

BARGAINING THEORY AND BUILDING STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING ARMED GROUPS

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 25-03-2010		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Bargaining Theory and Building Strategies for Countering Armed Groups				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Brook Leonard				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. Steven Metz Strategic Studies Institute				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This essay uses bargaining theory to highlight how important it is to think about why conflicts begin, why they continue, and why they end. The elements of bargaining theory and the negotiation techniques, typically used in economic and business, are powerful tools in building strategies that will guide the use of force through the ebbs and flows of persistent conflict. The theories and techniques of bargaining are not new to war, rather they are found throughout classic war theory in the writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and Carl Von Clausewitz. In response to the increasing prevalence and potential of global instability caused by non-state armed groups, many scholars have turned away from these theorists and searched elsewhere for guidance on building strategies to counter armed groups. However, this essay recommends viewing and understanding the confluence of insurgency, terrorism, and crime holistically and historically—countering armed groups is war and war is bargaining. To this end, this essay also introduces a concept called the ‘trinity of interests,’ examines how the shadows of absolute victory have crept into counterinsurgency doctrine, and suggests ways to match the instruments of power to intangible political goals.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Counterinsurgency, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Drug, War, Conflict, Negotiation, Trinity of Interests					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**BARGAINING THEORY AND BUILDING STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING ARMED
GROUPS**

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Brook Leonard

TITLE: Bargaining Theory and Building Strategies for Countering Armed Groups

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 25 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 6,595 PAGES: 34

KEY TERMS: Counterinsurgency, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Drug, War, Conflict, Negotiation, Trinity of Interests

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This essay uses bargaining theory to highlight how important it is to think about why conflicts begin, why they continue, and why they end. The elements of bargaining theory and the negotiation techniques, typically used in economic and business, are powerful tools in building strategies that will guide the use of force through the ebbs and flows of persistent conflict. The theories and techniques of bargaining are not new to war, rather they are found throughout classic war theory in the writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and Carl Von Clausewitz. In response to the increasing prevalence and potential of global instability caused by non-state armed groups, many scholars have turned away from these theorists and searched elsewhere for guidance on building strategies to counter armed groups. However, this essay recommends viewing and understanding the confluence of insurgency, terrorism, and crime holistically and historically—countering armed groups is war and war is bargaining. To this end, this essay also introduces a concept called the ‘trinity of interests,’ examines how the shadows of absolute victory have crept into counterinsurgency doctrine, and suggests ways to match the instruments of power to intangible political goals.

BARGAINING THEORY AND BUILDING STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING ARMED GROUPS

Our aim is not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; rather we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has long existed, and trace it back to its basic elements.¹

—Carl Von Clausewitz

Throughout history, the U.S. military has struggled to develop strategies for conflicts in which policy goals did not translate directly into military objectives, and sought intangible rather than physical results.² Developing strategies to defeat Germany in World War II or eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait was difficult, but not as challenging as developing strategies to counter a communist insurgency in South Vietnam, to produce positive and lasting ‘regime change’ in Iraq, to effectively counter the ‘war on terror,’ or to successfully prosecute a ‘war against drugs.’³ The challenge posed by these latter problems combined with a future of persistent conflict and strained resources, only sharpens the need to develop useful frameworks for handling them.⁴

To date, scholars have developed insightful bodies of literature dealing with the problems posed by insurgency, terrorism, and crime.⁵ However, this literature has not yet produced a comprehensive framework to guide strategy in these challenging and amorphous conflicts. This essay will draw on bargaining theory, negotiation techniques, the concepts of interests and armed groups, and insights from traditional war theories to produce such a framework. This framework will link ends, ways, means, and risk in more effective *and* efficient ways, for conflicts that, in the past, have proven tangled and difficult.⁶

Background

To understand the framework created by theories, techniques, and concepts in this essay, it is important to examine broadly the literature on countering armed groups like the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. In the current literature, scholars offer recommendations that fall into two main categories. First, they recommend using theory, but disagree on whether strategists should use historical war theories or develop new ones.⁷ This argument is rooted in their different understandings about the nature of war and its relationship to politics. Arguments over the nature of war arise because scholars categorize the same use of force differently—trying to delineate its character rather than identifying its nature. For example, they study the enemy’s tactics, objectives, legality, or size and categorize the conflict as terrorism, insurgency, crime, or a small war respectively. This method of categorization does not help create strategy because it fails to capture the nuances of each conflict, and fails to create a clear linkage to applicable theories of war.⁸

The other argument is whether war is an extension of politics or policy. Some scholars argue that war is an extension of politics and therefore its theories are not applicable to conflicts with non-state groups or any group without a political objective.⁹ However, this essay argues that war is an extension of *policy*, it is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and a paradoxical combination of violence/emotion and chance/creativity subordinated to policy/reason.¹⁰ It echoes the sentiment of M.L.R. Smith in *Rethinking the Nature of War*, who said,

All violence is rationally purposive to achieve certain goals, be it the breaking and entry for the purposes of selfish acquisition through theft of a lone burglar or the waging of war among states with mass armies over contested ideologies.¹¹

Therefore, the use of force, by any group, and for any reason shares war's characteristics and despite the tactics and types of actors in the conflict, historical war theories are useful in creating strategy.

