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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b>  United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is unique among the geographic combatant commands in that it is primarily focused on theater security cooperation activities intended to foster stability by building partner nation security capacity. However, the operational factors of force, time, and space present significant challenges as the command works towards achieving its theater strategic objectives. One useful idea AFRICOM can leverage is 3D security, the alignment of defense, diplomatic, and development efforts. Using the Millennium Challenge Corporation's proven framework, this paper proposes a 3D prioritization method to help the command balance the operational factors and more effectively focus its limited resources towards achieving its theater strategic objectives. It then analyzes AFRICOM's current approach to security capacity building by examining the Department of State's International Affairs Function 150 to see what security capacity building activities the command currently funds. The paper finishes by recommending where AFRICOM should apply the proposed 3D security method to improve its chances of achieving its theater strategic objectives.					
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Newport, R.I.**

**A 3D METHOD FOR PRIORITIZING SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
IN AFRICOM**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ //signed/RKB// \_\_\_\_\_**

**03 May 2010**

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## **Abstract**

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is unique among the geographic combatant commands in that it is primarily focused on theater security cooperation activities intended to foster stability by building partner nation security capacity. However, the operational factors of force, time, and space present significant challenges as the command works towards achieving its theater strategic objectives. One useful idea AFRICOM can leverage is 3D security, the alignment of defense, diplomatic, and development efforts. Using the Millennium Challenge Corporation's proven framework, this paper proposes a 3D prioritization method to help the command balance the operational factors and more effectively focus its limited resources towards achieving its theater strategic objectives. It then analyzes AFRICOM's current approach to security capacity building by examining the Department of State's International Affairs Function 150 to see what security capacity building activities the command currently funds. The paper finishes by recommending where AFRICOM should apply the proposed 3D security method to improve its chances of achieving its theater strategic objectives.

## INTRODUCTION

“I am convinced that building African security capability and capacity is the best path to assisting the people of Africa to achieve long term stability and security.”<sup>1</sup> In support of his vision, General William Ward identified five theater strategic objectives for United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) focused primarily on building partner nation security capability and capacity.<sup>2</sup> These theater strategic objectives are derived from the desired end state and military strategic objectives directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, respectively. Reaching these goals is no small task when one considers the operational factors of force, time, and space in Africa.

As the Department of Defense’s newest geographic combatant command, AFRICOM sits well below its approved manning levels and requires significant increases in Congressional funding to effectively accomplish its theater strategic objectives.<sup>3</sup> With the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq remaining the principal national military focus, coupled with current economic challenges within the United States, the command’s resource shortfalls will likely persist into the foreseeable future. These limitations clearly restrict the size of the force AFRICOM can apply towards achieving its theater strategic objectives, and consequently increases the time needed to accomplish them. However, the command’s biggest challenges lie in the factor of space. Africa is a continent of 1 billion people comprised of 800 ethnic groups living in 53 countries spanning an area three and one half times the size of the continental United States.<sup>4</sup> The challenges associated with these vast areas and diverse cultures are further compounded as the continent, with few exceptions, lacks adequate transportation, communications, and energy infrastructure.<sup>5</sup> In a resource

constrained environment, AFRICOM cannot reasonably expect to equally build security capability and capacity in each African country.

Consequently, AFRICOM should adopt a 3D approach for focusing its security capacity building efforts that balances force, time, and space factors. Senior AFRICOM leaders have publicly stated the command employs 3D security, the unity of effort between defense (AFRICOM), diplomacy (Department of State [DoS]), and development (United States Agency for International Development [USAID]).<sup>6</sup> An examination of where AFRICOM applies its resources indicates otherwise. One proven framework the command can leverage is the approach the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) uses to award economic development aid. Without a consistent methodology that aligns defense, diplomacy, and development efforts, AFRICOM risks applying its limited resources towards countries that may not provide the desired return on investment. This could ultimately result in the command's failure to achieve its theater strategic objectives.

### **3D SECURITY**

A major concern in the current international security environment is the threat of violent extremists operating from ungoverned spaces in weak or failing states. These groups exploit fragile political, economic, and social conditions to undermine regional and international security.<sup>7</sup> Traditional military power by itself is inadequate when confronting this type of threat since it only treats the symptoms and does not address the underlying causes. Consequently, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) details the need for unity of effort between defense, diplomacy, and development efforts.<sup>8</sup> This whole-of-government approach to security capacity building is commonly referred to as 3D security.<sup>9</sup> Africa, with its large number of weak and failing states, is the ideal theater in which to apply this concept.

## UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA

Reviewing how AFRICOM's theater strategic objectives were developed is helpful in understanding why a 3D security approach is vital to the command's success in Africa. The NSS and major foreign policy speeches by the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense describe the desired end state. From this, the Department of Defense (DoD) produces the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which further refine the military strategic objectives that contribute to the desired end state. Based on this more specific military guidance, AFRICOM develops its annual posture statement which articulates its theater strategic objectives.

