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THESIS

**A DISTRICT APPROACH TO COUNTERING
AFGHANISTAN'S INSURGENCY**

by

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December 2009

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**A DISTRICT APPROACH TO COUNTERING
AFGHANISTAN'S INSURGENCY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
ALP	Alternative Livelihood Program
AMF	Afghan Militia Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AP	Afghan Police
AP3	Afghan Public Protection Program
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
ATA	Afghanistan Transitional Authority
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
BAF	Bagram Air Field
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CAS	Close Air Support
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CF	Coalition Forces
CJSOTF-A	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan
CMOCs	Civil-Military Operations Centers
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander International Security Assistance Force
CQB	Close Quarters Battle
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTC	Combat Training Center
DA	Direct Action
DCC	District Community Council
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DDT	District Development Teams
DoD	Department of Defense
DRSALT	District Reconstruction Security Advisory and Liaison Team
DST	District Support Teams

EBO	Effects-Based Operations
EFT	Electronic Fund Transfer
ELJ	Emergency Loya Jirga
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPS	Electronic Payment System
FARP	Forward Advanced Refueling Station
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FOB	Forward Operating Bases
FST	Field Surgical Team
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GWS	Guerrilla Warfare Strategy
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HIG	Hezbi-Islami Group
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HN	Host Nation
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IMT	Individual Movement Techniques
IO	Information Operations
IRI	International Republican Institute
IRoA	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Body
JRTs	Joint Regional Teams
JSOA	Joint Special Operational Areas
KAF	Kandahar Air Field
KIA	Killed in Action LOC Line of Control
LP/OP	Listing Post/Observation Posts
MARSOC	Marine Special Operation Command
MOE	Measures of Effects
MoI	Afghan Ministry of Interior
MOP	Measures of Performance
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
OCC-P	Operational Command Center-Provincial
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
PX	Post Exchanges
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RC	Regional Command
RF/PF	Regional and Popular Forces
RIP	Relief in Place
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SFODA or ODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TPC	Tactical Psychological Operations Company
U.S.	United States
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UBL	Usama bin Laden
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSF or SF	U.S. Army Special Forces
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and have become sedentary in Afghanistan. Operations conducted during the infancy of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in 2002 were generally decentralized and consisted primarily of small numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF, specifically U.S. Army Special Forces (USSF or SF), conducted unconventional warfare (UW)¹ with limited resources by, with, and through indigenous Afghan tribal militias or Afghan Militia Forces (AMF). SF Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODA or ODA) established safe houses and firebases in strategic locations throughout the country to counter and pursue Taliban and al Qaeda combatants.

ODAs were assigned Joint Special Operational Areas (JSOA)² and were permitted to conduct special operations within their assigned boundaries and/or battle space with minimal restrictions from higher commands. SF operations were decentralized and characterized by adherence to traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) methods, with emphasis placed on the local populace as the centers of gravity. General Purpose Forces (GPF), and local AMF, enhanced SF operations by augmenting firebase security and permitting SF to engage in UW by providing a robust quick reaction force package positioned in close proximity at established firebases and/or base camp locations.

¹ UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area”(June 11, 2009 approved UW definition as directed by Commander USSOCOM ADM Eric T. Olson).

² Joint Publication 1-02 defines a joint special operations area as a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA (December 17, 2003).

USSF led UW operations throughout 2002 – 2004 facilitated the re-establishment of permanent Afghan government institutions, and the formation of a representative and elected government in accordance with the two and a half year timeline determined by the Bonn Agreement in December 2001.³ SF UW operations shaped the security environment permitting the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) to hold the first democratic Afghan presidential elections on October 9, 2004.⁴ Afghan acceptance of coalition methods was high, and violence throughout 2002–2004 was low; total coalition casualties during this timeframe were 184, not including the 12 casualties suffered during the initial invasion.⁵

As the Afghanistan Theater matured, ISAF forces increased in number from 4,650 in 2002 to 56,420 in 2008. With the yearly increases in GPF, the operational environment changed. Coalition forces no longer had a small signature; JSOAs were first engulfed and then replaced by four Regional Commands (RC) overseen by GPF brigade headquarters (see Figure 1). Concurrently, the institution of a sovereign Islamic Republic of Afghanistan resulted in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 62,376 AMF throughout October 2003 through July 2005.⁶ As ISAF force levels grew, a shift occurred in operational focus away from local tribes and districts, to provincial level development. The change is evident in the 2005 Afghanistan Compact that concentrates on capacity building and partnership at the national and provincial levels.⁷

In 2008, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was developed to address poverty issues, “improve the lives of the Afghan people, and create the

³ T. Sissener and L. Kartawich, *Afghanistan: Parliamentary and Provincial Elections September 2005* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005), 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵ Michael White, “Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count,” *iCasualties.org*, 2003, <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed July 4, 2009).

⁶ Michael Bhatia, “DDR in Afghanistan: When State-building and Insecurity Collide,” *Small Arms Survey*, 2009, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2009.pdf (accessed November 5, 2009).

⁷ The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*. The London Conference: Author, 2006.

foundation for a secure and stable country.”⁸ The goals of the ANDS focuses on three objectives consisting of, (1) security, (2) governance, rule of law and human rights, and (3) economic and social development.⁹ Unfortunately, 2008 and 2009 witnessed a decrease in security and an increase in ISAF and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) joint combined combat operations engaging in search and destroy missions against a revitalized Taliban insurgency. Operations continue to be centralized out of large Forward Operating Bases (FOB), are of short duration, and are restricted based on significant force protection requirements. Coalition military commanders generally use metric data, including the number of missions conducted, and insurgent¹⁰ body counts, to measure success. Violence increased significantly throughout 2005–2008; total coalition casualties during this period numbered 847, totaling 1,043.

⁸ Adib Farhardi, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*, Kabul, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Secretariat, Author, 2008, 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, i.

¹⁰ Thomas Riddig defines the insurgency in Afghanistan as segmented and consisting of seven armed structures: the Islamic Movement of the Taliban, the networks of the Haqqani and Mansur families in the South-East, the Tora Bora Jihad Front (*De Tora Bora Jehadi Mahaz*) led by Anwar-ul-Haq Mujahed in Nangrahar (Eastern region), HIG, small Salafi groups in Kunar and Nuristan provinces (Eastern region) and, as a new phenomenon, a number of not inter-related local ex-mujahedin groups that (or whose historical leaders) had been pushed out of power, are taking up arms and starting to adopt Taliban-like language and behavior, see *The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors, an Approaches to ‘Talks,’* 2009, <http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AANRuttigSummary2.PDF> (accessed October 25, 2009).




Figure 1. ISAF Expansion 2004–2006¹¹

In 2009, approximately 64,500 ISAF were deployed to Afghanistan.¹² ANSF number over 155,000 strong, consisting of a standing army of 79,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, and 76,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) police forces,¹³ and thus, providing the GIRoA with over 211, 420 combined coalition military forces to combat the insurgency.

¹¹ GobaSecurity.org, "ISAF Expansion," *Military*, June 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_orbat_isaf11.htm (accessed August 13, 2009).

¹² "International Security Assistance Force Facts and Figures," *International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength and Laydown*, July 23, 2009, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009).

¹³ Human Resource Report Project, "Afghanistan Conflict Monitor," *Security Forces*, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/securityforces.html#docs2> (accessed July 4, 2009).




Figure 2. U.S. Troop Numbers in Afghanistan 2001–2009¹⁴

Insurgents have capitalized on ISAF’s focus on national and provincial level capacity building, and limited scope search and destroy operational methods, by re-establishing strength at the district and village level. Complementing insurgent efforts is ISAF’s reliance on precision airstrikes, restrictive force protection requirements, and use of large-scale conventional military force structures. ISAF’s tactics, combined with a continual growth in military forces, may contribute to the yearly increase in U.S. casualties, illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Cumulative U.S. Fatalities, Afghanistan (October 2001–July 2008)¹⁵

¹⁴ “U.S. to Boost Troop in Afghanistan,” *BBC World News America*, February 18, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7895951.stm> (accessed August 13, 2009).

¹⁵ The Human Security Report Project: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, “Military Casualty Data,” July 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/military.html> (accessed August 13, 2009).

Approximately 12 times the amount of ISAF and coalition military and security forces in 2009, compared with 2002 troop totals, have not enabled the GIRoA to defeat the Taliban insurgency.¹⁶ The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated yearly since 2003. Taliban influence has spread from small pockets in central and eastern Afghanistan in 2003, to approximately 75% of the country in 2009, as illustrated in Figure 4.

¹⁶ I use David Kilcullen's definition of insurgency that he adapted from Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as 'an organized movement that aims at overthrowing the political order within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism, guerilla warfare and propaganda' his refined definition is found in, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 12.




Figure 4. UNDSS Security Risk Level-Afghanistan¹⁷

The deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan over time is alarming, and is consistent with the increased uncertainty of the Afghan population. Afghans were polled in a national survey in 2004 by the International Republican Institute (IRI), and asked if they thought the country was heading in the right direction. Of those polled, 79% agreed; however, only 30% agreed when asked the same question in 2009.

¹⁷ Developed using PowerPoint by combining two separate open source Afghanistan maps into one, with source data from United Nations Department of Safety and Security Maps as published in “Dangerous Areas Expanding Across Southern Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, September 1, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901> (accessed August 12, 2009); “Government Maps Shows Dire Afghan Security Picture,” *Reuters*, August 5, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSSP43015420090805> (accessed August 12, 2009).




Figure 5. Afghanistan Environmental Survey¹⁸

Also consistent in recent surveys, conducted by both the Asia Foundation and IRI, is the concern over the security situation in the country.¹⁹

Overall, the proportion of respondents who have a positive view of the security situation in their local area has decreased in most regions since 2007. Respondents report an improvement in security conditions in the Central Hazarajat, West, and East regions but a consistent degradation in security conditions since 2006 in the South, West, South East, and Central Kabul regions.²⁰

In the 2008 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, Afghan's were asked to justify their rationale, in that, if they thought the country was heading in the wrong direction, what was the main reason for this (see Figure 6), and what did they think was the biggest problem facing their country as a whole (see Figure 7). The results of the polls appear in the following two graphs.

¹⁸ This graph was recreated using PowerPoint. All data was taken from the environmental survey conducted as a part of the International Republican Institute (IRI). "Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey May 3–16, 2009," *Lapis Communication Research Strategy*, June 2009, www.iri.org (accessed August 3, 2009).

¹⁹ The Asia Foundation 2008 survey interviewed 6,593 Afghans from each of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The IRI 2009 survey interviewed 3,200 Afghan from all 34 provinces.

²⁰ Ruth Rennie, *Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People* (Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR): Kabul, The Asia Foundation, 2008), 5.




Figure 6. Asia Foundation Environmental Survey 2008²¹




Figure 7. Asian Foundation Biggest Problem Survey 2008²²

The results of the environmental polls are consistent with United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and Afghan government security assessments displayed in Figure 4. Security is the biggest issue facing coalition forces in Afghanistan. Given the rise in overall violence, reduced security situation, the increased influence of the Taliban, and a continued increase in coalition casualties, it is time for U.S. government policy makers to reassess the current overall strategy in Afghanistan and determine if ISAF are appropriately employing the current disposition of coalition

²¹ This graph was recreated using PowerPoint, all data was taken from survey's gauging problems at the national level as a part of the Asia Foundation 2008 Afghanistan survey *Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People* (Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), 2008), <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2008.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2009).

²² This graph was recreated using PowerPoint, all data was taken from survey's gauging the direction of the country conducted as a part of the Asia Foundation 2008 Afghanistan survey *Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People* (Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), 2008), <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2008.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2009).

military and police forces to maximize FID and COIN effects. This question is highly relevant, as ISAF are in its eighth year of conflict, and U.S. President Barack Obama has authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. forces in support of OEF.²³

B PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if ISAF and the U.S. are appropriately employing current coalition military and police forces to maximize effects against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The author has illustrated in the introduction that a small number of SOF conducting UW with limited resources by, with, and through indigenous tribal militias were successful, and that a robust coalition with over 275, 000 combined military forces face a continually growing Taliban insurgency, marked with increasing levels violence.²⁴ Ivan Arreguin Toft's theory of strategic interaction examines this phenomenon, and clarifies the implications behind the author's purpose. The following paragraphs examine Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic interaction to put the current situation in Afghanistan into relative perspective.

Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic interaction pits a strong actor against a weak actor in a competition, or an asymmetric conflict, for control of a state. The strong actor is generally a state government or polity with greater relative material power,²⁵ and the weak actor is generally a rebel group or smaller state with less relative material power. Strategic interaction theory explains why a strong actor may lose to a weak actor in an asymmetric conflict. Asymmetric conflicts, including state internal wars, with or without external actor support, and state verses state warfare, is defined by Arreguin-Toft as war

²³ Helen Cooper, "Obama will Send 17,000 Troops to Afghanistan," *New York Times*, November 8, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/world/americas/18iht-afghan.4.20287018.html> (accessed July 5, 2009).

²⁴ According to iCasualties.org, a Web site that compiles press releases from AP and Reuters, July 2009 marked the highest number of coalition and U.S. casualties to date at 76 (killed in action) KIA.

²⁵ Arreguin-Toft defines relative material powers as "the product of a given states population and armed forces," 2. The greater relative material power an actor has, the stronger he is.

in which, “the halved product of one actor’s armed forces and population exceeded the simple product of its adversary’s armed forces and population by 5:1 or more.”²⁶

According to Arreguin-Toft, strong and weak actors in competition can employ either a direct or an indirect strategic approach.²⁷

Direct strategic approaches—e.g., conventional attack and defense – target an adversary’s armed forces with the aim of destroying or capturing that adversary’s *physical capacity* [sic] to fight, thus making will irrelevant... Indirect strategic approaches—e.g., barbarism and guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS)—most often aim to destroy an adversary’s *will* [sic] to resist, thus making physical capacity irrelevant. Barbarism targets an adversary’s will by murdering, torturing, or incarcerating noncombatants. GWS attacks an adversary’s will by targeting enemy soldiers, though noncombatants may be targets as well.²⁸

Arreguin-Toft’s thesis concludes that a strong actor is likely to win, when the strong and weak actors both use the same strategic approach (i.e., direct vs. direct or indirect vs. indirect); however, his thesis also concludes that a weak actor is more likely to win when the strong and weak actors use different strategic approaches (i.e., direct vs. indirect or indirect vs. direct). To verify his conclusions quantitatively, Arreguin-Toft compared the predictions of his strategic interaction thesis to a large-n sample of 202 asymmetric conflict outcomes spanning from 1800–2003.²⁹ He determined that strong actors won 76.8% of same approach conflicts, and weak actors won 63.6% of opposite approach conflicts; however, more importantly, he discovered that resources were valuable in conflict, but the use of those resources by an actor is much more significant.³⁰

This conclusion brings us back to Afghanistan. During the initial invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. SOF embedded with the Northern Alliance employed a direct strategy of conventional attack against the Taliban’s conventional defense. U.S. technology,

²⁶ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 29. Arreguin-Toft defines strategy “as an actor’s plan for using armed forces to achieve military or political goals.”

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 44, 47.

precision munitions, and airpower provided the decisive advantage in relative material power, and the Taliban were quickly defeated. The Taliban facilitated a U.S. direct strategy by the conventional nature of the Taliban's established defensive positions and operational tactics. Following their defeat, the Taliban dispersed and chose to either surrender, blend in with society in Afghanistan, or to flee into ungoverned areas in neighboring Pakistan.

Most of the grass-root fighters returned to their home villages. Their leaders went to Pakistan or underground, knowing that they would face prosecution for their alliance with al-Qaeda which had permitted the 9/11 attacks. All of them waited to see how things would take shape. Some groups of fighters stuck together in remote areas like Shahikot (Paktia) and Baghran/Pasaband (at the Helmand/Ghor border). Although a number of leading Taleban signaled readiness to integrate peacefully into the post-2001 set-up, they neither surrendered nor were they finally included in any political deal. Only a small number of prominent Taleban officials joined the new institutions as individuals. Some of them were elected to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, others to parliament in 2005. With its leadership surviving, the Taleban never ceased to exist as a movement.³¹

Throughout 2002–2004, small numbers of SF established firebases at strategic locations in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and employed an indirect strategy of GWS against remaining Taliban. It is important to recognize that SF employed an indirect strategy of GWS by, with, and through host nation (HN) forces based on necessity due to a lack of relative material power. Remaining Taliban fighters also changed from a direct to an indirect strategy based on a significant decrease in relative material power. It was during this timeframe (2003–2004), that Afghanistan witnessed the smallest number of coalition casualties.³² It was also during this timeframe that the people of Afghanistan had the brightest outlook for their future and best perception of the effectiveness of coalition forces.³³ Over time, coalition forces increased, as well as the relative material

³¹ Thomas Ruttig, *The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors, and Approaches to 'Talks,'* July 2009, 6, <http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AANRuttigSummary2.PDF> (accessed August 19, 2009).

³² According to iCasualties.org, coalition forces suffered 57 KIA in 2003 and 59 KIA in 2004.

³³ International Republican Institute (IRI), "Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey May 3–16 2009," Lapis Communication Research Strategy, June 2009, www.iri.org (accessed August 3, 2009).

power of the GIRoA. Subsequently, the GIRoA and the ISAF coalition became a strong actor and changed tactics from a SOF lead indirect strategy to a GPF lead direct strategy of search and attack.

What is critical in this distinction is that both the strength of the actors involved and their strategic interaction changed over time; both actors literally switched roles in strength and strategy. ISAF forces, largely conventional in nature, as well as the conventionally trained ANA, employ a direct strategy of conventional attack (search and destroy). Conversely, the Taliban, originally a strong actor employing a direct strategy of conventional defense, became a weak actor employing an indirect strategy of GWS. This again begs the question, is the ISAF and the U.S. appropriately employing the current coalition military and police forces to maximize effects against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan?

 Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

The scope of this case study is to objectively compare and contrast the current ISAF and U.S. strategy in Afghanistan with a district level FID/COIN methodology using seven distinguishable conflicting criteria consisting of: (1) top vs. bottom mission focus, (2) tactical methodology (search and destroy vs. clear, hold, build), (3) centralized vs. decentralized distribution of resources, (4) sustained vs. periodic presence, (5) U.S./ISAF centric vs. Afghan centric, (6) force protection vs. force integration, and (7) provincial development vs. district development. Each conflicting criteria reflects the current ISAF strategy in Afghanistan versus the recommended district approach COIN strategy. For example, top vs. bottom mission focus in Afghanistan, is in reference to the U.S.’s and ISAF’s current focus on creating a strong central government in Kabul, as opposed to

allocating resources at the district or village level. Each strategy is examined highlighting potential benefits and associated risk. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level, and recommends feasible economy of force solutions to enhance the security, control, and influence of the GIRoA, and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

C. IMPORTANCE

Afghanistan has become priority for the Obama Administration, on February 15, 2009, President Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. Forces to Afghanistan.³⁴ On June 15, 2009, President Obama authorized the replacement of U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, with a former SOF commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal.³⁵ On July 19, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave U.S. forces in Afghanistan one year to make progress, and illustrate that victory is not out of reach.³⁶

As deliberations over an Afghan strategy continued over the summer of 2009, a declassified version of General McChrystal's initial assessment of Afghanistan was released to the public. In it, he called for a change in strategy to a more decentralized approach; however, he requested an additional 40,000 troops to accomplish his objectives. With General McChrystal's request, and as the overall force structure of ISAF continues to grow, it appears that the U.S. will continue to reinforce the same unsuccessful direct strategy, and fail to recognize that larger force structures are not sufficient to succeed in Afghanistan.