Second, scholars recommend changing policies or operational methods.¹² This recommendation is rooted in frustrations with policy or the U.S. penchant for absolute victory and also hinders a nuanced understanding of conflicts and creating strategies.¹³ The Weinberger doctrine, codified by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984, exemplified both attitudes. It argued the U.S. should only commit combat troops for vital and clearly defined interests, with an assurance of support from Congress and the populace, and as a last resort.¹⁴ However, the military does not control policy, but serves it, and therefore will not be in a position to choose the specific circumstances in which force is used.¹⁵

In reference to the desire for absolute victory, this doctrine also states, if it is necessary to commit forces, it should be done "wholeheartedly with the clear intention of winning."¹⁶ Winning in this context, reflects Russell Weigley's conclusion in *The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy*, that the U.S. is mesmerized by overwhelming victory and strategies of attrition or annihilation.¹⁷ This strategic instinct still influences the U.S. approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operationally, the U.S. is managing its use of force to win the hearts and minds of the population, but the strategy still focuses on absolute victory through optimal force ratios to 'attrite' the enemy's support and 'annihilate' its cause. According to Clausewitz and bargaining theorist Thomas Schelling, absolute victory through attrition and annihilation are objects of *absolute war*; *actual war*, on the other hand, is a process of bargaining,

driven by interests, costs, and risks that ends in a compromise, not complete victory.¹⁸

In summary, strategists should understand that insurgency, terrorism, and crime have the same 'logic' as war; they are guided by policy, costly and risky, and subside when the necessary parties reach an agreeable bargain.¹⁹

Answers and Methods

To help strategists understand and resolve conflicts, this essay uses insights from bargaining theory enhanced with negotiation techniques and the concepts of 'counter armed groups' (CAG) and the 'trinity of interests.' Bargaining theory can help create realistic strategies because it provides a framework for understanding why conflicts begin, continue, and end. Its main tenets are: 1) conflicts arise from disagreements over resources and policy; 2) fighting starts because of misperceptions over capabilities, costs, risks, interests, and commitment; 3) the process of fighting clarifies these misperceptions; and 4) conflicts short of absolute war end with an agreeable solution made possible by adjusted perceptions.²⁰ The theory stresses understanding interests and then integrating words, actions, incentives, and penalties. Therefore, conflict initiation, continuation, and resolution depend on communication. Regrettably, most communication is hampered by culture and complicated by the multiple and incongruous actors in a conflict. However, there are techniques and concepts to make it easier, clearer, and more reliable.

Applicable negotiation techniques from business literature include focusing on interests not positions, inventing options for mutual gain, and having a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).²¹ CAG is a categorization of conflicts that encapsulates fights between states and non-state actors (insurgency, terrorism, and crime) to highlight their similarities with war and how they share resources and tactics

(narco-terrorism). The 'trinity of interests' illustrates that war springs from a unique mix of the desires for power, profit, and prestige.²² This essay will combine these theories, techniques, and concepts and provide a framework to create tailored, effective, and efficient strategies for dealing with non-state armed groups.²³

Conflicts with non-state armed groups and bargaining theory have a long history, but the impact of these conflicts and the relevance of these theories have increased. Non-state armed groups are more capable today because of a greater access to technology, funding, and networking resources. This increase in capability represents a change in the grammar of war, not its logic.²⁴ CAG conflicts are still a "duel on a larger scale" where, like bargaining, the success of one's strategy depends on the strategy chosen by the other side.²⁵ Historic war theories echo the ideas of bargaining and negotiating which focus on the interaction of force and provide pragmatic options to resolve the conflict. For example, Clausewitz described these options as the many and shorter roads to success that are not as costly as the "opponent's outright defeat."²⁶ In bargaining theory, the use of force is necessary, but its ends and objectives are realistic. Even though the "destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means," it is "not the only means of attaining the political object."²⁷ Therefore, a good strategy is effective, but a great strategy is effective *and* efficient.

Bargaining theory, negotiation techniques, and the concepts of CAG and a trinity of interests are often overlooked or used predominately in other than military contexts such as economics and business. Therefore, this essay will first define the theories, techniques, and concepts, and then apply them to strategy using examples from CAG conflicts. Although a whole of government, or even a whole of society approach to CAG

conflicts is optimal, this essay will focus on the military instrument of power with some references to the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. In the concluding section, this essay will offer ten tenets on war, strategy, and bargaining.

The Bargaining Model of War

Bargaining theory's most important contribution to constructing CAG strategies is emphasizing that conflicts end in a bargain rather than absolute victory. This essay uses the application of bargaining theory known as the bargaining model of war. Similar to how economists use bargaining theory, this model is about the "allocation of scarce resources among unlimited and competing uses."²⁸ The bargaining model of war defines the essence of conflict as a disagreement over policies or resource allocation.²⁹ In 1960, the economist Thomas Schelling made a robust and coherent argument that conflict is essentially bargaining.³⁰ Later, he argued that even World War II ended with accommodations to the Germans and Japanese.³¹ From these initial arguments, the bargaining model of war grew to include why conflict begins, continues, and ends.

Bargaining theory reveals why conflict begins even though it is inherently costly and risky. The essence of conflict is a disagreement over resources and policy. Fighting starts because of misperceptions over the relative capabilities, costs, risks, interests, and commitment as compared to the other actors and the status quo. These misperceptions exist because of incomplete information, external deception, internal parochialism, and cultural biases.³² Groups fight because they think that a change to the status quo, despite the possible reactions and outcomes, is beneficial. This cost-benefit analysis is multi-dimensional; it has social, psychological, spatial, qualitative, and political components. For example, the cost of fighting today might be less than defending the status quo over the next five years; the cost of being offensive might be

less than being defensive because of the perceived benefits of initiative or surprise; and the cost of losing power might matter more than the cost of losing resources.³³ In addition, risk is a cost determined by the probability and impact of being wrong. Finally, bargaining theory argues that bargaining does not end when the conflict begins, but instead continues through words and actions for the duration of the fight.³⁴

During the conflict, words and acts reveal information and align perceptions about the environment and relative capabilities, costs, risks, interests, and commitments. However, conflict can also increase misperceptions because each side sees, interprets, reasons, and decides differently.³⁵ There is a tendency to label different perceptions and choices as irrational behavior, but these differences are the result of different rationales or non-critical thinking.³⁶ Therefore, understanding your enemy and yourself is still paramount.³⁷ For example, an insurgent group might gain confidence after losing control of one village versus the two it predicted; a terrorist group might advocate suicide bombing using religious beliefs; and a cartel might have convoluted policies based on different individual and organizational interests. In addition, developments such as shifts in alliances, technology, and domestic support can produce unpredicted changes in cost-benefit analyses. However, the physical results ultimately tilt and align each actor's perceptions making room for a bargain to end the conflict.

