

PAKISTAN'S FATA – A WICKED PROBLEM

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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In 1973 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in a seminal article, described a new form of problems as “wicked” and called for a new approach and understanding to solve these problems. They offered unique attributes and characteristics to distinguish these problems from others. The United States’ current struggle to solve the Pakistan sanctuary problem can be attributed to a failure by the administration and military to fully comprehend that this is a wicked problem and thus requires a new approach. To demonstrate clearly that the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is a wicked problem this paper will explore each of Rittel and Webbers attributes and then apply them to the current problem. The paper will then offer a new approach, given the wicked nature of the problem, on how President Obama and his decision makers can “tame” Pakistan’s FATA problem.

PAKISTAN'S FATA – A WICKED PROBLEM

In 1973 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, in a seminal article, described a new form of problems as “wicked” and called for a new approach and understanding to solve these problems. They offered unique attributes and characteristics to distinguish these problems from others. The United States’ current struggle to solve the Pakistan sanctuary problem can be attributed to a failure by the administration and military to fully comprehend that this is a wicked problem, and thus requires a new approach. To demonstrate clearly that the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is a wicked problem this paper will explore each of Rittel and Webbers attributes, and then apply them to the current problem. The paper will then offer a new approach, given the wicked nature of the problem, on how President Obama and his decision makers can “tame” Pakistan’s FATA problem.

Today the FATA provides a unique challenge. The FATA, with its 3.1 million people, is the most economically depressed region within Pakistan, with a per-capita income of half of the national average. Over half the population lives below the poverty line and the overall literacy rate is 17%, with female literacy rate at only 3%. The FATA is not fully integrated into the Pakistan political system, but is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), codified by the British in 1901. The FCR prohibits political parties and places the FATA under the direct authority of the President vice the National Assembly.¹

The importance and scope of the problem are critical. U.S. and NATO success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to success in the FATA. As long as Al Qaeda and Taliban forces are allowed to operate, train, plan and refit with impunity, success in

Afghanistan will be limited. Continued instability, brought about by extremists and their ability to strike within Pakistan, as evidenced by the Islamabad Marriot Bombing and killing of Benazir Bhutto, negatively impacts Pakistan's ability to lead and govern. Denying Al Qaeda this key sanctuary is in keeping with U.S. national security interests.²

Problem Solving

The process of problem solving usually begins with framing or understanding the problem. This is the case in both the civilian and military worlds. The Global Development and Research Center, a civilian organization that carries out initiatives in education, research and practice, in the spheres of environment, urban, community, economy and information, defines the first step in problem solving as defining the problem you want to solve. "You need to decide what you want achieve and write it down".³ U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership and 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, describe the military decision making process as a linear, step-by-step approach. The first step is recognizing and defining the problem, followed by making facts and assumptions about the problem.

As the commanders, civilian and military, responsible for solving the Pakistan issue, both have addressed the problem over the past 8 years, they utilized the above construct. They started with defining the problem and then made facts and assumptions based on the problem as they defined it. This approach has brought the United States no closer to solving the FATA problem. One cannot hope to solve a problem by using a conventional, linear approach when the very nature of the problem defies being solved in such a manner. The Pakistan FATA problem is one such problem. In order to have any hope of reaching a solution to the Pakistan FATA problem, President Obama and

his decision makers must realize they are facing a problem with a fundamentally different nature, and as such they must modify their approach, expectations, and temporal reasoning.

A Wicked Problem

In 1973, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber wrote an influential article describing a new set of social engineering problems that had a nature and characteristic profoundly different from traditional problems. They termed these new problems as “wicked”. These problems were unique in their nature because they exceeded the capacity of simple systems analysis or linear problem solving methodologies. The term “wicked” was used not to connote evil or malevolent but rather to discern the difference between a “tame” or traditional problem. They viewed the latter, although still a complex problem, as having a definable solution set. For example a chess master contemplating winning a game in five moves may be faced with a very difficult problem, one that most would not be able to solve, but yet one that does have an answer – easily defined and set. A wicked problem, on the other hand, does not have a single solution. For each attempt to apply a solution the problem morphs and changes. The result is the need for additional solutions to these new problems, which when applied, again creates more problems and solutions.

Rittel and Webber offered ten unique attributes and characteristics that set wicked problems apart from tame. To understand the true nature of the FATA problem, one must analyze it through the lens of these attributes. Each attribute will be fully explored and then laid against the current conditions in Pakistan and within the FATA.