In his NSS, former President George W. Bush stated, "Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."<sup>10</sup> While the Obama administration has yet to produce its first NSS, foreign policy speeches given by the President and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echo the necessary linkage of defense, diplomacy, and development in achieving international security and stability. In his July 2009 address to the Ghanaian Parliament, President Barack Obama emphasized, "democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of conflict" as areas critical for a successful future in Africa.<sup>11</sup> Secretary Clinton further elaborated how the United States will employ a whole-of-government national security approach in her discussion of smart power:

First, we intend to update and create vehicles for cooperation with our partners; second, we will pursue principled engagement with those who disagree with us; third, we will elevate development as a core pillar of American power; fourth, we will integrate civilian and military action in conflict areas; and fifth, we will leverage key sources of American power, including our economic strength and the power of our example.<sup>12</sup>

The most senior leaders at the national level clearly recognize that the best way to achieve the desired end state is to align defense, diplomacy, and development efforts of the United States Government.

In describing how the military will achieve the desired strategic end state established by the President, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directs a “new jointness” to achieve unity of effort in the NDS. This concept recognizes that “economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces...” produce lasting security and stability.<sup>13</sup> The QDR reinforces the NDS by acknowledging that “developing the security sector requires comprehensive, whole-of-government programs and activities” since a “neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development... does not exist.”<sup>14</sup> While the NDS and QDR provide overarching guidance for all the DoD combatant commands, the GEF specifically directs the following three strategic end states for AFRICOM:

**Endstate 1:** African countries and organizations are able to provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent.

**Endstate 2:** African governments and regional security establishments have the capability to mitigate the threat from organizations committed to violent extremism.

**Endstate 3:** African countries and organizations maintain professional militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the rule of law, and abide by international human rights norms.<sup>15</sup>

The GEF focuses AFRICOM on conflict prevention through security capacity building, and the NSS, NDS, and QDR direct a 3D security framework as the appropriate way to get there.

The AFRICOM Posture Statement describes the strategic environment, component and subordinate command activities, theater investment needs, and interagency initiatives.<sup>16</sup>

It also articulates the following five theater strategic objectives:

**Objective 1:** Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks;

**Objective 2:** Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to emerging crises, and continental peace support operations are effectively fulfilling mission requirements;

**Objective 3:** Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities and expertise;

**Objective 4:** Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring United States Government efforts in designated states;

**Objective 5:** Protect populations from deadly contagions.<sup>17</sup>

Given that AFRICOM's theater strategic objectives flow from the desired end state and higher level military strategic objectives, one would expect to see them influenced by the 3D security concept. This is explicitly stated in Objective 4, but is also implied in Objectives 2, 3, and 5 which clearly cannot be attained through military means alone. Even Objective 1, which reads like a traditional military objective, is best achieved through a 3D security approach in which Al-Qaeda safe havens are eliminated by economic and political efforts complementing the traditional use of force.

### **OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN AFRICA**

AFRICOM's theater strategic objectives provide the necessary context when examining the influence of the operational factors.<sup>18</sup> While space is the dominant factor in Africa, force and time also present significant challenges. Analyzing the operational factors

collectively provides a compelling justification for the critical need to develop a sound 3D framework for prioritizing AFRICOM security capacity and capability building efforts.

President Obama directed that the main effort for the United States military will be applied against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, sending 30,000 additional troops to that theater of war and focusing all other instruments of national power toward that same end.<sup>19</sup> This surge is occurring at the same time that the economy of United States is in a recession, and national unemployment is approaching 10 percent.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, AFRICOM will likely remain below approved manning levels and not receive increases in Congressional funding for many of its desired theater investments. Also, the command is working to build its human terrain capability (i.e., personnel with cultural and language expertise) beyond its special operations component command.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, DoS and USAID are unable to meet AFRICOM requests for personnel to support its core staff since they presently have their own personnel shortfalls.<sup>22</sup> Further complicating theater security engagements is that DoS organizationally places North Africa in its Near Eastern region, separating it from sub-Saharan Africa and injecting seams into any planning between DoD and itself.<sup>23</sup> Clearly, the “combat power” AFRICOM can apply towards meeting its theater strategic objectives must be prioritized given these force limitations.

AFRICOM reached full operational capability on September 30, 2008.<sup>24</sup> While the command has made significant strides in its short existence, concerns exist regarding its mission and activities. African stakeholders and non-governmental organizations remain skeptical of its intentions, and even members of the United States Government question the need for a separate geographic combatant command in Africa.<sup>25</sup> While effective strategic communications can help diffuse these concerns, AFRICOM is certainly feeling the effects

of the factor of time as Congress, the primary steward of the American taxpayer, expects to see a return on investment in the command.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, the AFRICOM staff has experienced challenges conducting business in Africa given the exceedingly long times it takes to travel between countries due to limited transportation infrastructure.<sup>27</sup> By more precisely focusing its efforts, AFRICOM can shorten the time needed to deliver tangible security capacity building results.

Of the three operational factors, space provides the greatest challenge. Africa spans almost 11.7 million square miles, an area greater in size than the United States, Western Europe, and China combined.<sup>28</sup> The diverse human terrain consists of more than 800 ethnic groups with over 1,000 languages.<sup>29</sup> Infrastructure challenges are significant as only one-third of rural Africans has access to an all-season road, large portions of populations in several countries travel over two kilometers for water, and basic services cost double on average compared to the developed world.<sup>30</sup> Globalization is another powerful challenge. The most recent Joint Operating Environment study predicts weak and failing states in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to fall behind in the global economy. Consequently, a concerted international 3D approach will be required to maintain stability on the continent.<sup>31</sup>

### **THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION METHOD**

Created by Congress in 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation is an independent United States agency that provides foreign aid targeted at reducing global poverty. The methodology it uses to administer the Millennium Challenge Account, a foreign assistance program in which funds are awarded to developing countries to promote economic growth, provides an excellent framework from which to develop a 3D security

prioritization scheme for AFRICOM.<sup>32</sup> Four features of the MCC process make it an attractive choice.