Bargaining theorists discuss three important perspectives for understanding conflict resolution. First, in order to create an agreeable solution, strategists need to realize that conflict is *not* a zero sum game in which one side's gains equal the other's losses. In fact, the solution to the conflict is something they must create, because the

victor must build an acceptable way out of the conflict for the other actors. Second, it is important to understand the 'divisibility' of the interests. Their divisibility determines the amount of effort capability, creativity, and time required to reallocate resources. An indivisible interest is a resource or policy that two sides cannot reallocate. Interests can appear literally indivisible, such as the disposition of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Similarly, they may appear practically indivisible, such as the Taliban's policy on Shariah law. However, given enough capabilities and time, *all* interests are divisible. More importantly in a given conflict, there are always multiple interests. The intertwined interests of the different individuals and organizations in a conflict are one of the reasons the cost-benefit analysis is multi-dimensional.³⁸ In addition, areas of overlapping interests, or bargaining space, are not contiguous and the solution is often a complex mix of concessions and reciprocations.³⁹ Third, it is important to understand how actors in a conflict view commitment and enforcement—the acceptability and durability of a bargain. Some bargaining theorists argue that conflict resolution hinges on each side's ability to commit to a bargain or to believe it will continue over time.⁴⁰ However, this essay and other bargaining theorists, consider commitment a political or social element and enforcement as a spatial or risk-related element of the cost-benefit analysis.⁴¹ Therefore, strategists should account for the divisibility of current and future interests of all actors involved in the conflict. Negotiation techniques provide unique and creative methods to blend these disparate interests into an agreeable bargain.

Negotiation Techniques

Negotiation techniques used in business provide three methods to help accomplish what bargaining theory recommends. The first one is to focus on interests, (what caused you to decide) not positions (what you have decided upon).⁴² This focus

enables strategists to get beyond incompatible positions and discover compatible interests and interests that only one actor cares about.⁴³ To discover an actor's interests, one must ask 'why' and 'why not' questions, consider basic human needs, and assume their interests are not the same as yours. Second, it is important to invent options for mutual gains. Making a premature judgment, searching for a single answer, assuming a zero sum game, and thinking that 'solving the problem is not your problem' hinder the creation of options.⁴⁴ Instead, strategists must take time to understand the problem before building solutions and look for ways to influence other actors' decisions.⁴⁵ Third, developing a BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and trying to decipher and shape the other actors' BATNAs is correctly beginning the conflict with the end in mind. This parallels Sun Tzu requirement to know when to fight and to attack the enemy's plans.⁴⁶ Developing a BATNA keeps one from entering into a conflict they cannot resolve with the available resources or accepting a bargain they would be better off not accepting.⁴⁷ These techniques will help strategists base their understanding and subsequent strategy in the interests of each actor, which is especially important given the complex nature of CAG conflicts.

Counter-Armed Groups

CAG conflicts are violent interactions between state and non-state forces. The term subsumes actions previously labeled counter-insurgency, -terrorism, -drug, or -gang operations; irregular, unconventional, small guerilla, asymmetrical, or 4th/5th generation wars; and low intensity conflicts.⁴⁸ The purpose of this classification is not to create convenient shorthand for 'other than major combat operations.' Instead, its purpose is to focus thinking on their similarities, how often and easily they intermix, and

how they are still derivations of war even though non-state armed groups carry them out.⁴⁹

The reason for collapsing a wide variety of current definitions into one category is to get past superficial characterizations and into a deeper understanding of the strategic issues CAG conflicts present. The defining and most difficult issue with CAG conflicts is that they are fought in the grey area between war and crime. Another issue highlighted by this categorization is the ever-increasing presence and danger of these types of groups, who are no longer necessarily small and local, and equipped with only small and low-tech arms.⁵⁰ Within CAG conflicts, interests rather than tactics make a critical difference in creating a strategy.

The Trinity of Interests

The concept of a trinity of interests can help one understand and create a strategy for complex conflicts. The concept proposes that an actor's interests are a unique mixture of a desire for power, profit, and prestige. These three desires are like the primary colors, and an actor's interests are different combinations of these colors. Power is about control, profit is about resources, and prestige is about status or influence. Included in prestige is the acceptance of one's own religion and other social, cultural, and moral desires. Politics is mainly about 'who holds the reins of power,' but it has powerful elements of prestige and profit, so it is not a *primary* interest according to this concept. In addition, some scholars consider politics the exclusive realm of states, and therefore using politics as a primary interest would not help define an actor interested in a type of control that falls short of ruling a nation state.

So how does understanding interests help build strategy? As discussed earlier, war is an extension of policy. Policy is 'what to do about' an issue and strategy is 'how

to do it.⁵¹ However, interests are the ‘why you are doing it,’ and they therefore create direction, guidelines, and limitations for policy and strategy. In addition, the success of one’s strategy depends on the other’s strategy. Therefore, strategists must understand interests to evaluate the other actor’s strategies and create their own. Similar to Clausewitz’s trinity, the trinity of interests enables strategists to identify and differentiate the primary elements of an actor’s interests. However, they must not ignore or “fix an arbitrary relationship between them” when evaluating or creating a strategy.⁵²

In conclusion, bargaining theory, negotiation techniques, and the concepts of CAG and the ‘trinity of interests,’ focus on understanding the relationship between the actors in a conflict. They highlight that conflict is a bargaining process and, short of an absolute war, will end in a bargain. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to realize all stakeholders matter—the adversary, the alliance, the populace, and the host-nation’s government, if applicable. It is also important to understand that to succeed in a conflict with multiple actors, with different resources and interests, requires a tailored strategy that constantly re-understands, shapes, and adapts.

