

HAND TO HAND COMBATIVES
IN THE US ARMY

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

HAND-TO-HAND COMBATIVES IN THE U.S. ARMY by MAJ James F. Blanton

The Modern Army Combatives Program was adopted by the U.S. Army in 2000. The program is the culmination of a directive by the Commander of 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment in 1995 to improve the Army's older and unused combatives program. Modern Army Combatives is a ground based fighting system that teaches soldiers to close the gap between him or herself, gain dominance and finishes the fight. The program's roots are in Brazilian Jujitsu, but is this the right program for the average soldier on today's battlefield? The attempt to answer this question was conducted by first analyzing the Army's program, then examining the Marine Corps, the Air Forces, the Russian military, the Israeli military, and the Korean military programs. Each forces program was then compared to Modern Army Combatives. In order to support the thesis of this paper, surveys and interviews from various organizations within the Army were conducted and in-depth interviews with martial arts experts from outside the military were used to provide a greater depth to the research. The current program has set the stage very well for the Army's hand-to-hand training, but through the half a dozen changes recommend in the thesis it can only get better.

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ACRONYMS

AFCP – Air Force Combative Program

ARFORGEN – Army Force Generation

CSAF – Chief of Staff of the Air Force

FM – Field Manual

H2H – Hand to Hand

L.I.N.E. – Linear Infighting Neural-Override Engagement

MACP – Modern Army Combatives Program

MCMAP – Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

MMA – Mixed Martial Arts

NCO – Non-commissioned officer

MOS – Military Occupational Skill

POI – Plans of Instruction

ROTC – Reserve Officer Training Corps

SOF – Special Operations Force

SSG – Staff sergeant

TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UFC – Ultimate Fighting Championship

USAF – United States Air Force

USMC – United States Marine Corps

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

1–23. Army combatives training

a. Combatives is the instruction of hand-to-hand and rifle-bayonet fighting and is key in ensuring Soldiers are mentally prepared to engage and kill the enemies of the United States in close combat. The Army combatives training enhances unit combat readiness by building Soldiers' personal courage, confidence, discipline, and the unit's esprit de corps. The dynamics of a full spectrum combat environment demands that Soldiers have the courage, confidence, and competence to implement controlled aggression to use the minimum amount of force to control the situation. It also improves Soldiers' ability to remain focused under duress. A successful combatives training program will empower Soldiers with the ability to conquer fear and anger, allowing for controlled actions and enhanced situational awareness.

b. Commanders in both the operational and institutional domains will implement a combatives training program that certifies safe and professional combatives training and competitions.

(1) Institutional domain commanders will schedule a minimum of 10 hours of combatives instruction training initial entry Soldiers on the principals of combatives and basic combatives skills during IET.

(2) Operational domain commanders will schedule more advanced combatives training to build upon combatives skills learned in IET. Commanders should program combatives in collective training events to ensure Soldiers apply the appropriate level of combatives to control the situation.

c. This regulation establishes Army policies for combatives training and FM 3–25.150 serves as the instructional guide for combatives training.

Headquarters Department of the Army, AR 350-1

In 2004 the Army underwent a fundamental change to its ideology. Every Soldier would be viewed as a warrior regardless of their military occupational specialty (MOS) and the Forty Warrior Core Tasks were created. In the Forty Warrior Core Tasks hand-to-hand fighting is listed as *react to man-to-man contact*, and considered an integral part of the Army's Warrior Ethos initiative. This also represents a change in the way the Army views combatives. Since Modern Army Combatives Program's (MACP) inception in 1995, the program has slowly grown in vogue throughout the Army. So, it begs the

question: “After more than a decade of existence, what is the status of the program today?” Does the Modern Army Combatives Program, as it currently exists today and is designed, meet the needs of all Soldiers, prepare our Soldiers to engage in successful hand-to-hand combat encounters on today’s battlefield? This thesis will look at how MACP has evolved since World War II, and why Soldiers need a formalized, efficient and effective combatives training program. The training involved in MACP, the basic skill sets of the program, and the basic proficiency levels to be achieved must be examined. The training will be looked at from the perspective of the Combatives School at Ft. Benning, basic training units, and regular Army units. The training aspect will also evaluate the present training guidance on various Army levels. This thesis will also look at how Modern Army Combatives compares against other US military service programs and foreign military programs, specifically Korea, Israel, and Russia.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the adequacy of MACP to prepare a Soldier to engage and defeat an enemy in hand-to-hand combat situations on today’s battlefield. This study will examine the hand-to-hand combatives utilized by the United States military services, and compare and contrast the Army’s combatives program to the Marine and Air Force programs. The training plan for Soldiers learning combatives and how commanders and trainers apply that plan during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle will also be examined. Finally, this study will use the military combatives taught in the Israeli Defense Force, the Korean Army, and the Russian Army to compare and contrast MACP. By putting all of these aspects of military combatives together, this study hopes to identify the strengths and potential improvements for the Modern Army Combatives Program.

Military combatives is the system of hand-to-hand fighting developed for U.S. military personnel. Combatives are trained in garrison or while deployed so that military personnel have the capability to attack or defend themselves without a firearm in battle. On the battlefield, in the event that Soldiers either cannot employ their firearms, or their firearms cease to function, combatives allow Soldiers to use only their hands or an improvised weapon to subdue or kill an attacker. Combatives can include many aspects ranging from punches and kicks, throws and sweeps, joint manipulation (the twisting, bending, or pulling of specific joints, usually wrist, elbow, shoulder or ankle, in order to cause pain or subdue ones opponent), and ground fighting (fighting that takes place while the combatants are on the ground). Combatives can include open-handed attacks (no weapon), knives, sticks, or any available object that Soldiers can use to defend themselves.

Today's Soldiers face a complex battlefield. The urban battlefield is a 360 degree environment. Combatants can be mixed in with non-combatants. Soldiers can be asked to conduct a full range of missions from passing out blankets, to raids, to personal security. Although Soldiers may face a hand-to-hand combat situation in any combat environment, the urban environment presents a significantly higher threat to a Soldier, with the dense population and restrictive nature of the terrain. Today, with more of the world's population urbanized, Soldiers will increasingly operate within the populated urban environment. In Iraq and Afghanistan, today's Soldiers must personally interface with the population to gain trust and to limit the insurgents influence over the population. In order to prepare them for the mission, today's Soldiers have been equipped with some of the most advanced gear available. The combat vests they wear have four ballistic

plates for projectile penetration prevention, the capacity to carry not only the basic load of ammunition in seven magazines, but carry even more ammunition, emergency medical kits, demolition kits, and other essential gear. Due to these enhancements in individual Soldier protection, this combat load makes the average Soldier better able to survive, but it also encumbers him when faced with a hand-to-hand fight. In the urban environment, Soldiers run the risk of encountering angry mobs, demonstrations, protests, or armed insurgents who have blended in with the population in order to get close enough to U.S. Soldiers in order to wound or kill them. These situations are frequently encountered by Soldiers who are not traditionally trained in the combat arms. On today's battlefield, female Soldiers are just as likely to come into contact with the enemy as males. In Iraq and Afghanistan, summer temperatures can reach over 120°F, which quickly fatigues even the strongest and well conditioned Soldier. Under all of these conditions, given an enemy who can strike anywhere, or a situation that can become volatile without warning, U.S. Army Soldiers must be able to defend themselves and apply the force necessary to prevent their injury or death, or the death of a fellow comrade. Army combatives training should address all of these situations, with a training regimen that can be easily incorporated into any unit's training plan as they prepare for deployment and maintained while deployed for extended periods.

Beginning in either basic training or the officer basic course, U.S. Army Soldiers, today, both enlisted and officer, are taught MACP. In addition, MACP is taught through all levels of the non-commissioned officer education system and in all Captains Career Courses. MACP trains Soldiers to become more aggressive in their warrior skills and instills in them the confidence that they are lethal with their bare hands, and not with just

their weapon, whether a rifle, pistol, or bayonet. In 1995, Army Combatives was a little-trained, seldom-used system of unarmed combat. It was characterized by dynamic throws and skillful joint manipulation techniques. It had its history in the techniques taught during World War II by men like William Fairbain, Eric Sykes and Rex Applegate (*FMFRP 12-80, 1991*). FM 21-150, *The Army Combatives Manual*, was first published in 1942, and changed very little over the next 50 years.

MACP was initially designed for the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Ranger's are manned by specially trained Soldiers, known for their extreme physical and mental toughness and indomitable fighting spirit. The Ranger's are a specially trained unit, with access to unique resources, and with a unique mission not common to the average Army unit. Their mission, set by the highest levels of the Department of the Army and Department of Defense, demand that every Soldier within the 75th Ranger Regiment be capable of accomplishing whatever mission assigned, at any time and any place, and not fail to accomplish his set objectives. Due to this intense demand, they demanded the requirement for an intense combatives training program to be developed and implemented into the unit.

When 75th Ranger Regiment researched a way to revolutionize their combatives program, they turned to a proven fighting system in Gracie Jujitsu. In 1993, Mr. Royce Gracie took the world of ultimate fighting by storm and introduced Gracie Jujitsu. Ultimate fighting, or mixed martial arts (MMA) is a hybrid martial art that allows almost any technique to be used during a competition. This includes striking with the hands, feet, elbows, and knees, or grappling and ground pounding (sitting on a person's chest while they are on the ground and punching them until they submit or are knocked out).

MMA has rules that prohibit strikes to the groin, neck, back of the head, or eye gouges, as well as others to protect the fighters. With this unique fighting skill, first pioneered by Royce Gracie's grandfather Gastao Gracie, Royce Gracie was able to defeat opponents outweighing him by 50 or more pounds. Even today, Royce Gracie retains the no-holds barred (a match without restrictions or rules) record of defeating four opponents in one night (Official Site of Royce Gracie Biography). The Gracie Jujitsu revolution had fully arrived, and in today's mixed martial arts world, no professional fighter will survive for very long without possessing an expertly-skilled, finely-honed ground-fighting game.

The flaw with adopting the Gracie Jujitsu style of martial arts for military combatives is that it is inherently a ground-based fighting system. While Jujitsu is a very powerful and effective form of fighting, it has severe limitations when applied to demands of the military. At its basic level, Jujitsu is an extremely technical skill. Jujitsu matches are played like a human chess game between two people. These skills take a significant amount of time to learn, and then additional time spent to hone for use in actual fighting engagements. Jujitsu essentially requires unencumbered flexibility, which is not always the case on the modern battlefield. A modern Soldier in a combat environment is oftentimes encumbered, burdened with the stress of wearing upwards of 75 pounds plus of "lightweight" combat and survival gear for the conduct of his assigned mission. Finally, Jujitsu is very effective against a single opponent in a situation where combatants, fighting on the ground are without risk of being attacked by another attacker, this is not always the situation encountered on the modern day battlefield.

Significance of a Hand-to-Hand Combatives Program

Soldiers, regardless of their job in the Army, are required to be trained on basic marksmanship and core battle drills (the Forty Warrior Core Task, of which *react to man-to-man contact* is one, embodies this ethos). Regardless of their rank, age, or sex, all Soldiers should be able to defend themselves without relying upon a weapon of any kind. Any combatives program should be simple to learn, simple to train and maintain, and provide the individual with the diversity of skills they need to survive on the battlefield. In a crisis people respond through either the fight or flight reaction, and especially by how they have been trained and conditioned to respond. When an animal is confronted with a threat or a stressful situation, the natural inclination of “fight or flight” reaction takes over. This response is inherent in all animals, especially that of humans, and is characterized by a marked increase in heart rate, rapid breathing, tunnel vision, and reduced mental capacity. Fight or flight supercharges the body into hyperactivity, capable of feats of incredible strength and speed. This natural response to danger requires the expenditure of a huge amount of energy, and cannot be maintained for every long (Neimark, 2008). The body’s reaction would impair a Soldier’s ability to perform complicated moves requiring the ability to clearly think and reason. As such, modern combatives should require gross motor skills, trained to create muscle memory so that when a Soldier’s adrenaline is pumping because he or she is literally fighting for their lives, they will react instinctively. On today’s battlefield, be it either Iraq, Afghanistan, or any one of the eighty-some odd countries the U.S. Army finds itself in today, Soldiers will most likely encounter situations dealing with crowds, whether passive or hostile, whose moods and posture can change without warning. Modern combatives should

address such volatile situations and train Soldiers in how to cope with multiple attackers coming from multiple directions, and the ability to defeat them.

In a combat situation, Soldiers are weighed down by at least 50-75 pounds of equipment, if not more. A Soldier's combatives skill should not default towards taking an attacker from the standing position down to the ground, where both attacker and defender are on the ground, if at all possible. In combat, once a hand-to-hand fight goes to the ground, surrounded by a hostile crowd, Soldiers are at an extreme disadvantage. This disadvantage is defined as Soldiers not being able to break contact, or being vulnerable to attacks by others while they are engaged on the ground. Also once a fight goes to the ground, a Soldier is fully committed until he either kills or submits his opponent or he is killed or subdued. The results of this study will assist the Army's combatives school at Ft. Benning, Georgia with evaluating the techniques that are being taught to Soldiers and trainers. The study will allow trainers to evaluate how they conduct combatives training and how they can improve the survivability of their Soldiers.

Assumptions

U.S. Army Soldiers will always have a need for some type of hand-to-hand combat skill. The nature of warfare, from the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War to today's Soldiers on the streets of Baqubah and Kandahar, will always be one of uncertainty, chaos, and violence. Soldiers will have to react instinctively towards developing situations and threats regardless of the other conditions around them or affecting them. This will require specific skills outside of simple self-defense techniques, cultural art forms, or competitive sports which many martial arts styles fall under.

The Army will resist changes to its combatives program. The average Soldier does not spend an adequate amount of time training on combatives. Qualified MACP trainers are in short supply, and it takes an inordinate amount of time to get a trainer qualified. With the condensed timeline most units face to re-equip, rearm, and conduct train-up for the next combat rotation into theater, there is not enough time to dedicate to a technical system such as Jujitsu.

Limitations

This research will address only fighting systems developed specifically for Soldiers, systems that involve both offensive and defensive techniques. The research will be limited by the time allotted by the United States Army Command and General Staff College. The time limitation does not permit actual training in every combative style mentioned in the research. Therefore past experience, interviews, and surveys with experts in the styles will have to be substituted for hands-on participation in every style mentioned in this thesis. Much of the information available is written in support of one style or another. Priority for any participation in a combatives style will go to the Modern Army Combatives Program. Kansas State University and Fort Riley, Kansas both have a Level Four MACP instructor, the highest skill level achievable in MACP. Time and funds permitting, enrolling in either Level One and/or Level Two will be priority. MACP levels will be further explained in chapter four of this paper. General information on this topic is readily available through either the research library or online. Most research tends to focus on only one style, so the comparative part of this study will be based on the total data collected and a majority consensus on the application of combatives styles. With almost twenty years of experience in martial arts and nineteen

years of experience in the military, the author of this thesis will rely on personal experience and knowledge to help identify what information is useful and what is not.

Practitioners of martial arts become very loyal to the style of martial arts that they train on. It may be difficult for people interviewed to look at their style (whether military or civilian) and evaluate it with an open mind. As the author, personal bias, with almost 20 years of Korean martial arts training experience, will have to be overcome to facilitate the research on this topic. The research included will be limited to those combat styles and martial arts directly related to military combatives. There are many martial arts styles in the world. Each is distinct in its own right, but most can fall into the categories of a cultural art, competitive sports, self-defense technique, or combatives style. In this thesis, the study will be limited to those styles specifically designed for Soldiers who will be engaged in combat operations.

"Absorb what is useful; Disregard that which is useless"
(Bruce Lee 2005, 24).

