

TRAINING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES STRATEGIC MISSION FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRAINING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES STRATEGIC MISSION FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the opportunity for Army National Guard Soldiers to train/assist and mentor host-nation security forces. The examination includes: (1) analysis of the current structure of Brigade Combat Teams augmented for security force assistance, (2) future challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency environment and development of the Guard to augment the total force by building competency and capacity, (3) provide background revolving around the vast experience and partnerships that the Guard can offer to security force assistance teams, (4) offers recommendations for successful development within the Guard States to develop citizen soldiers for contingency operations in the 21st century.

TRAINING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES STRATEGIC MISSION FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan change over the next few years, the National Guard should not revert back to being simply a strategic reserve

—Adm. Mike Mullen
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has gone through several transformations post September 11, 2001. The Army has managed its reserve components as an operational force for several years; it is time to pursue policy and legislative changes to institutionalize this transformation.² The Secretary of the Defense and Secretary of the Army, have numerous options to consider in regards to employment of the reserve component. The impact of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1200.17 “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force” will provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. DoDD 1200.17 recognizes the manner in which the reserve component has been used during the ongoing war on terror and addresses the resource changes that are necessary.³

The ARNG is at a critical junction, attempting to balance both state and federal missions. Defense leaders are discussing the Guard’s future roles and missions. One group would have ARNG support the Homeland Defense (HLD) as its sole mission.⁴ The second school of thought is for the Guard to take on a portion of HLD⁵ and continue to train and prepare for combat missions in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, General Craig McKinley explained his position to an audience at the National Defense University. General McKinley stated his priority is to identify the roles and missions for units to train

and develop the organization of the future.⁶ One group would have ARNG support the Homeland Defense (HLD) as its sole mission.⁷ The second school of thought is for the Guard to take on a portion of HLD⁸ and continue to train and prepare for combat missions in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The challenges of today's armed forces are numerous and complex. The national focus on providing security to the homeland in an era of persistent conflict needs be managed correctly in regards to our budgeting, policy, and program priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) February 2010 addresses ongoing reform and the reshaping of America's military. The task of building security capacity of partner states and reforming security assistance is addressed at length in several sections of this document. The QDR makes the point within the range of security cooperation activities, that the most dynamic in the coming years will be Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. The mission is explained as a "hands on" effort, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories.⁹ The QDR addresses six key initiatives to support the mission of SFA. The ARNG has the structure and experience to support at least three of the six initiatives.

This essay provides background information and justification for the ARNG providing Soldiers to address the requirement to train host-nation security forces. The first area to address will be a comprehensive analysis of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and how they are presently structured and trained for the SFA mission. The current needs of the Counterinsurgency (COIN) environment will be addressed and how

the ARNG can augment the force. The vast experience of ARNG Soldiers and leaders will build a strong bench that can assist the active component in meeting its goal of developing host-nation security forces. The final discussion will provide recommendations and outline a Coarse of Action (COA) that Guard States, along with The National Guard Bureau (NGB), can provide a trained and reliable organization for contingency operations in the 21st century.

In 2009 the ARNG had a very successful year; this announcement came a full month before the end of the fiscal year. The ARNG reached its congressionally mandated end-strength goal of 358,200 the week ending August 27, 2009.¹⁰ In addition to achieving the end-strength goal, ARNG personnel readiness is at the highest levels in history. In 2005, only 77 percent of ARNG Soldiers were considered trained in a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Today, over 91 percent are trained in a military occupation.¹¹ The 14 percent increase was accomplished while an Operational Tempo still remained very high in support of numerous worldwide operations. The ARNG is not only meeting the end-strength goal but also providing a trained and qualified force.

Strategic Context

The global security environment is more ambiguous and unpredictable than in the past. Many national security and intelligence experts share the Army's assessment that the next several decades will be characterized by persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.¹²

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlines the critical task for combatant commanders to focus on security assistance programs. The QDR states that shifting our military effort to enable foreign partners through expanding their

capacities, building key relationships, and establishing trust will prove especially valuable in the fight against terrorism.¹³

The 2006 National Security Strategy identifies conflict intervention, and how conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests. Recent experience has underscored that the international community does not have enough high-quality military forces trained and capable of performing these peace operations.¹⁴ In consonance with this, the National Military Strategy commits U.S. forces to establish favorable security conditions and increase the capabilities of partners.¹⁵

The challenge of conducting security assistance programs and training host-nation forces falls directly on the combatant commands' desk. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)¹⁶, provides priorities and strategic end states. One of the five areas that the GEF provides direction is in the area of Security Cooperation Planning. These plans provide direction to assist the nations that require guidance and training to build security force capabilities.