Other Answers

Alongside the increased presence and danger of non-state armed groups, scholarly insight and military doctrine for countering these groups at the operational level has sharpened, but not yet produced a holistic strategy. The leading COIN text currently is FM 3-24, U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which melds academic and military expertise.⁵³ This manual expands on the traditional winning the ‘hearts and minds’ operations discussed in previous counterinsurgency (COIN) literature.⁵⁴ This literature contains important COIN principles and phases. However, it does not provide an adequate framework for strategies in conflicts where an

actor's interests are driven by profit and prestige, rather than power *per se*, and in conflicts where absolute victory might not be possible based on relative resources or commitment. On the other hand, FM-3-24 does discuss levels of commitment in its three counterinsurgency approaches—clear, hold, and build, combined action and limited support.⁵⁵ However, while it provides some reasons and techniques for each approach, it mainly addresses operationally matching resources to task and not strategically matching force to policy objectives.

Other literature that has added to CAG operational art includes the five decades of COIN research done by RAND, summarized in *On 'Other War*.⁵⁶ This report compares the two main categories of COIN operations, winning the 'hearts and minds' and using 'carrots and sticks'—the cost benefit theory proposed by Leites and Wolf in *Rebellion and Authority*. While 'hearts and minds' focuses on legitimacy, 'carrots and sticks' focuses on the population's preferences. The report echoes bargaining theory's proposal saying, that an actor's decision calculus (cost-benefit analysis) includes the psychological aspect of legitimacy *and* economic aspect of preference.⁵⁷ While helpful, this conclusion focuses on how to affect the populace, which is an operational consideration; it does not cover how all the actors relate or how the conflict ends, which are strategic considerations.

Finally, Max Manwaring, in his book *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, addresses the complexities and similarities of CAG conflicts. He does this by modifying the counterinsurgency paradigm he created in the 1980's. This updated paradigm contains seven dimensions, or "wars within the general war": wars of understanding the conflict and enemy; wars of legitimacy; wars of internal support; wars of external

support; wars of staying the course; wars of intelligence and information; and wars of unity of effort.⁵⁸ He concludes, these are the basis for “a successful multi-dimensional counterinsurgency/irregular/asymmetric war strategy,” but that “no one has yet rationalized the development of a holistic and workable strategy to confront the phenomenon effectively.”⁵⁹ In summary, Manwaring provides some very astute and time-tested lines of operation—a logical line that connects actions—but not a holistic CAG strategy.⁶⁰ Therefore, despite the abundance of CAG conflicts and the development of operational doctrine for them, strategy is still missing and misunderstood.

The Essence of Strategy

Strategy translates policies into diplomatic, informational, military, and economic objectives. However, it is difficult to create CAG strategies when policies seek primarily intangible versus physical results.⁶¹ In addition, there is a natural tendency to bypass strategy and leap from policy to tactics.⁶² This tendency grows as policies seek more intangible results, and therefore the task of creating strategy becomes exponentially more difficult and misunderstood. Therefore, before applying bargaining theory and negotiation techniques to creating CAG strategy, this section will first define strategy. Then the following sections will demonstrate how bargaining theory and negotiation techniques provide a framework for CAG strategies by focusing on continuously understanding the conflict, shaping the actors and the environment, and adapting.⁶³

*Strategy is a continuous process of uniquely connecting policy and force for a continuing advantage.*⁶⁴ The core of this definition is that strategy (how to do it) connects policy (what to do) and force, or as Clausewitz said, it is “the use of engagements for the object of war.”⁶⁵ Military strategy translates political goals into

military objectives and national strategy is a mix of the appropriate instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. However, in general, strategy should contain the particular ‘ends’ that will accomplish the overarching policy goals and the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ authorized by policy, all appropriately balanced upon risk.⁶⁶ In addition, each strategy should be unique to each conflict because, as Clausewitz said,

War is not like a field of wheat, which, without regard to the individual stalk, may be mown down more or less efficiently depending on the quality of the scythe; it is like a stand of mature trees in which the axe has to be used judiciously according to the characteristics and development of each individual trunk.⁶⁷

Finally, the use of ‘continuous’ and ‘continuing’ in the earlier definition of strategy highlight that it, like the conflicts it addresses, does not have finite beginnings and endings. Instead, conflict is a continuous interaction of opposites whose intensity ebbs and flows.⁶⁸ Therefore, strategy rides on the waves of increasing and decreasing violence wherein the past forms the foundation of the future. Leaders must constantly review the situation, re-understand the problem, and reframe the strategy to maintain an advantage.⁶⁹ To this end, bargaining theory and negotiation techniques will provide a mental framework for creating CAG strategies.

Strategy Understanding CAG Conflicts

The melding of bargaining theory and negotiation techniques (BT/NT) provides a framework for creating and recreating unique and especially efficient strategies through three main functions: understanding, shaping, and adapting.⁷⁰ The main roadblocks in continuously understanding a conflict are shortsightedness and ‘self-sightedness.’ Bargaining theory helps strategists avoid these roadblocks by moving them from “the present into a variety of futures,” and from their “own calculations to those of his enemy.”⁷¹ It does this by asking and answering two questions, ‘how will the conflict end,’

and ‘what are the misperceptions the actors need to resolve to bring the conflict to that end.’