First, per capita income thresholds are set to target only those countries most in need of aid. Without this limiting condition, the challenge of where to distribute aid is intractable. Second, 17 indicators developed from publicly available data from 10 independent sources, are used to score the fitness of qualified countries in the following three broad policy areas: ruling justly (6 indicators), investing in people (5 indicators), and economic freedom (6 indicators).<sup>33</sup> A country must score better than 50 percent of all other countries considered in 6 of the 12 combined ruling justly and economic freedom indicators, 3 of the 5 investing in people indicators, and the control of corruption indicator.<sup>34</sup> These indicators are the strength of the MCC process since they analytically identify countries with political and economic environments conducive for successful growth. Third, those countries meeting the first two criteria are identified as candidates, who then propose projects based on their own economic growth and poverty reduction priorities. MCC teams help refine these proposed projects, ultimately resulting in a compact that details how approved projects will be managed and includes metrics for measuring results. This partnership between the candidate country and the MCC team ensures greater ownership of the selected projects, increasing the probability for successful return on investment. Finally, the process is flexible in that it accounts for countries that desperately need aid but do not meet the criteria for a compact grant. In this case, these countries may qualify for much smaller grants if they demonstrate improvement in the three broad policy areas.<sup>35</sup>

## **A 3D PRIORITIZATION PROCESS FOR AFRICOM**

The MCC process provides a robust “2D” framework to determine the fitness of a country to receive aid as it ensures the necessary diplomatic and development conditions are in place. For AFRICOM, this same methodology can be easily adapted to become a 3D process to help the command best focus its security assistance resources. The issue then becomes the selection of the most appropriate limiting condition and the strongest indicators to target African countries where security assistance will yield the best results.


Sound political and economic health provides an appropriate starting point for determining the fitness of a country to receive security assistance since it guarantees “2D” alignment. Thus, the MCC selection process serves as an excellent limiting condition for the 3D prioritization method. Applying the 2009 MCC selection results produces 19 eligible African countries to receive assistance.<sup>36</sup> Two caveats must be applied, however. First, Seychelles, Gabon, Libya, Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa are excluded from the MCC process because they exceed the MCC’s allowable per capita income threshold. Since these economically strong countries provide environments conducive to rapidly building security capacity, they should be included in the 3D security prioritization provided they otherwise meet the MCC criteria. Second, countries prevented by law from receiving MCC funds are immediately disqualified. Currently this includes Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Sudan.<sup>37</sup> Applying both these caveats leaves 23 African countries eligible for security assistance.<sup>38</sup>

Weak and failing states are characterized by a lack of capacity in five core institutions: military, police, civil service, judicial system, and political leadership.<sup>39</sup> They pose a significant danger to national security since they may serve as safe havens for

terrorists.<sup>40</sup> The weaker a state is, the greater its need for receiving security assistance. Thus, the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index (FSI) becomes the second component of the 3D security prioritization process. Using 12 social, economic, and political indicators of state performance compiled from 30,000 publicly available sources, the FSI attempts to measure the likelihood of a state to collapse.<sup>41</sup> States classified in the Alert (Critical) and Warning (In Danger) categories of the FSI are natural candidates for security assistance since they have the greatest need. For AFRICOM, these general categorizations do not provide a second limiting condition for security assistance; every country in Africa except Mauritius falls into these categories.<sup>42</sup> The FSI, however, is still exceptionally useful since it provides a rank order of the relative stability of every country in the world.

One final indicator, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), is added to the 3D methodology before determining the final prioritized list of states to receive security assistance. Corruption negatively affects the political, economic, and social climate in a country, undermining democracy and the rule of law while simultaneously hindering the development of fair markets and stunting economic growth.<sup>43</sup> Security assistance efforts will likely be squandered in countries where power is willfully misused for private gain. As one Tanzanian citizen lamented, "Most of our leaders are highly corrupted, they use these funds from you [United States] donors to enrich themselves."<sup>44</sup> Recalling the MCC indicators, one might argue that using the CPI is redundant as the MCC process already applies a corruption indicator in the initial vetting of countries. With special attention given to preventing misuse of security assistance, a premium is placed on avoiding corrupt states. Additionally, the CPI is calculated differently than the MCC's corruption indicator, which is derived from data from the World Bank Institute.<sup>45</sup> For this 3D methodology, the CPI score

(higher is less corrupt) is doubled and then subtracted from the FSI score (lower scores represent greater stability) to reward countries that control corruption. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 3D prioritization process.



**Figure 1: Overview of the 3D Prioritization Method**

### WHAT ABOUT SOMALIA AND DJIBOUTI?

The 3D prioritization method provides a sound way to target countries that have set the proper conditions for security capacity improvements. Critics may argue that states with the greatest need will never qualify since their lack of security most likely coincides with poor governance and limited economic development. Another question to consider is how to address regimes friendly to the United States that fail to qualify. Both these arguments are best addressed using the examples of Somalia and Djibouti, respectively.

