests that the numbers of men Jackson took with him on the march may have been very close to the mark.\textsuperscript{166} Jackson's estimate of the various kinds of "wastage" and "friction" he would face may have been intuitive but it was accurate.

Additionally, Jackson would have used Hill's division if he could have organized a night attack, as he was clearly attempting to do when he was wounded.\textsuperscript{167} The key point is that Jackson was wounded, and his staff, through a series of mishaps, could not continue with his intent so as to employ Hill's relatively fresh division. Another option, already addressed, was for Hill's division to attack down the Orange Plank Road. Besides the difficulties of coordinating night attacks along converging axes, Jackson could not possibly have known until he saw it happen that it would only take two divisions to crush the Federal right flank. Hill's division was not in place when the attack kicked off and did not play a major role in that day's action, but to infer that Jackson should have left them behind is to assume a knowledge that Jackson did not, and could not, possess at the time.\textsuperscript{168} The Flank march and subsequent attack had to succeed at all costs. Failure to do so removed any options Lee had left. Based on his observations at various battlefields, Jackson realized that attacks quickly reached their culminating point if not maintained and supported. He knew this from his own piecemeal efforts in the past, and as he
witnessed in the Federal attack on his position at Antietam. These experiences gave Jackson ample evidence of the need for mass at the right place.

Even though Lee's forces in the east were hard pressed at times, as evidenced by the difficulty with which they held off a desultory attack toward the Catherine Furnace, Jackson and Lee had a fine sense of what exactly was required to accomplish the mission. The ratio of forces given to Jackson was based on the experiences of two of the most astute generals in the Confederate army at the time and their experience brought together a deadly mixture for Union hopes at Chancerllorsville. Maintaining a viable punch in the west had to be counterbalanced with the need to resist attack in the east and perform a credible deception. To that end Jackson and Lee attained the finely tuned force distribution that created the possibility of success while assuming massive risk.\textsuperscript{169}
MANEUVER

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.\textsuperscript{170}

In FM 100-5 it states, "maneuver is dynamic warfare that rejects predictable patterns of operations."\textsuperscript{171} Ironically, Jackson's move was anything but unpredictable.\textsuperscript{172} Past experience with both Lee and Jackson revealed them at their most dangerous when faced with extreme crisis, and the usual solution to a situation where they found themselves outnumbered was to gain a local superiority by virtue of finding an exposed Federal flank.\textsuperscript{173} Many individuals commented that the situation was not new to the Confederates, nor to Jackson in particular, and that a flanking maneuver was their Modus Operandi in such cases.\textsuperscript{174} Once the retreat by Hooker uncovered the Plank Road and the Turnpike as far west as the Furnace Road, Lee was presented with an opportunity he would not otherwise have had, to use those exterior lines to move around Hooker.\textsuperscript{175} The sheer audacity of Lee's fixing attack in the west goes a long way to explaining the success of an attack that was quite predictable and purely Napoleonic in concept and execution.\textsuperscript{176} Poor Federal intelligence processing, despite good information gathering,\textsuperscript{177} allowed Jackson to move inside Hooker's decision making process. The relative speed of Jackson, exploiting exterior lines to move to a position beyond the expectations of the Federal command and control system, versus the inertia of Hooker, is best explained as Jackson's moving inside Hooker's decision cycle.\textsuperscript{178} The tempo of Confederate operations was faster than Hooker's primarily because the Confederate plan was simple and the command and control system flatter. Jackson acted independently
once his corps was on the road, Lee the same, while Hooker, given the complexity of the Federal army, was overwhelmed with conflicting messages and various opportunities. Even though the information was there to indicate to Hooker that a flank attack was coming, other key elements of information were coming in that contradicted such a maneuver. Lee's diversionary attack in the east was so effective that many Federals believed it was the main attack. Sickles' somewhat effective attack toward the Catherine Furnace also suggested to Hooker that Lee's army that was spilt and open to attack on an increasing scale. The opportunity of Jackson's movements to be seen as a retreat toward Gordonsville all made sense in the particular context in which the Federals viewed them, and undoubtedly made more sense than the dangerous splitting of Lee's army in the face of a well disposed army defending along interior lines.
SECURITY

Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.\textsuperscript{180}

Jackson took several very effective measures to ensure the security of his force and the success of his attack. Probably the most important was the choice of a secure route into the rear of Hooker's army that would allow his force to proceed, if not with total security, at least with compensatory factors of speed and deception. Jackson's discussions the previous night with Dr. Lacy, Hotchkiss, Fitzhugh Lee and General Lee all indicate that Jackson desired to move with speed if he could not have protection from enemy observation and vice versa.\textsuperscript{181} Security could never be total, but the friction inherent in war that occurred on the Union side certainly gave Jackson the amount of cover and concealment he needed. Even though observed along the route almost from beginning to end, the various interpretations placed on this information from balloonists to infantry pickets up to generals allowed Jackson's corps to proceed essentially unhindered. A number of detours were effected to attempt to remain concealed to Union observation.\textsuperscript{182} The first detour occurred around the Catherine Furnace when Union artillery and then infantry attacked Jackson's column as it moved west. The second detour was as a result of the perceived Union ability to observe the column from the vicinity of Fairview. The junction of the Furnace Road and the Brock Road was observable from the Union positions. Jackson's route took his force, first south then again west off of the Brock Road before joining it again about a mile and a half west. Although the huge column was seen again later, the Federal army interpreted the initial southward move as proof final that Jackson, and hence the Army of Northern Virginia was fleeing south. Further
Confederate activity to the west along the Brock Road and the route taken by Confederate cavalry to the north were interpreted as a normal screening attempt. The lack of Federal cavalry was of course a major factor in the success of the movement.\textsuperscript{183} Gone on Stoneman's ineffectual raid, the Union forces were reliant on too few cavalry to contend with the more numerous and aggressive Confederate cavalry. Even if opportunities had presented themselves to Hooker, Jackson posted extensive resources at the Catherine Furnace, as did Lee, and along the Orange Plank Road to prevent a Federal attempt to interdict his line of march or turn a flank. Once at the Line of Departure, Jackson threw out a heavy line of skirmishers whose tasks were not only to prevent effective Union reconnaissance but also to stop the usual defectors and deserters leaving the ranks to go to the Federal lines with information about the impending attack. Strong details were assigned the odious task along the route of march to stop stragglers from dropping out from their units.\textsuperscript{184} Jackson's notorious secrecy was in large extent due to his realization that his men, once told of a mission or task, could not stop talking about it.\textsuperscript{185} The taciturn Jackson contrasted with the verbosity and garrulousness of his men and staff and so Jackson went to great pains to keep his designs to himself, thereby maintaining an air of mystery about his plans.\textsuperscript{186} However, at Chancellorsville he could not keep his designs secret, especially when his options were so reduced that a flank attack was a good intuitive guess by even the lowest ranker in his corps. As far as was possible Jackson maintained enough secrecy to keep his antagonist guessing as to his real intentions. Jackson fully recognized the fragility of the venture he embarked upon and did much to maintain a high level of secrecy. That he succeeded in
gaining the right flank of the Federal army was due more to Jackson's skill and daring than to Union ineptness.
The single overriding image of the Battle of Chancellorsville, and the greatest remembrance of Jackson, is the surprise with which his Flank Attack caught the Federal army on 2 May 1863. For the Confederacy it symbolized the audacity of the Southern fighting man in general and Jackson in particular. That the Union forces did not react more effectively to the attack seems incredible given the plethora of accounts regarding the observation of the huge column as it snaked through the woods to the west. It is difficult to absorb the fact that a column 10 miles long, needing 4 hours to pass a single point from head to tail, arrived virtually unannounced in the vicinity of the Luckett's Farm and there stood for over 2 hours upon its arms while the lines formed within a mile and a half of the Federal positions. How this occurred is best described in FM 100-5 when it states that ,"The enemy need not be taken completely by surprise but only become aware too late to react effectively." Jackson carried on with the flank attempt, even though he must have suspected the enterprise was compromised. The myriad of factors already described contributed to his decision to persevere. Regardless of the opinion of junior Federal officers as they watched the column cross their front, what occurred in the absence of initiative was the baffling ability of the high command to ignore the warnings. Had more time been available to Hooker he would undoubtedly have filled in the gap between the right flank and the river as more men crossed the Rappahannock from north to south. Ironically, the very factor that prevented Jackson's men from gaining an even greater advantage than they did was the very thing that
contributed greatly to the element of surprise over the Federal army, namely the lateness of the day. Despite numerous warnings Hooker and his staff were unable to ascertain the main Confederate effort until far too late. Jackson exploited every meager advantage he possessed to pull off the attack successfully. Without examining the maneuver in the context of the time, and especially Jackson's habit of assuming risk, it is hard to see how the attack could have been successful. The very fact that so much pointed to the attack coming, that the march and attack could have been aborted several times along the route, testifies to Jackson's indomitable will. He knew his enemy, he knew himself and he knew his men. At several stages the continuation of his plan made no logical sense, thereby strengthening his hand and reducing the likelihood that steps would be taken to prevent him executing the attack.
PYRRHIC VICTORY