This thesis's hypothesis is fourfold. First, ISAF, and U.S. forces could employ a successful joint combined FID and COIN campaign in Afghanistan by, with, and through

³⁴ Karen DeYoung, "More Troops Headed to Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021702411.html> (accessed July 19, 2009).

³⁵ Greg Jaff, "New Afghanistan Commander will Review Troop Placements," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/15/AR2009061502884.html> (accessed July 19, 2009).

³⁶ Liam Stack, "Gates: U.S. has one Year to Make Progress in Afghanistan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0719/p06s01-duts.html> (accessed July 19, 2009).

Afghan military, police, and security forces with the current ISAF force structure, if applied systematically at the village/district level using a clear, hold, build methodology. Second, ISAF promotion and enablement of established village and district political hierarchies may effectively deny insurgents sanctuary, critical resources, and serve to isolate and separate the insurgents from the population. Third, ISAF and U.S. operations that do not develop a permanent capacity disrupt but do not defeat Afghan insurgents, and place cooperative Afghan citizens at a greater risk for insurgent reprisals following the departure of coalition forces from the village/district. Fourth, a clear, hold, build methodology maximizes resources, and is designed to decrease ISAF involvement over time.

D. METHODOLOGY

To support the thesis's hypothesis, the author examines three case studies, one case study of an operation prior to the establishment of Regional Commands (RC), in Afghanistan (2002–2004), and two case studies of operations following the establishment of RCs (2004–2009). Each case study is examined using a background, mission, and analysis format. Background information in each case study consists of a detailed description of the operational area, relevance of the mission, and a basic organizational structure of the units conducting the mission. Missions are described in the chronological manner.

Case studies are analyzed based on seven distinguishable conflicting criteria consisting of: (1) top-down vs. bottom-up mission focus, (2) tactical methodology (search and destroy vs. clear, hold, build), (3) centralized vs. decentralized distribution of resources, (4) sustained vs. periodic presence, (5) U.S./ISAF centric vs. Afghan centric, (6) force protection vs. force integration, and (7) provincial development vs. district development.

Conclusions and analysis are examined for each operation based on the tactical and operational success with respect to the seven criteria. Literary sources, interviews, and large-n graphical and statistical data are used to reinforce analysis of the case studies. Overall collective analysis, determined from each case study, support summary conclusions and recommendations.

E. ORGANIZATION

Chapter I provided a brief overview of the last eight years of conflict in Afghanistan, and defined the purpose of this thesis using Arguine-Toft's theory of strategic interaction. Chapter I also introduced the seven distinguishable criteria that objectively compare and contrast the current ISAF and U.S. strategy in Afghanistan with a district level foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency methodology. Chapter II analyzes and defines the seven criteria with respect to President Obama's strategic goals for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Chapter III is a case study analysis of UW operations conducted by SF in Orgun-e, at the beginning of OEF between 2002 and 2003. Chapter IV is case study of Operation JINGAL JORDAWNKI, the SF contribution to Operation Mar Karadad that liberated Musa Qala from the Taleban in 2007. Chapter V is case study of the pilot Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) conducted in Wardak Province in 2009. The final chapter compares and contrasts summary conclusions and recommendations from each case study to generate a framework for a counterinsurgency and stabilization strategy for Afghanistan, and concludes with specific recommendations tailored to the situation in Afghanistan.

II. DEFINING THE SEVEN CRITERIA

✦ Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

A. OVERVIEW

The seven contrasting criteria presented in this section were determined by first identifying the predominant ISAF/U.S. methods used in Afghanistan from 2002–2009.³⁷ The current strategy column represents the predominant methods. After determining the current methods used by U.S. and non-U.S. ISAF, feasible counter methods were identified for each current method. Each current method and counter-method (district approach) is examined in this chapter using U.S. doctrine as the basis to define each method. Case studies in the chapters that follow compare and contrast the seven conflicting criteria operationally to determine what methods resulted in success. Successful operations in Afghanistan are defined as tactical and operational level multinational military operations that institute an enduring effect, and support the strategic goals of the U.S. in Afghanistan as outlined by President Barrack Obama on March 27, 2009. The U.S. goals for Afghanistan are to do the following.

³⁷ The predominant (current) methods were derived from interviews with officers and soldiers who served in support of OEF from 2002–2009, newspaper articles, intellectual essays, and observations made by David Kilcullen in his book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Karl A. Slaiku in his article *Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot Strategy for Coalition Forces*, and in Seth Jones book *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* and in his RAND testimony *U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan* presented to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee on Middle East and South Asia on April 2, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT324.pdf (accessed July 17, 2009).

- Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and especially Pakistan, to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.
- Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.
- Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.
- Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.
- Involve the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the United Nations (UN).³⁸

The first three of the five goals identified by President Obama determine that security and capacity for both military and government institutions of Afghanistan as paramount to achieving ultimate success. President Obama also said that a “dramatic increase in Afghan civilian expertise was needed to develop institutions not only in the central government but at the provincial and local levels.”³⁹ Ultimate success is a stable, secure, and self-sufficient democratic Islamic Republic, capable of enforcing internal security and providing services to its people. To achieve U.S. strategic objectives, tactical and operational level ISAF multinational military operations must shape the environment, and establish conditions for success. In the following section, the seven criteria are explained in context, to illustrate the implications for U.S. and coalition strategic success in Afghanistan through tactical and operational level processes.

³⁸ President Barack Obama, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” *A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan*, March 27, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov> (accessed April 1, 2009).

³⁹ Vincent Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Alexandria, VA: Congressional Research Institute, August 25, 2009), 5.

1. Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up

Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives.⁴⁰

When considering the application of top vs. bottom emphasis for a COIN strategy, it is important to understand the socio-political dynamics of Afghanistan; however, before exploring the socio-political dynamics of Afghanistan, a top-down vs. bottom-up strategy must first be examined. A top-down strategy involves an outside actor allocating resources to the highest-level leadership, and political and military institutions of the HN government. In Afghanistan, the U.S. and ISAF “have focused the bulk of their efforts since 2001 on trying to create a strong central government in Kabul, capable of establishing security and delivering services.”⁴¹ A bottom-up strategy focuses on local institutions at the district and/or village level. A bottom-up strategy allocates resources to promote local leaders and “assists them in providing security and services to their populations, and by better connecting them to the central government when necessary.”⁴²

The GIRoA has a highly centralized central government but it is designed to delegate authority to the sub-national entities given that the intended structure of provincial and district administrations mirror that of the national government. Unfortunately, the actual structure of provincial and district administrations are determined through “the financial and military strength of local leaders, as well as personal and tribal loyalties.”⁴³ The disproportionate level of government authority is a major issue for the GIRoA. The national government uses consistent political negotiations and bribery to ensure compliance and support from sub-national entities.

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Author, June 2001), 2–2.

⁴¹ Seth Jones, *U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 2009), 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴³ Library of Congress, *Country Profile: Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Author, August 2008), 19.

Regional tribal leaders, warlords, or militia commanders manage affairs at the village and district level, due to the lack of a functional municipal or provincial judicial system. Order is maintained either through the Shari`ah (Islamic law), Pashtunwali, or through established norms of acceptable behavior (i.e., traditional tribal codes of justice).⁴⁴ Pashtun cultural practices, such as Pashtunwali, combined with the isolation of the population of the country make Afghanistan a sanctuary for insurgent movements.

The centerpieces of Pashtunwali ideology consist of four elements consisting of equality (Seyal), the application of equality (Seyali or competition), the protection of female members of society and wealth (Namus), and honor (Ezat).⁴⁵ Pashtunwali involves an arrangement of tribal relationships including rivalry (Gundi), tribal affiliation or ethnicity (Qawm), and tribal allegiances or unions (Taroon).⁴⁶ Pashtunwali also serves as a code of honor that maintains order through informal rules (Narkh), that endorses protection of neighbors or outsiders (Hamsaya), allows from revenge (Badal), and considers forgiveness (Nanawati).⁴⁷ The informal or traditional rules of Pashtunwali are implemented by the consensus of an elected tribal council (Shura), or a group of elders gathered to discuss a specific issue (Jirga).⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Vincent Iacopino, *The Taliban's War on Women: A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Physicians for Human Rights, August 2008), 2.

⁴⁵ Shahm Mahmood Miakhel, *The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their Role in Security and Governance*, 2006, 4, <http://www.pashtoonkhwa.com/files/books/Miakhel%20-%20Importance%20of%20Tribal%20Structures%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf> (accessed October 29, 2009).

⁴⁵ Miakhel, *The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their Role in Security and Governance*, 4.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.




Figure 8. David Kilcullen's Tribal Governance Triad⁴⁹

At the village or district level, leadership and decision making is divided into three poles of authority in what David Kilcullen has described as the tribal governance triad.

These were the Khan or, collectively the jirga as a group of tribal elders; the mullah as a member of the Islamic religious establishment (the 'ulema shura); and the government intermediary representative (the government approved political agent in parts of Pakistan, or the wali or district governor in Afghanistan).⁵⁰

Tribal members, specifically Pashtuns, routinely shift allegiance between the three poles (see Figure 8). Governance by the three poles is largely based on public opinion, and can be loosely compared to a modern democratic state.⁵¹ The legislative branch of government is most closely associated with the jirga, "the wali the executive, and the mullah the judiciary."⁵² Pashtun tribes exhibit what anthropologist Max

⁴⁹ This diagram was created using PowerPoint and replicates David Kilcullen's Tribal Governance Triad, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 80.

⁵⁰ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 77–78.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵² *Ibid.*

Gluckman has described as inter-hierarchical roles.⁵³ “An inter-hierarchical role is often filled by the village headman, and is subject to the conflicting interests and pressures from both the higher political order, and the villagers underneath his leadership.”⁵⁴ In addition to shifting allegiances with established informal tribal authorities, tribes people simultaneously occupy rungs on multiple ladders in “business, governmental, party-political, and religious hierarchies.”⁵⁵

The relative balance achieved in the traditional governance triad is fragile, and susceptible to outside interference. Currently, both ISAF and the Taliban have affected Afghan traditional governance at the district and village level. Tribal leaders or khans, that form the base of the traditional governance triad, have been overpowered and marginalized by the Taliban.⁵⁶ The Taliban has replaced the khan’s authority.

Government representatives or maliks supported by both the GIROA and coalition forces are viewed as corrupt, illegitimate, ineffective, and inconsistent. Many factors contribute to this perception; however, popular distrust and overall negative sentiment has effectively made maliks irrelevant, at the village and district level.

Taliban influence has shifted power to mullahs, distributing an unbalanced appropriation of power to the religious authority of the traditional triad. This has manifested in a more radical interpretation of Shari`ah, and violent applications of Hadith (punishments), both consistent with the Taliban’s fundamentalist ideological framework.

⁵³ M. D. Murphy, “The Manchester School,” *Anthropological Theories: A Guide Prepared for Students by Students*, <http://www.as.ua.edu/ant/Faculty/murphy/manchest.htm> (accessed August 17, 2009).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 79.

⁵⁶ Ibid.




Figure 9. Unbalanced Traditional Governance Triad⁵⁷

The same social factors that negate or undermine democratization in Afghanistan support insurgent movements like the Taliban, al Qaeda, or the Hezbi-Islami Group (HIG). The citizens of Afghanistan outside of the urban centers in Kabul and Kandahar lack a sense of collective national identity and retain decentralized tribal and clan affiliations under qawm. Pashtunwali may not be universally recognized across Afghanistan; however, vengeance and hospitality are generally respected behavioral norms. Afghan remote villages and/or independent households provide sanctuary to insurgents either by recognizing Pashtunwali, engaging in general hospitality, or through coercion. Lack of competent decentralized government security forces and intelligence networks allow insurgents, warlords, and rogue militia commanders to move and operate freely. Up until a recent restructuring of the ANP in 2005 by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), the ANP were generally, undertrained, ill equipped, underfunded, undermanned, incompetent, and universally corrupt.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Figure was created with PowerPoint by the author for a thesis briefing given to MG Cleveland, Commander Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) during his visit to the Naval Postgraduate School.

⁵⁸ Scott Cameron, *Assessing ISAF: A Baseline Study of NATO's Role in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: British American Security Information Council, March 2007), 10.

Now that the socio-political dynamics have been briefly examined, the difference between the two strategies and associated implications concerning COIN are more apparent. A top-down strategy allocates resources and places emphasis on the highest-level government institutions, and political and military leaders, to spread influence from the government center. A bottom focus allocates resources to the district or village level, promoting the authority of established tribal leaders. This method spreads influence from the rural areas outside of the central government's control and considers existing tribal socio-political hierarchies.

2. Tactical Methodology (Search and Destroy vs. Clear, Hold, Build)

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.⁵⁹

This section examines two opposing tactical methods that have been employed by coalition forces in Afghanistan. The first method examined is search and attack. Search and attack is defined in this section using U.S. military field manuals and joint publications, and entails considerable doctrinal definitions to describe this term clearly in context. Clear, hold, build is also described in this section, only with less reliance on doctrine and more emphasis on theory and practice; citing works from COIN experts to frame the description.

a. Search and Destroy

Search and destroy is not a doctrinal term nor is it one of the four types of offensive operations defined by the U.S. Army to describe offensive operations. Search and destroy is used in this thesis for comparative analysis to describe tactical and operational offensive military operations, generally of short duration, conducted by ground or aerial military forces. Offensive military operations as defined by FM 3-0, "are

⁵⁹ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2-5.

movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.”⁶⁰ This thesis focuses on movement to contact and attack; for they are the two most applicable and best represent the current tactical methods employed by coalition forces in Afghanistan.

A movement to contact “is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact” with an enemy force, that may result in a meeting engagement.⁶¹ Meeting engagements entail direct fire contact between friendly and enemy forces. One technique used for movement to contact operations is search and attack. It is generally accomplished through patrolling roads and villages. An attack is an offensive military operation that destroys or defeats an enemy force, seizes and secures terrain, or accomplishes both.⁶² Doctrinally, there are three types of attacks: hasty, deliberate, and special purpose. Attacks conducted by SOF are generally categorized as direct action (DA) operations. DA is an offensive operation or attack of short duration conducted by “SOF or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel;” DA is executed through raids, ambushes, stand-off attacks and direct assaults to accomplish a specific or time sensitive target or objective.⁶³

Search and destroy operations degrade and disrupt insurgent operations temporarily, and eliminate potential and/or legitimate threats to the government. The benefit of a search and destroy methodology is that immediate and quantifiable effects can be tracked metrically by military staffs. They track and post the number of operations conducted, and tally the total number of reported insurgents captured or killed throughout their respective unit’s combat deployment.

There are two dangers to this method, physical and ideological. Physical risk is twofold; first, when coalition forces patrol unfamiliar roads and villages, while searching for Taliban insurgents, soldiers are at risk of “traps in form of IEDs or

⁶⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 7–16.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Department of the Army, FM 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Author, April 1998), II–3.

ambushes that the Taliban use to reinforce their information operations (IO) campaign.⁶⁴ Second, HN civilians and their property are at risk of collateral damage. Ideological risk is the general inaccurate assumption of military and political leaders that quantifiable metrics that present more operations, more enemy captured or more enemy killed are indicative of operational success or strategic progress in defeating the insurgency. Correspondingly, commanders often confuse measures of performance (MOP) with measures of effects (MOE).

b. Clear, Hold, Build

Arreguin-Toft's indirect strategies are both based on violent acts to persuade or coerce the population. Arreguin-Toft defines GWS as the "organization of a portion of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct confrontation."⁶⁵ He describes GWS as attrition based, slowly eroding an adversary's will by destroying his resources (soldiers, supplies, and equipment) over time.⁶⁶ Arreguin-Toft's theory is a good basis for understanding the general framework of the conflict in Afghanistan, but does not examine the incorporation of mixed strategies, COIN and FID. This thesis adapts Arreguin-Toft's concept of GWS to depict an indirect strategy not based exclusively on targeting and violence, but on organizing a portion of society in a designated area for establishing security, and capacity development (i.e., a strategy that incorporates FID and COIN).

Additionally, Arreguin-Toft's model only accounts for rigid unconditional direct or indirect strategies without considering alternative methods that could employ both direct and/or indirect strategic approaches simultaneously. Instead of conceptualizing an indirect strategy in terms of an attrition-based concept through violence exclusively, consider an indirect strategy measured through public perception and enhanced cooperation through the reinforcement of security and legitimacy.

⁶⁴ Carl Slaiku, "Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot plus Strategy for Coalition Forces," *Small Wars Journal* (May 20, 2009), www.smallwarsjournal.com (accessed July 28, 2009).

⁶⁵ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32.

⁶⁶ Slaiku, "Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot plus Strategy for Coalition Forces."

Chapter 5 of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* defines three approaches to counterinsurgency: clear, hold, build, combined action, and limited support. According to FM 3-24, each of the three can be conducted simultaneously and be mutually supporting, or each can be applied independently depending on the assessed situation of the operational area.⁶⁷

The application of a clear, hold, build approach entails removing insurgents from the area with military force if necessary, securing the area and defending it from attack, and establishing permanent HN government institutions. The cleared area subsequently serves as a staging point for future military operations and expansion of government control. In Afghanistan, the process would begin with coalition forces (CF) clearing an area (designated village) and establishing a 100% secure perimeter. Authority would be returned to local leaders and then, within this safe environment, the coalition would pursue “stability initiatives, including enhanced security, services and development.”⁶⁸ When the village is determined by coalition forces to be independently functional, and is under the protection of local security forces, coalition forces then extend influence into other areas using the same process.⁶⁹ Clear, hold, build operations, or the oil or ink spot strategy, are designed to produce villages in which:

- (a) security works 24/7 to protect villagers from enemy threats; (b) governance reflects the national vision amended to honor local tribal customs; and (c) development yields basic services of health, education, and most important, jobs that pay living wages and allow breadwinners to support their families.⁷⁰

David Galula developed eight principles for conducting clear, hold, build in 1964 that still serve as the basis for modern counterinsurgency doctrine defined in FM 3-24. His eight principles are explained clearly in a step-by-step process in his book,

⁶⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Author, December 2006).

⁶⁸ Slaiku, “Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot plus Strategy for Coalition Forces.”

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*,” 4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, and are presented below. In applying his principles, a thorough understanding of the operational environment is critical to proper application.

This is evident in Galula's fifth principle, "set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities,"⁷¹ that has been marked below with an asterisk. This is to indicate that in Afghanistan, established tribal elders are respected members of the community, and appointed members of the shura. This is not because of their age, but because they have proven themselves over time with sound leadership and decision making ability. In Afghanistan, counterinsurgents should be mindful of this fact, and not be quick to employ a democratic process without first considering that at the village and district level, there is established traditional governance in the form of a shura.

Additionally, although shura members may have been cooperative with or members of the Taliban, this is not always indicative that they believe in the ideology. Cooperation or membership may have been exclusively based on survival. Circumstances must be considered on a case-by-case basis; however, there is no need to modify the macrohistorical processes that have manifested traditional governance at the district level, with force fed democratization.⁷²

c. Galula's Eight Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population; control its movements to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
- *5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

⁷¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55–56.

⁷² Jens Meierhenrich, "Forming States after Failure," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 153.

