Psychology of Terrorism

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Methodology

We have defined terrorism here as “acts of violence intentionally perpetrated on civilian non-combatants with the goal of furthering some ideological, religious or political objective.” Our principal focus is on non-state actors.

Our task was to identify and analyze the scientific and professional social science literature pertaining to the psychological and/or behavioral dimensions of terrorist behavior (not on victimization or effects). Our objectives were to explore what questions pertaining to terrorist groups and behavior had been asked by social science researchers; to identify the main findings from that research; and attempt to distill and summarize them within a framework of operationally relevant questions.

Search Strategy

To identify the relevant social science literature, we began by searching a series of major academic databases using a systematic, iterative keyword strategy, mapping, where possible onto existing subject headings. The focus was on locating professional social science literature published in major books or in peer-reviewed journals. The following database searches were conducted in October, 2003.

- Sociofile/Sociological Abstracts
- Criminal Justice Abstracts (CJ Abstracts)
- Criminal Justice Periodical Index (CJPI)
- National Criminal Justice Reference Service Abstracts (NCJRS)
- PsychInfo
- Medline
- Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS)

The “hit count” from those searches is summarized in the table below. After the initial list was generated, we cross-checked the citations against the reference list of several major review works that had been published in the preceding five years (e.g., Rex Hudson’s “The Psychology and Sociology of Terrorism”) and included potentially relevant references that were not already on the list. Finally, the list was submitted to the three senior academic consultants on the project: Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Dr. John Horgan, and Dr. Andrew Silke soliciting recommendations based only on relevance (not merit) as to whether any of the citations listed should be removed and whether they knew of others that met the criteria that should be added. Reviews mainly suggested additions (rarely recommending removal) to the list. Revisions were made in response to reviewer comments, and the remaining comprised our final citation list.

Annotations

Three types of annotations are provided for works in this bibliography:

- **Author’s Abstract**: This is the abstract of the work as provided (and often published) by the author. If available, it is provided even if another annotation also is included.
- **Editor’s Annotation**: This is an annotation written by the Editor of this bibliography.
- **Key Quote Summary**: This is an annotation composed of “key quotes” from the original work, edited to provide a cogent overview of its main points.
### Project Team

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1. Root causes of terrorism. International expert meeting in Olso Olso: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: An international panel of leading experts on terrorism met in Oslo to discuss root causes of terrorism. The main purpose was to provide inputs from the research community to a high-level conference on “Fighting Terrorism for Humanity” to be held in New York on 22 September 2003. The findings described below are conclusions drawn by the chairman on the basis of presentations and discussions.

-A main accomplishment of the expert panel was to invalidate several widely held ideas about what causes terrorism. There was broad agreement that there is only a weak and indirect relationship between poverty and terrorism. At the individual level, terrorists are generally not drawn from the poorest segments of their societies. Typically, they are at average or over-average levels in terms of education and socio-economic background. Poor people are more likely to take part in simpler forms of political violence than terrorism, such as riots. The level of terrorism is not particularly high in the poorest countries of the world. Terrorism is more commonly associated with countries with a medium level of economic development, often emerging in societies characterized by rapid modernization and transition. On the other hand, poverty has frequently been used as justification for social revolutionary terrorists, who may claim to represent the poor and marginalized without being poor themselves. Although not a root cause of terrorism, poverty is a social evil that should be fought for its own reasons.

-State sponsorship is not a root cause of terrorism. Used as an instrument in their foreign policies, some states have capitalized on pre-existing terrorist groups rather than creating them. Terrorist groups have often been the initiators of these relationships, at times courting several potential state sponsors in order to enhance their own independence. State sponsorship is clearly an enabling factor of terrorism, giving terrorist groups a far greater capacity and lethality than they would have had on their own. States have exercised varying degrees of control over the groups they have sponsored, ranging from using terrorists as “guns for hire” to having virtually no influence at all over their operations. Tight state control is rare. Also Western democratic governments have occasionally supported terrorist organizations as a foreign policy means.

-Suicide terrorism is not caused by religion (or more specifically Islam) as such. Many suicide terrorists around the world are secular, or belong to other religions than Islam. Suicide terrorists are motivated mainly by political goals usually to end foreign occupation or domestic domination by a different ethnic group. Their “martyrdom” is, however, frequently legitimized and glorified with reference to religious ideas and values.

-Terrorists are not insane or irrational actors. Symptoms of psychopathology are not common among terrorists. Neither do suicide terrorists, as individuals, possess the typical risk factors of suicide. There is no common personality profile that characterizes most terrorists, who appear to be relatively normal individuals. Terrorists may follow their own rationalities based on extremist ideologies or particular terrorist logics, but they are not irrational.

-What causes terrorism? The notion of terrorism is applied to a great diversity of groups with different origins and goals. Terrorism occurs in wealthy countries as well as in poor countries, in democracies as well as in authoritarian states. Thus, there exists no single root cause of terrorism, or even a common set of causes. There are, however, a number of preconditions and precipitants for the emergence of various forms of terrorism.

One limitation of the “root cause” approach is the underlying idea that terrorists are just passive pawns of the social, economic and psychological forces around them doing what these “causes” compel them to do. It is more useful to see terrorists as rational and intentional actors who develop deliberate strategies to achieve political objectives. They make their choices between different options and tactics, on the basis of the limitations and possibilities of the situation. Terrorism is better understood as emerging from a process of interaction between different parties, than as a mechanical cause-and-effect relationship.

-With these reservations in mind, it is nevertheless useful to try to identify some conditions and circumstances that give rise to terrorism, or that at least provide a fertile ground for radical groups wanting to use terrorist methods to achieve their objectives. One can distinguish between preconditions and precipitants as two ends of a continuum.
- Preconditions set the stage for terrorism in the long run. They are of a relatively general and structural nature, producing a wide range of social outcomes of which terrorism is only one. Preconditions alone are not sufficient to cause the outbreak of terrorism. Precipitants are much more directly affecting the emergence of terrorism. These are the specific events or situations that immediately precede, motivate or trigger the outbreak of terrorism. The first set of causes listed below have more character of being preconditions, whereas the latter causes are closer to precipitants. (The following list is not all-inclusive.)
- Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law is a precondition for many forms of domestic terrorism. The relationship between government coercion and political violence is essentially shaped like an inverted U; the most democratic and the most totalitarian societies have the lowest levels of oppositional violence. Moderate levels of coercive violence from the government tend to fuel the fire of dissent, while dissident activities can be brought down by governments willing to resort to extreme forces of coercive brutality. Such draconian force is beyond the limits of what democratic nations are willing to use and rightfully so.
- Failed or weak states lack the capacity or will to exercise territorial control and maintain a monopoly of violence. This leaves a power vacuum that terrorist organizations may exploit to maintain safe havens, training facilities and bases for launching terrorist operations. On the other hand, terrorists may also find safe havens and carry out support functions in strong and stable democracies, due to the greater liberties that residents enjoy there.
- Rapid modernization in the form of high economic growth has also been found to correlate strongly with the emergence of ideological terrorism, but not with ethno-nationalist terrorism. This may be particularly important in countries where sudden wealth (e.g. from oil) has precipitated a change from tribal to high-tech societies in one generation or less. When traditional norms and social patterns crumble or are made to seem irrelevant, new radical ideologies (sometimes based on religion and/or nostalgia for a glorious past) may become attractive to certain segments of society. Modern society also facilitates terrorism by providing access to rapid transportation and communication, news media, weapons, etc.
- Extremist ideologies of a secular or religious nature are at least an intermediate cause of terrorism, although people usually adopt such extremist ideologies as a consequence of more fundamental political or personal reasons. When these worldviews are adopted and applied in order to interpret situations and guide action, they tend to take on a dynamics of their own, and may serve to dehumanize the enemy and justify atrocities.
- Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupation may lower the threshold for acceptance of political violence and terrorism, and impede the development of non-violent norms among all segments of society. The victim role as well as longstanding historical injustices and grievances may be constructed to serve as justifications for terrorism. When young children are socialized into cultural value systems that celebrate martyrdom, revenge and hatred of other ethnic or national groups, this is likely to increase their readiness to support or commit violent atrocities when they grow up.
- Hegemony and inequality of power. When local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no other realistic ways to forward their cause by normal political or military means, “asymmetrical warfare” can represent a tempting option. Terrorism offers the possibility of achieving high political impact with limited means.
- Illegitimate or corrupt governments frequently give rise to opposition that may turn to terrorist means if other avenues are not seen as realistic options for replacing these regimes with a more credible and legitimate government or a regime which represents the values and interests of the opposition movement.
- Powerful external actors upholding illegitimate governments may be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to needed regime change. Such external support to illegitimate governments is frequently seen as foreign domination through puppet regimes serving the political and economic interests of foreign sponsors.
- Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers has given rise to a great many national liberation movements that have sought recourse in terrorist tactics, guerrilla warfare, and other political means. Despite their use of terrorist methods, some liberation movements enjoy considerable support and legitimacy among their own constituencies, and sometimes also from segments of international public opinion.
- The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism. When sizeable minorities are systematically deprived of their rights to equal social and economic opportunities, obstructed from expressing their cultural identities (e.g. forbidden to use their language or practice their religion), or excluded from political influence, this can give rise to secessionist movements that may turn to terrorism or other forms of violent struggle. Ethnic nationalisms are more likely to give rise to (and justify) terrorism than are moderate and inclusive civic nationalisms.

- Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Some groups are excluded because they hold views or represent political traditions considered irreconcilable with the basic values of the state. Large groups of highly educated young people with few prospects of meaningful careers within a blocked system will tend to feel alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which to express and promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option.

- The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social revolutionary terrorism. Relative deprivation or great differences in income distribution (rather than absolute deprivation or poverty) in a society have in some studies been found to correlate rather strongly with the emergence of social revolutionary political violence and terrorism, but less with ethno-nationalist terrorism.

- The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement or group. The existence of grievances alone is only a precondition: someone is needed who can translate that into a programme for violent action.

- Triggering events are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. Such a trigger can be an outrageous act committed by the enemy, lost wars, massacres, contested elections, police brutality, or other provocative events that call for revenge or action. Even peace talks may trigger terrorist action by spoilers on both sides. Individuals join extremist groups for different reasons. Some are true believers who are motivated by ideology and political goals, whereas others get involved for selfish interests, or because belonging to a strong group is important to their identity.

- Factors sustaining terrorism: Terrorism is often sustained for reasons other than those which gave birth to it in the first place. It is therefore not certain that terrorism will end even if the grievances that gave rise to it, or the root causes, are somehow dealt with. Terrorist groups may change purpose, goals and motivation over time.

- Cycles of revenge: As a response to terrorist atrocities, reprisals are generally popular with broad segments of the public. However, this tends to be the case on both sides, which often try to outdo each other in taking revenge to satisfy their respective constituencies. Deterrence does often not work against non-state terrorist actors. Violent reprisals may even have the opposite effect of deterrence because many terrorist groups want to provoke over-reactions. Policies of military reprisal to terrorist actions may become an incentive to more terrorism, as uncompromising militants seek to undermine moderation and political compromise.

- The need of the group to provide for its members or for the survival of the group itself may also cause a terrorist group to change its main objectives or to continue its struggle longer than it otherwise would have, e.g. to effect the release of imprisoned members or to sustain its members economically.

- Profitable criminal activities to finance their political and terrorist campaigns may eventually give terrorist groups vested interests in continuing their actions long after they realise that their political cause is lost. Alternatively, some continue even if many of their political demands have been met.

- No exit: With "blood on their hands" and having burnt all bridges back to mainstream society, some terrorist groups and individuals continue their underground struggle because the only alternative is long-term imprisonment or death. Serious consideration should be given to ways of bringing the insurgent movement back into the political process, or at least offering individual terrorists a way out (such as reduced sentences or amnesty) if they break with their terrorist past and cooperate with the authorities. Such policies have in fact helped to bring terrorism to an end in several countries.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: What motivates people to strap plastic explosives to their bodies, go to a public place, and detonate? Are they soulless criminals? Are they insane fanatics? Or is something else going on? The goal of this chapter is to help us see what is right in front of our faces. The reflections of this chapter are designed to help us reframe our thinking about the issue of terrorism, to help us see the issue with new eyes and a new heart. Specifically, the author examines the nature of terrorism, belief systems, and transitional steps to be taken in order to reduce the spread of terrorism.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this article, the author explicates terrorism as a form of deviant behavior. The initial focus is on how terrorist “attitudes” may develop in individuals. These attitudes are composed of cognitions, affects, and desire to engage in certain behaviors. Lawal uses Hofstede’s four dimensions of culture to describe how sociocultural factors may influence a process of socializing terrorists. Two core culture dependent attributes of terrorists are “dogmatism” and a sense of helplessness, which are caused by a lack of a sense of independence, lack of assertiveness and low self esteem.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article examines how psychodynamic characteristics of terrorist leaders and their followers are delineated, using concepts from both individuals and group psychology. Some parallels between the terrorist violence against peace-seeking forces and certain patient's destructive attacks on the psychotherapeutic process are demonstrated. Evidence does exist that most major players in a terrorist organization are themselves, deeply traumatized individuals. As children, they suffered chronic physical abuse, and profound emotional humiliation. They grew up mistrusting others, loathing passivity, and dreading reoccurrence of a violation of their psychophysical boundaries.

-To eliminate this fear, such individuals feel the need to "kill off" their view of themselves as victims.
- A terrorism-prone individual is pushed over the edge by a trigger from the environment.
- The vulnerable individual's self-esteem, mobilizes his "narcissistic rage," and propels him toward establishing or joining a terrorist organization.
- Like most groups, a terrorist organization consists of a leader and his followers. The leader is usually a traumatized but charismatic individual. The followers are usually inhibited young men, equally traumatized themselves and struggling to achieve a sense of selfhood and a cohesive identity. This helps his followers shift their aggression toward those outside the group. This enhances group cohesion, which, in turn furthers the leader's grip on the members.
- Two cardinal features of group psychology, namely intensifies affect and diminished intellectual acumen, contribute to the regression set in motion by the group leader. Individual members lose their previous sense of values on the alter.
- The cohesion of a terrorist group is furthered by the overt or covert financial aid and praise, shock and horror of the victims, notoriety achieved through public media.
- The terrorist organization cannot afford to succeed its surface agenda. If the group were to succeed, it would no longer be needed. The terrorist leader unconsciously aims for the impossible.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Al-Khattar spent 15 years with the Jordanian intelligence service, before pursuing his graduate education in the US. His doctoral dissertation forms the basis for this book. He sought to understand religious justifications for violence within Jewish, Christian and Islamic doctrine and traditions. He interviewed religious leaders from each of these groups (approximately 24 in all, with attempts to get multiple representatives from each of the major sects of each religion), looking for thematic consistency in how terrorism might be legitimized as a tactic. Four that would justify violence (not necessarily terrorism) emerged across most religious traditions: engagement in “just war” (a rubric imposed by the author to describe the conditions of conflict articulated by the leaders); preventing future violence; defense of self or others (endorsed as a
justification across all three religions, if it was the only means available to defend those lives; controlling the land (heard from the Muslim and Jewish leaders). This distillation is probably the main contribution to emerge from Al-Khattar’s original research.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This volume was one of the earlier compilations of practical reviews on behavioral aspects of terrorism. Although it includes chapters from some recognizable names in the field, including Brian Jenkins, Fred Hacker, and Jeanne Knutson, it also reflects the very nascent state of knowledge and prevailing reliance during that period on psychoanalytically-related formulations. The chapter by Tom Strentz, I believe, mark the first appearance of his oft-noted “organizational profile” of terrorist groups being composed of leaders, activist-operators and idealists. The book does contain a few attempts to bring a statistical analysis to bear on the problem (perhaps more effort even than many contemporary texts), but 25 years hence, there is little wisdom here that has not been repeated many times over or been superseded by subsequent analyses.

   Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter concentrates on the psychology of individuals who commit terrorist acts. This is done from the point of view of behavioral psychology, in particular of the experimental analysis of behavior, and post-Skinnerian developments. The field of work is the social context, the cultural contingencies, and in general the behavioral analysis of social issues. This work is based on social language theory, on the behavioral analysis of cognition and language, on rule-government behavior, and on the experimental synthesis of behavior.

   Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and economically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get the communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.
   -Suicide attack is an ancient practice with a modern history (supporting online text). Its use by the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicarii) in Roman-occupied Judea and by the Islamic Order of Assassins (hashashin) during the early Christian Crusades are legendary examples.
   -Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anarchists) or state-supported suicide attack as a weapon of terror is usually chosen by weaker parties against materially stronger foes when fighting methods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed.
   -According to Jane’s Intelligence Review: “All the suicide terrorist groups have support infrastructures in Europe and North America.”
   -Calling the current wave of radical Islam “fundamentalism” (in the sense of “traditionalism”) is misleading, approaching an oxymoron.
   -A first line of defense is to prevent people from becoming terrorists.
   -What research there is, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no appreciable psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off as their surrounding populations.
   -For U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive assaults on terrorists and those supporting terrorism are justified because: “Those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and are not deterred by rational concepts”.
   -Suicide terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate life opportunities relative to their general population. As the Arab press emphasizes, if martyrs had nothing to lose, sacrifice would be senseless: “He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation.... The Mujahed is full of hope”.
   -Although humiliation and despair may help account for susceptibility to martyrdom in some situations, this is neither a complete explanation nor one applicable to other circumstances. Studies
by psychologist Ariel Merari point to the importance of institutions in suicide terrorism. His team interviewed 32 of 34 bomber families in Palestine/Israel (before 1998), surviving attackers, and captured recruiters. Suicide terrorists apparently span their population’s normal distribution in terms of education, socioeconomic status, and personality type (introvert vs. extrovert). Mean age for bombers was early twenties. Almost all were unmarried and expressed religious belief before recruitment (but no more than did the general population).

Except for being young, unattached males, suicide bombers differ from members of violent racist organizations with whom they are often compared. Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or jobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do not vent fear of enemies or express “hopelessness” or a sense of “nothing to lose” for lack of life alternatives that would be consistent with economic rationality.

-From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pakistani relief worker, interviewed nearly 250 Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed suicide bombers, and relatives of deceased bombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38: “None were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed.... They all seemed to be entirely normal members of their families.” Yet “all were deeply religious,” believing their actions “sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam.”

-In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with a control group of Bosnian Moslem adolescents from the same time period reveal markedly weaker expressions of self-esteem, hope for the future, and prosocial behavior.

-Thus, a critical factor determining suicide terrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to intimate cohorts of peers, which recruiting organizations often promote through religious communion.

-But for leaders who almost never consider killing themselves (despite declarations of readiness to die), material benefits more likely outweigh losses in martyrdom operations.

-The first line of defense is to drastically reduce receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. But how? It is important to know what probably will not work. Raising literacy rates may have no effect and could be counterproductive. Lessening poverty may have no effect, and could be counterproductive. Ending occupation or reducing perceived humiliation may help, but not if the population believes this to be a victory inspired by terror. If suicide-bombing is crucially (though not exclusively) an institution-level phenomenon, it may require finding the right mix of pressure and inducements to get the communities themselves to abandon support for institutions that recruit suicide attackers.

-Are there reliable differences between religious and secular groups, or between ideologically driven and grievance-driven terrorism? Interviews with surviving Hamas bombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives suggest that ideology and grievance are factors for both groups but relative weights and consequences may differ.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Written in 1990 by dean of education at King Saud University and self proclaimed Islamic revivalist.
-Agrees Islamic revivalism has been declining in influence
-Calls for renewal usually begins with negative themes, but to evolve into a movement must have a positive core
-Negative trends typically has 3 themes:
   1. Ummah is totally debilitated(rhetoric of exaggeration)
   2. Cause of debilitation is westernization (therefore of scapegoating)
   3. Any alien "ism" (e.g.; materialism, socialism) cannot offer anything to solution in Islamic countries and can be easily dismissed as being flawed (rhetoric of straw man)
-Argues Islamic revivalism has been unable to move from negative to positive because is message lacks direction
-Offers suggestions to move contemporary Islam revivalism forward by countering the three negative themes

Call Number: Translation not Available

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This essay explores the intellectual artifacts and mechanisms that enable terrorists to do what they do—kill indiscriminately in the name of political, social or cultural causes.

-While it is widely recognized that there are no neat explanations of terrorism, that has not deterred research that seeks to discover underlying causes in the make-up of the terrorist personality.
-Without presuming too much, it is fair to say that a psychologist begins with an individual whose characteristic way of behaving is formed out of a complex interaction between emotional and neurological materials and social experiences.
-In his comprehensive review of terrorism (Laqueur 1987), notes that the analyses of motivations are as numerous and diverse as are the definitions and myriad forms of the phenomenon.
-Freedman observes that: “A psychological profile of a model terrorist cannot be drawn. The personalities are disparate.”
-We now turn to techniques of emotional concealment that enable the violent to rid themselves of the terrorist taint.
-To engage openly in indiscriminate violence, the individual must “morally disengage.”
-In this regard, Bandura’s model of the socio-psychological process is instructive.
-The “conversion process” of the socialized into dedicated revolutionaries is not only achieved by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or even moral standards. By cognitively restructuring the moral value of crimes committed against specific groups so that they can be done free from censuring doubt, the tasks of making violence morally defensible is facilitated.
-Responsibility can also be diffused such that an emotional division of labor can occur. Terrorist organizations are created and this means that there is a fractional compartmentalization of tasks. Moreover, decision-making in a hierarchy of authority may easily induce otherwise sensitive individuals to behave inhumanely because no single person need feel responsible for policies arrived at collectively or imposed by distant, unknown others in the organization’s leadership cadres.
-Immersion in the group’s ideology, specifically in its dehumanization of the enemy, can deaden moral sensibilities.
-The mesmerizing power of an ideology is not limited to politically desperate and naive individuals ready to cling to any set of ideas that promise relief from despair.
-Unlike more group-restricted or privatized paradigms, ideologies are a rhetoric of public discourse and produce what may be called “dramaturgic accentuation”.
-Ideologically inspired political programs drive contemporary movements that are labeled “terrorist”. Ideologies would appear to be basic foundational elements in cultivating the motivational structure and “mind-set” of the believer/adherent.
-The importance of a socially inspired belief system resides in its power to communicate, ideals, evaluations, and goals among group members. A major feature of ideological thought is the historical consciousness it breeds among those who embrace it.
-Ideologies are thus concerned with things to come. As a method of interpretation ideologies must possess some logic.
-As programs of actions, terrorist insurgencies are rarely isolated phenomena: they tend to reflect diffuse sympathies, desires and aspirations of larger segments of society.
-Ideology plays a role in sculpting the social universe: it aids by providing names, predicates, gestures, pictures, and interpretations of events. The “recipe knowledge” of ideology rewrites history in the interest of a political agenda, and enables the terrorist to re-structure social reality in ways that lend themselves to revolutionary interventions.
-To the extent that the organization and its social and political theories become the grounding of identity, the task of the terrorist then is not simply an empirical one of proselytizing; more is involved. First there is the job of spreading the word; secondly, one must do what is needed, which often entails defending the group against those who seek to discredit it.
-Whether the strategies of disobedience involve only symbolic protest or lead social movements, they seek to persuade the political leadership that it must attend to the opposition’s proposals so that modifications and changes satisfactory to all parties can be achieved.
-If a group believes it is treated unjustly, if the political process is unresponsive and offers little
realistic hope for reversing or changing laws and policies that are deeply resented and offensive, and finally, if non-violent acts of civil disobedience do not work to produce desired results or prospects of change, then, given the strength of the group's convictions and the realistic appraisal of demographic and political considerations, terror would seem to be the ultimate resort to weaken, to arouse, and to stimulate others to action.