Operationally brilliant, the Battle of Chancellorsville did nothing for the South strategically except generate the momentum that sets up an appointment with destiny and the Army of the Potomac on the third day of July, 1863. Still seeking the elusive decisive victory, Lee invaded the north without the one man who could have made Lee's plan work. With the death of Jackson, Lee lost the only man who possessed the drive to achieve all in the face of tremendous odds, whose willpower alone was capable of overcoming the most daunting of obstacles. Lee's style of issuing mission type orders, suited so perfectly to Jackson's style of strict obedience to his leader's intent, proved Lee's undoing in Pennsylvania. Lee adapted, of course, but by then the moment of opportunity was lost, and with the passing of the high watermark of the Confederacy, Southern hopes of achieving something from the ashes passed too.

Jackson's final legacy was that he left Lee believing that his men, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, could accomplish virtually anything in the face of incredible odds "if properly led." The magnificent, but doomed charge of Pickett's division had its cruel, ironic seed at Luckett's Farm on the Turnpike.

The war dragged on for over two years, with some notable Confederate operational victories still to come. But like Chancellorsville, they proved only to delay the inevitable defeat of the South, and strategically they were nothing more than pin pricks in the North's attempt to close the war out. Jackson and the Flank March and Attack served as a metaphor for the hopelessness of the Confederate cause. In spite of Jackson's genius for war, in spite of the crushing blow delivered by the Second Corps, in spite of Lee's generalship, the South could not turn tactical victories into anything meaningful.
strategically. Analogous to the German Army in Russia during World War II, the Southern armies could inflict stunning defeats on the North, but because their strategy was so bankrupt, their operational victories came to naught.

The sense of Pyrrhic victory is best summed up by the letter of an unknown Confederate soldier to his father. The letter stated that, "Today we have had a great battle and I believe a victory." Before the word "victory" the word "great" can be seen clearly erased. The drain on Confederate resources, especially men, was slowly grinding the South down, but of more significance was the feeling that in spite of what looked like crushing victories, the Northern Behemoth kept rising up to try again.
CONCLUSION

To say that Thomas J. Jackson was a maneuverist for the 21st Century is probably an exaggeration. But Jackson worked very effectively in decision making scenarios we would recognize today. Stonewall Jackson understood the limitations and the possibilities he faced, and his strength was his ability to minimize the former while maximizing the latter. Jackson executed amidst the great uncertainty of battle, and did this because he always kept the situation as simple as possible and powered through the friction of war and the inertia of lesser men by sheer force of will. By consulting with others he knew he would only give "counsel to his fears," and so he kept as much of the decision making process centralized in himself. Jackson did something that many aspire to but can never reach. He had the ability to make a hard decision affecting the lives and perhaps even the fate of the nation in moments of extreme crisis.

In today's military it is fashionable to speak of our people as the most intelligent, the best led, etc. Whether they are or not is immaterial. In war men need to lead and be led. Jackson rarely told his staff or his men anything about what his intentions were, and yet they performed brilliantly in combat and exhibited great initiative. Jackson retained a rigid control over everything he could, involving himself personally with the placement of artillery and even regiments. On the "expanding battlefield" the assumption is that control will have to be devolved to subordinate units to an ever greater degree. The contrary may be true, if only because higher technology allows the decision makers to involve themselves at increasingly lower and lower levels of command, and if that is the case then Jackson as a model of combat leadership and decision making still has great relevance.
As missions of the "Other than War" type are more prevalent, there is a tendency to centralize control rather than devolve it. When the foreign policy of a nation can hang in the balance depending on the actions of a nineteen year old Private First Class, and when Command and Control capability is so refined that missions can be controlled from thousands of miles away, the trend will be to keep control at the highest level, not delegate it down the chain of command. Jackson was an enigma. He worked for a commander at Chancellorsville who was tripping and stumbling towards the concept of Mission Type orders, while Jackson himself was arguably the most centralized commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. Regardless of the level at which he is examined Jackson is a relevant model for today's paradox of stated intentions regarding concepts such as Sea Dragon, Joint Vision 2010 and Operational Maneuver From the Sea and the practice of command and control in the recent past such as the Mayaguez Incident and the Scott O'Grady rescue in Bosnia.

The Flank March and attack were unique in one important aspect in that Jackson, once he received his orders from Lee, became again an independent commander. Once on the march the Confederate command and control system could not keep up with his progress, and in effect control of events passed from Lee almost entirely to Jackson. Jackson, realizing the changed situation at the Burton Farm, had complete freedom to act as he wished, even beyond Lee's intentions, and chose a radical course incorporating extreme risk. Even though Jackson did not know for sure exactly where the Federal flank was he decided to act with vigor in great uncertainty because the command and control (C2) system allowed him to. When messages took hours to reach their recipients the decision could only be Jackson's. While a "Flat C2 structure" is the stated aim and ideal of
modern military thinking regarding command and control concepts, actual application is something entirely different as witnessed by events in Somalia and Bosnia. In the end, the retention of the reins of command, while attempting to eliminate layers of command hold implications for today which Jackson's actions on 2 May can help us to analyze.

