

FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISOR PROFICIENCY: THE NEED
FOR SCREENING, SELECTION AND QUALIFICATION

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ABSTRACT

FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISOR PROCIENCY: THE NEED FOR SCREENING AND SELECTION, by MAJ Richard H. Hetherington, 105 pages.

Will centralized screening and selection improve foreign military advisor performance on the battlefield? The Army's 2009 doctrine on security force assistance indicates selection is necessary to find suitable Soldiers for the mission. The factors affecting advisor team performance include the complex mission and environment, team leadership, team development training, and Soldier attributes. Recent advisors indicate the lack of appropriate leadership skills and personal attributes of advisor team members are the primary factors affecting cohesion on teams. Special Forces (SF) assumed principal responsibility for the foreign internal defense mission post-Vietnam, but the global war on terrorism and competing SF mission requirements created demands once again for advisor conventional force manning. SF recruiting units screen all candidates to ensure they meet a high benchmark for foreign military advising; however, the Army as a whole has not employed this same procedure for conventional force Soldiers. A more deliberate and rigorous screening and selection process for conventional force military advisors will improve advisor team leadership, cohesion and combat performance. The Army should maintain the current advisory team construct, but the SF model for centrally screening, selecting and qualifying foreign military advisors should be incorporated, with modifications. Human Resources Command (HRC) should retain current responsibility for manning teams, but with specific changes to the selection, assignment process and policy.

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the service of their Nation. Without them, victory in the global war on terrorism would not be possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
ACRONYMS.....	ix
ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
TABLES	xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Statement.....	1
Researchers Qualifications	2
Background.....	3
Primary Research Question	7
Secondary Research Questions.....	7
Significance	7
Assumptions.....	8
Limitations	8
Delimitations.....	8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	10
Cohesion	11
Future of the Military Advisor Mission.....	13
Mission Complexity and Environment.....	16
Team Leadership.....	21
Training.....	26
Soldier Attributes	27
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	38
Interviews.....	38
Surveys.....	41
Analysis	43

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS.....	45
Structure.....	45
Demographics of Participants.....	46
Cohesion.....	48
Future of the Military Advisor Mission.....	51
Team Leadership.....	53
Training.....	54
Soldier Attributes.....	60
Screening and Selection.....	61
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	67
Findings.....	67
Team Leadership.....	67
Attributes.....	69
Training.....	70
Future of the Advisor Mission.....	71
Recommendations.....	71
Recommendations for Future Research.....	72
Summary.....	72
GLOSSARY.....	74
APPENDIX A ADVISOR INTERVIEW.....	76
APPENDIX B MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM (MiTT) SURVEY.....	79
APPENDIX C SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS.....	86
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	89
Periodicals.....	89
Government Documents.....	89
Other Sources.....	91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	93

ACRONYMS

AAB	Advisory and Assist Brigade
AC	Active Component
AKO	Army Knowledge Online
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ARI	Army Research Institute
BCKS	Battle Command Knowledge System
BDE	Brigade
BTT	Border Transition Team
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAT	Collection and Analysis Team
CF	Coalition Forces
CGSS	Command and General Staff School
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DA	Department of the Army
ETT	Embedded Transition Team
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	U.S. Army Field Manual
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSF	Foreign Security Forces
HRC	Human Resources Command
IAG	Iraqi Assistance Group
ID	Infantry Division
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces

JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
KIA	Killed In Action
KMAG	Korea Military Advisory Group
LNO	Liaison Officer
MiTT	Military Transition Team
MMPI	Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NPTT	National Police Transition Team
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PRD	Personnel Review Document
PSRC	Positional Special Reporting Code
PTT	Police Transition Team
QAO	Quality Assurance Office
REFRAD	Return For Active Duty
SFAS	Special Forces Acquisition and Selection (course)
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TC	U.S. Army Training Circular
TF	Task Force
TT	Transition Team
WIA	Wounded In Action

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. SFAS Overview	5
Figure 2. Stages of Culture Shock.....	20
Figure 3. Army Leadership Levels.....	24
Figure 4. Conflict Origins	49
Figure 5. Time Required for Cohesion Development	51
Figure 6. Training Phase Replacements	57
Figure 7. Disciplinary and Suitability Losses	58
Figure 8. Pre-Arrival Replacements	59
Figure 9. Selection Preference.....	61
Figure 10. Selection Type	62
Figure 11. Survey Opinions on Current Assignment Policy	64
Figure 12. Combined Interview and Survey Opinions on Future Army Policy	64
Figure 13. Screening Certification Memorandum Example	87

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Military Transition Team (MiTT) Composition	23
Table 2. General Demographic Information (Survey)	47
Table 3. Rank (Survey)	47
Table 4. Career Field (Survey).....	47
Table 5. Advisor Team Type (Survey)	47
Table 6. Duty Status (Survey).....	47
Table 7. General Demographic Information (Interview)	48
Table 8. Rank (Interview)	48
Table 9. Career Field (Interview).....	48
Table 10. Team Cohesion	49
Table 11. Sources of Conflict	50
Table 12. Team Development and Cohesiveness Responses	51
Table 13. Observed Application of Leadership Styles	54
Table 14. Sufficient Time for Development During Training?	55
Table 15. PRD Raw Data.....	57
Table 16. Desirable Foreign Military Advisor Attributes (Interviews)	60
Table 17. Desirable Foreign Military Advisor Attributes (Surveys)	60
Table 18. Selection Criteria	63

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions; even those considered to be the best and most experienced have failed at being an advisor. Former advisors acknowledge this; studies reinforce it. Although certain individuals seem to instinctively possess the requisite skill set, others must undergo extensive interpersonal training. Without formalized selection, assessment, education, and training process, those selected for advisor duty must self-educate while seriously addressing the mindset change needed to successfully advise FSF.¹

Problem Statement

This research illustrates successful foreign military advisor endeavors on the battlefield depend on cohesive teams. Cohesion may be degraded by a series of factors which may include the complex advisor mission, environment, team leadership, training, and Soldier attributes. Recently published Army foreign security force assistance doctrine indicates not all Soldiers are suitable for advisor duty. Personnel selection is a fundamental requirement. Despite the importance of the mission, there is currently no specific screening and selection process in place for the conventional force Army advisor mission.

Increased advisor manning at all levels of command in Afghanistan and ongoing requirements in Iraq complicate the assignment selection process. Competing operational and tactical requirements preclude apportioning the Security Force Assistance or foreign military advisor mission back to Special Forces (SF). Additionally, the Army's conventional force Advisory and Assist Brigade (AAB) or Brigade Combat Team - Augmented (BCT-A) concept will not likely satisfy demand for personnel due to the distribution of advisor responsibilities throughout the conventional force. Well

established chains of command, personnel stability and traditions within conventional force units combine to form cohesive units, but these traits do little to enhance their abilities to act as advisor elements. Studies suggest foreign advising success rests more on an individual Soldier's innate personal and leadership abilities and not training or unit affiliation.

Researchers Qualifications

The researcher volunteered to serve on an advisor tour in Iraq while attending Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth. He graduated and reported for training at Fort Riley in April 2007 as a designated replacement commonly referred to as a "bench" assignment. He graduated from the advisor course and deployed to Iraq in June 2007 as an intelligence advisor. He went with his advisor team because their original intelligence Captain was injured and assessed non-deployable. The team served alongside an Iraqi infantry battalion in the tumultuous city of Baqubah, Diyala Province.

Approximately seventy days into his tour, the researcher was asked to assume command of a sister battalion's dysfunctional Military Transition Team (MiTT). He ascertained through sensing sessions and individual counselings that weak leadership and cohesion were prevalent on the team. The division MiTT chief administratively moved the original team chief and three Captains to other advisor teams. The DIV chief had previously observed leadership and cohesion problems on this same team during training at Fort Riley and attempted, but failed to have the battalion chief replaced. The researcher observed a similar lack of unit cohesion on other battalion, brigade and division level teams during the remaining months of his tour in Iraq. He also heard

similar stories from other advisors indicating administrative movements of personnel between teams. The researcher returned to CGSS at Fort Leavenworth where he serves as a Center for Army Tactics instructor. He also performs duties as an electives instructor for a course titled Field Grade Role on Military Transition Teams.

Background

Conventional Army units inherited the Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission as a result of competing and limited SF resources in Iraq and Afghanistan. “In May 2003, the Iraqi army and many other elements of the former state security forces were disbanded and Coalition forces had to begin rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from scratch.”² The Army progressed quickly and by mid 2006 they devised the eleven-man external conventional force foreign military advisor or Military Transition Team (MiTT) concept. Literary research indicates a struggle in transforming this SF mission. As a Naval Post Graduate School study highlighted in 2007, “The lack of planning and preparation was evident in the military’s ad hoc approach to the initial selection, training and organization of advisors.”³ Continuing research and various lessons learned indicate a gradual advancement of conventional force advisory efforts; however, the inherent problem of unit cohesion on advisor teams remains.

U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a complex and challenging mission. Special Forces (SF) assumed the primary responsibility for SFA or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) post WWII. The Army recognized early on that military advising requires special skills and personal attributes not commonly inherent in all Soldiers. SF screens, selects, rigorously trains, and qualifies all candidates likely for this reason. Teams are

highly professional, cohesive and effective because screened volunteers receive specialized training and qualification over an extensive period of time.

Not all SF applicants achieve the title of foreign advisor. Volunteer candidates must apply for the three week Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course. Officers and enlisted Soldiers have application criteria they must satisfy for acceptance into the SF program. Among these criteria, all candidates “must score a minimum of 229 points on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), with no less than 60 points on any event.”⁴ Enlisted Soldiers must have a “General Technical (GT) score of 100 or higher” to qualify.⁵ Officers must “have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score of 85 or higher (or a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) of a minimum of 1/1 reading and listening score).”⁶ If accepted into SFAS, medical professionals evaluate a Soldier’s psychological suitability using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (see figure 1). “This assessment or test was designed to help identify personal, social, and behavioral problems.”⁷ Psychologists “help to rule out candidates who may not be a good fit for further SF training.”⁸ This legacy of successful experience indicates SF branch’s long-established screening and selection criterion are not only acceptable, feasible and suitable, they are effective.




Figure 1. SFAS Overview

Source: Department of the Army, U.S. Army Recruiting Command Pamphlet 601-25, *In-Service Special Forces Recruiting Program (Officer and Enlisted)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-3.

Unlike Special Forces (SF), Human Resources Command (HRC) career managers have no specific written guidelines for choosing conventional force Soldiers for advisor duty. Data collection interviews conducted as part of this research project indicate career managers currently focus on a soldier's rank, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), security clearance status, time spent between deployments or "dwell time," and to a lesser extent on previous assignments.⁹ Decades of successful SF advisory efforts attest to the need to holistically screen and select advisor candidates employing a universal set of criteria, but HRC personnel managers only draw on a Position Special Reporting Code (PSRC) for choosing team chiefs.

HRC uses this Position Special Reporting Code (PSRC) “to identify positions where there is a requirement for an officer to have experience in one of the combat arms branches.”¹⁰ 02A is the position code for Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) or combat arms officers. Army officers in other branches may only replace 02A team chiefs on the battlefield under exceptional circumstances. The current advisor team composition includes combat arms or Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE) Soldiers, but effective advisor leadership may require more than just combat arms technical and tactical proficiency. Advisor cohesion and resulting team performance may depend more on flexible and adaptable leadership than the team chiefs traditional Army Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

This study identifies four factors that could affect foreign military advisor team cohesion and performance on the battlefield: (1) mission complexity and environment; (2) team leadership; (3) training and; (4) Soldier attributes. These factors do not appear codependent; but they may be additive in their effects. The complex military advisor mission and harsh combat environment appears to increase the amount of stress on teams, making cohesion more difficult to maintain. Most teams maneuver daily over vast terrain far from secure Forward Operating Bases (FOB) with limited communications and force protection. Daily mission essential tasks include advising, training, and mentoring foreign security forces in intelligence, communications, logistics, and combat maneuver or infantry tactics in a hostile environment. As a result, team members rely on each other to accomplish their daily missions and most importantly to stay alive. Divergence in individual Soldier training and experiences appears to exacerbate this stress. The strongest Soldiers typically fill additional roles and responsibilities to maintain effective

team performance. These issues seem to serve as precursors of team competition, frustration, and dissention. When combined with weak leadership, the inherently difficult mission, and austere living conditions, teams come apart.

Primary Research Question

Will a centralized HRC screening and selection improve military advisor team performance?