There is No Definitive Way to Frame a Wicked Problem. For a tame problem, a comprehensive and exhausted listing of all the information one needs to solve the problem can be collected and processed, allowing one to identify a clear solution. Depending on the complex nature of the tame problem, the ease with which one can identify the solution is proportional to the ability and application of art. This approach is similar to how the military approaches developing a campaign or strategy. The assumption is that after a planner compiles all the facts, assumptions, limitations and constraints and develops several courses of action, based on his ability to apply operational or strategic “art”, a very clear and obtainable solution becomes apparent.

This construct does not apply to a wicked problem. The solution for a wicked problem will impact how the planner understands the problem. “In order to *describe* a wicked-problem in sufficient detail, one has to develop an exhaustive inventory of all conceivable *solutions* ahead of time”.⁴ A wicked problem is a tangled mess and to frame it depends on your perspective, as such that each person has a different set of issues at stake each will develop a different solution. This makes framing the problem in a way all the parties can agree to virtually impossible. Thus, to begin to solve the problem one must start with the solutions, and as each solution is developed, it changes ones understanding of the problem.

The FATA problem can be seen in this light. To even begin to understand the problem one must look toward the desired solution sets from the perspectives of all the major players. The Government of Pakistan desires to solve the FATA problem with limited blood shed and no change to the political recognition or status of the Pashto

people within the FATA. No solution will be palatable that alters their primary security and national focus on countering India's influence.

The United States wants to see the Taliban sanctuary eliminated. They would like the border sealed, and the Taliban influence diminished, in such a way as to prevent further cross border attacks. They desire for the economic and social conditions within the FATA to improve to eliminate the Taliban recruiting pool. Additionally, the United States would like to eliminate the threat and existence of senior Al Qaeda in the FATA. Finally, in an effort to reduce the potential for future transnational terrorists to call the FATA a sanctuary, the United States would like to see the Government of Pakistan extend their governance over this ungoverned space.

The Taliban, of course, desire to continue to expand their operations, conduct operational level planning and rehearsing, as well as launching, of operations from the FATA. They do not want the GOP to deploy troops into the FATA, or United States or NATO forces to deploy or occupy the FATA; and strategically they want to see the International Security and Assistance Forces in Afghanistan depart and the GOA to fail and be replaced with a Taliban political arm. Based on these divergent solutions sets, one can see how complex and wicked the FATA problem is.

We Cannot Understand a Wicked Problem without Proposing a Solution. The chess-master understands the rules and logic of the chess game. Based on this knowledge he develops a method to win the game in five moves. He does not need to know the solution to understand the problem of winning. They are separate entities: the problem is how to win in five moves, the solution is how to do it.

The wicked problem provides a dramatically different prospect. The very information need to understand the problem depends on the method and idea for solving it. For a wicked problem the problem and the solution are “identical and simultaneous cognitive processes”.⁵ One learns about a wicked problem by developing solutions. The problem/solution set is inextricably linked.

This is evident in the Pakistan FATA issue. To understand the problem one must understand the solutions, and develop them simultaneously.

Wicked Problems Have No Stopping Rule. In a tame problem one knows, through the planning process, when the solution has been reached. Again with the chess analogy, once the chess-master has determined how to win the game in five moves he has reached the solution. The wicked problem has no defined termination.

Based on the first wicked characteristic, formulating the solution and the problem were the same thing: there can be no final end-state. This process is an endless “do-loop”. For each solution there is a new set of problems, for each set of problems there is a new set of solutions, etc. Thus the wicked problem ends, not with a final solution, but when external factors come to bear. These factors can be a lack or depletion of resources, lack of interest or sheer exhaustion.⁶

This can be seen with the Pakistan FATA. Lets take a potential solution, extending governance to the FATA. The FATA is not fully integrated into the Pakistan political system, but is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), codified by the British in 1901. The FCR prohibits political parties and places the FATA under the direct authority of the President vice the National Assembly.⁷ The International Crisis Group has developed a solution in which the antiquated FCR system would be replaced

with one that brings National Assembly control of the FATA, allows for federal jurisdiction of the regular provincial and national court system, removes restrictions on political parties and introduces party-based elections for the provincial and national legislatures.⁸

Unfortunately, due to the nature of the wicked problem, this solution simply extends the problem and creates the need for more solutions. Will the Pakistan government have the resources, capacity and ability to extend governance? With governance, will the Taliban rise in legitimacy as the Hamas has in Gaza? Will the Taliban move en-mass to Afghanistan, creating stronger sanctuaries and a more difficult fight for the ISAF forces? Will Al Qaeda, living in austere conditions in isolated regions, then seek out other sanctuaries either deeper into Central Asia or perhaps Africa? Each of these problems then spurs on additional solutions, which then create more problems – the endless do-loop.

