

GROWTH OF DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

BY

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**GROWTH OF DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS AT THE STRATEGIC
LEVEL**

by

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This paper conducts a comparative analysis that examines three specific areas (historical changes; political cultural and ideology; and negotiating and conflict resolution skills), that influence how the United States develops and executes Foreign Policy in support of its National Interests. I will conclude this analysis by developing a model that provides a solution for how the United States can build its future diplomatic capability within the political element of power, to support the increasing requirements to sway international public opinion, in order to protect its national interests, while facilitating the execution of its National Security Strategy.

GROWTH OF DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Significant challenges face the United States and other traditional nation-states based on the changing dynamics brought on by globalization. Some of these geopolitical issues are born from the increased international and worldwide military threats posed by new nation-states, non nation-state groups and other entities. Globalization has arguably brought forth a greater number of challenges to include second and third order effects than anyone could have imagined just a few short years ago. The new and emerging threats faced by traditional nation-states like the United States will require a substantial review of how it achieves its national security goals and objectives using a strategy that places a higher priority on public diplomacy to achieve its desired results.

Mary Beth Ulrich discusses the challenges the U.S. now faces and must overcome if it wants to improve its international relations while simultaneously supporting its national interests. She states, "continuing to pursue national interests through a foreign policy that is perceived as aggressive, unilateral, narrowly self interested and unconstrained will not result in improving the U.S. global image."¹ It is the need to expand and grow American diplomacy that will be reviewed and discussed in this paper. There are four specific areas that must be discussed first in order to develop an understanding of the issues and problems that must be overcome with regard to building public diplomacy and diplomatic capability. The first area will address the historical changes that place a premium on diplomacy as the primary means of supporting and carrying out a nation's future national security strategy; the second area deals with the importance and influence cultural and political ideologies play in forming national and international opinions, the third area will focus on negotiation skills needed

in conflict resolution, and finally, a review and recommendation will be provided on how the United States should build its future diplomatic capability within the political element of power to support the increasing requirements to sway international public opinion in order to facilitate the execution of its national security strategy.

Historical Changes

Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, predicted some of the challenges that would face both the United States and the world community as early as 1993. “If we don’t find some way different ethnic groups can live together in one country then we will end up with 5,000 countries vice the slightly more than one hundred that exist today.”² The demise of the cold war brought about significant changes to the balance of power on a global scale. Many of the client states that fell under the Communist umbrella began to have internal conflicts based on ethnicity, and religious or cultural differences. These differences were normally suppressed during the cold war as the Soviet Union’s extended influence reached well beyond its national borders. Larry Addington notes after the cold war, “the danger of war has been chiefly associated with lesser states rather than with great powers, their motives stemming from ultra-nationalism, ethnocentrism, conflicts of religion and culture and the search for economic and military security”³. These conflicts, plus the rise of non-nation-state entities, that include terrorist organizations, are but one factor that has helped to reshape the way in which traditional nation-states must now deal with conflict resolution.

A second historical factor, the globalization of the world economy has facilitated change among how traditional states handle issues related to national interests and their use of the elements of power. Toffler argues that, “the old hard edges of the

nation-state are eroding.”⁴ This prominent trend is brought on by the evolution of markets that are not necessarily based on national interests as much as demands on local or even regional markets that can operate translucent to the nation they reside in. In short, economic influences are significant and will continue to grow with the existing close ties nation-states have with regard to interconnected trade markets. This new vibrant dimension requires diplomacy to assume the lead for most, if not all future conflict resolution. It is no longer feasible for any one country to assume a “go-it- alone” strategy without severe repercussions to both itself and the economies of its allies. In short, the risk is too great for any country to pursue a strategy that leads to alienating itself from the rest of the world whether that nation is the world’s only superpower or not.

The strategic environment has additionally changed with regard to how nation-states and non nation-state entities must now engage in order to influence the populace in a way that supports their causes and interests. Much like globalization of the world’s economy the relatively new dynamics of influence offered by the internet and technological advancements in the telecommunications field provide global audiences with innumerable outlets and resources that influence public opinion. Dr. Leon Mayhew addresses this new phenomenon in his book, “The New Public”. He identifies that evolution of advertised politics began with the presidential election of 1912 in the United States. “Only in the last decades of the twentieth century, when advertising became conjoined to market research, did a new rhetoric of presentation come to dominate the production of political messages.”⁵ Mayhew goes on to suggest that images and phrases espoused by individuals who are societal or cultural leaders can become as powerful as traditional political parties or governmental bodies. Although strategic

communication is a critical enabler in allowing any government or entity to sway public opinion, it represents but one element needed to augment building diplomatic capability. Later discussions will link how communication to a regional or global audience is quintessential in building and enhancing the United States diplomatic capacity in support of its national security goals.