Secondary Research Questions

Secondary questions help answer the primary research question. Will the future foreign military advisor mission remain a conventional force requirement? What effect does the complex mission and environment have on military advisor teams? What type of leadership facilitates cohesion? Does training improve team development? What attributes must an advisor exhibit?

Significance

The United States depends on U.S. foreign security force assistance to accomplish its foreign policy. Enabling host nation governments and transitioning security to indigenous forces in an efficient manner requires capable foreign military advisors. SF cannot satisfy all advisor requirements. For today, growing advisor force requirements require a simultaneous investment in conventional externally manned teams and a more broad BCT AAB approach. Additionally, decreasing U.S. ground force support on the battlefield will likely increase the amount of demand and stress on teams. As a result, the importance of sound leadership and team cohesion significantly increases.

Assumptions

Literary research and statistical data derived from interviews and surveys will provide evidence suitable for analysis leading to conclusions and recommendations for continuing or modifying the current Army assignment policy. Analysis will portray a relationship between advisor team leadership, cohesion and performance. This study will be able to depict a connection between unit performance and assignment policy.

Limitations

Available research time and funding limited the amount of interviews of former Vietnam field advisers. Survey data authentication was not possible due to extensive email dissemination. Operational security restrictions also limited the researcher's ability to document force projections and future operational plans for military advisor teams.

Delimitations

This research study was limited in scope to military advisor teams. Specialty teams such as Border Transition Teams (BTT); Police Transition Teams (PTT); National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) and Embedded Transition Teams (ETT) generally have a branch and unit specific manning and mission set. The Army also designed a new internally trained and manned Advising and Assist Brigade (AAB) to satisfy future foreign military advisor demands. These advisors will probably experience the same challenges as externally manned teams; however, scarce resources and limited information on the AAB concept inhibit the scope of this study. The researcher also recognizes other important performance variables such as team composition and training.

These significant variables require further detailed independent study and analysis; however, this study will only address these from the aspect of team development.

¹ Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 8-3.

² U.S. Congress, House. Armed Services Committee, “A statement by Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, U.S. Army: On the Status and Training of Military Transition Teams for Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 7 December 2006, 2.

³ Naval Post Graduate School, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces” (Research Study, Naval Post Graduate School, Providence, RI, 2007), 127.

⁴ Department of the Army, U.S. Army Recruiting Command Pamphlet 601-25, *In-Service Special Forces Recruiting Program (Officer and Enlisted)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-3.

⁵ Ibid., 2-3.

⁶ Ibid., 2-4.

⁷ American Psychological Association, “Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory,” <http://www.apa.org/science/testing.html> (accessed 20 March 2009).

⁸ Richard J. Hotujec, Bragg SFAS & SFPC Training Specialist, Electronic Correspondence with author, 10 February 2009.

⁹ William Bonilla, Jr., Major, U.S. Army HRC Fort Riley Transition Team LNO, Telephone Interview with author, 3 September 2008.

¹⁰ Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 3.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

We must, therefore, be confident that the general measures we have adopted will produce the results we expect. Most important in this connection is the trust which we must have in our lieutenants. Consequently, it is important to choose men on whom we can rely and to put aside all other considerations. If we have made appropriate preparations, taking into account all possible misfortunes, so that we shall not be lost immediately if they occur, we must boldly advance into the shadows of uncertainty.¹

— General Karl von Clausewitz

Karl von Clausewitz captures the basic requirement for carefully selecting reliable leaders and Soldiers to accomplish the mission. The researcher conducted a comprehensive and systematic review of historical and contemporary literature to answer several secondary questions to substantiate this requirement. Analysis of literature depicts three distinct periods of publication on the topic of the U.S. foreign security force assistance and, advisory missions--Vietnam, post-Vietnam, and 2006 to present. For the purposes of this study the researcher considers documents published after 2006 as contemporary literature. Vietnam was the Army's largest conventional force advisor effort leading up to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. During the Vietnam conflict, military advising was both a conventional and Special Forces (SF) mission. Following Vietnam, the Army transferred the primary advisory mission to SF. This shift in responsibility resulted in decreased volume of doctrinal or professional writing on foreign security force advising during the 80s and 90s. Most relevant literature cited on this topic was contemporary.

Twenty-four governmental publications were cited in this study. Of these, nine were Army doctrinal publications and fifteen were government sponsored studies. This

research project also cites sixteen other professional articles, periodicals, and strategic research projects. The literature review has six sections. The first two sections discuss cohesion and the future of the military advisor mission and the four remaining sections evaluate literature relating to the complex mission and environment, team leadership, training, and Soldier attributes.

Cohesion

Recently published professional literature provides evidence of internal and external factors impinging on advisor team cohesion on conventional and SF teams. A recent study, *Advising Iraqi Security Forces – Collection and Analysis Team Initial Impressions Report*, documents “Several TT members remarked that due to stress and austere living conditions, it is critical that teams function as a cohesive unit.”² Similarly, recent comments attributed to the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) and Task Force (TF) Phoenix indicate further concern that “Transition Teams are not performing to their full potential due to intra team conflict and failing to become a cohesive unit before deploying.”³ TC 31-73, *Special Forces Advisor Guide* (2008), highlights the additional interpersonal aspects that affect cohesion. “The most frequent complaints voiced by SF soldiers pertain to the nature of the mission, the nature of the host government, the relationships with counterparts and coworkers, and the lack of self determination.”⁴ Literature demonstrates the importance of cohesion and alludes to the factors affecting it.

Literary research emphasizes internal disputes may be the result of inherently exceptional team dynamics. Dahl’s Collection and Analysis Team (CAT) chronicles in the document *Advising Iraqi Security Forces – Collection and Analysis Team Initial Impressions Report* that “TT’s are composed of senior ranking individuals creating a

unique team dynamic that are different from most Coalition Forces (CF) units.”⁵ His team proposes another key point that “The uniqueness of team member personalities that make up the different TT’s makes it challenging to ‘mesh’ and become cohesive.”⁶ Further professional literary evidence supports this primary cause of internal conflict.

Several recent raw comments extracted from a Cross-Cultural Survey conducted by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in early 2008 emphasize the problems with team disagreements resulting from rank structure and poor leadership. A Master Sergeant states that he was “a turret gunner & was told to ‘stay in my lane’ and ‘keep my mouth shut’ when it came to operations by our team officers who were not even combat arms.”⁷ Similarly, a team medical specialist comments “The higher ranks need to realize there are no privates and they need to pull their weight. Team Chiefs head the team, but the team makes the team chief succeed.”⁸ Most importantly, the JCISFA study comes to the same conclusion as Dahl’s CAT team, “Team dynamics greatly influence team advising/operation--especially team leaders.”⁹ This is a point also shared by Caryn Heard in her research project, *Finding the Right Leaders for the Team*. She emphasizes that leadership is critical to achieving and maintaining team cohesion. She states, “A positive environment establishes loyalty and cohesion in the team by fair treatment and giving each member a voice in the team.”¹⁰ These authors similarly assert unique team dynamics strains cohesion and may require leadership beyond traditional military expectations to attain and maintain it.

Although doctrinal guidance is limited, sufficient professional studies and literature depict advisor team cohesion as an enduring problem. Literature portrays both internal and external factors that affect cohesion, but the primary (internal) catalysts

appear to center on team dynamics and leadership. Literature does not delineate in great detail the affects of foreign advisor mission complexity and environment on cohesion. Nor does it propose training as the sole solution to team development and attainment of cohesion. The researcher acknowledges the need for further research on specific advisor team composition and its effects on cohesion; however, a more fundamental issue arises from literature. Unique Soldier attributes and leadership may be required to attain and maintain cohesion on foreign military advisor teams.

Future of the Military Advisor Mission

Framing the future foreign military advisor mission is necessary before discussing the literature which bears upon the primary research question of screening and selection. The Army's two lead contemporary doctrinal publications Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, dated 2009 and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, dated 2006, clearly and authoritatively outline the future of the U.S. Army foreign military advisory effort. FM 3-07.1 states "The two pillars of security force assistance are the modular brigade and Soldiers acting as advisors."¹¹ FM 3-24 similarly portrays future advisory efforts as primarily a conventional force mission.

For Soldiers and Marines, the mission of developing HN security forces goes beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training programs today and the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have grown. While FID has traditionally been the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units.¹²

FM 3-24 clearly explains the reason for the shift from Special Forces to conventional forces. "While SOF personnel may be ideal for some training and advisory roles, their

limited numbers restrict their ability to carry out large-scale missions to develop HN security forces.”¹³ This manual also underscores SF’s vital, but limited role in foreign security force assistance. “For small-scale COIN efforts, SOF may be the only forces used. SOF organizations may be ideally suited for developing security forces through the FID portion of their doctrinal mission.”¹⁴ According to FM 3-07.1 and FM 3-24, the future of large-scale military advising rests in the hands of conventional forces.

This study found no additional published Army doctrinal references highlighting the future of the U.S. foreign advisory mission. However, two contemporary professional military articles similarly conclude that security force assistance is long-term, of national interest, and requires a conventional approach. A recent 2008 Army G3 position paper, *Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, documents that “Recent experience has demonstrated that Security Force Assistance (SFA) will remain an enduring mission for the Department, and that SFA will continue to be a key component of our defense strategy against both traditional and, increasingly, irregular threats.”¹⁵ In a 2007 article titled *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*, John Nagl reiterates the Army’s recent doctrinal stance on foreign advising. He accentuates the need for conventional force participation in advocating a “permanent Advisor Corps that would develop doctrine and oversee the training and development of 750 advisory teams of 25 soldiers each, organized into three divisions.”¹⁶ He also suggests that the Army use the “conventional force” in making this advisor corps.¹⁷ These articles portray the same conventional force significance and application referenced in recent Army security force assistance doctrine.

However, other professional contemporary articles reveal that some of today's senior Army leaders do not agree on increased demand for security force assistance and continued conventional force role in foreign military advising. Charles Jack points out in his *Creation of the Advisory Unit in the U.S. Army* that the Chief of Staff of the Army, George Casey, "argued this mission will not exist to the current scale in the near future; 'I'm just not convinced that anytime in the near future we're going to decide to build someone else's army from the ground up, and to me, the advisory corps is our Army Special Forces--that's what they do.'"¹⁸ In a 2007 article *Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future*, Peter Chiarelli similarly conveys "that a permanent advisory capability exists in the Special Forces and that there is no need to create the capability in the conventional Army."¹⁹ Although not readily found in publication, these opposing viewpoints to emerging Army security force assistance doctrine may exist elsewhere and influence the future of foreign military advising.

Although doctrinal references concerning the future of the Army's foreign security force assistance mission are limited in number, FM 3-07.1 and FM 3-24 clearly state that foreign advising is a conventional force mission. Other professional authors back this principle up and substantiate that foreign security force assistance demands will increase for the foreseeable future. However, further literary study also reveals a shared conviction amongst some senior Army leaders who believe Special Forces alone can manage the mission. Professional military authors and recent doctrinal publications capture the successes of advisory efforts over seven plus years in support of Operations

Iraq Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and validate the current Army doctrinal position for a continued conventional force lead.

Mission Complexity and Environment

Vietnam era professional military authors provide the earliest and most comprehensive representation of the demands, expectations and complexities associated with the foreign advisor mission. Hickey and Davison's 1965 unclassified memorandum, *The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam* details the complex role and associated problems the typical combat advisor faces. "To accomplish the mission he must be professionally competent, but also a realist, negotiator, fall guy, teacher, expresser of ideas, defender of the long view, and sometimes an organizer of both aid and assistance from other agencies."²⁰ The authors further explain "he must meet a range of expectations, of his home unit, the host country, the team leader, and often U.S. missions or agencies."²¹ Edward Stewart describes similar challenges in his 1965 *Military Review* article *American Advisors Overseas*.

The demands of these missions, in many ways subtle or intangible, are quite exceptional. The advisor, or trainer, is called upon to set aside his usual operational procedures as staff officer, or commander, and to work in a strange setting outside military organization to which he is accustomed.²²

Stewart describes an advisor who must step outside his traditional military role to meet the unique demands associated with advisory duty. Bryce Denno alludes to similar demands and high expectations in his 1965 article *Advisor and Counterpart*. He wrote that "the advisor is a member of a US military organization," "he receives and executes the orders of his superiors," and "he supervises subordinate advisors, and he lives, eats and works with his foreign counterparts regarding himself as one of them."²³ These

authors all describe an advisor who is both an insider and ‘outsider’, a soldier who is flexible and adaptable, who exhibits unique skills and behaviors outside of traditional military custom. They also introduce similar perceptions of ‘unexpected demands’ and the advisor having to meet a ‘range of expectations’ in conducting their daily mission. These authors portray evidence of the exceptional team relationship dynamic and leadership demands inherent in advising.