The 2006 QDR and the most recently published 2010 QDR continue to stress the need to rebalance the force. The mission of building security capacity of partner states is an area that is critical to the ongoing reform and reshaping of America's military. The ARNG has the experience and structure to assist in meeting the key QDR initiatives to support capabilities for SFA.

Joint Operations

The discussion of strategic context would not be complete without covering the goals and direction for Joint Operations in present and future conflict. Cooperative security involves the comprehensive set of continuous, long-term and integrated actions. The relationships are among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international

government and nongovernmental partners. These partnerships maintain and enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crisis, and facilitates other operations when crises occur.¹⁷

The training of host-nation security forces in the Joint Environment will bring rapidly changing trends that will have profound implications for the character of war.¹⁸ In almost every case, Soldiers will find themselves working closely with partners, a factor which will demand not only a thorough understanding of U.S. political goals, but coalition goals as well. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the next twenty years.

Training Mission 2002 -2005

Lieutenant General David Barno, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, established through the Office of Military Cooperation the mission to build an Afghan National Army (ANA). In Iraq, a renewed training program began in 2004 with an additional component of embedded U.S. military advisors in Iraq units.

The two training missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were initially manned in an ad hoc fashion, with a large proportion of reserve and ARNG officers and NCOs. The mission of training host-nation security forces has been and will continue to be the purview of Army Special Forces. The challenge for Special Forces at this time was supporting the growth of the ANA combined with initial combat operations in Iraq. The stress on Special Operation Forces (SOF) manpower requirements was stretch thin to support both the training mission and combat operations.

The ARNG assumed the mission of providing trainers for the Afghan Army training program in the summer of 2003. The training of Embedded Team Trainers (ETTs)¹⁹ for Afghanistan was conducted at numerous military reservations such as Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Hood, Texas and Fort Carson, Colorado. Many Soldiers

considered the training to be of limited value as the Army and some of the trainers themselves were unfamiliar with the mission they were preparing to conduct.

United States Army Reserve (USAR) proposed the concept of employing its units for USAR institutional training divisions. The Army never implemented the Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command concept because the establishment of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) made it unnecessary.²⁰ The USAR proposed the concept to then Lieutenant General Petraeus, commander of MNSTC-I, on 2 June 2004 just days before he took command in Iraq. Lieutenant General Petraeus intended to fill his training teams from active duty units. In the spring of 2005 the coalition also changed the term for unit advisor teams from Advise Support Train to Military Transition Teams (MiTT)²¹

Fort Riley Transition Teams

The Army took an enormous step in the summer of 2006. The 1st Infantry Division moved from Germany to Fort Riley, Kansas and assumed the responsibility of training thousands of service members who are filling the transition team mission in Afghanistan and Iraq. Major General Carter Ham, Commanding General of 1st ID, has 600 trainers that will push through 6,000 team members a year.²²

The designation of 1st ID Fort Riley to provide experienced trainers with actual combat experience from Afghanistan and Iraq was a sound message that SFA training is a critical mission that needed to be standardized in one location for Army forces.

Current Advisor Training

On September 1, 2009, the recently constituted 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana was scheduled to take over the advisor training mission previously performed at Fort Riley by 1st Infantry Division units since 2006.²³ The commander of

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Fort Polk, Brigadier General James C. Yarbrough, said the Army has recognized that the capacity to train combat advisors in security assistance roles is a critical mission. The Army intends not to let the art and science of this training task atrophy and die out like the country did after Vietnam.

The 162nd Infantry Brigade will have a cadre of about 825 soldiers, organized into five maneuver training battalions and one support battalion. Most training will be accomplished by mobile training teams.²⁴

The current plan calls for deploying BCTs to be augmented with twenty or more field-grade officers—depending on the number of coalition units that will need assistance in the area of operations. The BCTs will identify and allocate the necessary number of officers and NCOs already serving in the BCT to fill the teams. The training teams vary in size, from eleven to sixteen Soldiers depending on the designation of coalition unit to be trained (combat or combat service support).

To date the Army has addressed only half of the mission for training host-nation security forces. The 162nd Infantry Brigade is currently training soldiers and units tasked to deploy and train coalition forces. The piece that remains unanswered is who will serve as a military adviser. The Army has struggled over seven years with trying to identify who will become a military adviser.