Somalia is the classic example of a failed state, infamously topping both the FSI and CPI.<sup>46</sup> Its weak national government is unable to exercise control over the vast majority of the country as there is no functioning central police, judicial system, or civil service.<sup>47</sup> Somalia threatens international security, serving as a hub of international piracy for shipping passing through the Gulf of Aden and also providing safe haven for the Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Regional states are also at risk due to the country's worsening humanitarian crisis with greater numbers of internally displaced persons seeking to move into neighboring countries.<sup>48</sup> Without question, Somalia has the greatest need for security on the

African continent, but the proposed 3D prioritization method excludes it from receiving any assistance (see Table I). In this case, the 3D method still applies albeit indirectly. Adjacent states in the region (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania in this case) do qualify for aid, and AFRICOM can work to aggressively build their security capacity, and in turn minimize a cascading regional instability effect. Further, many other countries outside East Africa also qualify for security assistance. AFRICOM can help them build their security capacity to a level where they can provide forces for the African Union, which brings greater legitimacy and increased chances for success when compared to any non-African entity.<sup>49</sup> This way, AFRICOM can influence stability in a failed state like Somalia while maximizing its security capacity building investment in countries that will benefit from it.

Djibouti is the best example of a country that does not does not qualify for aid under the 3D methodology, but has a government friendly to the United States. It is the only African country that has permitted the basing of US troops on its soil with Camp Lemonnier serving as the home of Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa. It also maintains excellent geostrategic position adjacent to Bab el-Mandeb, an important world oil transit chokepoint that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean.<sup>50</sup> Clearly, the United States has significant interests that make a *quid pro quo* arrangement with Djibouti acceptable. While AFRICOM should strive to consistently employ the 3D prioritization method, exceptions need to be made when there is a significant benefit that outweighs the potential lack of progress in security capacity building of the friendly country.

#### **ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AFRICOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

When stratifying national interests, a common framework to consider is vital, important, and peripheral interests. Using this model, United States foreign policy towards

Africa is largely one of peripheral interests; those that are worth funding.<sup>51</sup> An examination of the Department of State's International Affairs Function 150 (i.e. Account 150) security related funding, shown in Table II, offers insight into current national (and by extension AFRICOM) priorities for security capacity building.<sup>52</sup> Comparing Account 150 expenditures side-by-side to the priority country list developed using the 3D methodology (see Table III), there are a considerable amount of mismatches as only Mozambique and Uganda receive similar rankings among countries qualifying for security assistance. Among the top 10 Account 150 countries, only three even qualify for aid based on the 3D formula; expanding this to the top 20, only nine make the cut. Four conclusions can be drawn from these discrepancies.

First, and most important, AFRICOM is not employing 3D security as its current security capacity building efforts are clearly not aligned with economic and democratic development efforts. Unlike the 3D priority country list, which accounts for economic and political health as part of its initial criteria, AFRICOM's actual security assistance (as represented by Account 150 priorities) is overwhelmingly focused on failing states where conditions conducive for terrorist safe havens exist (Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo) or on states that are actively engaged in combating terrorist groups (Tunisia and Morocco). AFRICOM is focusing on states that have definite security needs with little regard for political and economic conditions. This is a departure from the desired end state, national strategic objectives, and the command's own theater strategic objectives which all recognize 3D security as the preferred method for building security capacity. Providing security assistance to corrupt governments that have not demonstrated an ability to improve

the underlying political and economic conditions that lead to long term stability only increases the likelihood of AFRICOM failing to meet its objectives.

Second, Account 150 funding emphasizes sub-Saharan Africa's regional anchor states of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. There is certainly some merit in this approach. These larger states are financial hubs of their respective regions and each has traditionally played a significant role in regional peace and security.<sup>53</sup> Considering the operational factors, each is well placed on the vast African continent from which AFRICOM can theoretically influence the spread of security and stability throughout the East, West, and South Regions of Africa in less time using less security capacity building forces. South Africa fits this operational idea well, but a closer examination of Kenya and Nigeria reveals some challenges. Kenya, once a model of stability in East Africa, has seen intense ethnic violence in recent years. The divide between the political parties of President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, and a constant flow of refugees from Somalia provides unique challenges.<sup>54</sup> Nigeria, while of significant interest due to the oil reserves in the Niger Delta, is a corrupt and failing state fighting an internal insurgency over distribution of the oil wealth.<sup>55</sup> Like Kenya, its FSI stability rating has steadily decreased over the past 3 years. Consequently, these traditional anchor states may not be the optimal choices for AFRICOM's security capacity investment.

Third, of the four island nations that score in the top 15 of the 3D priority country list, only Cape Verde receives a noteworthy amount of Account 150 funding. This funding is properly focused on counter narcotics and law enforcement efforts as Cape Verde has a superior strategic position to interdict the movement of illegal narcotics in the waters near Guinea-Bissau, the midway stop on the heavily traveled drug trade route between South America and Europe.<sup>56</sup> However, all the other island nations in the AFRICOM area of

responsibility combined do not receive one-third of the funding that Cape Verde does, even though Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe rank first, fourth, and eleventh on the 3D priority list, respectively.