To answer the first question, BT/NT proposes that the conflict will end in a bargain the victor must create and the other actors will agree to. The actors will reach this agreement as their perceptions—about the costs and benefits of continuing to fight versus the status quo or proposed bargain—align. This brings up the answer to the important second question. BT/NT proposes that leaders need to listen to all words and actions to determine the relative capabilities, costs, risks, interests, and commitments of every actor. The actors in a conflict will align their perceptions by exchanging information through action and words. The information they will exchange is just as important—if not more important—than the physical results in determining how the conflict will end.

Therefore, thinking about the war’s end and reflecting on the trinity of interests helps strategists to determine the policy goals of each actor in the conflict and in turn, to understand the type of conflict they are in or about to enter.⁷² This is the critical, but often overlooked ‘test’ mentioned in one of Clausewitz’s more famous quotes, “to establish by that *test* the kind of war on which they are embarking.”⁷³ Then, based on an understanding of the type of conflict, strategists can efficiently determine the amount and types of force required, and how to use it to accomplish the policy objectives. Most importantly, strategists can use this methodology to determine if the required force exceeds the nation’s level of interest and resources, and can inform their leaders of the impending risks.

BT/NT helps strategists avoid overreactions and quagmires. It provides options short of committing the forces required to attrite or annihilate the enemy—or its cause—based on the forecasted bargain. If the forecast is accurate, the efficient use of force counters one of the main objectives of most armed groups, overreaction. If the forecast is inaccurate and an escalation of force is necessary to reach a bargain, the possibility of a quagmire and other risks exists. For example, while the exact costs and benefits of simultaneously trying to do regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan are still unknown, those conflicts have acted as a strategic anti-access campaign.⁷⁴ With all instruments of power stretched to their limits, the U.S. has had limited ability to address Iran's nuclear program and Iranian-backed instability throughout the Middle East. Strategically, a more moderate commitment of force aimed at negotiating with warlords and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan from the beginning might have brought about a bargain similar to what President Karzai is pursuing now, but with less cost and more flexibility.⁷⁵

On the other hand, our limited assistance to Yemen and Saudi Arabia to eradicate al Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula and buffer Iranian-backed instability could draw the U.S. into a quagmire.⁷⁶ If the conflict worsened, it would present the politically difficult question of whether to increase involvement or withdraw; especially if U.S. interests were waning or resources were scarce.⁷⁷ By focusing on how the conflict might end, and on the interests of all actors, strategists can better understand the force required and determine realistic ends and objectives to avoid over committing or being stuck in a quagmire.

Finally, bargaining theory offers ways to deal with the multiple actors in CAG conflicts. At a minimum, strategists will need to consider the interests of the domestic

population and the host nation. Often they will also need to consider the interests of allies and other stakeholders that support the conflict or have social or cultural ties to the nations or groups involved. For example, U.S. strategy toward Yemen needs to consider: U.S. public concern about the bombing of more airline flights and the larger U.S. interest in preventing al Qaeda and other terrorists from gaining a foothold in under-governed spaces. In addition, it needs to consider Saudi Arabian concerns about the border conflict with the Houthi and long-term concerns about al Qaeda, and Yemeni concerns about the Houthi uprising, the instability in Aden, and being seen as a U.S. ally.⁷⁸ For Yemen, the latter are more existential threats than al Qaeda.⁷⁹ In addition, the more actors, the more complicated the conflict. However, according to BT/NT, strategists can leverage additional parties to break deadlocks between actors or impartially enforce a bargain.⁸⁰

Molding interests to create an agreeable bargain is not about maximizing benefits and minimizing costs. Instead, it is about determining which actors will be a part of the solution, and which interests can be changed to create this solution.⁸¹ For example, if the U.S. wants a centralized government in Afghanistan, then bargaining—with either economic or security incentives—should be between the populace and the Afghan government, not between the U.S. and a local tribe. If this is not possible or productive then the U.S. should modify its objectives to seek a more dispersed governing structure.⁸² In summary, strategy requires a constant effort to anticipate the future and understand the interests of other actors. BT/NT, which focuses on creating a bargain through aligning perceptions, provides key questions and answers to sustain this iterative focus. It also helps determine how to shape the other actors' choices.

Strategy Shaping CAG Conflicts

The best action in any conflict depends on what the other actors chose. Therefore, the best strategy is to shape the other's actions by working on their expectation of how their actions will relate to yours.⁸³ Shaping is influencing who and what one thinks is important, based on an understanding of the conflict, with the goal of aligning perspectives to your advantage.⁸⁴ This section will cover the three aspects of shaping critical to gaining an advantage in CAG conflicts: combining punishment and rewards, the use of disproportionate change, and unity of effort.

CAG conflicts are a mosaic of interests, actors, and activities. They, therefore, require strategies that draw from across the spectrum of ways and means. For shaping the conflict, BT/NT recommends using both incentives (carrots) and penalties (sticks). Together carrots and sticks give strategists more options and enable them to build legitimacy *and* cater to the population's preferences. For example, the goal for states dealing with armed groups is to gain a legitimate monopoly on violence *and* services. In Afghanistan, the government needs to provide better security *and* governance than the Taliban. This includes everything from enforcing laws to addressing grievances. In addition, using carrots and sticks makes agreement easier as both sides are making concessions and filling demands.

Using carrots and sticks leverages the different instruments of power and opens up different ways to apply force. Though it may seem counterintuitive, each instrument of power can punish *and* reward. For example, military power might be more effective at rewarding (security) and economic power might be more effective at punishing (sanctions). In addition, carrots or sticks might be more or less effective within the different areas of misperception—capabilities, costs, risks, interests, and commitment.