Political Ideologies

The historical changes that have helped to shape the current strategic environment have briefly been reviewed. It is also necessary to understand the political ideologies that are at play in each society because they influence the political culture and leaders in decision making, negotiations, and diplomacy as they relate to the political process. Colin Gray cites Adda Bozeman's comments on this phenomena, "This means that diplomacy, is bound to incorporate the traditions and values peculiar to the civilization in which it is practiced."⁶ Gray goes on to support the notion that, "humans by default are agents of culture helping to shape their strategic environment."⁷ There are many ideologies that exist throughout the world. Those primary ideologies found in the United States, and the pervasive global ideology that America routinely finds itself at odds with while pursuing its national interests, will be highlighted in this paper. This review is needed in order to provide the framework to better understand the internal, political and societal influences that guide American administrations while simultaneously trying to synthesize policies and objectives that negotiators and diplomats must pursue to secure our national interests.

The United States is influenced by three general ideologies related to our unique political system and how we carry out negotiations and diplomacy. These ideologies are

realism, liberalism, and idealism. The first ideology, realism, is defined as, “a belief that international affairs are a struggle for power among self-interested states.”⁸ Many consider that this form of ideology is most closely demonstrated by the current Bush administration in terms of how it conducts United States foreign policy. America’s traditional allies view the United States’ tendency to address most issues from a unilateral approach as a major weakness in international diplomacy.

The second ideology impacting political culture is that of liberalism, “an expectation that democracies will not attack each other and will regard each other’s regimes as legitimate and nonthreatening.”⁹ Snyder also explains that liberalism by default has a penchant for enabling countries to understand and cooperate based on the maturation of the global economy, international trade organizations, and other multinational organizations. In short this ideology states that democracy will spread through the globalization of economic markets and trade.

The third ideology influencing the American political system is centered on idealism or as Snyder notes, constructivism, which is “a belief that foreign policy is and should be guided by ethical and legal standards”¹⁰. Europe’s creation of the European Union, and the maturation of this body, and other entities such as the World Court are examples of what constructivism’s overarching aim is. It seeks to manage the world’s issues through dialogue and discussion. While Snyder claims that constructivism as an intellectual theory can more closely define the legitimacy of radical organizations such as the Taliban, it too, like other ideologies has major shortcomings as a distinctly separate philosophy.

Dr. Kim R. Holmes claims that America faces an ever-increasing test of wills from the international community and organizations due to their adoption of an ideology which he terms as, "Liberal Internationalism which questions the sovereignty, values and national power of traditional nation-states."¹¹ This form of ideology is but one method that many nations (including our former allies) have succumbed to with a belief that it is a viable counter to offset America's preeminent power status. It reflects the internal changing dynamics of societies and political cultures as they have evolved within other democracies since the end of the Cold War. This recent development occurred once the majority of goals and objectives were met after the Cold War. American Alliances (such as NATO) were seen by the majority of the world's populace as no longer practical and were indeed serving as extensions of self-centered American policies. Increasing liberal constituencies and governments within the international community now argue that the demise of the former Soviet Union created a power vacuum which elevated the United States to a hyper-power nation status. To counter this perception many political constituencies within the nations of our traditional allies believe that the United States needs to have a counter-balance to fill this vacuum.

None of the ideologies discussed previously represent a uniquely superior form of thinking about future global diplomacy. What the descriptive and diverse ideologies do provide us is a better understanding of the challenges and complexities that America's strategic leaders and other nation-states now face. It requires not only managing conflicts and disputes with our adversaries but it also depicts the challenges required in managing the new ideologies that influence our relationships with traditional allies. The United States' acknowledgement of this dynamic tells us that negotiations

and alliances will require a much more disciplined and prolonged diplomatic effort in attempts to safeguard national interests while meeting the ever-increasing deliberate demands of the global environment.

