

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SECURITY – A UNIFIED STRATEGY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SECURITY- A UNIFIED STRATEGY

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

—The United States Constitution,
September 17, 1787

When Deterrence Fails

With the prospect of going to war looming on September 20, 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks of a week earlier, President Bush acknowledged to the world that “we are a country awakened to danger.”¹ These events, brought starkly home by network news coverage of planes crashing into the Twin Towers, forced Americans to face the reality that terrorists had infiltrated the United States to undertake the most significant attack on the nation since Pearl Harbor. The national experience of September 11 created a sense of vulnerability, promoted fear and anxiety as well as anger at the deepest level of the American psyche. National security, no longer an intellectual abstraction, became deeply personalized. It also became clear that the United States was standing in a new strategic environment. As the icons of U.S. economic and military power, the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, suffered destruction, Americans worried about where the next attack would occur. For the U.S. Government leaders, the hostile acts proved to be catalysts for a changed world view.

However, while there have been significant organizational changes and increased funding and attention to terrorist threats in response to the tragic events that occurred that September morning, nearly eight years after 9/11 the federal government

does not have a unified national security strategy with specific aims and priorities that addresses the full spectrum of threats to U.S. foreign and domestic national security.

A Paradigm Shift in National Security

Just as the United States cannot expect to eliminate national security threats altogether; it must learn from its experiences and reduce the opportunity for surprise attacks, especially ones that make American soil a “battlespace,” to use a military term. Reminiscent of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the indelible lessons of 9/11 had a transformative affect on how the United States viewed the security environment. Just as WWII indirectly shaped the postwar national security architecture, 9/11 was a catalyst for redefining the organizational breadth of the federal government to cover a tectonic shift in the strategic landscape.²

The 9/11 attacks vividly demonstrated the dangerous consequences of failing to recognize and protect against the domestic consequences of strategic threats. As with most paradigm shifts, a major change occurred in how the United States views the world. The new reality was that the preeminence of America’s global superpower status was an inadequate strategic deterrent for terrorist threats to the homeland.

Although the U.S. had already experienced less sensational terrorist attacks on U.S. soil before September 11, to include the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the deep wounds from this tragic breach of domestic security was never before so clear in terms of its ramifications. Further, the domestic consequences from Hurricane Katrina, four years later, brought with it a new standard of internal domestic security. With the advantage of hindsight in both cases, it became clear that America’s traditional concepts of national security or in the case of Hurricane Katrina, a revamped

federal response structure and plan, failed to keep pace with emerging threats and challenges from non-state actors or natural catastrophes.

The challenges presented by 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina were opportunities to reevaluate the way the U.S. views national security. Since these events, the Bush administration has taken a number of important steps to improve U.S. security. But these efforts have not adequately rectified one of the most serious flaws in U.S. security: its bifurcation into domestic and foreign components, which in turn, has formally divided its policy and strategy into international and domestic components. In this respect, the security challenges and conditions facing the Obama Administration are unlike any in recent history.

On January 20, 2009, for the first time in forty years, Barack Obama, the newly elected President of the United States took the oath of office in a time of war. Notwithstanding the global challenges facing the new President, the greatest challenge his Administration may face in the first 100 days is translating and prioritizing strategic aims into a comprehensive grand strategy that can be actualized by the federal government in an environment, which has, as the Washington Post describes it, “department-spanning 21st century issues.”³ If the noted Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz were alive today, he would also share his timeless advice with President Obama, urging him to consider the nature of the enemy when organizing and developing strategy to protect the security of the state:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.⁴

Function Follows Form

It has been said “the iron rule of bureaucracy is that to divide is to disorganize.”⁵ The challenges of the post-9/11 security environment provoked the most dramatic institutional changes to the federal government and the national security architecture since the National Security Act of 1947. Moreover, it created a division in the government’s understanding of national security, as if homeland security was something different altogether. Analogous to the statutory changes in government form and function in WWII, less than a month following the 9/11 attacks, the federal government created a new homeland security mission area.

