A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

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Counterinsurgency doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgency can provide a flexible framework to augment current counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposed model can serve as a guide for educating counterinsurgency forces to plan and conduct operations and understand the implications of their actions to gain popular support. While the model is not all inclusive, it does provide a way to conceptualize the underlying beliefs and perceptions that need to be targeted for effective counterinsurgency. Social engagement of the host nation population is also crucial for effective counterinsurgency, thus elements of social psychology and attitude change are integrated into the proposed model. A current and an historic case of counterinsurgency are presented to illustrate the importance of deliberately targeting underlying beliefs in the host nation population. Through proper and early targeting of these underlying beliefs, and continuous reassessment of the relevant parameters, the belief targeting model can enhance operations to garner host nation support.
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A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO COIN: COUNTERING DANGEROUS BELIEFS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

13 May 2009
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Abstract

A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

Counterinsurgency doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgency can provide a flexible framework to augment current counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposed model can serve as a guide for educating counterinsurgency forces to plan and conduct operations and understand the implications of their actions to gain popular support. While the model is not all inclusive, it does provide a way to conceptualize the underlying beliefs and perceptions that need to be targeted for effective counterinsurgency. Social engagement of the host nation population is also crucial for effective counterinsurgency, thus elements of social psychology and attitude change are integrated into the proposed model. A current and an historic case of counterinsurgency are presented to illustrate the importance of deliberately targeting underlying beliefs in the host nation population. Through proper and early targeting of these underlying beliefs and continuous reassessment of the relevant parameters, the belief targeting model can enhance operations to garner host nation support.
It is just as important that the minds of leaders and men...be adapted to the special demands of counterinsurgency warfare.

--David Galula
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice

Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgencies can provide a flexible framework to augment current COIN doctrine. The proposed model can also serve as a guide for educating COIN leaders as they plan and conduct operations; in addition, this model may enhance the ability of COIN forces to understand the implications of their actions to gain support of the population.

The scope of this paper is limited to providing (1) an introductory framework that illustrates the underlying belief structures that encourage active or passive support of insurgencies, (2) historic and contemporary examples of targeting these beliefs both directly or indirectly, and (3) recommendations for the inclusion of a coherent cognitive theory that can guide military COIN operations to increase popular support. Social engagement of the population is crucial for effective belief targeting, thus elements of social psychology and attitude change are integrated into the proposed model. The primary objective for COIN forces in countering dangerous beliefs is to diminish the intensity of the belief, and consequently diminish the impact of the belief (passive or active support for insurgents). Figure 1 in Appendix A illustrates the fundamentals of this model and the compatibility with doctrinal concepts.

**Hearts and Minds**

The term “winning hearts and minds” has a long history in COIN literature and military lore. However, the term lacks specificity. The proposed dangerous beliefs model
provides a theoretically cohesive structure for COIN operations to enhance support of the population and provides more fidelity on what constructs should be targeted in hearts and minds operations. The traditional hearts and mind approach has often led to “social transformation” initiatives that overlook more pragmatic steps. In reality, the population is not simply an emotional monolith that responds to simple entreaties but a group that engages in rational reasoning. Just as our enemy is a thinking enemy, so is the population during the time of an insurgency. However, experience shows that COIN forces often miscalculate the motivations and needs of the host nation population.

**Insurgency Defined**

The following definition of insurgency is extracted from a Central Intelligence Agency pamphlet, *Guide to the Analysis of an Insurgency*:

Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and cert party organization and international activity—is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.

A fundamental grievance provides the entry for insurgent interaction with the populace. The people then choose to support or facilitate insurgent action because they believe the insurgents can best meet their needs and that the government cannot.