-The civil disobedient accept the responsibility of lawbreaking, but deny the responsibility of blameworthiness. They differ from the terrorist not only in their non-violence, but also in another factor: the road to the goal.

12. Bandura, A. (1990). The Role of Selective Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. W. Reich (Ed), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Self-sanction plays a central role in the regulation of inhumane conduct. In the course of socialization, people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct. Once internalized control has developed, people regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves. They do things that give them satisfaction and build their sense of self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards, because such behavior would bring self-condemnation. Self-sanctions thus keep conduct in line with internal standards.

-But moral standards do not function as fixed internal regulators of conduct. Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and there are many psychological processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct.

-Self-sanctions can be disengaged by reconstruing conduct as serving moral purposes, by obscuring personal agency in detrimental activities, by disregarding or misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one’s actions, or by blaming and dehumanizing the victims.

-One set of disengagement practices operates on the construal of the behavior itself. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive reconstrual. People then act on a moral imperative.

-The conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants is not achieved by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively restructuring the moral value of killings, so that the killing can be done free from self-censuring restraints.

-Several features of terrorist acts give power to a few incidents to incite widespread public fear that vastly exceeds the objective threat. The first such feature is the unpredictability of terrorist acts. The second feature is the gravity of the consequences. A third feature of terrorist acts that renders them so terrifying is the sense of uncontrollability that they may instill. The fourth feature is the high centralization and interdependency of essential service systems in modern-day life.

-Activities can take on a very different appearance depending on what they are called. Euphemistic language thus provides a convenient device for making reprehensible activities or even conferring a respectable status.

-Whenever events occur or are presented contiguously, the first one colors how the second one is perceived and judged. By exploiting the contrast principle, moral judgments of conduct can be influenced by the expedient structuring of what it is compared against. Self-deplored acts can be made to appear righteous by contrasting them with flagrant inhumanities.

-Advantageous comparisons are also drawn from history to justify violence.

-Cognitive restructuring of behavior through moral justifications and palliative characterizations is the most effective psychological mechanisms for promoting destructive conduct. This is because moral restructuring not only eliminates self-deterrents but engages self-approval in the service of destructive exploits. What was once morally condemnable becomes a source of self-valuation. After destructive means become invested with high moral purpose, functionaries work hard to become proficient at them and take pride in their destructive accomplishments.

-Another set of dissociative practices operates by obscuring or distorting the relationships between actions and the effects they cause. People behave in injurious ways they normally repudiate if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the consequences of their conduct. Under conditions of displaced responsibility, people view their actions as springing from the dictates of authorities.
rather than from their own volition. Because they are not the actual agents of their actions, they are spared self-prohibiting reactions.

- The deterrent power of self-sanctions is weakened when responsibility for culpable behavior is diffused, thereby obscuring the link between conduct and its consequences. Responsibility can be diffused in several ways, for example, by the division of labor.
- Collective actions is still another diffusion expedient for weakening self restraints.
- Additional ways of weakening self-deterring reactions operate through disregard for or misrepresentation of the consequences of action. When people choose to pursue activities that are harmful to others for reasons of personal gain or social inducements, they avoid facing or minimize the harm they cause.
- The final set of disengagement practices operates on the targets of violence acts. The strength of self-censuring reactions to injurious conduct depends partly on how the perpetrator views the people toward whom the harmful is directed. To perceive another person as human enhances empathetic or vicarious reactions through perceived similarity. The joys and suffering of similar persons are more vicariously arousing than are the joys and suffering of strangers or of persons who have been divested of human qualities.
- Self-sanctions against cruel conduct can be disengaged or blunted by divesting people of human qualities.
- Imputing blame to one’s antagonist is still another expedient that can serve self-exoneration purposes; one’s own violent conduct can then be viewed as compelled by forcible provocation.
- The path to terrorism can be shaped by fortuitous factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal predilections and social inducements.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 as well as domestic terrorism in the United States and elsewhere in the world has prompted an analysis of the psychology of the terrorist. The perpetrators profound sense of being wronged their values undermined by foreign powers or a corrupt domestic power structure has cried out for revolution and revenge. The fanatic ideology of the perpetrators has provided the matrix for a progressively more malevolent representation of the oppressors: the image of the enemy. Retribution against the Enemy in the form of mass murder of anonymous civilians becomes an imperative. The counterpart of the image of the enemy is the idealized collective self-image of members of the movement, faction, or cult. The group narcissism of the white supremacists in the United States, the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and the Islamic extremists enhance their collective self-image as pure, righteous, and united. While the foot soldiers, as in any war, gain glory through martyrdom, the instigators and leaders have their own personal narcissistic goals (power and prestige) and plan. For the extremist Islamists the ultimate goal has been overthrow of the moderate Islamic governments; for the domestic terrorists, destabilization of the national government and reinstitution of the traditional values.

- What then is the psychology of the terrorist? It is crucial to understand that their ideology concentrates their thinking and controls their actions.
- Driving violent acts of this type is the perpetrators’ view of the victim: the image of the Enemy.
- Islamic radicals who become obsessed with these polarized images are prime candidates for recruitment for assignments of assault on the enemy.
- They have demonized their antagonists and dehumanized its people.
- The thinking of the terrorist evidently shows the same kind of cognitive distortions observed in others who engage in violent acts, either solely as individuals or as members of a group. These include overgeneralization that is, the supposed sins of the Enemy may spread to encompass the entire population. Also, they show dichotomous thinking a people are either totally good or totally bad. Finally, they demonstrate tunnel vision once they are engaged in their holy mission (e.g., jihad), their thinking, and consequently their actions, focuses exclusively on the destruction of the target.
- The perspective of the psychology of the terrorist needs to be extended to the polarized thinking of the militant fundamentalist groups that are the breeding grounds of the terrorists.
- The cognitive approach to “hot” violence (that is associated with anger) is based on two premises. First, people are people whether they are operating individually or in groups. Secondly, the violently hostile person has strong negative biases toward the victim: the greater the degree of bias and degree
of distortion, the stronger the affect.

- The most widely recognized theory that addresses the roots of all forms of violence is the psychoanalytic model. Despite its influence on writers in the political science, sociology, history, and criminology literature, this model has weak logical, theoretical, and empirical foundations.

- The enemy that we see, according to Freud, is simply a rejected image of our own inner nature. In contrast to the psychoanalytic model, I propose a generic cognitive model that is more parsimonious and which has been empirically supported in studies of individuals. When we perceive ourselves or our group as threatened (often by a stigmatized minority), our internal representation of ourselves is usually of goodness and that of other people with whom we are in conflict with badness.

- Over time our view of the other person or group progresses from opponent to antagonist to Enemy. We see the enemy as dangerous, needing to be isolated, punished, or eliminated.

- The second theme in personal or group violence is the sense of revulsion certain individuals experience when they perceive other individuals or groups as immoral, corrupt, subverting their basic values.

- A third component in violence is the reaction to the harm that people believe they have sustained.

- We all know that not everybody who is angered punches an antagonist in the mouth or shoots up a restaurant. No matter how strong, the urge is subject to restraints. These inhibitions operate automatically and effectively unless they are attenuated by the assailant’s permissive beliefs or ideology.

- Group narcissism is accentuated by ideologies and increases the willingness to resort to violence to resolve grievances.


   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is an early biography of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Although there is discussion of the individuals involved (and this was written before some of the key players killed themselves I prison), the focus is on the ideology (implicitly) and actions (explicitly) of the collective group. It is one of the most comprehensive and well-researched English biographical works on the organization, and Becker does not portray herself as an apologist of any kind for the group or its tactics. Beyond the essence of insights gained from a review of one’s personal history, however, there is little in the ways of psychological analysis or elucidation of principles


   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is a transcript of a conference session from the international organization for the study of group tensions (1981). The speaker is suppose to provide an overview on "psychology of leaders of terrorist groups". Although he reportedly spent his career talking to terrorists and "fanatics", but begins with the premise that "nobody knows what a terrorist is, much less a terrorist leader." States that the organizational chart of most revolutionary organizations looks like a Jackson Pollack Painting. Provides some anecdotes about "people who hold power and influence" in there organizations. They have very deep and very narrow political beliefs have tunnel vision that armed struggle is only option. Some discussion with other attendees. Despite a promising title this article offers very little substantive information on the topic.


   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Personal reflection of an NYC psychoanalyst on guilt experienced in the wake of 9/11 and subsequent US actions.

   - Recommends moving relations with people from other countries away from US-"Them" orientation to "we" orientation


   Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This paper examines the roles women perform as terrorist and political criminals, using as much data as we could locate from a variety of countries and historical periods.
If the women's liberation movement has brought about an increase in the participation of women in radical and terrorist groups, then one would expect that prior to the women's liberation movement the role of women in radical political protests would be much less noticeable. Historical evidence, however, does not support this conjecture. Not only is the active participation of women in revolutionary movements commonplace, women in revolutionary movements have not limited their participation to supportive, housekeeping roles.

-During the reign of Alexander II women were founders and leaders of many revolutionary groups and were regarded by some men as the driving force of the revolution. Consider for example the leadership role played by Alexandra Kollontai in the Bolshevik revolution.

-Historically women have also been active in revolutionary movements in Latin America. Jaquette claims that female revolutionaries can be traced back at least as far as Cecilia Tupac Amaro, who in 1780, led an Indian revolt against the Spanish.

-A study conducted by the U.S Department of the Army of insurgent movements in the Far East reported that about one-third of all guerrillas captured in Korea in 1951 were women. Five to 15 percent of the Min Yeun (the underground army of insurgent movement) in Malaya were women.

-According to McClure women constitute one-fifth to one-third of the participants in terrorist organizations in Germany and Japan.

-What kinds of women become terrorists? Biographies, diaries and police reports reveal that they are typically well educated and are drawn from the middle or upper classes. The average Japanese is just under 30. We see that age distribution of women is more uniform than that of men which is highly concentrated in the ages of 18-40. Why are there proportionally more girls (26%) than boys (5%) under the age of 17? Why are there proportionally more women (24%) than men (14%) over the of 40? One might make a plausible argument that young girls are socially invisible and hence make choice recruits for insurgent movements. The greater proportion of women over age of 40 shows that once a women joins a revolutionary group, she stays. Alternatively it may be that male guerrillas are more likely than their female counterparts to experience combat. There is a good deal of disagreement about whether the division of labor by gender is traditional or egalitarian in terrorist groups. Jaquette for example, notes that female revolutionaries are often wives or lovers of male revolutionaries.

-Contemporary terrorist groups can be divided into two categories; idealists and nationalists. In idealists groups, there seems to be little, if any division of labor by sex. By contrast, nationalist terrorist and revolutionary groups such as the IRA and FLN are more stable and have drawn more people to their causes.

-Fanon's study of the Algerian revolution demonstrates how women's roles in revolutionary groups may change as the position of the group vis-à-vis its enemies changes. It also illustrates our contention that revolutionary theory and practice can lead to a breakdown in traditional female roles, rather than a breakdown in roles leading to terrorist activity.

-Accounts of women's and men's activities in the FLN and the IRA suggest that nationalist movements tend to have a more rigid division of labor between men and women than do idealist revolutionary movements. In nationalist movements women are more likely to act as couriers, spies and occasionally saboteurs.

-In sum the evidence that we have marshaled suggest that women's terrorist activities are not a "side effect" of the women's liberation movement

-More substantial evidence suggests that the division of labor by sex tends to be fairly rigid in nationalistic movements but very flexible, or even nonexistent, in idealistic terrorist movements.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Horst Mahler, a young lawyer who had fled to West Berlin, was the co-founder of the Red Army Fraction. While imprisoned for committing acts of terror, he and other leading terrorist directed raids and kidnappings against the “system.” His published interviews and “cell circulars” provide important insights into the multicasual factors in the making of a terrorist: (1) Apprehensions over the profound progress of scientific and technological progress exploited by the capitalist system, (2) Blame directed toward the father’s generation for the horrors of the Hitler system and complicity with the expansionistic United States, (3) Inability to identify with an adequate father figure which led to anti-authoritarian stance and overcompensation when the terrorists exercised their own ruthless authority. Enclosure in the
underground reinforced hostility. The psychological mechanisms cause by withdrawal from society fostered commission of dehumanized acts.

-Modern German terrorism had its beginnings in 1968 when two department stores in Frankfurt were set ablaze.

-One of the arsonists (Andreas Baader) was defended by Horst Mahler, a young lawyer who gained respect among young radicals for having sued a German University that had discriminated against a student for political reasons. Mahler carried the case to the European Commission on Human Rights and won.

-Not satisfied with fighting legal battles in court, Mahler had been an active participant in street demonstrations in Germany during the middle of the 1960s and a few years later became one of the founders of Germany’s most notorious terrorist group, the Red Army Faction.

-His radical political views may have been rooted as much in his personal life as in the tempestuous political scene in Berlin during the 1960s. Mahler’s father, a dentist in Hitler’s Germany, was a committed Nazi party member.

-He was arrested for participating in acts of damaging property.

-Deprived of his professional standing, Mahler became even more deeply involved in serious violations of the law. He turned toward the ultimate authoritarianism that he detested in others, when he began to take a leading role in the riotous political world of the late 1960s.

-In May of 1970, Mahler conspired with Ulrike Meinhof to free Andreas Baader.

-Mahler escaped to Jordan with some of his companions, using forged passports. There they took guerrilla training in PLO camp. The 2-month training period was physically hard for the European intellectuals.

-With their knowledge of guerrilla tactics, Mahler and Meinhof joined together to fight what they perceived to be the authoritarian abuses of the German state.

-Under the leadership of Mahler and Meinhof the Red Army Faction planned attacks on army installations to steal weapons.

-Since the fledging organization needed money to finance its terrorist activities, Mahler masterminded three bank robberies which were synchronized to take place within 10 minutes of one another on the morning of September 29, 1970. All three were successful, but Horst was betrayed by a trusted friend.

-Mahler’s short career as an active terrorist was over. He continued to work as a theoretician for the RAF while in prison, but not for long.

-Other members of the RAF cadre who have been arrested and sent to prison did not welcome the lawyer’s plan for riot. Unlike Meinhof, who had become one of Mahler’s most severe critics, considered the plan to be a “selfish fit of rage.”

-When the protests against isolation proved unsuccessful the terrorists agreed collectively to use hunger strikes as a “final weapon of the comrades who are in the clink.”

-After 2 years in prison Mahler changed his position from that of the other terrorist. He condemned the hunger strikes as unwise attempts to achieve preferential treatment which would only deepen the split between the terrorists and the “normals.”

-Mahler became increasingly irritated with the various protests of the RAF underground against the prison regulation. He seemed to have been referring to the suicides of the Stammheim defendants.

-Serious disagreements had begun to develop among the terrorists about their basic strategy.

-The German magazine Der Spiegel arranged a discussion between Horst Mahler, the terrorist, and Gerhart Baum, the German minister of the Interior, while Mahler was still in prison (Jeschke, 1980).

-Baum questioned how he (a minister) and Mahler (the Lawyer-terrorist), both engaged in active political lives, both of similar age, both from substantial middle class backgrounds. Both having spent their boyhoods during the time of National Socialism, could have followed such divergent roads. Mahler held the “immorality” of the Nazi regime responsible for his acts while the minister was of the opinion that other factors played a role in causing acts of terrorism.

-According to Mahler’s reasoning, the state was accountable for provoking the wrath of the extremists. The state became, “the absolute enemy …the world’s evil, guilty of daily unending suffering, murder and manslaughter” (Jeschke, 1980).

-Mahler gave various reasons to justify the war of destruction between the state and its people. It occurred because those in power refused to listen to the truth.

-The former lawyer found the capitalistic system guilty of destroying civilization by abusing modern
technology and science.

-Although most of the imprisoned terrorists objected to being isolated from their comrades and refused to have contacts with “normal” prisoners, Mahler found such associations helpful. His “disputes with them moderated” his commitment to the terrorist cause and liberated his thinking. He began to oppose terrorist attacks and switched to the Maoist communist camp. Mahler was “excommunicated” from the RAF which he had founded only a few years earlier.

-The original goal of RAF had been to start a “socialist” revolution to fight humiliation of Germany’s past and the country’s entanglement with the USA. After the jailing of members of the Baader-Mainhof group, the emphasis shifted to freeing prisoners.

-The German terrorist movement appears to be multicasual phenomenon.

-Horst Mahler, the founder of the RAF, provides valuable insights into the making of a terrorist.

-Horst’s turning away from the extreme right was not only due to the Nazi regime’s defeat but probably motivated by his objections to his father’s ideologies.

-The terrorists became dependent on each other for support and considered the outside world an evil system to be eliminated.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The author uses the concept of relative deprivation (a group sees itself at a disadvantage when it is compared to some other reference groups) to explain conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. It argues that Catholics historically have perceived themselves to be at a disadvantage and that this perception is supported by objective data. Runciman's three areas of inequality are used: economic, social and political. Author suggests relative deprivation can lead to violence in at least two ways: (1) via frustration-aggression (Gurr) or (2) via “creative rioting” (Geschwender) rioting accompanied by stated political demands and attempts to occupy or control an area. The author’s conclusion is that relative deprivation is a causal factor on Northern Ireland violence and because the inequality is real, the only reasonable remedy to violence is correcting the lack or equality.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book began as the author's dissertation. It focuses on the diversity in racist and right wing violence in Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, & Denmark), with an emphasis on violence toward immigrants. Although some anti-immigrant violence is committed by racist gangs, much of it is done by young gangs that subscribe to no collective ideology.

-The author describes Helmut Willams' classification of perpetrators of racial violence: ‘ideological activists’, ‘xenophobes’, ‘criminals’ and ‘fellow travelers’. He classifies the groups themselves as either ‘national democrats’ (anti-immigration activists) or ‘racial revolutionaries’ (neo-Nazis). The text provides data on trends of the relevant offenses in each country. Sweden tends to have more Xenophobic violence. Group dynamics factor significantly into these attacks and the waves and patterns cannot be completely explained by macro-social factors. Younger gang members (adolescents) seem drawn to racist gangs and their anti-immigrant activity just to be part of a group. Young adult gangs (17-25) tend to be economically deprived and blame immigrants for their plight. What will facilitate violence with the group is prior familiarity with vandalism and violence, access to weapons, and proximity to hated targets. At the community level, law enforcement neglect, media publicity and a tacit anti-immigrant community sentiment also tend to breed such incidents. The revolutionary groups are driven by the notion of war against the Zionist occupied government and frenzied by “white power music.” In general, in racist groups racism tends to the result rather than the cause of group affiliation. The more individuals become included and socialized within the group (and insulated from extra-group influences), the more difficult it becomes to leave. The author discusses the differing dynamics in Scandinavian groups adhering to “anti-Muslim” versus “anti-Jewish” conspiracy theories. He concludes with a lucid and insightful summary of the core values areas over which racist groups, communities, the media, etc. all vie for control: ideology and immigration politics, identity, scarce resources, sexuality, territory, and security. An excellent work on the phenomenon of racist violence, with insights that extend well beyond the Scandinavian
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Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article presents a psychodynamic/Psychosocial model, that
essentially represents a pathway into and through terrorists groups. The three main phases are;
disposition originating in the family, primary deviance in the family system, and chances for
integration into increasingly deviant groups and subcultures. Ultimately the purpose of terrorism
becomes perpetuation of the group. Author acknowledges prospective application vs. not practical.
No real operational implications.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: There likely is no universal method in developing extremist
ideas that justifies terrorist acts of violence.
However, four observable stages appear to frame a process of ideological development common to
many individuals and groups of diverse ideological backgrounds. This four-stage process is a model
designed as a heuristic (trial and error) to aid investigators and intelligence analysts in assessing the
behaviors, experiences, and activities of a group or individual associated with extremist ideas.
Begins by framing some unsatisfying event or condition as being unjust, blaming the injustice on a
target policy, person, or nation, and then vilifying, often demonizing, the responsible party to
facilitate justification for aggression. To begin with, an extremist individual or group identifies
some type of undesirable event or condition (“it’s not right”).
- While the nature of the condition may vary, those involved perceive the experience as “things are
not as they should be.” That is, “it’s not right.” Next, they frame the undesirable condition as an
“injustice”; that is, it does not apply to everyone (“it’s not fair”).
- Then, because injustice generally results from transgressive (wrongful) behavior, extremists hold a
person or group responsible (“it’s your fault”), identifying a potential target.
- Last, they deem the person or group responsible for the injustice as “bad” (“you’re evil”); after all,
good people would not intentionally inflict adverse conditions on others. This ascription has three
effects that help facilitate violence. First, aggression becomes more justifiable when aimed against “bad” people, particularly those who intentionally cause harm to others. Second, extremists describe the responsible party as “evil”; dehumanizing a target in this regard further facilitates aggression. Third, those suffering adverse conditions at the hands of others do not see themselves as “bad” or “evil”; this further identifies the responsible person or group as different from those affected and, thus, makes justifying aggression even easier.

- Also, it is important to understand that analyzing counterterrorist intelligence requires an understanding of behavior, not just ideology. Investigators and analysts who attempt to understand and anticipate how a person will act in a given situation should seek to understand that individual’s “map,” or perception, of the situation. Ideology may be a part of that, but other important dynamics and behavioral factors may contribute as well.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Empirical study of college student’s hypothetical responses to aggression from another nation state. Examined personality styles in addition to experimental condition
- Persons higher in dominance almost always advocated for more aggressive retaliation than those who were more submissive. A similar but less robust or reliable trend was found for greater aggression in more conservative students than those that were more liberal
- Anticipated reactions were similar for military and terrorist attacks.
- Men and women showed similar levels of conflict in their reactions, unless a peace treaty was in place, in which women were more forgiving and men more aggressive.
- Responses escalated in level of conflict after repeated attacks.
- Very little discussion of methods.
- Very little generalizability, given college student sample.
- Does not contribute to understanding terrorist behaviour.
- Strength of personality variables in predictory response is interesting.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle is an authoritative and provocative analysis of the nature of one of the time's most prevalent forms of political violence.
- Dr Bowyer Bell has attended wars, not seminars, in pursuit of data, insight and explanation, and has been shot at, kidnapped, expelled and questioned from Central America to Northern Ireland: a scholar amid terror. The text arises from his access to the underground, from time spent in the revolutionary ecosystem and among those who kill to make a dream real. The result is a unique analysis that transcends traditional studies of insurgency or terrorism, depicting a strange world where the will is trusted, not tangible assets, where a galaxy of the faithful seeks to alter history. Sometimes the will prevails over the assets of the state: the weak win because their will endures until the centre fails.
- The structure that the faithful create, everywhere different yet everywhere the same, has not been examined before from the inside out. The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle is both a special and a general study of the hidden world of the gunman not as a mirror image of everyday reality amenable to academic tools, but as perceived by a scholar with a visa into violence. The reader will no longer find the armed struggles of our time inexplicable, merely horrible, yet emerging as cohesive means to act on events. This book offers a compelling insight into an elusive phenomenon, a process that at times allows the few to change the course of history.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book provides a fairly detailed account of the evolution of the Aum Shinri Kyo from Buddhist sect to cult and ultimately to apocalyptic terrorist group. It covers the plan and execution of the now famous Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, but also details other atrocities committed by Aum members both within the group (e.g., purification
rituals by scalding and murder of group members) and toward adversaries of the group (e.g., brutal murder of a lawyer and his family). The author acknowledges limitations in his ability to discern the “truth” due to often conflicting accounts and ongoing investigations that changed the official accounts. Although Aum’s motives were somewhat peculiar, for those concerned with the prospect of terrorists using WMD’s, this account can be seen as a case study in acquiring materials (including uranium in Australia) and technology (including collaboration with former Soviet scientists) and planning for their use in an attack all from the base of a relatively secure country with a stable government. The general “lessons” to the extent that there are any are not clearly elucidated, but that was not the main objective of the book, which was simply to tell the story.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: “Terrorism Studies” as a specific discipline is a comparatively recent addition to the social sciences and is still grappling with questions relating to a proper or appropriate methodology. This article argues that research within the field is often based neither on primary sources nor set within an independent analytical framework. Rather, it is characterized by an “aligned” position dependent on a research hermeneutic of crisis management, which perpetuates the "received view." Talking to "terrorists" and the use of social identity theory, applied in a context of cultural difference, are here proposed as a methodology enabling independent analysis.