Although the U.S. or central government has the primary responsibility for national security, it no longer has the sole responsibility to execute it. Instead, the federal government must now communicate the “common national purpose” for domestic security in addition to the strategic purpose of a global war against terrorism.⁶ Ideally, a guiding vision for this undertaking would describe the common purpose in terms of the critical linkage among national security efforts required to achieve U.S. vital interests. This relationship is an imperative for U.S. national security.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) to effect greater cooperation and coordination across the military services, departments and agencies of the U.S. Government and to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.⁷ The NSC system institutionalized federal preparedness aimed at balancing military requirements with economic realities and integrating the elements of national power.⁸ Paradoxically, the legislative branch’s mandate, intended to bring institutional stability to postwar policy-making, was viewed as an infringement on the executive branch’s

prerogatives, which “refused to create a security council that broadly represented all areas of government.”⁹ In October 2001, a month after the biggest failure in national security since the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Bush, by executive order, modified the national security architecture when he established the Homeland Security Council (HSC) to address national domestic security. The President’s decision to create a separate and distinct council for homeland security is a symptomatic of the artificial distinction made between foreign and domestic security. The deliberate decision to establish foreign and domestic security councils only served to divide governmental focus and increase complexity. It also added another layer of cumbersome bureaucracy to strategic assessment and policymaking while increasing the President’s span of control across the national security architecture. Although both councils share unity of purpose through their focus on national security, without an integrating mechanism, their efforts suffer from a lack of common direction.¹⁰ And despite all the 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations for achieving governmental unity of effort, the reality is that the HSC and NSC’s ability to work together effectively is compromised.¹¹

Furthermore, the assistants to the president for national security affairs and homeland security serve only in an advisory capacity and ideally the integration of national security advice would help remediate what the 9/11 Commission criticized as a “failure to connect the dots” in foreign and domestic national security issues.¹² In the wake of the events of 9/11 the establishment of the HSC may have seemed sound and pragmatic; however it speaks to an inability to analyze national security holistically.

Ultimately, fully integrating domestic security into the existing national security architecture and processes would have better served the President and the nation.¹³

In the years before Osama bin Laden's status as a serious national security threat, terrorist attacks on the United States and its citizens, were receiving the personal attention of presidents.¹⁴ More than a decade ago, President Clinton received intelligence reports indicating that al Qaeda planned to use aircraft as a terrorist weapon which caused him to declare that the United States was in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and sign a memorandum authorizing the killing of Bin Laden.¹⁵ In an apparent contradiction of this presidential policy, Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's National Security Advisor, testified to the 9/11 Commission, "the terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them."¹⁶ The 9/11 Commission's assertion that "good people can overcome bad structures" fails to point out that national security risks are also associated with the perceptions of officials holding key positions and individual discretion in the national security process.

President Obama is modifying the NSC system to help him with political consultation and national security policy-making. While his initial approach expands upon the statutory principals (the Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense), it does not at this time merge the domestically focused HSC members into the NSC to form a single security council.¹⁷ Perhaps foreshadowing greater unity of national security effort yet to come, less than a month after President Obama's Inauguration, General (Ret) James Jones, the National Security Advisor, remarked "the world we live in has changed so dramatically in this decade that the organizations that were created to meet a certain set of criteria no longer are terribly useful."¹⁸ It may be

time, as some argue, for a National Security Act of 2009 to more effectively guide the national security process and unity of effort in the 21st Century.¹⁹

One of those making this argument is David Rothkopf who pointed out in his book, *Running The World*, "...the NSC is given responsibility to deal with domestic and foreign dimensions of U.S. national security" and recommends "integrating them and better linking threats to consequences rather than a structure that separates 'national security' (foreign threats) from 'homeland security' (domestic consequences)."²⁰ The strength of Rothkopf's argument for integrating the NSC and HSC applies to unifying foreign and domestic national security strategy.

The Process of National Security

Perhaps the most glaring shortfall in the national security system is the absence of a process to integrate risk analysis. This problem is exacerbated by what the Congressional Research Service (CRS) describes in one of its reports as poorly designed congressional oversight mechanisms for national security.²¹ The result is a dangerous gap between the legislative and executive branches ability to facilitate transparency of domestic security risk.²² Although a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is considered by many to be the vehicle for such risk analysis, it too has its limitations as it relies on Intelligence Community analysts to make government leaders aware of emerging threats. In the case of the transnational terrorist threat, there had been no formal consideration or discussion of this subject among the executive and legislative branches of government prior to 9/11.²³ In a September 2008 report prepared by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the committees' assessed that the executive branch is

not organized to analyze the future implications of and potential seams among U.S. national security programs and activities in order to prevent terrorist attacks.²⁴ Additionally, the non-partisan Project For National Security Reform, which Congress created, in its recent study, points to "...an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation..." and "...without a realistic and creative national security strategy...no one can say what policy balances and tradeoffs are needed. No one can devise a rational investment strategy."²⁵ With all the lessons learned from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the Congressional Research Service also found it difficult to accept the fact that "strategic guidance does not always fully comply with legal mandates."²⁶

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, requires every administration to submit an annual national security strategy report to Congress.²⁷ Specifically, the newly elected President must submit his national security strategy to the Congress not later than 150 days after Inauguration.²⁸

In order to meet this legal requirement and establish direction for the nation early in its term, the new administration will have to review current policies and national security strategies. To be fully compliant with congressional intent the new Administration's strategy must articulate a coherent concept of:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States. (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression...(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives...(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power...(5) ...other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress....²⁹

Changing Perspective Changes the Strategy

In addition to complying with the law, the new Administration will, like its predecessors, use the national security strategy to communicate its foreign policy with the world and to orient international, governmental and private sector audiences to U.S. strategic aims. The National Security Strategy should also provide a vision on a grand scale for achieving the aims of protecting the homeland and advancing U.S. national security interests worldwide. It ultimately should seek to foster unity of purpose for all the elements of national power.