**Dangerous Beliefs and Counterinsurgencies**

The original five dangerous beliefs were described by two prominent psychologists with expertise in ethnopolitical conflict. Eidelson and Eidelson conducted an extensive review of sociological, social psychological, cross-cultural, and political literature. The five dangerous beliefs identified by Eidelson and Eidelson include: vulnerability, injustice,
distrust, helplessness, and superiority. Based on the breadth of their analysis, they consider these beliefs to have cross-cultural application.\(^5\) Harry Triandis, a noted expert in cross-cultural psychology, supports the notion of underlying beliefs within a culture and proposes that “culture is reflected in shared cognitions, standard operating procedures, and unexamined assumptions.”\(^6\)

The dangerous beliefs model posited in this paper considers the development of the atmosphere that foments support for an insurgency within a population. These five beliefs can be seen on a continuum, and all beliefs may have an interactive influence with other beliefs. The proposed dangerous beliefs model of counterinsurgencies provides for a deeper analysis of operational effects, as a common tendency of COIN operations is to depend on “face value” analysis and mirror image how Americans would perceive operations. Therefore, this model affords COIN leaders a cognitive prism to assist in deeper analysis and planning of operations. A description for each belief and application to COIN is provided below.

**Vulnerability**

The belief that one is vulnerable is the most central belief of the dangerous beliefs model. Groups holding this belief may see themselves as susceptible to victimization and dangerous threats from outside groups.\(^7\) During an insurgency, the population is often threatened or intimidated by insurgent forces. Not only does the local population experience grave physical dangers associated with being on the sidelines of a battle between Americans and the insurgency, but they also experience direct threats made by members of the insurgency toward their livelihood, families, and homes.
The use of force plays an integral role in countering dangerous beliefs, and it is often the only tool that can provide the initial security for the population. Security is the imperative foundation to target further dangerous beliefs. The minority favorable to COIN forces cannot mobilize the population until the dangerous threat of the insurgents has been adequately diminished. However, an overemphasis on security actions, especially kinetic operations that result in collateral damage, can result in increased acrimony. It must be recognized by COIN forces that an action at one point in time may counter the belief of vulnerability, but as such security measures increase, additional restraint is required to prevent the perception of injustice on the part of the population being protected. Besides collateral damage concerns, travel restrictions and curfews may also limit economic opportunity and eventually cause resentment.

There are apparent phases in mitigating the helplessness belief within a populace. It may initially require a strong external COIN force, but without the transition of responsibility for security to the host nation or locale, vulnerability is only exacerbated. As Galula states, “in the middle stage of the war…the population’s attitude is determined not by popularity, but which side provides safety, is the most threatening, and which one is likely to win.”

**Injustice**

The belief of injustice is based on the perception of being singled out unfairly for mistreatment by others. When injustice reaches a high level within a group, the development of violent insurgencies becomes more likely. Perceptions of injustice are especially salient for the population in an insurgency. As COIN forces establish physical security, provide economic benefits, and facilitate political representation, sect or sub-group perceptions of unequal treatment or injustice are common. The perception of arbitrary
detentions and widespread collateral damage experienced by a particular group also serve to strengthen the injustice belief.

Providing members of the population with reparations for excessive collateral damage incurred is one method of diminishing perceptions of injustice. Granting limited amnesty prevents putting all active and passive insurgent supporters in an inescapable and often escalatory position. Allowing the ability to save face or alter course is necessary, and the collective belief structure is likely to remain intractable if there is no perceived release valve. Overall, striving for equal or favored treatment is an important objective for sects and minority groups within the population.

**Distrust**

The belief of distrust is based on the presumed hostility and malicious intent of others.\(^{13}\) Insko and Schopler reported evidence from research in social psychology that groups are more inclined to be distrustful towards one another than are individuals of one another.\(^{14}\) This distrust can be toward any or all out-groups, especially in the context of historic oppression or current armed conflict.

Fostering trust with the population through proximity, engagement, and responsiveness is likely to benefit COIN forces. With deliberate engagements that elicit trust, the population is more likely to provide information on insurgent activities and communicate more openly about their perceptions concerning both COIN forces and insurgent forces. In the end, trust may not be in the COIN forces themselves, but in the effectiveness of security operations and the viability of the host nation government.

**Helplessness**
The belief of helplessness is the perceived inability to influence or control events. However, in the case of insurgencies, believing one is helpless does not necessarily mean a sense of impotence. Helplessness may also apply to existing group leaders that have power to apply, but are helpless in avoiding conflict or applying their power unilaterally. This compels the group to choose the side which appears most viable. For example, a group may choose to support the insurgency because they provide the most hope for future security.