Delimitations

There are literally hundreds of styles of martial arts across the world. These styles can be broken into four basic categories; self defense, cultural arts, competitive sports, and combative styles. A style such as Capoeira, a Brazilian blend of dance and martial arts, is an example of a cultural art. Capoeira practitioners must learn not only a style of fighting, but also musical instruments. Capoeira competitions are set to music, and if the competitors get too aggressive, then the music changes and more of the dance is used. The Japanese style of Aikido was developed so that an unarmed Samurai could successfully defend himself against an armed opponent. Aikido is a good example of a self-defense style. Aikido has no offensive techniques, and while an effective form of

defense, it has no relevance in the discussion about what makes a good combatives art for today's Soldiers. In the past several years, Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) has become extremely popular in the United States. MMA is a combination of striking (hitting an opponent with any part of the body) and ground fighting, conducted with a referee, inside an octagon-shaped cage. MMA is an excellent example of a competitive sport, and while it is violent and aggressive, it is still limited by rules that protect the competitors. These styles are very effective and take years to master. In a one-on-one competition or fight, they may prove effective, but because of their point scoring system and rules restrictions, these competitive sports such as MMA and boxing are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Combative styles, such as Krav Maga and Linear Integrated Neural-Override Engagement (L.I.N.E.) combatives, incorporate a mix of combat techniques that differ from Modern Army Combatives. Krav Maga is a fighting system developed in 1948 for the Israeli Defense Force (Krav Maga Worldwide History). L.I.N.E. is a combat system developed by USMC Gunnery Sergeant Ron Donvito in 1977 (L.I.N.E. Combatives History). Both combat styles involve gross motor skills trained repetitively in order to provide the defender with a simple arsenal of defensive tactics. Neither style centers on ground fighting but makes allowances if the fight goes to the ground (attacker or defender is no longer standing).

Combat is governed by many rules: the Geneva Convention, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Land Warfare. When engaged in a combat situation, Soldiers must react with the intent to kill or destroy their opponent's determination to continue fighting. They cannot be limited by the Marquess of Queensberry rules or the niceties inside the ring. There is no impartial referee standing between the two

opponents, ready to stop the fight when it gets too rough. Soldiers will react to situations based mostly on the way they were trained, and the level of training intensity. They will strike where they are trained to strike, with the intensity they are conditioned to in training.

There exists a wealth of information pertaining to theoretical techniques designed to disarm or kill an opponent. This information is relevant in the study of combative arts, but theory becomes irrelevant if it has not been incorporated into a realistic combatives system. A student can practice a technique over and over against a compliant opponent, but increase the stress, increase the danger, and the student will probably be incapable of executing the technique. Soldiers must learn to apply a technique under the most stressful situations; when your life is seconds from being taken from you, and an armed combatant who has the intent of killing you is charging directly towards you. There is a lot of information about the offensive and defensive applications of all the hundreds of styles of martial arts across the world. While relative to the discussion of martial arts, the overload of information about the hundreds of different martial arts is irrelevant to discussing the application of effective combative techniques. As previously stated, many martial arts fall into the first three categories; it is only combatives styles, that incorporate realistic, situational training, where the results of the technique are paramount over the proper stance or cultural significant of the movement that are of value to this thesis.

Manuals for martial arts have been written since the beginning of recorded history. The ancient Greeks recorded the first Pankration techniques on the sides of vases. The ancient Chinese recorded the techniques used by monks on scrolls passed from master to master. Even today, the sports section of any book store is rife with

instructional manuals on every style under the sun. Students can learn by distance learning through VHS and DVDs. This study will concentrate on the literature for the histories, practices, techniques and traditions of the various combat styles selected to be studied, those styles that were specifically created for use by Soldiers in combat.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP) was developed after the 75th Ranger Regiment, one of the United States Army's premier combat units, decided there was no established method for training-the-trainer on Army combatives, and also that the average Ranger did not find the techniques of the Army's previous combatives program effective. Train-the-trainer refers to Army programs that train individuals, usually non-commissioned officers (NCO), on how to teach a subject, much like a teacher certification program in college. Staff Sergeant (SSG) Matt Larson, then a NCO with 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was tasked with developing an effective combat style that would allow today's Rangers to defeat any opponent in unarmed combat. What emerged from SSG Larson's studies evolved into MACP. As MACP spreads from the elite combat forces to the average Soldier, it should be re-evaluated to determine if it is an effective technique for today's Soldiers on the modern battlefield. Any military combatives style must be effective regardless of a Soldier's sex, age, rank, or military occupational skill (MOS). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of MACP to meet the demands of combat, it can be compared to the combat styles of other services as well as the combative styles of other militaries.

The simplest way to examine the literature that exists on the subject of military combatives is to examine each style of combatives. Within each style, the literature review for this thesis will focus on three major subtopics. The first sub-topic is the history of combatives used by the United States military; most of which share a history. For the purpose of this thesis, only the history of military combatives training used from

World War II until the present will be studied in-depth. Hand-to-hand combatives have existed since the first armies were formed, but that history is beyond the scope of this thesis and will only be mentioned in passing to establish a clear history of military combatives. The literature review will look at military combatives collective history separately and then the individual styles history as part of the section on that style. The second sub-topic is the principles and techniques employed by the different combative styles. These techniques and their basic principles will allow the researcher to establish what these styles consider as their core techniques and the strength of the style. To help establish the effectiveness of MACP, this study will also look at the training techniques used by instructors. The amount of time spent training a martial arts is of equal or greater value than the techniques employed by that art. A strong style can be under-trained, which makes it ineffective, or a weak style can be over-trained to make a more effective style. The last researchable topic for the literature on military combatives will be various styles' affects outside the actual art. How combatives enhances a unit's training for war, how it enhances a Soldier's confidence and lethality, can all be researched and used as criteria when evaluating the overall effectiveness of MACP.

In order to establish a base for combative arts a brief reference may be made to one of the first combative fighting styles, developed by the Greeks, called Pankration. The primary reference that will be used for Pankration will be *The Martial Arts of Ancient Greece* by Kostas Dervenis and Nektarios Lykiardopoulos (Lykiardopoulos, 2007). The author classifies Pankration as a combat sport. The author goes on to clarify that combat sports grew out of ancient religious festivities or spring mating rituals. It was soon realized that it was counterproductive to kill or maim the warriors or most suitable

breeding stock, so rules were developed. Pankration itself means “total control/power” in ancient Greek. Pankration contests were both bloodless and honorable. It essentially became a sport where the goal was not to hurt the other fighter, but to have them submit to their opponent. In terms of this thesis a brief look at Pankration sheds light on modern mixed martial arts and helped delineate and define the boundaries between true combative arts and a combat sport. Another relevant statement made by the author is what better way to train for combat than through combat sports.

The history of military combatives is well documented. Men like Colonel (COL) Rex Applegate and Major (MAJ) William E. Fairbairn, leaders who first pioneered combatives during World War II published the first books that would become the guide for today’s military combatives programs. Today, the Marine Corps still re-publishes Applegate’s book *Kill or Get Killed* as FMFRP 12-80 (FMFRP 12-80, 1991). Applegate first published his book during WWII, where it became the standard for close combat. *Kill or Get Killed* is important to this thesis because it lays out the fundamental principles by which hand-to-hand combat during WWII was based. Applegate’s book covers strikes with hands and feet, throws, joint manipulation, self-defense techniques, knife fighting, and gun techniques. Many of these techniques are still used today. Another pioneer of early combative techniques was W.E. Fairbairn. Fairbairn’s book called *Defendu* (Fairbairn, 2007) was first published in 1926. *Defendu* brought a new aspect to combatives before and during the WWII. Fairbairn added violence of action to the subject of combatives. *Defendu* covers self-defense, disarming techniques, arrest techniques, throws, and introduces the importance of rolls and falls. Rolls are simply forward rolls or backward rolls. Rolls are used to help a person escape and avoid injury

from particular takedown techniques or throws. Falls are used to avoid injury when being thrown or taken to the ground. Basic falls are front, side or rear. Many of the techniques from this book have evolved in modern combatives, but just as many remain as Fairbairn taught them. W.E. Fairbairn also published *Get Tough!* (Fairbairn, 1979) in 1942. This book, unlike *Defendu*, was written specifically for the British Military. Here, Fairbairn credits the basics for his techniques in Judo (Jujitsu) and Chinese boxing. Judo began in Japan in 1882 and is a branch style from Jujitsu. Judo incorporates throws, pins (ground fighting), controlling techniques, arm bars and chokes. (Ohlenkamp, 2006) Chinese boxing should not be confused with western boxing. Western boxing is a sport, whereas Chinese boxing is a lethal form of combat that uses all aspects of the body with its own principles and theories. Many of Bruce Lee's martial arts theories were based on the methodologies of Chinese boxing. (Cravens, 2001)

Fairbairn also introduces the idea of not trying to master all techniques, but to pick ten techniques best suited for the individual and master those first. The idea of introducing simple, basic techniques for combatives, rather than trying to master a lot of techniques or complicated techniques is addressed as a viable solution for training Soldiers on combatives.

Military field manuals outline in great detail the task, conditions, and standards for teaching combatives. FM 21-150, first written in 1942, then titled *Basic Field Manual of Unarmed Defense for the American Soldier*, established the basic techniques for army combatives (FM 21-150, 1992). The last revision of FM 21-150, now titled *Combatives*, was in September, 1992. This field manual outlines the basic principles of combatives. Much of the first two chapters were copied directly into the MACP field

manual. The importance of this manual is that Army combatives of the time was a distance-based system, which is very different from today's combatives. This difference will be greatly expanded upon in chapter 4 of this thesis. After SSG Larson began to restructure combatives in 1995, FM 21-150 was updated with the arrival of the MACP and became FM 3-25.150 (FM 3-25.150, 2002). This field manual again outlines the principles of MACP. It addresses both empty handed techniques (techniques without weapons) and attacks with handheld weapons. FM 3-25.150 outlines the recommended basic training Plans of Instruction (POI) and helps instructors set up their own training area. This field manual takes Soldiers from basic warm-up techniques through basic and advanced ground fighting, takedowns and throws, strikes, hand-held weapons, and tactics.

Likewise, Marine Corps martial arts have gone through a number of changes. FMFRP 12-80 was a reprint of COL Applegate's book *Kill or Get Killed*. In 1978, Gunnery Sergeant Ron Donvito developed the L.I.N.E. combat system, and after joining the Marine Corps, introduced L.I.N.E. to the Corps where it was the established USMC combatives training program from 1989 to 1998 (Ron Donvito and the L.I.N.E. System). The L.I.N.E. combat system was published in the Marine Corps manual FMFM 0-7. This Fleet Marine Force Manual introduced the idea that close combat (combatives) is opposite of self-defense. While self-defense is involved in repelling an attacker, close combat is designed to permanently injure and kill an attacker. FMFM 0-7 or the L.I.N.E. program breaks combatives into a series of six drills. These drills demonstrate the progression of Applegate's and Fairbairn's techniques into a simple-to-learn system with relatively few techniques to learn. These techniques still address a large majority of the

spectrum of unarmed combat. The latest manual produced by the Marine Corps is MCRP 3-02B, *Close Combat* (Navy, Close Combat 1999). When the Marines transitioned from the close combat of FMFM 0-7 it was an acknowledgement that not all situations require deadly force. The premise behind the new Marine Corps system was that Marines must have a greater range of lethal and non-lethal techniques available and that a different system for combatives was required throughout the ranks of the Corps. The new Marine program adds a new idea to modern combatives, the idea of non-lethal force or as they call it a “continuum of force.” This idea will be discussed further in chapter four of this thesis.

Not all literature about combatives is written about one specific style of combatives. Books like *The Elite Forces Handbook of Unarmed Combat* by Ron Shillingford (Shillingford, 2000) reinforce ideas found in other combatives books. Shillingford discusses more of the historical background of combatives which draws from multiple countries across the world. Shillingford also introduces the idea that as technology advanced after WWII and the Korean War, many believed there would be no need for combatives. This could have contributed to the circumstances that led to SSG Larson’s development of MACP.

Unlike Shillingford’s book, *Survival on the Battlefield* written by Robert K. Spear (Spear, 1987) has definitely been influenced by the author’s preference towards Hapkido. Hapkido is a Korean style of martial arts that has its roots in Japanese styles. Hapkido is also a relatively new martial art beginning in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s (hapkido-info.net). Hapkido is a self-defense style of martial arts, considered a soft style, as opposed to the hard style of Tae Kwon Do. The book supports the thesis by the

psychological need for combatives (self confidence and team work), as well as developing the “will to kill.” Written in 1987, Spear supported the idea that wars in the future will no longer have a frontline and that there is a need for all troops, regardless of MOS, to have combative skills; this was definitely ahead of its time and reflects the modern battlefield very well. Spear argues that combatives should be easy to learn and teach, that training should be realistic, and that combatives should be easily incorporated into a unit’s physical fitness training program.

Other combatives styles such as Krav Maga have a rich history recorded on websites like *kravmaga.com*. The history helps to establish and identify how and why the style was developed. David Khan, the author of *Krav Maga: the Contact Combat System of the Israel Defense Forces* (Khan, 2004) starts with a brief history of the style. Krav Maga is very unique in the world of combative arts. The style was specifically designed as a killing technique to be used against combatants, specifically the Nazis, during the early rise of the Nazi party in Europe. Krav Maga involves a total body conditioning that teaches the practitioner to react instinctively with simplicity and adaptability. The study of Krav Maga adds valuable information to this thesis by the very nature of its inception and practice.

Style such as Tae Kwon Do and its later evolution, Tukong Moosul, have an imbedded history in the culture of Korea. Because these styles are highly proliferated across the globe, they will be easy to study, not only through the interview process but through firsthand experience. Both of these styles are also a part of the Korean military. Tae Kwon Do practiced by the larger conventional force, and their partnered American forces in Korea, and Tukong Moosul practiced by Korean Special Forces.

Scott Anderson, a known expert of the Russian martial art of Sambo, has provided a series of articles written by others on the history and techniques of Sambo. Mr. Anderson also provided the translation (for the most part) of these articles from their original Russian. The first article is a short manual on Sambo, written in Russian. One of the main limitations of studying Sambo is that a number of the available references are written in Russian. A number of techniques illustrated in the article are useful to the subject of this thesis. First, Sambo is similar to the Japanese art of Judo. It teaches rolls and falls and then the throws associated with each. Many of these Sambo techniques are related to the Jujitsu taught by MACP, techniques such as arm bars, leg locks, and self-defense techniques.

The second article was written by Senior Lieutenant L. Krasotkin for the National Commissariat of Defense in 1943. This article has to do with the combatives training for Soviet scout units during WWII. This manual talks about the training methodology used by instructors to teach Sambo at the time. This is very relevant to the thesis, in that it allows for the comparison of training techniques used by the Soviets during WWII and those used by the U.S. military.

The third article by E.J. Gatkin, a Master of Sports, USSR, describes Sambo as being broken into two categories, that of the sport aspect and combat utility. This is relevant to the thesis because almost all the styles being studied have primarily a sport aspect. Even MACP has a competitive sports aspect, much like UFC. Another unique reference made by this article is that Sambo teaches more than just a fighting style, it teaches problem solving, which allows the fighter to be a thinking fighter.

The fourth article provided by Scott Anderson is a history of Sambo. This is the final important piece for this thesis' study of Sambo. Understanding the relevant history of Sambo when compared to the history of U.S. Army combatives will advance the understanding of what made modern combatives what it is today. The history also provides a look at what other martial arts styles contributed to Sambo. This history can also be compared to those arts that contributed to the founding of MACP, and what might contribute to the recommended style.