6. Test these authorities by means of assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs (*sic*) and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political environment.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.⁷³

In summary, when considering the application of a tactical methodology, the long-range implications, the immediate desired effect, and the potential second- and third-order effects with respect to the socio-political dynamics must be calculated. Case studies examines what method is more effective for achieving long-range strategic goals; however, it may be that the best application is not “either or,” but a synchronized application of both methods simultaneously.

3. Centralized vs. Decentralized Distribution of Resources

When determining the allocation of resources⁷⁴ in Afghanistan, the task environment must first be examined. A complex environment is defined as an environment “that has many diverse, interdependent external elements.”⁷⁵ Afghanistan can be described as a complex environment due to the ethnic, linguistic, and tribal diversity of its people that consist of over 17 different ethnic groups that speak over 30 different languages.⁷⁶ Afghanistan is also an unstable environment, or an environment that is “turbulent, unstable, and shifts abruptly.”⁷⁷ Afghanistan has endured continual shifts in ethnic, linguistic, and religious beliefs throughout over 4,000 years of instability that has manifested diverse and distinct pockets of civilization in the region. Traditional rivalry between tribes and ethnic groups, disputes, and armed hostilities contribute to sustained instability at the village, district, and provincial levels.⁷⁸

⁷³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 55–56.

⁷⁴ Resources are defined according to FM 3-0 *Operations*, 2001, “as the employment of military forces (unit size, equipment type, and force component type) and arrangement of their efforts in time, space and purpose.”

⁷⁵ Professor Erik Jansen, lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, January 2009.

⁷⁶ Library of Congress, *Country Profile: Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Author, August 2008), 1.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

Professor Henry Mintzberg developed a theory of organizational configurations based on coherent internal consistency with relation to external conditions of the task environment.⁷⁹ According to Mintzberg, the external conditions of the task environment indicate the best method of coordination, management, or allocation of resources. Mintzberg developed three methods of coordination consisting of direct supervision, standardization of (work processes, output or skill), or by mutual adjustment. Mintzberg contends that the best method of management in an unstable and complex environment is through vertical decentralization.

When the task environment doesn't lend itself to standardization or even planning, team members have to coordinate through continuous *mutual adjustment* to each others' activities. This requires constant communication to make sure that coordination requirements (and expectations) are clear and that activities are performed with minimal confusion and maximum benefit. As a result, mutual adjustment is the most costly form of coordination. This can happen, for example, when the task environment is very dynamic and unpredictable.⁸⁰

Vertical decentralization delegates power down the chain of authority,⁸¹ promoting mutual adjustment, innovation and adaptability. Vertical decentralization is only recommended when lower level management and workers consist of highly trained professionals. Middle management military officers, such as company or operational level commanders, may use vertical decentralization through the established military chain of command to ensure operational flexibility at the tactical level. Vertical decentralization provides tactical commanders with the operational or strategic commander's intent, but permits flexibility at the tactical level to accomplish the mission without considerable guidance or oversight from the higher-level commander. Flexibility and the level of vertical decentralization are dependent on the nature and complexity of the operation.

⁷⁹ Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review*, reprint 81106, (January–February 1981).

⁸⁰ Dr. Gary Klein, "A Collaboration Evaluation Framework," *The MITRE Corporation*, 2006, http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_05/05_0190/05_0190.pdf (accessed September 2, 2009).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Centralized management is best suited in simple environments that may be either stable or dynamic. A simple environment is one in which very few external factors in the environment may affect the organization. A stable environment either remains unchanged or has very little change over time. Centralized management is applied either through direct supervision or through a standardization of work processes. Direct supervision is applicable in a simple and dynamic environment, whereas a standardization of work processes is best employed in a simple and stable environment.

In conclusion, when considering the application of either a centralized or decentralized distribution of resources, the condition of the task environment must first be examined. According to Mitzberg, for an organizational configuration to be successful in a complex and unstable environment, it must coordinate through mutual adjustment, be decentralized and adaptive, and possess both highly specialized and trained workers. When planning and implementing military operations in a complex and unstable environment, operations must be coordinated and decentralized to achieve unity of effort.

4. Sustained vs. Periodic Presence

A sustained versus a periodic presence references the marked difference between the establishment of permanent government institutions, representation, and a security apparatus in a village or district center, or a periodic visit to a village or district center by Coalition and Afghan Security Forces (ASF).

A periodic presence entails operations that attempt to gain local favor by providing temporary medical services, humanitarian assistance, assessments, and/or impromptu meetings or *jirga* with the local leadership. Similar haphazard operations consist of “digging a well, building a school, or opening a clinic—without first establishing a secure perimeter in cooperation with villagers.”⁸² This type of operation is exactly as it is described, periodic or haphazard. Operations of this nature do not institute permanent capacity in any respect, and only serve to disrupt the lives of the local villagers they are meant to positively influence.

⁸² Slaiku “Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot plus Strategy for Coalition Forces.”

The underlying assumption is that aid projects, such as building schools, clinics, and roads, will win the hearts and minds of Afghans, give them more faith in their government, and turn them away from the Taliban. The logic sounds reasonable. But the problem is that there is little evidence to support it.⁸³

The dangers of periodic type operations are twofold. The first danger in this method is to coalition forces. Periodic patrolling of roads and villages to establish a positive presence puts soldiers at risk of insurgent traps in form of improvised explosive devices (IED) or ambushes. The second danger is to locals. Locals who accept assistance from coalition forces or village leaders who are asked to disclose information on insurgent activities, put themselves at risk of insurgent reprisals following the departure of coalition forces.⁸⁴ Additionally, schools and clinics built and supplied without a permanent security apparatus are susceptible to attack and theft.

A sustained presence at the district or village level correlates with a clear, hold build, strategy constituting the allocation of resources committed to the development of the local government institutions and security apparatus. Describing sustained operations is best illustrated through comparison with a deterrent strategy. William W. Kaufmann identified four conditions for nations to deter enemy threats successfully.⁸⁵ The four conditions, although originally devised by Kaufmann to identify successful methods of deterrence for a nation or state, can be applied by coalition forces during the conduct of sustained operations. Kaufmann's four conditions, as defined by Richard Lebow in the *Origins of Crisis*, are: "Nations must (1) define their commitment clearly, (2) communicate its existence to possible adversaries, (3) develop means to defend it, or punish adversaries who challenge it, and (4) demonstrate the resolve to carry out the actions this entails."⁸⁶

⁸³ Andrew Wilder, "A 'Weapons System' Based on Wishful Thinking," *Boston Globe: Time.com*, September 16, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/> (accessed September 20, 2009).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ R. Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, February 1, 1984), 84.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Kaufmann's first condition is "commitments must be defined clearly."⁸⁷ Coalition forces accomplish this by communicating their intent, goals, and expectations to the local leadership, law enforcement, and the populace, when developing the operational area. The intent is mission specific, restricted to assigned area rules of engagement (ROE), and reflects the policy of the GIRoA. Coalition forces must ensure that the population understands the benefits of allegiance, and the consequences of supporting the insurgents.

The insurgents must understand the costs of persistence. Coalition forces' approach to deterrence is based on the rational choice theory. "Rational choice theory can be applied to the decision making of individuals, organizations, or states provided the actor behaves in an instrumentally rational manner."⁸⁸ The actor (individual, organization, etc.) bases decisions on rational analysis on the expected cost vs. the benefits of his actions.⁸⁹ Deterrence is based on the actor's perceived credibility of his opponent, and if the associated cost outweighs the benefits.⁹⁰ Coalition forces must understand cultural differences affect the decision-making process and perception of the actors in respective areas of operation.

Coalition forces use information operations to spread their message as a means to define commitment. The U.S. Army Field Manual, (FM) 3-13, defines Information operations as, "the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information systems and to influence decision making."⁹¹ Several methods of information operations employment to promulgate the desired message consist of town

⁸⁷ Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, 84.

⁸⁸ K. Watman and D. Wilkening, *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995), 18.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Department of the Army FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Author, November 2003), iii.

meetings, radio announcements, billboards, leaflet drops, newspaper articles, and websites. Once the message is publicized, commitment must be demonstrated through action to establish credibility.

Kaufmann's second condition is "commitments must be communicated to possible adversaries."⁹² Insurgents must recognize the commitment of the coalition. Commitment is illustrated through action to develop credibility. Once credibility is established, the insurgents and possible adversaries should recognize commitment. It is the goal of the coalition to establish control of the operational area; control is established through action.

Control is established when the coalition can manipulate the behavior of the population to become individually accountable. Action determines the perception and beliefs of the population. Action can be described as methods to reinforce credibility through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Kinetic methods involve violent action through offensive military operations to achieve an effect. Some kinetic operations consist of SOF DA operations, ambushes, clearing operations, and airstrikes. Non-kinetic methods, such as information operations, are achieved through military operations using nonviolent means to achieve the desired effect. Other non-kinetic methods consist of humanitarian assistance, medical and veterinary operations, and civil affairs.

The coalition employs a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic operations to illustrate commitment and reinforce credibility. During the conduct of sustained operations, kinetic operations, not including SOF target specific surgical DA strikes, are conducted to set conditions for non-kinetic operations. If kinetic operations outnumber non-kinetic operations in an operational area, this may indicate that the population is not convinced of the coalition's commitment, or the coalition lacks credibility based on negative perceptions of action by the populace. However, a high-level of kinetic operations can also indicate that credibility is positively recognized by the population,

⁹² Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, 86.

and the insurgents have been isolated. The population demonstrates allegiance by isolating the insurgent through denying sanctuary, and by providing information to the coalition.

Kaufmann's third condition is to "develop means to defend commitment, or punish adversaries who challenge it."⁹³ Kaufmann identified "convincing your adversary of your intent to act in defense of your commitment" as "the most difficult component of deterrence."⁹⁴ In sustained operations, coalition forces assist the state in developing the systems to defend commitment and to punish adversaries. Although, coalition organic weapons systems, technology, and firepower provide the tools and capabilities to defend commitment independently, the local government must ultimately assume this responsibility. The population must recognize the credibility of the HN government. The government must demonstrate the ability to maintain control. The coalition assists the HN government if it is incapable of maintaining control autonomously.

Ideally, coalition forces develop enough credibility to employ a deterrent strategy incorporating both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. Watman states, "deterrence by denial attempts to dissuade and adversary from attacking by convincing him he cannot accomplish his objectives with the use of force or that accomplishing his objectives at an acceptable cost are very low."⁹⁵ Watman defines "deterrence by punishment as attempts to dissuade an opponent from attacking by threatening to destroy or otherwise take away that which he values."⁹⁶

In sustained operations, coalition forces assist the HN government in establishing measures to maintain security and execute a deterrence strategy. Sustained operations permit the coalition to reinstate local law enforcement, based on HN policies. Security checkpoints, manned by ANA soldiers, defend commitment. Eventually, trained local police forces or Afghan Public Protection Forces assume this responsibility. Government

⁹³ Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, 88.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁹⁵ Watman and Wilkening, *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, 16.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

political leadership is reinstated when the security situation permits. Insurgents must understand the cost, that if they attempt to challenge for control of the area, they will be punished.

Coalition forces enhance the means to defend commitment through facilitating the implementation of Afghan Security Forces and by receiving assistance through popular support. Ideally, the population should recognize the strength of the coalition and host nation government forces as greater than the insurgents. The population's allegiance should enable the GIRoA to re-instate initiatives to defend commitment, and punish adversaries who challenged it.

Kaufmann's fourth condition is "a state must convince possible adversaries of its resolve."⁹⁷ The coalition, and the host nation government it assists, should lose control if it cannot sustain the ability to retain order, and protect the population. Security, infrastructure, education, and ergonomic and economic support systems must be instituted. Following the establishment of security, the desired end-state is to impose regulations to eliminate conditions that supported the insurgency in the first place. However, before regulations can be established, the government must continually reinforce credibility to the population. The population maintains expectations that must be addressed by the government. If the government cannot support the expectations of the population, it loses credibility, allowing insurgents the opportunity to reassert control.

The time period immediately following the re-institution of recognized state government control of a previously insurgent controlled area is critical. The state must demonstrate legitimacy and ability. The local government and security forces must prove themselves and validate their capability for sustained commitment. If allowed, insurgent forces seize the initiative and attempt to challenge the government. The insurgent can be reduced but is not defeated until it is no longer relevant. Enduring commitment deters insurgent operations as long as plausible punishment and cost exceed the measured effects. A sound deterrence strategy as part of sustained operations ensures insurgent forces perceive the government as strong, resolute, and able.

⁹⁷ Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, 89.

After examining the difference between periodic and sustained operations, it is apparent that the perceptions and beliefs of the population concerning the legitimacy of the coalition and the GIRoA, is significant. When dedicating resources, commanders must consider the implications of sustained versus periodic presence. This same lesson was learned over 35 years ago by the U.S. in Vietnam. Andrew Krepinevich points out in his book, *the Army in Vietnam*, that, “big unit sweeps did not promote pacification-you had to stay in the area; otherwise the” insurgents would come right back into the area and undo any developmental gains made.”⁹⁸

5. U.S./ISAF Centric vs. Afghan Centric

Military theoretician Edward Luttwak observed that all armed forces combine elements of attrition warfare and maneuver warfare in their overall approach to war.⁹⁹ A U.S./ISAF centric approach in Afghanistan is attrition based warfare. According to Professor Hy Rothstein, “the closer a military is to pure attrition, the more inward the focus.”¹⁰⁰ When a military is attrition based, “internal administration and operations receive the most attention, and the organization is much less responsive to the external environment.”¹⁰¹

U.S./ISAF centric is best described using Arreguin-Toft’s theory of strategic interaction. U.S./ISAF centric is a direct strategic approach that attempts to maximize relative material power through conventional attack and conventional defense.¹⁰² U.S./ISAF has focused on the destruction of enemy forces through superior military strength and technology. The employment of overwhelming firepower to destroy enemy forces has alienated and antagonized the Afghan population and weakened support for the

⁹⁸ A. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 222.

⁹⁹ H. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, 34.

GIRoA.¹⁰³ Additionally, U.S./ISAF centric operations have generally focused on “seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces” without council or coordination with Afghan civilian and military leadership.¹⁰⁴

Afghan centric operations are maneuver focused, indirect, and are conducted predominantly by Afghan forces and address Afghan interests. Rothstein maintains that the “closer an armed force is to the maneuver end of the attrition related maneuver spectrum, the more it will be externally focused.”¹⁰⁵ Commanders that employ externally focused operations understand the operational environment, and embody an effects-based operational framework. In this sense, commanders recognize potential second- and third-order effects, and apply resources in a manner to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives, without causing needless suffering.

In summary, considering Luttwak and Arreguin-Toft’s observations, U.S./ISAF centric is defined in this thesis as an attrition-based and direct strategy that maximizes relative material power. Afghan centric is maneuver based and employed through an indirect strategy, and considers second- and third-order effects. General McChrystal summarizes the effects of a U.S./ISAF centric strategy best in his commander’s initial assessment to Secretary Gates, when he claims that U.S. forces “run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage.”¹⁰⁶

6. Force Protection vs. Force Integration

Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place

¹⁰³ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Stanley McChrystal, *COMISAF’s Initial Assessment* (Afghanistan, Bagram: Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces, June 26, 2009), 1–1.

¹⁰⁵ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1–2.

and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.¹⁰⁷

Coalition forces have established FOB across Afghanistan to provide force protection, and support and launch tactical operations. FOBs can vary greatly in size and services available. Large FOBs in Kabul [Bagram Air Field (BAF)] and Kandahar [Kandahar Air Field (KAF)] offer large buildings with air-conditioned offices and living quarters, dining facilities, and entertainment services including: coffee shops, restaurants, internet cafes, massage parlors, Post Exchanges (PX), and well-equipped gyms with weight training and cardiovascular equipment. Some FOBs possess morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) centers with internal movie theaters, movie rentals, games, free internet, and international phone service. FOBs also coordinate bazaars so FOB personnel can purchase goods from contracted local Afghans, including but not limited to carpets, jewelry, wood carvings, movies, and CDs.

FOBs possess almost all of the creature comforts of the western societies of the soldiers that operate them, and offer soldiers engaged in combat a protected area to recover between combat operations. However, FOBs are resource intensive and require security forces and maintenance personnel to function. FOBs have become so large that military forces are assigned to Afghanistan, not to assist with the security and development of the GIROA, but to conduct security and support operations to maintain a FOB. Force protection is critical for ensuring the safety and survivability of coalition soldiers operating in a combat environment; however, when considerable resources are diverted to support the function of a base that is supposed to support operations, there is a problem.

FOBs further isolate coalition forces from the Afghan population. “The boundaries of FOBs in Afghanistan are not just physical; they represent the chasm of a cultural divide—soldiers on one side, the people whose trust, safety, and information they

¹⁰⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*.

should be securing on the other.”¹⁰⁸ When a former guerrilla commander from the mountains of El Salvador, Joaquin Villalobos was asked about the current situation in Afghanistan, he said that the situation was complicated and that:

To achieve anything in that sort of environment, soldiers have to be willing and able to move around among the public. But the “force protection” that is at the heart of so many U.S. military tactics and procedures makes that awkward if not impossible. You can't convince the people you can protect them from the insurgents, after all, if you look like you're not sure you can protect yourself. They just ask why you're there in the first place. And that question is increasingly hard to answer.¹⁰⁹

The current “FOB mentality” restricts tactical operations to FOBs in the name of force protection and limits situational awareness. Soldiers operate out of FOBs, turning operations into limited scope patrols of short duration, reinforcing the concepts discussed in the “Sustained versus a Periodic Presence” section of this thesis. FOBs by their sheer size and presence become targets for insurgent rocket and mortar attacks, as well as suicide bombing attempts. Coalition forces have assumed a defensive posture by securing themselves in FOBs. In the immortal words of Sun-Tzu, “one who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture.”¹¹⁰

In addition to the current FOB centric method employed in Afghanistan, vehicle platforms designed to offer additional security and force protection from roadside bombs and IEDs, play right into the enemy's hands. The RG-series of vehicles are designed to make bomb blasts survivable; however, they are not maneuverable, and are restricted to the limited roads available in Afghanistan, in which bombs and IEDs are emplaced. Additionally, the required ballistic equipment worn by each soldier, with respect to individual force protection requirements, combined with the small windows of the RG

¹⁰⁸ Norman Emery, “Information Operations in Iraq,” *Military Review* (May–June 2004).

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Dickey, “In Afghanistan, A U.S. Protection Racket Strategy may Help,” *The Daily Star*, August 8, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=105049 (accessed August 12, 2009).

¹¹⁰ Sun-Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: New York, Metro Books Publishers, 1994), 183.

series vehicles, reduces situational awareness and mobility, and isolates individual soldiers in the same manner as a FOB. An example of this was presented in a *Los Angeles Times* article describing a ride along with General McChrystal.

To get safely into town, McChrystal is transported in a German convoy of 11 Humvees sandwiched between two armored personnel carriers from which soldiers keep watch through submarine-style scopes. The convoy looks more like a military parade (without the waving flags) than a public relations mission. But security is an issue; the number of insurgent attacks is on the rise.¹¹¹

Force integration promotes interoperability and trust between coalition forces and Afghan Security Forces, as well as the HN population. Force integration involves inherent risk, but no more risk than patrolling heavily mined roads in restrictive vehicle platforms. Force integration requires the establishment of relationships, and forces soldiers to understand people's choices and needs (i.e., understand the operational environment). Moving off the FOBs also involves risk, but isolating forces onto FOBs, and separating and isolating coalition forces from Afghan forces and the population also involves risk. "U.S. forces cannot sit behind walls and wait; they must neutralize the enemy by winning over the crowd and giving the enemy no place to hide."¹¹² The real question is what do commanders want to accomplish? In the words of General McChrystal, when describing the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, he states that the U.S. is "pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that has distanced us-(*sic*) physically and psychologically-(*sic*) from the people we are trying to protect."¹¹³

7. Provincial Development vs. District Development

Simply, is it better to allocate resources to develop provincial or district level governments? During the last eight years, the majority of international support has

¹¹¹ Carolyn, Cole, "Afghanistan Ride-a-long with Gen. Stanley McChrystal," *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-general4-2009aug04.0.2053641.story> (accessed October 29, 2009).