For a window of about eight hours Jackson worked with little new intelligence. What new intelligence there was he could for the most part see with his own eyes, and he took pains, finally at great cost, to do so. Hooker, on the other hand, was flooded with input from Butterfield, Washington and his subordinates, as well as the intelligence he could view for himself. The lack of cavalry certainly denied him a most valuable type of intelligence but he clearly had enough on which to act to forestall the attack on his flank. What prevented him seemed to be that, at various stages, he reached information overload which inhibited his ability to make decisions. The variety and contradictory nature of the information contrasted with the simplicity of Jackson's situation. While Jackson's mind was clear Hooker's was flooded with information beyond either his ability or his staff's to cope. In short, the plethora of updates created for Hooker a self induced chaos through which neither he nor his subordinates could work. The end result was the kind of somnolence that affected Devens when he could not decide in the face of the approaching Confederate horde whether or not to reposition his men toward the enemy or leave them facing the silent woods to the south. The ability to gather intelligence will always exceed the ability to process it. The key is to know what is useful and usable now and what is not. The future holds some of the same implications for leaders as we supposedly move into the "Information Age." Can the human mind, no matter how well trained in the behavioral arts and management skills, process all the information that will
be available? And can it then be put to use for its intended purpose? If the answer is no, we fall back on the experiences of men like Jackson operating in uncertainty and having the moral and psychological courage to act decisively on partial information, to continue with a course when all around there is doubt. Some work has been done on intuitive and recognitional decision making, but the environment of unaffordable failure may negate to some degree the benefits of this work because it depends so much on actually experiencing the stress of command. Whether our leaders are prepared to rely on a decision making process that is inherently intuitive and cognitive and therefore manifestly intangible, over the analytical decision making process, which at least seems to provide a "product" of sorts, remains to be seen.

The context of the risk Lee and especially Jackson were prepared to absorb is important to emphasize. Today our military and political leaders are extremely risk averse, analogous to the commanders of the Army of the Potomac in 1863. On the other hand, the Confederates in the east, Jackson in particular, embraced risk to such a degree it acted as a force multiplier, analogous to some of our potential enemies on the world scene. If our enemies are placed in a situation where they perceive they have nothing left to lose, as Jackson and Lee at Chancellorsville, our antagonists may react with the same kind of radical asymmetric stroke that Lee and Jackson did.

The present military is increasingly fascinated with technology. The mantra of technology as the solution to all our shortcomings is an old one. In contrast, Jackson was a "people person." Not to say he was a particularly pleasant, warm or sensitive individual, but he understood his raw material, the soldiers under his command. Jackson understood the need for rigorous discipline (he never commuted a death sentence) and
continuous supervision. The greatest variable in combat is the warrior; hero one day, coward the next, disciplined and undisciplined and innovative and unthinking all in the same person. From the experience of living with his men, by being in constant contact with his people and sharing their defeats, victories and sufferings, Jackson was acutely aware of what was possible. The military officer of today is increasingly separated from the men he or she is supposed to lead. Leadership by simulation could be on the horizon, as fewer and fewer command billets become available, while the ratio of "staffers" to "trigger pullers" increases. The opportunity to experience the maelstrom of command under fire is increasingly a thing of the past and with that comes a burgeoning reliance on machinery and computers to do our thinking and leading for us. Simulation, Tactical Decision Games and professional readings may be part of the answer, but they cannot substitute for the real thing--the warrior who leads and is led under stress. Jackson made two years' worth of mistakes in the crucible of combat, experiencing both victory and defeat before the glory of Chancellorsville became associated with his name. The leaders in today's volatile environment may never have that kind of opportunity again.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hall, J.B., Rev. "Third Alabama Regiment." Unsigned manuscript found in papers of Rev. Hall. From the text it is thought to have been written by General Andrew Battle in 1905. ViH Mss 7: 4c 7603:2.
Hamlin, August Choate. *The Battle of Chancellorsville.* Bangor, Maine: Published by the Author, 1896.


NOTES


4Morrison, 95-97, 101. Whether any of the students of the time at West Point drank heavily from the war theorists of the time is doubtful. Throughout their time at the college the cadets only received the equivalent of four days of instruction regarding the theorists, and because of the world's fascination with Napoleon, what theory there was came from his adherents, specifically Jomini.


6Van Creveld, 265.

7Much of what Sherman did during his "March to the Sea" had already been done by Jackson in Virginia and Maryland. After First Manassass, Jackson tore up the railroad tracks and made "Sherman's neckties" from the rails (before Sherman gave them the name) and burned the hospital and depot at Sir John's Run. At Bath he allowed his men to loot and burn the houses of Union sympathizers. Farwell, 211. Interestingly none of the vilification attached to such onerous tasks attached itself to Jackson as it did to Sherman.


9Farwell, 475. A sense of hopelessness may have begun to seep into the Confederate army by even this early stage if Dr. McGuire's remarks at Fredericksburg are anything to go by.

10Farwell, 143.

11Farwell, 475.

12Farwell, 151.

13T.M.R. Talcott, "General Lee's Strategy at the Battle of Chancellorsville," in Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 34, ed. R.A. Brooks (2nd Print, Broadfoot Publishing, 1991) 1, Talcott remarked that Lee's army numbered some sixty thousand while Hooker's was close to one hundred and thirty thousand. Gary Gallagher, contributions by Robert Krick and Donald Pfanz, The Battle of Chancellorsville, National
Hooker had 134,000 and Lee had 61,000. John Bigelow Jr., *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* (New York: Smithmark, 1995), 273, 265. Federals numbered 70,267, and the Confederates 47, 626. Bigelow only counted the numbers of men in the immediate vicinity of Chancellorsville and as such seems the fairer estimate.


16 Farwell, 494.

17 Gallagher, "Chancellorsville; National Park Civil War Series," 15.; Henderson, 656; Farwell, 494. The Confederate defense of the heights above Fredericksburg in the first battle of the same name in December was facilitated by the sunken road already there. The notion of building defense works came almost as an afterthought. Indeed, Jackson's Corps fought the battle in the open, "a regular stand up fight." Earthworks and abatis soon became a regular feature in the war, much to the country's cost. Also Robert Krick, Chief Historian, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, interview by author, 3 January 1997. Don Pfanz, Staff Historian, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, interview by author, 24 and 29 January 1997.

18 Pfanz. One Confederate officer remarked that he realized the deception was not real because even though the Federal men, cavalry and guns were moved, the trains stayed in place.


20 In *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, Bigelow refers to the road simply as the Turnpike, probably in order to differentiate it from the Orange Plank Road. In Hotchkiss's map, given to Lee on 4 June 1863 it is called the Orange Turnpike. Farwell, 493 and 494, refers to the Turnpike as the Old Turnpike. Henderson calls it the Old Turnpike. For purposes of simplicity I will refer to the Turnpike and the Plank Road.

21 Henderson, 656, 657.

22 Henderson, 659, 660. Farwell, 495. Hooker seemed to be the victim of deception operations. Deserters told Hooker's officers that they were from Hood's and Pickett's divisions newly arrived from Richmond. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, The National Historical Society, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1887), Vol 25, Part 1, 323, 336, 326. Part 2, 353, 354. The Federal Aeronaut Lowe had trouble getting aloft because of high winds. Further, when he did manage to get aloft he was focused on Fredericksburg and not the west which was heavily foliaged.