-Substate activist groups engaging in, or threatening violence in order to further their goals operate across the globe. Between them, these groups represent a wide range of political ideologies, religious beliefs, and other intellectually, spiritually, or emotionally propelled agendas. They may be numerically large or small, and may enjoy popular support or be the subjects of widespread loathing. The groups and their members exhibit various degrees of volatility and stability. Operating in different geographic, political, and cultural environments, they adopt different *modi operandi* and rules of engagement. Their lowest common denominator a politically geared challenge to, and defiance of the nation state’s monopoly on armed violence and coercion has nevertheless caused this disparate collection of groups to be lumped together under the unified heading “terrorists.”

-Terrorism studies emerged as a subcategory within the social sciences in the early 1970s, seeking to explain there surgence of the seemingly inexplicable. It has remained one of the main forums for the study of political and religious substate activism since.

-Scholars within the field have sought to understand what “terrorism” is.

-The present article addresses what it sees as some of the more serious theoretical deficiencies within terrorism studies and explores potential avenues for improvement.

-This article argues that the theoretical deficiency within the terrorism studies community is merely a symptom of a more serious intellectual predicament.

-The present authors have termed the hermeneutic of crisis management. By this is meant an attitudinal predisposition and framework of analysis prevalent within the terrorism studies community that has the researcher approaching her or his research subject antagonistically, as a threat, with a view to facilitate its defeat.

-The close collaboration of the terrorism studies community with the Western counterterrorism agencies is mirrored by a profound reluctance to engage in dialogue with the “terrorists.”

-This article proposes that what is needed is there placement of the crisis management hermeneutic the metastructure within which theoretical models are applied with a more constructive framework that adequately accounts for the dynamics of group identity and belonging within a framework of profound cultural difference. This framework, it is argued, is found in social identity theory, a heuristic model of the way human identity develops in groups that takes seriously the critical issues of culture and social environment.

-As a non reductionist theory of group behavior, social identity theory emphasizes the significance of the subject’s social situation, the group member’s internally constructed social identity, and the context in which a cohesive group consciousness is installed in the minds and hearts of the members.

-The first section of this article offers a review of terrorism studies literature. The second section raises the issue of the hermeneutic of crisis management and two specific concerns emanating from it. The third section contains a framework for intergroup communication as developed in other
academic fields of study.
-Terrorism literature took off in the same year as international terrorism itself, 1968, and the accumulated output is by now vast.
-A focused survey of the scholarly output during three decades of terrorism studies indicates that the theoretical inadequacies are longstanding and the hermeneutic of crisis management is deeply entrenched.
-Theorizing about terrorism has always been problematic as a consequence of the diverse nature of the groups and individuals that are categorized as "terrorist."
-Models based on psychological concerns typically hold that “terrorist” violence is not so much a political instrument as an end in itself; it is not contingent on rational agency but is the result of compulsion or psychopathology. Over the years scholars of this persuasion have suggested that “terrorists” do what they do because of (variously and among other things) self-destructive urges, fantasies of cleanliness, disturbed emotions combined with problems with authority and the self, and inconsistent mothering.
-According to another prolific interpretative model, terrorism is based on power oriented instrumentalism, or "strategic choice theory."
-If it seeks to attribute a certain set of abnormalities to the "terrorist mind," it lacks empirical evidence and one must concur with Konrad Kellen in concluding that such interpretations of terrorism, "may or may not be accurate[ in particular cases, but] lack general applicability."
- Terrorism studies has remained profoundly distant from its research subject. The lack of interaction with actual "terrorists" is evidenced by the literature, and not talking to terrorists seems to have become established as a source of scholarly credibility.
-Instead, the field has increasingly come to rely on secondary sources.
-How is it possible to make psychoanalytical pronouncements about individuals one has never had contact with?
-Schmid and Jongman lucidly but damningly sum up the early years of terrorism research in a 1988 stock taking of the field: There are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the literature is not research based in any rigorous sense....
-Two recent works that understand the importance of primary encounters and make use of them are Jessica Stern’s The Ultimate Terrorists and Jonathan Tucker’s (ed.) Toxic Terror.
-From within its own intellectual metastructure, the terrorism studies community has created a profoundly adversarial relationship with its research subject. This seems to stem partly from the notion that scholars are obliged to defend liberal democratic society and, thus, to combat terrorism.
-As each scholar or institution makes their definitional bid, what they are offering is nothing more than a formal statement on who, in their opinion, should be thought of as a terrorist. The debate has gone no where precisely because defining terrorism is an exercise in political classification.
-When the rationale of the research becomes understanding the threat rather than understanding a social phenomenon, this influences the manner in which the subject is approached, affects the results of the research and thus impinges upon the scope of understanding and knowledge.
-Related to the adversarial relationship with their search subject and the close relationship with government agencies, is the bias developed through reliance on secondary source material even where primary sources are available.
-There is one fundamental issue relevant to such understanding that is rarely mentioned in terrorism studies and yet the virtual absence of which is an unambiguous sign of the flawed methodology currently in vogue.
-At the most general level "culture" refers to the totality of the impact that human beings make upon the natural environment. In this context, however, we are interested in the immaterial or social dimensions of culture, that is, the unique collection of social roles, institutions, values, ideas, and symbols operative in every group, which radically conditions the way in which its members see the world and respond to its challenge.
-In every human culture there are sets of behaviors( often quite specific to that culture) that are fairly predictable and regular and that are capable of being presented in generalized and typical patterns, even though the unpredictability endemic to human affairs means that they do not acquire the status of social law.
-In recent years there has been a great deal of research done to develop a taxonomy of national
cultures. Most useful for our purposes is the line of investigation begun in 1980 by Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede in his book *Culture’s Consequences*. In it, Hofstede analyzed 100,000 questionnaires by the employees of a particular multinational in fifty countries around the world. On the basis of his results he was able to isolate a set of five variables used for characterizing national cultures. These were (1) the respective significance of the individual and the group; (2) the differences in social roles between men and women; (3) the manner of dealing with inequality; (4) the degree of tolerance for the unknown; and (5) the trade off between long and short term gratification of needs. Subsequent work has shown that the most important of Hofstede’s variables was his allocation of every culture to some point on a continuum from pronounced individualism at one end to strong group orientation at the other, a continuum that does not preclude exceptions to the basic pattern. By individualism (which is quite distinct from individuality) Hofstede means the social condition where ties between individuals are weak, as opposed to group orientation, and where from birth onwards people are integrated into strong, cohesive groups that provide protection in exchange for loyalty. Individualist cultures, like those of the U.S. and the U.K., emphasize interpersonal competition, individual achievement, enterprise and innovativeness, and easy separation from kin and other groups, while collective ones prefer collective achievements, close ties within group members, and a disinclination to innovate or diverge from established ways. With group orientation being far more common.

Mediterranean culture that focuses on its group oriented nature as one of an ensemble of related cultural features. Other prominent features of Mediterranean culture include the status of honor as the pivotal social value (with its rough opposite being shame), the notion that goods (including honor) exist only infinite quantities (so that a person can only gain more of them at the expense of someone else), the importance of patron and client relations, and the role of purity codes in social interactions. Early researchers in this area included J. G. Peristiany, Julian Pitt Rivers, J.K.Campbell, and Pierre Bourdieu.

None of this is to deny that we are here talking about culture at a fairly high level of generality, which allows for exceptions and local variations as we move in to examine data closely. Our basic submission is that when interacting with group oriented persons such as those from the Middle East (and all others that perceive of themselves as substantially defined by belonging to a group, an issue returned to later), anyone socialized in an individualistic North Atlantic culture must assume that a very conscious and deliberate effort will be necessary to avoid misunderstanding and gross cultural blunders.

The preceding discussion on culture concerns the primary level of socialization, which we would expect (to impact upon all the individuals and groups originating in particular cultural settings. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that some more focused type of theory might be helpful for investigating how groups relate to one another either within a similar culture or, indeed, across different cultures. In other words, some framework, embedded in the context of cultural difference articulated above, that fixes upon the specific dynamics of group processes might assist in the analysis of substate activist groups. We have chosen social identity theory for this purpose.

Social identity theory represents a branch of social psychology largely developed by Henri Tajfel (and his colleagues and students) at Bristol University in England, in the 1970s and 1980s.

Social identity theory adopts a distinctive position in relation to the continuing problem of the relationship between the individual and the group.

The central idea of social identity theory, on the other hand, is that being categorized as members of certain groups provides an important part of the self concept of individuals. To an extent, we learn who we are from the groups to which we belong. It follows that any prestige or value associated with those groups will have implications for our feelings of self worth.

The extent to which group membership contributes to a sense of self varies depending upon the level of group orientation present in the ambient culture.

Nevertheless, in describing the experience of belonging to a group it is helpful to follow Tajfelin differentiating three components:
1. a cognitive component (i.e., in the sense of the knowledge that one belongs to a group),
2. an evaluative component (in the sense that the notion of the group or one’s membership in it may have a positive or negative connotation), and
3. an emotional component (in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the group and one’s membership in it may be accompanied by emotions, such as love, hate, etc., directed towards
one’s own group and towards others that stand in certain relationships to it).

- Tajfel defines "social identity" to mean that part of an individual’s self concept that derives from his or her knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.

- With in the context of social identity theory, stereotypes are reconceived as generalizations about people based on category membership.

- Social identity theory itself is developing a sophisticated battery of ideas for resolving intergroup conflict. Three prominent areas (among many) are crossed categorizations (using one social category to cancel out another), recategorization (bringing members of two categories together under an inclusive, superordinate one), and decategorization (dissolving the problematic categories altogether, especially by facilitating contact between members of rival groups).


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book is a technical treatise on how and why people continue to move forward on a decision they think is stupid or at least doomed to a bad outcome. The social-psychological term for being stuck is “entrapment.” The authors use the following formal definition of entrapment: "a decision making process whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, course of action in order to justify or 'make good on' prior investments." Most of the book focuses on pure, experimental social psychological research, which has very little relevance to counterterrorism operations. In fact, there is no discussion of terrorism, per se, anywhere in the book. Although this text thoroughly analyzes the research on social and nonsocial factors that effect “entrapment,” it is highly questionable whether these results would translate into any meaningful understanding of terrorist groups. It is interesting to note, though, that they found no compelling or even promising evidence for “entrapment prone personality.” Perhaps of some interest are the findings in chapter seven describing psychological effects of entrapment, including the way in which it can alter motivations and lead to a lack of attention to any “outside” or peripheral factors. Chapters nine and ten ostensibly discuss some implications, but the applied value for counterterrorism is rather limited. In essence, the research would suggest that if one thinks ahead about what could happen as a result of a decision and what the downsides or “costs” may be, this may build some resistance to entrapment.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Between 1976 and 1983, state terrorism produced a type of violence in Argentina with specific characteristic types that contained within it death, sophisticated cruelty and terror.

- Focuses on the victimization of victims of this oppressive state of violence.
- Describes tactics of repression used by the regime.
- A methodology of repression: Disappearance - Disappearance, employed as a method of ideological repression, involving kidnapping, clandestine detention, and later murder of adults, adolescents, and children of a specific social-cultural and ideological background, who may or may not have been political militants.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this brief essay I will describe three movements which are sometimes called 'fundamentalist': Pentecostalism in Latin America and other parts of the Third World, the new Christian right in American, and Paisleyism in Northern Ireland. After a brief account of each I will offer some general and comparative observations about 'fundamentalism'.

- There are undoubtedly political causes and consequences of the spread of Pentecostalism. Rather than seeing the spread of Pentecostalism as a sinister right-wing plot, one should appreciate the parallels between the social and psychological roles of Methodism in urban England in the second half of the eighteenth century.

- To take a positive side of appeal of Pentecostalism, it offers to those people who are, as David Martin put it, outside the downward thrust of elite power and free from the lateral ties of the organic community, a new character.
There is no obvious political consequences of the spread of Pentecostalism. By and large Pentecostalists are politically quiet. The Christian right (NCR) was a movement of cultural defense. The early part of this century has seen the major protestant denominations fragment with minorities rejecting the new liberal interpretations of the Bible, ecumenism, and the socially and ethically 'progressive' spirit which informed the denominational mainstream.

American fundamentalists were permitted considerable autonomy (or, to put it another way, ignored) until the fifties and sixties when liberal elites decided that race relations in the country had to be re-structured. The NCR was able to generate a great deal of media attention. Money was raised to campaign for and against policy issues and for and against candidates.

Although the explanation for the failure of the NCR is complex, we can short-circuit it by noting that most Americans (and that included many fundamentalists) are relatively happy with the present separation of church and state and the maintenance of a tolerant pluralistic religious culture.

Ulster: The Response to Ethnic Conflict - Reverend Ian Paisley (whose three European Community parliament election results show him to be easily the most popular politician in Northern Ireland) and his Democratic Unionist Party.

In the late fifties, Ian Paisley led Irish Presbyterian dissidents, concerned about the ecumenical or "Rome ward" trend in their church, into a schismatic 'Free Presbyterian' church.

It might be that Paisley is widely supported despite his religion, simply because he can be trusted not to 'sell out'.

The solution to the apparent paradox of 'secular' Protestant support for evangelical rhetoric can be found in the part played by evangelical Protestantism in forging and sustaining the shared identity of the people who settled the north-east of Ireland and their descendants.

I am suggesting that, for Ulster Protestants, the conflict is a religious conflict, not because it is about religious or even socio-moral issues (as it is in America), but because their religion is the core of their shared identity.

What is fundamentalism? The three movements briefly described have a number of features in common. The first is that they take religion seriously. Not being relativists, they suppose that there is truth and error and that it is important to get it right.

What is slight misleading is another hypothetical element of generic fundamentalism: the claim that fundamentalism is always reactive or reactionary.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: Through examination of statements made by Irish republicans involved in the Northern Ireland conflict and of the social identities of victims of republican violence, White has argued that the Irish Republican Army is not sectarian but that the loyalist paramilitaries are. This response challenges both the interpretation of republican rhetoric and the conclusions drawn from the study of victim selection.

Taken narrowly, it is perfectly correct that in contract to loyalist paramilitaries, republicans have concentrated on killing members of the security forces. However, the way in which the issue is framed and parts of White’s text are potentially extremely misleading. Republican violence is directed against a regime: loyalist violence is directed against a community. Furthermore, this difference in targeting reflects a significant difference in motive: republicans are not sectarian, in the sense that they do not kill Ulster Protestants because they are Protestants.

- For reasons I have given at length elsewhere we cannot, as a matter of principle, disregard the accounts of their motives that actors themselves give, but equally well, we cannot take them at face value, especially when their interests in presenting something other than deep and honest self-critical reflection are so great and so obvious. The important differences start to emerge when we move from reading the data to making inferences about the motives and attitudes that underlie the pattern of killing. A number of observations follow. First, the nature of loyalist violence means that incompetence inflates innocent civilian targets. My argument is as follows. Motive cannot be taken in isolation from opportunity. Before we can infer back from events to intentions, we need to consider the opportunities that were available to act on intentions. The pro-state terrorist has a very difficult job finding his legitimate targets. IRA men very rarely wear uniform, do not travel in
marked cars, do not mount stationary road patrols, do not have to operate offices where they can be found by the general public and do not have a duty to respond to request for assistance from the public. What I meant by target size was two-fold. First, and this refers to the availability of the most obviously legitimate targets, there have always been far more British soldiers than republican activists. Second, the very large number of groups defined as legitimate targets because they are in some sense close to members of the security forces means that there are a vary larger number of legitimate targets for the anti-state terror group. My greatest objection to the form of White’s argument is that his article rests on the distinction between the IRA killing soldiers and the UDA and UVF killing civilians: the latter is sectarian; the former is not. In the conclusion to his analysis of the murder statistics, White says: "The results suggest that the IRA is at war with the British and their security forces in Northern Ireland." Here White is using “British” in the narrow sense and is wrong. Had he used it in the wider sense to include what Gerry Adams calls ‘pro-British elements’ (that is, almost the entire Ulster Protestant population), he would have been right. I have no quarrel with White when he notes that the IRA differs from the loyalist paramilitaries in that the largest part of its victims have been members of the security forces while the largest part of the victims of loyalist terror have been helpless civilians.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors abstract: His paper is a theoretical essay concerning the intrapsychic phenomena provoked by the knowledge of acts of terrorism. Through projective and introjective identifications, the spectator of such acts feels compelled to rearrange the dynamics of his internal objects and may resort to primitive defense mechanisms to face the important anxieties which are thus aroused. This paper suggests the hypothesis that terrorist themselves experience similar intrapsychic phenomena.
-The basis of this essay is the psychoanalytic metapsychology developed by Melanie Klein and her successors, especially in regard to the concepts of unconscious fantasy internal world and schizo-paranoid and depressive positions.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors abstract: Ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence carried out for ideological, religious, or financial motives. Ethnic terrorists often seek to influence their own constituencies more than the country as a whole. Ethnic terrorists frequently seek to foster communal identity, in contrast to an identity proposed by the state. Ethnic terrorists often target potential intermediaries, who might otherwise compromise on identity issues. A secondary goal of the attacks is to create a climate of fear among the rival group's population.
-Ethnic terrorism creates a difficult problem for the state:conventional countermeasures may engender broader support for an insurgency or a separatist movement even when they hamstring or defeat a specific terrorist group.
-Ethnic terrorist are neither limited geographically nor unique to the current time period.
-Although the modus operandi of these groups is hardly new, ethnic terrorism as a phenomenon is neglected, it is a distinct phenomenon, different from other types of terrorism.
-Ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence committed for ideological, religious, or financial motives. Like other terrorists, ethnic terrorists attempt to influence rival groups and hostile governments. But unlike other terrorists, ethnic terrorist focus on forging a distinct and fostering ethnic mobilization.
-Yet another goal of many ethnic terrorists is to create a climate of fear among rival group's population.
-Because conventional countermeasures against terrorism may unwittingly engender broader support for an ethnic insurgency or political movement, ethnic terrorism poses a dilemma for the state.
-To illustrate the important role of terrorist groups in ethnic conflict, this paper will examine the experiences of the Kurds in Turkey, the Basques in Spain, Jewish radicals under the British Mandate in Palestine, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and other ethnic struggles.
-This paper has three parts. In the first I describe ethnic terrorism and consider why it often does not fit standard models of terrorism proposed by students of the subject. In the second I detail the distinct agenda of ethnic terrorist, as it relates to both their ethnic community in general and to the
population as a whole. In the third part I assess potential means of countering the difficult challenges posed by ethnic terrorists.

- Characteristics of Ethnic Terrorism:
  - Ethnic terrorism can be defined as deliberate violence by a subnational ethnic group to advance its cause. Such violence usually focuses either on the creation of a separate state or on the evaluation of the status of one communal group over others.
  - Terrorism committed by communal groups differs in motive and in nature from that committed by leftist or utopian groups.
  - Ethnic Terrorists, in contrast, usually focus on the status of a specific segment of the population, not the population as a whole.
  - Ethnic terrorism also differs from religious terrorism. Usually religious terrorists are far less nationalistic than ethnic terrorist.
  - Religious terrorist groups are also far more receptive to converts than are ethnically driven groups.
  - Some groups, of course, evolve from one type to another. Hzballah, for example started as a religious movement seeking to turn Lebanon into an Islamic state. In most recent years, however, Hzballah has increasingly pursued communal goals. Today Hzballah primarily seeks to advance the agenda of Lebanese Shi’a community.
  - The study of ethnic terrorism suffers from several general limitations. First, scholars focus too much on the materialist goals of political violence, ignoring its symbolic values. Secondly, ethnic terrorism is often erroneously lumped together with other forms of terrorism such as ideological or economic terrorism.
  - Motives of terrorists are lumped together, despite the fact that the understanding of the target and audience of terrorism is crucial to prevention. Motives vary: some groups seek a new regime, others an ideological triumph, and yet others may yearn for their own state.
  - Ethnic conflict also defies the very notion of innocent bystanders and not just in the mind of the terrorists.
  - A final and particularly pernicious analytic mistake is the exclusive focus on the rational and material elements of violence. Many scholars who examine civil violence see it as a tool used by groups to gain a greater share of state resources. Ethnic terrorism, however, is not simply an effort to divide the spoils of a state.

- Identity Creation:
  - The ethnic terrorist group begins the struggle by strengthening ethnic identity.
  - The identity sought usually contradicts rival identities proposed by the state and, at time, by the dominant ethnic group. The ethnic identity not only affirms its distinct nature; it rejects other identities that rival it politically.
  - When ethnic terrorism is successful, culture becomes the stuff of politics.
  - Terrorism can increase communal identity even when few members of a community consciously support political violence. Ethnic terrorists have an advantage over other terrorists: their agenda usually has some resonance with a preexisting, well defined group of people. Thus, their own acts are often considered retaliation or rebellion against repression rather than acts of random violence.
  - Even more beneficial to identity creation than terrorist violence, however, is the state response to violence.
  - A harsh state response is particularly effective in creating a separate identity.
  - When repression comes from a rival population, ethnic identity is particularly likely to become defined in opposition to both the state and rival communities. This change can lead to a stronger, more distinct identity among nonmilitants as well as greater support for an insurgency or terrorist group.
  - Without violence, it is hard to attract attention among one's own group.

- Ethnic Terrorism as a Defensive Phenomenon:
  - Perceived discrimination along economic, political, or cultural lines can trigger tremendous resentment and cause ethnic terrorism.
  - Like all unnecessary murder, terrorism requires a rationalization. Yet the rationalization for ethnic terrorism is often grounded in reality.
  - Ethnic terrorism is not necessarily limited to downtrodden groups.