Solutions to Wicked Problems are not True-or-False, but Good-or-Bad. The tame chess problem described above has either correct or incorrect solutions. As there is only *the* or *a* solution, one can easily determine if the answer developed is the correct solution. The Wicked problem on the other hand, is not as simple. Based on the divergence of solutions, each one different depending on the perspective of the stakeholder, there can be no single right or wrong solution. As each stakeholder holds a different set of values, ideological interests and personal viewpoints, they will never be able to agree on a single true or false answer. Their solutions are expressed as “good or bad or more likely as better or worse, or satisfying or good enough”.⁹

In the case of Pakistan's FATA, this comes to light when one looks at the potential solution for limiting the Taliban's ability to conduct insurgency operations in Afghanistan. One solution-set calls for using kinetic options by the United States, uncoordinated with the Pakistan military of government. One side of this solution would see it as beneficial because it targets and neutralizes key Taliban leaders. The other side however, see the indiscriminate civilian casualties that occur and questions the value of winning the "hearts and minds" of the local tribes in an effort to eradicate support for the Taliban. Yet on another hand, again proving just how wicked this problem is, the lack of coordination between the U.S. and Pakistan governments can be seen as detrimental to the entire effort and cause. Of course, when there is collaboration prior to the kinetic strike and the intended target, through compromises in operational security, becomes aware of the impending strike and flees the area this further skews the perspective of the planners for one simple solution to the complex wicked problem – a U.S. only kinetic strike.

There Is No Immediate and No Ultimate Test of a Solution to a Wicked Problem.

The tame chess-master problem of winning the chess match in five moves allows the chess-master to, on the spot, determine if his solution has achieved the desired effect – to win or not. He can easily and immediately know if his solution has worked or not. The wicked problem again is in juxtaposition to the tame problem. As a solution for a wicked problem is executed, it sets up a series of "waves of consequences" or in military parlance, second and third order of effects.¹⁰ Although the solution may immediately create the desired effect, over time, as the waves of repercussion spread, they could change the conditions, create new problems and thus new solutions. These could prove

to be undesirable and outweigh the desired advantage of the original solution. Thus the full consequences of a solution to a wicked problem cannot be evaluated until all the waves of consequences have completely run out.

The above example of the kinetic strike in Pakistan can be further explored as an example of this wicked characteristic. Although the immediate consequence of a strike, if the intended target was neutralized or not, can be easily determined, because the FATA is a wicked problem the “waves of consequences” make it difficult to determine the true value of the strike. Assume that this strike also killed several civilians from a tribe with a specific predisposition to side against the Taliban. The death of the civilians alters their perspective and they begin to support the Taliban. This wave of support spreads to their neighboring tribes linked by marriage and soon a certain element of the population is turned against the U.S. and the Pakistan governments toward the Taliban. This would be a serious negative effect, not readily or easily determined, that would take time to develop. It therefore can be seen that although the strike may have had an immediate positive solution, because of the nature of the FATA, the long-term impacts may negatively outweigh the short-term advantage.

Every solution to a Wicked Problem is a “One-Shot Operation.” The tame problem allows the problem solver the chance to try various different solutions without penalty. The chess-master can attempt to win the chess match in five moves each and every time he plays. If he fails, this does not impact the conditions of the next match. There are no legacy or latent imprints from his previous attempt on his next game.