In numerous professional journals and writings, military professionals write accolades about the different military combatives programs. An abundance of books and literature exists on individual martial arts styles, each focused on the strengths and application of the author's preferred style. *Black Belt* magazine, a publication for martial arts has published many pertinent articles in the last year alone. One concept in the April 2008 edition was that before WWII western boxing and Greco-Roman wrestling were the dominant fighting styles in the United States. After the occupation of Japan, styles such as Karate, Jujitsu, Judo and Aikido were introduced to the United States. Then after the Korean War, Korean styles such as Tae Kwon Do were introduced. These ideas contribute much to the blending of styles in combatives. In the June 2008 edition, the idea that MMA is just another evolution of martial arts is introduced. The writer states that in the 1960's and early 1970's, the success of Bruce Lee brought martial arts into the mainstream, then in the 1980's it was Ninjitsu, and finally in the 1990's came the Gracie's and Brazilian Jujitsu. The author writing for *Black Belt* magazine is saying that martial arts (therefore combatives) come in trends and fads. Yet trying to discern what would be useful for the Soldier on the battlefield is extremely difficult. Moreover, the

comparison of various styles and art forms is vaguely taboo. In the martial arts community, while students speak highly of their own style, it is considered bad taste to talk disparagingly about another style. By examining each publication, conducting surveys, talking to commanders and non-commissioned officer trainers, one can create a recommended tactics, techniques and procedures that constitute a good combatives routine for today's Soldier.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The first step in this thesis' research design was to conduct not only literary research, but also surveys of military schools and professionals, and interviews of civilian experts. The next step was to compile all surveys, interviews, and readings. From all of these multiple sources could be extrapolated the history, principles and techniques of each style. After each style is clearly researched and defined it can be compared to Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP). Once completed, analysis and conclusions were made based purely on the surveys, interviews, and readings, the strengths and weaknesses of MACP were assessed, and recommendations for changes were made.

The criteria for recommendations were based on the sum of the research. Extrapolations from the history, traditions, principles, and techniques of each style allowed for recommendations. All of the qualities were evaluated from a holistic view to make pertinent and relevant recommendations towards improving the MACP. Recommendations were, for the most part, divorced from personal experience and opinions, and were grounded in the input received from established and respected Masters in the various arts.

Each style was analyzed using the same model for evaluation. This model consisted of the relevant history of the style. Through the history, it can be highlighted how the style originally came into being, for what purpose did it serve, and the reason behind any changes that have happened in the style since its inception. The next part of the model consisted of the primary principles and techniques used by that particular style. In order to maintain some brevity, finer details about the potentially hundreds of

techniques the style uses were not examined. The research focused on the base techniques and the larger theories behind the style. The next step in the research model for each style was the training techniques and procedure that each style uses. For U.S. military styles, training techniques included training directives issued by the services or commanders. For all the styles, the discussion of training included an estimate of the time required for the average Soldier to gain a sufficient level of proficiency. This sufficient level of proficiency is defined as the average Soldier, regardless of sex, age, or MOS, having a basic skill level to win a hand-to-hand encounter on the modern battlefield. While the definition of a “basic skill” may be difficult to determine, research will establish what the acceptable minimum training requirements are or should be. It is obvious that no level of skill can ever prepare a Soldier for every possible situation that may be encountered, but Soldiers should have a higher level of proficiency than that of the average person. Finally, each style was compared and contrasted against MACP’s principles, techniques and training.

Using the technique outlined, the objective of this thesis is towards the continued improvement of MACP. Research was conducted through three methods: surveys, interviews, and book research. Each method used provided the basic materials needed to make educated and non-bias recommendations pertaining to Army combatives, and its effectiveness.

Establishing contacts with trainers and professionals across all the branches of the armed services was the first step in the survey process. After initial contact, the nature of the research, the thesis, and the objectives was explained in order to help focus the participants. Initial surveys were distributed to participants by May 15, 2008. Survey

questions for potential contributors were conducted in several rounds. The first round consisted of broad questions, in order to elicit a free-flowing conversation. Surveys provided specific input from members of the U.S. military. Surveys were validated by using a smaller population first, in order to refine the questions, and then expand the population to the entire chosen audience. Round two was a narrower round of questions based on the information provided by those surveyed or data still needed to research the problem statement. Round three consisted of follow-up questions as required. In-depth interviews of selected survey participants were used in order to expand on those topics that are critical for the research. Survey groups were broken into three distinct categories: Military Schools, Army units, and CGSC students.

The first category included the Army Combatives School at Ft Benning, Georgia and the Marine Martial Arts School at Quantico, Virginia. These two schools represent the centers of excellence for the military combatives programs taught within the U.S. military and are subject matter experts for both Army and Marine combatives. It is from the training centers that changes in techniques and teaching methodologies emanate. The population at each school house is made up of those individuals whose job it is to maintain the standard of the combatives form, and train the instructors that train Soldiers across the entire force. The responses from each round of questions validated the surveys or lead to changes to the surveys. Both schools directors agreed to fully participate in these surveys.

The United States Air Force (USAF) approved the establishment of a combatives program in March 2008. The USAF Combatives program is still within the developmental phase, working to get instructors qualified, establishing their training

center and school, and developing their doctrine. For this study, the USAF will allow the researcher a unique look as a program is established from its infancy. By including them in the first survey category, it established a much broader view of combatives programs across multiple U.S. military services. At this time, no program was identified within the U.S. Navy, other than the programs taught within Naval Special Warfare units. Emails and phone calls (perhaps 3-4 of each) were made to make contact through the services training command and establish whether the U.S. Navy does in fact have an official combatives program. The author of this thesis was unable to confirm that the Navy does or does not have a program. These surveys assisted in gaining a much clearer and accurate understanding of the schools recommendations and training methodology.

The second category of surveys was commanders and trainers of active duty Army units. The population of this survey is broken into several sub-categories. First will be the Battalion Commanders themselves. These commanders provided the ongoing research with an important look at what active duty line units are doing in regards to combatives training during their train up phase of ARFORGEN. It also provided feedback on what commanders think the value or importance of combatives is as their units prepare for combat.

The second sub-category of this survey was Battalion operations officers. The operations officer is the individual that interprets the commander's intent and establishes the training plan within their unit to meet that Commander's vision. Surveying this population provided a snap shot of how the training of combatives is planned.

The third sub-category was company commanders. This population will provides a more in-depth look at how Commander's guidance, personal experience/preference is

being instituted at the company level. From personal experience as a company commander, combatives training was trained a minimum of three times a week. Re-set funds were used as the company entered the ARFORGEN cycle to buy equipment (gloves, headgear, and training knives) to be used for training. Leader training sessions were taught one day a week to senior company leaders, but because of limited exposure to MACP, what was taught was from a more traditional martial arts background. All of these programs took a back seat to our preparation for combat and eventually dropped off the training calendar.

The last sub-category group for this survey was the non-commissioned officer's trainers themselves. This population provided valuable insight into how MACP is being trained by Soldiers. Contact with commanders and operations officers within the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division was established and they agreed to participate in the study. Initially a single Battalion was surveyed in order to refine and validate the survey questions for the greater population. From these survey groups the level of training the units received as they go through the ARFORGEN process and prepare for deployment was established. The emphasis, that commander's place on combatives training during ARFORGEN process, is an important part of this thesis.

The third category of surveys was the students at Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in classes 08-01, 08-02, and 09-01. By surveying the students an assessment was made as to what experience a portion of the military population has had with military combatives. This population represents a wide background of the military. The first two surveys went out to specific groups, specifically those Soldiers from Maneuver branches. The population at the school represents a diverse background of

Combat Arms, Combat Support, and Combat Service and Support. This population also represents a diverse background of officers with or without combat experience.

Responses from the initial survey lead to more in-depth interviews with those respondents who have practical experience with MACP. Responses were used to generate a more general survey, based on multiple choices or check-the-block questioning, rather than the broader, open-ended surveys. This helped when developing recommendations for improving the MACP. The respondents to the broad-based questions were used to validate the multiple-choice questions, whose responses were then used to refine or add to the list of questions. The knowledge and insight gained from the surveys helped to form a clearer picture for the thesis. These surveys are not the primary research method of the thesis, but supporting documentation to help shape the conclusions based on real world practical applications of MACP.

Interviews were used to learn about combatives outside the military. Contact was made with Mr. Scott Anderson, a recognized expert in Sambo. For Korean combatives forms contact was made with Master Ali Brown, chief instructor at the Headquarters of Tukong Moosul in Austin. Grandmaster Young Hak Lee of Lacey, Washington a 40 year veteran of Tae Kwon Do agreed to assist in the research of the combatives application of Tae Kwon Do. Master Sang Pae of Lakewood, Washington, who has experience in combatives training with the Korean Special Forces, was contacted and agreed to assist in the interview process. Contact was made with the Krav Maga instructor Steve Woolridge of the Lenexa, Kansas school. Unstructured interviews were used to allow professional martial arts instructors and masters to discuss their views of fighting styles that are applicable on the modern battlefield. The focus of these interviews is individuals with

extensive training and teaching expertise within their martial arts style. While these interviews focused on individuals within this population who have military or combat experience, it was not a prerequisite. Interviews were limited to those styles that were developed for military hand-to-hand combat such as the Korean military, the Israeli military, and the Russian military. Interviews of individuals with experience teaching civilian combatives courses were also used. Interviewees were probed to discuss their experience, their opinions, and their insight into hand-to-hand combat engagements. By allowing for this open flow of information, information outside what has already been learned can be discovered, and expand the knowledge to include concepts that limited personal training and experience has yet to be exposed to. Interviewing civilian professionals and practitioners helped gain a better understanding of other styles of combative arts.

Much of the historical research involved the analysis of literary works previously written on this topic. Through this research, the roots of modern combatives were examined. Understanding how previous generations developed their system of combatives, what their conclusions were, what they kept or discarded, and for what reasons helped this thesis develop into a more comprehensive picture. All surveys and interviews were completed and returned by 15 October 2008. The month of October 2008 was used to review the research, surveys, and interviews, and put them into a logical sequence of information that helped answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Hand-to-hand combat is an engagement between two or more persons in an empty-handed struggle or with handheld weapons such as knives, sticks, and rifles with bayonets. These fighting arts are essential military skills. Projectile weapons may be lost or broken, or they may fail to fire. When friendly and enemy forces become so intermingled that firearms and grenades are not practical, hand-to-hand combat skills become vital assets.

Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 21-150*

Hand-to-hand combatives, close combat, or the Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP), regardless of the name, are designed for a Soldier to be able to effectively kill or incapacitate an enemy using only their hand, feet, or a handheld weapon. Even on the modern battlefield where munitions can be delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles by a controller half the world away, Soldiers must be able to react to man-to-man contact. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that while the principles behind the U.S. Army's combatives program are sound, the program as designed may or may not be the proper combative style for today's average Soldier.

This chapter will be organized by the combatives styles being researched. It will begin with an analysis of MACP based on the history and traditions, principles, and techniques. Each subsequent style will be analyzed in the same manner, and then followed by a comparison with MACP. This comparison will follow the standard Army methodology on comparing the strengths and weakness' of each style. After the comparison, surveys collected from the field will answer those secondary research questions not already answered in this chapter. This chapter will conclude with a summary and transition to chapter five.

Jujitsu

A study of combatives cannot be done without examining Jujitsu. Almost every combative style researched for this thesis has some shared history or connection with the Japanese art of Jujitsu. Jujitsu finds its ancient history in feudal Japan. It was created as a method for an unarmed Samurai to fight an armed and armored opponent. What early Jujitsu practitioners discovered was that striking techniques were ineffective against an armored attacker. Therefore the Samurai developed methods of pins, joint locks, and throws in conjunction with using an opponent's energy against him. It is from this technique that Jujitsu became known as the art of gentleness or softness. This is opposed to the hard techniques such as Karate that taught directly opposing an attacker's energy (hard techniques). (Martial Arts Database, 2008)

It is from Jujitsu that Applegate, Fairbairn, and early combative styles took break falls and rolls, which are still taught today in MACP, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), and other styles. As an art, Jujitsu in its original form encompassed all forms of grappling to include throws, traps, joint locks, holds, gauging, biting, disengaging, strikes, and holds. Today, the art has become more segregated with schools such as Brazilian Jujitsu that specialize in only ground based grappling.

Modern Army Combatives Program

The "winner" of the fight in combat is the person whose buddy shows up with the gun first.

www.moderncombatives.org

FM 21-150 was first published in 1942, and while it was republished five times, it essentially remained the same. The basic principles taught by FM 21-150 were physical balance, mental balance, position, timing, distance, momentum, and leverage.

In *Kill or Get Killed* COL Rex Applegate talks about many of these same principles. Along with physical and mental balance, and momentum, Applegate adds the principles of maximum force and falls. FM 21-150 does not come up with new principles; it simply expanded Applegate's discussion of his principles. Applegate uses the term maximum force, which he defines as applying the greatest portion of your strength against an opponent's weak point (Applegate 1976, 14). In his explanation of maximum force, Applegate discusses keeping your opponent at arm's length or far enough away to avoid being taken to the ground. This correlates with the principle of distance. As part of his explanation of mental balance, Applegate discusses timing and having mental balance to not act too quickly or fail to react to an opponent's move. Under his definition of momentum, Applegate talks about potential momentum which is similar to FM 21-150's definition of leverage.

In Robert K. Spear's book, *Survival on the Battlefield*, written in 1987, there are twenty-two dynamic factors listed as part of martial arts theory. Among these are factor one – balance, factor thirteen – position, factor twenty – timing, factor eight – distance, and factor twelve – momentum. These principles by Spear shows that FM 21-150's principles were both unchanged since at least Applegate's book in 1942 and widely accepted as Spear's book demonstrates.

FM 21-150's combatives was a range-based system. It taught close range techniques such as throws and takedowns; choking and counter-choking techniques; and

some limited grappling techniques. FM 21-150 did not define grappling in the same terms as MACP. FM 21-150's grappling is better defined as joint manipulation, including wrist, elbow, or shoulder.

Medium range combatives has to do with striking vital areas of the body. These areas are divided into high, middle, and low. In the medium range, Soldiers were taught to use a variety of hand, elbow, and knee strikes. Long range combatives was considered to be a fully extended punch or kick or a handheld weapon (including rifle, rifle bayonet, knife, or an improvised weapon).




Figure 1. Vital Targets

Source: U.S. Army, FM 21-150, page 68

FM 21-150 finally concludes with sentry takeouts, pugil stick training, and bayonet training. Yet of all these techniques only the bayonet assault course had any

task, conditions, or standards against which a Soldier's performance could be evaluated. Minus the 10 hours of suggested training for entry level Soldiers; the Army had no standard or requirement for Soldiers to train hand-to-hand techniques. There was also no training methodology laid out for basic skills to advanced skills, and there was no instructor qualification program. This was the state of combatives in the U.S. Army in the early 1990s.

In 1995, the commander of 2nd Ranger Battalion ordered an evaluation of the combatives system being used by the Army. The Rangers had little confidence in the Army's combatives program and did not see a benefit to its training. Rangers relied on Soldiers trained in civilian martial arts to teach hand-to-hand. There was little to no consistency between what was taught within units. (Thompson, 2006) 2nd Ranger Battalion organized a committee under then SSG Matt Larson to research and develop a new, more effective program. The committee began by looking at those countries with an indigenous national program; Korean Tae Kwon Do, Japanese Judo, Thailand's Muay Thai, and Russian Sambo. What the committee learned from Sambo is the need for a competitive side to any combatives style. The Ranger committee also acknowledged that Sambo was not proliferated enough to have sufficient available instructors, so it turned to a similar system called Brazilian Jujitsu. The Ranger committee decided that Rangers would start with basic Jujitsu ground fighting and then move on to throws, takedowns, and strikes. (United States Combatives Arts Association, 2008)

FM 3-25.150 replaced FM 21-150 in January 2002. The principles of MACP, outlined in chapter one are mental calm, situational awareness, suppleness, base, dominant body position, distance, physical balance, and leverage. Many of these

principles are the same as those of the older FM style. For example, mental balance was replaced by mental calm, but it equates to the same meaning. Some, however, are new to the combatives style of MACP. Suppleness is a principle that a Soldier cannot rely on strength, but must use technique and tactics to overcome a stronger opponent. Base is the principle of keeping ones center of gravity low and the feet apart to provide a strong fighting stance. The technique of stand up in base is one of the key movements of all MACP, and is drilled repetitively through training. Dominant body position refers to the principle of dominant position in ground techniques. This could be back mount, front mount, guard, or side control.