- Group Maintenance:
  - Once an identity exists, it must be mobilized. It is not enough for an individual to feel loyal to an
ethnic group: he or she must also support the identity against rival claims. Thus, in order to become politically effective it must organize.

-Almost every ethnic terrorist group actively raises funds among its own people.
-By calling attention to a group and its cause, terrorist acts fulfill another organizational goal: recruitment into the movement. Radical groups commonly vie for the same members, particularly young disaffected males.
-At times group maintenance becomes the primary goal of an ethnic terrorist group, subsuming even its identity-strengthening agendas.

-Impact of Rival Populations:
- Ethnic terrorism creates fear among political victims. Fear serves two purposes. First, it silences talk of compromise and accommodations by discrediting the political system and the mediation process. Second, it stimulates immigration and population transfers.
- Ethnic violence can also undermine an incipient democracy, which might otherwise bring multiethnic societies together.

Terrorist Groups, Insurgencies, and Popular Movements:
-Nonviolent mainstream groups have an ambivalent relationship with terrorist organizations.
-Mainstream ethnic movements often capitalize on terrorist violence.
-Clever moderate leaders can capitalize on extremist pressure even as they denounce extremist activities.
-The climate of fear by terrorist is particularly important for ethnic insurgencies. Even when a population does not support an insurgent group's cause, fear of terrorist violence can lead individuals to cooperate.

-Political movements can also act as fonts for terrorist groups.
-The International Aspect of Ethnic Terrorism:
-If the focus of ethnic terrorism is on local issues and identities, why might an ethnic terrorist group strike an international target such as the United States? Terrorists often justify such strikes as punishment for foreign support of their rivals.
-Tremendous publicity is generated for the group that commits an act of international terrorism.
-A second attraction of international targets is that they force a state response.
-More often than not, successful ethnic terrorist groups receive some form of aid from outside powers or Diaspora communities.
-The usual tried-and-tested means of countering terrorism are often not effective in fighting ethnic terrorism. Particularly futile is the use of moral outrage. Statements declaring ethnic terrorists to be outlaws and other such legal and rhetorical tools do not work.
-The ideal way to counter ethnic terrorism is through "in group" policing in which the ethnic group as a whole identifies, ostracizes, and suppresses radicals.
-Thus authorities should encourage groups to police themselves. Such self-monitoring is far more effective and causes less resentment in the community as a whole.
-A first step toward encouraging "in group" policing is to recognize and protect the forces of moderation.
-In general, crackdown against terrorists should steer on the side of caution with regard to moderate political activists.
-In addition to "in group" policing, governments might consider fostering an identity that competes with that promoted by the terrorists.
-Politicians must recognize that ethnic terrorism often differs considerably from other types of terrorism. Ethnic terrorism has its own goals-and its own vulnerabilities-that analysts should recognize when examining how to cope with this problem.
-One key is the relationship that a government has with a mainstream ethnic opposition movement.
-States should try to improve a mainstream movement's desire to police radicals in its own community.
-By giving moderate forces more influence, the state can often drive a wedge between moderates and radicals.
-Indeed, one danger governments must avoid is being too successful against moderate ethnic opposition movements.
-Governments with resistive ethnic groups often must choose between stopping terrorist violence or preventing ethnic governments from achieving their particular goals.
Recognition of the thorny issues that surround ethnic terrorism is a first step toward solving its many problems.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Or as Mccann (1974) puts it, rather more succinctly: "There is more to Irish politics than economics and reason": there remain instead what Darby (1976) has labeled 'the unreal problems'.

This distinction between interpersonal and intergroup explanations of prejudice and discrimination is no mere academic point; it has important consequences.

As Hogan and Emler (1978) have stated, the attempt to locate prejudice within the individual has encouraged for too long a search for solutions at this level and thus it distracted attention from the root causes of prejudice of which the individual expression is but a symptom.

This chapter will therefore attempt to provide a social analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland, structured in terms of Tajfel's (1978b) approach to intergroup relations. Tajfel's theory suggests that we tend to structure our social environments in terms of groupings of persons, or social categories, thus simplifying the world we live in. These categories are to some extent based upon our own experiences but also largely determined by our society. Our knowledge of own membership of various of social categories is defined as our social identity and forms an important part of our self-concept. To enhance our social identity, we tend to behave in ways that make our own group acquire positive distinctiveness in comparison to other groups. If this is not possible we may seek to change our group membership; or if this is not possible, we may attempt a redefinition of the existing social situation so as to achieve a more positive social identity.

Social categorization may be defined as "the ordering of the social environment in terms of social categories, that is of groupings of persons in a manner which is meaningful to the subject"; (Tajfel, 1974).

Social categorization is of course recognized as a fundamental process common to all people in all societies, which enables them to systematize and simplify their environment.

This construction of ethnicity leads to the assumption of two important conditions necessary for social categorization to assume important proportions. The first of these is that the division of the social world is made along lines which produce two clearly distinct and non overlapping categories and the second is that there exists a serious difficulty, if not impossibility, of passing from one group to another. Given these two circumstances, then, Tajfel has hypothesized that behavior will be determined not in terms of self but rather in terms of group, thus bringing into play the process of social comparison, social psychological differentiation and social identity.

One of the considerations on which Tajfel's theory is based is that a major task for the individual is to find, create and define his place in the existing networks. That is, the individual will strive to develop a social identity, based on the knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups and not others and this will form a part of his view of himself or become, as Epstein states, an extension of the self.

Where the dynamic nature of Tajfel's conceptions of social identity really comes into its own is when one considers the direction of the evaluation of social identity. He hypothesized that individuals will try to find and maintain a positive social identity. This social identity is always achieved, Tajfel's theory suggests, in contradistinction to an out-group, that is, through the process of social comparison.

As Tajfel points out, a completely secure social identity is hardly ever possible, as even the most consensually superior groups must work at maintaining their positive social identity by making social comparisons and maintaining their social psychological distinctiveness.

In the case of a superior group, Tajfel has suggested that a threat to its position may be perceived either because its superiority is perceived to be under attack or because group members are in conflict regarding that basis of the group's superiority, for example, if it is seen as being based upon some form of injustice.

For the inferior group with an insecure social identity, three basic options are open, according to Tajfel. They may attempt to redefine the attributes which contribute to the existing negative social comparison for example black is beautiful. Or they may attempt to create, through social action, new group characteristics which have a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior groups. The
third option involves becoming 'through action and reinterpretation of group characteristics more like the superior group'.

Implicit in Tajfel's theory is the idea that an inferior group will inevitably possess a negative social identity at some time. As he notes, there is fairly abundant evidence from many parts of the world that members of underprivileged groups emerge quite often in in-group devaluation or denigration and consequently show signs of out group favoritism.

Observers during the more recent past appear to have concluded that the Catholics in Northern Ireland do in fact possess a positive social identity.

-Tajfel has pointed out that an important consequence of social competition may be that the so-called inferior group, while wishing to retain its own identity, at the same time wishes to become; more like the majority in their opportunities of achieving goals and marks of respect which are generally valued by the society at large.

-Northern Ireland watchers appear to have been in little doubt for some time that the protestant community has enjoyed a positive social identity.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: It is the aim of this chapter to show that the conflict in Northern Ireland is based on entirely rational processes which are at work in every society but which take on a special significance because of the historical context of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This chapter will do this by adopting a social psychological approach based on a theory known as Social Identity theory (Tajfel, 1981). This theory suggests that we tend to simplify our social environment by forming groupings of persons (social categories). Certain aspects of our self-concept are then based on our social group or category membership (social identity). A basic assumption of the theory is that people are motivated to enhance their self-concept and, to do this, will thus seek a positive social identity. Further, as acquiring a positive social identity means that our own group must be favorably different from relevant comparison groups, we either leave groups that do not fulfill this requirement to strive to make the groups to which we belong ‘positively distinct’ (Turner, 1987).

- Northern Irish people claim to be able to use various cues to determine other people’s religious group membership.
- What is important, as Burton (1979) has pointed out is that this phenomenon, ‘telling’ he calls it, reveals the importance attached to this activity in Northern Ireland.
- The five most commonly mentioned cues were the area where a person lives, the school they attended, their name, their appearance and the way they spoke.
- Cairns (1980) also reported that people in Northern Ireland claim to be able to tell whether a person is a Catholic or a Protestant by looking at the person’s face.

- The psychological significance of ‘telling’ therefore largely passed unnoticed until the development of a new social psychological theory on intergroup conflict, Social Identity theory (Tajfel, 1981)
- This theory to Social Identity theory social categorization is a process which is at work in every society and is a process which is used to make life simple by reducing the multiplicity of social stimuli we are faced with in everyday life to a smaller more manageable number of social categories.
- An important consequence of the process of social categorization, the theory suggests, is that we not only divide our social world into groups or categories but we inevitably see ourselves as belonging to certain of these social categories but not others.
- There is in fact abundant evidence that adults in Northern Ireland will readily admit to membership of one or other of the two groups. As children learn about the division of Northern Irish society into two major groups, they are at the same time learning which of these groups they belong to.
- Cairns (1982), who reviewed evidence based on observations by social anthropologists, historians, and other social scientists, has concluded that both groups in Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants, appear to possess ‘relatively positive social identities’.
- Weinreich (1982) ‘Identity conflicts’ he defined as those conflicts which emerged when an individual empathically identifies with another and yet at the same time wishes to disassociate him or herself from certain of the other person’s characteristics. He reported that, compared to his Protestant respondents, the young Catholics who took part in his study showed more evidence of ‘identity conflicts’ with their own group.
- Weinreich (1982) has made the interesting point that his results suggest that both Catholic and Protestant adolescents reveal identity conflicts with the other group. What this amounts to, Weinreich suggests, is in fact a 'pressure to disassociate' from the other group which in turn results in a tendency to exaggerate differences between the groups. This is of course exactly what Tajfel's theory predicts will happen in any intergroup conflict.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: “One has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are present in all men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends and that in a great number of people these are strong enough to determine their behaviour in human society.”
Sigmund Freud (1927, p.7)

-The basic idea that will be developed in this essay is that a symbolic equation is unconsciously made between acts of destruction that occur in reality and fantasized threats of internal destruction. Indeed, feelings of distress and despair are evoked not only because a destruction of symbols is carried out in real life that which provokes an intolerable sense of insecurity but also because, on an intrapsychic level, the very existence within us of good internal objects with which to identify is threatened.

- Theoretically, when facing such a dilemma, two psychological solutions can be sought. One consists in efforts to repair the good internal objects, thus sustaining their internal characteristics, and the view of life associated with the depressive position. The second solution sets in motion a regressive pull to the schizo-paranoid position. Splitting, and a defensive use of projective identification are thus resorted to in order to protect oneself, and one’s internal objects, from attack.

- Thus, many people are tempted by revenge since the illusion, entertained by the ego, that by killing external persecutory objects it will be freed, once and for all, of destructive impulses, and bad part-objects constitutes a powerful motivation.

- Many psychoanalytical authors have already observed how resorting to hostility, and revenge often aim at averting depressive anxieties. Horney (1948) postulated that the wish for revenge contributes to a feeling of self-protection against hostility coming from the "outside" as well as from the "inside". From her point of view, the desire for revenge is also used to suppress feelings of hopelessness.

- The necessity to expel good internal objects is inevitably accompanied by very strong feelings of envy, as the external world is then seen as possessing all the good and desirable objects; the terrorist, again identified with the victim, feeling himself deprived of all sources of goodness, and of all possibilities of libidinal satisfaction.

- There is no doubt that many pathways may lead to destructive acts towards innocent victims, and that religious fanaticism when it is supported by particular group dynamics can cause great harm (Casoni, 2000).


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Begins with personal reflection on 9/11 argues Psychoanalysis has many concepts useful to understanding terrorism (e.g. death instinct, paranoid position, malviolent, transformation parental empathetic features) but does not expand or apply them in any detail.

- Provides examples from literature and philosophy.

- No practical value or insight offer operational personnel.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: In rule-governed behavior, previously established elementary discriminations are combined in complex instructions and thus result in complex behavior. Discriminative combining and recombining of responses produce behavior with characteristics differing from those of behavior that is established through the effects of its direct consequences. For example, responding in instructed discrimination may be occasioned by
discriminative stimuli that are temporarily and situationally removed from the circumstances under which the discrimination is instructed. The present account illustrates properties of rule-governed behavior with examples from research in instructional control and imitation learning. Units of instructed behavior, circumstances controlling compliance with instructions, and rule governed problem solving are considered.

In contemporary analyses of human behavior, the term rule-governed behavior is used to describe responding determined primarily by instructions; rule governed behavior is commonly distinguished from contingency-shaped behavior that is determined primarily by its direct consequences.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Based on 48 fairly detailed case histories, and more limited data on 447 other individuals, this article describes significant patterns in the lives of members of the Basque insurgent organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). The article discusses the age and sex of ETA members, the socioeconomic background of the members and their families, and their ethnic and linguistic characteristics. The article also describes life in ETA, the radicalization of Basque youth, how new members are recruited into the organization, how they live and what they do as members, how ETA members relate to family, friends, and loved ones, and how they terminate their relationship to the organization. The study finds ETA members to be not the alienated and pathologically distressed individuals who join other insurgent organizations, but rather they are psychologically healthy persons for the most part, strongly supported by their families and their ethnic community.

- It seems to be fairly widely accepted among investigators of insurgent groups that their members generally suffer from distorted or distressed personalities, if they are not in fact insane. The prevailing view among students of political terrorism is that terrorists are, by definition, not psychologically stable.
- Not only are insurgents different, but they are different in a pathological way. My scope is reduced to this single case study.
- Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) the overwhelming majority of etarras are well within the range of functioning and sane human beings. Members of ETA suffer from no greater levels of stress than are observed across Basque society generally. Etaarras have relationships with loved ones that are normal to the point of being mundane. Etaarras are not alienated persons; they are, on the contrary, deeply embedded in the culture whose rights they fight to defend.
- There are several classes of etarras, including liberados, legales, enlaces, apoyos, and buzones, each of whom has a specific role to play in the maintenance and support of the organization. Relatively few etarras actually carry weapons and even fewer have actually carried out assassinations or bank robberies. My data set consists of approximately 23 percent of all etarras arrested during the eighteen-month period from January 1979 through June 1980. I use these aggregate data, together with the case studies, to describe for the reader several important characteristics of ETA members: the social origins of etarras (family, language, class, etc.); the process by which a young Basque is transformed (and recruited) into an ETA member; and, finally, what life is like within ETA, and how etarras terminate their relationships to the organization.
- ETA members tend to be in their middle to late twenties when they join the organization.
- The data on sex taken from Table 1 reflect ETA’s pronounced antipathy toward women in the organization. Fewer than one in ten etarras from the samples were female, and the few women who do manage to enter the organization are always found among the support or information cells. We have few if any actual cases of women taking part in a specific armed attack.
- As far as social class is concerned, the chances are about even that a typical etarra comes from a working class or a lower middle class background (about one-third of the sample of 81 members comes from each class). In my review of the 81 cases cited here, I found not a single instance of an ETA member who had come from a farming occupation or even a farming community. Despite assertions to the contrary that one reads in the popular literature about ETA, I found very few cases of etarras who were unemployed. Between four and five out of ten etarras were the offspring of two Basque parents (slightly below the average for the Basque population as a whole), while about one out of six was the son of two non-Basque parents (less then half the average for the population of the Basque provinces generally). Also revealing is the fact that while only about eight percent of the population of the Basque provinces is of mixed ancestry (with one Basque and one non-Basque
parent), fully forty percent of ETA's members come from such parentage. The consequence is that more than 80 percent of all etarras have at least one Basque parent, as compared with slightly less than 60 percent of the provinces' overall population.

-In a few cases, such as that of Jon Paredes Manot “Txiki,” we see the son of two non-Basque parents completely reject his non-Basque ancestry and even change his name (from the Spanish, Juan, to the Basque equivalent, Jon) to fit into a pro-Basque peer group. It is striking to read again and again descriptions of the family in which the father is either deceased, missing away from home for long periods, or just not mentioned at all in the account. The mothers of the etarras, on the other hand, are very prominent in every story.

-Slightly less than 45 percent of these etarras come from towns where more than 40 percent of the population speak the Basque language, Euskera; while slightly less than forty percent come from towns where less than 20 percent speak Euskera. These figures show that ETA tends to recruit from Basque speaking regions, since only 19.3 percent of the total population lives in towns of more than 40 percent Basque speakers, and about two-thirds of the population live in towns of less than 20 percent Basque speakers.

-About forty percent of the total population of the Basque provinces live in large cities of more than 100,000 persons, while about one-quarter of the total population lives in smaller towns of 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Significantly, the distribution of etarras is exactly the reverse: about four out of ten ETA members come from the small cities; about one out of four, from the large metropolitan areas.

- The process by which a Basque youth is transformed into a member of ETA is a long one full of detours and the exploration of competing alternatives. Even the actual recruiting process is a gradual one which many potential etarras resist for months or even years before yielding to the call to join.

- So it was that future etarras first encountered the notion of discrimination and deprivation when they emerged from the home and found themselves in a school setting where they could neither speak nor understand the language of instruction, and were in fact punished for their inability to do so.

- Even young Basques who did not speak Euskera as a child still felt the impact of Spanish government policies that suppressed not only this but other expressions of Basque ethnicity.

- As Basque youths grew and became increasingly aware of their deprivation, other factors began to come into play, factors that would move them along little by little toward their rendezvous with ETA. A significant number of them began as adolescents to engage in what we might term “searching behavior.” During their teen-age years, they wandered restlessly and intensely in a search for solutions to the crisis that afflicted them as individuals and their culture as a group.

- In all the cases for which I have data (very few, to be sure), the future ETA members tried other options first, and turned to ETA only when their earlier searches proved futile. Nevertheless, this searching phase of their young lives played a crucial role in the development of rebels in several ways.

- The searching phase in the lives of future etarras assumed many different forms.

- In all this change, the family appears to have played a surprisingly minor role. In only once case of the dozen or so which I have information was the family actually supportive of the youth’s decision to join ETA.

- The process by which new members are recruited into the organization is a slow and gradual one, and it is difficult if not impossible to say exactly when a young man crosses the threshold of ETA and becomes a full-fledged member. The recruitment process typically begins when an older ETA member approaches a young prospective member while they are with a group on an outing or a mountain climbing expedition. The ETA member who makes this initial contact is the key to the whole process. Throughout the recruitment phase, this person remains the contact between the organization and the prospective member.

- Since this recruiter is a critical member of the ETA organization, they put much emphasis on selecting etarras for recruiting duty

- The first task given to the youth during this novice phase usually consists of something like carrying packages of pamphlets to a drop point or delivering cans of spray paint to someone else for use in painting slogans on walls.

- As the youth demonstrates his ability to carry out challenging assignments, he also invests considerable psychological energy in the operations of ETA, so it becomes increasingly difficult for
him to disengage from the organization.

- As far as I can tell, however, there is no formal “oathing” ceremony involved in becoming a member.

- Young men approached to become etarras typically resist joining for a very long time before they cast their lot with the organization. Virtually every case study reports that the young man resisted the first invitations to join, sometimes for as long as 18 months or two years, before finally deciding to become a member. The reasons for delay vary from case to case. Great majority of the members of ETA continue to live at home. Being a member of ETA is time consuming, to be sure; and many members report having little time left over for the demands of their personal lives once they join.

- There are, in general, three kinds of activities that occupy the time and energy of members of ETA. The first involves what we might call consciousness raising. The second general type of activity engaged in by ETA members has to do with support services for the armed commandos of the organization. The third kind of activity undertaken by ETA members is, of course, armed assaults on persons or property, with the intention either to kill or injure people, to kidnap them for subsequent ransoms, or to seize money, weapons, automobiles, or other needed resources. My feeling is that fewer than half of the ETA members actually engage in violent actions of this sort. But they are the ones that give the organization its special insurgent character, as well as attract all the attention.

- ETA commandos were given orders to conduct armed attacks about once every eight months- About half the attacks were conducted in the home town of members of the assault comando- For active etarras, however, the principal source of support seems to me to be the small circle of friends, job associates, and other ETA members who cluster together for mutual psychological support and assistance.

- Most of the etarras about whom I have such personal data fell into one of two categories. Many had no real lasting relationships with women- There were others, however, who solved the problem essentially by courting and marrying women who likewise had committed themselves to revolutionary struggle.

- That these were not especially happy men but they continued the struggle out of a combination of factors that blends both positive and negative reinforcements. On the positive side, they received solid support from their close friends and from their spouses (if they were married). All had also learned to lower their expectation. There are, however, negative forces at work that discourage etarras from leaving the organization, no matter how depressed they may become.

- There is, simply put, a fear of reprisals- the simple fact of the matter is that men usually spend rather brief periods of time as ETA members.

- I would estimate that the average length of time that an etarra spends as an active member of the organization would be less than three years.- Obviously, a number of them are killed. Many, probably the majority, are caught and sentenced to long prison terms. And of course, there are those countless etarras in insignificant support roles who simply blend back into the environment after they “retire” from the organization. For some young Basques, ETA is a crucial end point in their lives, the determinative factor that gives meaning and purpose to an otherwise disorderly and rather pointless frustration.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this chapter, the authors present a compendium of psychological principles that contribute to understanding group violence, followed by a discussion of terrorism as an example of group violence. The authors then propose a general model of motivation for participating in group violence and summarize the processes that contribute to the development of such motivation.