In a wicked problem, each attempt at a solution has consequences. Each attempt at a solution changes the conditions, creates new problems and solutions and thus

leaves behind traces, elements and latent imprints on the environment, which cannot be undone.¹¹ For this reason every attempt matters greatly, must be deliberate and well thought out most importantly, this sets up a logical dilemma for wicked problems, for “we cannot learn about a wicked problem without trying out solutions, but cannot try out solutions without changing the problem”.¹²

This becomes relevant with the Pakistan FATA problem. An ideal example of this is the attempts by the Afghan, Pakistan and U.S. governments to solve the porous border issue. Under the U.S. FATA strategy, one element is the creation of Border Management Centers. These joint U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan military and civilian establishments will process information and oversee an assigned section of the border in an attempt to reduce illicit trade and trafficking. This “one-shot” solution changes the conditions and thus the problem and solutions for the FATA. One problem that this solution affects is the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the placement of the Durand Line that marks their shared border. Since neither country is willing to discuss the adjudication of the line, as they come together in a shared command center responsible for monitoring the border the local forces cannot determine who is responsible for prosecuting illicit activity, since it occurs in disputed territory.

Wicked Problems Do Not Have an Exhaustible Set of Definable Solutions. The tame chess problem has a definitive set of solutions. The chess master, based on the rules of chess, has a limited and definable set of solutions to win the game in five moves. That is not to say it is not complex or difficult to figure out the lengthy algorithm for all the combinations of moves, but it is still a definable set of options that can be explored to develop the solution.

The wicked problem does not have pre-existing solutions. They have to be created. As one creates the solutions to a wicked problem, they do not know if they have created all the potential solutions or not. Because there is no mathematical or scientific method to determine if all the solutions have been reached, it is the judgment of the planner who ultimately decides when to stop searching for additional solutions.¹³

This can be seen within the Pakistan FATA problem. Since the outset of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, the FATA became inextricably linked to our success. Since then, every pundent, political party, faction and military branch has put forward a set of solutions. These have run the gambit from full U.S. intervention, to sealing the border; to turning the problem over to the Pakistani's in lieu of extensive funding we give to them each month. This last summer and fall, during the height of the presidential campaign, both candidates offered multiple solutions. Faced with all these potential solutions, and again these are only those being postured from the perspective of the U.S., each party involved in the problem set has their own unique set of solutions; it will fall to the senior leaders within the White House and DoD to determine when the search for solutions has been exhausted, and of course it will be this same judgment which decides which solutions we seek to execute.

Every Wicked Problem is Essentially Unique. Tame problems allow for one to classify each set of problems based on distinguishing characteristics. The chess-master will classify problems based on set positions of the pieces and definable set of moves made famous by other great chess masters. In mathematics, types of equations used to arrive at the solution can classify problems.

Wicked problems, unfortunately, do not allow for easy solutions. There is no set of rules or principles that one can use to solve a set or type of wicked problems.¹⁴ Because each wicked problem has a unique set of solutions, based on the problems, which have inextricably linked relationships, no set of solutions for one wicked problem will work for another. The art of finding a tenable solution to a wicked problem is not falling into the trap of assuming that one can apply the solution from a previous problem. When tackling a wicked problem the planner will not know early in the process what type of solution to apply.¹⁵

The Pakistan FATA problem is amply suited to this characteristic. Many military planners are quick to state that the FATA is simply a counterinsurgency problem and to solve it one must use FM 3-24, the new counterinsurgency manual. These planners believe that this manual will provide a set of rules and principles for tackling the problem. Because the FATA problem is wicked in nature, this could not be farther from the truth. The counterinsurgency advocate does not take into account the solution set provided by the Pakistan government. Because the Pakistan government does not see the current crisis as an insurgency, and is unwilling to allow for the application of U.S. forces, the simple application of counterinsurgency principles falls well short of the solutions set. Other planners classify the FATA problem as a classic irregular warfare problem, and seek to find solutions in the latest irregular warfare publications. Again, this falls short of the mark because it does not take into account all the interested parties and their perspectives on potential solutions.

Every Wicked Problem is a Symptom of Another Problem. The wicked problem, by the very nature of interconnected solution and problem, makes peeling back the

layers of the problem a very difficult and problematic issue. With the wicked problem, as one determines the solution, based on a problem, this creates further problems and solution sets. It then follows that since we are faced with an initial problem, it was caused by a previous solution/problem interconnection. How broad the planner goes to determine the cause and effect relationships is subject to judgment, since there is no defined end state or simple solution.

