

# THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION

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## A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict

*Kathi A. Sohn*

**T**he October 2007 initial deployment of the Africa Partnership Station (APS) to the Gulf of Guinea and the coincident rollout of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* signaled a strong American commitment to leveraging U.S. sea power to protect and sustain the global, interconnected maritime sphere. The APS is a Global Fleet Station (GFS) sea base designed to assist the Gulf of Guinea maritime community in developing better maritime governance for denying use of the sea to those who threaten regional and global security.

The Global Fleet Station, born out of a need for military shaping and stability operations without the trappings of war, is a proven concept for this mission in such areas as the Gulf of Guinea and the Caribbean basin. It also serves as a platform from which to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to nations within its area of operations. The GFS is more a concept than a “platform,” and its promise and flexibility arise from, respectively, its minimal military footprint ashore and the wide cross-section of professional resources that it hosts.

The prevention of violence—still a challenge for the conflict-resolution profession and entirely new ground for the Defense Department—is one potential contribution, however, that the GFS has yet to realize fully.

The pilot Africa Partnership Station mission, which ended in May 2008, laid the foundation for conflict prevention by future deployments through the relationships it built with and between the peoples of the Gulf of Guinea region, by the goodwill it instilled through its humanitarian-action and disaster-relief

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efforts, and through its promotion of African maritime security. The U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Sixth Fleet staff has planned APS missions through 2012, with a scheduled 1 November 2008 deployment of the dock landing ship USS *Nashville* (LPD 13). By tapping worldwide conflict-prevention resources and improving coordination with international and regional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Africa Partnership Station can effectively support the mission of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to enable African solutions to African problems. In this process, the APS can demonstrate how powerful a tool the Global Fleet Station can be for preventing violent conflict.

#### THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON OPPORTUNITIES

Al-Qa‘ida ushered in a new era of terrorism on September 11, 2001, amplifying the need to address the underlying causes and conditions that give rise to extremist behavior. Subsequently, American national security strategies focused on the denial of safe havens to reduce the pool of terrorist recruits. These strategies acknowledged that peaceful alternatives could be offered to the disenfranchised through the building of civil institutions and relationships. This has traditionally been the work of NGOs, but these organizations have been largely crippled during recent decades. Spread thin by post–Cold War conflicts, chronically underfunded due to international-donor fatigue, and subject to inconsistent support from local governments, NGOs cannot alone foster the positive environment prescribed in post-9/11 strategies.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41, as updated through 2005, mandated better integration and synchronization of department-level strategies; a number of subsequent documents clarified matters of authority and responsibility.<sup>1</sup> Federal agencies reorganized to that end, and the military services aligned their efforts to eliminate “stovepiped” decision making and to increase communication and collaboration. The 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security* and its eight supporting plans established a comprehensive effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while preventing hostile or illegal acts in the maritime domain.<sup>2</sup>

On 17 October 2007, at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Gary Roughead, the newly named Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), unveiled the new joint maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, to representatives from ninety-eight countries.<sup>3</sup> This strategy translates the 2005 maritime strategic guidance into a collaborative effort by the U.S. maritime forces—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. It addresses the need for regionally concentrated, credible combat power and for globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces. It reflects a core requirement for maritime mobility, flexibility, and power, but it does not imply

that U.S. maritime forces alone are to do everything, everywhere, and all the time to prevent, deter, or victoriously end conflict. Instead, the strategy declares a strategic imperative to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners; however, it warns, “trust and cooperation cannot be surged.” The implication is a general need to work smarter, not harder, and so achieve more; former CNO Admiral Michael Mullen gave this idea specific form—a “thousand-ship navy,” in which membership “is purely voluntary and would have no legal or encumbering ties. It would be a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners—good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide. The barriers for entry are low. Respect for sovereignty is high.”<sup>4</sup>

The new strategy boldly places “Preventing wars is as important as winning wars” in a long-overdue framework of a collaborative, conflict-preventive maritime approach to global security. The strategy “focuses on *opportunities*—not threats; on *optimism*—not fear; and on *confidence*—not doubt.”

The U.S. maritime services can meet the strategic imperative to prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system by planning each joint, combined, or interagency initiative in light of all potentially affected conflictual processes. The Global Fleet Station program provides an ideal opportunity.

#### CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION

There is no consensus within the conflict-resolution community on the nature of conflict prevention. One major reason is that prevention involves action—and what action is required will depend on the shifting needs of a particular region at a particular time. Therefore, how conflict prevention is approached becomes more important than precisely what is done, where, or when. This critical conflict-prevention key is reflected in a 2006 study conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to provide expert insights into current thinking about conflict prevention. Regarding normative gaps, the study concluded that “the foremost issues that Canada should address are those of constructive engagement and cooperation among nonstate, state, and intergovernmental actors.”<sup>5</sup>

Also key to successful conflict prevention is a greater understanding of the nature of conflict itself and the difficulties of its resolution. Conflict is the metaphorical elephant groped by blind men, each trying to describe the entire elephant based on his perception of a part he can touch. American civilian and military leaders need to examine the conflict “elephant” from a variety of perspectives. One of them is the perception of conflict as a process, a “moving

elephant,” the inherent nature of which might be completely misunderstood if not reassessed over time.

Viewing conflict as a process also allows prevention to be understood in terms of aftermath. In June 2005, members of the international aid community met in Paris to discuss lessons learned during the thirteen years of peace building following the appearance in 1992 of the groundbreaking *An Agenda for Peace*, by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, secretary-general of the United Nations. This document signaled a paradigm shift in the UN approach to conflict, acknowledging the “critically related concept of postconflict peacebuilding” as action to identify and support “structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”<sup>6</sup> Thereafter, experts expanded the conflict lexicon to describe nuances. For example, “conflict prevention” became “violent conflict prevention” because conflict is a natural, productive process that should be allowed to occur, as long as it proceeds in a nonviolent fashion. Another example is the contemporary differentiation between “positive peace” (the absence of the underlying causes and conditions for violent conflict) and “negative peace” (absence of violent conflict), a distinction useful for decisions regarding intervention.

Further, because the organizational perspectives of military services and civilian agencies and the emotional impact of real-time media on public opinion exacerbate the “fog of war” in periods of conflict, it is crucial that civilian agencies and military planners build working relationships during times of peace. The GFS represents a great opportunity to build civil-military communication and coordination practices that can be leveraged in any theater in the event of war. The need for cooperation between military and civilian entities during joint operations is not new, as evidenced by the 1996 joint publication *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*.<sup>7</sup> What is new since 9/11 is an increasing urgency for the Defense Department to engage in peacetime operations traditionally considered nonmilitary. It therefore becomes equally urgent to streamline interagency processes and move beyond cultural civil-military barriers.

The GFS concept arose from this urgency, as a way to conduct security cooperation and capacity-building operations without deploying traditional carrier and expeditionary strike groups. Taking advantage of existing status-of-forces agreements and memorandums of understanding, as well as funding from the International Military Education and Training program and other such sources, the GFS is now a self-sufficient regional headquarters that “serves as the model for coordination with local government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.”<sup>8</sup>

*Naval Operations Concept 2006* describes the Global Fleet Station, illustrating its capacity to perform as a vital resource to combatant commanders:

Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander requirements, the operating environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of national objectives.<sup>9</sup>

The operations concept also features the Global Fleet Station as “a future sea story,” highlighting the potential of the platform to build relationships and trust with the local populace of such depth that the security payoff transcends peace operations and ultimately contributes to counterterrorism.<sup>10</sup>

Just as the new maritime strategy defined the joint military nature of the Global Fleet Station, authority and guidance for interagency and international participation in the GFS can be found in the many follow-up documents to NSPD-41. For example, one of the eight supporting plans to the 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security* is the *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, implemented by the Secretary of State. This document calls for the State Department to coordinate closely with other departments and agencies to “enhance existing ties and forge new partnerships with other nations, international and regional organizations, and the private sector to improve global maritime security.”<sup>11</sup> A further presidential directive, NSPD-44, assigned the management of foreign interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization to the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, in an effort “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”<sup>12</sup>

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* states:

Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the long war on terrorism, the Department [of Defense] issued guidance in 2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations within the Department. The directive calls for improving the Department’s ability to work with interagency partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad.<sup>13</sup>

This guidance to “place stability operations on par with major combat operations” sounds very similar to the new maritime strategy statement that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”

A Defense Department directive, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, states, “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or American civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”<sup>14</sup> In 2004, General Anthony Zinni stressed the need for improved civil-military cooperation in the interest of postconflict reconstruction. In language reminiscent of the directive, he declared, “The military is not the best answer for providing humanitarian support, but if there is a gap, the military will fill it.”<sup>15</sup> The Africa Partnership Station has proved the Global Fleet Station highly suitable for filling the humanitarian support gap and has demonstrated the focus on opportunities, optimism, and confidence called for by the new maritime strategy.