- The Contribution of Group: Processes to Violence- Long ago, Gustave Lebon (1896) argued that crowds of people may act as entities unto themselves, as if the whole were controlled by an irrational mind with primitive motivations, with members of the crowd losing their individual sense of responsibility. Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (as reported in Forsyth, 1994, p. 442) coined the term “deindividuation” to describe how individuals become “so submerged in the group that they no longer stand out as individuals.” Zimbardo (1969) continued the research and developed a process model that noted that lowered threshold of normally restrained behavior is brought about by
a sense of anonymity and diffusion of responsibility.
- The critical ways in which deindividuation leads to violence appear to include feelings of anonymity and reduced responsibility, as well as internal changes that include reduced self-awareness and perceptual disturbances.
- The other concept that should be included in this discussion is the process of groupthink (Janis, 1982, p. 552)- “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” Groupthink reinforces and is in turn reinforced by the shared beliefs of the group members. - Stronger group identity appears to be associated with increased violence. In an archival study, Mullen (1986) analyzed newspaper accounts of lynch mobs in the U.S. in the late 1800s to early 1900s. He noted that as lynchers became more numerous relative to the victims, the lynchers became less “self-attentive” and more deindividuated.
- Bandura (1986, 1990) posited three categories of psychosocial mechanisms that can operate to distance people from morally based self-control: (1) moral justification; (2) minimizing, ignoring, or misconstruing consequences; and (3) dehumanizing the objects of aggression.
- Ryan (1997) suggested that the concept of “chosenness”, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition has been a driving force in the self-righteous justification of destroying or subjugating groups seen as “not chosen”.
- Diffusion of responsibility occurs when people in a group feel less responsible for acting or making decisions than they would if they were alone (Schwartz and Gottlieb, 1980)- Dehumanization of the opponent enhances people’s willingness to use violence.
- Bandura (1990) made the point that empathic responses to others’ experiences depend in large part on whether or not we view them as similar to ourselves and that empathic responses strengthen self-sanctions against harming the object for our empathy.
- The influence of the social environment generally is more powerful than that of individual characteristics in promoting a dehumanizing attitude. Authoritarian institutional influences are particularly powerful.
- Long (1990) suggested it might be more useful to try to identify “the most common characteristics of terrorism, regardless of whether any particular one or combination of them is present in any given case” (p.4). He listed four categories: goals, strategies, operations, and organization.
- The most prominent explanations of terrorism fall into three categories: structural, rational choice, and psychological (Ross, 1993). Structural theories utilize the view that terrorism is caused by environmental, political, cultural, economic, and social factors in societies; rational choice theories explain terrorism in terms of cost/benefit analysis by the participants; and psychological theories address individual and group dynamics in relationship to the formation of terrorist groups and the commission of terrorist acts.
- Ross (1993) constructed a causal model based on structure. He posited three “permissive” causes: geographical location, type of political system, and level of modernization, and seven “precipitant” causes (listed in order from least to most important): social, cultural, and historical facilitation: organizational split and development: presence of other forms of unrest: support: counterterrorist organization failure: availability of weapons and explosives: and grievances. The permissive causes act as facilitators of the precipitant causes.
- Ross (1993, p.323) agreed with Laquer (1977, p.103) that “most terrorist groups come into existence as the ‘result of a split between the moderate and the more extreme wings of an already-existing organization’ (e.g., political party).” Ross postulated that the more splitting that occurs within terrorist organizations, the greater the likelihood that at least one of the splinter groups will advocate or use terrorism.
- Ross hypothesized that the greater the amount of support, the greater the failure of counterterrorist efforts, and, conversely, the greater the failure of counterterrorist efforts, the greater the amount of support for terrorists. Ross suggested that the greater the availability of weapons and explosives, the greater the incidence of terrorism.
- The last and most important precipitant cause is grievances. Ross (1993, p.326) parcelled them into seven categories: economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social. These grievances can be directed against “individuals, groups, organizations, classes, races, and ethnicities, both public and private.” Left unaddressed, serious grievances can result in the formation of social movements or interests groups that can, under the influence of the factors mentioned above, evolve
or split into terrorist organizations.
- Terrorists learn from others’ examples as well as from their own experience.
- According to Reich (1990, p. 263), psychological explanations of terrorism have not dealt with the enormous variety and complexity of the issue. He observed, “Even the briefest review of the history of terrorism reveals how varied and complex a phenomenon it is, and therefore how futile it is to attribute simple, global, and general psychological characteristics to all terrorists and all terrorism. - Some types of background are over-represented in terrorists. Post (1990) cited evidence from several extensive studies of terrorists’ backgrounds that indicate that many of them came from the margins of society or were unsuccessful in their personal lives, jobs, and educations, or both. - Tedeschi and Felson (1994) emphasized that learning from the repeated success of aggressive behavior is a major factor in encouraging groups to engage in violence.
- Terrorists generally are not impulsive, either individually or in groups. On the other hand, they do exhibit the propensity to take risks.
- A high proportion of terrorists appear to be stimulus seekers. They are attracted to stressful situations and are quickly bored when inactive (Long, 1990).
- Post (1990, p.35) “The cause is not the cause. The cause, as codified in the group’s ideology, according to this line of reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit. Indeed, the central argument of this position is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.”
- Terrorists use coercion as a form of social influence (Tedeschi and Felson, 1994). Tedeschi and Felson have identified three primary social motives for using coercion: (1) to influence others to obtain some benefit, (2) to express grievances and establish justice, and (3) to assert or defend social identities.
- Bandura (1990, p. 186) “The path to terrorism can be shaped by fortuitous factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal predilections and social inducements.”
- Although the study of terrorism is difficult and far from complete, the evidence suggests the following general characteristics of these groups, reflecting many of the principles that apply to group violence in general: Individual and group are influenced by their environment, including political, cultural, historical, economic, and social factors. When deciding on a course of action, they weigh risks/costs vs. benefits in service of obtaining desired goals or resources. They use strategies, tactics, and operations to create an imbalance of power in the terrorists’ favor. They work to create a strong group identity, with an “us vs. them” (in-group vs. out-group) mentality. This fosters groupthink. Members typically are not deranged. Although there is no personality profile that could be characterized as typical of terrorists, certain traits appear to be over-represented among groups’ members, including risk-taking (although they are not impulsive), low self-esteem, feeling out of control of their lives, and ascribing their failures to outside sources. Many of them come from the margins of society, and it is not uncommon for them to have experienced significant disruption of life during childhood. Terrorist leaders are, on the average, more hostile and narcissistic than their followers. Leaders manipulate followers’ emotions, and utilize coercion and disengagement of moral responses to help enable the perpetration of violence, especially on innocent people.


42. Collins, E., & McGovern M. (1997). Killing rage. London: Granta Books. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The principal author, Eamon Collins, is a former Intelligence Officer with the IRA where he personally was responsible for several murders. In this book, which is written as popular work more than a scholarly treatise, he recounts his story of involvement in the IRA and in terrorist activities. He focuses heavily on descriptions of the culture and context (emphasizing his personal conditions of socioeconomic deprivation) of Northern Ireland breeding a kind of collective anger that was then used to justify violence and human atrocities. He attempts to portray the violence and collateral disorder starkly, and not apologetically. To the extent that the reader can rely on the author’s self-reflective insights, appraisal of social influence, and internal narration, certain psychological lessons could potentially be inferred, although it is quite unclear how well these experiences would generalize, even to others involved in terrorism in Northern Ireland.
   Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Terrorist groups are not usually composed of violent people, but people who choose to use violence as a tool to what they see as a reasonable end.
   - The people who choose violence are usually fairly ordinary people in extraordinary groups, and we should look at the psychology of group processes rather than at individual psychopathology to understand their behaviour.
   - Accounts of how people become affiliated with violent groups often show more details about friendship and courtship than political grievance.
   - Violent groups are usually embedded within a network of psychological and ideological legitimacy, which gives them both material and moral support.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: It would be all too easy to write that it is not necessary to be a psychopath in order to be a terrorist. In fact, it is almost certain that it does not. Terrorism, like any other serious undertaking, requires dedication, perseverance, and a certain selflessness. These are the many qualities that are lacking in the psychopath.
   - Allied to this flattening of the emotions in the psychopath is a lack of moral responsibility that makes his actions peculiarly ungovernable.

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   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Shifts from question of "what is terrorism" to "what is a terrorist?"
   - Terrorists must develop justifications for their terrorist actions.
   - They also must believe it is necessary and effective.
   - Terrorists are not born terrorists they become them.
   - Terrorists are complex human beings and are quite diverse. They must be able to detach themselves against the suffering of others.
   - Argues that reasons we need to understand terrorists include: knowing under what circumstances they might kill a hostage; knowing the extent to which they might put their own lives at risk in a confrontation; know extent of capability to use new technology.
   - Draws analogy between terrorists and bullies (callous and project their own pathological fears onto others) and between terrorists and tortures.
   - A somewhat dated, naive psychological description of terrorists. No research basis or theoretical framework.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: By using the primary materials provided by the terrorists themselves, i.e., memoirs, statements, interviews and communiqués much information about the terrorist mindset and decision making can be gleaned.
   - What terrorists say about themselves is often more revealing than they intend.
   - The fundamental contradiction for terrorists is that while they are deliberately employing what we in fact regard as terrorist violence, they characterize their actions as something else.
   - To comprehend the terrorist mindset it is crucial to uncover the rationale, motivations and mechanisms for such denial.
   - This chapter takes a look at some of the dynamics of terrorism and proposes a simple framework for examining the terrorists’ view of themselves and their actions.
Part of the complexity of terrorism is the fact that it is conducted by a variety of idiosyncratic individuals with widely divergent national and sociocultural backgrounds. Efforts to provide an overall ‘terrorist profile’ are misleading, for as Post cautions, ‘there are as nearly as many variants of personality who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are variants of personality’. To mitigate the errors inherent in making overly sweeping generalizations, this study limits itself to an examination of terrorists from a particular geographical area, with the assumption that although a number of nationalities are represented, they probably share the concept or worldview of being ‘Western’ and ‘European’. Additionally, the groups chosen share similar ideological frameworks of the radical left.

Modern explanations of the phenomenon of secular terrorism range from the psychological to the sociological to the historical. From an additional perspective, however, it is useful and instructive to listen to what the terrorists have to say. How they characterize themselves, their chosen enemy, their actions and their goals, this provides us with a unique view. The act of choosing the targets for terrorist violence is an important component of terrorist activity. The attacks, contrary to popular belief, are not normally random and indiscriminate, but carefully calculated, measured and debated as to the appropriateness and the propaganda value of the target.

Aside from the message of violence directed against particular kinds of targets, the terrorists thus also use written and spoken language to legitimize, rationalize and justify their actions.

Much suggestive but inconclusive work has been done on the psychological mechanisms of terrorism exploring the personalities and backgrounds of those drawn to political violence, and the dynamics at play within a terrorist group.- Franco Ferracuti points out that the curious tendency of terrorists to always invoke war as the reason for and the intentions of their actions has a particular and not completely obvious purpose for the terrorists.

The ‘just’ war is the battle against evil, or in self-defense. Going against the prevailing system and mores, using violence in a ‘legitimate’ fashion can provide individuals with personal satisfaction (or frustration) far beyond the stated ‘cause’.

Terrorist memoirs of defectors and depositions given by repentant terrorists reveal that terrorists themselves have debated the issue of the morality of violence and just what constitutes ‘terrorism’. Generally living underground, such individuals slowly become divorced from reality, descending into a make-believe world where they wage Ferracuti’s ‘fantasy war’.

The active terrorists must continually justify their actions to themselves as well as to their real and perceived constituencies.

Violent, extra-legal activity is justified in the minds of the terrorists by their stated conviction that all legal processes are to no avail, since the cards are stacked against them.

Much effort goes into characterizing the enemy. The David and Goliath theme is prevalent- there is nobility and honour in the courage and determination of an oppressed party who dares to strike out at the ‘oppressor’. Dehumanizing the enemy becomes automatic with practice.

To justify acts of violence, the situation must be black and white, with little room for hesitation. Often using the claim of conspiracy, the groups build the veil enemy, explaining here why violence is necessary and why it is necessary now.-Violent action serves multiple purposes. It is meant to communicate, but it also serves as an example of what can be done.

It awakens, making the people aware of the ‘inherent contradictions of the state', and demonstrates that resistance is possible, ‘showing in practice the real possibilities of the confrontation with the police state in the strategy for socialism.’- Whatever the terrorists believe they will accomplish is fairly well hidden, but the fact that they believe they are successfully moving towards this unknown is often stated and with confidence.

Although idiosyncratic differences emerge from group to group because of different writers, different nationalities, and different national programmes, the basic characteristics of European ‘anarchic-ideologues’ are the same. The groups share (1) obviously, but importantly, a common use of terrorist violence; (2) denial that they are terrorists; (3) the need to portray themselves in a favorable light in order to attract support; (4) the need to rationalize and justify what they do; (5) the tendency for self-criticism.

What about ‘Euroterrorism?’ This ‘Internationalist anti-imperialist Front’ is actually what Bell has characterized as ‘quarrelling brothers’.

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Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Effective long-term governmental strategy in pluralist countries will inevitably address the critical question of what motivates terrorist. The answer would be likely to determine what, if anything, can be done to alleviate the conditions that foster terrorist movements.

In the proliferation of theories, two broad conflicting views emerge; one holds that terrorists are driven by mental disorders while the other holds that terrorists are generally driven by political idealism. Different governmental policy strategies are implied by two perspectives.

The major focus of the article will be a critique of the mental disorder perspectives of terrorist motivations.

Several authors in the field have blurred the critical distinction between terrorism as a phenomenon of insurgent violence and terrorism as a criminal act.

Mental Disorder Perspective: According to this perspective, political terrorists engage in gratuitous violence, which reveals psychopathological causes rather than socio-political ones. The focus will be on those terrorists who maintain that the following mental disorders motivate political terrorists: sociopathy or psychopathy (anti-social personality disorder); narcissism; the Freudian “thanatos” (death-wish) instinct; and organic of physiological disorders.

The Sociopath: The most prominent mental disorder linked to political terrorism and terrorism in general involves the personality disorder identified either as a sociopathy or psychopathy.

According to Pearce and Cooper, political terrorists are sociopaths.

Cooper, unlike Pearce, is aware of the contradiction between the dedication, perseverance and selflessness required of political terrorists and the absence by definition of the same characteristics in the sociopathy personality. Cooper does not ignore the contradiction or attempt to define it away, but rather, he claims that sociopaths make mediocre terrorists.

Pearce makes the following statement in reference to criminal psychopath killed in a barricade incident: “the tattoos on his torso revealed his psychopathology” (Pearce, 1977, p.172).

An additional concern with Pearce’s hypothesis is the difficulty in assessing the validity of his key psychoanalytic construct superego lacunae.

It appears then, in the absence of any clinical observations, that the diagnostic inference of superego lacunae is a political value assessment rather than a valid inference of sociopathy.

A final critical concern involves the need to assess the distribution of sociopaths within terrorist organizations and within the general population in order to determine if sociopaths predominate in these organizations or are present in disproportionate numbers compared to the general population. Obviously, obtaining these data is extremely unlikely.

Narcissism is also advanced as a mental disorder explanation of political terrorism, particularly in the form of a personality disorder. This hypothesis that contemporary Western political terrorists are narcissists has been argued most elaborate by Christopher Lasch. While Lasch inferred from secondary sources the importance of narcissistic personality disorder, Gustave Morf drew on comprehensive social, behavioral and psychological profiles he obtained from hundreds of interviews with young men to reach essentially similar inferences concerning the importance of narcissism.

Morf unlike Lasch, does not explicitly refer to a narcissistic personality disorder. Instead of focusing on personality, Morf emphasizes narcissistic cultural values and the permissive structure of Western society. Essentially rational young men adopted narcissistic values without suffering personality disorders.

For these theoreticians, narcissism ultimately is the causal or motivating factor of political terrorism. Whether it is expressed through personality disorders or cultural values, the result is the same.

Finally, the general criticism made earlier with respect to the sociopathic personality disorder applies to narcissistic persons. It is not evident whether the distribution of narcissistic values among political terrorists is different than their distribution in the general public.

The Death-Wish: Another personality characteristic that has been linked to the motivation of political terrorist is the death-wish. The theoretical origin of this concept lies with Freud’s introduction of the idea of “thanatos” or a death instinct to account for the unprecedented human devastation during World War I.

The contemporary psychoanalytic version of the death-seeking or death confronting behavior
focuses on the depressive characteristic in the terrorist personality. According to Konrad Kellen, this explanation reveals a terrorist who “often is a person who feels empty, anhedonic and … as a child he may have suffered from the triad of enuresis fire setting cruelty to animals” (Kellen, 1979, p.2).

- With regards to Cooper’s assertion that the death wish is part of the sociopathic personalities of political terrorists, other observers disagree.
- The hypothesis that terrorists are motivated by a death-wish thus remain unsubstantiated.
- The mental disorder perspective of political terrorism clearly suffers from the absence of clinical observations reported in a manner that compares or allows them to be compared to a general population sample. Additionally, there is little of the cross-cultural and cross-national data necessary to examine the relative importance of culture and personality.
- Physiological Impairments and Mental Disorders: E. Patrick McGuire reported that Hubbard and another psychiatrist, F. Gentry Harris, examined 80 imprisoned terrorist in 11 countries and found that 90% of them had defective vestibular functions in the middle ear.
- What he suggest, rather is that certain personas who engage in terrorism for strictly personal or nonpolitical reason suffer from personality disorder characteristics. These persons are identified by Hubbard as soloists. They act alone and appear virtually incapable of undertaking the group behavior required by political terrorists.
- Hubbard identifies two other types of terrorist types, the conspirator and the groupist. These two types appear more likely to engage in political terrorism. The conspirator also is exhibitionistic, but is motivated primarily by the fear of unresolved grief. The groupist in contrast, usually avoids public identification and willing surrenders his individual ego needs to the interests of the group.
- What remains confusing in Hubbard’s work is the physiological factors that he hints are related to terrorists: “I suspect it will be possible to determine specific chemical distinctions among and between soloist, conspirators and Groupists during moments of their actions” (Hubbard, 1978, P.191).

- As long a Hubbard is unwilling to provide detailed descriptions of his data and analysis procedures, the assertion that inner ear impairments tend to produce renegade or antisocial behavior such as terrorism appears to be conjecture.
- Rational-Idealist Perspective: - No theorist from this perspective views every political terrorist as a rational idealist.
- Irving Goldaber (1979) divides them into idealistic protestors, ideological zealots, and terrorist extremists.
- Paul Wilkinson is a leading proponent of the rational idealist perspective who nevertheless believes that many Western terrorist are criminals or criminally insane.
- J. Bowyer-Bell’s view of political terrorism is more typical of the rational idealist perspective, since he rejects the importance of both pathology and liberal democratic interpretations of revolutionary political terrorist such as the Japanese Red Army.
- Professor Wilfried Rasch of the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry of the Free University of Berlin examined leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Group another West German terrorist and concluded that with one exception “nothing was found which could justify their classification as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics or psychopaths. None of the men and women I saw could have been diagnosed as “paranoid.” This applies particularly to the four main defendants who died in the Stuttgart prison: Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, and Raspr” (Rasch, 1979, p.80)

50. Cota-McKinley, A., Woody, W., & Bell P. (2001). Veng eance: Effects of gender age religious background. Aggressive Behavior, 27, 343-350. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: Vengeance can be commonly defined as the infliction of harm in return for perceived injury or insult or as simply getting back at another person. Three hundred fifty-three participants responded to eight hypothetical scenarios that may elicit vengeful behavior in which the offending party was either a romantic partner, a friend, a coworker, or a stranger. Participants also completed a vengeance scale and a measure of biblical literalism. Participants were most vengeful toward coworkers and least vengeful toward romantic partners. Age, religious conservatism, and gender were significant predictors of attitudes toward vengeance. Although men were more likely than women to be accepting of vengeful attitudes as measured by the vengeance scale, only age was a significant predictor of behavior in the vengeance scenarios. The current research provides a basis for a systematic investigation of vengeance within the structure

- Vengeance can be commonly defined as the infliction of harm in return for perceived injury or insult or as simply getting back at another person.

- Revenge fulfills a wide variety of goals, including righting perceived injustice, restoring the self-worth of the vengeful individual, and deterring future injustice. Central to the concept of revenge are perceptions of personal harm, unfairness, and injustice and the “anger, indignation, and hatred” associated with the perceived injustice [Kim and Smith, 1993, p. 38; see also Stuckless and Goranson, 1992]. The perceived injustice must be righted or undone, and revenge, despite social taboo, is often seen as an acceptable means of doing so.

- Ellison [1991] found two religious variables that influenced acceptance of defensive violence to defend the honor and safety of one’s self and one’s family. He found that hierarchical images of God as a master and judge were associated with increased acceptance of defensive violence. “Much of hierarchical theology stresses the themes of moral judgment and divine punishment prominent in the Old Testament” [Ellison, 1991, p. 1233]. These views are highly correlated with the literal acceptance of the Old and New Testaments including all of the views on revenge described previously.

- Participants in the current study were asked to evaluate several hypothetical situations that may or may not elicit vengeful behaviors and to rate how vengeful they would be in those situations.

- Three hundred fifty-three introductory psychology students, 118 males and 235 females, from Colorado State University participated to fulfill a class research requirement.

- Participants also completed the Vengeance Scale [Stuckless and Goranson, 1992], for which they used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree) to address 20 statements regarding their attitudes toward vengeance participants completed a religious conservatism scale [Bensko et al., 1995].

- The relationship between the offending individual and the participant was a significant predictor of willingness to seek revenge. Participants’ willingness to seek vengeance was highest for coworkers, followed by strangers, friends, and romantic partners, respectively. An analysis of aspects of the various relationships sheds light on the intensity of attitudes toward acceptance of vengeance.

- Gender did not have a main effect on willingness to seek revenge in specific situations, and there was no significant gender by relationship interaction, although a gender main effect was found in participants’ attitudes as measured by the Vengeance Scale. Specifically, it was found that men are more accepting of vengeful attitudes.

- And age was a significant predictor of Vengeance Scale scores.

- Biblical literalism was a significant predictor of attitudes toward vengeance; biblical literalists were more accepting of revenge as a motivation for human behavior.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: While acknowledging that all behavior is multiply determined, Crayton chooses to focus here on the “psychology of narcissism” as a framework for understanding (not excusing) terrorist behavior. He uses Kohut’s concepts to guide his argument. The two key narcissistic dynamics are a grandiose sense of self and “idealized parental image” (I’m in a relationship with something perfect). As others have posited, he suggests that narcissistic rage is what prompts an aggressive response to perceived injustice. With regard to the effect of groups, he argues that narcissistically vulnerable persons are drawn to charismatic leaders and that some groups are held together by a shared grandiose sense of self. Not particularly innovative by contemporary standards, nor does it have much practical, operational application.

53. Crelinsten, R. D. (1987). Terrorism as political communication: The relationship between the controller and the controlled. P. Wilkinson, & A. M. Stewart (Eds), Contemporary research on terrorism, (pp. 3-23). Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter takes the position that terrorism is best viewed as a form of political communication and analyzed in the context of other political behavior and conflicts over power and legitimacy. The author begins with an extensive critique of the limitations he sees in terrorism research. He poses two levels of analysis: (1) terrorism as a tactic of communication to manipulate a target audience by use and threat of violence (2) the meaning of terrorism varies according to the legitimacy of the actor. Because terrorism is viewed as a form of communication it must be analyzed in the context of the behavior of targets and intended audiences (using symbolic interactions and conflict theory). Even the use of the term "terrorism" becomes a way in which the controller stigmatizes the behavior of the controlled. The model presented seeks to integrate a concept of terrorism that emphasizes both state and insurgent forms and accounts for the communication and reaction of both the controller and the controlled in a conflict for power. Not a piece with much practical, operational value.

54. Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379-399. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The study of terrorism can be organized around three questions: why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. Here our objective is to outline an approach to the analysis of the causes of terrorism, based on comparison of different cases of terrorism, in order to distinguish a common pattern of causation from the historically unique. -We would not wish to claim that a general explanation of the sources of terrorism is a simple task, but it is possible to make a useful beginning by establishing a theoretical order for different types and levels of causes. We approach terrorism as a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organization. -Not even all the individuals who share the goals of a terrorist organization agree that terrorism is the best means. It is essential to consider the psychological variables that may encourage or inhibit individual participation in terrorist actions. The analysis of these three levels of causation will center first on situational variables, then on the strategy of the terrorist organization, and last on the problem of individual participation. -An initial obstacle to identification of propitious circumstances for terrorism is the absence of significant empirical studies of relevant cross-national factors. -To develop a framework for the analysis of likely settings for terrorism, we must establish conceptual distinctions among different types of factors. First, a significant difference exists between preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. Second, a further classification divides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors, which provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct causes of terrorism. -First, modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that is a significant permissive cause of terrorism. -Urbanization is part of a modern trend toward aggregation and complexity, which increases the number of accessible targets and methods. -Social “facilitation” which Gurr found to be extremely powerful in bringing about civil strife in general, is also an important factor. This concept refers to social habits and historical traditions that
sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.