Negotiation Skills

Carl Builder suggests that, “for the United States, in peacetime, political ends are generally assumed to be the promotion of international stability, prosperity, and security.”¹² To achieve these goals the United States must increase the level of effort, training and prioritization it places on the development of skills its diplomats need in the face of these new and unique challenges. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issued its findings as early 2003, “The United States lacks capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the security threats emanating from political instability, economic deprivation and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim World.”¹³ If the United States wishes to grow a substantial capability within the next generation of strategic leaders in order to meet this new and changing environment, the education and development of these leaders must be a top priority.

Recent studies and documentation to include those found in the Strategic Leadership Course at the United States Army War College, have demonstrated that one of the most important requisites contained in any diplomat’s tool kit is his or her negotiating skills. Negotiating skills necessitate deliberate and dedicated study, “Skilled negotiation requires solid communication skills, and is often enhanced by effective consensus-building.”¹⁴ The improvement of these skill sets is but one important component of America’s commitment to improving its diplomatic capability to answer the challenges that face it during the 21st Century.

The most successful diplomats are those that study and understand not only the position that their government represents but they must assume the arduous task of understanding opposing positions. "The ability to see the situation as the other side sees it, as difficult as it may be, is one of the most important competencies a skilled negotiator can possess"¹⁵. Fisher and Ury argue that in order for a negotiator to influence the process he or she must understand the emotional context and the strength of the other side's position. These variables are indispensable if the negotiator wants to develop a relationship that facilitates agreements during the process. If one negotiator understands the history, culture and values that are represented by the other side they enhance their side's position of strength. A skilled negotiator who goes into deliberations appreciating and understanding the opposition's perspective, might be able to concede minor points early on in the negotiation process that address and appease the other side's perceived past injustices. These small concessions are made with the knowledge that it will strengthen and enhance concessions from the opposition later on, in an attempt to achieve the desired result in attaining one's national overall political objectives.

Foreign language competence, although not required for negotiators and diplomats, is another tool that provides invaluable benefits. It allows for easier understanding between parties. The absence of this natural communications barrier elicits a common bond and mutual respect from both parties that can serve as a catalyst and the unifying glue when the negotiation process is most difficult. An example of this is shown in the efficiencies gained throughout multilateral discussions occurred during the negotiation processes that formalized the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA) in the in the early 1990's. As the world continues to grow new countries the question now is how much language proficiency is enough to be a successful negotiator or diplomat? Thomas Bailey comments that, "Often the best arrangement is for the American diplomat to know enough of the language to understand what is being said, even though they may not speak it at all well. Thus, they provide themselves with additional time in which to formulate a reply while the translation is being made by the interpreter."¹⁶ Skilled negotiators realize there are natural risks one takes while communicating using their adversary's native tongue. Bailey provides such an example when addressing the situation that occurred between Japan's Ambassador to the United States Admiral Nomura, "who incorrectly reported to Tokyo that Secretary Hull was willing to make concessions and when they were not forthcoming, Washington seemed to be falling back to a hard position."¹⁷ The misunderstanding and misinterpretation of what Admiral Nomura believed he heard versus what the intended message was of the U.S. Ambassador, triggered the attack on Pearl Harbor. The inability for negotiators to properly understand and comprehend the seriousness represented by the other side can lead to serious or catastrophic circumstances.

Another attribute skilled negotiators must have in order to be successful is the ability to develop or utilize processes that facilitate the nature of negotiations. Dr. David Holt suggests that the global environment, "now requires many different models of negotiation to explain subtle distinctions among bargaining parties, most follow one of two mainstream concepts called distributive and integrative negotiation."¹⁸ The natures of these two concepts are fairly simple and straight forward yet they contain elements within each that make them distinctly different, particularly with regards to the outcome

each seeks. Holt further defines distributive negotiations as those that allow parties to maximize individual outcomes. In other words, negotiating parties using the distributive concept try to get a larger portion of a benefit, erroneously assuming that the pie is fixed or finite. If someone gains then someone must lose. Holt's definition of the integrative concept suggests that negotiating parties act as if the pie is expandable and work toward a collaborative process that seeks to benefit all parties through sharing of collective results. This negotiating concept allows for a win-win situation from all sides. This short review in an attempt to understand these two concepts provides a brief glimpse into another area of professional development that must be manifested by a government's agents. To understand basic negotiation processes and what the expectations are prior to conducting sensitive arbitration cases can help to set the conditions for success. The U.S. should provide the necessary resources and training demanded in today's environment. These must have a level of competency that transcends many disciplines with a focus on being able to invent options that provide for mutual gain in negotiations that impact national interests. National interests must be safeguarded during all high level and critically sensitive negotiations, and one of the best ways to ensure national interests are safeguarded is through the development of our negotiators.