Therefore, strategists should use carrots and sticks in order to leverage all instruments of power and reach all parts of each actor's cost-benefit analysis. The U.S. and Mexico's recent approach to countering drugs is an example of using too many sticks and not enough carrots. Since December 2006, the Mexican government has mainly used military and police force (sticks) in its 'narco-war,' but the level of violence, and public discontent continues to increase. The U.S. response is the Merida Initiative, which has obligated \$752.6 million to counter-drug efforts in Mexico as of September 2009.⁸⁵ The U.S. has spent 80% of that money on enhancing sticks in the form of helicopters, aircraft, and equipment, and the other 20% training police forces and enhancing Mexico's justice system.⁸⁶ None of the money is going toward carrots such as fixing the poverty that bolsters the cartel's recruitment, or offering incentives to members of the numerous and fractured cartels, to defect.

To strike an effective bargain, strategists should tailor carrots and sticks based on the situation. For example, the rules of engagement, which guide the proportionate use of force in conflicts, should be flexible enough to win the hearts and minds of the populace and impose significant costs upon the enemy when and where it is appropriate. Strategists should tailor carrots the same way. For example, the U.S. recently discovered that paying Afghan Security Forces half of what the Taliban was paying probably impacted recruitment.⁸⁷ If the U.S. could not afford to increase everyone's salary, it could offer an enlistment bonus in areas where the Taliban recruits. Combining incentives and penalties is an important part of strategy's shaping function and sometimes, drastic combinations are more effective at changing perceptions.

It is human nature to use evidence to confirm what one already believes.⁸⁸ In a conflict, each actor has an incentive to withhold information or deceive.⁸⁹ Institutions and people hold position-based agendas that taint their analysis and communication.⁹⁰ However, disproportionate changes can drastically affect an actor's cost-benefit analysis as they forecast the increased cost and risk over time. Therefore, it often takes a disproportionate change to shape expectations. In CAG conflicts, a strategist can effect disproportionate change with the use of a 'strategic bargaining reserve.' For example, rather than sending combat troops into as many places as one can secure, a strategist could hold back a large unit, then rapidly deploy it to drastically increase an actor's expectation of cost and risk, and then offer a bargain. According to Lieutenant General Ordierno, Commanding General, III Corps, from 2006 through 2008, this is what major offensives within the Iraqi surge did to enhance the Anbar Awakening and eventually secure Iraq.⁹¹ In addition to combining incentives and penalties to affect disproportionate change, it is important to synchronize shaping efforts.

BT/NT helps build a unity of effort because it drives the whole of government, or even the whole of society, to focus on communication.⁹² It is difficult for the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and Doctors Without Borders, for example, to synchronize efforts because they accomplish their mission in different ways. However, BT/NT proposes that all words and actions reveal information and by focusing on communications, strategists can build a better unity of effort. For example, the DOD stresses strategic communications, but it is an annex to operational plans and often added to the strategy at the end. On the other hand, communications is the focus of the DOS. If strategists made communicating through words and action the main effort

from the beginning, they could bolster unity of effort. In summary, no one can think through and shape an entire chess match, much less an entire conflict. However, a good player, more so than a poor player, thinks further ahead, considers his opponent's moves, and is prepared to adapt.⁹³

Strategy Adapting in CAG Conflicts

The enemy always has a vote and the future is not completely predictable, therefore, the third function of strategy is to build an actor's ability to adapt. BT/NT helps one adapt by focusing on continuous learning and robust goals and references. Learning through action has been part of military planning for years and is expanding to 'learning throughout the conflict' with the advent of campaign design in FM 3-24.⁹⁴ BT/NT reinforces continuous learning by proposing that bargaining continues throughout the conflict as fighting constantly reveals information. Realizing conflict is a continuous flow of information reminds strategists to look at the sequence of events, decisions, and words, rather than each item as a discrete entity.⁹⁵ This perspective does not necessarily provide strategists with answers, but it does provide them with lessons to build their understanding and an accurate point of departure from which to shape the future.⁹⁶

In order to continuously adapt and maintain an advantage it is important to have robust goals and references, which includes an end state *and* a BATNA. Prior to planning strategists receive or create a discrete end state. An end state is a desired goal, whereas a BATNA is the alternative to not entering into or continuing the conflict. For example, on a business trip a possible end state is 'a traveler happily home in time for dinner.' If the airlines asked that traveler to give up their seat on a flight for \$200, having a BATNA that specifies if the departure time of the next flight allows the traveler

to get home in time for dinner, is an important piece of making an appropriate decision. In addition, a BATNA is not a minimum acceptable bargain such as only giving up one's seat for a minimum of \$400. A minimum acceptable bargain is usually set too high, seems unchangeable, and limits creativity. Therefore, having an end state and a BATNA helps one reject offers they should not accept and opens up options that could maximize gain. Similarly, updating the end state and BATNA throughout the conflict helps strategists anticipate risks and opportunities, and then adapt the plan accordingly. After strategists adapt the plan, they need to go back and understand the ramifications, shape the conflict accordingly, and then adapt to those results...and so on. Bargaining theory provides insight into each of these functions to help strategists look at CAG conflicts with a different perspective, create a nuanced response, and thereby approach an era of persistent conflict with effectiveness *and* efficiency.

Conclusion

Armed groups with a myriad of interests suspended between the desires for power, profit, and prestige are continuing to mix and threaten regional and indeed global stability. However, CAG strategy has not kept pace. While a tremendous amount of literature dissects counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and counter-drug operations and tactics, there is little that helps strategists put it all together to meet policy goals. Currently the U.S. is overcommitted and consequently unprepared to sustain its advantage in an era of persistent conflict. This makes CAG conflicts one of the most effective strategic level anti-access capabilities for nations such as Iran.⁹⁷ BT/NT, which seeks to shift the U.S.'s paradigm of winning from absolute victory to realistic agreements, can provide effective and efficient options to maintain strategic flexibility.