¹¹² Emery, Norman, "Information Operations in Iraq," *Military Review* (May–June 2004).

¹¹³ McChrystal, *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, 1–1.

focused on developing Afghanistan's central government and provincial level government institutions. The lead organization in provincial development attempts has been Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). However, they have not adequately addressed the development goals outlined or provided the resources necessary to fulfill the ANDS.

PRTs began in early 2002; however, during their inception, they were much smaller and were called by a different name, specifically Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells or "Chiclets." Chiclets were small teams comprised of military civil affairs soldiers.¹¹⁴ Over time, "Chiclets evolved and grew into Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). JRTs consisted of civil affairs teams, Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs), and security forces. JRTs became PRTs in November 2002 at the request of President Karzai, who commented, "Warlords rule regions; governors rule provinces."¹¹⁵ Currently, the PRT concept:

brings together a combination of military, government, tribal, religious, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working together to achieve progress and a more stable and productive society for the population. The teams are comprised of not just soldiers, but include diplomats, policy development experts, rule of law experts, and those skilled in capacity and institutional development.¹¹⁶

PRTs have resulted in varying degrees of success. Overall, little focus or sustained efforts have addressed district level development by PRTs due in part to both security and inaccessibility. However, recently, "a new push is underway to bring civilian experts to the local level, in part through something called "district support teams"¹¹⁷ District support teams are the brainchild of Professor Thomas R. Johnson, who recommended this concept in an article published in the Atlantic in September 2008.

¹¹⁴ Colonel John Drolet, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq—Should we Have a Standard Model?* (U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006), 4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹¹⁷ Nathan Hodge, "Wicked Problems for Afghanistan's Development Surge," September 22, 2009, <http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/09/22/wicked-problems-for-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-development-surge/> (accessed October 5, 2009).

District Support Teams (DST) or District Development Teams (DDT) conceptually send “diplomats, aid workers or agricultural experts out to critical districts.”¹¹⁸ Staffing and implementation of DST are still in development.

The basic overall concept is to send small teams of civilians into receptive districts after the military has cleared and secured the area. Johnson’s DDT’s would consist of, “State Department and USAID personnel, along with medics, veterinarians, engineers, agricultural experts, hydrologists” and associated personnel determined based on assessed requirements.¹¹⁹ DDT’s would live in the district in a designated compound and work with locals daily, to build trust, demonstrate credibility, and reinforce commitment.¹²⁰

B. CONCLUSION

The seven distinguishable conflicting criteria have been addressed in detail throughout this chapter to provide an analytical foundation for reference during analysis of each case study. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the last section of each case study compares and contrasts the seven conflicting criteria operationally to determine what methods resulted in success for each respective mission. Each case study presents different military configurations, missions, and results; however, the seven criteria remain consistent.

¹¹⁸ Joshua Foust, “District Development Teams are a Go!” *Registan.net*, August 11, 2009, <http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/11/district-development-teams-are-a-go/> (accessed October 31, 2009).

¹¹⁹ Thomas Johnson, “All Counterinsurgency Is Local,” *The Atlantic* (October 2008).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

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III. SF OPERATIONS IN ORGUN-E, AFGHANISTAN

Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.¹²¹

A. BACKGROUND

This case study is set during the infancy of OEF when the operational environment was changing. Combat operations in support of Operation Anaconda concluded March 18, 2002, and ODA 361 arrived in Gardez Afghanistan on April 2, 2002.¹²² Joint-combined operations in pursuit of Usama bin Laden (UBL) in the Shi-e-Kot Valley had just culminated, UBL escaped into Pakistan, and Taliban and al Qa'ida had been forced predominantly into ungoverned areas in neighboring Pakistan. As a result of restructured command and control relationships to support Operation Anaconda, SOF would, henceforth, be dependent on conventional force higher headquarters for operational direction and mission approval, and would now be separated from United States



Central Command (CENTCOM) by two levels of command.¹²³ The resultant adjustment to command structure foreshadowed an end to “small teams conducting a low cost, high-

¹²¹ Sun-Tzu, *The Art of War*, 177.

¹²² SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, Ft. Bragg North Carolina, interview with author, August 2009.

¹²³ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 129.

leverage campaign,”¹²⁴ and signified an increase in the overall commitment of U.S. military forces; employed in a direct strategy to maximize relative material power.¹²⁵

Politically, Afghanistan still lacked a legitimate government; however, in June 2002, “the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) replaced the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) with the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA), and elected Hamid Karzai as head of state.”¹²⁶ In the hunt for bin Laden, Pakistan pledged conditional cooperation to the U.S.; however, limited Pakistani government control in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and border areas, combined with U.S. restricted border operations due to recognition of Pakistani sovereignty, restricted efforts. Given that the government of Afghanistan was not established, the mission of SF was UW.

In support of the UW campaign plan, ODAs were assigned joint special operational areas (JSOA) positioned in strategic locations in what would eventually become RC East, and RC South. ODA 361 spent only a short time in Gardez before being assigned to relieve another 3d Special Forces Group ODA in the Urgun or Orgun district, of the Paktika Province. Amidst the changing operational landscape, ODA 361 would conduct textbook UW in the months that followed, with minimal outside support or interference. This case study highlights some of the accomplishments of ODA 361 during their four and half months in Orgun-e, between April and October 2002, and examines an application of effects-based operations (EBO). EBO in this case study uses the 2001 Joint Forces Command definition:

A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’ on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 129.

¹²⁵ Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, 34.

¹²⁶ T. Sissener and Kartawich, L. *Afghanistan: Parliamentary and Provincial Elections September 2005* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005), 1.

¹²⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, *Effects-based Operations White Paper Version 1.0* (Norfolk, VA: Concepts Department J9, 2001), 5.

In 2002, Orgun had little overt Taliban influence; however, it was under the control of a local Pashtun warlord named Zakim Khan. Khan led a 300-man Afghan militia, and fought with the Northern Alliance during Taliban rule.¹²⁸ He wielded authority over the three tribes living in the Orgun district consisting of two Pashtun tribes, the Suleimkhel (Ghilzai Pashtuns) and Zadran, and a small group of Tajiks.¹²⁹ Khan was a significant presence in the area, and because of his influence, he was funded \$20,000 USD a month by the CIA.¹³⁰ In return, Khan allowed SF to operate in his area, use his militia for operations and security, and allocated the use of a small “safe house” property for SF in downtown Orgun-e.¹³¹ However, he was power hungry, corrupt, and hoarded international aid meant for the Orgun community, stockpiling food, school supplies, and fuel in warehouses placed under guard by his militia. Khan’s armed thugs occupied the government building in Orgun-e, established checkpoints in the area to tax travelers, and extorted local shopkeepers.

B. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 101

Unconventional Warfare: “Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.”¹³²

Following a short transfer of authority, ODA 361 identified four things that required immediate attention, specifically: (1) force protection, (2) the trust and support of the AMF, (3) the trust and support of the local community, and (4) to undermine

¹²⁸ Philip Smucker, “In Afghan Town, Warlords Clash over the King’s Return,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 29, 2002, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0129/p07s01-wosc.html> (accessed October 2, 2009).

¹²⁹ Wolfgang Vogelsang, *The Afghans* (Malden: MA, Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2002), 20.

¹³⁰ Ann, Tyson, “Do Special Forces Need Special Funding?” *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 24, 2004, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0524/p02s01-usmi.html> (accessed October 3, 2009).

¹³¹ (Ret) SGM Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

¹³² Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201, (*S/NF*) *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U)*, (Washington, DC: Author, September 30, 2008), 1–2.

Zakim Khan's influence in the area. The following paragraphs examine the ingenuity, persistence, and adaptability of the ODA, and serve to provide a general framework for a district level COIN strategy.

1. Force Protection

The first order of business for the ODA was to move out of the "safe house," and establish a secure location in an easily defensible position to promote physical force protection.¹³³ The safe house was an unsecure location situated between two main roads on low ground, adjacent to the Orgun-e district center. The team seized an old Soviet airfield on high ground overlooking the district center, and built a SF A-camp using a classic triangular shaped patrol base template that incorporated 360° fields of fire.¹³⁴ The airfield was already sited by Soviet engineers, defensible, only had one road in and out, and had established listing post/observation posts (LP/OP) positions. The A-camp was reinforced with bunkers, fighting positions, and the LP/Ops were manned to provide early warning, and to observe areas not directly visible from the camp.¹³⁵ A 101st Airborne platoon attached to the ODA provided base camp security and dedicated a squad for a quick reaction force (QRF) capability.

2. Trust and Support of the AMF

While the ODA was establishing the A-camp to promote force protection, it simultaneously developed the AMF. The ODA earned the trust and support of the AMF by considering Abraham Maslow's assertions, detailed in *A Theory of Human Motivation*,¹³⁶ through a practical application of four objectives. It, (a) treated each individual AMF soldier with dignity and respect, (b) "organized, equipped, trained, and

¹³³ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201, 1–2.

¹³⁴ Department of the Army, FM 7-8. *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* (Washington, DC: Author, April 2, 1992).

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Maslow's 1943 book titled *Theory of Human Motivation* described five (5) human needs that must be addressed in order of importance consisting of physiological, safety, love belonging, esteem, and self actualization. Abraham Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1943, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm> (accessed October 29, 2009).

advised” the AMF as a military force, (c) provided food and shelter, and (d) offered medical assistance.¹³⁷ Six ODA members were organized into three two-man teams consisting of a senior and junior member of the detachment.¹³⁸ Each of the teams was assigned an AMF company. ODA members assigned AMF companies would teach, coach, advise, mentor, de-conflict disputes, arm them, and direct tactical operations. They also addressed daily issues presented by AMF soldiers, insulating the ODA commander and team sergeant so that they could focus on the big picture.

a. *Treat Each Individual AMF Soldier with Dignity and Respect*

All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others.¹³⁹

Training and advising a foreign military force involves patience and maturity. Cultural and language barriers can lead to misunderstanding, frustration, and contempt. Complicate matters with the associated stress of a combat environment and inhospitable living conditions, and a simple mistake or failure of an indigenous soldier to understand or follow instructions can easily translate as an outlet for unprofessional verbal hostility. Tone and body language transcend language barriers. The ODA understood this, maintained professionalism, and treated AMF soldiers and the villagers of Orgun-e with dignity and respect.

b. *Organization and Training*

Although the AMF existed as a 300-man fighting force, it was not organized in a Westphalian military manner; soldiers clustered in random groupings of

¹³⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201, 4–13.

¹³⁸ SF ODAs have one senior and one junior member assigned to each military occupational specialty (MOS). For example, there are two 18E’s or communications sergeants on an ODA, one is either senior in rank or has more time on the ODA than the other; subsequently, the lower ranking or less experienced soldier is junior.

¹³⁹ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

familiar tribal affiliations, and were armed with a variable assortment of assault rifles and handguns. The AMF in Orgun-e consisted of three tribes, two Pashtun and one Tajik, each tribe coexisted in a constant state of animosity. The ODA organized the AMF into three 100-man companies represented by yellow, red, and blue armbands, and developed identification cards for each individual.¹⁴⁰ The ODA arranged a formal military command structure based on existing hierarchies. AMF were paid monthly, using money from the CIA allotment for Zakim Khan; AMF commanders received \$200 USD, and soldiers \$100 USD.

Tribal barriers were deteriorated by ordering different tribal groups to work together to accomplish collective tasks that required trust and cooperation. Similar to methods used in basic training for professional militaries, AMF were integrated into unfamiliar groups and assigned to squads. The ODA standardized AMF weapons by redistributing the numerous AK-47 (Avtomat Kalashnikova) assault rifles, magazines, and 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition confiscated in caches throughout the district. The ODA then instituted a rotational cycle in which one company assumed guard duty and conducted training, and the other two companies were employed in support of operations.

Traditional beliefs had to be altered to create a more effective fighting force. The men of the militia believed it was unmanly to hide behind cover and concealment and that true warriors charge their enemies or rush towards a target.¹⁴¹ It took the ODA several months to teach and persuade the AMF to employ tactical maneuver; however, once they understood the concept, they embraced the method. Additional training included but was limited to weapons training and marksmanship, small unit tactics, tactical maneuver, close quarters battle (CQB), and basic medical training. The AMF were now receiving monthly pay, weapons and ammunition, and professional military training.

¹⁴⁰ SFC Hector Michaud, Ft. Bragg North Carolina, interview with the author, August 2009.

¹⁴¹ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

c. Food and Shelter

When the ODA first established the a-camp, the AMF would return home after each day of training because there was no place to accommodate them. To better care for, integrate, and supervise the AMF, the ODA developed a second perimeter to the A-camp, and reinforced it with fighting positions and bunkers. The camp was expanded to provide a secure location to build barracks, a dining facility, and a well for the AMF, effectively co-opting them with the ODA.¹⁴² The AMF were now receiving pay, weapons and ammunition, professional military training, and were provided food and shelter. The expansion of the A-camp also contributed to force protection by creating two tiers of security. If the A-camp ever received a direct attack, attackers would have to breach both the outer and inner walls to reach U.S. forces.

d. Medical Treatment

Warlords pay tribal militia forces as long as they are healthy and capable. If a militiaman suffers an injury or wound that hinders his ability to fight for a warlord, he would be replaced and abandoned to care for himself. The militiaman's pay would be terminated, and he would most certainly not receive medical care. The ODA understood this dynamic, and incorporated medical treatment for the AMF as a method to erode their allegiance further to Zakim Khan. The AMF now received monthly pay, professional military training, were provided weapons and ammunition, food and shelter, and now received medical care.

Over time, the AMF expressed great respect and reverence towards ODA members; AMF were quoted as saying, "nothing can happen to the American's."¹⁴³ During operations, AMF would physically hold ODA members back, and not allow them to put themselves at risk by leading clearing operations into target locations. This was done by the AMF to protect the Americans, convey their respect, and illustrate their bravery and competence. The behavior of the AMF also corresponds with Maslow's

¹⁴² SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

assessment; specifically, an individual's "desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation."¹⁴⁴

3. Trust and Support of the Local Population

When the ODA arrived in Orgun-e, it was in a state of complete lawlessness. The local warlord seized the government compound, and village leaders were defenseless against rogue bands of armed thugs. The ODA was also perceived as a potential threat; another armed group observed with distrust and contempt. Villager perceptions may have been shaped on personal experiences with the last armed group of outside invaders, the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁵ To gain the trust and support of the community, the ODA illustrated credibility and commitment by accomplishing three objectives, it: (1) re-established the authority of tribal leaders, (2) developed a police force to maintain order, and (3) integrated the police force with the AMF to reinforce the local security apparatus.

a. Understand the Operational Environment

Before the ODA could re-establish the tribal shura, it needed to develop an understanding of the operational environment. This was accomplished by conducting a census with local shopkeepers in the village. This accomplished three things, it (1) introduced and familiarized the ODA with the local shopkeepers, people who generally have the most daily interaction with members of the community, (2) provided insight and perception ascertained through personal accounts concerning the local security situation, and (3) informed the shopkeepers of the ODA's noble intent and support. Understanding of the operational environment was also accomplished through daily interaction with members of the community. The ODA made it a point to visit with the villagers daily, "even if it was just going to the restaurant to have something to eat, they're out, they're being seen, not seen as a threat."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

¹⁴⁵ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

b. Re-establish Local Governance

The ODA re-established local governance in three phases. First, Zakim Khan's armed thugs were ousted from the government compound, and the ODA instituted deliberate precautions to ensure cooperation. Soldiers of the 101st Airborne reinforced the ODA and the AMF to retake the compound. The overwhelming force manifested immediate capitulation by Zakim Khan's armed thugs. The government compound was released without contest, and secured by AMF. Second, a meeting was arranged at the government compound to re-establish the tribal council; each tribe would be represented equally. The ODA mandated that each of the three tribes select no more than ten (10) representatives. Third, once the shura (council) was re-established, it was recognized as the governing authority; all local issues would be addressed through the shura and corresponding jirga's. "The difference between a Shura (council) and a Jirga (meeting group) is that members of council are elected or selected for longer periods, but members of a Jirga can be changed for every issue."¹⁴⁷ Understanding the operational environment proved critical in this process. On the first attempt to re-establish the shura, one tribe tried to stack the deck. This particular tribe somehow informed the other tribes that the meeting had been delayed a week; thus, only members from one tribe were represented.¹⁴⁸ The ODA recognized the ploy through the assistance of an interpreter, and diplomatically rescheduled the meeting for the following week.

c. Establish a Local Security Apparatus

The ODA established security and order in the community in three phases. During the first phase, the ODA removed illegal checkpoints established by local armed thugs, working for Zakim Khan, on the roads and passes in the area. Illegal checkpoints were replaced by district tolling stations/checkpoints established on the main road through Orgun-e, manned by local police or AMF, and overseen by the ODA. All proceeds from the tolls went to the tribal shura to be redistributed into the community.

¹⁴⁷ Miakhel, *The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their Role in Security and Governance*, 7.

¹⁴⁸ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

The tolls/checkpoints accomplished two things, the security forces that manned them monitored traffic in and out of the village, and tolls provided legitimate funding for the community. Toll money could be used to pay laborers for infrastructure improvements.

During the second phase, a local police force was established. The ODA selected 30 volunteers to form the local police force. The ODA conducted initial training and organization of the force; however, a police chief, who was requested by the ODA from Kabul, established standardization and professionalization. When the police chief arrived, the community expressed skepticism and distrust. He was an outsider, and a representative of the ATA central government. Nevertheless, he proved himself over time to be honest and legitimate, and gained the trust and support of the community.

Once the police force was formed, they were integrated with the AMF to establish a cooperative. If the police force encountered a problem that required a larger force structure, the AMF would augment them. A tiered level concept of force structure escalation was rehearsed and instituted into the village internal security apparatus. This was accomplished through the purchase and distribution of communications equipment, and overall coordination by the ODA. The established security apparatus fell under the authority of the shura.

d. Medical Services

The location of the A-campset back approximately 20 kilometers from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border made it an excellent location to emplace a forward advanced refueling station (FARP), and a field surgical team (FST).¹⁴⁹ The FST could safely treat and assess casualties of other ODAs, and coalition forces positioned on the border, at the relative safety of the Orgun-e a-camp. However, a Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) would first need to be constructed. Local laborers were hired to emplace crushed rocks across the open area designated as the HLZ to reduce dust and debris associated with the dry environment. Local laborers were also used to build an aide station, and emplace the walls and fortifications surrounding the HLZ as an extension of the a-camp.

¹⁴⁹ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

The ODA initially did not provide medical treatment to the citizens of Orgun; however, over time, it proved to be a valuable tool for developing rapport. The medical assistance provided to one child from a neighboring village literally won the trust and support of a previously non-permissive area. A small boy was treated by the ODA, who had his leg blown off by stepping on a remnant Soviet anti-personnel mine. The village shura was so grateful to the ODA for saving boy's life, that the people of the previously non-permissive village became cooperative, and shared relevant and accurate information concerning insurgent activity in the area.