Pakistan's FATA problem can be seen in this context. What appears to be a simple problem and solution set is in fact just a symptom of a set of larger issues. It is these issues, and how far and broad to expand the problem set, where the strategic planner must apply judgment. The FATA sanctuary can be seen as a symptom of the view the Urdu Pakistani's have of the Pashtun people and their unwillingness to allow them into the political mainstream of society. It also can be seen as a subset of their strategic mindset vis-a-vie India. Based on years of war and conflict with India, Pakistan may want to continue to allow the FATA to maintain its status quo because it allows them a buffer-zone in which to execute defense in depth against their western front. This allows them to concentrate their military efforts eastward toward India. An additional school of thought states that Pakistan wants to keep the FATA as it is, because this allows them to manipulate the Taliban to continue to pressure the Afghanistan conflict. This achieves two objectives. First, it keeps a strong central government from taking control in Afghanistan and destabilizing Pakistan's regional balance of power. Secondly, as long as a the Taliban and Al Qaeda pose threats from within the FATA, the U.S. is committed to provide funding, training and military

equipment to Pakistan, so in order to keep these items in supply, Pakistan takes very minimal efforts to solve the problem.

The Cause of a Wicked Problem can be Explained in Numerous Ways. Because wicked problems rely heavily on their solutions to determine the problem, and each stakeholder has a unique perspective and thus solution, the entire cause and effect relationship is extremely complex. This complex nature of a wicked problem makes it difficult, if not impossible to determine which of these multiple solutions/problem sets to focus in on and attempt to solve.

Rittle and Webber provided the example of crime in the streets to explain the complex nature of the wicked problem,

Crime can be explained by not enough police, by too many criminals, by inadequate laws, too many police, cultural deprivation, deficient opportunity, too many guns, phrenologic aberrations, etc

Each of these explanations depends on what the stakeholders perspective is. It is thus a challenge for a wicked problem to decipher the stakeholders, their perspectives and potential solution/problem sets, while at the same time realizing that the planner himself has a set of perspectives that color his vision of the best solution/problem.

Like the crime in the streets example, the FATA sanctuary has multiple potential "causes". It could be caused by willingness and desire of the local tribes, predisposition and corruption of Islam, counterproductive efforts of Pakistan ISI, influence of Indian agents, economic strife, inability of the Pakistani military, existing legal constraints etc. So which one does the planner tackle to try and solve the problem of the FATA sanctuary? Can the planner only center on one? Can they all be addressed in an effective manner or are they counterintuitive?

Taming the Wicked Problem

It is clear, through the above analysis of the characteristics and attributes of a wicked problem, that in fact, the Pakistan FATA problem is a wicked problem. Recognizing this, in large part, is a major step toward attempting to solve it. The Pakistan FATA problem cannot be analyzed through the conventional lens of an already-agreed upon process for solving a problem. The FATA should not be categorized as a counterinsurgency, unconventional war, irregular war, or stability operation in an attempt to seek a set of pre-defined solutions. Because it is a wicked problem, it is volatile and subject to change, as each solution is attempted following a script will only frustrate the process as well as the planners. This drives the decision makers to utilize an adaptive, or non-linear approach toward problem solving.

The U.S. Army TRADOC pamphlet 525-5-500, Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design, provides an ideal base for approaching a problem from a non-linear view. This pamphlet attempts to expand upon current joint and Army doctrine by providing a construct to solve complex and ever-changing problems. In an attempt to seek a solution, the commander must first start by creating a baseline or hypothesis, by framing the problem. From this framework he can continually reassess, reframe and redefine the problem as his knowledge and understanding of the problem and operational environment improves. This approach stresses the importance of acting to learn. As one acts, changes will occur in the conditions and allow the commander to further learn and understand the problem.¹⁶ “The presumption is that a commander will not be able to understand the problem fully before beginning operations to solve it and will learn more about the true nature of the problem as he operates”.¹⁷ Critical in the reassessment process is that the decision maker can discern if the problem framing

needs to be readjusted, if the solution set is achieving results, and if his learning mechanisms are tuned into the problem to learn from the actions.

Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design provides an outstanding baseline from which decision makers can begin to seek solutions to the FATA problem. With this approach as a backdrop the current administration should adopt the following strategy that ensures an effective application of U.S. ways and means to achieve the U.S.'s strategic objective, per the *National Security Strategy*, to “prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas”.¹⁸

The administration must embrace a strategy that calls for a coordinated approach from both sides of the Durand Line and targets the root causes of instability and insecurity within the FATA. This strategy, although it includes many of the current initiatives, is distinctly different, in that it calls for the complete integration of the FATA into Pakistan governance. Additionally, it looks to overcome Pakistan’s resistance to this approach by better leveraging U.S. pressure through shifting funding away from enhancing Pakistan’s military to bolstering their precarious economy and enhancing civilian control of the government. This strategy is outlined below using the four major elements of national power as key lines of effort.