25 In Henderson's biography, 658,659, he attests to the difficulty the Confederates had in trying to determine the location of the Federal lines. Additionally, Lee had at best an incomplete picture of the Union lines, especially to the west beyond Chancellorsville.

27 Henderson, 658. In Henderson's account based on Heros Von Borcke's *Memoirs* Jackson took a bridle path off to the right from the main track to the Catherine Furnace. The Hotchkiss map shows a path leading in that direction which in turn leads towards Hazel Grove. It would be likely then that the Federal batteries that Henderson referred to were positioned at the Grove, explaining to a large degree their effectiveness against the Confederate party.

28 Francis Smith Robertson, letter to his Father, MSS 5: 1R54621:1 Virginia Historical Society. Undated.

29 Robertson.

30 Robertson, "the unsuspected fire," hit one of Robertson's friends, Assistant Adjutant General Major Channing Price, who, with Robertson was on Stuart's staff. The shrapnel ball cut his friend's artery and even though they managed to get him to the rear, Robertson was forced to watch his friend die a slow and agonizing death for the want of a tourniquet. Stuart also lost two other members of his staff because of the lack of tourniquets, and as a result issued to all his staff bandannas that would serve that purpose. For other estimates of the danger of the situation regarding the reconnaissance see Henderson 658, 659; Farwell 496 and Bigelow, 253.

31 In his after action report, *Official Records*, Vol. 25, Part 1, 324, Lee states that the Federals were two miles along the Germanna Ford Road. He may have confused this with the Plank Road, from which the Germanna Ford Road eventually forks off, approximately one and a half miles south west of Dowdall's Tavern. Then again initial Federal movements had used the Germanna Ford Road when they approached the Wilderness from the west. Bigelow, map 11. The report was written before Lee received Hotchkiss's map on 4 June and is more evidence that Lee believed the Federals were somewhere in the triangle formed between the Plank Road, Brock Road and the Brook Road on 2 May. At the very least it is clear testimony as to how difficult it was to stay oriented in the Wilderness area. Lee, in different terrain, was to have a similar problem of terrain appreciation on 2 July 1863.

32 The Carpenter Farm was about one and a quarter miles south of the Orange Turnpike along the Brook Road (as opposed to the Brock road). Earl B. McElfresh, "Chancellorsville Battlefield, Includes Fredericksburg and Salem Church, Spotsylvania County, Virginia, 1863," map (Olean, NY: McElfresh, 1996), and Bigelow, Map 13.

33 Bigelow, 253. *Official Records*, Vol. 25, Part 1, 650; Schurz stated that he received information from a Negro but the information was deemed "indefinite." *B and L*, 193, 194

34 *War College Guide*, 186, 187. During a staff ride held by the War College's 1936/7 class a Major Ray E. Porter cited "original" research to prove that Lee believed that Hooker's right flank was in the vicinity of the Carpenter Farm based on Fitzhugh Lee's reconnaissance and Stonewall's subsequent message to Lee at 1500 stating that, "The enemy has made a stand..." Porter thereby inferring that Jackson believed the Federals had fallen back from a previously more southerly position. Although Porter was "in the ball park" his research was hardly original. In Bigelow, 264, he cites Fitzhugh Lee's account of an earlier reconnaissance that caused Fitzhugh Lee to come to the conclusion that Hooker's right was somewhere in the vicinity of the Orange Plank Road and the Brook road, near the Carpenter Farm. Bigelow, 290, later cites the same 1500 message from Jackson to Lee, and draws the same conclusion as more proof that Jackson thought the Federals had fallen back from an earlier position in the vicinity of the Carpenter Farm or the angle between the two roads. Since Bigelow wrote his book before Major Porter came up with his hypotheses I tend to give Bigelow the credit for more original thought.

35 Bigelow 262.
The romantic notion that Lee always referred to the Union forces as "those people" vice the enemy is fallacious. In Henderson's biography of General Lee he quotes a passage where Lee said, "It was hard to get at the enemy," 653.

In a letter from General Fitzhugh Lee to Dr. Bledsoe, Fitzhugh Lee stated that R.E. Lee had conducted a reconnaissance of the Federal left earlier in the day and deemed it unwise to attempt an attack.

War College Guide, 171.

Bigelow, 256. Henderson, 659.

Bigelow, 263.


Henderson, 663. T.M.R. Talcott, 17. Talcott naively asserts, despite much evidence to the contrary, that Jackson or Lee would not have ordered a reconnaissance if Lee and Jackson had already determined upon a flank attack. Talcott, who worked for Lee, may have been unfamiliar with Jackson's cold bloodedness and fatalistic belief in Providence.

Bigelow, 263.

Bigelow, 21.

T.M.R. Talcott, 17. Fitzhugh Lee stated that his cavalry held the roads to the Federal rear. It is more likely that he believed from the earlier fighting that Hookers right was at the Carpenter Farm, as already stated. If his cavalry had moved to his left--the south-- and around the farm he would have believed he was in the rear of the Federal flank. That he expressed great joy at having found the Federal flank at the Burton Farm the next day clearly shows that even in the daylight it was extremely disorienting country. The method of the reconnaissance the previous day, "feeling out," also contributed to inaccuracies and would be difficult and inaccurate even if there was not the almost constant fear of someone popping up only 30 yards away to take a shot at you. Farwell, 497, asserts that Stuart was roaming virtually at will in the rear of Hooker's army. That this was not so is clear from Fitzhugh Lee's encounter with the XI Corps.

Bigelow, 264.

Farwell, 479. At the time of all the various reports coming into Lee and Jackson, Jedediah Hotchkiss, Jackson's topographical engineer was trying to map the local area in a late attempt to survey the land. What is interesting, and is addressed by none of Jackson's biographers, is that the Confederate army wintered in Moss Neck, approximately ten miles south of Fredericksburg. No one took the initiative to have the area mapped or even conduct the most rudimentary reconnaissance of the area the whole time--close to 4 months. This is an incredible oversight, in an area that had great potential for conflict--
skirmishing in the area had been heavy the previous year--and demonstrates the lackadaisical attitude that the military profession was capable of in this period. Also, Talcott states that Hotchkiss did have maps of the area but that they were not very good and had no terrain relief. Talcott, 21.

Jackson had several bad experiences with land navigation in the past. His experiences at the Seven Days is representative. At the Seven Days; "The Confederate commanders knew no more about the topography of the country than they did about central Africa. Here was a limited district, the whole of it within a day's march of Richmond...almost the first spot on the continent occupied by the English people...and yet we were profoundly ignorant of the country...and nearly as helpless as if we had suddenly transferred to the banks of the Lualaba." Farwell, 364. In the Seven Days Jackson had some excuse, he had sent Hotchkiss back to the Valley!

Official Records, Vol . 25, Part 1, Lee's Report, 798. In Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 7-11 to 7-12 a "Turning Movement" implies depth, which, in the example cited--Inchon--gained "terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along its LOCs by maneuvering around the enemy." On the other hand, an envelopment develops an "assailable flank by arriving from an unexpected direction." Clearly an envelopment is what occurred at Chancellorsville but if a sense of scale is invoked it may be possible to see lee's original intent as being a turning movement. While it does not match the "depth" that Jackson used at Second Manassass, the Flank March may have constituted something of a hybrid that embraced a little of both of an envelopment and a turning movement in the execution.