- Moreover, broad attitudes and beliefs that condone terrorism are communicated transnationally.
- The most salient political factor in the category of permissive causes is a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism.
- The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. This is not to say, however, that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is a necessary or a sufficient cause of terrorism. The second condition that created motivations for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation.
- The last category of situational factors involves the concept of a precipitated event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism.
- The analysis of the background conditions for terrorism indicates that we must look at the terrorist organization’s perception and interpretation of the situation.
- Significant campaigns of terrorism depend on rational political choice.
- Terrorism is often designed to disrupt and discredit the processes of government, by weakening it administratively and impairing normal operations.
- Terrorism may also be intended to provoke a counteraction from the government, to increase publicity for the terrorists’ cause and to demonstrate to the people that their charges against the regime are well founded.
- In addition, terrorism may serve internal organizational functions of control, discipline, and morale building within the terrorist group and even become an instrument of rivalry among factions in a resistance movement.
- Weakness may result from the regime’s suppression of opposition.
- On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that where there is terrorism there is oppression.
- Terrorism is neither a automatic reaction to conditions nor a purely calculated strategy.
- The relationship between personality and politics is complex and imperfectly understood. Why individuals engage in political violence is a complicated problem. And the question why they engage in terrorism is still more difficult.
- No single motivation or personality can be valid for all circumstances. What limited data we have on individual terrorists, suggests that the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.
- The evidence also indicates that many terrorists are activist with prior political experience in nonviolent opposition to the state.
- The question of attitudes toward victims and justifications for terrorism are especially important because different forms of terrorism involve various degrees of selectively in the choice of victims.
- Similar problems in analyzing the connection between attitudes and behavior are due to the fact that there are role differentiations between leaders and followers.
- An alternative approach to analyzing the psychology of terrorism is to use a deductive method based on what we know about terrorism as an activity, rather than an inductive method yielding general propositions from statements of the particular.
- One of the most salient attributes of terrorist activity is that it involves significant personal danger.
- It is perhaps even more significant that terrorism is a group activity, involving intimate relationships among a small number of people.
- Terrorist can confide in and trust only each other.
- If there is a singular common emotion that drives the individual to become a terrorist, it is vengeance on behalf of comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspire to represent.
- The terrorists willingness to accept high risks may also be related to the belief that one’s death will be avenged.
- Vengeance may be not only a function of anger but of a desire for transcendence.
- Guilt may also lead terrorist to seek punishment and danger rather than avoid it.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Most definitions of terrorism, however divided on other points agree that it is a form of political violence. Unfortunately, this rare
unanimity has only infrequently served as a foundation for research on political terrorism, which is typically isolated from the broader field. There are advantages to be gained from integrating research on terrorism into the analysis of political violence. The study of terrorism, which is widely recognized as theoretically impoverished, stands to gain in theoretical scope, precision, and cumulativeness of findings. Situating the study of terrorism in the broader field could point analysts toward problems of significance to a larger community of scholars. Moreover, the phenomenon of terrorism might serve as a useful test-case for general theories of violence, which are rarely applied to terrorism by their authors. This essay first identifies common problems for research. It turns, next, to a discussion of the relationship between the phenomenon of terrorism and other manifestations of political violence: of what might terrorism be considered a case? In addition, which general theories of violence are most applicable to terrorism? Last, this assessment considers future research directions for the field of terrorism studies.

The concept of political violence is inherently ambiguous, and its usage can be extremely arbitrary. The boundaries of the concept are not only unclear but often hotly contested. While the term is usually understood to mean the use or threat of physical destruction or harm in order to affect the authoritative allocation of values in society, some authors would not include threats in their definition.

Still in dispute is the question of whether the concept implies only action from below or whether it also includes violence by the state.

Another unresolved dilemma is whether the concept of political violence should be reserved for destructive harm intended to influence politics, or whether the concept should include any violence that has a political impact.

The issue of intentionality also raises questions about the justifiability of violence and similarly of terrorism.

A related point of dispute involves the concept of “structural violence” to Johan Galtung, structural violence is an asymmetrical power relationship. In any situation of inequality, the strong exercise violence against the weak simply by virtue of being stronger. Such “silent violence” provokes terrorism by the weak as a defensive reaction.

Scholars in the area of political violence generally disagree as to whether their work should be practical and prescriptive or devoted to increasing knowledge for its own sake.

Efforts to categorize terrorism as a class or form of political violence are complicated by the fact that violence occurs on different levels of political interaction.

Distinguishing between subnational, national, and international levels of analysis becomes increasingly complex.

What made the phenomenon of terrorism noteworthy in the 1970s was its internalization.

The claim that terrorism is not only an international phenomenon but a new form of warfare is often made.

However, using an analogy of terrorism as war is an over simplification that raises as many questions as it answers.

Terrorism is also related to collective civil violence, whether organized or spontaneous.

The study of terrorism, like the study of other forms of political violence, tends to be interdisciplinary.

The concepts and theories even terms of discourse, in different fields are not necessarily compatible.

Generally, theoretical investigations follow two types of changes; changes in actual patterns and incidence of violence and changes in popular and academic interest in specific manifestations of political violence.

Research trends in violence and terrorism also reflect increasingly methodological sophistication. Since the 1950s and the so-called “behavioral revolution,” the social sciences have tried to become more scientifically rigorous.

Another problem for quantitative analysis lies in what is counted.

There are other paths to understanding the causes of violence and terrorism. Some researches are interested in the psychology of the individual who turns to political violence.

An alternative to the psychological approach, at mass or individual levels, is based on the idea that political violence is the result of reasoned, instrumental behavior.

Some modest explanations that appear pertinent to violence in general could be applied to terrorism
in the guise of hypotheses to be tested. 1) Violence follow lines of division evident in other nonviolent conflicts. Violence is not extraordinary to politics. 2) Participants in political violence are rarely deviant. 3) The likelihood of violence increases with the level of solidarity among the participants in violence. 4) Actors usually calculate their interests before turning to violence, but these interests are constantly changing. 5) Scholars should be attentive to the emotional side of violence, because political violence is not exclusively instrumental.

-A number of unsolved puzzles remain for students of political violence and terrorism. These are questions that case studies of terrorism might attempt to answer. 1) Research should focus on shifts from nonviolent political action to terrorism and vice versa. 2) Changes in the processes or stages of violence over time. 3) There is a need for study of the mix of instrumental and expressive or emotional motives in specific groups that use terrorism. 4) Research on civil violence should turn to the study of violent actors within societies rather than the analysis of conditions. There should be more focus on the group rather than the national level of analysis. 5) Similarities, studies of conflict resolution should situate conflict resolution processes within the political context. 6) There should be a greater appreciation of the heterogeneity of political violence. Researchers should concentrate on developing explanations of categories of political violence rather than general theories. 7) Researchers should analyze public perceptions of and reactions to terrorism. 8) There is a need for more study of the consequences and outcomes of violence, especially analysis of whether violence succeeds in attaining the goals actors set for it. 9) The interactions between governments and violent oppositions and of adversarial extremists movements against each other should be analyzed.

-Enormously complex casual models of war or of collective violence are less useful than more refined empirical analysis. Research on terrorism, which lends itself readily to such approaches, still needs to be firmly anchored in larger theories of political behavior, while studies of political violence, whether national or international, should include terrorism in their attempts at explanation.


Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: Terrorism is often considered the result of a strategic choice based on instrumental reasoning (Crenshaw 1990; DeNardo 1985)

- My Intentions is not to contest the premise that terrorism is often strategic behavior, but to describe possible psychological barriers to purely strategic calculation in underground organizations. Psychological factors influence both the initiation and the conduct of terrorism and may be the source of actions that are incomprehensible if interpreted strictly as external goal oriented behavior.
- I ask how group dynamics and collective belief systems influence the use of terrorism by making it possible, motivating it, determining its forms, and instigating its escalation or decline.
- Groups that are close rather than open to contacts outside the group may be less likely to be strategic in their reasoning.
- The appropriate focus of a psychological explanation is the interaction of individuals within the group, not individual personality.
- As Albert Bandura notes “it requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce heinous deeds.” Jerold Post (1987, pp. 25-26) also emphasizes that “once individuals join a terrorist group individual differences disappear in the face of the powerful unifying forces of group and organizational psychology”.
- For political oppositions, the initial decision to use terrorism against the state usually requires a transition to clandestine life in the underground. Relationships of leaders to followers in the group may contribute to the isolation of the group from society to the growth of interdependence among the members. Leaders usually control contacts with the outside world as well as the dissemination of information within the group. Leaders also base their authority on the ability to manipulate incentives for followers. These incentives are both political the ability to move the group toward accomplishment of collective goals and psychological.
- In general the members of such organizations are not suddenly converted to terrorism but acquire their commitment gradually, often through belonging to a group, set of friends, or family unit that collectively turns to terrorism.
- Loyalty is primarily to the group or entity, not to abstract objectives or ideology.
- Exposure to danger increases the cohesion.
- Deviation from group standards is probably rare because of mutual interdependence, peer pressure,
- A key role of the leadership is to develop or maintain a collective belief system that links overall ideological orientation to the environment in which the group operates.
- The sharpest and clearest aspect of the beliefs that may be conducive to terrorism is identification and characterization of the enemy. The enemy is portrayed as an undifferentiated and monolithic entity.
- The self-image of the terrorist is ambivalent, even contradictory. Terrorists need to see themselves as doing good, to justify their actions, and to maintain morale.
- Individual beliefs are likely to be stable rather than volatile. Even greater stability should characterize collective attitudes that are constantly reinforced by group interaction.
- "True believers" are not by nature skeptical (Snow and Machalek 1982).
- It is also possible that the resort to terrorism precedes and consequently determines beliefs. That is, rather than acting as a result of preconceptions, people may act impulsively or unthinkingly and then rationalize their actions.
- On a general level, members of groups may act simply to maintain a collective identity and thus seek to keep the group alive whatever its political accomplishments.
- Dependence on the group is likely to lead members to value the approval of other members of the group more than the achievement of long-term political goals.
- One consequence of the centrality of the group is that motives that unite its members, such as vengeance, take precedence over instrumental calculations, which can be deeply divisive.
- Vengeance, which is motivated by a sense of injustice and of powerlessness, is based on the principle of reciprocity. Escalation occurs because the act of retribution is never an exact match for the original offense.
- Revenge is part of a process of using violence in order to strengthen group cohesiveness, confirm beliefs about self and world, and maintain group morale and individual self-esteem.
- Because internal conflict threatens group cohesion and identity, leaders may try to deflect aggression onto external targets.
- Albert Bandura explains that "People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions, what is culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring.
- In effect the belief of terrorist actors serve as a mechanism of "moral disengagement"
- The escalation of terrorism to greater levels of destructiveness may also result from psychological processes. Participation in group discussions leads to a heightened propensity to take risks.
- This analysis suggests that justifications for terrorism and emotional support, both provided by the group, are critical.
- Franco Ferracuti has observed, "What happens in the mind of the terrorist who decides to abandon terrorism is not know".


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Terrorism is always a choice among alternatives.
- Within opposition movements, both in democracies and in authoritarian regimes, there is typically an internal debate over the use of terrorism.
- What is particularly satisfying about using terrorism? Terrorism has strategic value to its users precisely because it violates moral, political, and legal rules. Terrorism is deliberately meant to demonstrate the legitimacy of generally accepted standards.
- One of the strongest motivations behind terrorism is vengeance, particularly the desire to avenge not oneself but others. Vengeance can be specific or diffuse, but it is an obsessive drive that is a powerful motive for violence toward others, especially people thought to be responsible for injustices.
- The perpetrators of terrorism tend to be impatient. They are frustrated with talk, denounce, and endless argument.
- Terrorism can also be a way of building self-esteem and of exercising power over other people.
- Many people who belong to these kinds of undergrounds feel a certain sense of superiority. They consider themselves to be members of an elite, an exclusive group composed of only the people who are willing not only to act for the masses of people but to break all the rules.
Justifying violence is important to those who use it.
Second part of the question of motivation concerns overcoming inhibitions. Belief systems are one way. For example, violence is interpreted not as a choice but as an obligation.
Once recruits enter such groups, leaders try to teach them a certain set of values and to develop organizational routines that make violence easier to perform.
One way to overcome guilt and avoid remorse is to continue violence, in order to prove that the decision was right in the first place.
In an underground group one also finds a tendency to dehumanize the enemy.
Personality clearly matters in certain instances, but in general it is not the individual who matters but the group. One of the strongest factors that permits people to overcome moral inhibitions is group or peer pressure.
Group pressure is almost irresistibly strong in a very small group that lives in concealment, pursued by the government, and isolated society.
The answer may lie in the fact that terrorism serves the important social psychological function of maintaining the group. The members of the group have lost their individual identities (or may not have had a stable sense of identity) and assumed the collective identity of the group.
What keeps the group going may be terrorism itself, more the promise of homeland or of revolution.
If the group becomes inactive, frustration will build among the militant for who the attraction was the opportunity for action. Leaders must keep the action going or lose control of their followers.
Third question concerns why terrorism takes specific forms. It is harder for most people to kill someone face-to-face than at a distance. Bombing is often easier in a technological sense, but it is easier psychologically to place a bomb that will explode later.
A psychological advantage to hostage taking is that terrorists can blame the outcome on the government.
We can not understand terrorism without the contributions of psychology, although this knowledge does not provide a magic answer to dealing with terrorism. Three points should be remembered. One is that the group performing the act of terrorism is more significant than the individual. Second, it is important to the people who use terrorism to be able to justify what they do. The last point is that the stated goal of terrorism may not be what the perpetrators really want.
Understanding the psychology of terrorism, which is not unlike the psychology of other forms of violence or extreme behavior, demystifies the phenomenon.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter examines the way in which terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy. It attempts to show that terrorism may follow logical processes that can be discovered and explained. It interprets the resort to violence as a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors.
One of the advantages of approaching terrorism as a collectively rational strategic choice is that it permits the construction of a standard from which deviations can be measured.
The wide range of terrorist activity cannot be dismissed as “irrational” and thus pathological, unreasonable, or inexplicable.
The central problem is to determine when extremist organizations find terrorism useful.
The practitioners of terrorism often claim that they had no choice but terrorism, and it is indeed true that terrorism often follows the failure of other methods.
The existence of extremism or rebellious potential is necessary to the resort to terrorism but does not in itself explain it, because many revolutionary and nationalist organizations have explicitly disavowed terrorism.
Why does an organization lack the potential to attract enough followers to change government policy or overthrow it?
One possibility is that the majority of the population does not share the ideological views of the resisters. A second explanation for the weakness of the type of organization likely to turn to terrorism lies in a failure to mobilize support. A third reason for the weakness of dissident organizations is specific to repressive states.
People may not support a resistance organization because they are afraid of negative sanctions from the regime.

In addition to small numbers, time constraints contribute to the decision to use terrorism. Terrorists are impatient for action.

Terrorism has so far been presented as the response by an opposition movement to an opportunity. This approach is compatible with the findings of Harvey Waterman, who sees collective political action as determined by the calculations of resources and opportunities. Yet other theorists- James Q. Wilson, for example argue that political organizations originate in response to a threat to a group’s values. Terrorism can certainly be defensive as well as opportunistic.

An organization or a faction of an organization may choose terrorism because other methods are not expected to work or are considered too time-consuming, given the urgency of the situation and the government’s superior resources.

The costs of terrorism are high. As a domestic strategy, it invariably invites a punitive government reactions.

Another potential cost of terrorism is loss of popular support.

Terrorism may be unattractive because it is elitist.

Terrorism has extremely useful agenda-setting function.

Terrorism may be intended to create revolutionary conditions.

A corollary advantage to terrorism in what might be called its excitational function: it inspires resistance by example. As propaganda of the deed, terrorism demonstrates that the regime can be challenged and that illegal opposition is possible.

Radicals choose terrorism when they want immediate action, think that only violence can build organizations and mobilize supporters, and accept the risks of challenging the government in a particularly provocative way.

Terrorism can be considered a reasonable way of pursuing extreme interests in the political arena. It is one among the many alternatives that radical organizations can choose.

However, no single explanation for terrorist behavior is satisfactory. Strategic calculation is only one factor in the decision-making process leading to terrorism.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: While the overall level of terrorist activity seems to have leveled off over the past two to three years, the terrorist threat has become increasingly deadly. Where the majority of terrorist incidents during the 1970s were directed against property, today’s actions increasingly target people. Trends also suggest that terrorists are becoming more dramatic and hence less compromising in their efforts to maintain public attention. Where this will ultimately lead is a matter of speculation, but must be a matter of concern. The contributors to the present “ORBIS Forum” are Martha Crenshaw, Associate Professor of Government at Wesleyan University; Daniela Salvioni and Anders Stephanson of Columbia University; and Brian M. Jenkins, Director of the Program on Subnational Conflict and Political Violence at the Rand Corporation.

Terrorist acts result from decisions made by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations with distinctive characteristics. As autonomous political organizations, terrorist groups share qualities with other organizations independent of the state. Yet other features- their reliance on violence, conspiratorial nature, and small size are distinctive. Focusing on the organization as a determining factor in the process of terrorism can contribute to the development of theoretical analysis and comparison of different terrorist groups. Political organizations that employ terrorism as a strategy are similar to other voluntary organizations: (1) the group has a defined structure and processes by which collective decisions are made; (2) members of the organization occupy roles that are functionally differentiated; (3) there are recognized leaders in positions of formal authority; and (4) the organization has collective goals which it pursues as a unit, with collective responsibility claimed for its actions. Specific groups tend to have identifiable modus operandi or standard operating procedures. There are also features that distinguish terrorist organizations from other types of political association. The goals of such organizations usually involve what Gamson in his study of social protest calls the “displacement of the antagonist.” Their aims are ambitious, calling for radical change in the distribution of power in society or challenging the legitimacy of existing political and social elites. Furthermore, these groups rely on violence to
achieve radical change. Not all groups espousing fundamental change in the structure of society and politics wish to accomplish their aims through the forcible destruction of the existing order or the intimidation of its supporters.

- The extremism of their goals, their dedication to a provocative and shocking form of violence, and their isolation from society are factors that contribute to another distinctive feature: the extremely small size of most terrorist organizations.
- Most decisions are made in face to face discussions in autonomous combat units, rather than handed down through an impersonalized hierarchy.
- Generalizing about the characteristics of terrorist organizations should not lead to the false assumption that all such organizations are identical. Significant variations emerge within their common structure.
- Being part of a larger organization can be beneficial. At the same time, the relationship between the center and the supposedly subordinate subunit can kindle intraorganizational conflict.
- Groups lacking a social base usually possess a much simpler structure.
- There is also some indication that in the rare instance when a small terrorist organization gains a mass base, its organizational methods, developed during a conspiratorial period, are unsuited for mass mobilization.
- It does not always follow, however, that a terrorist organization acting on the behalf of a minority community will automatically acquire a social base of support.
- Two models of terrorist organizational design appear to prevail. The first is a cellular structure in which decisions are made at the top of a pyramid and communicated downward to subordinate but compartmentalized units, with only the top echelon having any knowledge of the comprehensive structure or the identities of leaders. The second form resembles a wheel, with a central leadership at the hub in direct contact with the encircling units. J.K. Zawodny attributes the development of the centrifugal structure to the extremely small size of modern terrorist organizations. He sees it as more flexible, interactive, and innovative than the cumbersome pyramidal structure. Decentralization is not new. The most extreme example of decentralization is anarchist terrorism in nineteenth century Europe and the United States. Like the Red Cells, each small subgroup acted independently, for the most part, in what they perceived as the common interest of the collectivity. The degree of “underground” that characterizes terrorist organizations is also qualified.
- The isolation of the professional terrorist group also increases group solidarity and can lead to conflicts with a central leadership in an extended organizational structure.
- Most explanations of terrorist activity focus on the ideological goals of terrorists, and terrorist organizations are frequently classified along this dimension as, variously, revolutionary, anarchist, nationalist, separatist, or neo-Fascist.
- The psychological approach considers terrorism to be expressive rather than instrumental political behavior. Terrorists are seen as people acting out their emotions, not rational calculators. Yet there is no single common motivation for terrorism; the group translates individual motivation into political action.
- Nevertheless, Waterman in a study of collective political activity, rejects an organizational focus as too narrow and prefers instead to concentrate on the resources and opportunities available to the government’s opponents.
- Focusing on organizational processes offers a way of integrating the variables of ideology, individual motivation, and social conditions into explanations of how terrorist campaigns get started and of why they continue despite the deployment of the government’s superior powers of coercion against them. Organizational effectiveness also determines the outcomes of terrorist campaigns against governments. The critical question is how an organization’s leaders view resources, opportunities, and threats, and how they decide to react. The following analysis is a tentative, explanatory examination of how organizational consideration may effect terrorist behavior and outcomes.- An organizational approach assumes that members may be attracted to terrorist organizations as much for nonpolitical as for political ends. Incentives to join can include comradeship, social status, excitement, or material reward. The longer a terrorist organization exists, the more likely that group solidarity will replace political purpose as the dominant incentive for members. Leaders of terrorist organizations struggle to prevent the dissolution or destruction of the group through individual defections or destructive factionalism as much as to protect it from government persecution. Such discord is often the source of new groups, as dissident members
splinter off from the main organization. Other terrorist organizations are formed as extremist factions of broader social movements that renounce violence but support the same political goals. These organizational factors are especially useful in explaining how terrorist behavior can become self-sustaining regardless of objective success or failure and of changing conditions.