In an article in the *Infantry Bugler*, winter 2007 edition, Matt Larson, now retired and president of the Combatives School at Ft. Benning, quotes a new set of principles that will be published in the next revision of FM 3-25.150. These principles are standards, systemic training, continuous training, competition, drills, live training, situational training, and combat feedback. These principles are a radical shift from accepted (or traditional) principles of combatives styles. The principles that Mr. Larson has developed are a little more open ended than the original principles. These principles seem to address more of a generic idea of combatives than principles that are unique to MACP.

MACP is a ground-based fighting system. MACP is broken into four levels (this could be equated to a belt system in traditional martial arts, but is not exactly the same). Level 1 is a 40 hour (1 week) training program. Level 1 teaches Soldiers the basic techniques. Level 1 starts by teaching a Soldier a simple fighting strategy of close the distance, gain a dominant position, and finish the fight. The first three drills taught to a

Soldier are ground based drills. (Thompson, 2006) Drill 1 is escaping the mount, passing the guard, gain side control, and achieve the mount. The term mount refers to one fighter being on the bottom, and one fighter being on top with the defenders legs trapped underneath the fighter on top. The term guard refers to one fighter being on the bottom with his legs wrapped around the fighter in the top position. Side control is one fighter on the bottom with the second fighter lying chest to chest on top with his legs to the side. Essentially this drill teaches a Soldier to escape from being on the bottom of a ground fight, to being on top, and gaining a dominant position in a ground fight. The bottom position means that the defender is on the bottom and the attacker is in the top position, either in the bottom person's guard, or in the mount. Drill 2 consists of arm, push, and roll, and escape the rear mount. This drill teaches a Soldier to go from his top dominant position to a rear mount, and then teaches a Soldier to escape a rear mount. Rear mount is the most dominant of the four body positions.



Figure 2. Rear Mount

Source: U.S. Army, FM 3-25.150, page 3-2

Drill 3 teaches shrimp to guard, scissor sweep, and missed arm bar sweep. These three techniques teach alternate methods of being able to get from the bottom position in a ground fight to a top position in a ground fight. The final parts of Level 1 training are arm bars, chokes, and take down techniques. All Level 1 techniques are exclusively ground based techniques. Fm 3-25.150 recommends that Level 1 instructors are employed at the squad and platoon level.

Level 2 MACP is a continuation of Level 1 skills with more advanced grappling. Level 2 instructors are at the company level. Level 2 consists of 35 grappling techniques, nine additional choking techniques, four additional arm bars, three leg locks (which are a ground based joint lock used on the ankle or knee in order to get your opponent to submit), and seven new take down techniques. It is not until Soldiers reach a Level 2 competency that MACP recommends beginning competitions. Level 2 is a two week (80 hour) course.

Level 3 MACP is where striking skills taken from boxing, Muay Thai, Kali, and other martial arts are taught. Level 3 also incorporates MACP into close quarter's battle. Level 3 is a four week (160 hr) course designed for the Battalion level. Instructors at this level oversee all Battalion combatives programs including teaching, safety, equipment, and quarterly competitions.

Level 4 is the top level of MACP. Level 4 personnel are trained during a four week (160 hr) program designed to be at the Brigade or installation level. These

instructors are the quality control agents of all MACP training on a post or in a major combat unit. The emphasis with these instructors is placed on safety and risk mitigation. They are responsible for continuing the training of Level 2 and 3 personnel. Presently only the United States Army Combatives School at Ft. Benning, Georgia can certify a Soldier in Level 3 or 4. Level 1 and 2 training is conducted at the unit level by qualified Level 3 or 4 instructors, which means units must have access to a Level 3 or 4 instructor in order to grow more Level 1 or 2 Soldiers.

Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

Close combat is the physical confrontation between two or more opponents. It involves armed and unarmed and lethal and nonlethal fighting techniques that range from enforced compliance to deadly force.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *MCRP 3-02B*

In October 2000, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) adopted its new hand-to-hand combatives system called Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). For the previous decade the Marines had used the L.I.N.E. system of close combat. According to All Marine Message (ALMAR) 142-98 one of the major reasons for changing was the need for a combatives system that had more non-lethal techniques. L.I.N.E. is an aggressive system of techniques designed to permanently incapacitate or kill one's opponent. The Marine Corps concluded that as the nature of warfare changed, so did their combatives system need to change. L.I.N.E. is a very regimented system, each technique is broken into a series of moves called ditties. The principle behind L.I.N.E. is to create nervous system override, where in the defender's training overrides his natural fight or flight instinct. The Marine Corps concluded that nervous system override was not a given and Marines could not rely on it. Further L.I.N.E. is executed in

a sequence, so if the attacker reacts differently or blocks an attack the sequence would be interrupted. The MCMAP system teaches individual techniques that allow the Marine to adapt as a combatives situation changes. As with other combatives systems, MCMAP builds on a fighter's basic instincts and reactions. MCMAP also relies on gross motor skills for their techniques, and attacking an opponent's vulnerable areas. Gross motor skills are physical movements that involve the larger muscles of the body; in the context of combatives it can mean using the whole arm or leg in attacks or blocks. Techniques such as joint manipulation or joint locks require finer motor skills on top of gross motor skills.

MCMAP is more like a traditional martial art than the Army's program. MCMAP has a belt system beginning with tan, gray, green, brown, and 1st – 6th degree black belt. In October 2001, the Marine Corps issued MARADMIN message 537/01. This memorandum outlined the standards for all Marine training in MCMAP. It stipulated that by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2003 all active and reserve Marines would be trained to tan belt. The Corps was supposed to reach gray belt by FY-04 with infantrymen trained to brown belt and all other combat arms Marines trained to green belt. Like many other programs in the U.S. Military, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, derailed the Marine's plan. As the war dragged on, the new Marine Corps Commandant issued a new directive in 2007. In ALMAR 034/07, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James T. Conway, spelled out the minimum standard for all Marines. He dictated that by the end of calendar year 2007 all Marines, active and reserve, would be trained to tan belt level. He further stipulated that infantrymen would

be trained to green belt level and all other combat arms Marines would be trained to a gray belt level by the end of calendar year 2008.

MCMAP aspires to be more than a system of techniques. According to MARADMIN 537/01, physical, mental, and character discipline make up the foundation of Marine training. Physical discipline is the technique part of MCMAP and straight forward in its definition. The principles of mental and character disciplines have different meanings to martial art and combatives styles and MCMAP in particular. Mental discipline is the development of the warrior ethos and combat mindset. As has already been noted in this thesis, combatives is more attitude than technique. Training Marines to become aggressive, almost predatory could be the key between their survival on the battlefield and their deaths.

The *USMC Martial Arts Training Log* quotes the Core values of the Marine Corps as honor, courage, and commitment. These Core values create the cornerstone of the Marine character and the character discipline of MCMAP. Through these core values, MCMAP strives to create combat Marines who understand when and where to use their combatives skills. The character discipline of a Marine Corps fighter dictates their behavior and conduct, much like the Samurai code of Bushido.

In MCRP 3-02B, the Marine Corps manual for close combat, MCMAP teaches a continuum of force which helps Marines decide the appropriate level of force/violence to use in a situation. Further MCMAP follows five tactical concepts: achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, speed, adapting, and exploiting success. These tactics are developed to help Marines evaluate a situation and deal with the unknowns of the

battlefield. These tactics are similar in idea to the principles of MACP and other combatives styles.

Continuum of Force		
Level	Description	Actions
1	Compliant (Cooperative)	Verbal commands
2	Resistant (Passive)	Contact controls
3	Resistant (Active)	Compliance techniques
4	Assaultive (Bodily Harm)	Defensive tactics
5	Assaultive (Serious Bodily Harm/ Death)	Deadly force

Note: Shading indicates levels in which Marines use close combat techniques.

Figure 3. Continuum of Force

Source: USMC, MCRP 3-02B, page v

MCMAP also has a number of fundamentals that are very similar to other combative styles. The most important of these fundamentals is the idea of range. MCMAP breaks combat into three ranges: long, midrange, and close range. MCMAP is a weapons based system, and the ultimate goal of every Marine is to engage the enemy as far out as possible. This could be with artillery fire or rifle fire. In close combat, long range includes improvised weapons, the rifle bayonet, or even one's entrenching tool. Midrange in close combat is knives, punches, and kicks. Close range is elbows, knees, and grappling. MCMAP fundamentals also teach Marines to exploit vulnerable areas of the body or target areas on the body. MCMAP breaks those target areas into head, neck, torso, groin, and extremities. Within these target areas, the final fundamental of MCMAP is pressure points of the body. Striking pressure points can be used to either control or cripple an opponent through pain.




Figure 4. Pressure Points of the Body

Source: USMC, MCRP 3-2B, page 1-5

MCMAP Comparison

The emphasis placed on close combat by the Marine Corps Commandant is the largest distinguishing aspect between MACP and MCMAP. The requirement that the Corps puts on hand-to-hand training when compared to the rather weak focus from AR 350-1 is what sets the two programs apart. Further, the Marine Corps actually outlines

the standard for all Marines, not just combat arms. The Marine Corps even goes as far as to impose a minimum rank requirement for achieving higher belts. Not only does this requirement acknowledge that greater skill requires greater experience, but it also plays into the next difference between the two styles.

Character discipline is unique to MCMAP from other U.S. military combatives. The Marines acknowledge that a fighter must be more than a brute, trained in deadly arts. Their stress on developing Marines who know when to use their combatives skills is important. The Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage are comparable to the Core Marine values, what the Marine Corps does is link their values to MCMAP. This linkage is very similar to a more traditional martial art.

Finally, the techniques MCMAP teaches differ from MACP. MCMAP is a weapons based system. It teaches Marines to engage an opponent as far out as possible. The Army tactics taught to all Level 1 students is to close the distance with your opponent. These two principles are diametrically opposed in their philosophy. This divergence is also what set their techniques apart. MCMAP tan belt includes upper body strikes (hand and elbow), lower body strikes (feet and knees), weapons techniques (rifle and knife) and counters to strikes, chokes, and holds. The Army and Marine Corps are similar in techniques with falls, throws, chokes, bayonet training, and pugil stick training.

Air Force Combatives Program

The primary source for the following section is email conversations with Lt Col Kevin P. Adelsen, Deputy Chief, Tech Training Division, HQ AETC/A3T, Randolph AFB, TX.

In March 2008, the United States Air Force (USAF) Air Staff approved the Air Force Combatives Program (AFCP). At the time of this paper, the program is still in its infancy. The first two steps for the Air Force is drafting an instruction manual and establishing a Combatives Center of Excellence. Presently the Air Force program is based directly on Modern Army Combatives Level 1 training.

Development of the AFCP was generated in part by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and in part by the Air Force restructuring itself to be more expeditionary focused. General T. Michael Moseley, then CSAF, responded to an article published in the *Air Force Times* about Airmen being taught L.I.N.E. combatives. His inquiry caused the Air Force's Training Command to establish a working group to look into the best combatives system for the Air Force's expeditionary airmen. According to Lt. Col. Kevin Adelsen in an article published in the Feb. 1, 2008 *Air Force Times*, "The combatives program is really just a smaller piece of our overall Air Force effort to better prepare our airmen as they get ready to deploy... We have always produced the smartest airmen ... ready to go out and do the mission ... but now we are producing warriors. The Air Force combatives is just another facet of that warrior production." (Holmes 2008)

In October 2007, the Air Staff determined that unarmed combat was an expeditionary skill required by all airmen. These expeditionary skills are in line with the Army's thinking and development of the Forty Warrior Core Tasks. Up until October 2007 only a few functional areas within the Air Force trained in hand-to-hand combatives. These functional areas were mostly related to special operations units. As the expeditionary mindset began to proliferate throughout the Air Force many units began developing their own programs. The Air Staff realized there was a need to standardize

the unarmed combat training within the service. The initial two modules of AFCP are broken between foundational type skills focused on ground fighting, and stand-up fighting and those skills needed by a deployed airman.

The more important part of the AFCP is instilling the warrior ethos among airmen. According to Lt Col Adelsen, the benefits of a combatives program are not determining the “perfect” technique. The most important role of AFCP is instilling self-confidence in airmen and bolstering the warrior ethos. The idea of instilling the warrior ethos ties in very well with the Army’s program. According to a January 2007 article in the *Air Force Times*, Matt Larsen, director of the Army’s Combatives Program, “The army program is designed to fit around the Army culture. The Air Force is going to grow their own [program] based on Air Force’s culture.” (Holmes and Tan 2008)

In February 2008, the Air Force began the first rounds of combatives training. A ten hour basic combatives program began at the Officer Training School. The program will expand to Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) by summer 2008 and then the enlisted recruit training program. The Air Force is still deciding how to fit the program into basic training and how to retroactively train the 500,000 airmen already in service. (Holmes 2008)

AFCP Comparison

The Air Force’s program maybe new but there is an important comparison to be made. Like the Marine Corp, the Air Force is looking at how to not only train the existing force, but retro actively train the active duty and reserve force. The Army intends for combatives to grow like a virus within the active component, but addresses no formal plan to train the Reserve or National Guard.

Sambo

A Russian definition of a good H2H system would be: easy to learn with reliable techniques that could net victory in the least amount of time in the most efficient manner to complete the objective.

Scott Anderson

Scott Anderson is a recognized expert in Sambo. As a martial artist he holds masters rank in four different styles of Jujitsu, Sambo and Judo. He is a licensed senior instructor, and has won more than a dozen championships. As an author, Scott Anderson has been published in *Karate International*, *Black Belt Magazine*, *The Journal of Asian Martial Arts*, *the American Sambo Academy Newsletter*, and *the American Jujitsu Association Newsletter*.

Sambo is a mixture of national wrestling styles that came out of different parts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, as well as Judo. It was originally developed for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), which would later become the KGB. V.P. Volkov in a 1940 NKVD (Volkov, 1940) training manual listed five main principles in the study of Sambo.

1. Intelligent use of the ploy within a fight.
2. Transitioning from one ploy to another ploy.
3. Skillful application of ploys to minimally expend strength to achieve the necessary results that are vital to the situation.
4. Developing a classification system for the ploys as a necessary tool to understand tactics and the application of techniques in the real world application of ploys.
5. Knowledge of the anatomical and physiological bases as the main underpinnings for the techniques used in ploys.

The style was originally developed by V.A. Spiridonov in the late 1920's. Spiridonov put his fighting techniques into seven groups: submissions, levers, twisting, unbalancing, press and compressing, strikes and combinations. Spiridonov developed his technique after observing that many disciplines were taught separately (fencing,

wrestling, boxing, and others), but there was no one system that combined them all. He selected Jujitsu as the base for his system because he believed it to be the most complete. Spiridonov acknowledged that no one system could address every situation, but thought that by combining styles a fighter would be more diverse in his ability to address situations. Spiridonov developed his system for self-defense, but later recognized that many of his students would be involved in detaining or arresting individuals, so he adapted his system to meet their needs. He developed several basic tenets for his fighting technique. A style would have an easy to learn training methodology, which would support rapid training. A style would possess a system of surveys to identify what worked and what did not work from the field, and it would have reliable ploys. To a Sambist a ploy can be defined as a trick. For example a hip throw, if the throw is the technique or technical aspect, then in order to execute the technique it must be combined with the tactics of setting an opponent up for the technique. The definition of a ploy is combining the technical skill with the tactical maneuver. For a Sambist a successful ploy would involve setting the conditions to execute a technique with little concern of it being blocked or countered. To a traditional martial artist these ploys would be similar to sparring sequences or self-defense techniques (Cambo, unknown author or Publishing date, translated by Scott Anderson).