Talcott disputes Hotchkiss' version that Hotchkiss went on a map reconnaissance and found a "Private road" by which the Corps would subsequently move. It does seem odd that Hotchkiss would go out in the night to make a map--it would certainly be difficult, but given the technique not impossible. However, Hotchkiss makes no reference to the special or "private" road in his book. He did, however, refer to two of Jackson's staff members going to the Welford House, though he did not name them. Additionally there was no reference to the special requirements of the road that would be needed. Henderson, 665, relying entirely on a letter written by Hotchkiss to him relating the "facts" quoted the letter verbatim, for Henderson's biography in 1897. For information on making maps during the period see also "Mapping a Battlefield: Jedediah Hotchkiss at Chancellorsville," in Chancellorsville Battlefield, map.

The majority of Longstreet's Corps was sent south to shadow Union movements around Charleston, South Carolina.

Farwell 497.


Bigelow, 264.

Bigelow, 264.

Bigelow, 264 and Map 18. It is difficult to understand why Jackson was concerned as to the observation of his Corps by the Federals when the maps he had available, already inadequate, did not, as Talcott said, have any topographical data on them, made as they were in such haste. Talcott 21; and Henderson, 665. The distance from the Federal picket line to the cavalry of Stuart was on the average 1000 yards or more in country where we have already seen the visibility was sometimes down to 30 yards. Bigelow, Map 18.

Bigelow, 265.
63. Farwell, 497. The exact sequence of who showed up and departed when is unclear. It seems that when Jackson committed to the attack, he left the details, unusual in itself considering their reputations, for Lee to work out while Jackson slept.

64. Turner's Almanac, 8.

65. Henderson 665.


67. Talcott, 21. Hotchkiss said that Jackson did not issue orders to move because Lee and Jackson were not sure they would launch the attack until they received more information, and that information was what Hotchkiss brought back in the morning from the Welford House. In the interview with Robert Krick he expressed the same view: that Lee and Jackson, though believing they were more than likely going to do the attack, did not commit until the morning, after Jackson had awoken, and the unit returns were received, which was considerably later than 0400, Jackson's stated departure time the night before. Talcott believed that Jackson had given out the modern equivalent of warning orders. The evidence does not support Talcott's clear partisanship.

68. Bigelow, 278.


70. James Power Smith, "Stonewall Jackson and Chancellorsville," Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol 5. 371. After J. P. Smith mentioned his part in getting the trains moving it is as if the heavy trains literally disappeared from the face of the earth never to be heard of again. Smith's speech to the Society on 4 March 1904 did not differ from his account in Battles and Leaders, Vol. 3, 205, 206.

71. Just when the orders were issued is open to debate. Although it is accepted that Lee had made up his mind in general terms what he was going to do, Jackson, despite his "move at 4 o'clock" did not issue the necessary orders, at least, he did not have them issued to all the involved subordinate commands. Having been involved in the plan from the beginning Stuart may have taken some initiative and positioned his forces near the bend in the road on the intended route as it turned south near the furnace. Stuart also received a gun reinforcement. Bigelow, 264, 265. McLaws' troops improved their position in preparation for possible defensive operations in the morning, but this would have been under Lee's initiative, not Jackson's. Jackson's units were uninformed of the proposed move until fairly late on the morning of the second, despite the protestations of Talcott, 22. In "Stonewall Jackson and Chancellorsville," 370,371, Smith says it was daylight before he was told what to do and he was on Jackson's staff. He said, "It was broad daylight, and thick beams of yellow sunlight came slanting through the pines, when someone touched me rudely with his foot, and said, "Get up Smith, the General wants you." He spent most of the day issuing Jackson's orders to the trains' officers and did not join up with Jackson again until 1500. In Official Records, Vol . 25, Part 1, 940, the report of Rodes, commander of the lead division, he states Iverson's brigade passed through the division to take the lead and the division did not get moving on the road until 0800. However, letters from members of the Third Alabama Regiment state otherwise. "On the following day (2 May) about 2 o'clock in the morning we started (sic) that is Jackson's corps to flank the enemy." Letter dated 8 May 1863 from an unidentified member of the 3d Alabama Infantry, Original in J.H.Scruggs collection (AR 50 77-25), Archives and Manuscript Department, Birmingham Public Library, Birmingham, Alabama. Copy in Fredericksburg and Spotslyvania National Military Park, Chatam House. Official Records, Vol . 25, Part 1, 900, Report of Lieutenant Colonel E.P. Taylor 22d Virginia Battalion;
the battalion, "was put in motion about 10 a.m." The 22d Virginia Battalion was in Hill's division and was one of the last to start the march, so late that along with many others they were still in column as the attack began. Also in a Private letter from a member of the Third Alabama regiment dated 9 May 1863, "The Battle of Chancellorsville," Montgomery Weekly Advertiser, 3 June 1863, page 1 column 6. "We, (Jackson's troops) marched about thirty five miles so as to get in the rear; we marched Friday evening and part of the night, and from daylight Saturday until two and a half o'clock without a single halt for rest."


73Bigelow, 273. Some sources quote about 28,000 men, but this only counts the muster roles for the men normally under Jackson's command and ignores the cavalry and supplements from McLaw's division.

74Bigelow, 273.

75Bigelow, 274.

76Bigelow, 273-274. The exact amount of time lost because of the reconnaissance is difficult to determine as even Bigelow alludes to the conflicting accounts. to position the guns, fire them and then remove them to provide free passage for the infantry columns to pass by must have been fairly time intensive. Even if Colquitt's men were moving at 0530, Lee watched the head of the column pass at 0730, a delay of at least one and a half hours. What seems curious to me is; why did they feel the need to conduct the reconnaissance in the first place?


78Keith S. Bohannon, "Disgraced and Ruined by the Decision of the Court; The Court Martial of Emory F. Best, C.S.A.," in Chancellorsville, The Battle and its Aftermath, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 204. Bigelow, 275. During the staff ride for the battle of Chancellorsville at Marine Corps Command and Staff College, it was postulated that the regiment, under the command of Colonel Best was detached because they were a "suspect" unit. However, the mission was clearly important, and the authority to essentially commandeer other units along the route would not be an authority lightly bestowed or given to someone that was deemed untrustworthy. The fact that a major conflict took place at the furnace and that several units were fed into the fight to hold off Union attacks testifies to the positions importance. Additionally, Jackson detached the Stonewall Brigade to cover the Orange Plank Road axis into the column further west. This task was given to his best brigade who had essentially the same mission as Best's regiment.


80Bigelow, map 18. McElfresh, map.

81William J. Reese (1st Lt. Jeff Davis (Ala) Artillery) Papers and letter home, W.S. Hoole Special Collections, U of Ala. Tuscaloosa, Alabama, dated 15 May 1863,

82Smith, 366; "He knew well the art of marching."