Building Diplomacy Capability and Capacity

As noted previously, the new world order has seen the development and growth of new nation-states which numbered barely one hundred just after the end of the Cold War to an international arena that now plays host to more than 260 countries. We have reviewed the importance of understanding how different political ideologies help to

shape national attitudes and the multitude of diverse cultures and languages a diplomat or negotiator will face in order to assist the United States in achieving its national security goals and objectives. Understanding the strategic environment is critically important in order to develop a plan that supports a national strategy. Many audiences in the international community harbor a perception that America far too often prefers the use of military force as the most favorable course of action. What Dr. Ulrich and many others suggest however, is that the use of force in today's geopolitical environment may in fact be counter-productive with assisting the United States in protecting its overall national interests, and further detracts from its ability to handle disputes and discourse through the use of public diplomacy. She continues by addressing incidents such as Abu Graib and Guantanamo Bay which detract from the United States credibility and undermines any tangible benefits or gains we may have established during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly in the Arab world.

Dr. Ulrich argues that, "effective public diplomacy is critical to winning the war of ideas, but simply focusing on communicating a message that in policy terms is loathed by its target audience will not sway public opinion."¹⁹ She supports her position by analyzing past instances where the United States supported our National Security Strategy through disaster relief efforts for earthquake stricken regions of Pakistan in 2005 and its relief efforts in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami. Both instances had positive results for the United States and demonstrate that a comprehensive public diplomacy effort pays great dividends for the United States in the long term.

Based on the results of the last national election cycle, Dr. Ulrich's theme of enhancing and expanding diplomacy as the primary means of America's engagement

with the world community has much merit. Of particular note, is the similarity between much of Mr. Obama's recent political platform and his campaign's recurring theme of announcing diplomacy as one of the primary tools of engagement his administration intends on using to reestablish America's international reputation. Dr. Holmes suggests in order for the United States to resurrect its international prestige, "it needs to have a steady and realistic campaign of diplomacy to convince the governments and free nations of Europe and elsewhere that we understand their security concerns."²⁰ "In order to fully comprehend and establish what specific diplomatic capacities and capabilities must be developed we should first identify the problem and understand the present conditions and challenges that face the United States both short and long term. For the new administration to simply state that it now places a higher premium on diplomacy and intends on having this element of national power serve as the new "Point of the Spear" to support its national goals and objectives is shallow and ignorant of a much larger problem.

Assuming that most pundits are correct in that America's current structure and resources within the public diplomacy realm are inadequate for the new tasks that await it, a complete top to bottom review and analysis is in order for each agency or system that is involved under the public diplomacy umbrella. The product of this review and analysis would be a centralized and operable strategic plan that incorporates and resources each of the necessary components needed in building greater diplomatic capacity and capability. Before the new administration takes this step it would be wise and sensible to briefly review the circumstances that led the United States to have such little capacity within this element of power. As a preventive measure this review could

allow a better understanding of the strategic environment that will preclude decisions that place our nation at risk. We do know that the strategic environment is different than what existed prior to September 11, 2001. The environment is arguably more contentious, and less than friendly. So the new administration might, by design, be more prudent by divesting itself of tendencies that provoke history to repeat itself.

A short historic assessment relevant in understanding America's reduced capacity within the public diplomacy domain that it finds itself in today can best be explained with this diminutive review. After the success of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 America was basking in the glow of success; it had just won the Cold War and the "Wall" had come down, the nation was scanning the horizon for a peer competitor and found none. So the new (Clinton) administration supported by both democratically-controlled houses of Congress began cashing peace dividends as quickly as they could. The Army was slashed by 300,000 soldiers from 780K to 482,000. At the same time the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Agency for International Development, and the State Department were all downsized. The USAID alone was cut from 21,000 to a mere 3,000 employees today. "Congress disbanded the United States Information Agency (USIA) entirely; which had been the single U.S. Government agency dedicated exclusively for public diplomacy."²¹ These agencies are critical enablers and are what the United States now needs most to assist it with enhancing its public diplomacy efforts while simultaneously trying to win the War on Terror.

I have constructed a model that to a large degree utilizes a portion of Dr. Ulrich's work in order to graphically depict the complexity and commitment the new administration faces in building a new level of diplomatic capability and capacity,²²



Figure 1.

