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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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DHS-DOD-JS-NORTHCOM STRATEGY DISCUSSION

Professor Bert Tussing
Director, Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group

On 8 March 2006, the Center for Strategic Leadership's Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group (HDSI) hosted a session dedicated to assessing the Department of Homeland Security's 2004 Strategic Plan, Securing Our Homeland. In addition to HDSI, representatives from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD-HD), the Joint Staff, and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) gathered to reevaluate and update this foundational document for homeland security policy in the United States. The leaders of the respective contingents saw this session as a great opportunity to establish what is hoped will become a perennial relationship between strategy development elements in DHS, Department of Defense (DOD), and the Joint Staff. Participants also believed that linking this function of DHS with NORTHCOM's J-5 will also prove beneficial in coordinating homeland defense/security/civil support functions between the two departments. It is hoped that these types of sessions will have long range benefits in the establishment of important relationships at the very outset of the Department's Policy and Strategy Directorate's operations.

During the discussions of DHS' 2004 Strategic Plan, continual reference was paid to the procedural differences faced by DOD and DHS in the development of strategies and strategic plans. The DHS contingent pointed to the requirements imposed upon them by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, neither of which impacts DOD. In addition, it was clear that DHS' focus was on responding to Congressional mandates and reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

DHS is approaching the update of their Strategic Plan (due to the Office of Management and Budget in June, and to Congress in September) in five phases.

1. The first phase (Information Gathering/Literature Review) was a month-long effort that took place in Jan-Feb.
2. The second phase consisted of a three day "on site" for the Strategic Plans Division, crafting a "Preliminary Concept Design." That session developed a new set of strategic planning priorities which strongly reflected the main issues delineated by Secretary Chertoff in his "Second Stage Review:
   a) Increased preparedness with particular focus on catastrophic events;
   b) Strengthening border security, interior enforcement, and immigration reform;
   c) Strengthening intelligence and enhancing information exchange between federal, state, local and tribal governments, as well as the private sector; and
   d) Enhancing screening coordination for the safe, secure, and efficient flow of people and things into the U.S.
3. The third phase centers on "external stakeholder feedback," on the strategic plan. This is reflective of a recommendation by the GAO that the DHS actively collaborate with essential external partners, to include in developing strategies, the strategic plan, policies, etc.
4. The next phase, expected to take up the months of April and May, will be devoted to "Internal DHS Stakeholder Feedback." This will be the point where the Department will come to its own conclusions on what the strategic plan should be.
5. The fifth phase will be the final

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drafting of the plan, scheduled to occur during the month of June.

All participants agreed that the session allowed a valuable exchange of views between the departments, and all players walked away firmly convinced of the value of perpetuating these relationships. While this initial interaction was definitely a small step, there is fertile ground for optimism that the relationships will continue.

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MILITARY GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION GAME

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Based upon a requirement from the U.S. Army War College, the Strategic Experiential Education Group (SEEG) started out the New Year by delivering the initial version (V1.0) of the Military Global Distribution Game (MGDG) to the USAWC faculty. It is a Systems Thinking game that will be used in three electives beginning in March 2006 and within the core curriculum course "Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking" in AY 07.

The MGDG borrows from other open-source games, like the MIT Beer Game, to provide a representation of a four-tiered commodity distribution chain where each link in the system has a limited view of the entire system and must make decisions with incomplete (local) information. This version of the game was created specifically for the faculty and students of the U.S. Army War College, but is open to other users as desired.

The objective of the MGDG is to provide USAWC students with an understanding of the impact of systems upon human behavior as discussed by author Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline, CSL designed it as an aid to understanding the key elements of the concept of systems thinking. During game play, students are presented with an opportunity to experience systems thinking first hand, to see how a limited amount of knowledge can contribute to major difficulties if one doesn't understand the whole system and how the system works as a whole. The game is intended to be a short experiential education event followed by seminar discussions. Understanding systems thinking supports several USAWC Themes and Institutional Learning Objectives (Human Dimensions of Strategic Leadership and Strategic Vision; Distinguish the uniqueness of strategic-level leadership; and, Apply competencies required by strategic leaders, to name a few).

The MGDG was designed to support multiple seminars, with any facility instructor able to modify the default settings of the game to meet his/hers specific seminar learning objectives. Instructors will create a game, decide whether to modify any of the default settings, then save and name that game for use by their seminar. Students then log in and play that game for their seminar on one to four computer systems – students can use their own computers or they can take turns on a fewer number of systems. During game play, the instructor is able to participate as a player or to watch game play as an observer. At the conclusion of the game, a number of reports are available which provide the instructor with a set of visual cues to lead a seminar discussion about systems and systems thinking.