The ten tenets listed below mix thoughts on war, strategy, and bargaining. They will shape the mindset of strategists and prepare them to embrace the principles of BT/NT by being a guide, easing the way, training the judgment, and helping strategists avoid the pitfalls of forgetting that conflict is costly and risky and absolute victory is unrealistic.⁹⁸

1. Many victories have and will be suicide to the victor.⁹⁹
2. War is continuous bargaining through action and words.
3. War is an extension of policy, which subordinates war's violence and creativity.
4. Strategy is a continuous process of understanding, shaping, and adapting that uniquely connects force to policy, for a continuing advantage.
5. Strategy must be efficient and tailored and it is formed by asking the right questions.¹⁰⁰
6. Force is the more costly and risky way to change policy or reallocate resources.
7. Employing less force than is required to win absolutely can be a viable short cut or a possible trap.
8. Words and actions reveal information about you, your enemy, the environment, and the nature and direction of the conflict...so constantly listen and reframe the problem and strategy accordingly.
9. Be persistent in pursuing your interests, but not rigid in pursuing any particular solution.¹⁰¹

10. The post conflict leaders must have had a say in the bargain and seat at the table regardless of which side it was on.

As Sun Tzu said, "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the way to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed."¹⁰² These tenets are for that purpose, but never forget the most important question...how will this conflict end?

Endnotes

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 389.

² For concept see Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 80-81. For evidence, see Elliot Cohen, "Looks Like War," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 16 October 2000.

³ For example see Andrew T H Tan, *U.S. Strategy Against Global Terrorism* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009), Joel P. Royal, *United States Counter-Drug Strategy and Policy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), or Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006).

⁴ For example see Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2007): 13 and Joseph D. Celeski, "Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 35-38.

⁵ For example see Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).

⁶ By describing the conflicts as difficult, I am describing their intellectual and physical challenges. For a thorough discussion on both challenges, a historical review of the U.S.'s inability to classify or build strategies for these conflicts, and why they share the same logic as Clausewitzian war, see M.L.R. Smith, "Strategy in an Age of 'Low-intensity' Warfare: Why Clausewitz is Still More Relevant than His Critics," in *Rethinking the Nature of War*, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 28-51.

⁷ For example see Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2007).

⁸ For more background see M.L.R. Smith, "Strategy in an Age of 'Low-intensity' Warfare: Why Clausewitz is Still More Relevant than His Critics," 28-64.

⁹ Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, 48-51.

¹⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 75 and 89 and Janeen Klinger, "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz," *Parameters* 36, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 79-89. I used violence/emotion rather than hatred/enmity violence is the result of hatred in war and because emotion captures the social and mental underpinnings of enmity. I also used creativity rather than probability to correspond the innovation talked about in bargaining theory.

¹¹ M.L.R. Smith, "Strategy in an Age of 'Low-intensity' Warfare: Why Clausewitz is Still More Relevant than His Critics," 34.

¹² For example see Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), and Antulio J. Echevarria, *An American Way of War or Way of Battle?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 1, 2004).

¹³ Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, xi.

¹⁴ Jeffery Record, "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 79-95. See also Antulio J. Echevarria, *An American Way of War or Way of Battle?*

¹⁵ See Michael Mullen, Landon Lecture Series remarks, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, March 3, 2010, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1336> (accessed March 13, 2010).

¹⁶ Jeffery Record, "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?" and Antulio J. Echevarria, *An American Way of War or Way of Battle?*

¹⁷ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 475. See also, Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1966), 16 and Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?" 53.

¹⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in *The Art of War in World History*, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 1013-1022, Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 90-94 and 605, and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 5-6.

¹⁹ I used the word subside rather than end in this sentence to highlight that conflict does not have a true end. It rises and falls. Just like there is no absolute war there is no absolute peace. In addition, insurgency, terror, and crime are the words Max Manwaring uses in his book title that describe the normal spectrum of conflicts with non-state armed groups, see Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime* and Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

²⁰ Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics* (2003): 27-43.

²¹ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 40-102.

²² I created this trinity by combining the idea of motives (fear, honor, and interests) in Robert B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 43 and the idea that “insurgency sometimes meets the economic and psychological needs of the insurgent” in Steven Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” *Parameters* Vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 27. See also Max G. Manwaring in *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, 12.

²³ Built from ideas in Len Fisher, *Rock, Paper, Scissors, Game Theory in Everyday Life* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 195.

²⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

²⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 15 and 120-161.

²⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 93-4.

²⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 95-97.

²⁸ David L. Sills, ed., *International encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1968), 472.

²⁹ Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” 28.

³⁰ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 5.

³¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 126.

³² Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004): 786-788 and James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49, Iss.3 (Summer 1995): 390-98.

³³ Robert Powell labels the qualitative and political components of the cost-benefit analysis as commitment problems and not a product of indivisible interests. See Robert Powell, “War as Commitment Problem,” *International Organization* 60, Iss.1 (Winter 2006): 194.

³⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

³⁵ Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” 786-88.

³⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 16-19. He talks about how often people do not maximize their cost-benefit analysis or have different ways of looking at costs and benefits. People and organizations perceive and make decisions differently. They also fall victim to group think or do not think critically through problems. Therefore, the debate over rational versus irrational behavior is impractical, if not irrelevant.

³⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 179.

³⁸ James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 392 and Robert Powell, “War as Commitment Problem,” 171.

³⁹ Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace, War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 225.

⁴⁰ See Robert Powell, "War as Commitment Problem" and Kenneth A. Schultz, "War as an Enforcement Problem: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars," March 9, 2007, http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/centers/browncip/2006_2007%20papers/War%20and%20Enforcement.pdf (accessed February 28, 2010).

⁴¹ R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State* (Ann Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007).