Figure 1, provides my conceptual view of Ms. Ulrich's idea on how the United States can improve its image internationally by transforming and expanding the public diplomacy capabilities within the political element of power. She identifies two dimensions noted as the Integrate Public Diplomacy Into Policy Making Process (IPDIPMP) and Increase Public Diplomacy Capability (IPDC) circles that, "use an integrated approach that transcends departments and agencies and even the private

and public sectors.”²³ The shared area encompassing the (Policymaking process=Comprehensive and Coherent Strategy) reflects both the output of the IPDC and IPDIPMP systems and their vital influence with developing policy. This policy making process helps form a comprehensive and coherent national strategy with the other elements of national power. The influencers and enablers (subsystems or additional agencies) to this process are those agencies and programs listed on the periphery of the model. They each represent different entities that provide unique capabilities that are needed to build synergy and competencies to enhance public policy and diplomacy.

The single most important imperative to this diplomatic and strategic transformation effort is funding. Funding for the different programs, while increasingly difficult to explain to the American taxpayer, must be supported by Congress and the next administration. Resourcing from an operational and strategic context is the Center of Gravity for this initiative. The criticality of this was recently demonstrated by Secretary of Defense Gates’ comments that stated, “I support an immediate 100% increase in resourcing for the Department of State, even if I have to give them the resources”. The lack of funding for an initiative of this magnitude will surely serve to cripple the long term investment and commitment it requires.

Quality personnel and the recruitment of America’s finest citizens to serve as officials within governmental agencies and other departments is an essential element of this proposal. Recruitment and retention must transcend beyond political party affiliations and appointments if the system is to manifest competencies and efficiencies needed for the new design to actively participate in the formulation of a national

comprehensive strategy. Dr. Kathy Fitzpatrick states that the United States needs to depolitize the public diplomacy effort and, “we need to figure out a way to transcend administrations with public diplomacy rather than have it reflect the current administrations’ policies.”²⁴ We should not take this to mean that all political appointments should stop, there is a certain amount of credibility that successful businessmen and women outside of the State Department bring to the bargaining table while in the company of foreign governments and their diplomats. Additional support for the recruitment effort comes from the bipartisan United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy which recently advocated, “the State Department needs to work harder to recruit people who have experience and skills that are more directly relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy.”²⁵ Recent progress has been made from within the State Department and other agencies to highlight significant contributions made by individuals on behalf of public diplomacy. The recent creation of the new Benjamin Franklin Award for Public Diplomacy is a testament to the realization that the State Department must develop programs that acknowledge individual achievements in order to retain its professional workforce. While many can view this as a small antidote to retention it does reflect a changing dynamic that has been often overlooked in the past. People will tend to stay in jobs and build their professional careers where they are appreciated and acknowledged among their peers.

Every agency within all forms of government and among successful businesses and corporations requires its workforce to have a certain level of formal education within its work force. This education is compulsory in order to assist with the development of the technical competencies its employees must have if they are to be viable agents and

productive members of that organization. Public Diplomacy is no different and arguably is more challenging for the human resource managers to establish and support training programs that may range from understanding interoperable government systems, to developing and understanding the realm of interagency communications, to the previously mentioned language training for American Diplomats and negotiators. The model however, suggests that education is an integral part of the public diplomacy transformation. Formal education training programs already reside within each domain listed in Fig. 1. The challenge that presents itself is to determine if there are efficiencies to be gained with consolidating training programs with individuals who will work in concert with each other during interagency discussions. This educational element of the model will need further evaluation to determine the most feasible course of action. It should at the very least consist of a review and analysis based on existing programs that lend themselves to shared resourcing as a possible solution to budget constraints.

While we have examined three of the influencing agents (Funding, Personnel, and Training) within our model it primarily reflects their influence with internal audiences. We need to further examine the remaining elements of our model that are just as important for the United States to develop its internal capacity and capability in order to build and support further public diplomacy competencies. Recent developments within the public diplomacy domain sponsored primarily by the Bush administration have already begun to build positive reciprocating relationships while rebuilding America's reputation. The recent White House Conference on the Americas included approximately 150 organizations from the region and within the United States that, "focused on effective ways to deliver aid and build institutions that are necessary

for strong civil societies. The participation of five cabinet members Secretaries underscored the regions' importance to all sectors of the federal government."²⁶ This conference highlighted four of the enablers (public and private sector, other governmental agencies and departments) identified in Figure 1 as significant contributors to developing our nation's future comprehensive strategy. It also underscores the importance that, "public and private partnerships enable governments and private sector organizations to amplify their resources for a common goal."²⁷