A game session is normally between 26 and 52 weeks (aka game periods or turns) long, but could be shorter or longer if desired. Starting with week one, each player (student) assumes one of four roles – Retailer, Wholesaler, Distributor, and Factory/Producer. Each week (game period or turn), without the benefit of communication and only limited visibility, players place orders based on the demand that they believe is required to fill their orders – only the retailer sees actual demand from customers. Up the system chain (incoming orders) the player sees the next person's inventory and what is in transit to them two weeks out. Down the system chain (outgoing orders) the player sees their own flow out for two weeks, and they see their own current inventory and backorders. As each week's orders are processed, the current demand is filled and the resulting excess or deficit is put into inventory or placed on backorder respectively. At the end of the game, several reports and graphs are available for students and faculty instructors to analyze week by week and overall individual decisions and the effects that they had on systems overall performance.

The MGDG provides the player(s) an excellent experiential education tool to encourage aspiring senior leaders to think in "depth", in a "systems" fashion and to understand the value of collaboration, all essential ingredients of strategic decision making. This is because players are able to observe behavior and reflect on their experience, forming abstract concepts based on this reflection. Players are also given full control over decision making, and experience the effects of their decisions throughout the whole game. Initial faculty and student feedback from testing and demonstrations has been extremely positive. The SEEG is confident that this will continue as more faculty instructors and students are given an opportunity to play the MGDG and appreciate its usefulness in strategic level and systems thinking education.

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THE 2006 COLLINS CENTER SENIOR SYMPOSIUM, ORCHESTRATION THROUGH CATASTROPHE

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Homeland Defesne and Security Issues Group

The U.S. government responds to between forty to sixty Presidentially Declared Disasters every year ranging from wildfires in the plains, to mudslides along the coast, to flooding along through major river basins, to hurricanes along the gulf. However, Hurricane Katrina, the subsequent failure of the levee system in New Orleans, and government response at all levels demonstrated to the Nation and the world that "this was not your typical disaster." Katrina has been described as a "once or twice in a generation occurrence;" one that took the nation beyond the realm of disaster and into the depth of catastrophe. The scope of the storm's destruction obviated state borders that define most of our governments' response. Federal, state and local officials were faced with a regional catastrophe that immediately demanded a national response. In the words of the President:

...The storm involved a massive flood, a major supply and security operation, and an evacuation order

affecting more than a million people. It was not a normal hurricane– and the normal disaster relief system was not equal to it. Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States military…and state and local governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days.

In Katrina's wake, some have declared that the Department of Defense (DoD) is the only entity in the federal government capable of leading disaster relief efforts due to its ability to quickly respond, bringing to bear the vast array of resources and capabilities resident in the Department. Some officials, and some pundits, have also suggested that DoD should become the lead federal agency during disasters or catastrophes of similar scope and magnitude. But is putting DoD in charge of the government's response the solution?

The Center for Strategic Leadership recently hosted the Eighth Annual Collins Center Senior Symposium, "Orchestration through Catastrophe." The purpose of the symposium was to examine the accepted and potential roles of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Joint Staff, and the States/Territories Joint Force Headquarters in responding to a catastrophic event. The forum brought together an exceptional panel of retired general officers and civilian officials to engage in a critical examination of the issues and assess potential roles for the Department of Defense in preparing for and responding to future catastrophes, whether natural or manmade.

Round table discussions focused on a series of questions designed to examine the command, control, coordination, and cooperation (C4) systems employed during Hurricane Katrina, in an effort to see how those systems should be retained, or amended, for responding to "the next catastrophe." The forum discussed the distinctions that delineated a "catastrophe" above and beyond a "disaster," and the change in mindset and rule sets that might be called for in the nation's response to a "higher tier of destruction." The panel was asked to examine the basic assumptions surrounding the military's role in the Department of Homeland Security's *National Response Plan* and other existing plans and strategies devoted to defense support to civil authorities, viewed against the backdrop of a disaster that had transitioned to a catastrophe. The role of NORTHCOM in such a response was considered, particularly as that Combatant Command wrestles through issues of unity of command and unity of effort with a non-federalized National Guard that will also play a key part in response and recovery operations. Beyond this military interaction, participants were asked to address NORTHCOM's proper role in state-to-state planning for catastrophic response, and how the Command would go about establishing exercise relationships that would prove or disprove the strength of those plans.

These issues and others were discussed throughout the course of the day in an effort to properly frame the role of the military in a national response to catastrophe. The insights garnered from this distinguished group of experts will be applied alongside the results of recent studies on the government's response to Katrina released by the Homeland Security Council and the U.S. House of Representatives, allowing Carlisle to properly represent these response operations in exercises, future studies, and the War College curriculum.

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COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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Terrorism is a growing threat in Southeast Asia (SEA). It is fostered by two simultaneous trends: the spread of militant religious ideologies and the growth of transnational 'enabling' factors that allow illegal mobility, and access to weapons and funding.