Diplomatic. State and senior U.S. officials must work with Pakistan to alter the semi-autonomous stature of the FATA and fully integrate it into Pakistan National Assembly control. The antiquated FCR system must be replaced with one that brings National Assembly control of the FATA, allows for federal jurisdiction of the regular provincial and national court system, removes restrictions on political parties and introduces party-based elections for the provincial and national legislatures.¹⁹

Pashtunwali, the tribal way of life, can be integrated into the governmental process by utilizing the *Jirga* system as a means to elect and choose local and regional representatives, who would replace the current presidential-appointed Political Agent. Understanding that this is a lofty goal, it is critical that the tribes and the local stakeholders have voice during the FATA integration decisions and process.

State must also work with Afghanistan and the international community to resolve the Durand Line issue. As the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is still unresolved, a solution will greatly quell dispute between the two capitals. Furthermore, the U.S. must encourage India to reduce their influence in Afghanistan in order to appease Pakistan and relieve their fears of Indian “encirclement”.

The U.S. must explore options with the United Nations and the international community, especially the GCC and moderate Arab nations, to seek a resolution to the FATA refugee crisis. By solving the refugee crisis, the available recruit pool for the extremists and terrorist will dry up. GCC countries should be encouraged to provide economic support, increase visas and work opportunities, which will provide them with a needed work force and employment for qualified refugees. UN and NGO relief entities should be encouraged to increase their commitment to resolve this crisis.

Information. The U.S. must carefully script its involvement in Pakistan and efforts to bring the FATA under Islamabad’s governance. No impression can or should be given that Pakistan is executing this strategy as a lackey of the U.S. This is a Pakistan solution to a Pakistan problem and the U.S., like the rest of the international community, is simply supporting Islamabad’s efforts.

Military. The U.S. must continue to train and equip the Pakistan SOF and Frontier Corps, but must also address and work with the Pakistan leadership to determine a way ahead for the Frontier Corps (FC). The FC, an arm of the Ministry of Interior, recruited and manned by Pashtu and led by the Pakistan Military, must be fully integrated into the PAKMIL. As the FATA becomes fully integrated into Pakistan governance, a plan must be in place and executed to also integrate the FC, to avoid creating a large body of disenfranchised, armed and trained Pashtu.

The PAKMIL must also be encouraged to shift their military focus from a conventional, “army-on-army” force focused on India, to a counterinsurgency force capable of defeating insurgents. The understanding is that this cannot begin until the U.S. is able to politically pressure India and Pakistan to begin to reduce the tensions surrounding the dispute over Kashmir. The U.S. should work with the UN to develop a requirement for a UN counterinsurgency force, trained and capable of engaging an insurgent enemy. This force would augment and provide a needed capability to UN Peacekeeping Forces, deployed throughout the world facing insurgencies. This UN requirement, coupled with PAKMIL’s new focus on counterinsurgency, would provide an ideal opportunity for Pakistan to continue to be a key UN troop contributor and become a recognized expert counterinsurgency force, increasing their global status.

The U.S. must curtail its unilateral counterterrorist efforts within the FATA to avoid working cross-purposes against its overall objectives. Continued strikes will further incite public mistrust and foster anti-U.S. sentiments within Pakistan. U.S. efforts must have a Pakistan face. Understanding the difficulty regarding information and operational security concerns, additional pressure needs to be placed on Pakistan to

strike at senior Al Qaeda individuals and networks. One potential carrot is to offer nuclear technological agreements, similar to those agreed to by the U.S. with India.

Economic. In light of the current international financial crisis and the perilous balance Pakistan is striking between national solvency and bankruptcy, the U.S. has an opportunity to exert pressure in exchange for economic assistance. The U.S. must immediately convert the billions of dollars being sent to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds to bolster Pakistan's struggling economy. These funds go directly to the Pakistan military to build its capacity to counter a regional state actor. Rather than focus on military improvements of this kind, the U.S. should use this money, sent directly to President Zadari's government, as a tool to help Pakistan build and grow its economic base. In exchange for these funds, desperately needed by Pakistan, Pakistan must normalize relations and trade with India and Afghanistan as well as bring the FATA into the political mainstream. Additionally, Pakistan must be encouraged to normalize and expand trade with Afghanistan and India, which will bring economic stability and growth to the entire region.