Further, the President's strategy should define the dynamic relationship among ends and means to minimize risk. Ideally, a unified national security strategy composed of coherent, functional strategic aims, not limited by geographic boundaries, will shape subordinate strategies and policies aimed at the full range of threats. That such a unified strategy can be devised is reflected in the HSC and NSC's efforts to develop the first national biological defense strategy in 2003.³⁰ Lastly, a unified strategy also should posture the U.S. to employ instruments and resources wisely in responding to security challenges and opportunities.

In the final analysis, the Obama Administration must assess the adequacy of the nation's capabilities to meet concomitant foreign and domestic security aims by determining whether or not to retain two distinct national security strategies. Currently considered equal in weight and importance, together the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) address foreign and domestic national security respectively. These two overarching national security strategies provide the foundation for all other national strategies. The NSS provides a broad framework for national security challenges and identifies the national

security goals and foreign policy for the elements of national power necessary to achieve those goals. Although the NSHS “complements” the NSS, it does not specifically define its relationship to the NSS.³¹ Instead, the NSHS specifically addresses the threat of terrorism and other catastrophic events in the U.S. and outlines objectives for state, local, and tribal governments as well as private sector and non-governmental organizations’ levels of effort. Further, the NSS is written in a strategic context whereas the NSHS is focused at the “operational and tactical” levels. Ultimately, the value of unifying the NSS and NSHS is in linking all levels of national effort to strategic aims and in so doing, “connect[ing] the dots” so as to initiate adequate planning capacity in among all stakeholders involved in protecting the United States from terrorist attack. Unifying the documents also addresses the concerns critics of U.S. security policy point out: the conspicuous absence of an overarching strategy in anticipating future challenges within the context of the larger post-9/11 security environment.³²

Another area needing attention concerns the stated objectives of the NSS and the NSHS, which differ with respect to security of the homeland. Homeland security is an implied strategic end of the NSS whereas the NSHS defines the “operational and tactical ways” from a predominantly domestic perspective. The NSHS also specifically addresses the threat of terrorism and other catastrophic events in the United States and outlines objectives for state, local, and private levels of effort. As indicated earlier, the NSS is required by statute to include interests, goals, and objectives vital to national security; detail the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to implement the strategy; identify the proposed short- and long-

term uses of national power to protect our interests and achieve our goals and objectives; and assess the adequacy of our capabilities to carry out the national strategy.³³ There is no such mandate for the NSHS, which contributes to a lack of transparency for Congress and the American people as to the adequacy of the national investment in domestic security.³⁴

In fact, U.S. national strategies, in general, are not governed by a single, consistent set of requirements.³⁵ In February 2004, at the request of Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated the NSS and NSHS as well as other national security strategies. The GAO developed and evaluated the strategies against six desirable characteristics for effective national strategies related to terrorism: (1) stated purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, objectives, and performance measures; (4) resources and risk management; (5) roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation.³⁶ The GAO acknowledged that national strategy is a starting point for balancing homeland security priorities with non-homeland security objectives.³⁷

The GAO's observations of the NSS and NSHS make a compelling argument for unifying national security strategy; the existence of multiple national level strategies increases complexity and difficulty in comparing goals, objectives, performance measures, purpose, scope as well as roles and responsibilities for assessing national risk.³⁸ Notwithstanding this difference in scope, it is still incumbent on the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), and Congress to analyze and understand two distinct national security strategies in order to manage risk and balance the ways and means required to achieve the strategic ends.