In later stages, putting the face of the host nation on COIN operations requires external COIN forces to remain in the background for military operations. To best empower the people with a stable government, initiatives should be crafted such as there is a realistic attribution of credit to the government, not the occupying COIN forces.

According to Galula, “The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.” However, depending on the group’s intentions and capabilities, if the belief of helplessness is targeted along with security and vulnerability, you may have the conditions to shift the hostile minority to the neutral majority or even the minority favorable to COIN forces. This is arguably the case in the Anbar province example presented later in this paper.

**Superiority (Entitlement)**

The belief of superiority “encompasses shared convictions of moral superiority, "chosenness", entitlement, and special destiny.” For the proposed dangerous beliefs model of counterinsurgencies, this belief is referred to as entitlement. The group thinks that because of their shared history and unique qualities, they are entitled to certain privileges. They may also see out-groups as morally and culturally inferior. Entitlement is distinguished from injustice because it does not just seek equal treatment, and entitlement conceptually differs...
from distrust because it is also about the “specialness” and uniqueness of the in-group. The entitlement belief can be seen as a group believing that they are isolated in their oppression and that other groups may even deserve the oppression they are undergoing. R. Scott Moore further describes the influence of entitlement, “historically, the most intractable and bloody insurgencies have been rooted in extremist and exclusionary beliefs about identity, especially ethno-nationalism, cultural exclusiveness, religion, or a combination of the three.”

Shared hardship and sacrifice by COIN forces also erodes the perception of entitlement by the local population. Thus, addressing the entitlement belief with the provision of COIN commitment diminishes the resentment over “not getting what they deserve.”

Integrating this belief model with social engagement of the population is critical. Therefore, based on the underlying beliefs and the principles of social psychology, we can glean principles for countering dangerous beliefs in a host nation population.

**Social Psychology and COIN**

Social psychology and social cognitive theory provide useful insight into influencing a local population. A tenet of social cognitive theory is that “beliefs, expectations, self-perceptions, goals and intentions give shape and direction to behavior.” Human expectations and beliefs are developed and changed by social influences that elicit emotional reactions through modeling, teaching, and social persuasion. Perceptions can be viewed as the conduit to the underlying beliefs. Changing beliefs is generally more of a long-term venture, while perception change can incrementally serve to modify beliefs and attitudes.

To help foster attitude change, an ongoing social relationship is required with a focus on limiting exposure to alternatives and social reassurance when post-decision (i.e., to
support COIN forces) dissonance or anxiety develops. Based on his seminal research, Festinger also describes the importance of offering incentives up to the threshold of compliance, or in common terms, “don’t give an offer they can’t refuse.” You can potentially encourage greater long-term attitude change with more modest, practical, and intrinsic incentives. In the same vein, Wolf states that the standard hearts and minds approaches often lead to ambitious initiatives that overlook more simple and practical steps.

For example, enhancing an indigenous irrigation structure may be preferable to constructing an expensive and elaborate irrigation system. In addition, it is critical to insure that people have a good idea of the risks and benefits of their decision. Therefore, if circumstances become difficult, the new recruits will not easily give up on their decision (i.e., support the counterinsurgency).

The constructs of moral disengagement and diffusion of responsibility are important when considering active or passive support of violent insurgencies. Moral disengagement refers to the detachment of moral restraint from inhumane behavior; the diffusion of responsibility refers to the group phenomenon that occurs when responsibility is not directly assigned and individuals are more likely to engage in conduct they otherwise would not engage in unilaterally. In his seminal research in social psychology, Milgram demonstrated that individuals act more violently when perceived legitimate authority accepts responsibility for their actions. Kilham and Mann’s research found that individuals not held responsible for carrying out violence and not held responsible for making the decisions are more likely to experience moral disengagement.