With the enhanced medical capabilities at the A-camp through the development of the HLZ and the aide station, and an attached FST, the ODA medics and FST expanded treatment from strictly coalition forces, to treatment of coalition forces and AMF, and over time extended medical services to the Afghan citizens of Orgun-e. Medical treatment of Afghan citizens also evolved, it started from treating case-by-case emergency situations, then into a weekly sick call combined with emergency surgeries, and finally, sick call became part of the daily routine. Additionally, ODA medics trained and assisted medical personal at the local clinic in Orgun-e. Efforts were made by the ODA medics to make the local clinic self sustaining and independently capable, to reduce the community's overall dependency on the ODA for medical advice and services.¹⁵⁰

4. Undermine Warlords Influence

When the Afghan's embrace you, you're their brother, and you will receive the support of the tribe they are affiliated with.¹⁵¹

The ODA eroded Zakim Khan's power and authority indirectly through the employment of a slow and calculated approach. It was orchestrated in a manner that ensured that by the time Zakim Khan realized his power was deteriorating, it was too late. When the ODA first arrived in Orgun-e, Zakim Khan would visit the A-camp daily. He would join the ODA for tea, and discuss operations, and query how the ODA planned to

¹⁵⁰ CW2 Jim Moore, Ft. Bragg North Carolina, interview with the author, August 2009.

¹⁵¹ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

employ his militia. However, the ODA did not trust him, and did not want to share operational information with him.¹⁵² Over time, Khan visited less and less; finally, he only came to the A-camponce a month to get paid his \$20,000.00 USD a month, from the CIA. Throughout the deployment, the ODA recommended that the CIA cease paying him, and reinforced their recommendations with factual accounts that indicated Khan was selling information, and basically, playing both sides. Although the ODA could not control whether or not he stayed on the CIA payroll, they would ensure that Khan would eventually yield little influence in the area.

By re-instating local governance, standing up a police force and local security apparatus, taking care of the AMF, treating people with dignity and respect, and providing medical services, the ODA developed a vast intelligence network. Members from each of the three tribes were in the AMF. AMF shared information from each of the three tribes from areas outside of the district center with the ODA. “When the Afghan’s embrace you, you’re their brother, and you will receive the support of the tribe they are affiliated with.”¹⁵³ Additional information was ascertained through daily interaction with members of the community, the shura, the police force, and visitors. People from remote areas surrounding the A-camp would visit daily to share information with the ODA, some people did it as a kind gesture of respect; others attempted to gain influence or money. Information shared consisted of locations of weapons caches, insurgent whereabouts, locations of potential ambushes or attacks planned against the ODA, and improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements. People would also bring weapons, explosives, and ammunition to the firebase, both as an act of good faith or to receive compensation.

One day, approximately three months into the deployment, the ODA called the AMF to an impromptu formation. At the formation, the AMF were given an ultimatum; “you can either work for Zakim Khan or you can work for us.”¹⁵⁴ The AMF were notified that if they wanted to leave they could, with no hard feelings; however, they

¹⁵² (Ret) SGM Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

were instructed to be gone by the next morning.¹⁵⁵ Of the 300 men assigned, approximately five left. The five that left were quickly replaced by many volunteers that gathered at the gate of the A-camp each morning, including AMF family members that routinely expressed interest in joining whenever they visited the A-camp. Zakim Khan no longer controlled his militia, no longer controlled the government building or influenced local governance, he no longer controlled the roads in and out of Orgun-e, and he was no longer permitted to tax citizens with illegal checkpoints or coerce local shopkeepers. Zakim Khan was irrelevant.

C. EXAMINING THE SEVEN CRITERIA

 Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

1. Top Down Focus vs. Bottom Up Focus

ODA 361 insulated tribal leaders at the district level and allowed them to reassert their authority. The ODA facilitated the re-establishment of traditional local governance, but did so in a manner that ensured each tribe in the area was represented equally. The ODA served as an outside impartial entity with the leverage to ensure the cooperation of all parties involved. The ODA enhanced operational success and overall security by focusing on the people of the district, treating them with respect, interacting with them daily, and gaining their trust and support.

¹⁵⁵ (Ret) SGM Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

2. Search and Destroy vs. Clear, Hold, Build

Overall, the best method to describe the ODA's tactical methodology is clear, hold, build. However, it is of note that the ODA gained control of the area without firing a shot. Clearing was accomplished when the ODA rid the village of Zakim Khan's influence, through eradicating his checkpoints and control over the government compound, and most importantly, winning over the allegiance of his militia. The ODA held the village because they became the powerbroker; however, they used their influence to reassert authority back to the community and traditional governance hierarchy.

The ODA began to build infrastructure by expanding on the concept instituted through the establishment of tolls. Capitalizing on the plethora of Soviet tank and vehicle remains in the area, scrap metal from the hulks was given to a local welder to cut and sell. Proceeds made from the scrap metal went the shura to be used for civic and infrastructure development projects. Purchases made by the shura included uniforms for the local police, and gravel for the main road through the district center.

The ODA generally refrained from engaging in search and destroy or "hard knock" type operations unless there was no other course of action (COA) available.¹⁵⁶ However, the ODA gathered considerable intelligence, including the locations of middle to high-ranking insurgents operating in the area. To maximize resources and employ a full range of capabilities, the ODA synchronized COIN and CT by sharing information pertaining to the activities and whereabouts of insurgents with coalition CT forces. The ODA accomplished this in a manner consistent with ongoing UW operations in Orgun, and promoted local support through an incentives-based framework.

3. Centralized vs. Decentralized

The ODA understood the operational environment and recognized it to be complex and unstable. Subsequently, the ODA commander coordinated operations through mutual adjustment, and vertically decentralized authority to the highly

¹⁵⁶ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

specialized and trained members of the ODA. The ODA commander and the members of the ODA knew the operational and strategic commander's intent. Through the ODA commander's application of vertical decentralization, he permitted the members of his ODA the flexibility, at the tactical level, to accomplish the mission without considerable guidance or oversight achieving unity of effort.¹⁵⁷ The same vertical decentralization that was employed by the ODA was also instituted by the AOB, the FOB, and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).

4. Periodic Security Presence vs. Sustained Security Presence

While assigned to Orgun, the ODA instituted a sustained security presence. It accomplished this not by continuously physically being in each village, but by building a local security apparatus and local civil support base that promoted individual accountability. Individual accountability was indicated through villagers continuously turning in arms, ammunition, and explosives to the a-camp. The ODA acquired so much ordinance, that it had to isolate an approximately 50 meter by 50-meter section of the camp as a temporary storage area. Some of the ordinance was provided to other ODAs to assist in training the ANA in Kabul. The remaining ordinance was either in unusable or unstable condition and had to be disposed of. However, because there was so much ordinance, the assistance of explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) technicians was requested.

Innovative methods were used by the ODA to secure the area. In some instances, the ODA would be notified by a villager that they possessed an insurgent's cache on their property, but they were afraid to hand it over because they would be punished. In such cases, the ODA would write a detailed letter to the insurgents. The letter would list everything the ODA took, explain that ODA overwhelmed the villager with hundreds of soldiers, and invite the insurgents to reclaim their property at the a-camp. The letter was

¹⁵⁷ Dr. Gary Klein, "A Collaboration Evaluation Framework," *The MITRE Corporation*, 2006, http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_05/05_0190/05_0190.pdf (accessed September 2, 2009).

then signed by a member of the ODA and given to the villager. Generally, villagers in this situation were happy with the letter as it provided them with an excuse and a scapegoat for the offense.

Another technique used by the ODA involved asking villagers to leave ordinance on the side of the road. In this way, there was no direct interaction with the ODA, and villagers could discretely discard unwanted ordinance at their leisure. Unfortunately, the response was overwhelming, and resulted in an inordinate amount of artillery rounds, tank rounds, land mines, being laid on the side of the road. An AMF patrol was dedicated exclusively to collect truckloads of ordinance from the side of the road daily.

Given the overwhelming response by citizens to acknowledge the requests of the ODA, and the fact that the ODA could not maintain a permanent presence in each village all the time, a permanent presence was established through influence and consistency. Each individual recognized the ODA's positive influence through word of mouth or personal experience. Subsequently, stability was achieved when individuals elected to take responsibility for their own actions, with confidence that the ODA or local shura would support them if they were challenged for doing so.

5. U.S./ISAF Centric vs. Afghan Centric

Operations in Orgun were not attrition based; they were effects based, focused on district level development and capacity building to achieve security and stability. ODA operations were Afghan centric. ODA operations provided security to insulate the local traditional governance permitting the shura time to reassert authority. Police forces (local security) were developed and once they were established, they fell under the authority of the shura. AMF were wrested from the control of a warlord; ultimately, they could have been handed over to the control of the shura. Unfortunately, the ODA was repositioned before this could happen.

6. FOB Force Protection vs. Force Integration

Security was achieved by the ODA, but not by the physical barriers, weapons, and positioning of the a-camp, but through force integration that resulted in the psychological

trust, rational cooperation and support, and intelligence offered by the AMF and community of Orgun-e. Winning the trust and support of the AMF made the tribes accessible and support of the tribes was based on Qawm. Afghanistan is a fragmented network based society, and Qawm maintains, “that tribal members will support members of their own tribe no matter if they are right or wrong.”¹⁵⁸ However, the ODA secured the cooperation of each of the three tribes by using its influence to ensure that each of the three tribes was equally represented in the shura, and through daily interaction with members of the community whose positive experiences with the ODA were shared by word of mouth. Ultimately, the ODA enhanced force protection by attaining both the cooperation and support of the tribes through persistent interaction and integration.

7. Provincial Development vs. District Development

This case study illustrated the benefits of district level development exclusively, and did not examine provincial development as part of the case study. Therefore, this case study cannot make a recommendation as to where emphasis is better served in this capacity. Not mentioned in the case study, but important when considering the application of development projects, was the unified efforts of civil affairs (CA) and the ODA. CA worked collectively with the district shura to expand educational opportunities in the district by building several schools. CA ensured that all projects and decisions concerning rebuilding efforts were community led, and endorsed by the shura.

D. CONCLUSION

They saw us as improving their lives, not taking away from them. We’re not the local government, we’re not colonizers.¹⁵⁹

ODA 361 conducted EBO through the employment of UW to stabilize Orgun. In four and a half months (March 2002–August 2002), ODA 361 ousted a warlord, re-established traditional governance, established a police force, developed a harmonized

¹⁵⁸ Miakhel, *The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their Role in Security and Governance*, 4.

¹⁵⁹ SGM (Ret) Mark Bryant, interview with the author.

internal security apparatus for the district center, developed infrastructure, assisted the economy, gained the trust and support of local tribes, and began disarmament. The ODA attributes their accomplishments to being impartial and consistent in their treatment of each individual Afghan. The ODA also considers the Afghan population's general desire for peace and an enhanced quality of life, following Taliban repression, as instrumental to each Afghan's willingness to cooperate.

This case study begs the question, is the ISAF and the U.S. appropriately employing the current military and police forces (resources) to maximize effects against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan? In conclusion, SF operations in Orgun were Afghan centric, bottom focused, and combined clear, hold, build and search and destroy through a synchronization of CT and COIN. The ODA relied on de-centralized decision making, through vertical decentralization. Therefore, success was achieved by the ODA through the implementation of a bottom up, decentralized, sustained, integrated, Afghan centric methodology with a harmonized employment of clear, hold, build tactics and search and destroy methods in support of district level development.


IV. OPERATION JINGAL JORDAWANKI

Power and authority by contrast, both refer to relationships of legitimacy, the first being a generalized kind of legitimate relationship and the second being a highly specific institution charged with regulating tests of legitimacy when they occur and exercising physical coercion in order to preserve the division of labor.¹⁶⁰

A. BACKGROUND

In the Helmond Province in 2006, British forces were engaged in a violent struggle with Taliban insurgents, while guarding district centers in Musa Qala, Sangin, Nowzad and Kajaki.¹⁶¹ The most well coordinated and sustained Taliban attacks occurred

in the Musa Qala district, resulting in eight British casualties. The 24-man British outpost in Musa Qala nicknamed “The Alamo” endured “52 days of sustained Taliban mortar and ground assaults.”¹⁶² To reduce British casualties and incite a peaceful settlement, the Commander International



Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), British Gen. David Richards, negotiated “a deal” or cease-fire, and a subsequent 15-point peace agreement with the Taliban in September 2006.

¹⁶⁰ Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 28–29.

¹⁶¹ Michael Smith, “British Troops in Secret Truce with the Taliban,” *The Sunday Times*, October 1, 2006, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article656693.ece> (accessed September 22, 2009).

¹⁶² Thomas Donnelly, “Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/96-donnelly.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2009).

The peace settlement was brokered through the Musa Qala tribal council, and supported by Helmond's governor, Mohammad Daud. The agreement was threefold in that it called for: (1) the withdrawal of British military and GIROA military and police forces, (2) the creation of a 50-man local tribal militia to oppose the Taliban, and (3) an end to the Taliban military offensive.¹⁶³ Following the agreement Brigadier General Ed Butler, the commander of the British taskforce in Helmond, ordered his forces to remain in the village for 35 days to ensure peace; they abandoned the village on October 17, 2006. On February 2, 2007, just over three months after the withdrawal of British forces, the Taliban re-initiated its military offensive and seized control of the village of Musa Qala.¹⁶⁴

The tragedy in this scenario was that the British could not establish credibility through decisive action against the Taliban, and the Afghan government military and police forces assigned to the village were ineffective. The consistent dynamic was that the population was torn between allegiance to government forces or Taliban insurgents. The population had to play both ends for survival. However, the tribal politics in Musa Qala, even without coalition interference, are complicated. Musa Qala is home to Helmond province's largest Pashtun tribal group, the Alizia tribe¹⁶⁵. The Alizai tribe is known to be Taliban sympathizers, and have extensive influence "in most of northern Helmand, including Musa Qala, Baghran, and Kajaki districts."¹⁶⁶ Complicating the situation even more is the linkage between tribal politics and the opium trade. Musa Qala is at the crossroads of the Opium trade, whose profits finance the Taliban. It is situated along the "Highway 1 ring road that ties Afghanistan together and connects the capital,

¹⁶³ Selig Harrison, "Discarding an Afghan Opportunity," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2007, <http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/commentary/commentaryother.asp?file=februarycommentary32007.xml> (accessed September 22, 2009).

¹⁶⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "Taliban Takeover of Town Could Mark Start of Military Offensive," *Eurasia Insight*, February 5, 2007, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020507.shtml> (accessed September 22, 2009).

¹⁶⁵ Thomas Donnelly, "Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/96-donnelly.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2009).

¹⁶⁶ Matt Dupee, "A Chronology of the Musa Qala Dilemma," *Small Wars Journal*, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/a_chronology_of_the_1.php (accessed September 28, 2009).

Kabul, to the rest of the country,” and “links the ring road and lowland Helmand to the mountains of central Afghanistan.”¹⁶⁷ To establish control in the area, the GIRoA and the ISAF coalition needed to deploy a force of sufficient size to oust the Taliban, and establish an enduring security apparatus and legitimate government capacity in the village to deter future threats.

A renewed commitment to asserting GIRoA control, combined with a general opposition to negotiations, and local cease-fire agreements, occurred when U.S. General Dan McNeil relieved British General David Richards as COMISAF on February 1, 2007. One of the first indicators of a change in strategy employed by General McNeil was the prosecution of a NATO airstrike that killed Mullah Abdul Ghaffar,¹⁶⁸ the Taliban commander that led the attack on Musa Qala.¹⁶⁹ The case study that follows illustrates what ISAF commitment is capable of in the conduct of a joint combined COIN operation. This case study examines the SF contribution to the overall joint combined operation, Operation Mar Karadad (*Serpent Thunder*), namely Operation Jinjal Jordawanki (*Chaotic Fury*). Specific tactics and names are withheld for operational security reasons; however, the integration and harmonization of the operation are illustrated and then analyzed based on seven the distinguishable conflicting criteria.

B. OPERATION JINGAL JORDAWANKI

1. The Operation in Musa Qala

Operation Jingal Jordawanki was a joint combined effort led by a U.S. Special Forces (USSF) company and involved the participation of a company of Marine Special Operation Command (MARSOC) Marines, elements from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Combat operations in Musa Qala

¹⁶⁷ Donnelly, “Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency.”

¹⁶⁸ It is of note that Mullah Ghafour led the attack on Musa Qala in retaliation for the death of his brother and eight other Taliban fighters by a NATO airstrike outside of Musa Qala; the Taliban also claimed that the airstrike breached the agreement.

¹⁶⁹ Michael Evans, “NATO Airstrike Kills Taliban Leader who Broke Deal,” *New York Times*, February 5, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1329331.ece (accessed September 22, 2009).

as part of Operation Jinjal Jordawanki began on December 7, 2007 and ended December 12; however, the operation itself carried into late January 2008. Preceding kinetic combat operations in the village, non-kinetic shaping operations, including IO in the form of leaflet drops, warned villagers of an impending coalition military operation. The overall tactical methodology employed during the conduct of Operation Jinjal Jordawanki consisted of shape, clear, hold, build.



Figure 10. Musa Qala Operation Jingal Jordawanki¹⁷⁰

At the start of kinetic clearing operations, the only people remaining in the village were approximately 2,000 hardcore Taliban fighters.¹⁷¹ The northern portion of Musa Qala was cleared by elements from the 1st Battalion, 508th (1/508) Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division.¹⁷² SF and ANSF, consisting of an ANA brigade from

¹⁷⁰ David Loyn, "Why the Battle for Musa Qala Matters," *BBC News, Kabul*, December 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7137041.stm (accessed September 28, 2009).

¹⁷¹ Donnelly, "Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency."

¹⁷² Bill Roggio, "The Battle of Musa Qala," *The Long War Journal*, December 9, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/the_battle_of_musa_q.php (accessed October 31, 2009).

the 205th Corp and ANP spearheaded the operation from the east, west and south, and were accompanied by “2,000 British troops with additional backing from Danish and Estonian units.”¹⁷³ Coalition forces encountered heavy resistance from an entrenched enemy, but eventually overwhelmed Taliban fighters with synchronized fires and coordinated airstrikes. The Taliban suffered heavy casualties and withdrew north from the village after only three days of fighting. On December 10, the ANA 205 Corp, with accompanying SF and ANP, secured the district center, and raised the Afghan flag. During the flag raising ceremony General Gul Aqa Naibi, Commander 205 Corps, captured the moment by commenting that “today the Afghan National Army restored freedom and democracy to the people of Musa Qala by removing the Taliban and their foreign fighters.”¹⁷⁴ Clearing operations from one compound to the next continued through the district center until Dec 12; however, reconstruction and the re-establishment of GIROA government institutions had just begun.¹⁷⁵

Throughout the operation, all participating units executed operations in a coordinated, synchronized, and decentralized manner. Each sub element was assigned a clear task and purpose and specific objectives by higher command, and permitted to operate at the discretion of respective ground force commanders to permit flexibility and adaptability. Vigilant coordination efforts between joint combined coalition forces ensured interoperability, integration, and operational control. Clear and accurate reporting by ground force commanders facilitated the rapid allocation of available intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), close air support (CAS) and medical assets, and served to inform higher-level commands continuously of the situation. Integration and interoperability were particularly important with partnered USSF and ANA units that spearheaded operations into the district center. Trust, competence, and interoperability allowed partnered units to overthrow an entrenched enemy.