FM 31-73, *Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations* (1967) did not clearly outline the demands and expectations of foreign advisors; however, further literary study uncovered two similar and relevant contemporary Special Forces manuals on this topic of foreign advising. The psychological relationship theory of ‘role shock’ in the 2001 *Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book* outlines complex mission roles, expectations and associated predicaments advisors deal with on a daily basis.

The chief problems arise in connection with their jobs: role, relationships with colleagues and indigenous peers, personal achievement, self-development, self-determination, and similar matters related to their image of themselves as professionals.”²⁴

These are similar to the relationships and team member expectations discovered in other Vietnam-era non-doctrinal literature; however, the new leadership concepts of ‘self-development’ and ‘self-determination’ appear for the first time in Army doctrine in 2001. More directly, “The SF advisor finds his role expectations and performance being influenced by his fellow team members, by the actions of his predecessors, and particularly by the qualifications and activities of his counterpart--a unique role relationship.”²⁵ TC 31-73, *Special Forces Advisor Guide* (2008), also reiterates the common theme that advisory expectations and demands far exceed a soldier’s standard

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS); however, no direct mention is made of leadership requirements.

A significant number of SF soldiers find that the duties and activities in which they engage during deployments are at least somewhat different from those expected--the actual duties and responsibilities are greater in scope, involve technical work outside of their assigned specialties, and require honed administrative (rather than military) skills.

These SF manuals increase the doctrinal understanding of mission complexities associated with foreign military advising.

The Army's most recent attempt at capturing the complex nature of the foreign military advisor mission appears in FM 3-07.1 *Security, Force Assistance* (2009).

Although a complementing conventional force mission, this manual illustrates BCT Security Force Assistance (SFA) and foreign military advising operations separately.

The manual effectively highlights in broad terms inherent difficulties associated with advising. For example, "Advisors find it difficult to satisfy their own units, and they never fully satisfy the demands of their FSF (Foreign Security Forces). They are figuratively and literally caught in the middle."²⁶ In even broader terms, this manual describes "BCTs conducting SFA may support FSF development, assist FSF operations, and support and assist the development of host-nation institutions and infrastructure."²⁷

This recent Army doctrinal manual introduces a distinction between parallel and complementing SFA and advising missions.

The Army continues to advance its appreciation for the multifaceted foreign military advisor mission. Vietnam era literature provided the first professional military recognition of the complex roles, responsibilities and tribulations associated with the foreign security force assistance mission; however, the foundation of knowledge surfaced

during the 1980s and 1990s in SF doctrinal publications. From the earliest literary accounts, the portrayal of the advisor's role was that it far exceeded traditional MOS and leadership expectations.

This study found no Army doctrinal references published prior to 2001 describing the foreign military advisor environment. Bryce Denno documented the lethality of the advisor environment in his 1965 article, *Advisor and Counterpart*, "Danger is everywhere: in the city as well as in the countryside, in higher headquarters as in the platoon. The odds are small indeed that the average advisor, during a counterinsurgency tour, will [sic] encounter at least one instance where his life will be threatened."²⁸ Other military authors during and post Vietnam portrayed similar lethal aspects of an advisor's environment. These military authors provide a narrow glimpse into the complex, unconventional, austere environment; however, this topic would not appear in Army doctrine until 2001.

The U.S. Army introduces the clinical theory of "Cultural Shock" in *Special Forces Advisor's Reference Book*. Culture shock comprises both lethal and non-lethal effects of the combat environment; whereas, historically it was depicted as simply lethal. Authors of contemporary doctrine surmise that "Culture shock occurs because the mind and body have to go through a period of psychological and physiological adjustment when individuals move from a familiar environment to an unfamiliar one."²⁹ More importantly, doctrine now identifies a link between an advisor's personal background, character and how well they adjust to culture shock. "For example, the individual's state of mental health, type of personality, previous experiences, socio-economic conditions, familiarity with the language, family and/or social support systems, and level of

education all contribute to an individual’s particular reaction to culture shock.”³⁰ Also, current doctrine depicts that “reactions are emotional and not easily controlled by rational management” and Soldiers must work different stages of shock (see figure 2).³¹ This may explain some of the challenges associated with maintaining team cohesion, effective leadership and foreign military advisor performance in general. This doctrinal recognition apparently led to the decision to clinically assess SF candidates for suitability to operate in unfamiliar austere environments over extended periods of time. Culture shock presents many challenges to advisor team leaders and their Soldiers. The 2007 *Transition Team Handbook* includes literal excerpts of environmental ‘culture shock’ which suggests its continued relevance to the field of advising.




Figure 2. Stages of Culture Shock

Source: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 8-7.

The effects of environment on foreign military advisors evolved once again in 2006 professional military literature. Robert Ramsey proposes in an occasional paper, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, that extended periods of separation from other U.S. forces was counterproductive to the advisor mission. The author states “living constantly with local national army tactical or isolated units support regiments removed from personal association with other US personnel had adverse effects on advisors’ morale and efficiency.”³² This is an extension of the psychological challenges described in the 2001 *SF Advisor’s Reference Book*.

Army doctrine demonstrates a common recognition and in-depth understanding of environmental challenges facing advisors; however, professional military authors portray separate but equally important environmental complexities associated with the advisor mission. The three prominent factors of danger, unfamiliarity and isolation appear in literature. Army manuals portray that a Soldier’s ability to adjust to unique environmental stress associated with foreign advising is contingent on their personal experiences. SF manuals also insinuate that advisors will need reliable leadership to handle stress related to environment.

Team Leadership

No Army doctrine or professional military literature was found on the specific topic of military advisor team leadership. A 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division unclassified mission briefing depicts the eclectic composition of foreign military advisor teams. Eleven Soldiers make up the standard (external) advisor team--six officers and five Senior (enlisted) Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO) or Sergeants (see table 1). The team leader is normally a field grade officer. The remaining five company-grade

(Captain and Lieutenant) officers and four SNCOs serve in intelligence, operations, logistics, fire support and Headquarters Support Company or administrative duty positions. Sergeants also fill the medical and communications chief positions. Most officers appear to have minimal time-in-grade and no command experience, and the SNCOs on the team range from Staff Sergeants to Master Sergeants. Soldiers come from diverse professional backgrounds and have different experiences. This briefing alludes to the unique leadership challenges created by advisor team composition.

Table 1. Military Transition Team (MiTT) Composition				
Duty Positions	Career Fields (CF)	<u>Battalion Rank</u>	<u>Brigade Rank</u>	<u>Division Rank</u>
Team Chief	Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE)	Major	Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)	LTC (P) or Colonel
Staff/Maneuver Trainer	MFE	Captain	Major	LTC
Intelligence Trainer	Operational Support (OS)	Captain	Major	Major
Logistics Trainer	Force Sustainment (FS)	Captain	Captain	Captain
HSC Advisor	FS	Captain	None	
FA/Effects Trainer	MFE	Captain	Captain	Major
Intelligence NCO	OS	Master Sergeant (MSG)	MSG	MSG
Logistics NCO Trainer	FS	Sergeant First Class (SFC)	MSG	MSG
FA/Effects NCO Trainer	MFE	SFC	SFC	MSG
Communications Chief	OS	SFC	SSG	SSG
Medic/Corpsman	Health Services (HS)	Specialist (SPC) - Staff Sergeant (SSG)	SPC - SFC	SPC - SFC
Signal Company Advisor	OS	Not Authorized (NA)	NA	Captain
Engineer Company (Co) Advisor	MFE	NA	NA	Captain
Ordnance Co Advisor	FS	NA	NA	Captain
Military Police Advisor	MFE	NA	NA	Captain
Military Intelligence Co Advisor	OS	NA	NA	Captain

Source: Mark B. Flynn, Knowledge Management Advisor- Transition Team Forum Facilitator Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS), OIF MiTT, <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=65757&lang=en-US> (accessed 18 September 2008).

The researcher conducted further literature study to determine what particular influence techniques assist in small unit leadership. The first step to determining applicable techniques was identifying the appropriate leadership level. Doctrine depicts

the three distinct levels of direct, organizational and strategic leadership. FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, portrays “Direct leadership is face-to-face or first-line leadership. It generally occurs in organizations where subordinates are accustomed to seeing their leaders all the time: teams and squads; sections and platoons; companies, batteries, troops, battalions, and squadrons.”³³ Advising falls within direct level leadership parameters (see figure 3).




Figure 3. Army Leadership Levels

Source: Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 3-6.

FM 6-22 identifies a spectrum of ten leadership techniques that “seek different degrees of compliance or commitment ranging from pressure at the compliance end to relations building at the commitment end.”³⁴ These techniques include “pressure, legitimate requests, exchange, personal appeals, collaboration, rational persuasion, apprising, inspiration, participation, and relationship building.”³⁵ Pressure entails associating demands with negative consequences.³⁶ A leader relies on traditional military ‘source of authority’ in conveying legitimate requests. Exchange technique

involves offering incentives to subordinates for conformity. Personal appeals are requests “based on friendship or loyalty.”³⁷ Collaboration takes place when leaders offer their support to a particular effort.³⁸ Rational persuasion involves leaders providing “evidence, logical arguments, or explanations showing how a request is relevant.”³⁹ A leader may ‘apprise’ subordinates on the benefits of complying with a request.⁴⁰ Leaders may also attempt to ‘inspire’ “by arousing strong emotions to build conviction” in subordinates.⁴¹ The participation technique incorporates Soldiers in decision making cycle. And lastly, relationship building involves “positive rapport and a relationship of mutual trust, making followers more willing to support requests.”⁴² FM 6-22 identifies leadership sincerity of paramount importance followed by the application of these ten techniques to influence subordinates to achieve mission success.

Further literary research suggests influence techniques replaced former leadership styles. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (1990), introduced the three leadership styles of directing, participating, and delegating. A leader uses the directing style of leadership to convey to subordinates what, when, where, and how he wants something done.⁴³ This style is more authoritarian in nature and requires no input from subordinates. In the participating style of leadership, Soldiers have a say in what tasks to accomplish and how to go about completing them.⁴⁴ The delegating style gives sole problem-solving and decision making authority to subordinates.⁴⁵ This style of leadership usually requires additional oversight. This older manual also identifies that “Effective leaders are flexible in the way they interact with subordinates.”⁴⁶ In simplest terms, older Army doctrine similarly recognizes the fact that not every situation warrants the same

leadership approach; on the contrary, resourceful leaders must recognize and frequently adjust leadership tactics or techniques.

Army doctrine has consistently documented that leaders must demonstrate knowledge and proficient application of leadership techniques or styles to accomplish the mission. Older leadership styles are broader conceptually but resemble newer leadership techniques. These doctrinal concepts highlight the basic requirement to delegate responsibilities to subordinates. Both professional military publications also suggest the situation or mission determine the necessary apportionment of this responsibility.

Training

Training was addressed only from the perspective of team development. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* states the need for advisor "training in rapport building, negotiation, small group team building."⁴⁷ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, similarly asserts "the training regimen must create an environment in which teams can work not only to develop and strengthen individual team members, but those of the team as well."⁴⁸ However, the Army's new FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (2009), does not mention team development training specifically. The predominance of Army doctrine alludes to the importance of team development training; however, it provides no further explanation concerning the variables or factors affecting a military advisor team development.

This study discovered no specific team development courses currently offered during the six week pre-deployment training at Fort Riley. "June 1st, 2006, 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the training, manning, equipping, deployment,

redeployment, and reintegration of organized transition teams preparing to serve in the Iraqi Theater of Operations.”⁴⁹ Teams receive a wide range of training on basic maneuver tactics, weapons proficiency, combat lifesaving skills, Arabic language and cultural understanding; however, review of the standard training schedule reveals no team development instruction. Detailed doctrinal reference on team development training does not exist, nor have studies, or professional literature revealed details on ideal team development training.