Finally, current security assistance is widely spread in disproportionate amounts to the 21 countries participating in the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a DoS led initiative in which AFRICOM military advisors have trained approximately 100,000 African peacekeepers for United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions since 1997.<sup>57</sup> Specifically, foreign military financing, which can be used to purchase military equipment to address the many transportation and communications shortfalls faced by nearly all African peacekeeping forces, is currently awarded to just 13 ACOTA countries. This limits the potential of ACOTA to produce countries capable of conducting peacekeeping operations with minimal AFRICOM assistance, increasing the likelihood for AFRICOM forces to directly engage on the continent.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Apply the 3D method.** General Ward and other senior AFRICOM officials have publicly stated the command pursues a 3D security strategy to meet its theater strategic objectives, but this is clearly not the case in practice. Current actions likely reinforce negative perceptions of Africans who see AFRICOM as an attempt to militarize the continent in order to deplete natural resources.<sup>58</sup> The command will greatly increase its chances for meeting its theater strategic objectives if African populations see it as a positive force. Truly applying a 3D security process is the best way to prove that AFRICOM is but one instrument of the United States Government working to build stability on a continent that desperately needs it.

**Focus on smaller bands of states in West Africa.** Nigeria's stability is critical to the United States, largely due to its oil reserves. However, AFRICOM will likely not see appreciable returns from direct security investments in Nigeria since the country lacks the political and economic environment necessary to support and sustain security capacity building efforts. Just as with Somalia, AFRICOM's theater strategic objectives may be more quickly achieved through building the security capacity of Nigeria's regional neighbors, of which Niger, Ghana, Benin, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, and Burkina Faso all lend themselves nicely to a 3D approach. Also, if AFRICOM is looking to promote democratic values and ideals throughout Africa, focusing on a larger number of smaller states may be the best way to reach more of the population than tying itself too much to larger states.

**Don't forget about the island nations.** While Cape Verde is receiving an appropriate level of attention from AFRICOM, the same is not true for Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe. All these countries show tremendous promise for 3D security in addition to the excellent geostrategic positions they maintain. All three islands have significant strategic value for global competitors such as China, India, and Brazil that are striving to secure greater access to Africa's natural resources.<sup>59</sup> As their investments in Africa continue to grow, China, India, and Brazil will likely continue to expand their navies to protect their interests; no different than what the United States has done. Consequently, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe all provide excellent locations for naval bases to help maintain access to resources. One simple way the United States can hedge against this growing influence is to forge strong partnerships with these island nations through 3D security capacity building.

**Increase funding to 3D qualified countries participating in ACOTA.** The ACOTA program is an established framework to build African peacekeeping forces which directly supports AFRICOM's second theater strategic objective of building peace operation capacity. It also indirectly advances the command's other four objectives through the resulting increased capacity of African security forces. ACOTA has produced results, as evidenced by the deployment of Rwandan troops to Darfur in support of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the contributions of Senegalese peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, and the regional peacekeeping efforts conducted by Mali and Ghana in Sierra Leone.<sup>60</sup> Since 16 of the 21 countries participating in ACOTA qualify for security assistance under the 3D prioritization method, AFRICOM should apply more resources towards the program since it has proven it can yield legitimate peacekeeping forces vital for providing stability in Africa.

## **CONCLUSION**

The 2008 NDS states "...arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves."<sup>61</sup> Accordingly, AFRICOM has aligned its theater strategic objectives to this end. In a resource constrained environment, the command may not be able to properly balance the operational factors of force, time, and space on the vast African continent without an effective method to determine where best to apply its limited means.

AFRICOM must adopt an approach beyond simple need. It should use a 3D prioritization method that truly aligns defense, diplomatic, and development efforts, and rewards states that reject corruption. As President Obama highlighted during his first visit to

Africa, “Development depends on good governance... Governments that respect the will of their own people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.”<sup>62</sup> Applying the proposed 3D security prioritization method, and then using it to focus security assistance efforts on smaller states in West Africa, African island nations, and countries participating in ACOTA are ways AFRICOM can maximize its chances for successfully achieving its theater strategic objectives.