¹⁷³ Roggio, “The Battle of Musa Qala.”

¹⁷⁴ ISAF Press Release 2007-732, “ANA Troops Retake Musa Qala District Center,” December 11, 2007, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/12-december/pr071211-732.html> (accessed September 28, 2009).

¹⁷⁵ Donnelly, “Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency.”

2. Rebuilding

Immediately following the Taliban withdrawal, extensive coordination between Afghan and Coalition forces focused on establishing security to promote civil military operations and reconstruction. The Karzai government, as well as the British, understood the significance of retaining and rebuilding Musa Qala. Afghanistan's Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Mohammad Ehsan Zia, told local tribal leaders on January 17, 2008, "I have money, lots of money, particularly for Musa Qala."¹⁷⁶ Recapturing the village through a conventional warfare direct strategy was a relatively easy feat, securing the village and establishing permanent, effective, and legitimate government institutions would prove to be the real challenge.

Tactically, coalition and Afghan forces prepared for a potential Taliban counterattack, and organized internal security within the district center to facilitate the return of evacuees. The 1/508 continued to isolate the village to permit the return of evacuees and allow ANA and ANP to establish headquarters in the district center. USSF advised and assisted ANA and ANP, and collectively met with local government (Malik), religious (Mullah), and Alizia tribal (Khan) leaders, and British Commanders to re-establish GIROA institutions and discuss reconstruction. British forces began constructing a FOB, FOB Edinburg, approximately 10 kilometers west of the Musa Qala district center. British forces at FOB Edinburg would augment ANSF positioned in the Musa Qala district center. UAE forces assisted in establishing critical checkpoints on the high ground west of the Musa Qala district, and the MARSOC Company patrolled and pursued remaining Taliban that attempted to maneuver south of the village. ANA forces conducted patrols around the district center, and ANP began to establish a local security apparatus.

A converted Taliban commander, Mullah Salaam, was appointed district governor of Musa Qala early in January 2008. As the local security apparatus continued to improve, FOB Edinburg developed, and as it was determined a Taliban counterattack was unlikely, coalition forces phased out of the area. The 1/508 was the first to go, followed

¹⁷⁶ Donnelly, "Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency."

by USSF and coalition SOF, and finally, augmenting British units. The military drawdown indicated the improved security situation within the district center; however, the rural areas and mountains surrounding the district center remained under Taliban control. The coalition once again illustrated its effectiveness at conventional warfare by overwhelming Taliban conventional defenses, and ousting them from the district center. However, the coalition failed to eliminate the threat, and exploit military success through pursuit and elimination of the remaining Taliban fighters.

C. THE SITUATION IN 2009

British forces continued reconstruction efforts throughout 2008 and 2009. Musa Qala has new schools, improved infrastructure, and a functioning local government. “For the first time, there is a Musa Qala branch of the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team, as well as representatives from the Helmand Civil and Military Cooperation team.”¹⁷⁷ British efforts have continued to promote a more capable, accountable, and effective district government in Musa Qala. Musa Qala’s internal security apparatus also continues to improve; however, security outside of the range of British weapons at FOB Edinburg and outside the district center is poor. The 350 British soldiers manning FOB Edinburg continue attempts to expand influence into the outlying districts; however, they face a stiff Taliban resistance. The same Taliban spared in 2008, continue to harass British forces, GIRoA government representatives, and local Afghan security forces. The same Taliban spared in 2008 continue to recruit and expand influence in outlying districts. An indicator of the poor security situation and continued Taliban resistance occurred on February 2, 2009, when Musa Qala District Governor Mullah Salaam’s house was attacked by Taliban.

¹⁷⁷ Donnelly, “Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency.”

When my house and my soldiers were surrounded by the Taleban, ISAF did not send any troops to help. The foreigners have not taken any effective measures in term of security. My relations with the foreigners are good because we work together, but they do not protect me.¹⁷⁸

In addition to the Taliban threat and associated security issues other problems also plague Musa Qala. The Governor of Musa Qala, Mullah Abdul Salaam, recommended three areas of emphasis for the coalition during an interview with the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, William Wood, conducted on January 13, 2008.¹⁷⁹ He indicated that trust, government corruption, and economics hinder reconstruction efforts.¹⁸⁰ Governor Salaam explained a lack of trust of coalition forces because of resentment stemming from General David Richards “deal” with the Taliban; that literally, abandoned the people of Musa Qala, and subjected them to Taliban occupation. Not only was the village abandoned, the local people and elders were disarmed, and then charged to defend themselves against the Taliban without coalition support or weapons.¹⁸¹ The people fear being abandoned again.

Additional problems in the district, addressed by the governor, include health and economic dilemmas. Approximately half the population is addicted to opium, and the coalition has yet to determine a suitable alternative cash crop to replace opium cultivation. Salaam also indicated that government corruption exacerbates the problem. One example cited by Salaam, included funding for district development. Funds sent from the central government for district development have been intercepted at the provincial level; specifically, the Helmond provincial administration in Lashkar Ghar, and never reach the district.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Institute for War and Peace Reporting, *Taliban Hamper Musa Qala Reconstruction Efforts*, ARR no. 311, February 2, 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/498beca18.html> (accessed October 22, 2009).

¹⁷⁹ Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Former Taliban Commander Advises U.S. Ambassador,” *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, January 16, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079359.html> (accessed September 29, 2009).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Former Taliban Commander Advises U.S. Ambassador.”

The British have also experienced economic corruption at the local level. British PRT contractors learned the hard way that local Afghan sub-contractors must be continually monitored. The Afghan sub-contractors used poor quality materials, to pocket extra cash, when building the main bazaar road, a health clinic, and a mosque. Subsequently, each project rapidly deteriorated and needed to be redone.¹⁸³

Barring the problems associated with reconstruction, the joint combined operation to retake Musa Qala is a great example of what ISAF and the GIRoA can accomplish when working collectively. However, this concept needs to be explored in a greater scope, not just at the village level, but nationally. A comprehensive strategy that not only clears, holds, and builds a village, but clears, holds, and builds a district, and then another district, and then a province, and then another province, until the country is under the control of the GIRoA. If ISAF and GIRoA forces can work collectively to retake a village, then it is possible to retake the country. The problems facing reconstruction efforts in Musa Qala would be less complicated in a permissive security environment. Following the recapture of Musa Qala, the British Defense Secretary Des Browne commented that it was “iconic.” What would make Musa Qala truly “iconic” is to use the joint combined tactics employed by Afghan and coalition forces to recapture the district center as an operational template for a comprehensive campaign strategy aimed at recapturing Afghanistan. That would be “iconic.”

D. EXAMINING THE SEVEN CRITERIA

 Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

¹⁸³ Maduri Katti, “British Find it Impossible to Rebuild Musa Qala in Afghanistan,” *Asia Burning*, September 15, 2008, <http://www.asiaburning.com/> (accessed September 30, 2009).

1. Top Down Focus vs. Bottom Up Focus

Operation Jinjal Jordawanki was a bottom focused initiative aimed at recapturing a district center. Emphasis was placed at the district level; however, extensive coordination and cooperation between NATO ISAF international partners, ANSF and the Afghan national and provincial government was required. Recapturing the district center militarily was only the first phase of a lengthy rebuilding effort. Musa Qala requires continued bottom focus as indicated by the many problems that face ISAF in support of reconstruction efforts.

The examples, illustrated by Governor Salaam, indicate that the population is at risk of falling into the hands of the Taliban, due to the Afghan government's inherent corruption and inability to provide basic services, combined with a general lack of trust of coalition forces. A bottom-up focus must be employed; however, equal attention must be addressed to the central government that ultimately supports sub-national entities. Conclusions derived from this case study reveal that emphasis at the top and bottom are equally important notwithstanding oversight and regulation at all levels of government.

2. Search and Destroy vs. Clear, Hold, Build

Operation Jingal Jordawanki, at the tactical level, is a classic example of clear, hold, build. The tactical employment of the operation adhered to the first four of Galula's eight principles of counterinsurgency. First, the joint combined effort concentrated enough armed forces to destroy and expel the main body of Taliban armed insurgents.¹⁸⁴ Second, enhanced coalition force structure facilitated clearing operations and deterred a potential Taliban counterattack.¹⁸⁵ Third, SF and British forces by, with, and through ANSF established contact with the population, and ISAF and ANSF screening forces and checkpoints established on Line of Control (LOCs) controlled population movements.¹⁸⁶ Unfortunately, enhanced force structure was not maintained long enough to support

¹⁸⁴ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55–56.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

reconstruction efforts or effectively cut Taliban links with the population. Fourth, ISAF effectively destroyed overt Taliban political organizations within the district center; however, GIRoA influence is restricted to the district center.¹⁸⁷ It is at this point where ISAF failed to adhere to Galula's principles, and this may correlate to current political, economic, and security challenges in Musa Qala.

ISAF did not follow principles five through eight. They never set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.¹⁸⁸ Mullah Salaam, a defected Taliban commander, was appointed district governor. His legitimacy is questionable; however, he has illustrated political savvy and a firm grasp of the problems that plague the district. Salaam's authority has been tested; however, he has blamed any ineffectiveness or deficiencies of the local government as a failure of ISAF and the GIRoA. He claims that ISAF and the GIRoA fail to address his concerns, and provide adequate security and resources. ISAF has attempted to provide Salaam full support, but unresolved security issues resulting from a failure to expand influence, and a failure to organize and develop local defense units hamper reconstruction efforts. Therefore, to a degree Salaam is right. Finally, ISAF continues attempts to educate leaders in a national political environment, but face an uphill battle in attempts to enforce Wesphalian democratic governance, especially when dealing with deep-rooted tribal allegiances and engrained inter-hierarchical interdependence.

Search and destroy was not relevant during the conduct of Operation Jingal Jordawanki; however, search and destroy could have been employed through pursuit operations that would have exploited tactical successes. The lack of pursuit or search and destroy following the seizure of the Musa Qala district center by an enhanced coalition force structure facilitated Taliban reconstitution and recruitment in outlying districts.

Conclusions derived from this case study indicate that shape, clear, hold, build is an effective method to seize and hold terrain. This case study also indicates the importance of follow on operations that maximize available resources to exploit tactical

¹⁸⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 55–56.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

success through enduring pursuit. Coalition forces should continue pursuit until threat forces are destroyed or surrender. This case study reinforces that the Taliban should never be afforded the opportunity to reconstitute.

3. Centralized vs. Decentralized

Operation Jingal Jordawanki was decentralized. The SF Commander properly assessed the task environment and vertically decentralized authority to his highly trained and professional sub-unit commanders during the execution of tactical operations. The employment of vertical decentralization throughout the conduct of Operation Jingal Jordawanki promoted mutual adjustment, innovation and adaptability. All sub-unit commanders understood both the operational and strategic commander's intent, and were provided the flexibility to accomplish the mission without considerable guidance or oversight from higher-level commanders.

4. Periodic Security Presence vs. Sustained Security Presence

Musa Qala illustrates the importance of a sustained security presence. British forces recognized the need to enhance a 24-man outpost to a 350-man FOB to provide a more effective sustained security presence. Musa Qala indicates how quickly the security situation can deteriorate in Afghanistan if ISAF fails to allocate appropriate resources to improve security, development, and local governance (infrastructure and capacity building) at the village and district level. Musa Qala also illustrates the need for continued GIRoA expansion from one area of control into outlying districts. If one area is secured, militant forces, afforded refuge in outlying areas, hinder reconstruction.

5. U.S./ISAF Centric vs. Afghan Centric

Operation Jingal Jordawanki was Afghan centric in that it sought to bring governance and security back to the people of Musa Qala. The effort to retake Musa Qala was endorsed by the Afghan government and conducted as a joint combined effort with

ANA forces spearheading the operation. Attrition was not the intent of ISAF; the intent, was to return an ideologically, geographically, and demographically important village to the control of the Afghan government.

6. FOB Force Protection vs. Force Integration

The tactical execution and initial rebuilding efforts of Operation Jingal Jordawanki involved extensive force integration. The British creation of a FOB in close proximity to the Musa Qala district center provides force protection, and the opportunity to integrate forces. SF integration with ANSF during the establishment of Afghan police and army headquarters in the Musa Qala district center facilitated initial reconstruction efforts. The current overall security situation indicates that the British have focused primarily on the internal security apparatus and have not allocated the appropriate resources for expansion into outlying districts. This case study suggests that force integration was successful during tactical operations to retake the village, and advocates that it would be equally effective during sustained reconstruction efforts. Whether or not the British apply this concept remains to be seen.

The creation of a FOB in close proximity to the district center is both positive and negative, and accomplishes four things: (1) it separates British forces from the population, (2) provides an area to plan and stage future operations, (3) enhances coalition force structure in the area, and (4) provides a quick reaction force capability to augment the ANSF internal security apparatus. Of the four points, the most glaring is the first. Separating British forces from the population is beneficial when viewed strictly in a myopic force protection framework; however, it continues to reinforce an existing issue of trust. In COIN, trust is paramount to success. The HESCO barriers that surround and isolate British forces on the FOB are physical representations that serve to reinforce existing psychological barriers. With the creation of a FOB, the British must be careful to ensure that they interact and integrate with the population, government representatives, and security forces or run the risk of broadening distrust and isolation.

7. Provincial Development vs. District Development

During the reconstruction of Musa Qala, it became apparent that development and anti-corruption campaigns are required at both the provincial and district levels of government. The GIRoA is based on having a highly centralized central government, designed to delegate authority to sub-national entities. Unfortunately, all levels of government are corrupt and selected officials under the Karzai government continue to recognize tribal allegiances before national interest. In theory, based on the current construct of the GIRoA, eradicating corrupt leaders at higher levels of government would eventually become self correcting at lower levels. It is the author's conclusion that ISAF monitor and advise all levels of government, but at the same time, promote locally established hierarchies. Therefore, both district and provincial development are important.

Not illustrated in the case study but indicative of continued development efforts, are ongoing British, USAID, and GIRoA Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development attempts to connect provincial and district development economically. The combined effort attempts to expand economic programs by: “(1) improving access to productive infrastructure, (2) developing a livestock cluster, and (3) exploring the potential for a horticultural agribusiness cluster for management effectiveness and maximum visible impact.”¹⁸⁹ USAID's Alternative Livelihood Program (ALP), together with the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation in Helmand, continue expansion of the Spring Seed Distribution project in an effort to promote alternative cash crops to reduce opium production. “Eleven seed varieties, including tomato, cucumber, eggplant, ochre, leak, squash and melon,” are distributed each spring to all the districts in Helmand. ALP is also pursuing a number of investor-based, agribusiness cluster opportunities to replace opium cultivation. “One such activity presently being pursued is the cultivation,

¹⁸⁹ USAID Afghanistan: Alternative Livelihood Program-Southern Region (ALP/S) Quarterly Report, October–December 2006/January 2007, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACK592.pdf (accessed October 1, 2009).

drying and processing of chili peppers.”¹⁹⁰ Unfortunately, the grim reality is that alternative cash crops have yet to take effect, and opium is still the primary revenue for citizens of Musa Qala.

E. CONCLUSION

Operation Jingal Jordawanki reinforces the effectiveness of ISAF forces executing a direct strategy of conventional attack. It also reinforces ISAF’s inherent weakness of implementing an indirect strategy to counter the Taliban insurgency. Musa Qala is a microcosm of the overall situation in Afghanistan that replicates conditions of the initial invasion. Taliban forces gained enough strength to mount a conventional defense in Musa Qala only to be overwhelmed by ISAFs’ greater relative material power. Once driven from the district center, remaining Taliban dispersed and were afforded the opportunity to reconstitute. The Taliban adapted to an indirect strategy following their defeat and continue to harass ISAF conventional defenses (FOB), rebuilding efforts, and continue to build strength in outlying districts. Moreover, the current security situation would indicate that British ISAF in Helmond are not appropriately employing coalition military and police forces to maximize effects against the Taliban insurgency.

In conclusion, Operation Jingal Jordawanki was an Afghan centric, bottom focused initiative that employed a clear, hold, build tactical methodology. It relied on decentralized decision making, through vertical decentralization down to sub-unit commanders. Therefore, in this operation, tactical success was achieved through the implementation of a bottom up, decentralized, sustained, integrated, Afghan centric methodology that employed a phased combination of clear, hold, build tactics, but lacked balance and harmonization in the employment of provincial and district development.

¹⁹⁰ USAID Afghanistan: Alternative Livelihood Program-Southern Region (ALP/S) Quarterly Report.

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V. AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION PROGRAM

A. BACKGROUND

Due to the deterioration of the overall security situation in Afghanistan, and increase in the number of attacks as part of an apparent Taliban resurgence, ISAF has restructured a pilot concept similar to program originally devised and employed during the Vietnam War. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, “the Saigon government formed a part-time hamlet militia program called the People’s Self Defense Force (PSDF).”¹⁹¹ It was a village level neighborhood watch type program composed of men either too old or too young to join the uniformed military or police forces. The PSDF was the last rung in a fourfold tiered security concept preceded by the “regular ARVN, the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), and the National Police.”¹⁹²



In Afghanistan, the Taliban has effectively re-established control in approximately 75% of the country and has also established a foothold in two critical provinces just south of Kabul, specifically Logar and Wardak.¹⁹³ “There are currently insufficient security forces—(sic) Afghan, US, and International Security Assistance Force—(sic) to deal with the worsening situation.”¹⁹⁴ Coalition and Afghan commanders

¹⁹¹ Jim Willbanks, “The Afghan Public Protection Force,” *The CGSC Blog*, June 4, 2009, <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/hist/archive/2009/06/04/the-afghan-public-protection-force.aspx> (accessed September 8, 2009).

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Reuters, “Government Maps Shows Dire Afghan Security Picture,” August 5, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSSP43015420090805> (accessed August 12, 2009).

¹⁹⁴ CJ Radin, “The Afghan Public Protection Force Pilot Program is Underway,” *The Long War Journal*, March 25, 2009, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/> (accessed September 8, 2009).

require the immediate fielding of additional ANA and Afghan Police forces (AP) to augment security efforts; however, due to the considerable time it takes to train and field proficient and professional forces, this is not possible. ANSF currently in training will not be available to reinforce and augment ongoing security efforts in time to address any current security concerns. The development of an alternative solution to address the current security and an overall lack of uniformed Afghan troops in the field, “calls for fielding some lightly armed, quickly trained gunmen associated with tribes.”¹⁹⁵ The alternative solution is the Afghan Public Protection Program or AP3. This effort resembles the PSDF neighborhood watch concept instituted during the Vietnam War. AP3 will rapidly provide some forces to fill the gap in critical areas where the GIROA is in danger of losing control, while additional professional ANSF are being trained.¹⁹⁶

Like the PSDF in Vietnam, the APPF is reinforced by uniformed military and police forces. However, unlike the PSDF, the APPF is not a tribal militia, and it is not the last rung of defense. The concept was devised by ISAF to address the reoccurring dilemma of insurgents freely coercing the unprotected rural Afghan population to provide refuge, subsistence and supplies. AP3 is designed to use a bottom up approach to shape the security environment at the village through district level, and focuses on improved security, development, and local governance (infrastructure and capacity building). AP3 is an Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) endorsed concept and is cushioned in a three pillar organization “designed to support police functions.”¹⁹⁷ The three pillars consist of the regular Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Anti-Crime Division. Historically, the AUP have been overextended, underfunded, improperly employed, and reduced to performing basic guard duty functions. With the employment of APPF, the AUP is no longer restricted to protecting schools, roads, and government buildings; they can be liberated to conduct actual police functions.¹⁹⁸ With the fielding of the APPF, a district has the AUP performing police

¹⁹⁵ Radin, “The Afghan Public Protection Force Pilot Program is Underway.”