For this strategy to be successful the U.S. must link its efforts on both sides of the Durand Line. Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be viewed as separate problems but rather as inextricably linked. To achieve success in Pakistan, by following the above strategy, the U.S. must encourage Kabul to immediately bring governance, economic development and security to those Pashtun tribes within Afghanistan, that reside along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. By doing this rapidly, in an environment more permissible than the FATA, it will demonstrate to those tribal elements in the FATA that positive quality-of-life gains can come from these developments. The result will be an

increased desire and pressure within the FATA tribes to seek similar improvements.

The Afghanistan portion of the recommend strategy is outlined below using the same four major elements of national power as key lines of effort.

Diplomatic. State must sell this initiative to Karzai and his government. Success depends on the inclusion of the Pashtu tribes into the governmental process. State must immediately refocus USAID and encourage international donors and Kabul to build community and government relationships, improve health and education and spur economic growth and development within the border tribal region.

Information. The U.S. must show that Afghanistan is working hard to include the Pashtu people into the legitimate government process and spread economic prosperity to all people of Afghanistan. The theme is that by working through and with the government, security is improved and economic development can be achieved. As with the Pakistan strategy, this must be viewed, not as a U.S., but as an Afghan solution.

Military. In exchange for economic and infrastructure growth, and allegiance to the Afghan central government, the U.S., NATO and Afghan forces will expand security efforts along the border. A key element is to foster a relationship with the tribes so they work on monitoring and maintaining their own security, and the security of the border in exchange for economic and governmental development. This approach is similar to the CORDS program run successfully in Vietnam.

Economic. The U.S. must immediately commit resources to ensure that infrastructure and governance programs, to include border checkpoints, police stations, government buildings, hospitals, schools, power and water projects, can be funded.

State should utilize the billions of dollars earmarked for Afghanistan to pressure Kabul to extend governance, infrastructure and security to the border tribal regions.

This revised strategy is feasible, suitable and acceptable. It is feasible from the Pakistan perspective because, in light of the newly elected non-military government, they have the means to begin to engage in political integration. It is feasible on the Afghan side because USAID and Afghan infrastructure and the U.S. and NATO security forces are available to immediately engage the border tribes. The option is suitable from the Pakistan and Afghan sides because there is an increased desire internationally, and in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad, to see a long-term solution to the FATA crisis and full inclusion of the Pashtu people into the governmental process on both sides of the border meets international expectations. Additionally, it is suitable because, as the world economic crisis deepens, and Pakistan's national reserve shrinks to zero and her dependency on foreign aid increases, the economic influence the U.S. can exert increases. The option is acceptable because it ensures a long-term solution by targeting the root cause vice symptoms.

This new strategy does, like all options, have risk. The primary risk is the inability to get Pakistan or Afghanistan to agree to expand governance to the Pashtu living in the FATA and the border areas. Intertwined with this is the inherent risk from internal Pakistan politics. As a fledgling democracy, ripe with a long history of military coups and shifts in power, any long-term strategy must be able to withstand a shift in power. One way to mitigate this risk is to ensure that there is a solid coalition of international support and the economic, military and political incentives are high enough to ensure continued support. Additionally one cannot overlook the importance India plays in finding a

regional solution to the FATA. The U.S. must continue to strive, using all elements of national power, to pressure India to assist in finding a lasting solution to this wicked problem.

Conclusion

Through an in depth analysis it is evident that the FATA is a wicked problem. The administration, if there is any hope in addressing the issue, must first understand and recognize it as a wicked problem. From this recognition they must employ an adaptive, non-linear approach to problem solving. Ideally they should utilize an approach similar to the one outlined in the Army's Commanders Assessment and Campaign Design. With this as a backdrop they must undertake a new approach to the FATA that includes increasing pressure on the Pakistan Government, by harnessing the economic element of national power and, with this pressure, shape the behavior of the Pakistan to bring governance to the western tribal areas. This approach will only be the first set of solutions, which, due to the wicked nature of the problem will further change the problem, and therefore the administration must continually learn from their actions, reassess their efforts and adopt new solutions. Only through this approach will the U.S. truly achieve its national security objectives in Central Asia.

Endnotes

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