#### THE PILOT APS MISSION AS PROOF OF THE GFS CONCEPT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sponsored the first pilot Global Fleet Station mission from April to September 2007, using the high-speed vessel (HSV 2) *Swift*. During the course of visits to seven Caribbean and Central American nations its crew “conducted 39,890 hours of subject matter expert exchanges in such areas as leadership, small boat operations, port security and small unit tactics.”<sup>16</sup>

Two weeks before the issuance of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, the Sixth Fleet deployed two platforms—the *Swift* again and the USS *Fort McHenry* (LSD 43), a large amphibious ship—on a seven-month joint and combined (that is, multiservice and multinational) maritime APS mission.

Naval Forces Europe developed this Africa Partnership Station mission as part of efforts in West and Central Africa resulting from a pivotal 2006 conference in Cotonou, Benin. There, all eleven Gulf of Guinea nations had expressed their commitment to addressing maritime governance on local, national, and regional levels. They specifically resolved to “continue engagement with international maritime partners, including the African Union and African nations outside the Gulf of Guinea, the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations and its relevant agencies, bilateral partners and non-governmental agencies.”<sup>17</sup> Representatives from eight European navies were to join the three American maritime services in APS visits to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo, and other African countries over the seven-month period. Numerous media reports underscored the many successful activities undertaken by the Africa Partnership Station, including all aspects of

maritime security training and awareness building, humanitarian work, and crisis response. U.S. agencies involved include the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Agency for International Development, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

In March 2008, the repositioning ships of the Military Sealift Command's West Africa Training Cruise joined the Africa Partnership Station for a sea-basing and humanitarian-assistance-distribution exercise off Monrovia, Liberia. The 28 March 2008 edition of *Rhumb Lines*, a weekly Navy Office of Information e-mail circular for senior Navy leadership, reported the impact of such additional sea-base platforms as the Improved Navy Lighterage System, a redesigned floating-dock system originally used during World War II, in its first operational deployment. *Rhumb Lines* reported, "The ability to create a mobile platform at sea enables future execution of the Maritime Strategy, complements APS initiatives and has the potential to enhance future support in the African region."<sup>18</sup> One report on an early February 2008 visit by APS to Cameroon to assist with the relief of refugees escaping to the northern part of that country from civil conflict in Chad illustrates the multifaceted relationship-building nature of the APS mission: "In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, Sailors from Swift will conduct a community relations project, meet with local officials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception aboard the ship."<sup>19</sup>

The diplomatic role of each member of the APS crew cannot be underestimated, and continuing cultural education is vital. A July 2007 GFS concept paper referred to building cultural awareness as a critical component of GFS shaping and stability operations, tying in the Defense Department-mandated military Foreign Area Officer program as further expanding "the Navy's enablers and capability to engage more effectively around the world in a culturally informed and meaningful manner."<sup>20</sup> A November 2007 report entitled "Cultural Awareness Personifies Africa Partnership Station Mission" highlights the importance of cultural training for the APS crew, quoting a senior Marine Corps Africa analyst: "Our steaming here is a means to an end. A lot of people on the ship, regardless of where they work, will be going ashore in terms of either liberty or community relations events."<sup>21</sup>

Beyond the press reporting about diplomatic events and the training of mission personnel on African culture, there is an invaluable opportunity to capture the experiences and insights of the men and women on board the Africa Partnership Station, so quickly lost by rotation. The potential for building cross-cultural understanding spans the multiple dimensions of day-to-day joint, combined, interagency, and foreign interactions. Between formal and informal liaison activity, input gained during a time of peaceful interaction can be

used to inform operations during a time of crisis. To that end, the AFRICOM commander, General William E. “Kip” Ward, emphasized during an interview in October 2007 that the APS initiative and his new command would strive “as a whole” to help African countries build capacity. He elaborated on how the new APS initiative “provides a good example of what the newly established Africa Command is all about as it relates to helping our partner nations on the continent of Africa build their capacity to better govern their spaces (and) to have more effect in providing for the security of their people.”<sup>22</sup> The Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, referred to the Africa Partnership Station as “a Noah’s Ark of tremendous capability.”<sup>23</sup>

When the APS returned in May 2008 from its seven-month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea, the Center for Naval Analyses, European Command, and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (in Norfolk, Virginia) completed assessments begun during the mission of its effectiveness and perceptions of it. These reports informed the decision to continue the APS program through 2012. As General Ward implied, the Africa Partnership Station is an integral part of the new AFRICOM and U.S. policy in the African region.