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

duties, the APPF as guards, and the Anti-Crime Division to provide investigative services. Any given district may employ “approximately 90 Afghan Uniform Police supported by six Anti-Crime Division investigators (police detectives), and 200 APPF.”¹⁹⁹

What makes this program unique is the significant emphasis placed on the Afghan provincial and district leadership to lead efforts, and recruit volunteers. Also noteworthy, is the considerable level of synchronization and interoperability required between coalition forces, Afghan provincial and district leaders, ANSF, and Afghan Commandos. However, AP3 is not designed as a permanent solution; it is a temporary fix designed to address immediate GIRoA security concerns. The fielding of APPF provides the GIRoA much needed time to train and field professional ANSF adequately. Over time, APPF assessed by ANP mentors as competent and trustworthy can be recruited into ANSF. It is the intent of the MoI to disband the program once there is enough ANSF trained to meet GIRoA overall security requirements.

B. THE AP3 CONCEPT

Four synchronized joint combined military tactical operations are required to implement AP3, in a four phased process; specifically, shape, clear, hold, and build. The intent of the AP3 is to disrupt the influence of insurgents in rural areas not yet protected by ANSF by supporting local community leaders (District Community Councils), while simultaneously extending the influence of the sub-national level of governance.²⁰⁰ The tactical employment of the AP3 requires the integration of civilian and military efforts to synchronize operations and promote the legitimacy of the GIRoA. The following paragraphs highlight the overall tactical employment of the AP3 concept. It is important to consider that although the program is currently implemented in only one province, the method is universally applicable. The level of coordination and synchronization required to accomplish each of the four-phased sequential tactical operations cannot be

¹⁹⁹ Radin, “The Afghan Public Protection Force Pilot Program is Underway.”

²⁰⁰ This information was ascertained through interviews with members of C Company. Interviews were conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, August 2009.

understated. Also of note is that the following paragraphs do not cover any actual tactical operations conducted to date, and are explicitly designed to illustrate the general processes for each phase of the AP3 concept.

1. Shape

Shaping operations consist of three primary tasks: (1) disrupt insurgent leadership in the district, (2) identify, screen, and initiate training of APPF recruits, and (3) prepare ANA forces for follow on clearing operations. Shaping operations are coordinated between coalition forces, the Operational Command Center-Provincial (OCC-P) and the District Community Council (DCC). All operations in support of AP3 are coordinated and synchronized through the OCC-P. The OCC-P is a joint-combined headquarters element located in an Afghan provincial capital consisting of provincial leaders, headed by the governor, representative ANSF leadership, consisting of ANP)and ANA forces, including an Afghan Commando company, coalition force commanders (GPF and SF), and APPF commanders. The OCC-P coordinates with the DCC, and requests the following information, (1) names of potential recruits for the AP3 program, and (2) names and details pertaining to any known insurgents in the district. The Afghan MoI and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) subsequently vet the names of potential recruits for AP3 training provided by the DCC to the OCC-P. Names of insurgents are also analyzed and may become target packets that can be prosecuted by Afghan Commando's as part of shaping operations. Insurgent leadership is disrupted through the employment of surgical DA operations conducted by Afghan Commandos advised by Army SF.

2. Clear

A robust contingent of ANA and GPF ground forces conduct clearing operations in the designated district, and secure the district center. The degree of offensive operations conducted is dependent on the level of resistance encountered in the district. Once the district center is secured, ANP and trained APPF integrate with the DCC promoting local governance and security efforts. The high level of security provided by

ANA and GPF facilitate the integration of civil and military efforts. It also contributes to the identification and implementation sub-district and district community level quick impact projects (QIP), funded through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP "provides U.S. Governmental appropriations directly to operational and tactical forces, enabling them to meet emergency needs of civilians."²⁰¹ QIP assists in winning the trust of locals, and promotes the development of civil infrastructure. During this phase, QIP and longer-term projects are identified through meetings between coalition forces and local leaders in shuras or DCC meetings. Throughout this phase, APPF are continually trained, equipped, and integrated into the district security apparatus with the regular ANP and the Anti-Crime Division. When the security situation permits, ANP and APPF conduct a relief in place (RIP) and transfer of authority (TOA) with the ANA. At the end of this phase, ANA prepare to continue offensive operations and expand GIRoA influence into the next district.

3. Hold

During this phase, ANP partner with and mentor APPF. A continued security presence of ANP and APPF operating throughout the district mitigate insurgent attempts to re-establish a support base. A layered QRF is implemented to reinforce APPF and ANP security efforts, and is prepared to mobilize in support of any overwhelming security threat. Four layers of district and provincial level coordinated ground and aerial reinforcements consist of: (1) a designated village and district level ANP QRF, (2) an ANP provincial reserve force, (3) an ANA company sized provincial reserve, and (4) a GPF ground or aerial QRF, also positioned at the provincial capital. SF and GPF continue to "provide advice and help find, disperse, capture, and defeat remaining insurgent forces" within the district.²⁰² Coordination between the OCC-P and the DCC, combined

²⁰¹ Mark Martins, "The Commander's Emergency Response Program," *Joint Forces Quarterly: A Professional Military Journal*, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 37 (2nd Quarter 2005): 46-52.

²⁰² Department of Defense, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-5.

with mid-sized CERP projects, spawn political, social, and economic programs that undermine the insurgency.²⁰³ Local shuras continue to integrate, and increase support of APPF.

4. Build

The security situation continues to improve as APPF become more experienced and effectively partnered with ANP. Layered QRF forces and security mechanisms become well rehearsed and established. Overall management of the APPF and respective district security mechanisms is transferred over to the GIRoA. Select APPF are recruited for formal ANP training. Due to the improved overall security situation throughout the district, the local population's perception and support of government security forces increases. Insurgents are unable to re-establish support areas and influence the populace because the conditions that supported their existence no longer exist. The improved security conditions facilitate the completion of long-term CERP projects, and result in an increase in donations and projects by non-military donors, and non-government organizations (NGOs).




Figure 11. AP3 Concept Phases and Command Relationships²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Department of Defense, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-1.

²⁰⁴ Images were modified in PowerPoint and obtained from an unclassified AP3 information brief designed by Major Bradley Moses.

C. THE APPLICATION OF A PILOT PROGRAM

1. Overview

The following case study examines what Charlie Company accomplished in Wardak Province, during their seven-month deployment to Afghanistan, the problems they faced, and the results of their efforts (see Figure 2). Operational details not covered in the overall conceptual outline are addressed in this section including the coordination to establish the program in Wardak Province, employment of information operations, and specifics about AP3 recruitment and training. It is of note that SF, GPF and Afghan civilian and military leadership worked collectively during the employment of the AP3. This section illustrates that the mission could not have been accomplished if it were not for the close working and professional relationship between SF, GPF, and Afghan commanders.

From February 9, 2009 through August 1, 2009, Charlie Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne) or AOB 3230, inherited the concept and spearheaded the pilot employment of the AP3. Charlie Company's original mission when they deployed to Afghanistan in February 2009 was in support of ongoing United States Special Forces (USSF) led Afghan Commando mentorship and training.²⁰⁵ However, once in country, AOB 3230 inherited an additional task; establish the AP3 in the Wardak Province.

SF is versatile and adaptive; however, it is extremely limited when it pertains to sizeable force structure, and enablers (i.e., rotary wing aircraft and CAS). To maximize resources and attain the enablers needed to accomplish the mission, the Charlie Company AOB would have to work closely with GPF. This accomplished three things, interoperability, synchronization, and a professional sharing of each organization's inherent strengths.

²⁰⁵ Afghan Commando training is conducted by USSF soldiers at Camp Morehead (named after Special Forces Master Sgt. Kevin Morehead) and is located in a former Soviet training based in Rish Khvor, near Kabul.

The AOB Commander divided his company leaving two ODA's with the Afghan Commandos at Camp Morehead (one ODA was attached to an operational Commando Company, and the other ODA ran the Combat Training Center (CTC)). He positioned his AOB, two ODAs, a tactical psychological operations company (TPC), and a CMOC at FOB Airborne, with the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment (2-87 Infantry), 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), of the 10th Mountain Division. FOB Airborne is located near the governor's compound in Maydan Shahr, Wardak Province, and provided a secure location for planning, coordination, and staging operations. Collectively, the AOB Commander and the Commander of the 2-87 Infantry synchronized coalition operations in support of the implementation of AP3, and developed critical relationships with the Governor, provincial and district leaders.

When the AOB arrived at FOB Airborne, the framework for the OCC-P had been established in Maydan Shahr through the efforts of 2-87 Infantry. Shaping and clearing operations were underway in Jalrez Province; initial shaping operations for Nerkh district were also in progress. APPF from Jalrez were positioned in the district center while clearing operations continued. The first graduating class of APPF from Nerkh were in position at FOB Airborne waiting for conditions to be set to facilitate their return. The second class of APPF, also from Nerkh, were still in training. The AOB integrated with 2-87 Infantry and worked closely with "Wardak's governor, Mohammed Fe'dai. Fortunately, Governor Fe'dai speaks "fluent English, is pro-American, and has a background in the professional world of non-governmental organizations or NGOs."²⁰⁶ The AOB and 2-87 Infantry worked with Governor Fe'dai to establish a comprehensive IO campaign to facilitate the promotion and support of AP3. The AOB also recognized the opportunity to integrate Afghan Commando's into shaping operations in support of AP3, and recommended this as a future and permanent course of action to the governor and higher ISAF command.

²⁰⁶ Robert Kaplan, "Saving Afghanistan," *The Atlantic*, March 24, 2009, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903u/saving-afghanistan> (accessed September 8, 2009).

The following paragraphs illustrate historic events that occurred during the implementation of AP3. The overall chronology of AP3 implementation, overseen by AOB 3230 following the establishment of the OCC-P in the Provincial Capital, Maydan Shar District, Wardak Province, is indicated in Figure 12.




Figure 12. AP3 Spreads the influence of the GIRoA²⁰⁷

2. Setting the Stage

This section examines some of the information operations conducted prior to and during the implementation of AP3. This section illustrates how important governor's cooperation and support is in setting and maintaining the conditions for AP3. It also explains the significance of enduring commitment, and assiduous vigilance when serving in an advisory capacity.

Governor Fed'ai took a lead role in shaping public perception and setting conditions for the implementation of AP3. He accomplished this through a campaign of radio broadcasts, addresses, and visits to the districts within his province. He pursued this initiative based on advice received from AOB 3230. The AOB also advised the governor to start his campaign on a broad scale. This advice came to fruition on February 19, 2009,

²⁰⁷ Created in Excel from data received from Major Brad Moses in interview with the author.

when Governor Fe'dai, addressed over 275 Wardak Provincial and District elders and leaders to share his vision of increased security and development in Wardak through the AP3. With the AOB and attached CA's support, Governor Fe'dai issued certificates of participation and portable radios to each attendee. His speech provided local level leaders and key communicators a greater perspective of the AP3, as well as guidance on how they should respond in the future when there is an increased level of ANSF in their districts. Five days later on February 23, the governor travelled to Nerkh District. There, he again shared his vision of increased security and development through the application of AP3; this time, to the Nerkh district elders, leadership, and populace. Following his brief, the governor handed out humanitarian assistance (HA), provided by AOB 3230. District leaders and citizens in attendance received thermoses, prayer rugs, hygiene kits, and blankets. Governor Fe'dai took the lead role in shaping public perceptions to reinforce the credibility of the provincial government, and the legitimacy of the GIRoA, based on guidance from AOB 3230.

On February 25, the Commander International Security Assistance Force or COMISAF, General McKiernan reinforced Governor Fe'dai's efforts and illustrated coalition support by addressing the members of the Wardak OCC-P. COMISAF addressed the importance of the OCC-P's mission and how their efforts support the entire AP3 program. He stressed that the synchronization of security and governance throughout the tactical clearing and holding phases of the operation, enables the future APPF to assist at the local level better. The governor also spoke; however, he emphasized the importance of provincial and district level leader's acceptance of the AP3. Overall, COMISAF's outright support of Governor Fe'dai, reinforced Afghan perceptions and realization that the GIRoA, through ANSF, is actively working to provide for their security and regional stability. Following the address, General McKiernan and Governor Fe'dai met privately to discuss the status and governor's perceptions of ongoing security operations in Wardak Province.

3. Recruitment

For this program to work, volunteers were needed. The mountainous and remote villages where insurgents freely operate can only be accessed by single lane mountain unpaved roads or foot trails. Prior to expanding GIRoA influence in Jalrez, ISAF security assessments suggested that any coalition mounted convoys patrolling these isolated areas outside of the Maydan Shahr would receive tremendous insurgent resistance. To recruit volunteers for the program, prior to the establishment of the Maydan Shar's City Radio on February 26, 2009, coordination would have to take place through traditional Afghan methods, specifically direct coordination between the governor and the respective district leaders. Through the request of coalition forces, Governor Fe'dai advised District Leaders to select volunteers for AP3 that possessed the following characteristics: they must be an Afghan citizen between the age of 25–45, physically fit, not using drugs, lives in or is from that district, is trustworthy, respected by the community, not employed by any other Afghan government organization, and has no criminal record. Names of the volunteers nominated by Village Elders and Shura Leaders (Community Council) are vetted by the Afghan MoI and National Directorate of Security (NDS). Volunteers selected and vetted for training would be bused to a small secure training camp established in Mihterlam City, the provincial headquarters for Laghman Province north of Jalalabad, for indoctrination and training.

Once the program grew roots, additional recruiting and promotional mechanisms were conducted including the previously mentioned governor's information campaign, radio announcements and billboards. Additional promotional activities included an APPF welcome/ graduation ceremony conducted at the Wardak Provincial Soccer Stadium. The governor orchestrated the ceremony to recognize the completion of training of the second APPF class and to commemorate their first official duty day. During the ceremony, Governor Fe'dai gave speeches to the crowd of 400, thanking the new APPF for volunteering their service, and congratulated their efforts to increase local security and development of their district. The ceremony also provided the governor the opportunity

to announce the awarding of CERP funds for two mosque projects in the Jalrez and Maydan Shar districts. The governor's efforts promoted the support of the provincial leadership for the program, and reinforced the legitimacy of the GIRoA.

4. Training and POI

APPF in processing and training lasts for 20 days. During in processing, administrative information is collected from each recruit including the names of home villages, tribal affiliation, and family information. Generally, each class consists of recruits that all come from the same district. In processing also includes recording and filing each recruits biometrics. Recruits are issued a uniform, an identification card, and are enrolled in an electronic payment system (EPS) and an electronic fund transfer (EFT) system. Financial transactions can be conducted by APPF via cell phone. Funding and equipment for the APPF is a joint U.S. and GIRoA venture. The Afghan MoI provides the weapons (non-U.S.) and ammunition for APPF, and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)²⁰⁸ and the MoI work jointly to account for the weapons. The U.S. funds the salaries, as well as equipment, including uniforms, vehicles, and radios that the APPF receive through CSTC-A.

A core cadre of APPF trained by the ANP conducts training. The curriculum for all APPF consists of a common core that teaches recruits the Afghan Constitution, as well as classes in ethics, morals and values, the rule of law, human rights, and use of force. Additional instruction consists of marksmanship training (AK-47), radio communications and procedures, first aid and basic medical training, basic battle drills and individual movement techniques (IMT), IED detection, driver training, vehicle checkpoint procedures, basic search and detention, and drug interdiction. At the conclusion of training, each APPF class returns to the provincial capital in Maydan Shar to await deployment back to their respective districts.

²⁰⁸ The CSTC-A Web site defines its mission in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, as to plan, program and implement structure, organizational, institutional and management reforms of the ANSF to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within its borders, March 15, 2009, http://www.cstc-a.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=199&Itemid=145 (accessed September 11, 2009).

5. Challenges

The challenges associated with AP3 are fourfold and consist of: (1) commitment, (2) cultural sensitivity, (3) operational awareness, and (4) professionalism of advisors. For this program to work, continuous coordination and vigilance is required from SF advisors. New and unimaginable dilemmas develop almost daily. One dilemma experienced by Charlie Company occurred when a newly graduated class of APPF was issued brand new AK-47s. Since the AK-47s were new, and did not appear used and combat tested, the APPF were insulted, and did not trust the weapons. The new weapons almost resulted in an entire class's resignation. If it were not for the quick thinking, and evocative coordination efforts by SF advisors to acquire used weapons, fast; a class of APPF may have been lost.

Additional challenges are personalities, personalities of the leaders involved including, Afghan civil and military leaders, as well as coalition commanders. If the governor were uncooperative, the program would have failed. If SF and GPF leadership could not work together, the operation would have failed. If coalition forces did not exhibit cultural sensitivity and commitment to APPF, the operation would have failed.

An inherent danger with the program as a whole is the level of trust allocated to APPF. APPF outnumber ANP in any given district and APPF are all from the same tribe. The threat of APPF unifying as an autonomous tribal militia exists. The only control mechanisms are the ANP advisor's legitimacy, the inherent provincial QRF capacity, and each APPF's commitment to peace and security in their district.

Another danger is operational. If ANA are moved out of a district too quickly, the potential exists for insurgents to reassert themselves prior to the APPF establishing a coherent security apparatus. The resultant potential defeat of an unprepared ANP and APPF by insurgents would delegitimize GIRoA efforts, and substantially, degrade the program.

The program is also limited to receptive districts, and therefore, is not universally applicable. This corresponds with Hy Rothseitn's conclusions outlined in contingency

theory and processes of innovation. Specifically, “the nature of an organization’s interdependencies can either inhibit or enable effectiveness; no single rule applies to all situations.”²⁰⁹

6. Overall Affects

Although there are challenges associated with the implementation of AP3, the overall effects are impressive. In a seven-month period, AP3 restored GIROA control in four and a half out of the nine districts within the province. What makes this even more impressive is that prior to AP3, the districts currently under GIROA control, had a strong Taliban presence. A graphic representation of AP3 expansion of GIROA influence by month is depicted in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Expansion of GIROA Influence in Wardak Province²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 165.

²¹⁰ Map was created with PowerPoint by combining two distinct maps consisting of the map of the districts of Wardak province of Afghanistan, and Google Earth. Created by Rarelibra 19:33, March 29, 2007 (UTC), for public domain use, using MapInfo Professional v8.5 and various mapping resources, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1b/Wardak_districts.png (accessed September 15, 2009); *U.S. News*, www.usnews.com/.../photos (accessed September 15, 2009).

D. EXAMINING THE SEVEN CRITERIA

 Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

1. Top Down Focus vs. Bottom Up Focus

AP3 is bottom up focused, but clearly requires support from the top to be successful. It is bottom up focused in that the emphasis is placed at the district or village level; however, to accomplish the training, equipping and fielding of APPF, considerable support was required from the provincial governor, coalition forces, and the Afghan MoI and CSTC-A partnership. AP3 implementation and its inherent bottom up focus, forces coalition forces to “interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion.”²¹¹ The bottom up focus also forces relationships between coalition and Afghan civilian and military constituents. Without close working relationships, and an understanding of the operational environment, AP3 would fail.