V.S. Oshchepkov is acknowledged as the second founder of Sambo. At a young age, Oshchepkov was awarded his first black belt in Judo and later studied Wu Shu (a competitive form of sports martial art) in China. In 1929, Oshchepkov introduced Judo to the Russian Army. Oshchepkov's program included three sections: throws, levers, holds and strikes; defense against armed opponents; defense against two or more

opponents. These two founders of Sambo have several important distinctions which shaped and influence the style. First, Oshchepkov is more Judo based and sports orient. Spiridonov preferred joint locks and believed in quick, sharp jerking motions and feints to defeat his opponent. Oshchepkov preferred throws, but not in the style of unbalancing as Japanese Judo teaches. He preferred strikes to set up throws and finishing moves. In 1941 and the beginning of WWII for the Soviets, the two styles were united to train Soldiers (Cam6o, unknown author or Publishing date, translated by Scott Anderson).

Like so many combative styles, Sambo is broken into two modules: sport and combat. The combat side of Sambo takes the throws, holds, submissions of sport Sambo (the non-lethal techniques), and adds the lethal techniques of strangle holds, and striking with hands and feet. As many combatives styles have demonstrated, Sambo has taken techniques from boxing, Kickboxing, Karate, Tae Kwon Do, and others. Sambo does not completely separate the sport and combat aspects of its style. The sport part of Sambo is viewed as an important part of a combative fighter's training. The closer the sport is to actual combat, the better trained a Soldier is for combat and the less fatal using a sports technique can be in combat. Early Sambo was still limited by the technology of the time. There was no way to pad (protect) a fighter sufficiently to allow them to train at full power without first limiting a fighter's movement and second giving him a false sense of security.

In the article by E.J. Gatkin, entitled "Fighting Sambo" some of the philosophy of Sambo begins to be revealed (Gatkin, 1). This philosophy becomes important in that any fighting system will inevitably involve teaching its students how to think. Gatkin acknowledges that any debate about one form of combatives being better than another

may be useless. People are influenced by their personal, ethnic, or cultural upbringing. He also acknowledges that many styles of combatives follow fads or fashion. He believes that combatives forms must be a learning style. He uses the example of Soldiers who go off to war. They are exposed to other styles of fighting which they bring home with them after the war is over; this fact alone may be the true history of all combative styles. Combative styles are always learning, always being enriched. He uses the example of a closed system of martial arts being one that is veiled in secrecy, and stuck in traditions. These arts have no ability to improve, and are not usable combative styles.

Gatkin stipulates that hand-to-hand combat is unpredictable. So it is impossible to predict that one style will prevail over another. Gatkin discusses several principles for a good Sambist to have. The first is the ability to estimate the true nature of a situation or opponent. The second is progressive training from simple to complex, building instinctive skills. Learning to distract your opponent from his attack plan and monopolize on that distraction is called a ploy by Sambists. For Sambist, the idea of simple to complex is different from the traditional martial arts. Traditional martial arts have a belt system marking the progression of the student, and it also can mark the complexity of the student's skills. Sambo uses more of a spiral technique, where a student progresses and then is brought back to the previous level to learn the techniques from a different angle. Spiral training continually reinforces previously learned techniques. Spiral training also helps the fighter become more mentally flexible in the application of his techniques. Spiral training creates that thinking fighter. Gatkin's last principle is learning to use hand-to-hand weapons or improvised weapons. Gatkin summarizes his article by stating that a person must devote themselves to the art of hand-

to-hand combat, and that Sambo develops more than just fighting skills; it develops the character of a person.




Figure 5. Lever over the forearm

Source: NKVD Sports Club Dinamo Training Manual for 20 SAMBO Lessons, provided by Scott Anderson, publication date unknown




Figure 6. Counter to lever over the forearm

Source: NKVD Sports Club Dinamo Training Manual for 20 SAMBO Lessons, provided by Scott Anderson, publication date unknown




Figure 7. Twisting arm knot against the overhead knife attack

Source: NKVD Sports Club Dinamo Training Manual for 20 SAMBO Lessons, provided by Scott Anderson, publication date unknown



Figure 8. The rear stepping throw- front, rear and side stepping throws were the “work horses” of Sambo endorsed by both Spiridonov and Oshchepkov

Source: Example from 1943 NKVD training manual: Hand to Hand Combat for Scouts by Sr. Lt. A. Krasotkin and Lt. I.A. Vasiliev, provided by Scott Anderson



Figure 9. Method for taking down a sentry from behind followed by a strangle hold
Source: Example from 1943 NKVD training manual: Hand to Hand Combat for Scouts by Sr. Lt. A. Krasotkin and Lt. I.A. Vasiliev, provided by Scott Anderson

Sambo Comparison

Before the U.S. Army chose a combatives style based on Jujitsu it considered one based on Sambo. Sambo has its roots in Jujitsu, but like many other combatives styles has absorbed techniques from different martial arts.

The principle of minimal effort, energy, or strength expenditure to achieve results is the first difference in a Sambo fighter. Anyone who has ever trained on the ground or gone more than a minute or two wrestling with an adversary knows that it is a tiring experience. Like other combative styles, Sambo acknowledges the necessity to be versed in grappling, but does not base its system in ground fighting. These ideas are reflected in using ploys that expend minimal effort with little fear of being countered.

Weapons training and defense against weapons are also techniques taught in combat Sambo. This is very different from MACP. FM 3-25.150 addresses attacking with a knife and defense against such attacks, as well as pugil and bayonet training, yet none of the training levels within MACP address these techniques. It would be difficult

to find a Soldier on today's battlefield that does not carry a personal knife or their issued bayonet. Additionally, Soldiers will most likely be attacked by a knife, stick, or handgun wielding opponent in combat.

As already mentioned Sambo, like MACP, has its beginnings in Jujitsu. The new principles for MACP reflect some of the same principles found in Sambo. For example, situational training and competitions, yet there are also differences between the two. Sambo sports competitions are supposed to replicate combat as near as possible. MACP competitions are more similar to a UFC fight. While both styles use striking, Sambo incorporates striking from the beginning of their training versus MACP which does not introduce striking until Level 3. MACP does use arresting techniques in the form of arm bars, chokes, and leg locks, but they are all ground based techniques. MACP also uses the principle of feedback from the field, just like Sambo. What MACP lacks, up until this point, is to change and adapt new techniques. This becomes very close to being the closed system described by Gatkin.

Krav Maga

In scientific theory, if your premise is wrong then everything that follows is wrong.

Steve Woolridge

In Hebrew Krav Maga means 'close struggle'. This system was developed by Emerich "Imi" Lichtenfeld during World War II and the Israeli War of Independence. Imi was already a trained fighter prior to World War II but as anti-Semitism increased Imi was forced to protect his community and neighbors. He quickly learned the difference between sports fighting, and effective techniques on the street. After World War II (during which he served with the Free Czech Legion), Imi arrived in Palestine,

which was soon to become modern day Israel. His skills were quickly recognized and in 1948 he became the primary instructor of combatives for the Israel Defense Force. (Kahn 2004, 15-17)

As part of the research for this thesis, Steve Woolridge of Krav Maga & Fitness Center, Lenexa, Kansas agreed to be interviewed and talk about his style. The interview was conducted on 26 July 08 between 12pm and 1pm at the Krav Maga Fitness Center. Appendix A of this thesis has the five base questions used to conduct the interview, but inevitably very few were used as Steve answered most of the questions before they were asked. Steve Woolridge is a 15 year veteran of martial arts. His background includes Tae Kwon Do, certain styles of Kung Fu, Kempo, and Brazilian Jujitsu. Steve also served for six years in the United States Air Force.

Steve started off by explaining that there was a difference between combat and sports fighting. He explained that in sports fighting there were still rules to be followed. In combat there are no rules, just like in Krav Maga. Krav Maga works on simple principles. Principles that are applied on all levels where the principle does not change, just the conditions under which it is being applied and the stress under which it is being executed. Krav Maga stresses principles that can be applied all the time with efficiency under combat stress. Steve demonstrated the defense against a choke using a technique called plucking. He showed how this technique involves building off of a person's instinctual response. Instinctual response is how a human will respond under the highest form of stress. For Krav Maga, instinctual response creates a baseline for training. This could be compared similarly to the animal forms taught by Chinese monks. The monks took the attack and defense techniques they saw in nature and created martial arts

techniques from them. Krav Maga takes our natural reactions when we are attacked; the reactions that 99 out of 100 people will use when attacked, and creates self defense and attack techniques from them. Trying to override a person's natural reaction is counterproductive in hand-to-hand techniques, so Krav Maga simply builds on these reactions. This correlates very well with the scientific idea of fight or flight instinct. In the example of a front choke the natural instinct of a person is to grab the attacker's hands to try and keep from being choked. The technique Krav Maga teaches is to reach up and grab the attacker's hands and violently pull them down and away, and then follow through with a series of finishing blows. This technique first builds off our natural instinct to grab the attacker and second can be applied regardless of how the attacker grabs you (meaning front, side or rear choke). This technique can even be applied from the ground, for example if the attacker is on top of you trying to choke you.

This demonstrates one of Krav Maga's other principles: the idea that what a student (Soldier) needs to learn is two to three basic techniques that can be applied against 500 different attacks. These techniques are not reliant on a defender's strength, athleticism, or speed, but built around the body's natural reaction and simple body mechanics. Krav Maga as a combatives system relies on simple techniques that can be learned rapidly. In the interview with Steve Woolridge, he stated that 20-25 hours of hard training would provide students with the tools necessary to defend themselves. Krav Maga works on the premise of providing students with simple tools. To get back to the example of the front choke, a person does not change hammers if the angle or area they are hammering changes, nor does the technique for defending against a choke change simply because your attacker comes at you from the side or rear. For the defense against

the front choke, the technique does not change until the defender is presented with an additional problem, for example being pinned against a wall. Here the natural reaction of plucking does not work so the student must try a different technique. This is a good example of another principle of Krav Maga, which is that of problem solving. The basic principles and techniques of Krav Maga do not change simply because a student progresses from a white belt (entry level Soldier) to a more advanced belt. What changes for the Krav Maga student are the conditions under which the technique must be applied and the stress the student is placed under.

As Krav Maga students advance they are taught to problem solve through a situation when their basic technique does not work. The Krav Maga student learns to adapt and apply thought to a situation. Students of Krav Maga are stressed to the point of exhaustion and then presented with a new problem. This trains the student (Soldier) to learn to think and apply the principles they have been taught in a changing environment. While this may seem contradictor to the principle of building on a fighter's natural response, not all fights can (and will) end in an instant, and the fighter must be trained to continue to think and, above all else, not panic. Soldiers on the battlefield face this every day. In Krav Maga, like on the battlefield, a student must understand how to apply their techniques and must understand when the situation has changed and so they must apply a different technique.

The April 2008 edition of *Black Belt Magazine* lists ten principles for combat Krav Maga.

1. Avoid conflict whenever possible
2. Talk peace while preparing for war
3. Don't stay in the combat zone

4. Avoid the ground at all costs
5. Think multiple attacks and weapons
6. Take only seconds to react
7. Fight Dirty
8. Fight for your life
9. Get to your feet
10. Train under stress in realistic environments

These principles reflect more a way of thinking than what techniques to use. On the official Krav Maga website for Israel, the principles are listed as avoid injury, devise drills that take advantage of natural reflexes, defend and attack in the minimum time required, use the human body's vulnerable spots, use the body's natural weapons as well as ordinary objects that may be close at hand, and no Rules. (Krav Maga, Official Israel website, 2008) These principles seem more based in the techniques of the system. Along with what Steve Woolridge discussed it is easy to see how principles can vary even within the same style.

As a system Krav Maga is very adaptable. Although much of the system is unchanged since the days its founder Imi Lichtenfeld developed it, the system is designed for old knowledge to go out and new knowledge to come in. The reason that Krav Maga has not changed can be found in its principles. The techniques taught are basic and based on instinctual response. A person's reaction is the same today as they were in 1948 when Krav Maga was developed for the Israeli Defense Force. A good style of combatives is also a learning style. Krav Maga demonstrates this taking feedback from the field. Krav Maga was tested and honed from its very beginnings, and the system has continued to adapt to meet the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

The strengths of Krav Maga lie in its combat focused nature. Students of Krav Maga begin defending against a single attacker, or simple weapons. As students progress

the number of attackers increase, but the techniques do not. Krav Maga is an integrated system in that the same techniques used by a white belt are the same techniques used by a black belt; what changes are the conditions. Steve Woolridge used the example of defense against a knife attack. At lower levels students use rubber knives. As the students progress the knife may become more rigid, made of hard plastic, than a rounded metal knife, and finally at the black belt level a live (real) knife is used. This kind of integrated system allows Krav Maga to have a very low level of injuries. The system is taught from the ground up and the techniques used have been trained repetitively from white to black belt. Again while the training may become progressively harder, the techniques remain the same. Students are taught from both the attacker and defender stand point. Part of a student's training is how to be a good training partner to facilitate the learning. An attacker, who throws a lazy kick or punch, or a punch not aimed at the defenders head, does not teach the student to defend against a real attack, an attack trying to kill the defender.

Krav Maga teaches realistic training in order to prepare students for what they will face on the streets or what Soldiers will face in combat. Like many combative techniques Krav Maga teaches to attack points of vulnerability. In the example of the choke, if the attacker applies a rear naked choke, the weakness in the rear naked choke is the point where the attackers hand grabs his opposite arm to complete the technique (simple body mechanics). The defender applies his or her pluck technique at that point and is able to escape. The student has not applied a new technique to escape the attack; the student has simply adapted his basic pluck, at a point of vulnerability, and applied the principles of Krav Maga. One of the last points brought out about Krav Maga during the

interview is the fact that Krav Maga is willing to admit when a technique may not work and the defender is in a bad situation. Hand-to-hand fighting, much like combat, is inherently unpredictable. A student (Soldier) can find himself in a situation that he had not planned for and where the techniques he is trained on may not apply. Krav Maga acknowledges that these situations may be out there, but by applying the principles and techniques that Krav Maga teaches, by being a thinking fighter, the student is prepared to overcome and adapt to the situation.

Krav Maga Comparison

Krav Maga maybe the most unique fighting style analyzed in this thesis. Its history is born out of conflict. This history is what makes Krav Maga different from MACP. MACPs origins are in Brazilian Jujitsu, a sports oriented style. Krav Maga was actually developed through unarmed conflict with an enemy who was trying to hurt or kill its creator. In the new principles proposed by Matt Larson, MACP makes allowances for this learning, but MACP has yet to evolve and adapt.

Both MACP and Krav Maga stress competitions in their styles. The difference is that MACP uses a UFC style completion, with rules, judges and limitations. Krav Maga stresses no rules, and while it may introduce limitations to keep a competitor from becoming permanently maimed, it definitely is less structured and more focused on teaching good combat techniques. Once a point scoring system is introduced to a combatives competition it loses its combat focus.

The key to Krav Maga is building off instinctual response. Trying to override a person's natural response is counterproductive to the rapid teaching of a combatives style. Soldiers learn as they are trained over a long career to react instinctually, and

however one looks at a situation, 40 hours of combatives training is not going to override that natural response. Krav Maga builds on the defenders response and applies techniques which exploit that reaction.