Assuming Strategic Risk-The Rising Cost of Security

When the national security of the United States is at risk, the Federal Government's constitutional role to protect the United States against aggression is primarily a shared responsibility between the executive and the legislative branches of government as well as the primary determinant of the ways and means by which the political ends of U.S. grand strategy are achieved. A secure homeland is an enduring vital interest; however, the complex and dynamic translation of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of power into national security policy and programs has been a source of great friction in the national security process.³⁹

Prior to the events of 9/11, the 2000 National Security Strategy spoke to the vital interests of "the physical security of our territory... (and) the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad...."⁴⁰ In 2002 President Bush reassured the American people in his State of the Union address when he told the American people, "Our first priority must always be the security of our nation."⁴¹ Three years later, in his December 19, 2005 Press Conference, President Bush remarked that

As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, to prevent this from happening again, we need to connect the dots before the enemy attacks, not after. And we need to recognize that dealing with al Qaeda is not simply a matter of law enforcement; it requires defending the country against an enemy that declared war against the United States of America...After September the 11th, one question my administration had to answer was how...we effectively detect enemies hiding in our midst and prevent them from striking us again...⁴²

In September 2008, President Bush reaffirmed his earlier strategic risk assessment when he extended the national state of emergency by authority of the Emergency Economic Powers Act based on extraordinary and immediate threats to the

United States.⁴³ Americans were reassured that the priority must always be the security of our nation; nevertheless, without a unified strategy, it is difficult to “connect the dots” to assess how domestic security is considered within the entire range of national security priorities.

The adequacy of the capabilities to carry out the national security strategies involves both a complex interdependency and competition for limited resources among the departments and agencies of the federal government responsible for this mission. The executive and legislative branches must work closely together to honor the president’s promise to the nation, that homeland security would be the priority. Unfortunately, with more than eighty-eight congressional committees and subcommittees which oversee homeland security, it only serves to fragment attention even more.⁴⁴

As the Obama Administration will learn, the national strategies require a coordinated effort of all the elements of national power in order to achieve the collective strategic aims. With these assumptions, as we saw with 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, comes added risk. Nevertheless, the gap between the threats and the nation’s capacity to meet the threats is widening, as reported in November 2008 by the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP), one of many “think tanks” which has examined U.S. strategic challenges⁴⁵ The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), another group examining related issues, recently published its study and concluded that one of the factors contributing to the dangerous gaps in national security includes the lack of a unifying mechanism that integrates governments’ national security effort.⁴⁶ In fact, the PNSR’s conclusion is consistent with many other studies in recommending major

national security reform while critically assessing the absence of a coherent strategy as a national security obstacle for legislative branch resourcing and executive branch leadership.⁴⁷ The PNSR described the highly compartmentalized nature of the executive and legislative branches as “the enemy of strategic thinking, action, and the best use of resources.”⁴⁸

The PNSR also specifically cited that the dependence on the President’s direct leadership to integrate and execute national security strategies often results in problems evolving “into disasters before they receive adequate attention.”⁴⁹ In fact, the PNSR unequivocally stated that the current system “rarely achieves integrated policy and unity of purpose... in addressing immediate, medium, and long-term national security issues.”⁵⁰ “What is needed” the PNSR reported, is a “single integrated source of directive authority...”⁵¹

In October 2008, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a colloquium report, entitled on *Leadership and National Security Reform: The Next President’s Agenda*, which argued that the added bureaucracy of the HSC is symptomatic of national security bifurcation.⁵² The report warned that “we have lost our strategy,” assessing the current system as dysfunctional, not optimizing the federal government’s national security efforts.⁵³ This position is also consistent with the PNSR report, which deems the 1947 national security apparatus as outdated and cautions the president that the lack of a coherent national security strategy impedes interagency efforts to address dangerous national security seams.⁵⁴ It further states that the line between foreign and domestic threats is “blurred almost beyond recognition” such that the United States is

risking “policy failure...of such scope that our constitutional order cannot be confidently assured.”⁵⁵

A Parallax View of National Security: A New Perspective on an Old Threat

The enemy’s ability to exploit weaknesses in U.S. security was undeniable on September 11, 2001. The events of 9/11 publicly revealed an urgent national security seam and exposed the nation’s domestic vulnerabilities. As a result, Congress chartered the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission, to provide recommendations for preventing future terrorist attacks.⁵⁶ The 9/11 Commission offered specific recommendations for improving domestic security.⁵⁷ Before 9/11, national security, although global, was limited to protecting and defending the homeland from external aggression. As a consequence, domestic security was largely ignored. The 9/11 Commission characterized the state of national security as a “failure in “imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.”⁵⁸ Further, prior to September 11, 2001 no executive department formally had as its first priority the internal defense of the homeland.⁵⁹ The immediacy of the transnational threat of terrorism revealed by the 9/11 events demanded a reorientation and expansion of the concept of national security. The global primacy of the United States and the safety of American citizens at home catapulted the prevention of the next terrorist attack to the policy forefront. Unfortunately, even with the newfound emphasis on homeland security, some argue that the nation is less secure today than before 9/11.⁶⁰ While the historical “tug- of- war” between the foreign and domestic components of national security continues into the 21st Century, Americans may not actually be more secure from a major disaster at home.”⁶¹ The PNSR report

underscored this point when it noted the inability of the national security apparatus to “integrate properly the external and homeland dimensions of post-9/11 national security strategy,” specifically citing the nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina as an example of U.S. strategic vulnerability.⁶²