The bipartisan Iraq Study Group recommended increasing sharply the number of U.S. personnel devoted to the MNSTC-I training mission. The concern is any large-scale U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be dependent on creating Iraqi security forces capable of filling the void. Defense Secretary Robert Gates described the training effort as “arguably the most important military component” of the overall war effort.²⁵

In the Army young officers have long complained that serving on training teams left them far less likely to be promoted than soldiers with combat command experience. Brigadier General Michael Linnington, Commandant of West Point, interviewed thousands of soldiers as part of an internal Army effort to gauge the effect of repeated tours of duty, found this ideology to be true.²⁶ The question that Soldiers ask prior to taking on a new assignment, is this position such as serving as a military adviser going to help or hurt my career advancement?

The Army took action to change the negative perception about serving on training teams. To ensure the best possible officers are selected to serve on these teams the Army leadership took action. The Chief of Staff of the Army designated captain and major positions as key developmental positions.²⁷ The improved status of placing training team positions on par with company command, operations officer, and executive-officer positions in other units will facilitate a paradigm shift in negative thinking. Additionally, there are thirty-eight positions for lieutenant colonels that have been designated to receive battalion-command credit. These positions are the team-chief positions on teams that are directly aligned with brigade-sized Iraqi and Afghan units. The selection of these officers will be a competitive process. Officers who are selected for transition-team positions will receive credit for sixteen months of battalion command.²⁸

Counterinsurgency Environment

The 1999 National Security Strategy made no mention of Counterinsurgency (COIN); it deemed America's principle national security challenges to be negotiating international peace agreements, reforming international commerce, and curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²⁹

Most elements of the American military were focused on either conventional warfare or peacekeeping. The challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq have turned COIN into the most important problem confronting the United States in the early twenty-first century. Martin Van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, argues that insurgencies have been almost impossible to defeat ever since Nazi Germany failed to suppress Josip Broz Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia.³⁰

In his 2002 book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl USA (Ret) discusses the British attempts in Malaya to conduct COIN operations and reviews the American experience in Vietnam in dealing with insurgencies. John Nagel assisted with the development of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was published back in December 2006. Nagel has been an advocate in sound COIN methods dictated from senior leadership in the form of orders and doctrine. The task of finding and developing the right leaders and getting them into key command positions are far more complex and daunting than is generally recognized.³¹ The ARNG has a core of experienced and trained combat ready veterans that can assist in the mission to develop the present need for security force trainers and also mentor and train future leaders and build a bench for future conflict.


How has war changed since the end of the cold war? It is more likely than not that most of America's enemies in the near future will continue to be at least as awkwardly and inconveniently asymmetrical as they have been over the past twenty years.³²

The mission of the U.S. Army is to fight and win the nation's wars. When bullets are flying, Soldiers are in harm's way, and the national interest is at stake. The Army

must focus on one thing, winning the wars it is in.³³ Future conflicts are important, but the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is not going well. The Iraq situation was on the verge of catastrophic collapse only two years ago. The message that the American public has heard loud and clear is that the U.S. military and Department of Defense (DOD) will be committed to both campaigns for some years to come.

Personnel Shortage SFA

According to the Government Accountability Office, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded just 46 percent (1,019 of 2,215) of the DOD required number of embedded trainers for the (ANA), and only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors to the Afghan National Police (ANP).³⁴ This is shocking despite the fact that numerous military leaders and scholars have stated that victory in this struggle depends on America’s ability to develop capable host-nation security forces. The advisory efforts are hampered by numerical and quality shortfalls. U.S. tactical units are well trained and cohesive; however, military advisory elements are pickup teams which often lack effective preparation for their complex duties.³⁵ The statement continues to bear the truth, the advisory effort in Afghanistan and Iraq is essential for success. The reality is training teams finish a distant second behind provisions of tactical units.






Figure 1: Army (all compos) Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement through Early 2009³⁶

The U.S. is not alone in the blame game for lack of planning and development of training teams. Coalition partners have done an inadequate job in fulfilling their commitment to training host-nation security forces in Afghanistan.