Krav Maga stresses teaching a few techniques that are applicable against a plethora of attacks. This seems like a reasonable idea in the life of a Soldier given the limited time they have to train. Further, Krav Maga does not change the techniques at a higher level; it changes the stress and conditions under which the technique is applied. MACP does allow for this style of advancing. Many of the grappling techniques taught in level 1 are the foundations for higher level techniques.

Krav Maga also teaches weapons and improvised weapons attacks and defense techniques. This teaching is critical to a Soldier. It is better to engage someone with a handheld weapon, then with the naked hand or foot.

Tae Kwon Do/Tukong Moosul

Tae Kwon Do, translated as the "art of kicking and punching," is a Korean martial art that emphasizes spectacular kicking techniques.

Grandmaster Young Hak Lee of the United States Martial Arts Center is a 9th degree black belt in Tae Kwon Do. Grandmaster Lee served in the Korean military for three years between 1969 and 1972, and has been studying Tae Kwon Do since 1962. The interview with Grandmaster Lee was conducted on August 29th, 2008 in Lacey, Washington between 12pm and 1pm. Master Jason Lee was also present during the interview.

Grandmaster Lee began by explaining that Tae Kwon Do is part of the Korean national culture. In this way it is more of a cultural art than a fighting style, but after the

Korean War, with infiltration and influence from the North, the military application of Tae Kwon Do changed. The Korean Rangers began adding Hapkido into their training regimen. Grandmaster Lee emphasized that the greatest change in the military aspect of Tae Kwon Do immediately following the Korean War was the mindset. He stated that for a Soldier it was adopting the survival, no rules mindset of combat. It was this combat mindset that allowed military professionals to engage sports champions and knock them out quickly. In order to adapt further Tae Kwon Do changed and became Tukong Moosul, which Grandmaster describes as being 60% Tae Kwon Do, 20% Hapkido, and 20% Judo/Jujitsu.

The fundamental principle of Tae Kwon Do as a combative art is striking. Grandmaster described these as shoot techniques. These techniques are powerful, aggressive strikes with either your hands or feet in order to disable or kill your opponent with one strike. The key to these techniques is explosive power and speed. For example, the round house kick is a signature move of a Tae Kwon Do practitioner. The kick when done properly acts like a whip with the hip leading, then the leg, knee and finally the striking surface of the foot. As the kick moves, potential energy builds up traveling down the leg until the foot strikes the target. The kick is pulled back as fast as it is delivered therefore delivering the maximum amount of explosive energy into the target. These strikes are focused on the vulnerable areas of the body. These shoot techniques are effective regardless of the practitioners size or gender.

Grandmaster Lee stated that striking is always the first techniques a person should use. The last technique you want to use in combat is grappling. He said that the basic proficiencies a Soldier should train on are stamina, striking and kicking, moving, knees

and elbows, and finally grappling. He said that it should take about six months for a Soldier to develop these proficiencies. Unlike sports Tae Kwon Do, the strikes and kicks for a Soldier should focus below the belt line and at vulnerable points. Grandmaster Lee said that most people develop and protect their upper body, but they are weak below the belt, and part of combat training is exploiting this weakness.

Grandmaster emphasized numerous times during the interview that for a Soldier it is all about the mindset. Soldiers must focus on survival skills. He also pointed out that Soldiers must get used to using every part of their body as a weapon. He demonstrated that using the head as a striking weapon is more powerful than any strike with your hands or feet. This technique is amplified by a Soldier wearing a helmet, and is not expected by your opponent. In training, Soldiers should limit the amount of protective gear they wear in order for them to realize the strength of the techniques.

When asked about weapons training, Grandmaster said that here is also a difference between the knife fighting taught in civilian classes and that taught for combat. In combat, he said, you should always keep your knife in front of you, centered along the centerline of your body. He said that weapons' training is a good confidence builder and he again emphasized the importance of a no rules, combat mindset. Grandmaster talked about using improvised weapons to distract your opponent so you can get in close enough to kill. This was a new idea not mentioned in other styles, and reinforces the idea of no rules in combat.

Grandmaster concluded the interview by saying that you must continually change up your training in order to improve. He said that you can teach a confident person one technique and he will win a fight, but you can teach ten techniques to a non-confident

person and he will not win. The key to Tae Kwon Do combatives is to start out at a distance and only close into grappling range if necessary. Strikes are focused on the vulnerable areas of the body; eyes and groin. Finally Grandmaster Lee emphasized one last time that the survival mindset is different and must be trained as hard as any technique.

Master Sang Heon Pae of Master Shon's Tae Kwon Do in Lakewood, Washington, an 8 year veteran of the Republic of Korea Special Forces and is a 4th degree in Tae Kwon Do, a 5th degree in Hapkido, and 2nd degree in Tukong Moosul adds the following to the discussion of combative styles. Interviews with Master Pae were conducted via email.

Master Pae begins by stating that a good hand-to-hand combatives training system for Soldiers must include situational training and mindset training. He further expands to say that a Soldier must have confidence, be able to control fear, and the ability to react instantly. He says that a combatives technique must be able to adapt easily to any situation. Tae Kwon Do is based in speed, the ability to attack in an instant. Hapkido is based in grappling techniques that are more close distance. Tukong Moosul is situationally based and is similar to today's mixed martial arts. Tukong teaches one to react dependent on the situation for example confronted with a gun, two or more attackers, or attacking with a knife. Each style (Tae Kwon Do, Hapkido, and Tukong Moosul) allows the practitioner to learn and develop their own skills.

Master Pae points out that it is developing timing that is the most difficult technique to develop. Timing is knowing the exact moment to attack. Timing can only

be practiced with partner of equal skill. Timing must be practiced continuously to develop, at a minimum of 3-4 times per week.

Master Pae also points out that a combatives style must be adaptable, and that students (Soldiers) must learn to adapt one technique to deal with multiple situations. He uses the example of using falls and rolls in a ground fighting situation, and being able to adapt weapons techniques to be used in a ground fighting situation. He states that building endurance and patience is essential to a combatives style.

Master Pae concluded his interview by saying that good combative training should be conducted for about 1 ½ hrs three or four times a week. He says that with this kind of training regimen it would take about six months to build a basic proficiency. Master Pae defines this basic proficiency as having a strong spirit, a strong attitude and being able to control a situation.

Master Ali Brown a twenty-five year student of Tukong Moosul, and a direct student of Grandmaster Wonki Yi, founder of Tukong Moosul was interviewed, via email, to establish the final piece of the Korean martial arts pie for this thesis. Tukong Moosul literally means Special Warrior Martial Arts and unlike Tae Kwon Do it is a well rounded art that teaches students the entire gamut from striking to grappling to weapons techniques. According to Master Brown the most important part of a combatives style (or any martial art) is that the movements or techniques must make sense to the students. In some schools students are taught to execute a technique because their instructor told them. In the better schools, an instructor will take the time and effort to explain to a student why a technique is what it is. This understanding by a student helps the technique be more effective. At lower levels, a student learns to apply a technique on a

more compliant partner. This is for the protection of the partner and learning the technique. As a student increases in rank, the partner becomes less compliant. This system of training proficiency progression is very much like the Army's crawl, walk, run training mentality, and can be applied in all combatives training

Because Tukong Moosul was first developed as a combatives form, there are many of these requirements that carry over into the civilian or temple style as Master Brown refers to it. Part of the incremental training of Tukong Moosul, is multiple opponents (at lower levels this maybe only two, at higher levels three, four or greater), an encumbered defender, or even a defender required to protect another person (personal protection). At higher levels, Tukong training stresses sleep deprivation and exhaustion training.

Master Brown also stressed the need for mental calm. He stated stressing mental calm in training will better enable students (Soldiers) to remain calm in a real world situation. Master Brown demonstrates this concept by stating 'A person can drown on a single drop of water if he does not keep calm.'

In Master Brown's opinion it will take a Soldier two months to develop a basic proficiency, followed by maintaining that proficiency through regular training. He defines basic proficiency as: basic rolling techniques, to include rolling while encumbered or holding an object; break falls. Basic proficiency must also focus on striking with both hands and feet. One of the tenets of Tukong Moosul is 'One strike, one finish'. This tenet demonstrates that a defender should be able to use powerful strikes to incapacitate his opponent with minimal effort. Master Brown also identifies grappling techniques as a basic proficiency although he identifies these as arresting

techniques at close quarters with going to the ground as a final resort. Lastly, Master Brown identifies knowledge of weapons, knives or other easily accessible weapons, as a basic proficiency.

Korean Martial Arts Comparison

Korean combatives as a style stresses striking techniques. The style is known for its powerful kicks delivered with as much speed as there is force. As a combative art, Tae Kwon Do stresses engaging the enemy as far out as possible. This is much like the FM 21-150 version of combatives. All fights can be thought of in terms of distance. At longer distances jumping or sliding strikes can be used to engage an opponent. At closer distances, one uses kicks and punches. At even closer distances, an attacker can be engaged with elbows, knees, and joint locks. Finally at what is called zero spacing, one is engaged in grappling range. This concept of range engagements is opposite MACP which teaches its students to close the distance as rapidly as possible. These striking techniques are effective regardless of a Soldier's size or sex. A powerful kick, whether with the shin or toe of a combat boot, to a person's kidney, liver, or head delivered by a man or woman, big or small, will incapacitate or kill an attacker regardless.

Korean combatives forms are highly adaptable. Tae Kwon Do started out as a cultural art form. Hapkido is a separate self-defense style. When the two were combined together, you have Tukong Moosul. Tukong is a comprehensive style that teaches techniques along the entire spectrum. It is a hard style which relies on building a practitioner's endurance to take punishment in order to win a fight and deliver a killing blow. Tukong's philosophy is one strike, one kill. The evolution of Korean combatives forms demonstrates its high level of adaptability.

Tae Kwon Do as a combatives style also introduces the idea of using improvised weapons to distract your opponent. This idea is very similar to ploys used by Sambo. This idea also emphasizes the no rules mentality of combat. Korean Combatives does mirror another of the new principles of MACP, that of situational training. As a style Tukong evolved to teach situational responses to what a Soldier will encounter on the battlefield. This is similar to what MACP hopes to accomplish with situational training.

Korean combatives styles, whether Tae Kwon Do, Hapkido or Tukong Moosul focuses on training the mind. As was emphasized by Grandmaster Lee, Master Pae, and Master Brown, a Soldier must be in the mindset to kill his opponent. A Soldier must understand that there is no second place in combat and that the other person will not allow you to “tap out” on the battlefield. They also emphasized that his mindset must be thoroughly trained, honed and ultimately engrained into the Soldier before it will become effective. This is very similar to the statement that hand-to-hand combat is 90% attitude and only 10% technique.

General Comparative Analysis

By surveying Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students, active-duty company commanders, and in depth interviews with active-duty combat units a picture of MACP in the army today can be created.

As part of the initial control group to establish the validity of the multiple choice survey, fifty CGSC students were surveyed, of those surveyed nineteen responded. Of the CGSC students surveyed, 30% were combat arms, 23 % were combat support, and 47% were combat service and support. Of all the respondents, Question 1: 53% said that their training on MACP was limited only to service schools, Question 2: 35% had

received no training at all, and Questions 3 and 4: the remaining were split between level 1 and level 2. Of this population of students, 41% felt hand-to-hand combatives was important, 24% felt the program was very important, and 24% felt it was mission critical. 52% of the respondents responded that MACP as a hand-to-hand style was effective or very effective, while 30% did not know. An overwhelming majority of the students felt that the program was either useful (41%) or very useful (41%) in building Soldier confidence and esprit de corps in a unit or individual Soldier. Of the students surveyed, 76% had had no command emphasis in their last unit, while the remaining 24% had only generalized emphasis. 77% these students reported never conducting combatives training at their last unit, while 18% reported it as a once a month event. This group of surveyed students reported that the most significant challenge in training MACP was qualified instructors (47%), followed by lack of a command priority (41%), and followed by lack of training time (12%). None of the students surveyed reported resources as a training challenge for MACP. This population of CGSC students represents the next generation of senior tactical leadership in the Army, as Battalion Operations and Executive officers who will be planning the training of our Army.

After the initial control group was surveyed 200 CGSC students were surveyed, of which 42 responded. Breaking these responses into several categories creates a quantifiable picture of MACP. The first category is the general knowledge of the students and attitude toward MACP.




Figure 10. How much personal experience do you have with the Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP)?

Source: CGSC survey by author.




Figure 11. Do you feel that there is a definitive requirement for every Soldier, regardless of rank, branch or gender, to train in a hand-to-hand combatives training program, such as MACP?

Source: CGSC survey by author.

The second category of responses portrays the attitude of CGSC students towards MACP. The first graph shows the level where those surveyed served prior to attending CGSC. This graph puts the student's opinions in perspective with regards to their

opinion. The second graph in this section demonstrates the command emphasis, or lack thereof, the students experienced in their last unit. The last graph of this section emphasizes the time that the unit of those surveyed spent training combatives.




Figure 12. Level of Last Assignment

Source: CGSC survey by author.




Figure 13. Level of Command Emphasis for MACP Training in Your Last Unit

Source: CGSC survey by author.




Figure 14. In Your Last Unit, How Much Training Did Your Unit Do in MACP Per Month
 Source: CGSC survey by author.

The last category contains only one graph. This graph reinforces the reoccurring themes that have come to light through the previously mentioned surveys and interviews. This graph is based on the student's opinions of the challenges units face when instituting a combatives program. This graph is perhaps the most significant when it comes to portraying the status of MACP in today's Army.




Figure 15. In Your Personal Opinion, What is the *MOST SIGNIFICANT* Challenge in Training on MACP?

Source: CGSC survey by author.

In addition to the above graphs, the general comments of those surveyed also helps to establish the link between multiple choice questions and the surveyed student’s qualitative opinions of MACP. One student responded by stating that every Soldier has potential for coming into contact with the enemy and that a combatives Level 1 and Level 2 skill was necessary to give them an advantage over the enemy. Two respondents stated that while they thought combatives was great for teaching the warrior spirit to young Soldiers, they believed it had a limited usefulness in combat. One officer, who came from the special operations force (SOF) community, responded that SOF has developed their own program that is a 50/50 mix of striking and grappling. More than one officer responded that command emphasis on the program was lacking and that the skill was of equal value to weapons qualification or basic battle drills. Other officers reported high

injury rates coming out of the school at Fort Benning, and a disappointment in the lack of weapons training, specifically your rifle as a weapon.

In a series of surveys conduct with nine company commanders from two separate combat arms battalions at Fort Lewis, Washington a single snapshot can be analyzed about the status of training across the force. A positive theme from the surveys was that MACP helps instill confidence and the warrior ethos in Soldiers. Commanders all recognize that today's Soldiers come from a diverse background ranging from high school athletes to couch potatoes. Combatives is a way for Soldiers to build up their own self-esteem and become more warrior oriented.

Commanders acknowledged a lack of trained personnel and the lack of time dedicated to training. On average, commanders' reported having only six to nine instructor-qualified personnel in their company, this is only an average and maybe higher or lower in other units. These limitation contributed company commanders difficult to grow or maintain a comprehensive and effective combatives training program. These two limitations could be explained as being self supporting; the lack of instructors could contribute to most companies only dedicate one physical training session a week to combatives training. Commanders gave various reasons to this lack of training emphasis on combatives. Some themes for not conducting combatives were a different focus on cardio and strength training, while reoccurring themes were concern for injuries. Still for other commanders the reason was that it is just not a higher command emphasis.

Commanders replied to the survey that their understanding of MACP was that it is the only acceptable form of combatives training allowed by the Army. This seems contrary to the new principles that Matt Larson reported coming in the new FM. The

strength of any combatives system or martial art is its ability to grow and adapt. Students (Soldiers) should be able to take what is useful to them, reject what is not, and seek out new knowledge to fill that void.