Country	Rank	Total	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factorialized Elites	External Intervention	TI Corruption Perceptions Index
Mauritius	1	33.9	3.9	1.0	3.5	2.4	5.9	4.3	5.3	4.4	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	5.4
Botswana	2	57.6	9.2	6.7	4.3	6.0	7.2	5.6	5.8	6.4	5.0	4.0	2.8	5.8	5.6
South Africa	3	58.0	8.4	7.4	5.3	4.3	8.5	4.6	5.5	5.7	4.5	4.3	5.9	3.0	4.7
Seychelles	4	58.1	6.3	4.4	5.0	4.7	6.8	4.8	7.1	4.6	5.9	5.6	6.0	6.5	4.8
Ghana	5	58.4	7.0	5.1	5.4	8.1	6.6	5.5	5.3	7.2	4.7	2.4	4.2	4.7	3.9
Namibia	6	66.6	7.7	5.5	5.8	7.7	9.1	6.1	5.0	7.1	6.0	5.8	3.6	6.2	4.5
Senegal	7	68.2	7.4	6.0	6.3	5.6	7.5	6.5	6.0	7.3	6.0	5.9	4.0	5.7	3.0
Cape Verde	8	68.3	7.9	4.0	4.4	8.2	6.2	7.2	7.4	7.6	6.2	5.7	6.1	7.6	5.1
Benin	9	69.7	7.5	6.2	4.1	7.0	7.4	6.9	6.6	8.0	5.6	5.2	4.3	6.7	2.9
Morocco	10	70.5	7.0	6.7	6.8	6.2	7.8	6.5	7.4	6.5	6.7	5.1	6.2	4.2	3.3
Sao Tome	11	71.1	8.0	4.0	5.0	7.3	6.1	7.9	7.3	7.5	5.3	5.6	6.3	6.4	2.8
Mali	12	73.1	8.7	4.6	6.5	7.4	6.9	8.3	5.3	8.4	5.2	6.5	4.0	6.9	2.8
Lesotho	13	75.2	9.4	4.7	5.2	6.5	5.6	8.4	7.4	8.7	6.5	5.5	6.9	7.0	3.3
Mozambique	14	75.7	8.7	3.2	4.8	7.6	7.4	8.0	7.3	8.9	7.2	6.0	5.6	6.0	2.5
Tanzania	15	75.9	8.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	6.9	7.5	6.7	8.0	5.8	5.4	6.3	6.8	2.6
Zambia	16	78.2	9.0	7.1	5.3	7.0	7.1	8.5	7.8	8.4	5.6	5.2	5.7	7.5	3.0
Rwanda	17	82.4	9.3	6.9	8.7	7.2	7.3	7.5	7.9	7.3	7.3	4.6	8.0	7.0	3.3
Burkina Faso	18	84.1	9.0	6.0	6.1	6.5	9.0	8.2	7.9	9.0	6.5	7.5	7.6	8.0	3.6
Liberia	19	85.6	8.6	8.0	6.1	6.8	8.5	8.2	7.0	8.5	6.7	6.9	7.9	8.6	3.1
Malawi	20	87.2	9.3	6.3	5.9	8.3	8.5	9.1	8.3	8.8	7.5	5.6	7.8	8.4	3.3
Niger	21	90.7	9.5	6.4	8.5	6.3	7.6	9.2	8.7	9.5	8.2	7.4	7.1	8.1	2.9
Uganda	22	91.9	8.7	9.3	8.0	6.5	8.7	7.6	8.0	8.0	7.7	8.2	8.2	8.0	2.5
Kenya	23	97.0	9.0	9.0	8.6	8.3	8.8	7.5	9.0	8.0	8.2	8.0	8.8	8.2	2.2
Countries below this point do not qualify for aid because they fail to meet MCC criteria.															
Tunisia	24	59.2	5.9	3.2	5.4	5.3	7.2	4.9	6.6	6.1	7.4	6.2	6.0	3.4	4.2
Libya	25	64.4	5.9	4.2	5.8	4.0	7.1	5.5	7.1	4.2	8.1	5.4	7.1	5.0	2.5
Gabon	26	68.6	7.2	5.7	3.0	6.0	7.8	5.5	7.3	6.8	6.3	5.9	7.2	5.7	2.9
Gambia	27	73.2	7.2	5.7	4.4	6.4	7.0	7.4	7.8	7.1	6.9	6.0	6.2	6.9	2.9
Djibouti	28	75.0	8.0	6.4	5.7	5.2	6.3	6.6	7.4	7.5	6.2	6.2	6.9	8.2	2.8
Algeria	29	75.0	6.7	6.7	7.7	6.2	7.3	4.6	7.7	6.7	7.6	7.0	6.7	5.7	2.8
Swaziland	30	75.2	9.2	4.0	4.0	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.8	7.8	7.5	6.8	6.9	7.4	3.6
Madagascar	31	75.6	8.9	5.0	5.6	5.0	7.6	7.4	6.6	8.8	5.9	5.9	7.1	7.8	3.0
Angola	32	81.2	8.6	7.0	6.1	5.5	9.4	4.5	8.0	8.0	7.2	6.2	7.3	7.2	1.9
Togo	33	81.6	7.9	6.0	5.8	6.9	7.5	8.2	7.5	8.3	7.6	7.4	7.3	6.8	2.8
Comoros	34	81.7	7.4	3.7	5.5	6.0	6.3	7.8	8.7	8.7	7.0	7.5	7.9	9.8	2.3
Mauritania	35	83.7	8.7	6.2	8.2	5.0	7.0	7.8	7.0	8.5	7.1	7.9	8.0	7.3	2.5
Equatorial Guinea	36	84.7	8.3	2.0	6.8	7.4	9.0	4.4	9.4	8.6	9.2	8.6	8.6	6.0	1.8
Eritrea	37	85.1	8.6	7.0	5.8	6.5	6.0	8.6	8.6	8.6	7.9	7.4	7.7	7.6	2.6
Sierra Leone	38	87.7	8.9	6.9	6.6	8.5	8.4	8.6	7.4	8.7	7.0	6.1	7.7	7.3	2.2
Republic of Congo	39	89.3	8.9	7.8	6.5	6.1	8.0	8.0	8.6	8.8	7.9	7.8	7.1	7.6	1.9
Cameroon	40	90.9	8.0	7.5	7.2	8.0	8.9	6.9	9.2	8.0	8.0	7.8	8.7	7.1	2.2
Guinea-Bissau	41	91.0	8.6	6.5	5.8	7.0	8.5	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.1	1.9
Burundi	42	92.1	9.2	8.1	7.5	6.5	8.4	8.0	7.5	9.0	7.6	7.3	7.7	8.9	1.8
Ethiopia	43	93.5	9.4	8.0	8.2	7.7	8.8	8.3	7.9	8.2	8.5	7.5	8.8	7.6	2.7
Nigeria	44	94.8	8.5	5.3	9.7	8.3	9.5	6.6	9.2	9.0	8.6	9.4	9.6	6.1	2.5
Ivory Coast	45	98.3	8.6	7.8	9.0	8.4	8.1	8.3	9.1	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.7	2.1
Guinea	46	101.0	8.5	7.1	8.2	8.6	8.9	8.7	9.8	9.2	9.0	9.4	9.2	8.0	1.8
Central African Republic	47	101.4	8.9	9.0	8.6	5.7	9.1	8.4	9.3	9.3	8.9	9.6	9.5	9.1	2.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	48	104.9	9.7	9.6	8.9	8.1	9.3	8.3	8.6	9.2	9.0	9.7	8.7	9.6	1.9
Chad	49	109.0	9.3	9.4	9.8	7.8	9.3	8.3	9.8	9.6	9.5	9.9	9.8	9.7	1.6
Sudan	50	109.4	9.0	9.8	9.9	9.0	9.6	7.0	9.8	9.5	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.8	1.5
Zimbabwe	51	109.6	9.8	9.1	9.1	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.8	9.8	9.9	9.7	9.5	7.6	2.2
Somalia	52	112.5	9.8	9.9	9.7	8.5	7.7	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.8	1.1