While the dangerous beliefs model may have adequate universal relevance, belief manifestations are greatly influenced by societal and cultural dynamics. Kunda provides
clarity on social cognition and cultural differences and proposes that non-westerners may perceive other people’s conduct as determined by their role in society and interpersonal context rather than their personalities. However, Kunda has proposed that westerners see behavior as suggestive of a disposition or individual personality flaw. In the context of counterinsurgency, this has serious implications for an information operations campaign that focuses on the evil nature of an individual leader. For example, if the population sees the insurgent’s behavior as a result of a social role and not due to a moral defect, simply vilifying insurgents without addressing underlying grievances is often futile. Another important cultural element is how a local population approaches dilemmas based on their shared perceptual framework. As Melucci postulates, “collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by individuals that enables them to develop a common cognitive framework for assessing the environment and calculating the costs and benefits of action.”

However, a population is not necessarily culturally monolithic, as a particular locale may include different religious sects, social classes, and centers of commerce that have cross-cultural contact. In many areas of the eastern world there are also western influences transmitted via the internet and satellite television.

In summary, the primary elements gleaned from social psychology can be seen as important enablers in changing perceptions and beliefs. Social engagement is imperative in preventing moral disengagement and encouraging attitude change. Engagement serves to humanize COIN forces and separates the population from the social influence of the insurgents. Providing legitimate authority erodes the diffusion of responsibility that the population encountered under the insurgency. In addition, enforcing responsibility for actions also diminishes the tendency to act without restraints. For example, to maximize the
empowering quality of economic assistance, the COIN leaders need to expect something in return from the population for the support provided. Proportional rewards and incentives are a key ingredient for social influence to change attitudes. Wolf postulates that striving for popular support often includes social and economic programs for the host nation, but this may be more symbolic than pragmatic. Communicating realistic expectations of COIN operations is also vital in managing perceptions of the population, as overpromising ultimately results in damaged credibility. Lastly, an understanding that the cultural perceptions of a population may not focus on individual responsibility, but social roles, is a primary factor in considering COIN operations.

**Belief Targeting Considerations**

In *Analyzing Insurgency*, John Waghelstein and Donald Chisholm remark:

> Insurgencies do not find fertile ground in a population in which most sectors are generally contented with their lot in life. Underlying conditions of real grievance are necessary, usually described by a mismatch between sentiment of a significant portion of the population and government policies, especially the provision of public goods and services.

Galula posits a local approach to COIN, and this focus allows for greater fidelity in gauging the relative magnitude of beliefs. The local approach should be the foundation of COIN planning. Within the locale, the primary goal for COIN forces is to gain respect (moral, ethical, and physical) and find the common goals that will satisfy both the counterinsurgent and population’s interest. There is a tendency for COIN leaders to become frustrated when the population does not express gratitude for sacrifices and initiatives. This perceived ingratitude may occur because the operations appear on their face to win hearts and minds, but they do not pragmatically target the underlying beliefs that fuel support for the insurgency.
Legitimacy occurs when populations and their leaders understand that the results of COIN actions benefit them more than the insurgency’s actions.\textsuperscript{39} The central question is what elements help them make the determination to choose the counterinsurgents over the insurgent? Perhaps the benefits can only be perceived as truly beneficial by the population if the underlying beliefs and perceptions are truly targeted or influenced.

The dangerous beliefs are not completely discrete constructs, but are often distinguishable and provide unique contributions to analyses. Most COIN practices will target more than one dangerous belief. The notion is to deliberately target these beliefs and balance or modify practices to achieve the greatest impact. Overemphasis on one belief or premature action can be to the detriment of others (i.e., building schools before establishing security).

Information operations (IO) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) are often seen as the psychological and cognitive approaches to COIN. However, the COIN actions themselves, including presence patrols, direct action, engaging the populace, and humanitarian projects, can be used to change beliefs and perceptions. The primary utility of IO and PSYOPS is emphasizing the intended message of the COIN actions themselves (see Figure 1, Appendix A). Other vital uses of IO to enhance belief targeting include the use of local host nation voices, and consequence management for both collateral damage and large-scale operations.

For the population, especially the neutral majority and passive supporters of the insurgency, the rigidity of beliefs may not be as ingrained.\textsuperscript{40} Countering dangerous beliefs can also be viewed as much a prevention of insurgency growth by diminishing the receptive
recruiting pool, as it is also changing perceptions of those currently supporting the insurgency actively or passively.