#### AN APS AT SEA PROMOTING AFRICOM SUCCESS ON THE CONTINENT

On 7 February 2007, President George W. Bush directed the establishment of AFRICOM to “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.”<sup>24</sup> Like the new maritime strategy and the GFS project, AFRICOM reflects how senior American policy makers are digging in for “the long war” against terror. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review proposed developing “the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies—shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves.”<sup>25</sup> AFRICOM, which was “stood up” on 1 October 2008, is such an “authority”—as the APS is a “resource” for building partnership capacity in the African region.

Previously, responsibility for operations on the African continent was divided among U.S. European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. Channeling all American security initiatives in the African region through one unified command should help streamline the communication and coordination processes critical to the novel approach of enabling “African solutions to African challenges.” General Ward stated in early 2008 to delegates of the fifteen member nations of the Economic Community of West African States that U.S. assistance will be “not as we think or what we direct, but what comes to us

in the way of requests, and again, in keeping with our stated U.S. foreign policy objectives.”<sup>26</sup>

Reaction to the plans for AFRICOM has been as mixed as were responses to the new maritime strategy.<sup>27</sup> Robert G. Berschinski addresses the main concerns in his *AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*. The new command's critics “allege that the Command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing Africa's burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.”<sup>28</sup> Berschinski points out that post-9/11 American “kinetic” operations in the trans-Sahara and Horn of Africa regions have not produced lasting solutions while they have served to alienate segments of the African population. Further, policies of “aggregation” regarding Africa have reflected an ignorance of the true nature of the regional insurgent threat, amalgamating the regional insurgent threat into a “frightening, but artificially monolithic whole.”<sup>29</sup>

AFRICOM, in conjunction with the Africa Partnership Station, has the unique opportunity to adopt a new security paradigm for an integrated approach to violent-conflict prevention, an approach that will lessen the need for quick military reaction in crisis intervention. A major factor will be the chance to leverage the indigenous wisdom and expertise of the African people, not force Western solutions on their problems. Instead of the conventional plan to put “boots on the ground,” cooperative security and diplomatic events can take place on the APS with “minimal footprint ashore.”

African leadership perceptions regarding the true intention of AFRICOM will be as important to the command's success as are the leaderships' own perspectives of regional problems. It is particularly vital that the United States resist the urge to build military bases on the African continent to host AFRICOM initiatives. The United States can assuage fears that the true intention of the new command is to militarize the region by decentralizing the command, continuing to use the Africa Partnership Station, and making an unwavering commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict.

#### AN INTEGRATED APS APPROACH TO VIOLENT-CONFLICT PREVENTION

On the African continent, AFRICOM has begun its work amid conditions of ongoing violent conflict processes and negative peace. It will be especially important for the command to fend off criticism for not producing quick results by educating observers—using precise conflict terminology—regarding the length of time required to build trust and institutions. It will also be necessary for all concerned to understand that conflict is a cycle, characterized by varying

degrees of intensity, from nonviolent manifestations of underlying structural conflict to full-scale bloodshed. Further, it will need to be stressed that AFRICOM has chosen an approach reflective of the appropriate role for external actors in an advanced stage of postconflict (or nonviolent conflict) intervention—a critical time, full of opportunity to promote positive peace and prevent violent conflict.

The classical stages of postconflict intervention include, first, a *stabilization* stage, during which external actors manage the society.<sup>30</sup> The next, or *transition*, phase can last for one to three years while an interim government is established and humanitarian relief shifts to developmental projects. During this time, internal and external actors increasingly work together to bring about the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration necessary for stabilization. The final, *consolidation*, phase lasts between four and ten years, during which security sector reforms occur, internal actors take the lead, and external actors assume a role of capacity building and support.

In this schema, the current engagement of the APS and the future role of AFRICOM relate to consolidation—the longest and, because of its role in preventing violence, most critical stage of peace building. This is also the most difficult stage to manage; the characteristic ineffectiveness of postconflict programs has been historically attributed to “the lack of attention to the point of view of local populations, and to the disjointed nature of international response and lack of coherence between different actors.”<sup>31</sup> The proceedings of the June 2005 Paris conference mentioned above highlighted the importance of integrated preventive measures in postconflict strategies, noting that “as a large percentage of countries coming out of crises are at risk for falling back into the conflict trap, there is a need to see the post-conflict stage as also a conflict prevention stage.”<sup>32</sup>

These suggested integrated preventive measures could be a natural function of the APS integrated operation. In 2005, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force, suggested that “integrated operations” is a more accurate, inclusive term than “interagency” or “combined” for contemporary collaborative efforts: “Many services, Federal agencies, allies and their governmental agencies, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations must cooperate to meet the full spectrum of military operations, from peacekeeping to battle to the transition to lasting peace.”<sup>33</sup>