- Wilson argues that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.
- Wilson views the position of organizational leadership in terms of the nature of the incentives an organization provides for its members.- Collins and Guetzkow term these nonpolitical incentives “interpersonal” as opposed to “task-environmental” rewards.
- The popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a more complex reality. At least four categories of motivation can be defined distinct from the organization’s ideological purpose. These incentives are (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward.
- There seems to be two patterns of group processes relating to the decision to resort to terrorism. In the first case, individuals join groups that are on the periphery of the actual terrorist organization, which is, in a sense, at the center of a concentric circle. People then move through the groups to the core, sometimes following close friends or relatives. The decision to resort to terrorism is gradual and indirect. Involvement in the terrorist organization may not, at the outset, have been a deliberate choice.
- The second pattern of group development occurs when the existence of the group precedes the decision to turn to terrorism. The adoption of the terrorist strategy is a collective decision by the group as a whole or by a faction within the group. Such decisions are usually hotly debated.
- Wilson suggests that the organization’s political purpose affects its stability. He distinguishes three categories of purpose: single-issue, ideological, and redemptive. Although most terrorist organizations are ideological, in the sense of being based on beliefs that compromise a systematic, comprehensive rejection of the present political world and the promise of a future replacement, some are single-issue groups. The Rand Corporation describes issue-oriented groups as common but short-lived. The third incentive, redemption, is characteristic of organizations whose efforts concentrate primarily on changing the lives of their members or followers rather than changing the outside world.
- In their redemptive aspects terrorist organizations resemble religious cults, which generally require the absolute commitment of members to a rigid system of belief that divides the world into the saved and the damned.- Wilson concludes that all conspiratorial organizations tend over time to substitute group solidarity for political purpose as the dominant incentive.
- The group becomes simultaneously more introverted and unrealistic, as contacts with society are severed. Terrorism, thus, becomes self-sustaining, as the group acts to maintain itself rather than to instigate political change.
- Hirschman maintains that dissatisfied followers of an organization have two options: “exit” or “voice.” “Exit” can indicate that two courses of action: (1) joining an established rival organization that provides more satisfactory incentives; or; (2) leaving with enough similarly discontented associates to form a new organization.
- Exit often occurs after an attempt to exercise “voice” has failed.- Although terrorist organizations usually attempt to define exit as betrayal and threaten severe punishment for treason, factionalism is not uncommon.
- Terrorist organizations tend, however, to view “voice” as a more serious threat than exit. Most are extremely intolerant of internal dissent, thereby promoting factionalism to resolve internal conflict.
- This rigidity has several sources. Cohesion and solidarity are important values
- To enforce obedience and acceptance, leaders can rely on only two rational sources of authority (they also have a certain command over the group because of psychological dependencies). First, their skills at organization and strategy are known by their past record. Second, Verba suggests, generally with regard to small groups, that leaders rely on their position as an “agent of impersonal force” and as representative of group norms to legitimize their directives.
- Terrorist organizations often deliberately build loyalty through ideological indoctrination and through emphasizing the external threat. Loyalty is demonstrably strongest when the possibility of exit exists, but members choose to stay anyway. Organizations establish what Hirschman terms “severe initiation costs” to prevent members’ departures. If members have invested a lot to join an
organization, they will be reluctant to leave. 
- Given high initiation costs and the corresponding constraints on exit they impose, discontent serious enough to surface is likely to be explosive, and it is not surprising that it often leads to bitter factionalism. Paradoxically, extreme discontent may sometimes motivate increased activity to achieve group goals rather than to dissolve the organization. 
- The behavioral differences between terrorist groups in competitive versus noncompetitive situations may have significant implications for intensity of violence in a terrorist campaign. Under competitive conditions, where exit is possible, there should be less internal dissent. On the other hand, where exit is easy but no competitors exist, small organizations are likely to proliferate.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: After 1968 in Western Europe terrorism seemed to replace riots and protest demonstrations as a dramatic and violet disruption of stability, often disturbing to the public because of its unexpectedness in societies hitherto thought immune to serious domestic violence. Ideology has also motivated terrorist resistance to regimes in Latin America and the Middle East.

- In order to generalize about psychological influences on terrorism, one must take into account the diversity and variation of the phenomenon.
- Answers to the questions of why individuals are attracted to terrorism, why terrorism funds supporters among the population, why a terrorist organization chooses particular strategies, and why terrorism has extreme effects on some cases but not others depend on political and social context and type of terrorist organization as well as on psychological theory.
- Another element in the complexity of modern terrorism is its transnational character.
- The transnational of intention into action is modified by chance and opportunity, neither of which can be satisfactorily predicted. Furthermore, in asking why terrorism happens, one must distinguish between the initiation of a campaign of terrorism and its continuation in the face of government reaction. One must also distinguish between why an individual becomes a terrorist and why an organization (already formed as a group) collectively turns to terrorism. Why terrorists persist despite the risks involved and the uncertainty of reward us an important question. Why terrorist organizations choose the particular strategies they do bombings, kidnappings, or armed attacks, for example is also significant.
- Scholarly analysis should also be attentive to what is meant by becoming a “terrorist” or a member of a terrorist organization.
- Actually, complex role differentiation exists within terrorist organizations. First, there are significant differences between leaders and followers.
- As with all forms of political behavior, terrorism cannot be studied in isolation from its political and social context. The analysis of terrorism clearly deals with the intersection of psychological predispositions (which may be derived as much from prior experience and socialization as from psychological traits emerging from early childhood and infancy) and the external environment.
- Most analysts agree that there is no common “terrorist personality.” Terrorism is not purely expressive violence; it is also instrumental.
- To argue terrorism does not result from a single personality constellation or from psychopathology is not to say that the political decision to join a terrorist organization is not influenced or, in some cases, even determined by subconscious or latent psychological motives.
- Knutson (1981, p.109) found that the terrorist she interviewed in American prisons were ambivalent in their attitudes toward the use of violence.
- Some evidence suggests that not all terrorist are ambivalent Morf (1970), in an analysis of the early members of the Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ), found more explicit signs of an early interest in violence.
- Bollinger (1981), a member of the West German study team, also found that some of the terrorists he interviewed were attracted to violence which he attributes to unconscious aggressive motives.
- Jager (1981, pp.167-169), however, found no common pattern in attitudes toward violence, neither ambivalence nor attraction, among the West German terrorists. Some individuals reported a strong prior aversion to aggression.
- Possibly, rather than being attracted to the inherent violence of terrorism, some individuals are
seduced by the lures of omnipotence and grandeur to compensate for feelings of inferiority or impotence.

-Arther possible psychological trait, which appears to have been neglected thus far by researchers, is stress seeking.

-Terrorists may be “stress seekers,” who are attracted to “behavior designed to increase the intensity of emotion or level of attraction of the organism (Klausner, 1968,9.139).

-Stress seekers seem to fall into two types. The individualistic stress seeker is uncomfortable as a follower; he seeks attention to the point of being narcissistic. The group stress seeker, in contrast, wishes to abandon the self in the group. This type of stress seeker identifies with the group and merges himself completely in the collective personality (Klausner, 1968, pp.143-145).

-Followers may be attracted more to the group than its activities.

-Sullwold noted two types of personality traits among terrorist leader. The first type is the extremely extroverted personality, whose behavior is unstable, uninhibited, inconsiderate, self-interest, and unemotional. The second type of terrorist leader is neurotically hostile. Suspicious, aggressive, defensive, and intolerant, he rejects criticism and is extremely sensitive to external hostility.

-The available evidence strongly suggests that, for the majority of terrorist who are followers, to become a member of the group is a dominate motive.

-Observers of terrorism in West Germany have also noted the importance of personal connections and relatives in the process of joining a group.

-Some authors believe that female participation in terrorism is unique in character motivation.

-Sullwold (1981, pp.106-110) does not regard the causes of female participation in terrorism as unusual.

-Feuer’s (1969) theory of the “conflict of generations,” which is based on a Freudian interpretation of terrorism as a psychological reaction of sons against fathers, a generational phenomenon rooted in Oedipus complex and, thus, in maleness.

-A more sophisticated theory connecting individual psychology to society is found in the developmental psychology of Erik Erickson (especially 1963 and 1968).

-The successful development of personal identity is essential to the integrity and continuity of the personality. Identity enables the individual to experience the self as something that has continuity and sameness, to act accordingly, and to be confident that one’s sense of self is matched by one’s meaning for others. Erickson’s theory has influenced as least two specific analyses of the personalities of terrorists.

-Bollinger argues that joining a terrorist organization was the last of a series of attempts at identity formation. These potential terrorists were searching for meaning, structure, and a stable social role.

-Knuston (1981) also used Erikson’s conceptualization, especially his concept of negative identity.

-If a positive identity is not possible, the individual prefers being a “bad” person to being nobody or partially somebody.

-The individual’s path to becoming an active terrorist is often through groups and through personal contacts who introduce them to organizations.

-The social psychological dynamics of terrorist organizations help determine not only why individuals join them but why stay in and why choose terrorism as a strategy.

-Terrorist organizations become countercultures, with their own values and norms, into which new recruits are indoctrinated (see Wolpang and Ferracuti, 1982). They are in this respect similar to youth gangs or nonpolitical cults and sects (see Bainbridge and Stark, 1979; Balch, 1980; Levine, 1978; Stark and Bainbridge,1980).

-All primary groups strive toward cohesion and uniformity (Cartwright, 1968; Verbra, 1961), and terrorist organizations exhibit stronger than usual tendencies toward solidarity and conformity.

-Another consequences of group cohesiveness in the tendency to encourage the pursuit of violence.

-Another group characteristic that helps explain the conduct of a terrorist strategy concerns relationships between leaders and followers.

-Janis describes in combat situations a “fear-ridden” dependency, based on the reactivation of early separation anxiety, which is likely to develop toward authority figures perceived as able to ward of danger.

-Another way the group facilitates terrorism is by creating an appropriate context for social learning. Bandura (1973) has argued that aggressive patterns of behavior are learned from observation or experience, rather than emerging from instinctual drives or frustration.
-Psychological findings dispute the assumption that personality abnormalities explain terrorism. Instead, they point to the significance of the small cohesive group in determining behavior.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Research on political terrorism, which began in the early 1970s, faces some persistent problems. These involve defining the concept, collecting empirical data, building integrative theory, and avoiding the attribution of terrorism to personality disorders or “irrationality.” Furthermore, analysis risks being driven by events or the concerns of policymakers. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that psychological explanations of terrorism must have multiple levels of analysis into account, linking the individual to the group and to society. Future research should critically examine the assumption that a “new terrorism” has appeared at the end of the 20th century. Analysis should also take advantage of 30 years of history to develop comparisons and developmental studies that look not only at the causes of terrorism but at changes in terrorist strategy, the termination of terrorist campaigns, government decision-making, and policy effectiveness.

-The record of research on political terrorism is mixed.

-Enduring questions involve the definition of terrorism, the use of research for public policy purposes, the collection of empirical data, the attribution of terrorism to personality disorders or “irrational” thinking, the need for integrative and cumulative theory, and the event-driven character of much research. Although progress is apparent in all of these areas, more work needs to be done. In addition, research on terrorism has not yet fully considered the implications of recent claims that a “new” terrorism has developed in recent years and will prevail in the near future.

-The problem of defining terrorism has hindered analysis since the inception of studies of terrorism in the early 1970s. Furthermore, even within the terms of this definition, the practice of terrorism is highly diverse. A second issue from the past concerns the possible uses of psychological research on terrorism. In the 1990s terrorism came to be seen as a major national security threat and thus a subject of intense interest. Alexander George (1993) has called for “bridging the gap” to bring about closer collaboration between academics and policy makers in the field of foreign affairs, but he also cautioned that the task of the academic is to diagnose problems rather than prescribe solutions. One source of tension, however, is some policymakers’ insistence on the possibility of a fixed and unambiguous: “terrorist profile”, a list of characteristics that permit identification of actual or potential terrorists. A related issue is the question of a distinctive psychology or psychopathology of women participates in terrorism. Nevertheless, most analysts of terrorism do not think that personality factors account for terrorist behavior, nor do they see significant gender differences. One of the basic research findings of the field is that terrorism is primarily a group activity. It is typically not the result of psychopathology or a singe personality type. Shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are much more important determinants of terrorist behavior than individual characteristics. Bandura (1990) took a different approach to the analysis of individual behavior. He argued that terrorism was the result of a “principled resort to destructiveness” (p. 191) rather than unrestrained impulse. He identified three major points of development in the self-regulatory process: when reprehensible conduct can be reconstructed as justifiable, its detrimental effects minimized or distorted, and the victim blamed or devalued. As Ross and Rabbie both noted, a mature research program requires empirical testing of integrative psychological theories. It is not enough simply to propose hypotheses. Several recent works focus on a “new” terrorism that is motivated by religious belief and is more fanatical, deadly, and pervasive that the older and more instrumental forms of terrorism the world had grown accustomed to (e.g., Laqueur, 1999). This emerging “new” terrorism is thought to differ from the “old” terrorism in terms of goals, methods, and organization (see Hoffman, 1999). An earlier and more violent historical antecedent of the conception of a “new” terrorism is anti-Western terrorism originating in the Middle East that in linked to radical or “fundamentalist” Islam. What psychological evidence exists to support the prediction that religious terrorists will seek to cause catastrophic destruction, particularly using biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear means? So far the only explicitly psychological analysis is that of Lifton (1999), whose findings are based primarily on interviews with lower level members of Aum Shinrikyo as well as press and other observer accounts. Thus, within the category of the “new” terrorism, even if a common motivation is assumed, different organizational structures are present.
Most past research findings are based on data from clandestine undergrounds: closed groups that are typically in competition with each other, whose members experience strong group solidarity and peer pressure, feel intense personal loyalty to each other, merge individual identity in the group, and display distorted perceptions of the outside world. They are also fundamentally political, even if they see authorities as illegitimate. Which of the old findings will apply to groups such as the Osama Bin Laden network? Most seem to be bound more by past experience (fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan) and shared beliefs than by direct contact with each other. Little is known about the psychology of militants who operate independently of a group and what seem to be motivated by ideological inspiration rather than directed orders.

- The absence of empirical evidence for many claims about a “new” terrorism, particularly the likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction, raises more questions. The study of terrorism should go beyond a concentration on current events or speculation about the future to develop systematic analysis of the development of the phenomenon over time. First, little is known about why the users of terrorism would abandon the strategy. Research should try to identify the psychological incentives for giving up violence. A second area for fruitful research concerns the development of strategies of terrorism. In particular, what leads to innovation in terrorist behavior, such as hostage takings or the resort to weapons of mass destruction? Another research area that has been neglected is the study of decision making in the area of counter terrorism (see also Crenshaw, 1990). What is needed is an investigation of the effects of different policies on a range of groups with different motivations, organizational structures, and social relationships. An additional research concern is the public reaction to terrorism. Last, the study of psychological motivations for terrorism, as well as for ending terrorism, should continue to be based on a model that integrates the individual, the group, and society. “Terrorists” cannot be considered in isolation from their social and political context.


Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: It is difficult to understand terrorism without psychological theory, because explaining terrorism must begin with analyzing the intentions of the terrorist actor and the emotional reactions of audiences. The task assigned for this chapter is to identify those questions about terrorism that psychological research might be most helpful in answering. My goal is not to suggest specific psychological theories or methods or to view the literature but to propose research questions that are both interesting for students of terrorism and appropriate for psychological approaches.

- One of the major tasks for research on the causes of terrorism is identifying the psychological benefits to the individual of participating in an organization that employs terrorism.
- Analysis of the biographical profiles of terrorists can reveal patterns in individual experiences and backgrounds.
- It is essential to analyze the dynamics of the entry process.
- The group may be more important than the individual to the initiation and conduct of campaigns of terrorism.
- Questions can also be raised about relationships between leaders and followers and between occupants of different roles in the organizational structure of the group. The sources of authority in violent opposition groups are incompletely understood.
- The content and structure of the collective belief system as well as the way it is formed are important elements in the process of terrorism.
- Important ingredients of collective attitudes are the perception of the government and the expectation of government response to terrorism.
- Without assigning undue casual significance to social forces, it is still important to trace the links between background conditions and the incidence of terrorism.
- Many of the same factors that contribute to the initiation of terrorism also affect the forms it takes. Here, however, we are concerned with the operations of terrorist organizations (rather than with the inception of the strategy) and with how terrorist actions unfold.
- Another phenomenon that deserves study is brutalization as a result of participation in violence.
Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The actions of terrorist organizations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experience and memories. The psychological, and ideological factors that constitute the terrorist’s world-view are only part of a complex web of determinants of terrorist behavior, one of which is surely a strategic conception of means and ends.

-Any psychological analysis must proceed with caution. The data are scarce and imprecise, as terrorists do not readily submit to acting as experimental subjects.

-Members of terrorist organizations act in terms of belief systems that structure their interpretations of the world and filter the information they receive. As Holsti (1967, p.18) contends, the belief system ‘may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received.

-What terrorists believe affects perception and action.

-Horowitz argued that it does not make sense to distinguish between left and right terrorism. He asserted that ‘terrorism is a unitary phenomenon in practice and in theory’ (Horowitz, 1983, p.48).

-Most political beliefs systems are affective as well as cognitive. That is, they not only order information so as to make it meaningful but establish values by which behaviour is judged. The beliefs of terrorists, in addition to being excessively abstract, also seems to be highly moralistic. The world is seen in black-and-white-terms and there is a strong concern with justification for terrorist actions.

-Both legalistic and military self-conceptions may be regarded as essential justificatory beliefs.

-For revolutionary terrorists, the concern with justifying violence is often accompanied by a strong emphasis on perceived injustice done by the state to weak and helpless populace and the related necessity for revenge.

-Terrorists of both right and left seem to see themselves as a morally superior elite to whom conventional standards of behaviour do not apply. They perceive their role as an obligation, not a choice.

-In conclusion, this overview suggests the following observations. The beliefs of terrorists are characterized by abstraction, impersonality, and impracticability. They may be complex to the point of abstruseness or naively simple. The provision of moral justifications for violence is an integral component. The world is divided between good, represented by terrorist organizations, and a much stronger and pervasive evil, usually embodied in governmental authority and the social classes identified as supporting the state. The terrorist see themselves as elites of superior consciousness and perceptiveness, acting alone through necessary and appropriate violence, with eventual victory guaranteed by the forces of history. Moral objectives are, for the left the freedom of the people, and for the right, the restoration of traditional or mythical values and order and hierarchy. Their moral duty is to destroy a corrupt state and society, whether they see that corruption as materialism and inequality or as a racial impurity and social permissiveness. The categories in which terrorists think are rigid and unchangeable. Victims are by definition agents of the system—‘genocidal robots’, according to the Weatherman (Jacobs, 1970, p.518).

-Inquiry into terrorist belief system is concerned not only with the content of nature of beliefs about world and self but also with how these conceptions are formed or determined. On the other hand, beliefs are the product of social learning and thus reflect their context. On the other hand, beliefs are a product of the psychological characteristics of the individual.

-Religious justification for terrorism were analysed by David Rapoport (1984). He found that although these groups took their transcendent justifications from the parent-religion, their beliefs were deviant and represented distortions of the doctrines on which they were based. Nevertheless, divine sanction was a prerequisite for terrorism and determined the forms it took. Religion established the boundaries of permissible violence.

-Secular ideologies which also embody traces of millenarianism are often identified as sources of terrorism (see Wilkinson, 1986).

-Further evidence for the claim that ideology is not stronger a motivation than cultural influences lies in the observation that although modern terrorist adopt ideological terminology, most are practitioners, not intellectuals or theorist. Emphasis is always on action rather than talking. Many
terrorist groups break away from larger revolutionary or nationalist organizations precisely because their members think too much time is spent debating ideas rather than implementing them.

- This analysis suggests that terrorism is not a product directly of particular patterns of political thought or idea. Instead, terrorist groups may first develop beliefs and then seek justification for them through the selection of fragments of compatible theories. The ideas that are most attractive include millenarian narrative structures that justify individual violence.

- In sum, the political and the non-political environment shapes terrorist behavior, and many elements of this environment are non-political. In specific conditions, individuals deliberately or unconsciously assimilate models of appropriate action. These symbols, myths, or narratives have deep historical roots and are embodied in the institutions and cultural realities of a given society, but they may also be of recent creation. From family traditions, religious observances, art, literature, the individual learns how to live a life that will become meaningful in terms of past and the future. The immediate political or personal consequences of terrorist actions may be less important than their transcendent and personal consequences of terrorist actions may be less important than their transcendent and personal significance. Explicitly political ideologies may play more of a role when strong cultural narratives are not present, but the two sources of belief interact. To terrorist, ideology may be secondary or even superficial but it represents an important reinforcement of extremist beliefs, making them easier to sustain in the face of unpleasant reality. Rather than uncritical borrowing of theories, terrorist beliefs may represent a selection of what is psychologically and politically useful.

- Beliefs serve individual psychological needs. Emotional predispositions to terrorism, if there is such, are not in most cases pathological, although there is some evidence that terrorists of the right suffer more mental disorders than those of the left (Ferracuti and Bruno, 1981). Nor is the answer so simple as an attraction to violence or aggression per se.

- Knutson (1981) argued that many terrorists are actually ambivalent about the use of violence.

- Role differentiation in terrorist organizations is relevant to the leader psychological functions of belief. The distinction between leaders and followers may be critical.

- Another important function of the belief system for terrorist is the neutralization of guilt. People who become terrorists may experience guilt for the commission of violent acts, so the belief that someone else is responsible and that normal standards or moral behavior do not apply to them is comforting.

- In addition to psychological dependence on beliefs, the dynamics of interaction within the terrorist organization prevent members from challenging collectively-held belief systems or for the group as a whole to change. In particular, the tendencies toward cohesion and solidarity present in all primary groups lead to the suppression of dissent and the internalization of group standards and norms.

- For the individual who becomes active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract political ideology or to violence.

- Knutson (1980) found that perceptual distortions and lack of objectivity led to a form of ‘groupthink’ that hampered the individual terrorist’s ability to test reality.

- Group leaders, who are the guardians and interpreters of doctrine, also work to maintain the loyalty and collective identification of the membership.

- The question of dissent has not been systematically studied, but it seems plausible that when disagreements remain internal to the terrorist organization or even to the broader resistance movement, they are based on different conceptions of the best way to achieve ends with which all agree.

- Terrorism is difficult to understand, much less to predict.

- Government communications to terrorists should stress three things: The terrorism causes harm to innocent victims, that it fails as a tactic and that alternatives to violence can work in bringing about political change.

64. Crenshaw, M. (2000). Terrorism. A. E. Kazdin (Ed), Encyclopedia of Psychology. New York: Oxford Press. Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: Entries in the Encyclopedia are relatively brief and intended to emphasizing key issues. Crenshaw’s contribution includes a review of research related to the individual terrorist (Including rebuttal of the psychopathology explanation, acknowledgement of the wide diversity in persons and behavior, and highlighting the role of vengeance as a possible “common emotional drive). She also has a section on Group Dynamics that suggests the consensus
among scholars is that the group is more important than the individual in understanding terrorism, and that group identification and solidarity were two important dynamics. Finally, with regard to responses and future directions, she notes that little is known about decision making in counterterrorism or about the complexities of hostage taking by terrorists.

65. Crenshaw, M. (1995). Terrorism in context. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is a stellar compilation of works on political violence, examining many regional conflicts in the early 1990s. Specific subject areas include Europe, Russia, South America, India and the Middle East. The emphasis clearly is on “revolutionary” terrorism and insurgencies. The perspective leans decidedly on political analysis, although there are “tid bits” of psychological analysis interspersed throughout. The link between psychological and historical contexts is made most explicitly and extensively by Crenshaw in her introductory chapter. Beyond this, no other single chapter gives substantial attention to psychological issues in terrorist-related behavior.