**Case Examples: The Philippine Moros and COIN in the Anbar Province**

The historic case of the pacification of the Philippine Moros has germane parallels with COIN operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This paper does not present a comprehensive case study or complete description of either campaign, but a series of examples extracted from the cases to illustrate the dangerous beliefs model. Both cases will be referenced to illustrate early failures and eventual successes in COIN operations, and the critical role of targeting beliefs and perceptions. This will also demonstrate that while there are stark differences in technology and weaponry, certain axioms of COIN remain relevant.

**CASE I: Pacification of the Philippine Moros, a Century Past**

The United States entered the Philippines following the Spanish-American war and began operations in 1899. Moros were Philippine natives who had adopted the Islamic religion brought to the islands by Arab missionaries in the 14th century. The Spanish were unable to rule the Moros successfully and rarely left their garrisons to engage the local populace.

General John J. Pershing spent two of his three tours in the Philippines in Moro Province. In 1909, Pershing served as the Civil Governor of Moro province and the military commander of the Department of Mindanao. Pershing followed two provincial Governors, Major General Leonard Wood and Brigadier General Tasker Bliss. MG Wood had served with a heavy hand, killing hundreds of Moros in his punitive expeditions to quell resistance. BG Bliss’ approach was more passive and even-handed, but he kept the soldiers in their posts isolated from the populace.
Pershing’s approach to quelling resistance was exemplified during the 1911 Bud Daho rebellion. About 800 Moros had fled to the mountains to make a stand. Pershing demonstrated tactical patience, used negotiating skills, cut off their lines of supply, and the end result was only 12 enemy killed. However, in a later operation in Bud Bagsak there were 500 Moros defying his order to lay down their weapons, and Pershing’s negotiations and patience were not successful in effecting surrender. Consequently, he ordered an attack on Bud Bagsak and killed nearly all the Moros there, including 50 non-combatants. Following the attack in Bud Bagsak and successful disarmament of the Moros, there was no further major resistance.

**Vulnerability.** Pershing was greatly concerned with the exploitation of the Moros by white planters and the military, and he took steps to stop this practice. The Moro Province was plagued with crime, lawlessness, and slavery, and Pershing was able to effectively reduce these activities. Pershing exercised restraint and discipline and did not tolerate arbitrary violence or punitive expeditions against the Moros.

**Distrust.** The Philippine Moros had a pervasive distrust of non-Muslims and were strongly independent. However, Pershing gained the trust of the Moros and this was integral to his success in his operations throughout the province. In 1902 Pershing made a high risk march around Lake Lanao, engaging the datus (chieftans) of various cottas (villages) and exercised considerable restraint in using military force. Consequently, he became the first non-Muslim man to be granted the title datu. He was known to take other calculated risks, at times even going unarmed into dangerous territory to meet with Moros.

**Helplessness.** Pershing communicated his long-term commitment to the Moro province and invested time and resources in economic empowerment. His use of
indigenous forces not only demonstrated his ability to gain trust, but provided a visible alternative for the Moros to participate in their own security and stability.

**Entitlement.** Pershing was able to bring historically disparate and violently antagonistic groups of Filipinos, including Moros, together for a successful trade fair. Pershing became a student of the Moros and learned about their culture, customs, and language. He believed the key to pacifying the Moros was a “human problem,” not simply a military problem. Pershing fulfilled his promises, appealed to their self-interest, and most importantly reassured them that their freedom of religion was not in danger. These actions appealed to the sense of uniqueness and entitlement of the Moros and contributed to diminished attacks against COIN forces.

**Injustice.** Pershing was a patient man and was willing to trade time for Moro lives. However, Pershing was aware that he needed to use military force against irreconcilables, or it would be perceived as weakness. His enforcement of laws was not about retaliation, but about bringing the guilty to justice.

Pershing was not the only officer to find success in pacifying the Moro people, but his actions do provide an example of how targeting underlying beliefs is effective. However, the great loss of Moro lives, which Pershing played a role in, resulted in anti-American sentiment that was even evidenced in the resistance to American involvement in the fight against Abu Sayyaf beginning in 2003.