The synergy created by this proposed model is ideally more efficient and collaborative in its approach to redefining and establishing a new paradigm in how public policy can play an important role in attaining strategic goals and objectives. The transformation would require a significant undertaking by our government and a level of cooperation and understanding between large diverse groups, agencies, inter-agencies and departments that have typically viewed each other not as complimentary agents in pursuit of similar goals but rather as competitors. Further analysis of Ulrich's proposal demonstrates that a comprehensive and coherent strategy to "proactively shape public opinion,"²⁸ as policy is being developed will allow the United States to positively influence foreign policy ends. This is an absolutely critical element in today's modern geo-political environment and one in which nation-states and their strategic leaders must have competencies if they wish to develop plans that succeed in carrying out a nation's national security strategies. The most significant change identified in Dr. Ulrich's proposal, "occurs with the integration of public diplomacy as a critical component of the policymaking process and provides direct input in developing a formal comprehensive and coherent national strategy."²⁹

The *Model Paradigm* listed above is an attempt to codify the challenges that face the United States in developing public diplomacy capability. Whether it represents the optimal design is not as important as to realize that agents are working to educate the rest of the beauracracy in addressing needed changes that will build future diplomatic capability while enhancing our strategic leaders' competencies. These first steps are the beginning of a much larger process that identifies the investments and required systems needed to provide residual means for the United States to train future strategic leaders while ehancing its ability to support a national security strategy through the public diplomacy domain. Economic and diplomatic factors play a much more significant role in conflict resolution than in generations past. The use of public diplomacy by strategic leaders represents a relatively low cost investment in allowing nation-states like the United States the opportunity to provide positive engagement within the full spectrum of international relations in order to protect national interests that are tied to national security goals and objectives.

In summation this study addressed the need for nation-states like the United States to increase diplomatic capabilities in order to resolve an ever-increasing number of regional and international conflicts. The historical review of political ideologies and the impact that these ideologies have on different cultural perspectives addressed critical elements that strategic leaders must study and understand prior to engaging in diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Negotiation skills were covered to address competencies that are needed to fulfill strategic expectations of our diplomats whether they are negotiating treaties, involved in United Nations Security Council discussions or while conducting visits which enhance America's image abroad. Finally, a model using

Dr. Marybeth Ulrich's analysis was further developed to define a paradigm shift in the design and operating procedures of the public diplomacy element within the political element of national power. This proposal would permit an integrated, comprehensive and coherent strategy that allows strategic leaders to use public diplomacy in order to proactively shape public opinion in support of America's national interests.

Endnotes

¹ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 234.

² Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Congressional Research 1994), 242.

³ Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington Indiana: University Press, 1994), 325.

⁴ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Congressional Research 1994), 242.

⁵ Leon H. Mayhew, *The New Public, Professional Communication and the Means of Social Influence* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 274.

⁶ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 137.

⁷ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 141.

⁸ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no.145, (November/December 2004): 55.

⁹ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no.145, (November/December 2004): 56.

¹⁰ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no.145, (November/December 2004): 59.

¹¹ Kim R. Holmes, *Liberty's Best Hope, American Leadership for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008), 95.

¹² Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War, American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (London: Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., 1989), 5.

¹³ George Teague, *Revitalizing U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 43.

¹⁴ George J. Wood and Dr. Breena E. Coates, *Strategic Leadership Course Directive* (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 43.

¹⁵ Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting To Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 23.

¹⁶ Thomas Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 45.

¹⁷ Thomas Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 45.

¹⁸ David H. Holt, *International Management, Text and Cases* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1998), 454.

¹⁹ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 234.

²⁰ Kim R. Holmes, *Liberty's Best Hope, American Leadership for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008), 101.

²¹ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 232.

²² Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 231.

²³ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 234.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Ideas Abound For Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Effort," <http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2008/August/200808281818321xeneerg0> (accessed December 14, 2008)

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Ideas Abound For Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Effort," <http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2008/August/200808281818321xeneerg0> (accessed December 14, 2008)

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Public Diplomacy Update, White House Conference on the Americas: Advances Issues of Social Justice*, Vol II, issue iii, (2008): 1.

²⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Public Diplomacy Update, White House Conference on the Americas: Advances Issues of Social Justice*, Vol II, issue iii, (2008):

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²⁹ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Retooling U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Strategic Instrument of Foreign Policy", 3rd ed. (Carlisle, Army War College, June 2008), 234.