In June 2008, almost three years following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported that the bifurcation of the nation’s security at the White House will continue to prove inadequate to effect federal unity of effort to prevent, prepare for and protect against catastrophes.⁶³ Critics suggest that anything less than a formal policy guiding the national homeland security interagency coordination increases risk.⁶⁴ Thus, a legally sufficient, unified national security strategy is needed to serve as a guiding directive for affecting greater interagency coordination.

Immediately following 9/11, “prevention” was the government’s priority.⁶⁵ However, just six months before the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, warned that an attack on American soil was likely and highlighted the lack of strategic planning and “overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policy making and resource allocation.”⁶⁶ The Bush administration National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor told the 9/11 Commission that before 9/11 they did not feel domestic security was their job.⁶⁷ Richard Clarke, President Bush’s counter-terrorism advisor reported that the Administration did not take reports of the severity of al Qaeda threats seriously and although he had made numerous attempts to get the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, to have the impending threat addressed at the Principals Committee meetings, the issue did not receive

President Bush's personal attention until the events unfolded on 9/11.⁶⁸ Although President Clinton had declared war on al Qaeda, there was a gap in the transition between administrations. The 9/11 events also suggest that unifying the foreign and domestic national security strategy divide is a critical part of transition planning between administrations to ensure nothing vital is lost at this vulnerable moment.

Room for Improvement

Eight years after 9/11, the federal government still does not have a national security strategy with specific objectives and priorities for foreign and domestic security and transnational threats. Instead, there are a plethora of narrowly focused strategies dealing with these issues in a piecemeal fashion.⁶⁹ Further, although the NSC was established to advise the president on the integration of foreign and domestic national security matters, this focus has been lost and additionally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established a separate council, the HSC, to advise the President on matters of homeland security, which only exacerbated the problem.⁷⁰ As noted in a July 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, these organizational problems are compounded by the view that homeland security is limited to the geographical boundary of the United States.⁷¹

Thus, as these and other studies point out, that homeland security is fundamentally disconnected from other national strategies and that the President lacks a single, impartial advisor to arbitrate among competing foreign and domestic security issues.⁷²

The U.S. must not prepare for the 21st Century strategic challenges with what is characterized as an outdated definition of national security.⁷³ As the Strategic Studies

Institute (SSI) colloquium report recommends, better integration and alignment of government capabilities to address a broader appreciation of national security threats and challenges is required.⁷⁴ Specific steps is include the unification of the NSC and HSC into a single council as well as reorganizing Congressional committees to address foreign and domestic national security requirements in an integrated and comprehensive fashion.⁷⁵

The PNSR report also recommended that the formulation of national security strategy be centralized and that the NSC and HSC be unified and renamed as the President's Security Council (PSC), focusing on national missions and desired outcomes rather than goals.⁷⁶ The PNSR's report went on to recommend that a review of national security strategy commence with each presidential term for the purpose of assessing national capabilities and seams against prioritized national security objectives.⁷⁷ Finally, in addition to the PNSR's recommendations, transitioning administrations should conduct deliberative transition planning to ensure nothing of vital interest to national security is lost as strategy is developed by the new administration.

Conclusion

Most Americans would probably define national security today according to an ideal concept about the physical and financial environment. To some degree, a unified national security strategy should strive to appeal to the average American and identify the contributions' required of each citizen in addition to the benefits that citizens would derive from of the achievement of the national security objectives. With experience as our teacher and a keen ability to apply findings and recommendations from numerous studies, the United States can reorient its national security strategy to achieve greater effectiveness through unified and clearly articulated strategic goals, prioritized objectives as well as the responsibilities and relationships needed to achieve both

foreign and domestic national security. The greatest threat to national security ultimately may be our cultural blind spots and the national security mission seams resulting from well intentioned, but divided efforts to achieve the purpose of two security strategies. And finally, if Condoleezza Rice is correct in her post-9/11 assessment that “America faces an existential threat,” then we cannot afford to delay essential national security reforms.⁷⁸ The PNSR’s words to the president provide equal impetus to make necessary changes without further delay: “If we do not act boldly but deliberately now, as the term of the 44th president of the United States begins, to achieve comprehensive reform, the nation is bound to regret its lack of foresight.”⁷⁹

Endnotes

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