83Official Records, Vol. 25, Part II, 719. The order was a reiteration of General Orders number 110, issued 25 September 1862. Presuming that Jackson's men kept the pace, they should have covered 16 miles in 6 hours of marching (0800-1400) with rests (In a letter to Henderson, 668, Hotchkiss stated there
were three rest stops on the march). The distance from Decker (A), on Bigelow's map 18, is 10 miles to the
jump off point for the attack. The reason for the "under achievement" was a significantly later start than
intended, the effects and ensuing delay of the reconnaissance by fire in the morning and finally the usual
friction associated with the march of 30,000 plus men, their equipment and impedimenta.

84 Henderson, 665. This was probably an exaggeration, more likely was Farewell's assertion that men were
assigned to herd the men along with bared bayonets, prodded as it were to keep going. Farwell, 499.


86 Sears, 242, 243.

87 Sears, 243.

88 War College Guide, 175.

89 Bigelow, 276.

90 Bigelow, 276, 277. Theodore A. Dodge, The Romances of Chancellorsville, (Boston: Ticknor and Fields,
Records, Vol. 25, Part 1, 981. Howard denied ever receiving the message. This would suppose that he
did not receive two messages because one was sent directly to Howard and another message, identical
to the first, a "circular," was sent to Slocum and Howard. I think Bigelow and Dodge both have it right when
they say Howard probably paid little attention to the message because he was already doing all he would
do regarding a threat from the west. Sears is convinced Howard saw the dispatch based on comments by
General Schurz who was with Howard when the messages were received. The almost simultaneous
sighting of Jackson's column near the Catherine Furnace may have been just enough to distract Howard
into believing Jackson was "flying west" instead of planning a flank attack.

91 Bigelow, 276.

92 This disputes Sears assertion that the Confederates could only be seen near the furnace. See note 110.

93 Bigelow, 278. Howard's message was sent to Hooker before Howard received Hooker's message sent at
0930.

94 Bigelow, 279.

95 Bigelow, 280.

96 Bigelow, 281.

97 Captain Hartwell Osborn, "On the Right at Chancellorsville," Military Essays and Recollections,
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Vol IV, (Chicago: Cozzens and Beaton, 1907),
182, 183. Osborn believed that even though Hooker's message of 0930 warned of attack from the west,
the subsequent order from Hooker to Howard negated that concern, one still felt by Howard. If Hooker
still believed the right to be threatened he would not have ordered Howard to detach his only reserve.

Howard received the request for reinforcements from Hooker at approximately 1600, when Jackson's units, were almost ready for the attack and after Jackson's skirmishers were already committed in attempts to stop Federals gaining intelligence of the attack.

The screeners in the 2nd Virginia cavalry found the front of the heavily defended Federal position and reported this to Colonel Munford who in turn sent the report to General Fitzhugh Lee. Bigelow, 281, 282.

Bigelow, 28. Bigelow states, and I agree, that from the Burton hillock the extent of the Federal right flank was unobservable. On the other hand the Confederate cavalry, who essentially had the run of the place, would have gained some idea of the location of the Turnpike and the Federal positions nearby.


Henderson, 668. Common tradition has it that Jackson, moving his lips as he observed the Federal lines, was praying. However, Jackson, who had placed so much credence on Fitzhugh Lee's report of the previous night that the Federal right flank was in the vicinity of the Carpenter House along the Brook road, was thinking what he was going to do to Fitzhugh Lee when the next few hours were over. Jackson, and of course Lee and the whole Confederate cause was in extremis. Jackson, unsure of where the Federal right really was now, could still pull off a retreat to Gordonsville. He could attack down the road at the Federal line and still be somewhat successful and still close to Lee. However, if he continued west to seek the Turnpike he would be further than ever from the eastern wing of the army. That Jackson proceeded as he did indicates the level of risk Jackson was prepared to accept. That Jackson was wounded was perhaps even more fortunate for Fitzhugh Lee.

Bigelow, 282.

The point where the Stonewall brigade was positioned was at the juncture of the Plank Road and the road, no more than a rough track really, used by the cavalry to screen the column. The road that the cavalry was using was the original route proposed by Dr. Lacy that Jackson said provided insufficient Force Protection. The cavalry were about three quarters of a mile from the Federals at Dowdall's Tavern. Bigelow, Map 18.

Even though the Confederates only had 14,000 men with which to maintain the position, the convergence of the Plank Road and the Turnpike conveniently gave the Federals the impression of a force of great strength. The ruse was certainly effective. Lieutenant Willis Babcock, 64th New York Infantry, Letter to his Brother, Lt. Col Willoughby Babcock, 75th New York Infantry at Port Hudson, Louisiana, Donated by Philip E. Faller to the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, dated 24 May 1863. Babcock believed they, the V Corps, had repulsed a main Confederate effort at 1700 and he wrote to his brother still unabused of that fact.

Babcock stated they could see the Confederate columns moving across the front all day. He thought that nothing was done to prevent catastrophe in the west because the Union generals were, "thinking probably that they were trying to distract our attention from our front, where the attack was expected." Also, Osborn, 184-186. Osborn states, the officers of the XI Corps were on edge because of the continuing observation of the mass of Jackson's column crossing their front left to right. Hooker had inspected the lines--Osborn states it was around 1100--and for a while everyone felt better. But as the day pressed on a sense of danger resurfaced. When Howard told Hooker that the right rested on essentially nothing, and Howard had nothing left with which to extend the right, he was told by Hooker that a division of cavalry would be sent to cover the gap north to the river. It was at this point that the plethora of riders from XI Corps were seen at the various higher headquarters only to be told they were spreading panic. The cavalry, of course, were never sent.
By 1400 reports were reaching XI corps headquarters of Confederate movements in the Union rear. Owen Rice, "Afield With the Eleventh Army Corps at Chancellorsville," *Papers of the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, (Cincinnati, Ohio: H.C. Sherrick, 1885), 23, 24. By 1445 Rice was sending his famous "make disposition to receive him!" message (see note 111).

From the original in the Virginia State Library, copy from Virginia Historical Society, ViHMSS 2J1385a7.

Near 3 P.M.
May 2d, 1863

General,

The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor's which is about 2 miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to attack.

I trust that an ever kind Providence will bless us with great success.

Respectfully,

T.J. Jackson,
Lt. Gen.

P.S. The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well closed.

T.J.J.

The lead division was well closed up, but the next two were still struggling to get along the roads. So spread out was the column, that Hill's division was not in position for the attack, the rest of the corps proceeding without them. It will be recalled that two brigades, Archer's and Thomas's of Jackson's corps, were detached to assist in the security of the trains back at the Catherine Furnace and the Welford House. Additionally, McGowan's Brigade was assigned prisoner detail, and no doubt straggler recovery detail as well, all of which served to string out the column even further.

Bigelow, 290.

Bigelow, 288, 289.