NATO Involvement in Afghan Security Forces

NATO’s involvement with the ANA largely involves assisting the Afghan government and the United States with the operational employment and training of the ANA units. The United States as lead nation for the ANA program has the primary responsibility in all areas—from manning to basic and collective training, funding, equipping, sustainment and validation.³⁷

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT)³⁸ program consists primarily of officers and non-commissioned officers from a wide range of troop-contributing countries who are embedded in Afghan units as mentors and trainers to the ANA. The aim of the OMLT program is to facilitate the focused development of ANA so that it can take responsibility for security in the

country. The OMLTs replaced the U.S. ETTs at all levels of command, mentoring ANA leaders on such issues as leadership, area specific functions, implementation of doctrine, operational procedures, tactics, and on the job training during operations in the field.

The first NATO OMLT was introduced by the British in 205th Corps, 3rd Brigade, in Helmand Afghanistan in May 2006. The author of this paper was selected along with four other U.S. ETTs to serve as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assist nine NATO nations OMLT teams training in Germany for thirty days. The training took place in May 2006 at the conclusion of a one year deployment in eastern Afghanistan. The author served as operations officer and executive officer of an eleven man ETT that mentored an ANA Infantry Kandak in eastern Afghanistan. The concern of the NATO Soldiers training to serve as OMLTs was the idea of being in combat. Many NATO countries have not been involved in actual combat situations. The majority of OMLTs had served on peace keeping missions. The successful trainers understand that to gain the respect of the host-nation Soldiers you need to be in the field and leading from the front. Three years have passed since observing the OMLT training process. The trepidation regarding the combat environment is the challenge faced by NATO countries attempting to execute their responsibilities for producing trained OMLTs.

As of August 2008, only 34 OMLTs out of 71 eligible positions had been validated for operational use throughout the theater, with only a few countries volunteering to fill 37 unmanned OMLT positions.³⁹

The U.S. is the main effort with all aspects of training the ANA. When our efforts to fill training team vacancies is seen as not a priority, it should not be a surprise that coalition forces follow the U.S. Army's example of placing emphasis on tactical units.

Special Forces and Training Mission

A plan that involves the ARNG in taking a portion of the training mission cannot be addressed without discussing the role of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The Special Operations Forces (SOF) are one of the nation's most valuable assets. While training Foreign Internal Defense has been the primary responsibility of SOF, training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all services.⁴⁰

The concern is the operational tempo has been elevated for some time and these highly trained warriors are in need of relief or assistance. The missions of SOF have gradually increased so that by 1997, approximately 4,760 personnel were deployed abroad every week, a threefold increase from 1991.⁴¹ With the advent of the Global War on Terrorism, USSOCOM personnel have become stretched even further. As an example, a U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team members currently spends six months abroad during an 18- month period rather than the previous standard of six out of every 24 months. In the case of Iraq, some 9,000 to 10,000 U.S. special operations forces (including operators, administrators, and support staff) are deployed from a total contingent that is only 49,000 strong.⁴² The SOF community is expanding. The problem is it takes five to six years to train and educate a fully qualified SOF Soldier.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of the New York Times-bestseller "The Pentagon's New Map", discusses the training mission and the role of SOF in his latest book. Barnett agrees for now that the idea for a separate training adviser corps has been

rejected by the mainstream Army leadership. The plan is to keep the skills a niche within the U.S. military and thus solely by the far smaller SOF community.⁴³ The challenge, however, is that more senior SOF personnel, those frequently tasked as trainers and mentors, are the individuals seeking earlier than expected release from service.⁴⁴

The Need for “Army Advisor Corps”

Many in the institutional Army urge returning the advisor role to Army’s Special Forces, especially as they grow their force. Others, such as Dr. John A. Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret), argue for a permanent 20,000 man Army Advisor Corp.⁴⁵ Noted analyst Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, recently briefed the Pentagon’s leadership on a similar proposal.⁴⁶

Dr. Nagel addresses the insufficient advisory capacity, in the future. He proposes the creation of a U.S. Army advisor command led by a lieutenant general. This command would be the proponent for all aspects of the advisor mission: doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities. It would oversee the training and deployment of 25-Soldier advisory teams organized into three 200-team advisor divisions, to be commanded by major generals who would deploy with the teams on their yearlong advisory tours.⁴⁷

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich is of the opinion that the Army must face the challenges of an era of persistent irregular conflict. The Army must be prepared to engage in substantial steady-state peacetime training and advising of indigenous security forces, when requested by the host-nation.⁴⁸ Dr. Krepinevich mentions in his plan for the long

haul that the Reserve component force has tremendous potential to add to the advisor role.