Commander's discussed other themes when asked about any perceived weakness in MACP. The first is the lack of training in full gear. These commanders point out that Soldier's will always be encumbered by full kit in combat. They believe that many MACP techniques will not work when Soldiers are wearing body armor. Further, commander's point out the lack of striking techniques, weapons training, and are uncomfortable training Soldiers to default to fighting on the ground or "on their backs."

Commander's also exhibit a trend of themselves not understanding combatives. Many believe that Soldiers can gain a basic proficiency without the necessity of training them to level one competency. They do not understand that this is really one and the same. Others express a concern over the lack of information of how to incorporate combatives into regular training programs. In the United States Army, our great NCOs are primarily trainers and officers serve as planners, and working together, they are responsible for synchronizing training at all levels. To date, combatives training has been stressed more in the NCO ranks, which creates a disconnect between the trainers and the planners.

In-depth interviews were conducted with Soldiers, NCOs, and Officers from 2-3 IN, 3-2 SBCT, Fort Lewis, Washington on October 9, 2008. These interviews took place from 9am until 12pm, and consisted of four groups selected out of the population of the Battalions soldiers. The first group was new privates that had graduated from basic training within the last three months. The privates were asked what their experience in

basic training was with regards to combatives, what they had learned since arriving in the Battalion, and what their expectations had been about combatives before joining the Army. The privates represented a variety of basic training posts including Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, Fort Jackson, Mississippi, and Fort Knox, Kentucky. The Soldiers from both Fort Jackson and Fort Leonard Wood reported having only conducted combatives training for three days during their entire basic training. The soldiers from Fort Knox reported only about three hours of training, while only the Soldiers from Fort Benning reported having conducted the entire one week, 40 hour, level 1 program. Of the Soldier's at Fort Benning, only a few had actually received a level 1 certification. Since arriving at 2-3 IN, the Soldiers stated that while they thought they learned a lot in basic training, they have learned even more from their units. The privates said that for the most part their training consist of some review, some advancement in learning and then sparring. Depending on the combat arms Soldiers reported conducting training once a week, while the non-combat arms soldiers said their training was limited to about once every month or every other month. When asked if they had incorporated in striking or training with combat gear, two said they had trained in a stripped (no gear attached) body armor vest, and a couple said they had added punches only. All the Soldiers said they liked the program and it had made them feel more confident. When asked about their expectations they replied that they thought, before enlisting, that they would learn more lethal techniques, and that their training would look more like a UFC fight. They also expected to learn a few more defensive techniques, especially against strikes. The next group interviewed was new officers.

The focus of the group was Lieutenants who had recently completed the officer basic course. The questions centered on their experience in basic training and how they have incorporated combatives into their platoon training. All Lieutenants interviewed were combat arms who attended the officer basic course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Only three officers were interviewed. First they were asked how often they conducted hand-to-hand training during their course. The answers varied from once a week for four weeks, to once a week for the entire course. Two of the officers present were Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates. They reported that Soldiers get the same training in basic training, then they repeat the same training in OCS, then they repeat the same training for a third time in the officer basic course. Essentially the officers were reporting that a training opportunity was lost, because they never advanced past the basic level 1 techniques. One officer was a WestPoint graduate and he said that MACP is now a mandatory one quarter class at the military academy. When asked about how they have incorporated the training in their platoons, one officer said that his platoon was now almost completely level 1 qualified, but that it is difficult to maintain due to lack of instructors at the platoon level. One officer stated that they only conduct combatives training once a month because his company commander does not like the program and thinks that more can be accomplished during physical training hours. He also stated that he was concerned about injuries. The third officer reported that the conduct training once every other week. All of the officers said that MACP helped create aggressive soldiers. They all stated they had not incorporated combat gear because of fear of injury and that they were told by their NCO trainers that MACP could only be conducted at about 50% intensity in order to avoid injury.

The third group of individuals interviewed was select NCO trainers from the Battalion. The interview consisted of four NCOs, three of which were level 3 and one whom was level 4. The questions asked them were their opinion of MACP, and any recommendations for changes to the program. The NCOs interviewed were very positive about the program. They said that the program was a great improvement over the old FM 21-150 system. They said the program provided all soldiers with a great level of confidence. The goal for the Battalion prior to its next deployment is to have every soldier trained to Level 1. When asked about the effectiveness and efficiency of this training, they responded that Soldiers will always be in at least a team size element, never alone, and that the goal of level 1 training was to teach the soldiers to hold off an attacker until their buddy arrives with a gun. They said that level 1 was easy to learn, but that they made sure to caution their soldiers against using it alone in a bar fight scenario. As the final drill in Level 1, Soldiers must achieve the clinch while being punched. This teaches soldiers confidence that they can take a blow and still fight. They said that they had started incorporating pads and striking for those select Soldiers ready to advance. When asked about training in combat gear, it was reported that the risk is not to the defending soldier, but to the attacking soldier, and that MACP techniques were designed to be executed by a Soldier in combat gear. When asked about weapons training, they stated that weapons techniques are not added until Level 3 and that in combat it took too much time to pull a knife and that Soldiers were better served by training the basics. The NCOs said they had added two attackers to one defender drill. The last question asked was what they would like to see change about the system. They all said command emphasis was important. They said that there should be MACP kits for every company

which included Blauer Suits (Blauer suits were developed by Tony Blauer, they are impact resistant suits which would allow soldiers to train at a higher level of intensity, and still be relatively safe), rubber weapons, and hand held tasers. They also wanted to see Level 3 and Level 4 certification not be controlled by Fort Benning, because with the limited time available it was very difficult to get NCOs to the course for the 160 hour program.

The last group on interviewees was a group of six platoon sergeants. Of this group one was Level 2, one was Level 3, and one was Level 4. This group represents some of the most experience NCOs in the Battalion. The focus the questions for this group was their opinion of MACP, and what they thought could be changed. All of the NCOs interviewed were combat arms Soldiers. They started off by saying that the program was 100% better than the old style of combatives that they were taught when they first enlisted. The biggest improvement was actually a structured program. They agreed that it was a great confidence builder, and that every soldier should be trained to Level 2. Much like the trainers they stated that you never know how a soldier will react until they have been punched in the face, and MACP was a great tool for getting Soldiers over the fear of being hit. They believed that combat arms soldiers should be prioritized and that combat arms soldiers should be trained to Level 4. They viewed combatives training as a combat multiplier on the battlefield. One of the NCOs present had just completed an assignment as a drill sergeant and reported that all drill sergeants were required to be Level 2 qualified. When asked about the applicability of MACP for female soldiers, they said that while a female Soldier may not be able to overcome an attacker, she would be able to defend herself long enough until her buddy shows up with

a gun. When asked about the concern voiced by the privates about a lack of lethal techniques, they responded that chokes can be just as lethal as they are non-lethal and that the standard was to detain an attacker, not kill them. A detained attacker could be more valuable as an intelligence source. The interview concluded with their recommendations. They started off by saying that the greatest change for MACP would be when the older generation of non-trained NCOs and Officers had retired and the generation now growing up with MACP would be in charge. They all agreed that the minimum time that should be spent training was two hours a week. They agreed there should be more training with combat gear, and that it was the responsibility of the leader to manage the risk.

All of these comparisons whether to an established combatives style, or through surveys and interviews lead to a number of conclusions. The following chapter will contain conclusions and recommendations for MACP. Finally, chapter five will conclude with research outside the scope of this thesis that can be done.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that while the principles behind the U.S. Army's combatives program are sound, the program as designed may or may not be the proper combative style for today's average Soldier. This chapter will be organized by first improving upon the picture of what a combatives style could be and demonstrating the need for a certain combatives style. Second, this chapter will outline the conclusion developed from the research conducted. Following those conclusions, this chapter outlines the recommended changes or modifications to the Army's combatives program, and finally wraps up with the recommended focus of future research and offers my conclusion.

Like so many other skills that Soldiers are taught, from weapons marksmanship programs, to emphasis on radio procedures, to repetitive and stressful conduct of battle drills, to staff procedures, hand-to-hand combatives is in itself a very perishable skill. Hours of training to develop muscle memory and training a Soldier to think tactically in his reacting to man-to-man combat situations can be degraded through neglecting the training of these skills. Today's Soldiers are under a huge amount of pressure to prepare for war, balance time with their families and prepare themselves physically and mentally for combat. As trainers, and those responsible for the training and welfare of Soldiers, it becomes incumbent upon leaders to insure that our Soldiers are able to find this balance. The same time it takes to maintain a Soldier's proficiency at reflexive fire, is all it takes to maintain a Soldier's close combat skills.

Besides the fact that the Sergeant Major of the Army found combatives important enough to make it a core warrior skill, Soldiers and trainers alike recognize that it is a necessary skill. The military is unlike any other business in the world, and no one can come from civilian life and step directly into the life of a Soldier. The mentality of the Soldier must be trained. Much like the transition from circular marksmanship targets to man shaped targets, the combat mentality must be ingrained into the warrior. When presented with a threat, whether an infantryman in the street, a military police Soldier at a check point, or a logistics Soldier conducting a combat logistics patrol, all of them must have the training to engage an enemy with their hands and win. This conclusion brings this discussion full circle to what then is the right combatives system.

Conclusions

MACP is a ground based fighting system. As previously discussed in chapter four, a preponderance of the techniques taught are on the ground. Therefore, to answer the question of whether the program is the right systems for today's soldiers, the issue of a ground based system must be addressed first. Every expert studied, interviewed or surveyed for this thesis agrees that in combat the last place you want to be is on the ground struggling with an assailant. Beginning with COL Rex Applegate, arguably one of the fathers - if not the father of Modern Army combatives - states as one of his fundamentals to avoid, if at all possible, going to the ground. (Applegate 1976, p.11) Kelly McCann, a recognized expert in hand-to-hand combatives, stated in an email conversation that ground fighting is great for developing fitness, unit cohesion, strength, and mental acuity, but it is questionable in its application on the battlefield. Ron Shillingford in his book *The Elite Forces Handbook of Unarmed Combat* states that one

of the principles of unarmed combat is never going to the ground with an opponent. (Shillingford 2000, p 18) Marine Corps close combat does not teach its first two ground techniques until gray belt. Their first level, tan belt, has no ground fighting involved. As part of this thesis, five martial arts experts were interviewed, and all agreed that for a Soldier, in combat operations, the ground was the last place that they would go. In defense of ground fighting, all the experts interviewed acknowledged that it was important for Soldiers to train and have knowledge of ground fighting techniques. The important nugget of that knowledge is how to disengage and regain your feet as fast as possible.

MACP focused the fighter in on a single opponent; this is an inherent flaw in any ground fighting system. The fighter is committed to that opponent by the tactical principles of MACP, which are to close the distance, establish dominance and finish the fight. As the program is designed today, a Soldier's comfort zone will be taking a potential attacker to the ground. This will be his default action, because he will react as he has been trained. Through current MACP training and conditioning, the ground is where the Soldier feels most comfortable. The problem that exists here is with the amount and bulk of combat equipment a Soldier will be wearing. Training Soldiers in the heavy, sometimes cumbersome equipment they will wear in combat is essential to success.

While it may be an accurate statement that a majority of fights end up going to the ground, it is also a correct statement to say that a majority of fights, if not all, start with being on your feet. With the extremely limited training time available to Soldiers, MACP must incorporate more striking in order to give Soldiers more of an advantage in fighting.

Striking could be limited to low kicks or quick jabs. Striking can be as much a technique to off balance an attacker, so that he could be taken down to the ground, as it can be a technique to debilitate or quickly kill the opponent.

Much of the issues with MACP are time oriented, and admittedly these issues are not inherent to MACP, but could affect any style of hand-to-hand training. The time issue can be defined in time allocated to training, which is always problematic.

Currently, it takes 40 training hours to get a Soldier qualified to Level 1, 80 hours to Level 2, 160 hours to Level 3, and 160 hours to Level 4. When all said and done, to become fully proficient in MACP means that a Soldier spends 11 weeks (at 8 hours to a training day) to learn this skill. That is in and of itself is a huge commitment of time. This time represents just training Soldiers. The requirement to train instructors is the same, so in order for a company to have a Level 2 instructor they would lose an NCO for three weeks, or two months for a Level 3. Now compound that by a minimum of one NCO per platoon or even one NCO per squad, and you have a huge commitment of time and personnel. While there is an honest difference between the amount of time that it takes a Soldier to gain basic proficiency and the amount of time that has to be dedicated to maintain that proficiency, it is still a question of allotting adequate time for both, and what that time quotient is for the given style.

Likewise Soldiers trained to only Level 1 proficiency may become over confident on their ability. Level 1 is strictly and exclusively ground based. The world has hundreds of distinct fighting styles. Hand-to-hand training is not exclusive to the U.S. military. Even a street brawler has some level of proficiency. Students surveyed had

reservations about Level 1 trained Soldiers being able to deal with an opponent with fighting skills.

It is not necessary to scrap MACP and start over. MACP has many good qualities. A different approach maybe to take the 40 hour Level 1 training and change it in order to give Soldiers a better rounded base. By incorporating a mix of ground skills, basic striking, and weapons it will not only make a Soldier more well rounded but more lethal. For example, the front kick is a very basic, powerful kick. It can be delivered to an attacker's midsection, groin, or knee. By adding this technique to Level 1 training it allows Soldiers to learn a single technique that can be used against multiple targets with a variety of effects. Also the basic jab and reverse punch should be trained at Level 1. While everyone has watched boxing matches and dreamed of being Mike Tyson, it is a guarantee that until you hit a focus mitt or heavy bag you do not know how bad your punches are. In addition, adding basic knife defenses against the four basic attacks (straight thrust, overhead strike, outside slash, and inside slash) and basic attack techniques, for example the 12 angles of attack, a combatives program would provide Soldiers with more diverse techniques at the basic level. Envision a company dedicating one week to Level 1 training. The training would begin with basic ground training for safety and then as the week progresses it would move to standing, culminating with the last day incorporating the clench drill with full combat equipment. The company would have reached a basic level of proficiency together and then could maintain training with fifteen minutes of combatives training twice a week after morning physical training.

The interviews conducted with Soldiers at Fort Lewis, Washington bring up another flaw in the system; how MACP is being taught at basic training and the basic

officer course. In theory every Soldier and officer who completes basic training or the officer basic course would be Level 1 certified. This would change how combatives is spread across the Army. Instead of a viral system (one soldier trains two soldiers, they train four soldiers, etc.), combatives would become ingrained in the Army culture. But in reality this is not happening. Across the basic training forts there is a difference in the amount of time being allocated for combatives training, and although as part of this thesis basic officer training outside of Fort Benning, Georgia was not looked at, it would be easy to deduce that the same disparity in training also exist at the officer rank. The Army has no system for tracking, or reporting a Soldiers MACP training status. For many other programs in the military there are formal systems for reviewing and recommending changes, but none exist for combatives. Like any other basic warrior task, combatives must be tracked and reported.

MACP grew out of a style of martial arts that .was essentially a combat sport. As the popularity of UFC grows, as well as the popularity in the Army of the All-Army Combatives Tournament, which is now on its fourth annual event, MACP is in danger of becoming nothing more than a combatives sport itself. While a great recruiting tool, MACP will lose its focus as a form of close combat for soldiers on the battlefield. Combat by its very nature is lethal; Soldiers must be prepared to deliver a killing blow to their opponent. The more MACP becomes sports oriented, the more it will become ineffective on the battlefield.