To understand the support environment for terrorism in SEA, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies hosted a 3-day conference (31 January to 2 February 2006) that was co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic Leadership and involved roughly 40 participants. Among the objectives of the conference were: to assess and understand the ideological underpinning of terrorism in the region, its causes and current trends; to assess the transnational 'enabling' factors, such as crime, porous borders, availability of small arms and explosives, that helps sustain terrorist organizations; and to assess current measures by states and regional organizations to counter terrorism and to identify any limitations that act as barriers to success.

The conference was divided into six key sessions. **Session one** was designed to provide an overview of the regional terrorism challenge facing SEA. For **Session two** participants focused on state and regional responses to terrorism. During **Session three** participants focused on the ideological roots of extremist movements in Southeast Asia. During **Session four** participants focused on specific case studies of terrorism involving Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. For **Session five** participants were asked to address the 'enabling environment' factors that make SEA attractive The final sessions (**six** and **seven**) featured breakout sessions and report-back sessions that addressed four critical questions. Those questions and the group recommendations were:

1. What are effective measures to counter-ideological support for terrorism in SEA?
   - Comprehensive knowledge of ideologies and their environments
   - Advocate multi-level approach (international, national, and organic, including Islamic civil society groups)
   - Identify target audiences and tailor messages specific to each
   - Develop metrics process to ensure program effectivemess
   - Decide who and what organizations are most effective
   - Open collaboration environment that allows opportunities for info sharing and capacity building
   - Develop support and aid-based system that encourages peaceful, tolerant civil society structures
2. How to reduce the functional enabling environment in SEA?
   - Regionally: Combat transnational crime, improve multilateral cooperation, reduce border porosity,

and promote legal responses to terrorism
- Nationally: Improve state capacity, reduce corruption, and strengthen rule of law
- Locally: Focus on conflict resolution and mediation, improve law/governance, enable community empowerment and participation, including education, and increase economic development and social services

3) Which state or ASEAN responses are working and which are not?
- ASEAN members have to see deeper cooperation as valuable to their self-interest
- They must come to a bottom-up common understanding of the problem and their vulnerability to nontraditional security threats
- The Malacca Strait may be the lynchpin to evolving multilateral cooperation
- Build habits of cooperation—humanitarian aid and disaster relief
- Understand the value of offers and implementation of assistance that take cultural sensitivities into account

4) What can be improved regarding U.S. policy toward the region in the context of terrorism?
- Restore U.S. capacity in strategic communications
- Encourage better attention from electronic media to SEA communities and their interests
- Build up a substantial strategic scholarships program, especially for Islamic intellectuals, to equip change-agents and ambassadors
- Explain the benefits of mil-mil relations
- Help build the capacity of government agencies in SEA to consolidate democracy and secure the region
- Build understanding within U.S. agencies of Islam in SEA
- Encourage foreign language proficiency and cultural knowledge amongst DOD and DOS officers

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INTERNATIONAL FELLOWS COALITION BUILDING EXERCISE 2006

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From 6-7 March, the Center for Strategic Leadership conducted the International Fellows Coalition Building Exercise 2006. This exercise is part of the core curriculum for the International Fellows of the U.S. Army War College 2006.

The exercise was divided into two parts. The first part consisted of training on negotiating skills. The second part involved a scenario-driven negotiations exercise focused on coalition building. The forty International Fellows were divided into seven teams representing the Foreign and Defense Ministries of their assigned nations. Six former U.S. Ambassadors and several War College professors that are experts in their respective regions served as mentors for each team. A control team provided the scenario drivers and played other regional and international actors.

The game, set in 2019, focused on building a coalition to respond to an unstable situation in the Caucasus region. The teams had to formulate a strategy to deal with instability and to engage in strategic coalition building to allow a multi-national force to enter the region on a peacekeeping mission. In addition to coalition building, issues such as relative contributions, command and control, timelines, routes, and logistics were addressed. The exercise included a series of scheduled bilateral negotiations between various nations in addition to a myriad of coordinated ad hoc meetings requested through the control cell.

In addition to the International Fellows, the staff of the Center for Strategic Leadership and the U.S. Army War College and several outside experts participated. These experts included the six retired U.S. ambassadors, as well as personnel from the Joint and U.S. Army Staffs. They served as subject matter experts and advised the International Fellows on the politics, militaries, economies, and cultures of the regional actors.

After a day and a half of tough negotiations, the exercise culminated with a series of After Action Reviews conducted at the country team and entire participant levels. The students were again provided key insights into preparing for, executing, and following up on their negotiations. Overall comments from the students and other participants indicated that the exercise was very beneficial in not only teaching the science of negotiating and coalition building but also allowing the art of these tasks to be practiced.

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This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp.

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