Ignoring growing challenges to the U. S. ability to project and sustain military capability overseas will not make those challenges go away.⁴⁹ Sooner or later this lack of security force training teams and the implications for U.S. security must be confronted. A decline in the U.S. military's ability to influence events abroad may be inevitable; however, it should not be the result of indifference or lack of attention.

ARNG – Experience & Partnerships

While the phrase “citizen-soldier” is often applied only to members of the National Guard and Reserves, the closely related rhetoric of sacrifice and national gratitude is everywhere applied to regular soldiers as well.⁵⁰

This past decade the men and women of the Guard have been “Always Ready, always There.” Since 9/11, some 300,000—almost seventy percent of guardsmen – have served in anti-terrorist operations around the world. As was recently announced, the 2nd BCT from the Iowa National Guard will deploy to Afghanistan next year. The Vermont 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, departed for the mobilization site on December 8, 2009. The 86th has been in preparation for deployment to work with and mentor Afghan Security Forces in Regional Command- East.

State Partnership Program (SPP)

The SPP has been a very successful National Guard program since its inception in 1993. The mission is to enhance combatant commanders' long-term U.S. and international security by building enduring civil military partnerships across all levels of the host nations' society. The program boasts more than sixty-two bilateral partnerships

between states and foreign countries, creating an enduring presence and fostering security cooperation.⁵¹

In 2008 the ARNG participated in forty-three bilateral multinational exercises in thirty-four countries. The Army deployed sixty-five security assistance teams to thirty-nine countries to support military assistance efforts.⁵² Army military-to-military programs continue during wartime and may even expand; this is the case in Afghanistan today.

The men and women that fill the ranks of the ARNG today are made up of smart, aggressive, innovative, flexible leaders. The Guard Soldier has a wealth of experience after eight years of persistent engagement. The commitment from these Soldiers has been recognized by countless senior leaders in the military and many levels of government.

The national focus at the present time will continue well into 2010 as the U.S. effort in Afghanistan will soon amplify. High praise was sited around the performance of ARNG Soldiers by General Stanly A. McChrystal Commander United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A). General McChrystal told congress that the Guard's contribution in Afghanistan has been "extraordinary."⁵³ The General went on to say that people say they're just as good as active Army troops... That's an understatement he told members of the House Armed Services Committee. "In many cases, they bring unique skills, like our agricultural development teams that are around the country; bring skills and maturity active components don't have."⁵⁴

Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated that I've got Soldiers in the ARNG who are farmers in Texas, Missouri and Iowa. They are

deploying to Afghanistan to work on agriculture because employees from the U.S. Department of Agriculture do not expect to be sent to Afghanistan.⁵⁵

The one big difference between ARNG Soldiers and their active duty counterparts is they do not have a permanent change of station (PCS) every three years. The benefit from this stability is relationships and team work will develop over the years from training and working together.

Most Soldiers in the ARNG spend their careers in one state moving between several organizations. The relationships and associations that grow over time will directly affect the career of these Soldiers. The bottom line is if a Soldier plans to spend time in the ARNG he or she needs to be professional and productive team member. The Guard Soldier does not have the opportunity to move every few years and start over. The reputation and work ethic will follow an officer and non commissioned officer for their career.

The ARNG can complement the mission of training host-nation security forces with combat experience from Afghanistan and Iraq along with the long term relationships, maturity level of the Soldiers and the strong sense of commitment. The qualities list above will support the mission of training host-nation security forces now and long into the future.

ARNG Structure to Facilitate Security Force Training

The ARNG has provided countless Soldiers to fill roles as ETTs in Afghanistan and MiTTs in Iraq. The larger Guard states have deployed Training Teams (TT) consistently to both theaters of operations since 2003. The Guard Soldiers that have returned from an adviser mission report positive comments regarding the work and the rewarding experience. The strong “desire to do the mission” that resides in the ranks is

motivation that the ARNG could supply a large portion of the force structure to fill slots in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Soldiers that deploy from individual Guard states have worked together in some cases for well over ten to fifteen years. The level of familiarity and team work along with maturity level is positive for training host-nation security forces.