Table I: Rank Order of African Countries using the 3D Method<sup>63</sup>

Country	Rank	Total	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	PKO
Sudan	1	70200	24,000	3,900	300	0	42,000
Somalia	2	69040	0	2,000	40	0	67,000
Liberia	3	27525	8,000	0	525	9,000	10,000
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	4	26650	1,700	1,000	500	2,450	21,000
Tunisia	5	17600	0	300	2,300	15,000	0
Morocco	6	14130	2,030	1,200	1,900	9,000	0
Kenya	7	10550	0	8,500	1,050	1,000	0
Angola	8	8000	0	7,500	500	0	0
Nigeria	9	4500	2,000	50	1,100	1,350	0
Ethiopia	10	4275	500	0	775	3,000	0
South Africa	11	3200	0	1,500	900	800	0
Guinea-Bissau	12	3100	3,000	0	100	0	0
Algeria	13	2870	970	950	950	0	0
Djibouti	14	2850	0	0	350	2,500	0
Mozambique	15	2700	300	2,000	400	0	0
Cape Verde	16	2125	2,000	0	125	0	0
Ghana	17	1800	500	0	850	450	0
Senegal	18	1500	0	0	1,100	400	0
Uganda	19	1235	385	0	550	300	0
Libya	20	1100	0	500	350	250	0
Tanzania	21	1050	450	0	400	200	0
Chad	22	900	0	0	400	500	0
Botswana	23	890	0	0	690	200	0
Rwanda	24	700	0	0	500	200	0
Sierra Leone	25	650	250	0	400	0	0
Mali	26	550	0	0	350	200	0
Gabon	27	400	0	0	200	200	0
Zambia	28	400	0	0	400	0	0
Mauritania	29	370	330	0	40	0	0
Burkina Faso	30	350	100	0	250	0	0
Ivory Coast	31	340	0	300	40	0	0
Malawi	32	300	0	0	300	0	0
Cameroon	33	295	0	0	295	0	0
Burundi	34	275	0	0	275	0	0
Benin	35	250	0	0	250	0	0
Madagascar	36	250	0	0	250	0	0
Niger	37	250	0	0	250	0	0
Sao Tome	38	200	0	0	200	0	0
Guinea	39	150	110	0	40	0	0
Mauritius	40	150	0	0	150	0	0
Namibia	41	150	0	0	150	0	0
Togo	42	150	0	0	150	0	0
Central African Republic	43	125	0	0	125	0	0
Comoros	44	125	0	0	125	0	0
Republic of Congo	45	125	0	0	125	0	0
Gambia	46	120	0	0	120	0	0
Lesotho	47	100	0	0	100	0	0
Seychelles	48	100	0	0	100	0	0
Swaziland	49	100	0	0	100	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	50	40	0	0	40	0	0
Zimbabwe	51	40	0	0	40	0	0
Eritrea	52	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Amounts in thousands of US Dollars