⁴² Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed., 40-55.

⁴³ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed. Ury, 43.

⁴⁴ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed. Ury, 57.

⁴⁵ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed., 76-79 and Albert Einstein's quote, "If I had an hour to save the world he would spend fifty-nine minutes defining the problem and one minute finding solutions."

⁴⁶ Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York, NY: Franklin Covey Co., 1989), 95-144 and Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 177-179.

⁴⁷ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed., 97.

⁴⁸ Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?," 19. This is an example of linking counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism and calling it irregular warfare.

⁴⁹ See for example, the mixing of threats in U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 15, 2009) 2-17 and M.L.R. Smith, "Strategy in an Age of 'Low-intensity' Warfare: Why Clausewitz is Still More Relevant than His Critics," 31. The term 'non-state armed groups' is prevalent throughout academics and the internet, see a Harvard-sponsored research site at www.armed-groups.org for example.

⁵⁰ Hezbollah versus Israel in Lebanon 2006 for example.

⁵¹ Alan G. Stolberg, "Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century," paper presented to the annual American Political Science Association Conference, (Toronto, Canada, 2009), 2 and Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

⁵² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

⁵³ The U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

⁵⁴ See David Galula *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006) and John A. Nagl *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005)

⁵⁵ The U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 174-188

⁵⁶ Austin Long, *On 'Other War,' Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

⁵⁷ Austin Long, *On 'Other War,'* 31.

⁵⁸ Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, 10.

⁵⁹ Max G. Manwaring, *Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime*, 10.

⁶⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3.0*, 17 September 2006 incorporating Change 1 13 February 2008, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), GL-19.

⁶¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 80-81 and Elliot Cohen, "Looks Like War."

⁶² Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?" 53.

⁶³ Frans P.B. Osinga *Science, Strategy, and War* (New York, NY: Rutledge, 2007), 217-219.

⁶⁴ I melded this definition from the several theorists. See Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy* (New York, New York: Frank Cass 2005), 18, Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 17, Carl Von Clausewitz, 128, and Kimberly Kagan *The Surge, A Military History* (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2009), 203.

⁶⁵ Alan G. Stolberg, "Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century," paper presented to the annual American Political Science Association Conference, (Toronto, Canada, 2009), 2 and Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 128.

⁶⁶ Harry R. Yarger, "Toward a Theory of strategy; Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 44-47 and Alan G. Stolberg, "Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century," 2-4.

⁶⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 153 and choice depends on circumstance p. 94. See also, R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State*, 151, for thoughts on having a specific versus a general strategy.

⁶⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 136.

⁶⁹ Supports the U.S. Army's growing emphasis on design, see The U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 137-150.

⁷⁰ Frans P.B. Osinga *Science, Strategy, and War*, 217-219.

⁷¹ Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace, War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, 241.

⁷² R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State*, 483.

⁷³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

⁷⁴ Cell discussion during USAWC's Strategic Decision Making Exercise, March 10, 2010.

⁷⁵ Nouredine Jebnoun, "Denial of Failure in Afghanistan," 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/120-jebnoun.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2010).

⁷⁶ Ahmed Al-Haj and Salah Nasrawi, "Saudi Arabia Bombs Yemen Rebels," *The Huffington Post*, November 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/05/saudi-arabia-bombs-yemen_n_346787.html (accessed February 12, 2010).

⁷⁷ Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," 785. This section discusses how leaders pay domestic political costs for getting into a conflict and then backing down. See also the discussion on ratcheted escalation in Austin Long, *On 'Other War'*, 27.

⁷⁸ Lawrence E. Cline, "Yemen's Strategic Boxes," (2009) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/339-cline.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2010).

⁷⁹ Lawrence E. Cline, "Yemen's Strategic Boxes," (2009) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/339-cline.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2010).

⁸⁰ R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State*, 230. This reference discusses how a third party can build an uncertain political process or it can pay parties to move toward peace. For a discussion on group cooperation that varies with size, see Len Fisher, *Rock, Paper, Scissors, Game Theory in Everyday Life*, 196.

⁸¹ Jan Angstrom, "Inviting the Leviathan: External Forces, War, and State-Building in Afghanistan," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 377-378, 383, and 389 and Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace, War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, 194.

⁸² Strategists do not have to make a plan where the host nation government is a complete ally. Sometimes it might be best to remake the government in order to reach your policy objectives, see Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, vii.

⁸³ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 15.

⁸⁴ Robert Powell, "War as Commitment Problem," 176-181.

⁸⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Status of Funds for the Merida Initiative* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 3, 2009), 2-7 at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2010).

⁸⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Status of Funds for the Merida Initiative* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 3, 2009), 18-24 at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2010).

⁸⁷ "Taliban Pay vs. Afghan Forces," December 9, 2009, <http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2009/12/09/taliban-pay-vs-afghan-forces-pay/> (accessed March 10, 2010).

⁸⁸ Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," 801.

⁸⁹ James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," 391 and 395-396.

⁹⁰ Robert Powell, "War as Commitment Problem," 344 and Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace, War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, 8, and Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," 786-788 and 807.

⁹¹ Kimberly Kagan *The Surge, A Military History*, 97-115, 134-138, and 196-203.

⁹² Whole of government includes all departments of the executive branch and whole of society not only adds non-governmental organizations, but private and local business and popular support.

⁹³ Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace, War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, 240.

⁹⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, *Planning* (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, July 21, 1997), 65-83 and *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, xixx and Chapter 4.

⁹⁵ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 61.

⁹⁶ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 70-75.

⁹⁷ Cell discussion during USAWC's Strategic Decision Making Exercise, March 10, 2010.

⁹⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 141

⁹⁹ Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. B. Jowett (New York, NY: Random House, 1937), 19.

¹⁰⁰ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 4.

¹⁰¹ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed., 173.

¹⁰² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 167.