Providing a secure environment at the district level enables the GIRoA to illustrate legitimacy and establishes the framework for future capacity building efforts. Security at the district level enables the GIRoA to expand influence and provide its citizens with the three critical functions accomplished by all strong states: security, basic services, and protection of essential civil liberties.²¹²

²¹¹ McChrystal, *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, 1–1.

²¹² Stuart Eisenstat, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005): 136.

2 Search and Destroy vs. Clear, Hold, Build

The implementation of AP3 combined both search and destroy and clear, hold, build. Search and destroy operations were approved and facilitated by the DCC, and accomplished by Afghan Commandos during shaping phase, and by ANA and GPF during the clearing phase. Both DA and clearing (search and destroy) operations were vetted and approved by both the Afghan provincial and district level leadership, and tactical operations were predominantly conducted and led by Afghan military forces. Thus, in this scenario, both methods were used in a phased approach to support a clearly defined end state. Therefore, there is no better method, just a synchronized application of each method to achieve the desired and clearly defined end state.

3. Centralized vs. Decentralized

AP3 is primarily a decentralized operation; however, the OCC-P centralizes or streamlines the information and planning process fostering coherent unity of command and effort,²¹³ and resource distribution. This is indicated through the formation of the layered QRF security apparatus. AP3 employs dynamic partnership, engaged leadership through SF and GPF advisors, and a de-centralized decision making process of the DCC and ANP forces. An example of this is districts determine the level of support they require based on the threat. Information is relayed back to the OCC-P that can deploy the appropriate level of forces to address the security situation. Additionally AP3 is decentralized in that it is the objective of AP3 is to empower local leaders (by district), and promote responsive and accountable governance²¹⁴ by holding local leaders responsible for the security and development of their community.

4. Periodic Security Presence vs. Sustained Security Presence

The entire concept of AP3 is based on the requirement of a sustained security presence. The Afghan Public Protection Program is designed to shape the security

²¹³ McChrystal, *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, 2–1).

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2–2.

environment at the village through district level by focusing on improved security, development and local governance (infrastructure and capacity building). Additionally, the third phase, hold, reinforces this point in that a continued security presence of ANP and APPF operate throughout the district and mitigate insurgent attempts to re-establish a support base. AP3 provides the capability for sustained presence by filling the gaps in critical areas where the GIRoA is in danger of losing control, while additional ANSF are being trained.

5. US/ISAF Centric vs. Afghan Centric

The AP3 is an Afghan centric effort to disrupt the influence of insurgents in Afghanistan by supporting the local community leaders (District Community Councils) while simultaneously extending the influence of the sub-national level of Governance. This effort is focused on bringing the GIRoA to the population. AP3 is accomplished through the efforts Afghan civil and military leaders. It is not focused on attrition warfare, or quantifiable metric statistics, exhibited through numbers of operations conducted or numbers of Taliban forces captured or killed, as indicators of success.

6. FOB Force Protection vs. Force Integration

AP3 required force integration, cultural understanding, and the building of relationships to achieve success. Although FOBs are used to stage and plan operations, both SF and GPF accomplished overall execution through force integration during the conduct of tactical operations with Afghan counterparts. Additionally, relationships, credibility and trust were established through sustained presence, CERP, and reinforced commitment.

7. Provincial Development vs. District Development

Throughout each phase of AP3, CERP is identified and implemented. Districts are priority; however, if legitimate projects are identified and can be accomplished at the provincial level that supports overall operations; there is no reason not to employ them. AP3 leverages the distribution of resources and relies on provincial and district level

leadership to determine the priority of resources to promote development. A real world example of this was a contract signing ceremony that served as the culmination event of the Jalrez Shura. It was conducted at the provincial headquarters on June 2, 2009. Seven contracts totaling over \$120,000 were signed at the ceremony. The sub-governor was instrumental in the process by conducting numerous meetings and negotiations to both identify the most effective projects for the area, and properly bid them to local sub-contractors.

E. CONCLUSION

In seven months, AOB 3230 facilitated the institution of a GIRoA presence in four out of the seven districts in Wardak Province. It did not accomplish this alone. The commitment and dedication of all parties involved reinforced the legitimacy of the GIRoA through persistence and action. Without the relationships established between SF, GPF, and Afghan civilian and military leaders, the implementation of AP3 would not have been possible. In conclusion, AP3 is an Afghan centric, bottom-focused initiative that employs both search and destroy and clear, hold, build tactical methodology. It relies on de-centralized decision making, from integrated joint civilian and military leaders that have developed relationships through a sustained presence at the provincial and district level. Therefore, in this operation, success was achieved through the implementation of a bottom up, decentralized, sustained, integrated, Afghan centric methodology that employed a phased combination of tactics, and a balanced employment of provincial and district development.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What do you do when you get lost? You go back to the last point when you still knew where you knew you were going, and you regroup from there.²¹⁵

A. A REVIEW

In a review of overall concepts examined, Chapter III illustrated that a small contingent of USSF with minimal outside interference or support can stabilize and develop a district. Chapter IV demonstrated GIRoA and ISAF capabilities through unity of effort to recapture a district center from insurgents, using a direct approach of conventional attack. It also provided a glimpse of ISAF's problems with stabilization and development. Chapter V revealed the effectiveness of a district level local security program endorsed and promulgated through Afghan provincial and district leaders applying both direct and indirect strategies.

This section employs the available evidence from analysis of the seven criteria examined in each case study, using the conclusions drawn from each case study as evidence to indicate which operational methods generally result in success. Assessments from only three operations conducted during an eight-year timeframe remain inadequate in many respects, and explain only a small portion of what may ultimately constitute a successful strategy. However, analysis of the seven criteria with respect to the three operations conducted in three different provinces does provide a contextual framework, and an indication of methods that generally result in success.

²¹⁵ Comment made by an SF Warrant Officer with six deployments to Afghanistan, OEF I, III, V, VII, XI XIII from 2002–2009 during an interview at Ft. Bragg, NC, August 2009.

B. FINAL REVIEW OF THE SEVEN CRITERIA

 Current Strategy	District Strategy
Top Down Focus	Bottom Up Focus
Search and Destroy	Clear, Hold, Build
Centralized	Decentralized
Periodic Security Presence	Sustained Security Presence
US/ISAF Centric	Afghan Centric
FOB/Force Protection	District/Forces Integration
Provincial Development	District Development

1. Top Down Focus vs. Bottom Up Focus

In the case studies examined, bottom focused initiatives were successful. However, case studies also indicated that the tactical application of different methods may be required in each district. Case studies suggest that there are some constants and some variables. The constants are threefold and consider local and tribal interests based on qawm: (1) sustained engagement with tribal leadership at the district level is productive, (2) the level of cooperation of the shura is based on incentives, and (3) the shura has a vested interest in the tribal population's perception of their status and loyalty.

The variables are also threefold and pertain to coalition force structure (resources) assigned to a district. First, the size of the force or the allocation of resources allocated to each district is not consistent. The size of the force must accommodate force protection, and be sensitive to Afghan cultural idiosyncrasies with respect to qawm, i.e., suspicion of outsiders, perception of the central government as corrupt and oppressive, and a general resistance to any foreign invaders.²¹⁶ Second, some districts may be more cooperative or receptive than other districts. Third, the same tactical or operational approach may not work in every district. Some districts may require shape, clear, hold, build, where others may only require a small element to assist in development and security efforts, while other districts should be avoided altogether.

²¹⁶ Ali Ahmad, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War* (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 1995), xiv.

2. Search and Destroy vs. Clear, Hold, Build

Conclusions derived from the three case studies indicate that a combined application of clear, hold, build, and search and destroy works best. Case studies propose that search and destroy operations may be more successful when employed as part of a larger clear, hold, strategy. Ideally search and destroy, as defined in Chapter II, should be developed through intelligence received from Afghans, approved by Afghan government and military officials, conducted by Afghan military or police forces, and synchronized with ongoing operations in the area through communications networks linking Afghan district, provincial, and national entities.

3. Centralized vs. Decentralized

Afghanistan represents a complex environment; therefore, according to Harvard Professor Henry Mitzberg, “the more complex the environment the more difficulty central management has in comprehending it and the greater the need for decentralization.”²¹⁷ Case studies reinforced Mitzberg’s contention that for an organizational configuration to be successful in a complex and unstable environment, it must coordinate through mutual adjustment, be decentralized and adaptive, and possess workers that are both highly specialized and trained.

4. Periodic Security Presence vs. Sustained Security Presence

A sustained security presence permits the counterinsurgent the time necessary to understand the operational environment and develop critical relationships. Each case study presented operations that employed a sustained presence; however, just being there in many respects is not enough. A sustained presence combined with force integration, and Afghan centric operations proved to be most successful. Sustained presence works best if coalition forces are not isolated on FOBs that restrict interaction.

²¹⁷ Henry Mizberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or fit?”

5. U.S./ISAF Centric vs. Afghan Centric

Case studies, as well as the current situation in Afghanistan, illustrate that U.S./ISAF centric operations are not optimal to counter the Taliban insurgency. The U.S. and ISAF continue to employ a direct strategic approach to maximize relative material power. However, Arreguin-Toft's second hypothesis suggests, "when strong actors attack with a direct strategic approach and weak actors defend using an indirect approach, all things being equal, weak actors should win."²¹⁸ The case studies indicate that Afghan centric operations yield better results, and are consistent with an indirect strategy.

6. FOB Force Protection vs. Force Integration

Force protection is important; however, it does not have to be achieved through physical isolation on large FOBs or by donning bulky ballistic equipment. Force protection is a matter of scale; do commanders want to protect an immediate area or the entire area? Force integration, as illustrated during SF operations in Orgun, promotes force protection by gaining the trust and support of the population. Case studies suggest that force integration offers greater force protection by focusing on atmospherics that enhance the security and stability of an area, not just contiguous physical armaments that focus on an immediate area.

7. Provincial Development vs. District Development

Case studies illustrate that each district presents a different set of problems, and that all counterinsurgency is local. With respect to qawm, the best way stabilize Afghanistan is through district development. Afghanistan is tribally based and consists of semi-autonomous "village states" dispersed regionally.²¹⁹ "Afghan's identify themselves' by qawm the basic sub-national (sic) identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes

²¹⁸ Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, 38.

²¹⁹ Ahmad, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War*, xiii.

occupation.”²²⁰ In a region where locally based groups, and local relationships are so important, why would an outside state government committed to developing the region not focus locally?

8. Conclusions

A COIN strategy in Afghanistan must address local conditions as they pertain to Afghanistan and cannot replicate surge operations that may have contributed to relative success in Iraq. A COIN strategy in Afghanistan must maximize and focus available resources to enhance security, governance, and development. A COIN strategy in Afghanistan must promote and enable established village and district political hierarchies, by, with, and through Afghan forces, and engage sustained capacity building, civil-military operations, intelligence and information operations.

Before outlining the author’s proposal for a district level strategy, the author must address ten questions that brought him to his conclusion.

1. What is the U.S. goal in Afghanistan? President Obama cited four objectives in his white paper release on February 27, 2009 outlined in Chapter II; however, the U.S.’s primary goal is stabilization.
2. What is NATO’s primary goal in Afghanistan? The NATO Web sites claims, “NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.”²²¹ This translates to stability.
3. What is the number one concern of Afghan citizens? Polls indicate that the number one concern of Afghans is security.
4. How have the U.S. and ISAF addressed the issue of security? The U.S. and ISAF have focused security and development efforts at the central and provincial levels of government.
5. What is the primary means of governance in Afghanistan outside of Kabul? Afghanistan is a rural country that has effectively resisted every major military power due to its decentralized local recognition of qawm. The primary means of governance in Afghanistan is through district and village level tribal shuras.

²²⁰ Ahmad, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War*, xiii.

²²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed November 5, 2009).

6. Where does the Taliban insurgency get its support in Afghanistan? Through tribes and villages at the district and village level.
7. What has been the U.S./ISAF means of COIN? Arreguin-Toft would argue that the U.S./ISAF have primarily used a direct strategy of conventional attack and defense. Professor Hy Rothstein would suggest that the U.S. has not adapted from the traditional American way of war that is attrition based and bureaucratic in nature.²²²
8. What kind of environment is Afghanistan? Professor Henry Mitzberg would classify it as complex and dynamic.
9. What is the best means of command and control in a complex and dynamic environment? Professor Henry Mitzberg claimed that decentralization is the best method of command and control in a complex and dynamic environment.
10. Does the U.S. possess a unit that is decentralized in nature, small, well trained, culturally sensitive and versatile that “can advise, train, or assist indigenous personnel in conventional reconnaissance, surveillance, and small-unit tactics to accomplish tactical objectives?”²²³ Yes, there is an existing institution within the Department of Defense (DoD), and the unit is referred to as U.S. Army SFODAs and are described in “FM 3-05,” *Army Special Operations Forces*:

3-10. SF is well suited to operate in a joint, multinational, or interagency environment. The inherent versatility and flexibility of SF allow commanders to integrate and synchronize their capabilities readily with those of other theater assets. SF Soldiers learn advanced skills to operate independently for extended periods in remote, isolated areas. The inherent skills required for conducting SO—(sic) combined with the quality, motivation, and experience commonly found in SF—(sic) allow SF Soldiers to conduct a multitude of missions. SF have superb collective skills and can adapt to dynamic, complex situations and emerging missions.

C. RECOMMENDATION

The author is recommending a hybrid concept that could address the GIRoA’s developmental objectives consisting of: (1) security, (2) governance, (3) rule of law and human rights, and (4) economic and social development.²²⁴ His recommendation does

²²² Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the troubled state of Unconventional Warfare*, 3.

²²³ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201, 3–5.

²²⁴ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 5.

not require considerable resources or a large force structure; it calls for the employment of an SF ODA, an ANP core cadre, a DDT, with associated linguists or interpreters in what the author calls a District Reconstruction Security Advisory and Liaison Team (DRSALT). The DRSALT conducts COIN and FID in support of the GIRoA, and UW against the Taliban shadow government.

The overall recommendation is fivefold: (1) maintain current force levels, only restructure focus to the district level making SF the main effort—no additional forces without a clear, specific purpose in support of the district approach; (2) conduct detailed district level assessments to determine primary select districts to introduce DRSALT; (3) begin implementation of district level approach by Regional Command/province by phases (Phase I Assessment, Phase II Force Realignment/Transition, Phase III Execution, Phase IV Sustainment), and in accordance with select districts determined during the assessment phase; (4) unify and harmonize U.S./NATO/Afghan command, control and partnerships to support DRSALTs, and (5) assign DRSALTs JSOAs to operate in independently.




Figure 14. District Approach Intent²²⁵

The mission of the DRSALT is fourfold, in accordance with the ADS, and focuses on the GIROA's development objectives through: (1) governance, insulate tribal leaders from the Taliban allowing them to reassert authority, (2) security, develop the local security apparatus or arbakai (tribal security system) and place them under the control of the shura, (3) support the shura in addressing the rule of law and human rights (already generally understood through pashtunwali and shari'ah), and (4) DDT's focus on economic and social development based on the recommendations and requests of the shura. The DRSALT is versatile and could be readily employed in select districts. The DRSALT is not rigid in composition and can be augmented by additional ANSF if necessary; however, it is designed to be small, versatile, and independently capable.

²²⁵ Picture created in PowerPoint, and used in a thesis brief given to MG Cleveland, Commander SOCCENT.

The DRSALT is positioned in select districts and consists of military, civilian, and Afghan elements to address GIRoA development objectives, U.S. and NATO stabilization goals, and most importantly, restore authority to tribal leaders and marginalize Taliban influence. DRSALT integrates with the community and rent a compound or “safe house” within the district. DRSALT falls under CJSOTF-A as a decentralized element, that executes Afghan centric operations. It maintains a presence in the district until it is secure, has improved social and economic conditions, and its governance is assessed as independently capable. DRSALT ensures that all tribes in the district are represented equally in the shura. Arbakai are trained by the AP3 POI and paid in the same manner as APPF, only on site. The Afghan MOI, as a legitimate security force, not a militia, endorses them.

Employment of DRSALT requires the difficult, but necessary, reprioritization of COIN efforts in Afghanistan back to SF, to capitalize on SOF’s strategic utility, and embark once again on a low cost, high leverage campaign.²²⁶ DRSALT ensures international developmental assistance is distributed and managed appropriately at the district level. It embraces President Obama’s civilian surge strategy, and provides the military means to secure them. DRSALT is to be decentralized, less resource intensive, versatile, and unconventional in nature.

However, DRSALT goes against deep rooted institutional arrangements within the U.S. military command structure, and suggests that U.S. and ISAF COIN efforts, following the establishment of a conventional headquarters in March 2002, has inappropriately employed its resources in an inadequate strategy. DRSALT also suggests modification of the Afghan constitution and calls for the central government to recognize tribal hierarchies at the district level. Moreover, ISAF and the GIRoA should cease efforts to democratize leaders at the local level, when there is already a functional traditional form of governance in place that works.

²²⁶ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled State of Unconventional Warfare*, 129.

There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan; however, not all have similar security situations. If the author's recommended strategy is applied with the current disposition of coalition forces, it could take up to eight years to attain control over 100% of the country. However, this assessment is made considering the the current disposition of coalition and ANSF. Not included in the assessment is the imminent expansion of ANSF being training daily that serve to augment ongoing operations. The timeframe is based on the worst-case scenario calculating districts with heavy insurgent resistance. Not included is the potential for districts to capitulate support based on observed success and word of mouth indicating the enhanced quality of life of citizens in districts under GIRoA control:

where citizens have no fear that the Taliban will enter their homes in the night to intimidate, with services launched that address the peoples' most pressing needs, with other villages hearing—word of mouth, face to face, radio—the news of what is possible through cooperation of local leaders and CF, with the Taliban on their heels as a result of effective search and destroy—never sleeping a peaceful night—with the door to reconciliation with neighbors open wide and with continued military losses for the Taliban, then it is only a matter of time until the enemy does a cost benefit analysis that leads to the conclusion: “Let's talk.”²²⁷

The author's assessment is based on the nine to 12 month deployment rotation of coalition forces and the level of accomplishments achieved by a given force during this timeframe. His assessment incorporates the approximately three months it generally takes for coalition forces truly to familiarize themselves with the operational area, given that most forces do not redeploy to the same operational area. His calculations also consider the time it takes to build permanent government institutions, capacity, infrastructure, and above all, the trust and support of the local population.

D. FINAL THOUGHTS

In the beginning, approximately “350 Special Forces soldiers, 100 C.I.A. officers and 15,000 Northern Alliance fighters routed a Taliban army 50,000 strong.”²²⁸ It is

²²⁷ Slaiku, “Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot plus Strategy for Coalition Forces.”

²²⁸ Bruce Barcott, “Special Forces,” *The New York Times Book Review*, May 14, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/books> (accessed November 5, 2009).

important to consider that recommendations to increase U.S. troop numbers will not improve the overall security situation of the country unless they are deployed to consult with tribal leaders and are partnered with or deployed to advise and train ANSF. The problem to date is that there are not enough ANSF to fulfill the security requirements of the country. Autonomous U.S. or non-U.S. ISAF operations, like the U.S. Marine operations in southern Helmond province during the summer and fall of 2009, are exactly the type of operations that have reinforced the resolve of insurgents and do not promote the legitimacy of the GIRoA. The overwhelming majority of Afghan citizens do not closely follow or care about the political dynamics of the Afghan government; they simply seek an environment where they can freely carry out their daily activities in a relative state of security, stability, and peace, without the threat of violence and terror. However, the manner in which security is implemented, as well as who is providing it, will ultimately determine success in Afghanistan.

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