In addition to its potential conflict-resolution role in the Gulf of Guinea, the APS is concurrently serving that of violent-conflict prevention in the general African region. It is important for military planners to acknowledge, in their effort to place all security-related initiatives within the context of the conflict spectrum, that the APS maritime security mission has this dual function. In his discussion paper “Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional

Perspectives,” Owen Greene acknowledges, “It is clear that [security-sector reforms] can contribute in many ways to conflict prevention and reduction. However, many efforts to reform the security sector are not primarily concerned with conflict prevention or reduction, and so their contribution to these goals may be more or less direct.”<sup>34</sup>

Of additional significance is the opportunity for AFRICOM to learn during the conduct by APS of its integrated maritime security mission. Lessons learned in this floating laboratory for collaborative efforts—whether about successes or failures—are perishable but can greatly contribute to synchronizing missions. This can be a particular challenge, considering the additional complexity created by giving the lead role to African leadership. Failure to plan, implement, and evaluate integrated processes properly could degrade progress toward AFRICOM’s overall objectives as well as diminish Africa’s confidence in the command.

The 2005 Paris conference participants agreed that integration needs to occur during all the stages of intervention, from planning to evaluation. This means that regular reporting and widespread information sharing are crucial, because each perspective is a piece of the puzzle. These stages are not necessarily linear, and the processes of one could inform another. For example, aid workers implementing a humanitarian project could collect valuable qualitative metrics on progress made toward establishing a positive peace. AFRICOM could facilitate the reporting of such insights and maintain a centralized database for the African region.

In a December 2007 technical report entitled *A Systems Engineering Approach for Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea*, twelve Naval Postgraduate School student officers evaluated interagency and NGO coordination as a facet of Global Fleet Station that was not in itself a mission but deserved attention to equal that given “shaping” operations and humanitarian or disaster-relief missions.<sup>35</sup> They acknowledged that “outside” agencies “provide to an overall campaign for regional stability, [including] a historical perspective on lessons learned out of the changing nature of war and how to prevent it.”<sup>36</sup>

The following recommendations would maximize the opportunities represented by the Global Fleet Station concept for implementing the principles of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and for leveraging the knowledge, skills, and experiences of GFS crewmembers.

*Widen the Global Fleet Station program.* Lessons learned from the APS missions and SOUTHCOM’s past and current Navy Diver Global Fleet Station can illustrate the adaptability of the GFS to the requirements of combatant commanders. GFS deployments to the Central and Pacific theaters should be

considered, taking care to maintain international perception of the platform as noncombatant.

Widened use of the Global Fleet Station concomitant with an increased use of the sea for staging combatant forces would risk contaminating the noncombatant image of the GFS. Nonetheless, sea basing as an alternative for staging combatant forces needs to be seriously considered. Minimizing the U.S. military footprint ashore has support from analysts who see grave consequences in building military bases on foreign soil. For example, University of Chicago professor Robert Pape strongly believes that suicide terrorism has found encouragement in the coerced withdrawal of American and allied forces from territories. He suggests that the United States use a strategy of “offshore balancing” as an alternative to putting bases where violent acts are likely to be perpetrated to force them to leave.<sup>37</sup>

*Keep the Africa Partnership Station afloat as a partner to AFRICOM in integrated violent-conflict prevention.* APS deployments to the African region should continue, with the least amount of time possible between deployments. The Global Fleet Station featured in the 2006 *Naval Operations Concept*, “Future Sea Story,” was on station for two years building partnership and trust. The Africa Partnership Station sustains symbolic and practical relevance for Navy planners with regard to American policy in Africa. A persistent presence of the APS can assist AFRICOM in developing an end-to-end integrated approach to violent-conflict prevention, which will incorporate the unique contributions of all agencies, services, and organizations involved in promoting security in the African region.

*Tap worldwide conflict-prevention resources for GFS missions.* Peace-building and conflict-prevention resources on board the GFS and among its partners on the continent are rich, but even so, they could be greatly enhanced by tapping worldwide academics and practitioners. AFRICOM databasing of aid worker evaluations and a myriad of other metrics related to conflict prevention could be replicated in other theaters to share lessons learned and track global trends.

*Apply lessons learned from GFS in peacetime to integrated operations in war.* During times of war, conflict is continually reassessed and courses of action adjusted. A clear picture of the desired end-state and war-termination indicators can guide conflict and postconflict planning. All courses of action during the violent phase of the conflict should help bring about the desired end state, and all postconflict planning should assume conditions that end the war. American military planners can apply lessons learned from streamlined, integrated operations during Global Fleet Station violent-conflict-prevention missions to develop better military exit strategies from war in any theater of operations.

## NOTES

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