Soldier Attributes

Literature research discloses one official Army memorandum, three key government sponsored studies and four doctrinal references on the desirable characteristics, behaviors and traits of foreign advisors. A consistent message found in most literary resources suggests not all Soldiers are suitable foreign military advisor candidates. Soldier attributes were first documented in an official *Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development* (1972). John Cushman acknowledges that advisors need to demonstrate skills beyond general technical and tactical competence. He states “qualities which might make for effective, or even outstanding, performance as a battalion or brigade commander are not necessarily those which make the best advisor.”⁵⁰ The Marine Corps held a Transition Team (TT) conference in November - December 2007. Their veteran advisors stated in *Lessons and Observations from OEF and OIF* “that it is demanding and requires certain personality traits and skills. Not everyone is suited for TT duty.”⁵¹ Similarly, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* depicts not everyone is good at counterinsurgency . . . people able to grasp, master, and execute COIN techniques are rare and rank may not indicate the required talent.⁵² JCISFA’s

2008 *Commander's Handbook* identifies the need to “consider the individual talents or traits of subordinate leaders when matching them to the SFA mission.”⁵³ FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, outlines “Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions; even those considered to be the best and most experienced have failed at being an advisor.”⁵⁴

Vietnam and post-Vietnam literature identifies a broad, not necessarily comprehensive list of desirable advisor attributes. The two earliest documented government-sponsored studies were the American University Center for Research in Social Systems *Preparation and Utilization of Military Assistance Officers* published in 1969 and a similar *Technical Report* completed by the Interactive Research Institute immediately following the Vietnam War in 1975. The Army Research Institute (ARI) in cooperation with JCISFA completed the most recent *An Analysis of Cross-Cultural Behaviors for Military Advisors in the Middle East* in 2008. The four Army doctrinal publications on this subject consist of FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, published in 1994, TC 31-73, *Special Forces Advisor Guide* dated 2008, JCISFA's 2008 *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance*, and the 2009 FM 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance* manual. Although sufficient in number, these governmental studies and doctrinal references are not necessarily consistent in their findings. Each literary source has a slightly different perspective on desired foreign advisor traits, characteristics, and behaviors.

The American University Center for Research in Social Systems records the performance behaviors, characteristics, and attitudes desirable in Americans working overseas. These performance behaviors include “emotional stability, persistence,

teaching, leading, organizing, adapting, diplomacy, and fraternizing.”⁵⁵ This study also identifies personal characteristics and attitudes as “tact, patience, perseverance, thoroughness, good personal appearance, dignity and reserve, self-reliance [sic] liking for foreign nationals, and incorruptibility.”⁵⁶ This Social Systems study focuses on all facets of Foreign Service like State Department employment, which might explain an expanded civilian perspective on desirable attributes.

Technical Report 74-5, *Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor, Vol. II Goals, Problems and Recommendations*, documents a similar 1975 study. This time however, researchers asked former Vietnam advisors “What personal characteristics, abilities, or skills do you feel are most important for an advisor to possess?”⁵⁷ Respondents felt “integrity, knowledge, courage, experience (combat), endurance, flexibility, sense of humor, positive attitude, language, complete understanding of supporting arms, honesty, tact, empathy with professional knowledge” were most important.⁵⁸ This study constitutes the first direct military attempt to gather recommendations concerning desirable advisor attributes. When compared with the two earlier Vietnam studies, tact, integrity and incorruptibility stand out as the only similarities.

Special Forces (SF) literature expands the consortium of knowledge of the topic of military advisor attributes. FM 31-20-3 and TC 31-73 have extensive lists of desired behaviors, characteristics, and attitudes for advisors. FM 31-20-3 documents that “An advisor must be extremely flexible, patient, and willing to admit mistakes. He must also be a diplomat of the highest caliber and possess an unusual amount of tact. An advisor must be honest. He must maintain high moral standards and understanding and [sic]

sincere. He must present a good military appearance, stay in good physical condition, and lead by example.” He must also be “tactically competent”, “positive,” and “persistent.” “Common sense is possibly the greatest asset of the successful advisor.”⁵⁹ These pre-OEF and OIF SF manuals document for the first time the need for advisors to be diplomats, in good physical condition, humble and exhibiting common sense.

The 2008 Army Research Institute (ARI) and JCISFA study titled *An Analysis of Cross-Cultural Behaviors for Military Advisors in the Middle East* recognizes that the “job of advisor likely requires tactical proficiency and technical expertise;” however, this “post-deployment survey (only) focused on the portion of the advisor’s role that is least understood--specifically, interacting with others in the operating environment.”⁶⁰ This behavioral study did not address the wide-range of desirable attributes of foreign advisors documented during the Vietnam War. Only the associated cultural attributes of tact, positive attitude, and empathy or “demonstrate tolerance toward individuals from another culture” carried over into this contemporary study.⁶¹ This study suggests a distinct separation in traditional and nontraditional skill categories based on cultural understanding.

The TC 31-73, *Special Forces Advisor Guide*, introduces several different desirable advisor characteristics, traits and behaviors then previously documented in other research studies and doctrine. This comprehensive list includes:

tolerance for ambiguity, realistic goal and task setting, open-mindedness, ability to withhold judgment, empathy, communicativeness, flexibility, curiosity, warmth in human relations, motivation of self and others, self-reliance, strong sense of self, tolerance for differences, perceptiveness, ability to accept and learn from failure, and sense of humor.”⁶²

This contemporary SF manual focuses more on psychological interpersonal requirements of effective advising. This manual, along with the combined ARI JCISFA study, suggest an evolving recognition of the unique leadership demands inherent in advising.

The JCISFA's 2008 *Commander's Handbook* similarly documents a narrower set of leader attributes "personnel who are patient, perseverant, have a reflective bent, and are somewhat empathetic, perform well over time in advisory roles."⁶³ This handbook also depicts the importance of efficient application of these attributes "Coalition/U.S. leaders often serve as the model or mold and 'moral compass' from which HN counterparts develop *leadership styles*."⁶⁴ The specific documented requirement for advisor leadership, leading by example or influencing only appears in *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* and *Special Forces Advisor Guide*. Handbooks, doctrine and professional studies similarly suggest effective military advisors must have a collection of attributes that exceed traditional military expectations.

This study found no written Army Human Resources Command (HRC) methodology or guidance for determining Soldier suitability for advisor duty. Robert Ramsey amplifies this historical trend in his comprehensive study titled *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador*, that during the Korean War "Officers with the appropriate Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), a need for overseas tour, and the required rank found themselves in KMAG."⁶⁵ The author also states that "Often, advisors were junior company and field grade officers--willing and eager to do the job, but professionally weak."⁶⁶ Similarly, this author mentions that during Vietnam "Military advisors were selected on the basis of MOS, rank, and

vulnerably [sic] to an overseas tour, not on the basis of language skills or the ability to work effectively with Vietnamese counterparts.”⁶⁷ Another professional author, Cecil Bailey, comments in *The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador* that “there was a general lack of careful selection of personnel to weed out those professionally or personally ill-suited for advisory duty.”⁶⁸ Irving Hudlin makes a comparable assertion in his article *Advising the Advisor*: “We are still using the age-old approach to our newly acquired problem, and professional competence and military know-how are considered as the dominating factors in selecting advisors.”⁶⁹ Substantial literary evidence suggests a consistent and almost exclusive reliance in the Army on a Soldier’s rank, MOS related technical and tactical competencies, and security clearance when assigning Soldiers to advisor duty.

This literature review highlights a difference in recognition and application of desirable foreign advisor attributes over the past five decades in literature. This fact may be due to the shift from unconventional to conventional force manning. This may also reflect a general lack of contemporaneous understanding amongst military and civilian authors on the necessary attributes of advisors, or simply signify a better comprehension of the complex nature of the mission. Not one common attribute appears in all literary references. Literary research portrays advisors are far more than just tacticians; their success depends on personal attributes centered on human relations.

Army doctrine specifies that increasing foreign security force assistance and military advisor demands today and in the future require conventional force involvement. However, literary research also depicts deviation between the application of forces proposed in Army doctrine with that of various senior level Army leaders. This could

complicate course of action development concerning the acquisition and employment of future advisory force assets. Literature also indicates a major challenge to effective advising may be attaining and maintaining team cohesion. An adequate amount of professional literature portrays possible catalysts degrading team cohesion. They include the complex mission and environment, team leadership, training, and Soldier attributes. Complexities associated with the foreign advisor mission and environment appear to inhibit advisor performance; however, these external factors do not seem to outweigh the challenges presented by the inherent internal variables centering on team dynamics. Doctrine acknowledges the importance of team development and cohesion and the requirement for determining Soldier suitability; however it does not specifically delineate the assignment process. Further quantitative research in the form of interviews and surveys will reveal if problems associated with advisor team cohesion still exist and the range of possible causes..

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⁵ Dahl Col. and Collection and Analysis Team, *Advising Iraqi Security Forces – Collection and Analysis Team Initial Impressions Report* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 2007), 7.

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¹⁹ Peter Chiarelli, Lieutenant General, “Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” *Military Review* (September-October 2007), 18.

²⁰ G.C. Hickey, and W.P. Davison, The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam, Unclassified Memorandum RM-4482-ARPA, March 1965, 106.

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²³ Bryce F. Denno, Colonel, “Advisor and Counterpart,” Association of the US Army article, vol. 15, no. 12 July 1965, 26.

²⁴ U.S. Army Special Warfare Command, *Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book* (Columbia, SC: Research Planning Inc., 2001) 107.

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²⁶ Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1. *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 7-2.

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²⁸ Bryce F. Denno, Colonel, “Advisor and Counterpart,” Association of the US Army article, 15, no. 12 (July 1965), 30.

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³⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

³¹ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Transition Team Handbook*, 2nd ed., (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, 2007), 18.

³² Robert D. Ramsey. III., *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006, 20.

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³⁹ *Ibid.*

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⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

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⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

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⁵² Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), A-3.

⁵³ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, 2008), 4.

⁵⁴ Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 7-3.

⁵⁵ George R. Greenway, Major, “*Attributes and Selection Criteria for Military Assistance Advisory Group Officers*” (Thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, 1974), 80.

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⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶² Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 31-73. *Special Forces Advisor Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-2.

⁶³ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, 2008), 5.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶⁵ Robert D. Ramsey, III., *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006, 11.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁶⁸ Cecil E. Bailey, "OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador," *Special Warfare* (December 2004), 67-68.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Data collection and analysis will attempt to identify ways to improve advisor team performance and meet Army demands for more effective foreign military advising. Chapter Two Literature Review provides a historical foundation of advisor team experience. Further data collection in the form of interviews and surveys attempts to determine if problems revealed in the literature review associated with advisor team cohesion still exist, the range of possible causes, and if any new or previously unrecognized factors are at work. The remainder of this research employs a mixed methodology approach, using interviews of experienced Vietnam era advisors and surveys of Iraq Military Transition Team (MiTT) advisors as data collection instruments. These in-depth interviews and the researcher-generated MiTT survey of former advisors serve as the main sources of data collection for the remainder of this study. The researcher chose a target population of former Vietnam advisors for interviews and Iraqi advisors for surveys because most literature reviewed covered these two distinct time periods. The researcher completed the preponderance of literature study before interviewing and surveying former advisors. Initial deductions drawn from literature on foreign military advising were confirmed, expanded or disregarded by these two research methods.

Interviews

The purpose of the Vietnam veteran interviews was to gather personal firsthand perspectives on challenges associated with foreign military advising. Topics of

discussion ranged from the uniqueness of the foreign advisor mission to desirable attributes, training and team cohesion. The researcher recognized early in the preparatory phase the fallibility of interviews. Graduate study policies and procedures were followed to mitigate such risks. Risks include but are not limited to bias and accidental or deliberate disclosure of participant's identity. Professional research assistance provided critical guidance on selection of participants and interview sites. The researcher developed, vetted, and implemented a standard interview script to ensure relevance and impartiality of information gathered.

A script of twenty-six open-ended questions (appendix A) facilitated interview discussions with former advisors. The script was divided into three sections: background, preparation and deployment. The reason for structuring the script in this manner was to ensure the most relevant data was collected and analyzed without limiting or encouraging certain responses. Background data separates or defines the accessible population facilitating descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. The preparation and deployment sections help differentiate what, where and when advisors faced challenges. The script facilitated dialogue between the researcher and interviewees and structured sequencing of responses aiding in the transcription of information.

Approval to field the interviews came from CGSC Quality Assurance Office (QAO) and the Army Research Institute (ARI) regional office at Fort Leavenworth. These organizations reviewed and approved the researcher's script. Wording of questions was scrutinized so classified responses or war crimes would not be incited. Professional editing of grammar and content helped solidify data relevance by ensuring

clarity of meaning. ARI researchers also provided a final content assessment to make certain research efforts on advising were not being duplicated.