Captain Mark Patterson, who served in Northern Afghanistan as an ETT from 2008-2009, explained the difference between a Guard Soldier and an active duty Soldier serving on a TT. The active duty Soldier at times was not very flexible when dealing with the newly trained ANA. The daily frustration for active duty trainer for example, occurred when the ANA did not complete task that the active duty Soldier had instructed them to perform countless times in the past.⁵⁶ The theory for this lack of flexibility may exist when a soldier is on active duty a majority of the time Soldiers do their jobs consistently and that job is your career. The flexibility for ARNG may be in the fact that training occurs only two days each month. The level of flexibility may also revolve around the fact that all Soldiers in the Guard maintain a civilian career as well as membership in the ARNG. The level and complexity training a Guard unit two days a month instills in a Guard Soldier the need for patience and flexibility.

The Adviser's Tools for Success

- Life Experience
- The Advisor's Personality
- Personal Flexibility
- Knowing the Local Culture
- Knowing American Culture and History

- Knowing the Terrain
- The Hypocrisy Factor

The seven critical skills and traits listed above would apply to an experienced ARNG Soldier serving on a training team.⁵⁷ Chapter six of the COIN manual titled, *Developing Host-Nation Security Forces*, goes into depth and lists seventeen guidelines for advisors.⁵⁸

The ARNG Organization to Develop Training Teams

The final discussion will revolve around the organizations within the ARNG that could work with NGB to prevent the knowledge and experience currently in the ranks of the ARNG from going to waste if not utilized.

The individual Guard states would decide based on their size and structure how many teams the state could consistently man and deploy. The large states such as Texas, Florida and California would have the greatest opportunity to establish teams based on their size and structure. The smaller states such as New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Maryland to name a few could establish teams but nowhere near the numbers to support large teams with specialized skills. The goal would be to rotate Soldiers from positions within BCTs to serve several years on a training team. This opportunity would add to the education of our young Captains and Majors and provide an opportunity that may retain Soldiers in the ARNG and keep them from leaving or retiring. The individual teams would deploy with their home state or train with an active component BCTs and prep for their deployment. It is critical that relationships and familiarity on TT are developed for success on future operations within the COIN environment.

The ARNG would not replace other components but add to the trained and experienced pool of Soldiers for the mission of training host-nation security forces. The plan is to augment the force and build a group of experience Guard Soldiers that would rotate into theaters such as Afghanistan or Iraq for combat operations or training missions.

The Adjutant Generals (TAGs) from each state would work with NGB for funding and facilitation of deployment cycles for training teams. The critical piece to developing a force of qualified advisers would start with the Plans Operations and Regional Training Advisory Council (PORTAC). The PORTAC meets quarterly and consists of seven regions from across the country. The issues and concerns raised from PORTAC meetings would be addressed with the TAGs and NGB.

The Regional Training Institutes (RTIs) in each state have an established network to develop a consistent training program that would coordinate with Fort Polk to assist in the training requirement to support the development of ARNG host-nation security forces. The coordination and team work would facilitate cross leveling of knowledge that would support Mobile Training Teams (MTT).

The issue of how much money will be needed initially to develop a training program in the ARNG will be the first question asked. The infrastructure presently exists in the ARNG in the form of PORTAC and RTI facilities in each state. The relationships with state TAGs in the seven regions, would share in the initial commitment and working relationship with NGB. The largest investment for the Guard to pick up a portion of the training of host-nation security forces has already been completed. The Soldiers that have served in the capacity of a trainer and mentor in

Afghanistan and Iraq is significant. The time to harvest this experienced crop of knowledge in the ARNG is now. The next priority is to start planting the seeds for the next generation of SFA Soldiers, and not repeat the lack of trained and qualified personnel over the past six years.

Conclusion

The current requirement in Afghanistan and Iraq will be to provide a consistent flow of trained and competent military advisers. The discussions have been centered on these two operational environments. The ARNG needs to be prepared and utilized to meet the diverse security needs of the twenty-first century.

The ARNG offers capabilities and skills that commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq can utilize to complement the force. The ARNG needs to be prepared to operate in complex contingencies that lie ahead. The citizen Soldiers of the ARNG can partner with and develop relationships that will provide a positive outcome with a modest investment. The question remains will our senior leadership in the military utilize this vast knowledge and experience to train future leaders in the ARNG and host-nation security forces. The current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have a tremendous need for embedded trainers. When the majority of combat forces return in the next several years, training teams will still be required to oversee the ANA and Iraq security forces.

The ARNG has been used as an operational force over the past several years. The mission of training host-nation security forces is critical based on current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2010 QDR provides strategic guidance that U.S. forces will continue to treat the building of partners' security capacity as an increasingly important mission.

Endnotes

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