INCLE: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

NADR: Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

IMET: International Military Education and Training

FMF: Foreign Military Financing

PKO: Peace Keeping Operations

Table II: FY2010 Account 150 Security-Related Funding<sup>64</sup>

Country	Account 150 Rank	Account 150 Funding (1,000's of \$'s)	3D Rank	3D Score
Mauritius	40	150	1	33.9
Bots wana	23	890	2	57.6
South Africa	11	3200	3	58.0
Seychelles	48	100	4	58.1
Ghana	17	1800	5	58.4
Namibia	41	150	6	66.6
Senegal	18	1500	7	68.2
Cape Verde	16	2125	8	68.3
Benin	35	250	9	69.7
Morocco	6	14130	10	70.5
Sao Tome	38	200	11	71.1
Mali	26	550	12	73.1
Lesotho	47	100	13	75.2
Mozambique	15	2700	14	75.7
Tanzania	21	1050	15	75.9
Zambia	28	400	16	78.2
Rwanda	24	700	17	82.4
Burkina Faso	30	350	18	84.1
Liberia	3	27525	19	85.6
Malawi	32	300	20	87.2
Niger	37	250	21	90.7
Uganda	19	1235	22	91.9
Kenya	7	10550	23	97.0
<b>Countries Below Do Not Meet 3D Criteria</b>				
Tunisia	5	17600	24	59.2
Libya	20	1100	25	64.4
Gabon	27	400	26	68.6
Gambia	46	120	27	73.2
Djibouti	14	2850	28	75.0
Algeria	13	2870	29	75.0
Swaziland	49	100	30	75.2
Madagas car	36	250	31	75.6
Angola	8	8000	32	81.2
Togo	42	150	33	81.6
Comoros	44	125	34	81.7
Mauritania	29	370	35	83.7
Equatorial Guinea	50	40	36	84.7
Eritrea	52	0	37	85.1
Sierra Leone	25	650	38	87.7
Republic of Congo	45	125	39	89.3
Cameroon	33	295	40	90.9
Guinea-Bissau	12	3100	41	91.0
Burundi	34	275	42	92.1
Ethiopia	10	4275	43	93.5
Nigeria	9	4500	44	94.8
Ivory Coast	31	340	45	98.3
Guinea	39	150	46	101.0
Central African Republic	43	125	47	101.4
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	4	26650	48	104.9
Chad	22	900	49	109.0
Sudan	1	70200	50	109.4
Zimbabwe	51	40	51	109.6
Somalia	2	69040	52	112.5

**Table III: Side-by-Side Comparison of Account 150 vs. 3D Method**

## NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement,” Written Testimony to Congress, 17-18 March 2009, page 4, <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed 24 February 2010).
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, page 11.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pages 31-32, page 37.
- <sup>4</sup> William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command Brief,” slide 4, <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed 24 February 2010).
- <sup>5</sup> Clarence J. Bouchat, “Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach,” January 2010, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil> (accessed 20 February 2010).
- <sup>6</sup> William E. Ward, “Transcript of Final Day of U.S. Africa Command Academic Symposium,” 20 August 2009, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=3370&lang> (accessed 20 March 2010).
- <sup>7</sup> Robert M. Gates, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2008, pages 2-3, <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>8</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, page 33, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>9</sup> The 3D Security Initiative, “Human Security Options for Africa and AFRICOM,” November 2007, <http://www.3dsecurity.org> (accessed 24 February 2010).
- <sup>10</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, page 33, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>11</sup> Barack H. Obama, “Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament,” 11 July 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/) (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>12</sup> Hillary R. Clinton, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,” 15 July 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm> (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>13</sup> Robert M. Gates, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2008, page 17, <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, page 74, [http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf) (accessed 21 March 2010).
- <sup>15</sup> These end states are derived from the GEF and listed in the AFRICOM Posture Statement. William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement,” Written Testimony to Congress, 17-18 March 2009, page 11, <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed 24 February 2010).
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, page 3.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, page 11.
- <sup>18</sup> The operational factors are described in great length in Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, reprint, 2009.
- <sup>19</sup> Barack H. Obama, “Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 1 December 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> (accessed 1 March 2010).
- <sup>20</sup> Kirk Victor, “Obama’s Pivot Points,” *National Journal*, Washington: 29 January 2010, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed 1 March 2010).
- <sup>21</sup> William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command,” Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, 19 March 2009, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2844> (accessed 1 March 2010).
- <sup>22</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181, Washington D.C: GAO, February 2009, pages 4-5.
- <sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of State, “FY 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124295.pdf> (accessed 19 March 2010).
- <sup>24</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181, Washington D.C: GAO, February 2009, page 3.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pages 3-4.
- <sup>26</sup> William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command,” Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, 19 March 2009, <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2844> (accessed 1 March 2010).

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Boston University, “How Big is Africa?” <http://www.bu.edu/africa/outreach/materials/handouts/howbig.html> (accessed 2 March 2010)

<sup>29</sup> William E. Ward, “United States Africa Command Brief,” slide 4, <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed 24 February 2010).

<sup>30</sup> World Bank Institute, “Transforming Africa’s Infrastructure,” 12 November 2009, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22386904~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644.00.html> (accessed 20 March 2010).

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Joint Force*, page 14, <https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/j5/j59/default.aspx> (accessed 24 February 2010).

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Congress, *Millennium Challenge Act of 2003*, Section 602 (2), <http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml> (accessed 4 March 2010).

<sup>33</sup> Detailed descriptions of the indicators are located on the websites of the independent sources that the MCC process uses. These can be accessed through the MCC’s website <http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/selection/indicators/index.shtml>

<sup>34</sup> Millennium Challenge Corporation, “2009 Country Scorebook,” <http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/bm.doc/mcc-2009-scorebook.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Countries and Country Tools” Tab, <http://www.mcc.gov/> (accessed 21 March 2010).

<sup>37</sup> Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Report on Countries that are Candidates for Millennium Challenge Account Eligibility for Fiscal Year 2010 and Countries that would be Candidates but for Legal Prohibitions,” December 2009, <http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/bm.doc/mcc-report-fy10-candidatecountryreport-3.pdf> (accessed 6 March 2010).

<sup>38</sup> Analysis using the World Bank Governance Indicators quickly eliminates Libya and Gabon as potential aid recipients due to poor scores on the corruption indicator. World Bank Institute, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc\\_country.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp) (accessed 6 March 2010).

<sup>39</sup> The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index FAQ,” [http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=327](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=327) (accessed 6 March 2010).

<sup>40</sup> Robert M. Gates, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2008, page 9, <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2010).

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