Interviews were completed in a professional setting. All seven former Vietnam advisor interviews transpired at Carlisle barracks in Pennsylvania (PA). Limited resources dictated the selection of one interview location and the War College appeared to have the largest comprehensive population of former Vietnam advisors. A fellow CGSC instructor informed the researcher of a Vietnam veteran organization of former advisors in PA. The group's leader facilitated coordination with six other members. Volunteers signed a CGSC graduate degree program approved consent form prior to participating in interviews. All Interview sites had to meet certain suitability criteria. Primary criteria consisted of accessibility, comfortability and privacy. These conditions limited distractions and protected applicant identity. Digital voice recording also guaranteed protection of participant identities and facilitated transcription. The interview process was methodical to ensure limited bias and collection of relevant perspectives associated with the foreign military advisor mission.

Although a challenging research collection technique, interviews reveal important perspectives from former Vietnam advisors. These points of view corroborate and enhance qualitative analysis from previous professional studies on advising. Firsthand experiences of field advisors validate professional Vietnam era literary evidence, reveal historical trends and provide baseline information for comparison with this study's self-generated contemporary survey. Vietnam was the Army's last conventional force advisory effort prior to the global war on terrorism and interviews highlight the existence of similar challenges and problems.

Surveys

The researcher determined that a self-generated survey would maximize quantitative nominal data collection. As with interviews, particular assumptions arise in using this research method. The first and most important assumption involves the voluntary and former advisor status of participants. The second assumption involves the level of bias and accuracy. ARI and QAO provided valuable assistance in the development and approval of the survey. These organizations also facilitated circulation. This survey was designed to encapsulate relevant contemporary foreign advisor experiences and observations to help understand historical and ongoing challenges, problems and possible solutions associated with foreign military advising.

QAO and ARI endorsed the researcher's twenty-nine question advisor survey (appendix B) through a series of meetings and review processes. Once again, the editorial process revolved around the importance of relevance and minimizing information redundancy. Survey questions were methodically constructed to encourage different research outcomes and limit participant confusion; however the product was not perfect. Not all possible responses for two particular questions were listed on the survey after more than eight revisions. Question three asks: 'what was your rank at the time?' However, responses above the rank of major were not included. The researcher was able to ascertain from the remarks section of the survey that three colonels and seven lieutenant colonels participated; however, four other participant's ranks are not known. This limits the researcher's ability to assess survey responses by rank. Generating an original survey proved much more challenging than the researcher anticipated; however it

was a valuable collection device. Assessing a great deal of contemporary foreign military advisor experiences was possible with a widely distributed survey.

The survey received two control numbers prior to circulation. QAO assigned control number 09-043 for random CGSC distribution. ARI issued control number DAPE-ARI-AO-09-12 for further dissemination amongst former foreign military advisors serving outside of the CGSC academic institution. These control numbers not only certify approval; however, more directly a general recognition amongst other researchers for potential increased compilation of knowledge on the topic of military advising.

While the interviews focused on Vietnam War Advisors, only former Iraq advisors participated in the survey. QAO circulated the survey with one random AKO email amongst one hundred and sixty students assigned to CGSC. Of these, the total number of advisors on the email list is not known; however, thirty-nine eventually responded. The approximate remaining seven hundred U.S. students attending CGSC class 09-01 were not contacted due to the concern for competing academic requirements. Restricted circulation in the schoolhouse limited potential research findings and created the possibility for bias because of rank and the fact that the majority of Majors having served on advisor teams attending CGSC were in team chief positions. As a result, approval was sought and received for further survey dissemination amongst former advisors serving elsewhere in the Army.

The BCKS website seemed the logical choice for disseminating this study's survey. It has a Transition Team (TT) forum that serves as the central foreign advisor database in the Army. At the time of this study the TT forum had approximately two

thousand and nine hundred members registered. Some members are current or future advisors awaiting or going through training at Fort Riley. The survey was posted to the forum homepage and sent in a monthly member wide email asking volunteers to participate. The number of combat advisor veterans registered to the forum is not known; however, seventy-seven Soldiers responded over a period of ten days. Responses were not authenticated because the military privacy act precludes the release of Soldier email addresses. However, extensive circulation of the survey likely reduces the effects of bias and also substantiates team chief observations and experiences gathered at CGSC. The main objective of the survey was to validate challenges facing advisors and identify possible solutions.

Analysis

Analysis was particularly challenging due to the requirement for compiling, describing, cross referencing and synthesizing findings from large volumes of survey, interview and literary data. The preparatory analytical phase required professional assistance from QAO and ARI. Interview results were transcribed from a digital recorder and sent to ARI for interpretation. Raw data was displayed in a linear manner on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for quick referencing and analysis. QAO utilized the SPSS software program to prepare and process survey data. This preliminary analytical stage facilitated the development and display of descriptive statistics. The objective of this study was not to compare differences between Vietnam and contemporary advisors. These narrative descriptions of summarized data and the display of descriptive statistics in tables and figures facilitated qualitative analysis of survey and interview results.

Qualitative analysis interpreted the meaning of the quantitative analysis. These interpretations were subsequently used to synthesize conclusions and recommendations.

Analytical efforts focused on describing participant demographics and response distributions from each data collection instrument. Interview and survey information were processed independently and portrayed in tables and figures. This was a deliberate effort to simplify depiction of findings. Not all information gathered was included in the study due to questionable relevancy and an interest to keep the study concise. Possible data correlations were analyzed but were not incorporated in the study because causation could not be established between variables. With this in mind, the researcher thought it necessary to qualitatively analyze and describe some of the additional written remarks made on surveys.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This is a mixed methods research design. The literature review constituted a first step, in providing a historical foundation, and an initial qualitative analysis to reveal key issues and themes for further research. With that foundation, two data collection instruments were designed and developed to seek data that would either reconfirm or refute available literature, and to elicit responses revealing factors that might not have been previously addressed in literature. Quantitative analysis provided descriptive statistics and summaries of responses; qualitative analysis of interview responses and unstructured survey questions revealed themes. Qualitative analysis consisted of independent review and multi-source synthesis of interview, survey and literary findings.

Once again, the researcher acknowledges survey and interview results are not a valid representative sampling of the whole of former advisors. First, no one knows how many of the one hundred and sixty CGSC students emailed were former advisors. Similarly, the researcher does not know how many of the two thousand and nine hundred registered BCKS TT forum members completed advisor tours. Representative sampling is resource intensive and may require a scientifically controlled environment. The researcher concludes that all survey respondents were former advisors, or they would not have likely wasted their valuable time filling out a questionnaire.

Structure

Demographic data is displayed first to facilitate understanding of survey and interview responses. This chapter then analyzes and portrays secondary research

questions involving cohesion, the future advisor mission, mission complexity and environment, team leadership, training and Soldier attributes. During the analysis process, advisor team cohesion emerged as a key factor, so it is specifically addressed. The qualitative analysis process also revealed a specific personnel screening and selection process as a possible means of improving team cohesion. This final emergent theme is addressed separately.

Demographics of Participants

Survey and interview demographics form the analytical foundation for this study (see tables 2-9). These statistics help frame the challenges created by the unique composition of the foreign advisor team. Both officers and enlisted Soldiers participated in the research survey, suggesting an equal representative sampling of ranks; however, it was circulated to two distinctly different size and type sampling groups. Although of possible statistical value, this study did not describe different viewpoints according to rank. One hundred and sixteen Soldiers responded to the advisor survey. Surprisingly, review of survey data indicates the majority of these respondents were first-time volunteers who received formal advisor training and had no previous combat experience (see table 2). A preponderance of survey participants were Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) career field, formerly known as Combat Arms (CA) officers (see table 4). CGSC students (Majors) account for thirty-nine of these respondents. Thirty-four enlisted Soldiers participated in the survey circulated outside of the schoolhouse over a ten day period (see table 3). Demographic analysis does not suggest an equal or greater interest of officers; however, survey data reflects sampling of two distinct groups. An overwhelming majority of participants consisted of independent externally trained active

duty advisors (see tables 5 and 6). The diverse background of survey respondents reflects the similar eclectic nature of manning and challenges presented by the foreign advisor mission.

Table 2. General Demographic Information (Survey)						
Response	Volunteers		Combat Experience		Training at Ft. Riley	
Yes	67	58%	48	42%	92	80%
No	44	38%	64	55%	19	16%
Not Answered	5	4%	4	3%	5	4%

Table 3. Rank (Survey)		
Colonels	3	3%
Lieutenant Colonels	7	6%
Majors	40	34%
Captains	24	21%
1 st Lieutenants	1	1%
2 nd Lieutenants	0	0%
Master Sergeants	5	4%
Sergeant First Class	21	18%
Staff Sergeants	8	7%
Other	7	6%

Table 4. Career Field (Survey)		
Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE)	67	58%
Operational Support (OS)	18	15%
Force Sustainment (FS)	28	24%
Not Answered	3	3%

Table 5. Advisor Team Type (Survey)		
External (Independent)	97	80%
Internal (BCT)	12	16%
Not Answered	7	4%

Table 6. Duty Status (Survey)		
Active	101	87%
Reserve	6	5%
National Guard	3	3%
Not Answered	6	5%

Vietnam advisor demographic data is much different highlighting the Army's initial combats arms and officer centric approach to foreign military advisor personnel

manning. All seven of the interviewees were combat arms officers (see table 8 and 9) and comments indicate enlisted Soldiers served on advisor teams to a limited extent during the Vietnam War. Less than one-third of interview participants were volunteers; however, they had much more combat experience and less training (see table 7) than recent advisors. Locating and interviewing advisors over three decades after a war proved quite challenging. Interestingly, Vietnam interview responses generally seem to align with contemporary advisor experiences.

Table 7. General Demographic Information (Interview)					
Volunteers		Combat Experience		Advisor Training	
2	29%	5	71%	5	71%

Table 8. Rank (Interview)		
Majors	2	29%
Captains	3	42%
1 st Lieutenants	2	29%

Table 9. Career Field (Interview)		
Combat Arms (MFE)	7	100%
Combat Support (OS)	0	0%
Combat Service Support (FS)	0	0%

Cohesion

The majority of recent military advisors report that frequent disagreements or conflicts degraded unity on their teams. An even larger percentage of these Soldiers observed poor cohesion on other teams (see table 10). Analysis of survey data portrays conflicts primarily surfacing during training and deployment (see figure 3). Disputes during training at Fort Riley are comprehensible because members do not know each other on a personal or professional basis. Analysis of data indicates excessive arguments in combat are associated with poor leadership and weak advisor skills; most recent

advisors specify the primary causes of conflict include poor leadership and lack of necessary skills (see table 11). Forty-four percent specified leadership, forty-two percent professionalism and thirty-six percent team development as primary sources of conflict. Survey respondents also believe mission and environment are equal, but less significant causes of degraded cohesion on teams.

Table 10. Team Cohesion				
Response	Frequent Disagreements affected Team Cohesion		Observed Poor Cohesion on Other Advisor Teams	
	Yes	64	56%	102
No	49	42%	8	7%
Unsure	3	2%	5	4%
Not Applicable	0	0%	1	1%




Figure 4. Conflict Origins

Table 11. Sources of Conflict				
Catalyst	Yes	Percent	No	Percent
Leadership	52	44%	64	55%
Environment	32	28%	84	72%
Mission	32	28%	84	72%
Tm Development	42	36%	74	64%
Professionalism	49	42%	67	58%
Proficiency (tactical/technical)	38	33%	78	67%
Other	19	16%	97	84%

Interviews of former Vietnam advisors reveal similar findings on mission and environment; however, they do not believe cohesion was a major problem in team performance. Troubles on Vietnam-era teams ranged from Soldiers “feigning illness and requesting replacement,” to being psychologically unfit for duty, to having “personal agendas, such as seeking awards and badges.”¹ Literature review indicates advisor teams were much smaller and varied in size as the Vietnam War progressed. This may explain why former Vietnam advisors generally do not assess cohesion in the same way as current Iraqi advisors: they viewed cohesion as important, but not as a significant problem. Synthesis of data collected from survey and interview participants reveals the importance of cohesion. The associated factors that contribute to attaining and maintaining team cohesion are addressed later in this chapter.

Sixty-six percent of recent advisors surveyed comment that full team development took over two months to attain (see figure 5). Of these, only fifty percent assess that their team ever experienced full team development and cohesion during their tour (see table 12). A majority of them trained together and cohesion was a problem. Conversely, no

Vietnam advisors trained as a team or sensed cohesion was an obstacle. Data collected from recent advisors suggests a notable deficiency in small external conventional force team cohesion.