**CASE II: COIN in Anbar Province 2004-2007**

**Vulnerability.** The use of force is imperative in depriving the insurgency of sanctuary, and this is a key to targeting the perceptions of vulnerability by the local populace. Burton and Nagle describe an inability of the COIN forces in Iraq’s Anbar Province from
2004 to 2006 to provide adequate security, and a premature push for a transition to the Iraqi security forces.\textsuperscript{64} In 2004, unmitigated insurgent intimidation and US assertions of withdrawal signaled weakness to the tribal leaders in Anbar Province.\textsuperscript{65} Fear of retribution if the insurgency outlasted the US was a powerful disincentive to cooperate with COIN efforts.\textsuperscript{66}

There are numerous examples of operational and tactical successes that were accomplished through engaging the local populace and focusing on security.\textsuperscript{67} However, instability and sectarian violence still prevented large scale success in COIN from 2004-2006. There were also political and economic reconstruction programs during this period that were not successful, primarily due to problems with safety and security. As the troop surge was just beginning in 2007, an ABC/BBC poll found that 48 percent of respondents indicated security issues as the single biggest problem, economic issues were 17 percent, and political issues 13 percent.\textsuperscript{68}

A certain degree of security began to be established as early as 2004 through the suppression of Mahdi’s Army (Shi’a) in August 2004, the second offensive against Fallujah in November 2004, heavy U.S. military presence in urban areas, and success of nationwide elections in January 2005.\textsuperscript{69} Malkasian contends that the insurgent perceptions of US military success were correlated with willingness to work with the Iraqi government and coalition forces.\textsuperscript{70} The US troop surge that commenced in 2007, coupled with the Anbar Awakening, in which many Sunni tribal sheikhs turned against al Qaeda, combined to remove a critical sanctuary for the insurgents.\textsuperscript{71}
**Distrust.** Taking risks through proximity and social engagement can build valuable trust with the population. However, the initial concentration of conventional forces on protected bases forged a schism between COIN forces and the local populations in Iraq.\(^7^2\)

Special operations forces (SOF) were a great force multiplier in Anbar province and their engagement with the local populations was another catalyst for procuring support from both the tribal sheikhs and the local populace. The SOF troops began focusing in 2004 on influencing the tribes through pragmatic longer-term approaches and built on these approaches in 2005 and 2006.\(^7^3\)

Burton and Nagle provide an example of a brigade commander of the 1st Armored Division who was able to convey the US intentions to persist until the terrorists were defeated.\(^7^4\) This message and supporting COIN actions (along with tribal engagement by SOF) set the conditions for the Anbar awakening that greatly weakened Al Qaeda in Iraq.

**Helplessness.** In 2004, SOF began to publicly provide civil affairs resources to tribal sheikhs (existing power structure), rather than serving as the “de facto” sheikhs by dealing directly with the people. In 2005 and 2006 SOF built on successes in Anbar province and were able to work with the same tribal leaders to ensure continuity.\(^7^5\) The SOF forces understood the social roles and did not see the tribal leaders as inherently bad actors, but the existing power structure that was seeking security. The tribal leaders in western Iraq were not simply moved from passive or neutral to active supporters of the counterinsurgents, but shifted from active insurgent supporters to active COIN supporters.

There are several examples of US conventional and SOF forces working with Iraqi security forces to empower the indigenous forces and successfully quell violence. For example, in 2007 a battalion of the 1\(^{st}\) Cavalry Division worked with a 2,300 man Sunni unit
to patrol a region between Baghdad and Fallujah. Consequently, attacks against US forces dropped precipitously. The conventional forces increased their presence in Anbar province in late 2005 and early 2006 and with interagency support were able to help grow the police force in Ramadi from 200 to 5,000.

**Injustice and Entitlement.** The insurgency in Iraq began among many nominal Baathists, including Sunni educators and administrators. As Galula points out, “For it is among the rejected elite that the insurgents can find the indispensable leaders.” The de-Baathification resulted in resentment and a firm belief in the injustice of the US occupation. In summer of 2004, moderate Sunnis found they had no real stake in the new sovereign government and determined to continue support for the insurgency. As of March 2005, few Sunnis were in pivotal government position and Shi’a areas were given priority in economic assistance. In addition, the discovery of Shi’a secret prisons that engaged in mistreatment of Sunnis further fomented strife and confirmed the perceptions of an unjust Iraqi government.