Bigelow, 288. Rice, 23, 24. According to Rice the, "superior woodcraft," of the Confederate pickets kept the Federal "tenderfoots" away from the Confederate main lines. However, they did not keep the Union soldiers attempting to figure out Jackson's intent so far away that the Federal soldiers could not hear the orders to the Second Corps being issued for the attack. As a result, Rice sent a message to Von Gilsa at 1445, from the "skirmish line" saying, "A large body of men is massing in my front. For God's sake make dispositions to receive him!" Much of Rice's alarm was based on his men telling him they could hear the Confederate officers giving the commands to form for the attack! I believe that although, with hindsight, there seems to have been plenty of warning, the Confederate pickets did such an effective job that the exact nature of Jackson's designs were masked to such a degree that they were mistaken for regular picket line skirmishes. Sears, 264, 265, 266. It is asserted by Sears that Jackson's Corps was a lot more stealthier than the later Federal accounts give credence, because the pickets were reporting what they usually reported--any activity. However, he goes on to say that the very same activity later in the day on the Federal flank should have been heeded, particularly Rice's account. Sears also says that the route Jackson took was observable to the Union only from the road into the furnace. While that is true today, it probably was not then.
It is difficult today to realize how long it takes to get that many men in position but, it was a very cumbersome and time consuming procedure. While much could be accomplished as other units formed but to ensure proper or even close alignment many events were dependent on others. Additionally, later arriving forces would have to move nearly a mile left or right to take up their positions in addition to the march distance they had already covered. Jackson's anxiety over the length of time it was taking and the setting sun was, even though he was very familiar with the process, understandable. It should also be remembered that until this time such a massive body had never before been formed in quite this fashion as Jackson was forming his corps, the nearest resemblance to any such undertaking being Albert Johnston at Shiloh on the first day.

Hamlin says the lines were 100 yards apart. Hotchkiss and Allen say 200 yards.

At the beginning of the war, the standard distance between lines was based on Napoleonic criteria, and the maximum effective range of 100 yards for the musket. As the Civil War progressed the space between lines increased as part of a conscious realization of the increased firepower available. At Chancellorsville the men were still "feeling" for the right distance between lines to avoid rounds of all sorts meant for the first line hitting the second. In the end, the lines began to commingle anyway, precisely as happened at Chancellorsville.

By 1500 Von Gilsa, Rice and his men knew the Confederates were coming.

Ely ford crossed the Rapidan and the U.S. ford crossed the Rappahannock.

Jackson wanted to at least cut the Federals off from the fords as he made clear in his statement to A.P. Hill when he became the main effort and was instructed to cut the U.S. ford and when J.E.B. Stuart was sent north to cut the Ely ford.
the army they had a bad reputation. Babcock's letter to his brother best summed up the post Chancellorsville verdict of the Unionist soldiers when he refers to the soldiers of the XI Corps as, "the frightened dutchmen," who, "soon began to run away." he went on to say that they were so panic stricken that "we had to prick some of them with the bayonet even to stop them."

130Sears, 274. Colonel Lee of the 55th Ohio asked General Devens to change his regiments front, which was facing south, to a front that faced west. Devens could not assimilate the information and Lee did not take the initiative to do what needed to be done.

131Babcock.

132Bigelow, 298; On the far right of the Confederate front line was Colquitt's brigade. Disregarding orders, and thinking linearly, Colquitt stopped his brigade when he received reports that bodies of men were on his flank. Bigelow states that Colquitt's pause caused the effective loss of 5,000 men to Jackson. The reason for the pause was the mistaken belief that some of Stuart's cavalry, thrown far forward down the Plank Road, were Union Cavalry. I believe they could also have been Paxton's men from the Stonewall Brigade.

133Hamlin states that 17 regiments were prevented from participating in the attack due to Colquitt's delay (79). In his analysis Bigelow (298) gives the number of "thwarted" regiments as 13. Colquitt's brigade contained 5 regiments, one of which, the 23rd Georgia, was detached to provide route security. Ramseur's brigade contained 4 regiments, and 5 regiments constituted Paxton's Stonewall brigade. Therefore it would seem that Bigelow's estimate of 13 regiments and 5,000 men, as reflected in the Official Records, is the more accurate assessment. Regardless, Jackson was denied the use of those 5,000 at a key juncture in the fight.

134Hamlin, 79. Bigelow, 298-299.

135Hamlin, 80. Hamlin, with benefit of hindsight says it was a mistake to stop, denying Colston's later claim that the halt was needed. I take the view that the odds were already stacking up against Jackson's corps and that if he called the halt there must have been a very good reason for it. Even though it was contrary to his orders against delays and probably contrary to his natural inclination Jackson must have felt it was necessary and gives some indication of the enormity of the task he and his men faced.

136Hamlin paints a somber scene had Sickles corps been cut off from the main army. However, of all the Union commanders Sickles had demonstrated a high degree of aggression. Consequently, it would be hard to imagine Sickles not attempting some desperate venture should he be cut off. His attack, at night, confused and disorganized as it was threw the Confederates into considerable confusion. With such a temperament it easier to imagine Sickles launching a furious attack north into the disorganized Confederate flank than it is to see him flailing around trying to develop a plan waiting to be overrun.

137Babcock.

138Lee was on occasion particularly bloody minded. At Malvern Hill he launched attack after attack against well defended Union positions at great cost, and was prepared to hurl his men against the last ditch Union positions around the fords.

139FM 100-5, 2-6.

140Hill's division would be the logical choice for an oblique attack along the Plank Road as it was at the end of the column. The time saved not having to march all the way around to the Turnpike at Luckett's,
about two hours, could have been used forming up on the Orange Plank Road, Jackson's and Lee's originally intended axis of attack.

141Krick. Mr. Krick stated that a converging attack was far beyond the sophistication of the armies of the time. Fratricide was a constant problem amongst both sides throughout the war because the rudimentary command and control system could not handle many complications. The lack of what we know of today as "Fire Support Coordination Measures" were not even in its infancy in any formalized manner.

142Krick Interview.

143FM 100-5, 2-6.

144FM) 100-5, 2-4.

145FM 100-5, 2-5.

146Krick Interview; For more on Mr. Krick's ideas on whose idea it was for the attack, see: Krick, "Lee at Chancellorsville," 365-368. For an opinion other than Krick's see Talcott, 1-27.

147Bigelow, 316.


149Official Records, Vol. 25, Part 1, 769; The first message at 0300, tells Stuart to "attack vigorously and Unite the wings." The second message was sent only half an hour later in which Lee said, "I repeat what I have said half an hour since." It is clear that Lee was very distressed at the separation of his wings, clearly far more distant than he had anticipated.

150Official Records, Vol. 25, Part 2. 768. Lee still thought that Jackson had found Hooker's rear, instead of his flank, as the following quote from Lee's message to President Davis on 3 May 1863 clearly shows; "Yesterday General Jackson, with three of his divisions, penetrated to the rear of the enemy."

151Bigelow, 292; Bigelow believed that Jackson's intent was merely to block reinforcements. Henderson, 682; Henderson, however, believes Stuart's cavalry and a regiment were to hold the Ely Ford, and that when Stuart was recalled to take over command of the corps he was preparing to attack the Federals at the ford. Official Records, Vol. 25, Part 1, 887.


153Bigelow, 340. The only man left who had any idea of Jackson's intent to reach the U.S. Ford was Hill, and he was incapacitated. Rodes did not know where to attack next.

154Krick interview; Mr. Krick thought that a night attack, though difficult may have, for psychological reasons, prevented the need to fight on 3 May. While I believe that Jackson had nothing to lose by a night attack, resistance was increasing rapidly and Sickles attack, though bloody, recaptured some of the psychological high ground for the Federal army.