Figure 5. Time Required for Cohesion Development

Did your advisor team achieve full development and experience cohesiveness?		
Yes	50	43%
No	41	35%
Undecided	9	8%
Not Answered	16	14%

Future of the Military Advisor Mission

The Army has adopted a new internally focused Assist and Advise Brigade (AAB) or Brigade Combat Team Augmented (BCT-A) concept. By late 2010 independently trained and manned foreign military advisor teams will cease to exist. In

the simplest terms, the Army will bestow the advisory mission on deploying Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and phase out external teams. The initial plan calls for the assignment of additional augmented field grade officers to lead and manage internal BCT advisors similar to the existing external mission. Similarly, functional MOS related subject matter experts will still form the ranks of the advisor team; however, these Soldiers will come from within the BCT. Of course, BCTs may be required to conduct lethal operations in addition to their primary security force assistance and advising mission. A shared belief amongst current military planners is that the new concept may also improve unity of effort with land owners or ground commanders. However, will advisory efforts improve overall?

The new advisory effort concept does not appear to align with doctrinal guidance for consideration of Soldier suitability in foreign military advising. Army doctrine recognizes that “Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions...”² However with the exception of team leaders, the new concept relinquishes the primary manning responsibility to BCT commanders. Selecting team leaders and permitting BCT commanders to select team members may not resolve the ongoing problem with cohesion. Actually, Soldiers may have a tendency to view leaders as outsiders because they are not original members of the unit. It is also not out of the realm of possibility that commanders will assign unqualified and undisciplined Soldiers to the mission. In fact, some survey comments specifically identify this unfortunate occurrence. Adopting this course of action appears to complicate future advisory efforts.

Team Leadership

The complex foreign military advisor mission and environment demand leaders who can act decisively in the absence of orders and guidance. The Army's leading doctrinal manual on leadership refers to this concept as "leadership without authority."³ The same manual defines leadership as "anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization."⁴ The noncontiguous battlefield and multiple chains of command inherent in counterinsurgency warfare and security force advising complicate Command and Control (C2). Advisors frequently travel over great distances to overcome the limited range of radios. The fact that teams spend nearly all of their time with their Host Nation (HN) counterparts on the battlefield further complicates C2. Interview of former Vietnam advisors reveal similar C2 challenges. Advisor chain of command or higher U.S. echelons frequently operate in distant provinces and districts.⁵ Fifty-seven percent categorized C2 relationship with US forces as poor.⁶ Leaders must leverage persistent competing interests of the team, Host Nation (HN) counterparts, the advisor chain of command and higher Coalition Force (CF) headquarters.

Literature, interviews and survey research indicate successful foreign military advising requires dynamic rapport or influence of subordinates, peers, superiors and HN counterparts. Data analysis and survey comments suggest the primary cause for ineffective leadership is the improper or insufficient application of leadership styles. One recent advisor commented "My failure was the complete reliance on the participative

type of leadership.”⁷ Similarly, another advisor stated that the “Team chief has to be a competent leader, experienced and not a dictator all the time.”⁸ Only forty-four percent of recent advisors observed a participative and delegative leadership methodology. More directly, a smaller percentage of respondents perceived adequate application of all three leadership styles (see table 13).

Table 13. Observed Application of Leadership Styles													
Authoritarian		Participative		Delegative		Combination of all three		A & D		D & P		P & A	
14	12%	15	13%	6	5%	15	13%	13	11%	29	25%	6	5%

Army doctrine and analysis of this data indicate that situations determine when various observed combinations of leadership influence apply. Previous Army doctrine presented authoritative and delegative, or participative styles and recent doctrine ten techniques necessary for successfully influencing others. However, analysis of survey responses suggests the problem originates *when leaders fail to recognize the need for combining multiple styles or techniques*. If leaders cannot recognize three leadership styles how are they going to remember the ten leadership techniques proposed in recent doctrine. Analysis underscores the general lack of inflexibility or adaptability of past small team leaders in applying influence.

Training

Analysis of Vietnam interviews and survey data indicates foreign military advisor training steadily improved over the years; however, it may not be closely associated with

team cohesion and success on the battlefield. One hundred percent of Vietnam advisors interviewed received specific advisor training before deploying; however they did not train as a team.⁹ Interestingly, none of these former advisors experienced major problems with cohesion on their teams. This could possibly indicate a lower level of performance expectation, a positive effect associated with training separately or operating in smaller teams. In late 2006, the Army began training teams together at Fort Riley. Seventy percent of advisors surveyed who attended this training claim it was satisfactory. Another sixty-two percent thought there was adequate time for teams to fully develop during training (see table 14); however, current curriculum does not include specific team development courses. While no specific research data proves that team development training improves cohesion, large conventional force units have demonstrated that training together over long periods of time may enhance team development. The fact that advisor teams do not train together very long before deploying simply limits the window of opportunity to develop cohesion. This suggests Soldiers on teams must consciously choose to accept other members of the team. Training can possibly improve cohesion that already exists on teams; however, attaining and maintaining it comes from genuine leadership.

Table 14. Sufficient Time for Development During Training?		
Yes	72	62%
No	32	28%
Undecided	12	10%

1st Brigade (Bde), 1st Infantry Division (ID) currently tracks Soldier replacements during pre-deployment training at Fort Riley on a Personnel Review Document (PRD). This document captures training replacements back to mid-2006 when 1ID first assumed the training mission. Raw data from the November 2008 PRD spreadsheet portrays the frequent need for replacements (see table 15). As of November 2008, a total of three hundred and fifty-four Soldiers did not successfully complete advisor training. Analysis shows that of these individuals, nearly seventy percent were enlisted and just over eighty-seven percent Active Component (AC) Soldiers. Additionally, an overwhelming sixty-five percent of early releases or failures during training were due to medical reasons (see figure 6). Disciplinary percentages broke down equally amongst officers and enlisted (see figure 7). Identical percentages of officer and enlisted disciplinary problems are unusual. Enlisted Soldiers usually have more discipline issues in conventional Army units. Replacement for suitability reasons was equal between NG, RC and AC units. This reflects a likely increase in the competency level between active and reserve forces due to continual deployments. Surprisingly, twenty-five more percent officers were replaced due to suitability than enlisted Soldiers. The number of replacements documented during training suggests that Soldiers are haphazardly assigned to the advisor mission.

<u>Loss Category</u>	<u>Raw Number</u>	<u>Active Component</u>	<u>National Guard</u>	<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Administrative	44	90.91%	2.27%	6.82%	27.27%	72.73%
Compassionate	8	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	75.00%
Disciplinary	6	50.00%	16.67%	33.33%	50.00%	50.00%
End of Tour Separation	5	20.00%	20.00%	60.00%	40.00%	60.00%
Medical	231	95.67%	1.73%	2.60%	28.14%	71.86%
Release From Active (REFRAD)	16	0.00%	6.25%	93.75%	25.00%	75.00%
Security Clearance	19	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	21.05%	78.95%
Suitability	8	50.00%	12.50%	37.50%	62.50%	37.50%
Wounded In Action	10	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	90.00%
<u>Unknown</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>42.86%</u>	<u>0.00%</u>	<u>54.14%</u>	<u>14.29%</u>	<u>85.71%</u>
Total:	354	87.29%	2.54%	10.17%	27.97%	69.49%




Figure 6. Training Phase Replacements




Figure 7. Disciplinary and Suitability Losses

Additionally, this same PRD document reveals three hundred and eighty-two Soldiers deleted from the advisor assignment prior to arrival at Fort Riley for training. Human Resources Command (HRC) deleted about forty percent of these Soldiers for undocumented reasons. The next highest cause for drop in assignment is medical at ten percent and no show at eight percent respectively (see figure 8). Literary research revealed no further explanation for ‘no show.’ The total number of obligatory replacements stands at seven hundred and thirty-six when combined with the number of Soldiers dropped from training over a period of about two and a half years.




Figure 8. Pre-Arrival Replacements

According to the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) J1 administrative officer in Iraq, “complete documentation capturing combat advisor replacements does not exist.”¹⁰ Records exist for Wounded in Action (WIA) and Killed in Action (KIA); however, paperwork documenting necessary substitutions for administrative, leadership and disciplinary reasons are not kept on file. Military Transition Team (MiTT) leadership replaces personnel at their level rarely forwarding paperwork documenting or substantiating moves. Lack of appropriate documentation limits the scope of this and future research studies.

Soldier Attributes

Seventy-one percent of former Vietnam advisors weigh cultural understanding, perseverance, patience and technical and tactical abilities as key attributes (see table 16).¹¹ Most advisors during the Vietnam era were combat arms career field officers which could explain the high ‘tactical and technical’ proficiency response. These advisors considered leadership, language, and attitude less, but equally important. This study’s survey required recent advisors to rank order desirable attributes. Sixty-one percent ranked leadership most important. Conversely, only twelve percent of them chose ‘tactical and technical’ proficiency and only one percent ranked ‘language’ skills highest priority (see table 17). The researcher did not include a ‘patience and perseverance’ choice on the survey which prevents a direct comparison of interview and survey responses, but the data does indicate a strong consensus among experienced advisors that required advisor skills consist of much more than technical and tactical proficiency.

Table 16. Desirable Foreign Military Advisor Attributes (Interviews)											
Leadership (Influencing)		Tactical & Technical Proficiency		Cultural Understanding		Patience & Perseverance		Attitude		Language	
4	57%	5	71%	5	71%	5	71%	4	57%	4	57%

Table 17. Desirable Foreign Military Advisor Attributes (Surveys)											
Leadership (Influencing)		Tactical & Technical Proficiency		Cultural Understanding		Language		Other		No Answer	
70	61%	14	12%	21	18%	1	1%	7	6%	2	2%

Screening and Selection

Six of seven former Vietnam advisors interviewed believe centralized screening and selection of future Army foreign advisors is optimal (see figures 9 and 10). Rationale ranges from the need for advisors with improved leadership abilities, special skills, and increasing mission complexity. According to one advisor, “Future advisors should be selected. If you look at a Special Forces team they are a pretty cohesive force.”¹² Another officer comments that “our advisor mission was somewhat different from yours today. You are more involved in civil affairs . . . I think the Army should be more selective based on this fact.”¹³ More succinctly, a different advisor states “Special Forces figured this issue out years ago. Use the SF model of screening and selection.”¹⁴




Figure 9. Selection Preference




Figure 10. Selection Type

Survey participants indicate the Army should use screening and selection criteria to pick future military advisors. Eighty percent consider having the right personal attributes, character traits and behaviors most important (see table 18). A close second and third at seventy-five and sixty-eight percent respectively believe willingness to work within a small team and with foreign officials critical. These survey responses generally relate to leadership and the ability to influence. This aligns with the sixty-one percent of advisors who believe leadership is the most desirable attribute (see table 17). Only half of former advisors assessed combat, tactical, and advisor experience as necessary selection criteria. Interestingly, only a small percent of them consider language ability or aptitude essential. Efficient performance in advising requires a wide-range of attributes; however, former advisors strongly deem leadership potential or the ability influence others the most important selection criteria. The research does not contend that previous experience is not of value at all. However, analysis of survey responses demonstrates

that standard assignment practice is not sufficient in choosing future foreign military advisors.

Table 18. Selection Criteria								
Answer	Personal Attributes	Combat Experience	Tactical Experience	Advisor Experience	Willingness to work in Small Tm	Willingness to work w/foreign officials	Language ability/aptitude	Tactical/ Technical knowledge
Yes	80%	56%	51%	52%	75%	68%	26%	58%
No	20%	44%	49%	48%	25%	32%	74%	42%

Only five percent of recent advisors surveyed consider the Army’s current assignment policy fully effective. Thirty-nine percent of respondents assessed the present policy as partially effective (see figure 11). These results indicate the Army needs to change its assignment policy. Additional remarks collected from the survey indicate HRC relies too heavily on a Soldier’s dwell time.¹⁵ Eighty-four percent of survey respondents and a hundred percent of Vietnam advisors interviewed consider screening and selection a necessity for improving foreign military advisor performance on the battlefield (see figure 12). The entirety of this study clearly shows effective assignment criteria should expand beyond deployment vulnerability; MOS, security clearance and rank.




Figure 11. Survey Opinions on Current Assignment Policy




Figure 12. Combined Interview and Survey Opinions on Future Army Policy

Analysis of literature, survey and interview data indicates changing the current foreign military assignment policy is not only necessary but a vital step in improving Soldier performance on the battlefield. This chapter confirms cohesion is an obstacle to effective advising. Analysis links excessive arguments experienced on teams primarily with weak advisor leadership and attributes. Analysis reveals team development training is not directly associated with a team’s level of cohesion. Genuine leadership is the

foundation of cohesion. Analysis also reveals that advisor attributes exceed traditional MOS tactical and technical proficiency. Soldier replacement rates also signify that there are problems with the current assignment policy. This chapter suggests changing the assignment policy will improve foreign military advisor effectiveness and support the Army's doctrinal requirement for selecting suitable Soldiers to serve as advisors.