A bigger concern is the effectiveness of MACP for female Soldiers. Today's battlefield has no frontline. Female Soldiers find themselves on the streets with the same regularity of their male counterparts. Many of the MACP techniques rely on skill more

than strength and speed, but the hard, honest fact is that MACP techniques can be overcome by sheer physical strength. Adding striking techniques is one possible answer for evening the playing field for women. A shot to the groin, neck, or temple is just as effective if you are 100 pounds or 200 pounds. What Army combatives cannot become is a male dominated activity. If the system is as not as effective for female Soldiers as it is for male Soldiers then it is not an effective system. If a female Soldier can be overcome by an untrained attacker due to physical size executing MACP's default technique of closing the distance and achieving the clinch, then it is not an effective system. More than their male counterparts, female Soldiers must be able to finish an attacker quickly without becoming decisively engaged in order to prevent a male attacker overcoming her in a prolonged wrestling match. An Aikido instructor once demonstrated an upper cut to the chin in order to break an opponent's choking technique; he then applied a throw to finish off the attacker. When the attacker protested that Aikido has no offensive technique and that it was not a true Aikido technique to punch, the teacher responded that he was simply unbalancing the attacker and then applying the Aikido throw. Adding striking techniques can provide a smaller Soldier an advantage over a larger opponent.

As previously acknowledged in chapter four, MACP training adds a lot to a Soldier's confidence and warrior ethos. Almost every survey returned by a US Military person, highlighted the fact that Soldiers show an increased level of self-confidence after attending combatives training. This increased warrior ethos can be achieved through any effective hand-to-hand program and is not inherent in MACP. What gives the soldiers confidence is being trained to fight, not the specific techniques taught by MACP.

Recommendations

The first recommended change to MACP is better training for leaders. The Army provides leaders with field manuals on how to do everything, from running a company training meeting to engaging the enemy with indirect fire. Field grade officers at the Battalion level allocate resource and time for companies, platoons, and squads to prepare for combat. If these field grades do not have a basic understanding and appreciation of combatives, and more importantly how to plan and manage an effective combatives program, the program will not be resourced and synchronized properly to make it beneficial to Soldiers. Company commanders need to be educated on how to effectively integrate a combatives training plan into their reset and training during the ARFORGEN process. The Marine Corps ties close combat qualification to promotion. It also ties belt level to rank. Giving soldiers promotion points for their combatives training level, as well as adding a requirement for senior NCOs and officers to be trained to a certain level will help grow the Army's program.

The Army has several resources already available to it to help improve the combatives program. These include the Army's competitive Tae Kwon Do, Judo, Karate and boxing teams. Also the World Class Athlete program can help develop training plans to better balance the Army's need to maintain cardio fitness, physical strength, flexibility, and hand-to-hand skills.

MACP must adopt a weapons training program. This should include knife fighting, defense against an opponent armed with a hand-held weapon, and old school pugil and bayonet training. An unloaded (or jammed) rifle is really just a glorified club. It could be used to strike an opponent, block an attack or even subdue or takedown an

attacker. As has been previously stated, every Soldier on today's battlefield carries a knife. A knife in an untrained hand can become a danger to himself or a potential weapon for an enemy.

The addition of striking techniques, with either hands and feet or knees and elbows, is a must. As already demonstrated, striking can be used to disable or kill an opponent, unbalance or distract them, or engage further out before they are in grappling range. Strikes are easy to learn and Soldiers only need to be proficient on one or two per body part. A person never knows how bad their punching technique is until the first time they hit a heavy bag. Striking must be trained, the body conditioned in order to make it effective. Soldiers cannot wait until they are Level 3 or 4 to incorporate striking into their personal arsenal. The majority of Soldiers in service never attain these MACP rankings. This also includes more lethal techniques. MACP teaches arm bars, chokes, and submissions. It should also teach head stomps, eye gouges, and throat strikes. In a combat situation, against an attacker determined to kill, Soldiers must rapidly react with lethality and certainty.

This need to add striking techniques demonstrates another flaw in the MACP system. Currently the system is very rigidly structured. It does not allow for the addition of other techniques outside the approved plan of instruction. Matt Larson is adding the additional principle of combat feedback, but must make changes in the institution which allows for the system to learn and evolve. The argument could be made that this increases the risk factor of combatives, by adding an unknown element that a potential instructor is not versed in, but this risk can be mitigated by either the Soldiers continuing education in fighting techniques outside MACP, or by the instructors continuing

education. The Marine Corps requires Marines to have a black belt in an approved civilian martial art in order to obtain a black belt in MCMAP.

MACP must also accept risk and start training in combat equipment. The goal of all Army training is to simulate like-combat conditions, so when you are in combat it is just like training; or also stated “train as you fight”. This training can be conducted in a safe manner, but it must be implemented. A Soldier must understand the limitation of his gear when he tries to either grapple or strike an attacker. The wrong time to learn the limits of your flexibility is when you are actually going for an arm bar in combat and cannot because your equipment gets in the way.

This leads to the last recommendation for improvement to MACP, which is situational training. This training must include multiple attackers, extreme fatigue, harsh situations, and limited space (inside a room). One of the techniques by which MACP can incorporate this is by focusing on teaching Soldiers responses to individual situations. That could be defense against a knife or hand gun, or a defense against a choke or grab. Any which way, a Soldiers training must reflect more of what they will encounter on the battlefield.

Overall the best way any of these changes can be made is through command emphasis. This emphasis must start at the highest level. It is well documented within the Army that nothing gets attention like something that your superior is interested in. One can draw emphasis from the USMC on this issue. Without clear cut guidelines, much like the requirement to take a physical fitness test twice a year and attain a minimum score of 60 percent on each event, or the requirement to qualify with your assigned weapon with a minimum score of marksman, training in combatives must have a clearly

quantifiable requirement and standards that must be achieved and maintained. Soldiers are required to maintain their physical fitness in order to meet Army standards; therefore, they could also be required to maintain a certain degree of combative skills so they can demonstrate a basic proficiency twice a year. It is this command emphasis that will motivate units, regardless of MOS, to provide their Soldiers with the appropriate training for combat. This standard must be for all Soldiers, regardless of rank, branch or gender.

Areas of Further Study

This thesis only addresses the need for change to the MACP. While recommendations for changes have been made, the actual techniques adopted must be studied further. The easiest way to accomplish this is how Imi Lichtenfeld, the father of Krav Maga did. By studying the encounters of Soldiers on today's battlefields, recommendation for changes in techniques and the adoption of techniques can be made. There is no technique that is 100 percent successful. It is learning to adapt to a situation that gives a Soldier their greatest chance for survival in these harrowing situations.

Summary

The history of war teaches us that while war changes it also stays the same. On the earliest battlefields Soldiers engaged each others with swords and pole arms. They were already within the hand-to-hand range. During World War II, as American troop swept across the Pacific islands they were forced to engage the Japanese at close combat ranges. In the tunnels of Vietnam, tunnel rats often got within grappling range to kill their enemy. Even today on the streets of Baghdad, Soldiers are in close proximity to the people and an enemy that does not wear a uniform, who knows they cannot defeat us

militarily, but will still try to kill a Soldier if given the opportunity. Combatives will always have a place in war, and while the Army may be a diverse community of Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service and Support Soldiers, all of them need, regardless of their sex, age, and MOS, the basic skills to fight and kill the enemy with their hands and feet if necessary. MACP has already advanced the Army's combatives program, establishing levels of proficiency and assigning techniques to those levels. MACP established an instructor training program that the older system of combatives lacked. MACP has institute a competitive side to combatives training which allows Soldiers to test their skills, learn, and become more confident. The contributions of MACP cannot be ignored, but now MACP must take the next step and make the Army's combatives program better. There may be another way to step afterward, but the Army is about constantly learning and prides itself on adaptation. We change our tactics in combat; we change our doctrine with the advent of new technologies. Let us not be guilty of having a combatives program that is too rigid and too closed to change that fails to serve well the magnificent Soldiers that keep our great Nation free.

APPENDIX A

SURVEYS

Informed Consent form used for all surveys and interviews

My name is MAJ James F. Blanton. I am a student at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Section 5B. I am writing my Masters for Military Arts and Science on the Application of the Modern Army Combatives Program.

I am interested in conducting an email survey with any Faculty and/or Students from any branch of service that has trained in any of the combatives programs offered by a military service.

My survey has been approved by the CGSC Survey and Research Control Center. My authorization number is 08-028. Participation in this survey is voluntary and you may choose to discontinue the survey process at any time.

Any information you provide will be used in order to write my thesis, and all questions and opinions I use are for my personal research only and do not represent the Command and General Staff College. Your answers and surveys may become part of the CGSC reference library.

Please indicate your consent. YES NO Sign_____

If you agree to participate in this survey please answer the questions below.

Thank you for your time and assistance.

MAJ James F. Blanton, Section 5B
James.blanton1@us.army.mil

Questions for military schools:

Round 1: What principles make a good fighting system for US Army Soldiers or Marines on the modern battlefield?

Round 2: (These questions will be a menu from which I can pick and choose to get more information from my subject. Round 2 questions can also evolve from their initial response to me.)

1. What is the history of your style in its present form?
2. In your opinion, what makes a good combatives style for the modern Soldier?
3. What would be classified as the inherent strengths and weakness of your style?
4. How adaptable is your style to change, improvement or modification?
5. How does your style address situations like multiple attackers, armed attackers, combat equipment (an encumbered defender), and effect of extreme stress and fatigue on the defender?
6. How much time do your students have to dedicate to learning, mastering, and maintaining the required proficiency on the skills you think are necessary for survival on the modern battlefield?
7. What is your definition of proficiency in the combatives skills program that you instruct?
8. What investment in personnel and time is necessary for developing fully qualified instructors? Who certifies them and under what authority? How accessible are certified trainer programs?

Questions for unit leaders/trainers:

Round 1: How have you incorporated combatives training into your preparation for deployment for combat operations?

Round 2: (These questions will be a menu from which I can pick and choose to get more information from my subject. Round 2 questions can also evolve from their initial response to me.)

1. What guidance have you received for the training of Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP)? From Brigade, Battalion, or Company level.

2. What guidance have you given subordinates for the training of MACP?
3. What value to you see in training MACP as you reset for deployment, and how much emphasis (importance) do you place in training MACP?
4. Have you personally trained in MACP? If so how much, and where?
5. How many qualified trainers do you have for your unit? Brigade, Battalion, or Company level.
6. Is there a Level IV trainer available to your unit?
7. Do you intend to send more Soldiers to become instructor qualified to the MACP School at Ft Benning, GA, or have a Mobile Training Team (MTT) come to your unit?
8. What do you consider the strengths of MACP
9. What do you consider the weaknesses of MACP?
10. Does the concern over injuries during combatives training contribute to your decisions to conduct MACP training?
11. How have you adapted MACP during training to suit your Soldiers needs (equipment, armed combatants, and multiple attackers)?
12. Have you incorporated any other style or method of combatives other than MACP into your unit combatives training program?
13. How many people in your population have been trained in Level 1, Level 2 or higher MACP?
14. How does the Modern Army Combatives Program contribute to the Warrior Ethos or Warrior Spirit in your unit?

Questions for MACP/ Marine Corps/Air Force students and faculty here at CGSC:

Round 1: Describe your experience in training on hand-to-hand combatives?

Round 2: (These questions will be a menu from which I can pick and choose to get more information from my subject. Round 2 questions can also evolve from their initial response to me.)

1. What level of Combatives did you train to?
2. What, if any, difficulties did you encounter during your training?
3. What were some of the strengths of your service's combatives system?
4. How effective do you feel your service's combatives system will be in a combat situation?

Multiple choice questions for CGSC students:

Rank: _____

Branch: _____

Gender: Male/Female

(Thank you for your) Years of service: _____

Level of last assignment (i.e. PLT, CO, BN, BDE, DIV, etc): _____

1. How much personal experience do you have with the Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP)?
 - i. No training in MACP
 - ii. Limited only to schools attended (i.e. Basic Training, AIT, Officer basic course, Officer career course)
 - iii. Level 1 qualified
 - iv. Level 2 qualified
 - v. Higher than level 2
2. Based on your personal knowledge, what do you know about MACP?
 - i. What's MACP?
 - ii. I know a little bit – heard about the program, but not much more than that.
 - iii. Fairly sound knowledge
 - iv. Very knowledgeable

3. Do you feel that there is a definitive requirement for every Soldier, regardless of rank, branch or gender, to train in a hand-to-hand combatives training program, such as MACP?
 - i. Not important at all
 - ii. Limited importance
 - iii. Important
 - iv. Very important
 - v. Critical importance (should be a Mission Essential Task)

4. How effective do you think MACP is in providing good hand-to-hand skills for utilization in combat operations?
 - i. Not effective
 - ii. Limited effectiveness
 - iii. Effective
 - iv. Very effective
 - v. Don't know

5. How useful is MACP in building confidence and esprit de corps in a unit or individual Soldiers?
 - i. Not useful
 - ii. Limited use
 - iii. Useful
 - iv. Very useful
 - v. Don't know

6. Level of command emphasis for MACP training in your last unit was:
 - i. Very specific
 - ii. General
 - iii. None

7. In your last unit, how much training did your unit do in MACP per month?
 - i. Once a week
 - ii. Twice a week
 - iii. Daily
 - iv. Once a month
 - v. Never

8. In your personal opinion, what is the **MOST SIGNIFICANT** challenge in training on MACP?
 - i. Time
 - ii. Resources
 - iii. Qualified instructors
 - iv. Not a command priority

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. It is the intent that through this research that the MACP is further improved upon for the benefit of the US Army and its great Soldiers.

Any Additional Comments you may have:

Questions for Civilian Martial Arts Schools:

Name:

Style:

Years training:

Military experience (if so, how long, with whom):

Other styles trained that may influence you:

My Thesis: Does the current Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP) as designed prepare Soldiers for hand-to-hand combat on today's battlefield?

- 1. In your opinion what principles make up a good hand-to-hand combatives system for Soldiers?** For example, modern army combatives is based on the principle of standards, systematic training, continuous training, competition, drills, situational training, and combat feedback. Marine Corps martial arts use the principles of achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, speed, adapting and exploiting success. Other principles may include ideas like gross body movements, repetition, simple to learn, and techniques that can be applied universally (regardless of your attackers action).
- 2. What would you say are some of the inherent strengths and weakness of your style?**
- 3. How adaptable is your style to change, improvement or modification?**

- 4. Does your style address situations like multiple attackers, armed attackers, combat equipment (an encumbered defender), and the effect of extreme stress and fatigue on the defender? If so how do you train for these situations?**

- 5. How much time would be required (in months training, days per week training, and hours per day training) for someone (a Soldier) to gain a basic proficiency in your style?** For example, Soldiers are often limited by the amount of training time available and their time must be balanced with a multitude of competing requirements. Yet before Soldiers deploy into combat they would want to have a basic proficiency in hand-to-hand combatives that would give them the advantage over the average attacker.
 - a. What skills do you consider basic proficiency? Or how do you define the idea of a basic proficiency?**

APPENDIX B

APPROVAL MEMORANDUMS

ATZL-SWA-QA

28 APR 08

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAJ James Blanton

SUBJECT: Request for Research: Modern Army Combatives.

1. Your request to administer a questionnaire to individuals at the US Army Combative School and to members of the US Marine Corps Martial Arts Center is:

Approved

Approved with Conditions (see below)

Denied (see below)

2. You are required to submit an *End of Project Data Collection Report* to the CGSC Quality Assurance Office when data collection for your project is complete. This report can be found at:

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/QAO/download/End_Of_Data_Collection_Report.doc.

3. Should you have questions concerning the above, please contact Mr. Rick Steele in the CGSC Quality Assurance Office, room 3524 Lewis & Clark, (913) 684-7331, DSN 552-7331.

Notes:

- This approves you to administer the questionnaire only to individuals who volunteer to participate in your research.
- You must make it clear in your questionnaire that you are conducting research to fulfill your MMAS requirements and that your research is not being conducted by the US Army Command and General Staff College nor the US Army.

Ricky Steele
CGSC QAO
Survey & Research Control

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