Additionally, there were numerous sectarian-related killings by security forces. For example, Shi’a dominated Iraqi forces conducted raids in Sunni dominated Anbar province, and this inflamed sectarian tensions. Sunnis enjoyed a position of power and privilege under Saddam, and this made the mistreatment at the hands of Shi’a even more egregious.

Both the perceptions of injustice and entitlement were countered by several political and military changes. Reducing the restrictions of de-Baathification, providing Sunnis a role in the military, ensuring Sunni representation in government, and economic assistance to Sunni areas may have dissuaded the moderates from joining or supporting the insurgency. Through conventional and SOF engagement, the Anbar tribal leaders and local populace were given a place at the table and provided a more just alternative to the brutal Al Qaeda.
Limitations

Measures of effectiveness in countering dangerous beliefs are difficult to quantify. Increases of intelligence sources are the result of good will and a rational offer for increased security. As such, the numbers of insurgents turned in by the local population and reduction in insurgent attacks may be a useful metric. In addition, numbers of tribal elders or local leaders supporting the COIN forces has some utility. Also, widespread participation levels in local and national elections are strong indicators that the population is moving away from the belief of helplessness, and is taking steps to ensure justice in their political system. Ultimately, the two “conditions for irreversibility” presented by Galula are the best measures, (1) COIN troops come out of their secure bases to live among the population until the population is capable of providing the bulk of security, and (2) dedicated host nation leaders emerge to support the counterinsurgency.

The dangerous beliefs model may not generalize to all insurgencies. For example, the criminal element or opportunism may be an additional factor not covered in this model. In addition, a dispersed global insurgency with small “sleeper” cells would be less dependent on the local population for support, and thus the dangerous beliefs model for targeting population support would not be as applicable.

Conclusions

The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgencies provides a framework for designing operations to target underlying beliefs that foment support for insurgencies within a population. As the case examples illustrated, the successful operations in pacifying the Philippine Moros and progress in COIN operations in the Anbar Province were related to targeting of the five dangerous beliefs and deliberate use of social engagement. In both case
examples, an earlier focus on the underlying beliefs may have reduced the insurgent’s support and truncated the period of resistance. This model provides operational leaders and COIN forces a cognitive prism to understand the underlying changes that can be affected through targeted COIN operations. This model also presents operational leaders with factors to consider early in a campaign to improve support of the population and sustain operational successes. The two most vital enablers of this model are (1) social engagement and influence of the population and, (2) a comprehensive education of COIN forces on targeting of underlying dangerous beliefs.
Dangerous Beliefs Model for Counterinsurgencies

**Targeted Beliefs**

A. Vulnerability
B. Distrust
C. Helplessness
D. Injustice
E. Entitlement

**Change Agents:**

**Coin Forces**
Present, Engaging, Effective, Responsive, Ethical, Fair, Visible

**Coin Actions**
Security based, Empowering, Fair, Proportional (force and assistance), & Visible

**Message Enhancement**
I/O, PSYOPS Capitalize on COIN Actions*

Direct Belief Targeting & Successful COIN Operational Practices (FM 3-24)*

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<th>Targeted Belief</th>
<th>(1) Focus on the population needs and security</th>
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<td>(2) Establish and expand secure areas</td>
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<td>(3) Isolate insurgents from the populace</td>
<td>A, B, C</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(4) Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those</td>
<td>B, D, E</td>
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<td>willing to support the new government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5) Expand and diversify the host-nation police force</td>
<td>C, D, E</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(6) Deny sanctuary to insurgents</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7) Secure host-nation borders</td>
<td>A, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Protect key infrastructure</td>
<td>B, D, E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Embed quality advisors and SOF with HN forces</td>
<td>B, C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Enabling) Successful COIN Operational Practices (FM 3-24)

(1) Emphasize intelligence
(2) Conduct effective, pervasive and continuous information operations *
(3) Train military forces to conduct COIN operations

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Figure 1. This figure demonstrates the FDB model and compatibility with FM 3-24. Examples of Successful COIN Operations. Practices are paired with the primary targeted beliefs for illustration purposes.
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