¹ Army Research Institute, Interview Responses Excel Spreadsheet, 18 February 2009. 1.

² Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 8-3.

³ Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 3-11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

⁵ Army Research Institute. Interview Responses Excel Spreadsheet, 18 February 2009. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁷ Anonymous comment extracted from survey data prepared by David Bitters, Quality Assurance Office. Survey for BCKS Link and CGSC Open-Ended Comments, 12 March 2009, 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁰ Jeanine White, Major, Iraqi Assistance Group J1, 2008, Electronic Correspondence with author, October 2008.

¹¹ Army Research Institute, Interview Responses Excel Spreadsheet, 18 February 2009. 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵ Anonymous comment extracted from survey data prepared by David Bitters, Quality Assurance Office. Survey for BCKS Link and CGSC Open-Ended Comments, 12 March 2009, 1, 3, 4, 6.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

These research findings expose leadership as the central cause for weak cohesion on foreign military advisor teams and underscore the need for centralized screening and selection. Weak advisor skills are a secondary reason closely associated with leadership and the decline in team cohesion. Soldiers must demonstrate specific interpersonal attributes, some of which may not be trainable. They must understand and focus on the human dimension of the foreign military advisor mission. This research study concludes through survey and interview data analysis that deficient leadership and advisor attributes result in reduced team cohesion limiting performance on the battlefield.

Team Leadership

The majority of recent advisors surveyed indicated that leadership was the primary cause of arguments and disagreements which led to degraded cohesion. Doctrine outlines that leaders must develop Soldiers and HN counterparts through sound leadership application. Doctrine also depicts flexible and adaptable application of the ten influence techniques formerly known as leadership styles is essential to effective leadership. Survey data analysis reveals the majority of recent advisors attribute poor cohesion to leadership. Leaders do not recognize or may not adequately apply influence techniques. No survey respondents commented on the existence of the ten influencing techniques, nor did they recognize that Army leadership doctrine no longer includes the three leadership styles described in FM 22-100 dated 1990. Influencing fellow advisors

is the first step in successful advising. If team leaders cannot effectively lead their own team then how can they influence their foreign counterparts?

Advisor leadership is especially challenging due to unique team dynamics. As the demographic survey analysis shows, Soldiers do not have the same level of training, experiences, personal or professional aspirations. This leadership challenge is further amplified by the complex unconventional foreign military advisor mission and environment. Mission accomplishment and survival on the battlefield requires advisors to function as a team every day. Synthesis of these factors indicates that effective leadership propels team development, cohesion and performance on the battlefield.

Foreign advisor team leadership is arduous. Doctrine and survey results indicate leaders should understand the human dimension associated with effective advising. Leaders must willingly self-assess and accept constructive criticism from team members and HN counterparts. Effective leaders recognize the necessity and demonstrate competency in employing different influence techniques. They must know when to delegate, except input and make well informed decisions that enhance accomplishment of the mission and benefit the team. They recognize that Soldier welfare is synonymous with mission accomplishment.

Recent leadership doctrine states that advisors must be leaders who can operate with limited guidance in austere environments. However, the Army has a requirement that limits team chief assignments to 02A MFE (combat arms) officers. This implies that only combat arms officers are decisive and have the ability to think critically and creatively. However, the Army invests valuable resources every year sending officers of all occupational specialties to leadership and professional development courses. For

example, all promotable Captains and Majors may attend the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth. Students spend ten months perfecting their abilities to think critically and creatively as staffs and leaders. Another implication derived from this position coding is that only a team chief from one of the combat arms could possibly be tactically proficient. History proves officers can be effective combat leaders and not necessarily be combat arms officers. Another important point is that the majority of senior Army officers have valuable combat experience. All officers who meet relevant screening, and selection criteria and successfully demonstrate their leadership abilities during training should be permitted to lead advisor teams.

The foreign military advisor mission is a full spectrum (offensive, defensive, stability, civil support) operation requiring decisive leadership. As one former advisor asserts, “This is more about leadership than combat related requirements.”¹ Many officers in the Army have valuable tactical experience and the natural ability to lead. Years of combat and many victories on the battlefield show the depth of competent leadership. Diverse nonlinear or noncontiguous operational environments and the Army’s modular force structure require small unit leaders who can grasp first, second and third order effects of their decisions and still act decisively. Such abilities are not found only among combat arms officers. Thus, screening and selection criteria should not exclude officers of other military occupational specialties from serving as team chiefs.

Attributes

Surprisingly, a low percentage of former advisors surveyed consider language and foreign cultural understanding as essential to productive or successful daily military advising. Literature, survey and interview findings validate the importance and inherent

need of effectively influencing and being able to build rapport. The perceived insignificance of language and cultural understanding could signal an unbalanced reliance on interpreters; however, it also could indicate that effective advisors only need basic leadership or interpersonal skills to overcome the requirement for years of specialized linguistic training. This statement is based on the survey responses of recent advisors: only one percent assessed language, while sixty-one percent assessed leadership as desirable foreign military advisor attributes. Additionally, as one former advisor states, “If you don’t have interpersonal abilities and are a self starter you are useless as an advisor.”² All advisors must have the innate desire and ability to work with people of other cultures.

Training

This research indicates that advisor pre-deployment training is of limited value. Survey data reveals linguistic and culture fluency are not attainable in two months of training and cohesion cannot be taught, it must be attained through effective leadership. Literature, interviews and survey comments point out interpreters are essential to effective communications with host nation security forces. Simple advisor efforts to express appropriate greetings and gestures appear sufficient to build the necessary levels of rapport with foreign counterparts. Foreign military personnel can sense when leaders and advisors are not genuine. Daily demonstration of innate interpersonal skills like patience, perseverance, approachability, modesty, and empathy are more directly connected with building rapport and influencing. These natural attributes originate and are nurtured throughout childhood. This is not to say that all leaders are born. On the contrary, a shared belief in the Army is that a leader’s abilities are developed with time,

instruction and experiences. As doctrine points out, not all Soldiers are considered suitable advisors. Soldiers who do not have a genuine desire to serve with foreign security forces will probably not attain or demonstrate these innate interpersonal skills. SF has psychologically evaluated candidates over many years for this very reason. Literature, interviews, and surveys reveal Soldiers must be found with these intrinsic personal abilities to serve as foreign military advisors.

Future of the Advisor Mission

The new AAB concept may counterbalance the strain on the Army force management system because BCTs inherit primary responsibilities for manning teams. This concept will also likely unify advisory efforts under one command; yet the primary issue of Soldier suitability still remains. There is also the underlying problem of BCT decentralized selection and the lack of universal screening criteria. Unit commanders, officers and senior noncommissioned officers know their troops; however they often cannot discern the nuances or demands of the foreign military advisor mission. Shared experiences amongst recent advisors reveal a propensity of commanders to hold onto their most competent Soldiers and leaders, not allowing them to serve as advisors. Still, cautious screening and selection of future advisors appear likely to reduce replacement percentages and more importantly provide enhanced leadership and cohesion on teams, thereby improving performance.

Recommendations

The Army should maintain the current advisory team construct. However, the SF model for centrally screening, selecting and qualifying foreign military advisors should

be incorporated, with modifications. Human Resources Command (HRC) should retain current responsibility for manning teams, but with specific changes to selection and assignment policy and procedure. A description of a complete four phase selection, screening, assignment, and developmental qualification process is detailed in Appendix C.

Recommendations for Future Research

A number of issues and unanswered questions emerged during the course of this research. These issues may warrant future research: combat replacements; incentive programs, and centralized selection board composition. A high number of advisor replacements in combat would substantiate this study's conclusions and possibly identify specific or new catalysts for performance issues. Quantitative and qualitative research on incentive programs is needed to determine if they are effective or conducive to acquiring suitable Soldiers for the advisor mission. Further research on the topic of centralized selection board composition could enhance the effectiveness of a selection board process.

Summary

This study examined a perceived problem of poor team cohesiveness among U.S. Army foreign military advisor teams. Causes of the perceived problem were sought through a review of literature and primary data collection through interviews and surveys of experienced foreign advisors. Data collected was analyzed to reveal common experiences, opinions, and perceptions among experienced advisors. Four major factors emerged from this analysis of the contributors and impediments to cohesiveness: 1) mission complexity and environment; 2) team leadership; 3) training, and 4) Soldier

attributes. The results of this analysis were further examined and subsequently combined or synthesized to derive conclusions about the perceived relative importance among experienced advisors of the factors under investigation. Leadership and Soldier attributes emerged as the most important factors, and as the factors that lent themselves to pre-assignment advisor candidate selection, screening, and qualification. From these conclusions, a recommendation was developed, based largely on a successful Special Forces model, for centralized selection and screening by HRC, followed by a qualification course.

¹ Anonymous comment extracted from survey data prepared by David Bitters, Quality Assurance Office. Survey for BCKS Link and CGSC Open-Ended Comments, 12 March 2009, 1.

² Ibid., 1.

GLOSSARY

- AAB:** Advisory and Assist Brigades are designated Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) with field grade advisor officer augmentation. The exact structure of the organization is not known.
- BCKS:** The Battle Command Knowledge System website is part of the Army-wide knowledge network. Soldiers may access thirty seven professional forums through this site on topics ranging from recruiting to counterinsurgency.
- CGSS:** Army Majors attend a 10 month military art and science course Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Departmental instruction includes history, leadership, joint operations, tactics, and logistics.
- FID:** Military and governmental agency assistance to protect foreign societies from hostile entities.
- HRC:** A personnel management organization with four career divisions and support staff who manage and satisfy global Army force management requirements. Officers and enlisted career managers assign Soldiers to certain bases or garrisons using universal selection criteria.
- JCISFA:** The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance gathers and analyzes lessons learned at Fort Leavenworth from different contemporary operations to make the Army's advisory missions more effective.
- LNO:** Liaison Officers facilitate communication, guidance and, or coordination between different levels of command, military services or foreign governments and, or militaries.
- MiTT:** The Military Transition Team is an externally manned and trained eleven man advisor force responsible for daily advising, training and mentoring of Iraqi security forces on intelligence, logistics, communications, administration, and maneuver or infantry tactics.
- MOS:** Military Occupational Specialties are assigned to all officers and enlisted Soldiers - when they join the military. This is one key criteria branch managers consider in satisfying Army force management requirements.
- PRD:** Personnel Review Documents are maintained by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Div Transition Team administrative officer (S1) at Fort Riley. They record the causes for advisor replacement during pre-deployment training.
- PSRC:** The Army G1 uses Positional Special Reporting Code to identify and assign officers to duties requiring special skills outside of their normal occupational specialties.

SFAS: All SF candidates must successfully complete the three week Special Forces Acquisition and Selection course to proceed onto the fifty five week qualification course.

APPENDIX A
ADVISOR INTERVIEW

Background

1. What was your duty position on the advisor team?
2. What was your rank when you served on the team?
3. What was your occupational specialty at the time?
3. Did you volunteer for advisor duty?
4. How long was your advisory tour?
5. Where were you deployed?
6. How were you chosen for the duty?
7. How many soldiers were on your team?
8. Did you serve on a Bn (field), Bde (District), or DIV (Provincial) advisor team?

Preparation

9. Did you receive advisor training? If so, did it adequately focus on team building and advisor skills for effective (Host-Nation) counterpart rapport building?
10. (If applicable) Did your team complete training together?
11. Were the members of your team tactically, technically, physically and, or personally (character traits/attributes) ready for the mission? Please explain.
12. Did your team encounter personnel problems **prior** to deployment? For example, quarreling/disagreements among teammates, injuries, disciplinary or other issues that may have caused loss/replacement of a team member.
 - How was the problem/issue handled?
 - Could the situation have been handled better?
 - What role should the training (Brigade/unit) play in sorting through these problems?

- What role should the advisor team chief/leader play in sorting through these problems?
- Does the chain of command adequately address personnel problems encountered by teams? If not, what should be changed? For example, should the advisor chain of command or aligned coalition force unit process, or should the team chief have UCMJ authority?

Deployment

15. Did your team deploy together? If not, please explain.

16. Did your team encounter personnel problems during the deployment? For example, quarreling/disagreements among teammates, injuries, disciplinary or other issues that may have caused loss/replacement of a team member.