155FM 100-5, 2-4.
Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982). Such is the premise of McWhiney's and Jamieson's book. The preface makes a good case that the Confederate soldier was eaten up in attacks when he could have been better used in the defense. By relating proportional losses the authors indicate, as was borne out by Confederate losses at Chancellorsville, that many Southern victories were simply too expensive to support continued resistance. Part of the thesis, that the Confederacy attacked so much because of its Gaelic heritage is harder to support.

Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1952), 276, 277. The best cognitive explanation for this very American trait is found in Grant's explanation of the bloody attacks he conducted at Vicksburg. Grant's memoirs 277, 278. Lee exhibited this tendency at Malvern Hill as he would do again at Chancellorsville on 3 May. He did much the same at the Wilderness almost a year later to the day in 1864.

Bigelow, 276.


FM 100-5, 2-4.

FM 100-5, 2-4.

Letter from Virginia, Bivouac, 3d Alabama, near Fredericksburg, December 27th, 1862, Mobile Advertiser and Register, 8 Jan 1863, Vol 270 at Chatam House, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, Col 2.

Official Records, Vol . 25, Part 2, 360, 368-369. Some of Hooker's messages to his subordinates took three or more hours to reach their intended recipients and the delays became the subjects of messages themselves.

Krick Interview. Not that the Confederate C2 system was not likewise affected. Messages from one wing to the other after the Flank Attack took over 5 hours, it just seems that the Confederates were less dependent on centralized C2 and subordinate commanders acted with more freedom. Henderson, 601; Henderson believes this was the deciding factor in the superior operational performance of the Confederate armies over the Union. One can not help wonder what he would have said about the North's Western commanders.


See note 131.

The 33rd North Carolina was a regiment from Hill's division and had just carried out their passage of lines in anticipation of a night attack. This and the cavalry attack earlier in the evening explains their nervousness and later claim to fame as the regiment that killed Jackson. For more information see; Robert R. Krick, "The smoothbore Volley that Doomed the Confederacy," in Chancellorsville; The Battle and its Aftermath, (Chapel Hill: University of north Carolina, 1996).

Krick. He says it has become fashionable amongst some historians to criticize Jackson's force apportionment. He discounts the criticism as perfect hindsight.
Official Records, Vol. 25, Part 2, 360, 354. Some messages took hours to reach their destinations only a few miles away and sometimes with disastrous consequences.

FM 100-5, 2-5.

At Cedar Mountain Jackson performed a double envelopment of the Federal force, at Front Royal he turned Banks' flank while at Second Manassass he did virtually the same thing he did at Chancellorsville on an even grander scale.

Seven Days, Second Bull Run et al.

"Third Alabama Regiment," Unsigned manuscript found in papers of Rev. J.B. Hall. From the text it is thought to have been written by General Andrew Battle in 1905. ViH Mss 7: 4c 7603:2. "The situation was not new to him (Lee)." He goes on to say that Lee had beaten McClellan, "by a flank attack at the swamps of Chickahominy and was going to try versus Hooker." In Smith's paper, 370; "Moreover, General Hooker, I suspect, did not give General Lee credit for great military audacity. Nor did he remember that Stonewall Jackson was there, and there to do as he had done over and over again, in the Valley campaign, and at Cold Harbor, and the second Manassass. It is a remarkable thing that as to Hooker and his generals there was no suspicion and no preparation to meet an attack in rear."

Smith, 369, 370; Smith believed Hooker made two great mistakes. The first was turning over so much of his cavalry to Stoneman. The second, possibly greater mistake was retreating from the vicinity of the Zion Church, thus uncovering the roads that Jackson would eventually take into Hooker's rear.

David G. Chandler, "Campaigns of Napoleon," (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1966), 179-182. Jackson's maneuver was classic Napoleon. The size of the unit and the intent of the "turning" movement to place itself in the rear of the enemy, "athwart his line of retreat," seems as if it was pulled word for word from what might have been Jackson's intentions.

Hooker's own intuition, at least early on the morning of 2 May, served him well. He correctly guessed, based on his knowledge of Lee and the possibilities that Hooker's own observation of Jackson's column presented; that an attack was in the offing. The Federal pickets actually did their job rather effectively as shown by the accounts of several men who witnessed the procession of Jackson's column, and there was a sense as the day progressed that something was about to occur that would be detrimental to the Federal cause. Additionally, had Captain Rice's message of 1445 (see note 111) been heeded much of the shock of the Confederate attack could have been reduced in the three hours available to prepare for the attack. Despite solid information, Hooker failed to act; his failure was one of information interpretation.

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989), 84. A good discussion is given throughout this publication regarding decision making and one of the many acronyms used to explain getting inside someone else's decision cycle is the OODA loop (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action). The idea is that someone can make good decisions quickly while another attempts to make more perfect decisions, all the while getting further behind in the process. In relation to one another, the adversary decision maker is increasingly reacting to outdated information while the other is making progressively better and more appropriate decisions. If the metaphor of circles is used one decision maker is said to be inside the other's decision cycle. I think this applied particularly to Jackson in relation to Hooker.

Babcock.
Farwell, 498. Hotchkiss asserted that there were a number of routes that would have gotten Jackson into roughly the same position he was in at 1400 on 2 May. But he also makes clear that Jackson made it known that the route had to be secure, shorter if possible but also capable of supporting the traffic of 30,000 and their trains, a considerable requirement. Talcott, 21; The added trafficability requirement may explain the rejection of other routes and the prolonged search for a way around the Federal right, although Hotchkiss did not describe such a requirement in his book.

Chandler, 165, 167; shows the use of a Curtain of Maneuver, just as Jackson used the cover to perform a classic Napoleonic maneuver by use of the forced march.

Smith, 369, 370.

Sears, 257. The concept of operational security amongst the men was unknown, either that or they too were aware that there is an inherent friction in war that prevents the effective translation of information into intelligence. The most poignant demonstration was the remarks of men from the 23rd Georgia captured at the Catherine Furnace who essentially, in their boasting of Jackson's intentions, gave the game away.

Mr. Krick believes that Jackson's secrecy was the result of his deep religious belief, and that everything was in God's design. However, I believe three factors played strong in his renowned taciturnity. Jackson's primary reason for secrecy with even his closest advisers was to maintain operational security, though he would hardly recognize it in those terms. His next reason was that by keeping everyone in the dark it gave Jackson the opportunity to change his mind at the last minute, maintaining for himself the highest degree of flexibility, or he did not know what he was going to do until the last minute. The last reason for not revealing his intentions was that it kept everyone on edge in anticipation of what was coming next. Farwell, 425.

Farwell, 224, 265.

FM 100-5, 2-5.

Farwell, 227. Henderson, 173-175. Jackson only ever held one council of war. He held the event responsible for one of his failures, the uncontested loss of Winchester in 1862 because of his failure to organize a surprise night attack. He swore he would never hold another. He held true to that promise and never really trusted his subordinates again.


Whether elements up the chain of command will give credence to something which appears to have a large element of the intuitive about it is doubtful in my estimation. Yet, so much of what great leaders do, recognizing patterns from past experiences, appears to me to be the most logical explanation for the actions
of the most successful of generals. Jackson experienced an incredible amount of combat in two years. He had certainly made mistakes, but unlike many of his Federal counterparts he was not relieved and so went on to apply the insights that accrue to those with experience and daring.