17. What was your command and control (C2) relationship with aligned U.S. forces and, or other advisor teams?

- Did your attached unit integrate your team into the planning and, or operational process?
- Did the coalition force commander in your AO utilize your team as merely liaison, or did he acknowledge and fully understand your training and advising mission?
- What was your C2 relationship with the higher advisor unit in your chain of command?
- Generally speaking, what worked well and not so well concerning command and control?

18. How did your team receive logistical and administrative support?

19. Did lethal and, or non-lethal stress affect you mission? If so, please explain.

20. What stresses did you feel were unique to the advisor role?

21. How much of what you did as an advisor went beyond performing duties of your Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)?

22. What skills did you rely on that were not related to your MOS?

23. What critical skills and, or personal attributes should every advisor exhibit:

- To be a successful advisor?
- To be a contributing member of an advisor team?
- To be a successful team chief/leader?
- Are they the same as those skills/attributes needed for conventional duty positions/roles, like battle captain or staff?

24. Did you develop skills or attributes during your advisor tour that helped you in subsequent assignments? Please explain.

25. Should Army career managers continue to assign soldiers to advisor duty, or should there be a screening and selection process based on set criteria?

- If you believe selection is necessary, should selection be centralized at the Human Resources Command (HRC) or decentralized at the individual command level? Why?
- What should selection criteria consist of? For example, previous combat experience, strategic assignments, professional military/civilian education, language proficiency (DLAB score), MOS, rank.
- If you believe (pre)screening is also necessary before selection, what should the criteria consist of? For example, PT test, physical, psychologically evaluation, or commander's recommendation.

26. Do you think the advisor mission and its objectives are effective in improving the security forces of host nations?

- What's working?
- What should be changed?

APPENDIX B

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM (MiTT) SURVEY

(Making the Army's Advisor Teams More Effective)

I am an Army Officer serving in a faculty position in the Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. I am conducting research on the effectiveness of our military advisor teams.

Your input is important for this research. The survey will take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Participation is voluntary and all information collected is strictly confidential. No personal identification will be made in the context of my writing.

Thank you for assistance. Your efforts will go far in making the Army's advisor teams more effective.

This survey has been approved by the Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Office and the Army Research Institute.

QAO survey control number is 09-043.

Survey Approval Authority: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences survey control number: DAPE-ARI-AO-09-12

RCS: MILPC-3

1. Did you volunteer to serve on a Military Transition Team? {Choose one}

Yes

No

2. What was your status/component when you served on a MiTT? {Choose one}

Active

Reserve

National Guard

3. What was your rank at the time? {Choose one}

Major

Captain

Lieutenant

Master Sergeant

Sergeant First Class

Staff Sergeant

Other []

4. What is your branch or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)? {Choose one}

Acquisition

Adjutant General

- Air Defense
- Armor
- Aviation
- Chemical
- Civil Affairs
- Comptroller
- Engineer
- Field Artillery
- Finance
- Functional Area Officer
- Human Resources
- Infantry
- Logistician
- Military Intelligence
- Military Police
- Ordnance
- PSYOPS
- Public Affairs
- Quartermaster
- Signal
- Special Forces
- Transportation
- Other []

5. What is the highest level of professional development course you successfully completed prior to serving on an advisor team? {Choose one}

- Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)
- Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC)
- Captain's Career Course (CCC)
- Command and General Staff School (CGSS)
- None

6. What was your last assignment prior to serving on a MiTT? {Choose one}

- MACOM Other []
- BCT/RCT
- Battalion/Company
- Civil Schooling
- ROTC/Military Academy
- AC/RC
- Strategic
- Recruiting

7. In what duty position did you serve on the advisor team? {Select all that apply}

- Team Chief
- S1/HSC

- S2/Intelligence
- S3/Operations
- S4/Logistics
- S6/Communications
- Executive Officer
- Medic
- NCOIC

8. When did you serve on the advisor team? {Select all that apply }

- 2003
- 2004
- 2005
- 2006
- 2007
- 2008

9. Did you complete a 6-15 month combat tour in Iraq or Afghanistan prior to serving on an advisor team? {Choose one }

- Yes
- No

10. Did you serve on an external trained (Fort Riley) team or internal (BCT/RCT) team? {Choose one }

- External
- Internal

11. Did you attend training at Fort Riley? {Choose one }

- Yes
- No

12. (If applicable) What is your assessment of the pre-deployment training on ADVISOR SKILLS at Fort Riley? {Choose one }

- Excellent (no changes required)
- Satisfactory (minor changes/modifications required)
- Unsatisfactory (major improvements required)

13. (If applicable) Do you think adequate time is built into the training schedule at Fort Riley to facilitate team development? {Choose one }

- Yes
- No
- Undecided

14. What phase of development was your team upon arrival in Iraq? {Choose one }

Forming - High dependence on leader for guidance and direction. Individual roles and responsibilities are unclear. Leader clarifies team purpose, objectives and external

relationships.

Storming - Decisions do not come easily within group. Team members struggle for position as they attempt to establish themselves in relation to other team members and the leader. Cliques and factions form and there may be power struggles.

Norming - Agreement and consensus is largely formed among the team, who respond well to facilitation by the leader. Smaller decisions are delegated and big decisions made by group agreement. Commitment and unity are strong.

Performing - Team has a shared vision and are able to operate independently from leader participation. Disagreements occur but now they are resolved within the team positively and necessary changes to processes and structure are made by the team.

Undecided

15. In your opinion, did your advisor team achieve full development and experience cohesiveness? {Choose one}

Yes

No

Undecided

16. (If applicable) How long did it take for your team to fully complete development? {Choose one}

1-2 Months

3-4 Months

5-6 Months

7-8 Months

9-10 Months

11-12 Months

17. Did frequent disagreements (partisan and, or contentious quarreling) affect team unity/cohesion? {Choose one}

Yes

No

Unsure

18. Did you observe poor team unity/cohesion in other advisor teams during your tour? {Choose one}

Yes

No

Unsure

Not Applicable

19. (If applicable) When did team disagreements/conflicts surface? {Choose one}

Before arrival at Fort Riley

During Pre-deployment Training

Kuwait

Iraq

- During Redeployment
- Unsure

20. Definitions are provided below for three of the most common leadership styles; please read each and determine what leadership style you as a team chief or your team chief MOST relied on in leading your team? Note that a leader may use a combination of these styles.

Authoritarian: Subordinates have no decision making authority - are told how to accomplish tasks without providing feedback/advice.

Participative: One or more subordinates are fully vested in the decision making process. Leader does not pre-approve every decision or task.

Delegative: Subordinates are allowed to make some decisions and carry out tasks with leader's prior approval; however, the leader retains overall approval authority. {Choose one}

- Authoritarian
- Participative
- Delegative
- Combination of all three
- Authoritarian & Delegative
- Delegative & Participative
- Participative & Authoritarian
- Unsure

21. (If applicable) What do you think the causes were for the disagreements/conflicts? {Choose all that apply}

- Poor Leadership (inability to influence/lead)
- Environment (stress associated with combat and austere living conditions)
- Mission Complexity (C2 structure, situational awareness, culture and competing loyalties)
- Lack of Team Development
- Lack of Professionalism (Tact/bearing)
- Lack of Proficiency (Tactical/technical)
- Other []

22. How effective is the current assignment policy on selecting soldiers for the advisor mission? {Choose one}

- 90-100% (Completely Effective)
- 75-89% (Partially Effective)
- 74% - below (Ineffective)

23. Do you think future advisors should be selected using a centralized selection board process with a set of expanded screening criteria (including psychological, medical, and

previous assignment consideration), or continue using the current assignment policy with the standard set of screening criteria of MOS, rank, security clearance, and dwell time?

{Choose one}

- Select
- Assign
- Undecided

24. If you believe future advisors should be selected, what criteria should be considered?

{Check all that apply}

- Personal Attributes (Character, Behavior, and Traits)
- Combat Experience
- Tactical Experience
- Advisor Experience
- Willingness to work within a small team
- language ability/aptitude
- Tactical knowledge
- Technical (MOS) Knowledge
- Willingness to work with Foreign officials

25. Rank order or prioritize the essential advisor skills listed. {Rank the following from 1 to 6}

- Tactical Proficiency
- Technical (MOS) Proficiency
- Language Proficiency
- Cultural Understanding
- Leadership (ability to influence)
- Other []

26. Rank order or prioritize the following (FM 6-22) leadership attributes (what a leader is): {Rank the following from 1 to 3}

- Character (Army Values, Empathy, Warrior Ethos)
- Presence (Military Bearing, Physically Fit, Composed, Confident, Resilient)
- Intellectual Capacity (Mental Agility, Sound Judgment, Innovation, Interpersonal Tact, Domain (MOS) Knowledge)

27. Rank order or prioritize the following (FM 6-22) leadership competencies as they relate to the advisor position (what a leader does). {Rank the following from 1 to 3}

- Leads (Extends influence, leads by example, communicates)
- Develops (Creates positive environment, prepares self, develops others)
- Achieves (Gets results)

28. Would you voluntarily serve on another advisor tour? {Choose one}

- a. Yes (Under current conditions)
- b. Yes (With more incentives)
- c. Yes (With changes to the assignment policy)

- d. Yes (With changes to pre-deployment training)
- e. Combination of b & c
- f. Combination of b, c & d
- g. Combination of c & d
- h. No
- i. Undecided

29. Any general comments or remarks? Further explanations for 'other' choices. {Enter answer in paragraph form }

Once again, your assistance is much appreciated. Your input is of great value to the U.S. Army advisory effort! Please ensure you click the FINISH box before you close the survey, or it will not save. Thank you!

APPENDIX C

SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS

Advisor candidates should be centrally screened and selected using a three phase process before proceeding to phase four training and qualification at Fort Polk, Louisiana. 162nd Infantry Brigade will assume the advisor training mission in 2010. Standard Army assignment procedures still apply and constitute the initial phase for finding suitable advisors. Soldiers will send their duty preference choices to HRC career managers. In turn, HRC will notify available Soldiers and unit personnel managers of future advisor requirements. The main difference originates in the requirement for Soldiers to be screened by their units using a common set of criteria.

Commanders complete the second critical phase in the screening process. Unit administrative sections and chains of command identify prospective volunteers, pre-screen personnel records, schedule and complete Army Physical Fitness Tests (APFT), physical and psychological assessments. Candidate certification will be documented on an official memorandum signed by the first Lieutenant Colonel in the chain of command and sent to HRC (see figure 14).

Office Code	Date
Memorandum for Human Resources Command	
Subject: Screening Certification for Foreign Military Advisor Candidate, <u>Last Name, First Name</u> <u>MI, Rank, last four of SSN,</u>	
1. <u>Rank and name</u> was screened and found suitable for foreign military advisor duty.	
2. Previous leadership positions and assignments include:	
3. No UCMJ actions documented.	
3. APFT: _____ Pass; _____ Fail. Score:	
4. <u>Rank and name</u> passed the physical examination on date <u>Medical profiles - ?</u>	
5. Psychological (MMPI) exam: _____ Favorable; _____ Unfavorable.	
6. The point of contact for this memorandum is.....	
	John M. Doe Colonel, IN Commanding
<u>Encl.</u> Medical Profiles MMPI	

Figure 13. Screening Certification Memorandum Example

The third phase is the centralized HRC selection process. The existing Command Selection List (CSL) board is presented as a model for selecting future advisors. The board will select and notify advisor candidates and units immediately following adjournment. If recommendation packets are late or incomplete, Soldiers may resubmit their packet when the next board assembles. Units and selection boards should not waive psychological, physical and leadership criteria. Soldiers must pass their physical exam with a minimum score of 229 and have a psychological profile conducive to SF operational standards. Standard counseling and evaluations should document a Soldier's ability to lead. Any inconsistencies should be annotated on the screening certification memorandum. The board retains the final decision for selection; however unit commanders and Soldiers should be permitted to appeal for further consideration.

The fourth and final phase is qualification at Fort Polk. Advisors must demonstrate competency in advisor skills and leadership. This can be accomplished through a series of written evaluations from cadre, subordinates, peers, and superiors. Advisor skills could essentially be assessed on a pass fail basis. The online Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) system should be used as an appraisal. The sensitive nature and amount of time required for adequate objective review suggests the need for a leadership department within the training command. They would review and maintain all evaluations for each team and class. This would also necessitate a diverse rank structure within the department to notify the training chain of command when issues arise. This leadership appraisal system could also identify problems with cohesion on teams.

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