   -The first explanation is based on the assumption that the act of terrorism is a deliberate choice by a political actor. The organization, as a unit, acts to achieve collective values, which involve radical changes in political and social conditions.
   -The second explanation focuses on internal organizational processes within the group using terrorism or among organizational sharing similar objectives. Terrorism is explained as the result of an organization’s struggle for survival, usually in a competitive environment. Leaders ensure organizational maintenance by offering varied incentives to followers, not all of which involve the pursuit of the group’s stated political purposes.
   -Terrorist actions do not necessarily or directly reflect ideological values.
   -The instrumental Approach: In this perspective it is seen as intentional. Terrorism is a means to a political end. Terrorism is par excellence a strategy of surprise, necessarily for small groups who must thereby compensate for weakness in numbers and destructive capability. The actions of the attacker are determined by perceptions of incentive and opportunity. Bringing about surprise, from an operational viewpoint, is often a matter simply of timing.
   -An organization’s success or failure is measured in terms of its ability to attain its stated political ends. Few organizations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure. The reason it continues in the immediate is that extremist organizations frequently achieve their tactical objectives, particularly publicity and recognition.
   -Two forms of deterrence are open to the defender, according to Snyder. The first is denial, a strategy resembling and indeed in implementation basically identical to defense. The second type of deterrence is its more widely recognized form. Punishment or retaliation involves the threat of the use of military force in response to an attack after it has been committed.
   -Organization Process Theory: This explanation focuses on the internal politics of the organization. It assumes that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself. Terrorist behavior represents the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic action.
   -The incentives the organization provides for its members are critical to its survival.
   -The incentives for joining a terrorist organization, especially one that is already established and of known character, include a variety of individual needs: to belong to a group, to acquire social status and reputation, to find comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits.
   -Wilson concludes that conspiratorial organizations tend over time to substitute group solidarity for political purpose (whether protest, revolution, or redemption) as the dominant incentive.
   -Organizational analysis explains not only why terrorism continues regardless of political results but why it starts.
   -Emphasizing organizational maintenance explains why terrorism may persist in the face of evident failure to achieve political purposes.
A second general theory of organizational behavior focuses on the prevention of decline in firms. A fundamental precept is that organizations behave differently in competitive than in non-competitive environments.

Hirschman proposes that dissatisfied members of an organization have two options: ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. ‘Exit’, as it applies to the special circumstances of clandestine extremist organizations, refers to the possibilities of (1) joining another, rival organization that appears more satisfactory, or (2) splintering off and creating a new group.

Exit can thus hasten organizational decline. Yet the exercise of ‘voice’ can also be destructive. Most underground organizations strongly (even forcibly) discourage the expression of discontent (for which security is a paramount concern) and to the psychological well-being of members for whose belonging is a dominant incentive.

The leaders of an organization can avoid the disastrous extremes of exit and voice by soliciting the loyalty of members.

Extremist organizations often deliberately build loyalty through ideological indoctrination.

Another method by which organizations inhibit defection is to establish what Hirschman terms ‘severe initiation costs’.

This analysis suggests than in competitive conditions, where exit is possible there may be internal dissent. Yet organizations may have to devote efforts to distinguish themselves from other groups, in order to prevent defection to successful rivals. Competition may inspire escalation, as each group tries to outdo the other in violence in order not only to retain existing members but to attract recruits.

The task of the government is to encourage disintegration without provoking the escalation of violence. Denying reward is difficult.

Organization analysis also suggests that there may be counter intelligence opportunities for creating dissatisfaction and dissent within terrorist organizations. Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, for example, recommend attempts to disrupt terrorist organizations by making it hard for them to recruit new members or to keep the loyalty of existing members. Exactly how this is to be done, however is left unexplained.

It would probably be easier to affect recruitment and support functions by influencing the attitudes of sympathizers than by directly undermining the loyalty of indoctrinated activists.

Gazit and Handel further recommend that governments try to create conflicts within terrorist organizations or between groups and their rivals. However, accomplishing this objective without infiltrating the activist core of the organization is difficult.

Gazit and Handel also suggest measures such as misinformation.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This paper tries to examine the evolving role of forensic psychiatrist as they participate in such situations.

- Forensic psychiatrists in the west have made their contributions in roles, that are non-activist
- Request was that he comment on the feasibility of breaking into the siege room with anesthetic gases.
- All Parties involved at the interface in crisis situations may benefit from an awareness of conflict resolution by intervention.
- The psychiatrist may have a contribution to make to the resolution of terrorist-linked incidents as an accepted intermediary rather than as a behavioral scientist.
- There is much that a psychiatrist can do to help the victim of terrorism.
- Naïve interaction with the media can be avoided by appropriate governmental briefing.
- Forensic psychiatrists should seek the formal approval of the medical profession so that their is no question concerning their professional identity.
- Terrorist-patients are a particularly difficult clientele.
- Dealing with terrorism is a potentially hazardous but relevant extension of the role of the forensic psychiatrist.
Call Number: Published Abstract: The focus of this chapter is on understanding and predicting the development of international terrorist activities through the perspectives of international psychology. The author discusses the lessons that can be learned from social, cross-cultural, and international psychology for countering international terrorism. It includes issues of language and communication, as well as social identity and social influence. It embraces issues of majority/minority influence processes and group processes. In addition, the chapter draws on international psychology's knowledge of intercultural communication, including aggression and violence and interpersonal attraction/dislike. Finally, this chapter includes practical proposals derived from research and theory for reducing and countering the threat of international terrorism.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Much contemporary terrorism seems to be predicated on excessive resentment and extreme self-righteousness. Terrorist tend to believe that their causes whether they stem from ethnic, religious, or ideological; convictions have been undermined, exploited, or betrayed by powerful forces internal or external to the nation.
-It has been argued that people predisposed to recruitment by modern terrorist organizations have learned to see the world in very simple terms.
-terrorists are collectors of injustice. They are extremely sensitive to slights and humiliations inflicted on themselves or on members of social groups to which they belong or with which they identify themselves.
-The dehumanization of the enemy is a critical component within the belief system of terrorist in general.
-The terrorist perceives himself part of an elite engaged in a heroic struggle to right the injustices of a cruel world.
-Rushworth M. Kiddler, a prominent researcher on terrorism, has identified seven characteristics observed in interviewing well-known terrorists around the world: oversimplification of issues, frustration about inability to change society, a sense of self-righteousness, a utopian belief in the world, a feeling of social isolation, a need to assert his own existence, a cold-blooded willingness to kill.
-In the end, however, the threat we face is not from a weapon but from a cluster of beliefs, motivations, and cultural forces that have molded a human mind.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Proposes some general hypotheses about individual motivations for joining a left-wing underground group and about the social dynamics which reinforce this commitment.
-My principal source for this study has been the biographies of former militants of left wing underground groups.
-All had political motivations. The future militants of the underground groups shared, first, strong political identities that is political commitment was an essential constitue of their personality and second, a political socialization to violence that is their political ideology and activities did not exclude the use of physical violence. How did political become a totalistic experience? The accounts of former militants highlight three main contributing processes , the large amount of time devoted to political activities, and the transformation of everyday life. The frequent use of the family in there recollections testifies to the emotional importance of the relations within the political groups.
-Militants found a justification for violence in the widespread belief that the state had broken the rules of the democratic game, and that revolutionary violence was therefore the only way to oppose an increasingly authoritarian state. The militants also found another justification for the use of violence in the shared belief that it was necessary to resist the violence of the police. Justifications for the use of violence also emerged from the militants concrete everyday experiences of political violence.
Violence was justified, first of all, as a practical and defensive need.

Recruitment: Two precipitating causes: The social network to which a militant belonged and the militants perception of a situation of emergency. The decision to join an underground organization was very rarely an individual one. In most cases it involved cliques of friends. In some cases recruitment was determined by the individuals solidarity with an "important" friend who was arrested or had to go underground.

The militants decision to go underground were also often determined by their perception of being involved in a personal emergency that is by the lack of alternative solutions.

Persistence of commitment, however can be attributed less to the fear of negative sanctions than to the existence of positive "incentives." Terrorist organizations fostered a sense of collective identity in which every member became a "freedom fighter."
The "sense of the group" affective ties within the terrorist organization were vital in preserving loyalty to the group. "Human solidarity", "Sense of the group" further underground groups stuck together because their members shared a "sense of responsible" for each other. Shared values and images of the external world.

The militants justified their use of political violence by depersonalizing their victims, defined in the documents of the underground groups as "tools of the system" and later as "pigs" or "watch dogs". "By declaring your enemies 'non-persons' and by denying their human qualities, moral scruples are blocked from the beginning." Ideology also offered images of the "self" which, interiorized by the militants, helped them persist in their commitment.

The militants further justified their activities by invoking quasi-existentialist explanations that emphasized the "extraordinary" role of a small minority. The more isolated the militants felt from the external world, the more firmly they came to see of themselves as a few heroes with an important symbolic role.

As underground groups drew more and more isolated, they shifted their rationale for the "armed struggle" from the "instrumental" role of violence in a revolutionary process to the "symbolic" value of violence as an expression of conflicts. Finally analogies with war allowed the militants to define "successes" and defeats strictly in military terms.

A militants recruitment to the underground was therefore often facilitated by precipitating factors, such as the arrest or assassination of a friend, a friend's decision to go underground, and the risk-or perceived risk-of being arrested oneself. Group dynamics that produced the freedom fighter identity. We can conclude that the degree to which the underground group is isolated is the single variable capable of explaining the differences in the perception of the reality. In other words, the more isolated the underground organization, the weaker its members sense of reality.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book is based more on sociological, rather than psychological analysis, but it one of the deepest theoretical contributions to contemporary research on political violence. The author’s central objective is to develop a comparative socio-political analysis of terrorist movements in two countries: Italy (Red Brigades) and West Germany (Baader Meinhoff) from the 1960s into the 1990s. Della Porta frames her explanation according to three levels of analysis macro, meso, and micro moving from the broader societal influence to the narrower individual influence. At the macro level, she shows that the manner in which societal institutions (such as the police) respond to protest movements can effect the radical trajectory of those movement (i.e., ideological movement tend to become more radical when driven underground). At the meso level, she examines the factioning that often happens within groups and movements, with more radical elements splitting off and gaining their own support. At this point the primary driving force of a group often shifts from advancing their protest to maintaining their own survival as a collective. At the individual level, she argues that recruits often are motivated or influenced to join by seeking solidarity with friends and acquaintances, and sometimes by indignation over an injustice (e.g. death or imprisonment) done to someone they know. Within the group, members develop a “freedom fighter” identity that supports subsequent justifications for violence. Although many differences exist between violent extremist movements covered in this book and those in the contemporary security environment, Della Porta’s analyses of the processes that drive social movements as they become violent, militant movements is well worth our
Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The roots of terrorism lie not in this or that American foreign policy error, but in the extremely abusive families of the terrorists.

-Global battle by terrorists against liberal Western values. In order to understand this new battle, it would be useful to know what makes a terrorist, what developmental life histories they share that can help us see why they want to kill "American infidels" and themselves so we can apply our efforts to removing the sources of their violence and preventing terrorism in the future.

-Families that produce the most terrorists are the most violently misogynist.

-Many agree with the Iranian Ministry of Culture that all American television programs "are part of an extensive plot to wipe out our religious and sacred values," and for this reason feel they must kill Americans.

-From childhood, then, Islamists terrorists have been taught to kill the part of themselves and, by projection, others that is selfish and wants personal pleasures and freedoms.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Applying interactionist and social behaviorist principles to historical data, this analysis of Nazism suggests that Germans were attracted more by Hitler’s stress on national renewal and his attacks on Marxism than by his anti-Semitism. Allegiance to their traditional authoritarian monarchy and the euphoria of World War I until 1917, followed by the political, economic, and social upheavals of the Weimar period, seemed to create a psychological need in many Germans for return to a traditionalistic political order. The Nazi movement and the Third Reich itself, at least until 1939, responded to this political need for cognitive consistency and thereby gained sufficient support among Germans who themselves did not accept Hitler’s virulent racist agenda.

-Nothing has so imprinted itself on the 20th century historical consciousness as the powerful, albeit flawed, personality of Adolf Hitler.

-Psychoanalytically inspired interpretations focusing merely on an individual have usually proven unsatisfactory. Psycho biographers have tended to interpret all actions and attitudes that have not the surface seemed libidinous as symbols of subconscious urges.

-Interactive studies of leadership and group dynamics have also been used to explain the interconnection between varied socioeconomic groups and the Fuhrer.

-Still, one major problem has persistently troubled scholars. Numerous non-Nazi radical organizations developed without Hitler’s inspiration.

-Recently, such interactionists as Staats have emphasized the role of interchanges between and among individuals as determinants of human behavior and have highlighted the role that previously learned behaviors actively play in shaping the events that affect subsequent behaviors. In summary form, central to this social behavioral paradigm is the concept that complex functional human behavior is learned. Humans can learn different responses to stimuli that are quite similar and can discriminate when consequences vary.

-Ultimately, human activity gains its complexity through building up increasingly complex constellations of behaviors. When a constellation has reached a specific complexity, composed of repertoires that have been permanently learned and thus provide continuity, it tends to be labeled personality. To help organize behavioral responses, a person formulates a “world view” which includes philosophical and religious beliefs, myths, and prescriptive statements or modes or social interaction. Such a world view helps determine complex social actions (Staats, 1975, pp.155, 158).

-In cognitive conservatism the ego a self-justifying historian. Cognitive conservatism is the disposition to preserve such existing knowledge structures as precepts, schemata, and memories.

-Given the desire for cognitive consistency, people rapidly rewrite or fabricate memory in a diversity of situations.

-Motivational explanations interpret cognitive biases as occurring in the service of needs.

-Use of the concept of the conservatism bias can help in explaining resistance to such cognitive change, for example, as accepting a new constitution, new political values, and political leaders espousing new political ideals.
Conclusion: When disruptive social conflict occurs, when routine adaptive activities are interrupted or are perceived as dysfunctional, people can be cognitively alerted and emotionally aroused.

To meet the needs of the destabilized society, Hitler stressed four themes: 1) The past was to be restored and elevated to a primary position so that cherished psychological security would not have to be surrendered. 2) Struggle was stressed which meant that enforced passive submission to events could be avoided; 3) Affective characteristics (instinct, will, intuition, blood) were highlighted to replace rationally disciplined, and seemingly ineffective, responses; and 4) A hierarchical social order was to be reestablished. This internally coherent Nazi ideology seemed to restore a sense of adequacy and continuity.


Call Number: No substantive analysis of terrorist behavior.


Call Number: No substantive analysis of terrorist behavior.
-Targets may be selected primarily for their symbolic value.
-For many terrorists, the mechanics of the assault are often less important than the symbolic message of the action. It follows that one of the most important collateral objectives for terrorists is to maximize the role of the media in a bid to spread their message and images.
-In addition to the symbolic value, terrorists typically consider a range of other political and logistical issues in target selection; factors include accessibility, vulnerability, publicity value, financial commitment, probability of success, possible retribution, and an idiosyncratic values of particular interest to the operators.
-It has been a general observation of many terrorism researchers that whereas terrorist acts typically involve acts of destruction, the general goal of terrorism is not the destruction itself it is the production of fear.
-Terrorists may also have more specific objectives related to their particular political or social agenda, which may include recognition of their cause, intimidation of leaders, coercion, provocation of overreaction, support of an existing insurgency, or simple retribution (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, U.S. Government, 1996).
-Individual terrorists impelled to action by a broad range of motives, but for purposes of general classification it may be useful to examine the taxonomy promulgated by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (U.S. Army Field Manual, as cited in Terrorism Research Center, 1997).
-This model incorporates some of the research done at RAND (Hoffman, 1993) and cites three general motivational categories.
-The Rationally Motivated Terrorist: Denotes perpetrators who think the goals and possible consequences of their acts. Decisions about the use of terrorism tend to be made through analysis of the presumed cost-benefit ratio of the intended actions.
-As a general rule, every handful of core terrorist operators who actually commit acts of violence are supported by a structure that evolves outward in an into-layer fashion to include tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of persons who provide varying degrees of support.
-The question of the rationally motivated terrorist might be, "Will this terrorist act work for my desired purpose, given the present sociopolitical conditions?"
-The Psychologically Motivated Terrorist: In the case of the psychologically motivated terrorist, the impetus to commit acts of violence is often related to a profound sense of failure or inadequacy for which the perpetrator may seek redress through revenge. The question of these terrorist might be expressed as follows: "How can I use terrorism to develop and maintain a sense of identity, mastery and self-esteem?" For these terrorist the attraction to terrorism is typically based on the psychic of group affiliation.
-One finds a variation of the psychologically motivated terrorist in the lone wolf operator, for whom the validation of the self is not derived through group affiliation, but through the sense of power, mastery, and autonomy that attends to the ability to make unilateral decisions.
-The Culturally Motivated Terrorist: According to Hoffman, the motivation of these groups to commit violent acts typically derives from an almost fear of cultural extermination or the loss of cultural identity. The essential question for them is this: "How can I use terrorist tactics to stop the threat to my culture, faith, ethnic group, clan, tribe?" The range of sources for such contamination is daunting. For example, Ignatieff (1997) has commented on the role of globalization as a potential threat to cultural identity.

Call Number: Published Abstract: To what extent, if any, can 100 years of psychological research into cults, sects, and religion help in understanding, preventing, and opposing terrorists? Specifically, are bin Laden and Al-Qaeda cultists? Religious zealots have gone to war throughout history in the name of Jesus, Allah, Jehovah, Zeus, God, and various other deities. Unfortunately, it is likely that religious zealots will continue to terrorize. This chapter explores these questions.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Conclusion: in the future, some groups may do small scale WMD attacks for fear (form of psych operations)
The author critically examines some widely held assumptions about trends in the nature and scope of religious terrorism, as well as the belief that they are more likely than other groups to use WMDs. Hoffman has noted 2 trends: Increase in number of religiously motivated terrorists groups and increase in proportion of terrorist incidents resulting in lethality and posts a causal connections between the two. Dolnik questions the conclusion that the number of terrorist attacks has declined because (a) media may be paying less attention to smaller attacks (b) attacks in less important countries are less likely to be covered. Looking at other databases including CNS shows:
- Out of 130 attacks on airliners, only 10 were conducted by religious groups.
- Out of the 30 most deadly attacks since 1990, 18 were by suicide groups.
- Only 1/3 of 400 suicide attacks bombing were conducted by religious groups.
- Out of 74 vehicular bombings killing 25+ victims, 1/3 were by religious groups.
- Conclusion: Deadliest form of terrorism have been associated by religious groups.
- Out of 90 Type I CBRN attacks in CNS database, 34 were done by religious groups.
  - 12 of the 34 were Aum Shuorikyo.
  - Out of the 1311 people killed in CBRN attacks, 1211 were attacks by religious groups.
  - All the 1211 fatalities from just 5 cases (causes of death for most are still unknown).
- Argues escalation of terrorist violence over time is a natural phenomenon and likely is independent of rise in religiously motivated groups. Religion has become more prominent in past 20 years as a supporting but not primary philosophical basis. All violent campaigns find it useful to glorify martyrs and tend to case their struggle in "good vs. evil" terms.
- Livelihood of mass causality, non-conventional attacks
- Apocalyptic views that killing others benefits them (altruism)
- May be religious or not
  - Strong sense of paranoia among group members
- Expressive value attacked to a mode of attack (e.g. killing with out steady blood)
- Self perception of grandiosely and ideological uniqueness
- Organizational structure: tight hierarchical or small independent cells
- Parental social control: Indoctrination, isolation, intimidation

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: A serious handicap for those interested in psychohistory is the seemingly compulsive need to justify or rationalize their efforts in acceptable philosophical and methodological terms.
- Terrorism developed within the anarchist element of the nineteenth century revolutionary movement. The first great disciple of "propaganda by the deed" was the Russian Michael Bakunin, although it is entirely possible that the core of the terrorist argument was supplied by his strange and sinister young friend Nechaev. Together these men produced a most fascinating revolutionary document, The Revolutionary Catechism. From the publication of which, in 1869, historians date the emergence of philosophically based terrorism. Bakunin's famous comment, "Let us put our trust in the eternally creative source of life. The urge to destroy is also a creative urge," could in fact serve as the leitmotif of this discussion.
- To the anarchist was to bring society down by actions which destroyed symbols of the oppressive state. This belief in propaganda by the deed not only provided for the removal of an oppressive individual or institution, but would, it was hoped, begin the unraveling of society.
- This formulation allows for the Freudian (or, if preferred the arguments of Becker or Fromm) conception of the return of the repressed as a universal phenomenon. The form it takes depends, of course, on the way in which each society integrates the personality (in Lifton's terms the cultural historical).
- In summation, the Freudian paradigm of "the return-of-the-repressed" (that is, man's wish to be free and integrated), the Eriksonian paradox of the influence of "great men" (for example, Bakunin, Sorel, Fanon) with emphasis on personality integration, and the "shared themes" paradigm, which
might take the form of group, generational, or cohort analysis, seem to be vital aspects of dealing with the historical phenomenon of terrorism.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Ideology plays a crucial role in terrorist's target selection; it supplies terrorists with an initial motive for action and provides a prism through which they view events and the actions of other people. Those people and institutions whom they deem guilty of having transgressed the tenets of the terrorists' ideologically-based moral framework are considered to be legitimate targets which the terrorists feel justified in attacking. As an extension of this, ideology also allows terrorists to justify their violence by displacing the responsibility onto either their victims or other actors, whom in ideological terms they hold responsible for the state of affairs which the terrorists claim led them to adopt violence. While it is not the only factor which determines whether a potential target is attacked, ideology provides an initial range of legitimate targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves.

- Target selection is instead determined by a number of factors, and the terrorists' ideology is central to this process, not only because it provides the initial dynamic for the terrorists' actions, but because it sets out the moral framework within which they operate.
- Definition of Ideology: An ideology is the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives however ill defined or tenuous by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims. What is important is that ideology provides a motive and framework for action.
- While in practice most groups' ideologies are fairly unique, for the purposes of convenience the following categories are used to classify ideologies: separatism, religion, liberalism, anarchism, communism, conservatism, fascism, single-issues, and organised crime.
- These ideological categories are not mutually exclusive and it is perfectly possible for a group to hold to more than one political aspiration.
- How Ideology Influences Terrorists Target Selection: Unless they are motivated by a pure lust for power and the benefits which it can confer, most political groups are motivated by an ideology. The notion of guilt, or indeed innocence, is thus dependent upon the subjective moral imperatives of the terrorists.
- The influence of ideology on terrorist targeting can be seen by comparing the targets attacked by different groups.
- In general, separatist terrorists such as the Irish republican terrorist groups tend to attack people who are members of, or co-operate with, organisations which they see as representing the 'foreign' occupier.
- On the other hand extreme right-wing terrorists such as the Northern Irish loyalist terrorists use terrorism to protect the existing state of affairs, sometimes claiming to protect the state from subversion.
- Operational decisions may be made by middle-ranking or junior terrorist leaders on the ground, rather than by the heads of the terrorist organisations, and thus it would be a mistake to attribute decisions about target selection to one central doctrine or mindset.
- Overall, communist ideology provides terrorists with a ready list of targets because, although it purports to be an objective, scientific theory of history, it also confers a strong moral sense of what is good and what is bad, and defines those people who are bad.
- The differences between the West German and Italian communist terrorists in selecting police officers as targets illustrate the important ideological differences between them.
- The difference in target selection concerning the police reflected the primary preoccupation of the Red Brigades and other Italian communist terrorists with targets and issues possessing a national or even local significance, as opposed to the international emphasis of the communist terrorists in West Germany.
- Conclusion: In an earlier article I argued that similarities could be found among terrorists with similar ideologies in that case conservatism and by extension I implied that differences would be found between groups with dissimilar ideologies. The targeting patterns of the terrorist groups examined here tend to bear out the contention that terrorists' targeting choices are crucially affected by their ideology and that ideological differences lead to differences in the targeting patterns of
terrorist groups even between groups which have superficially similar but distinct ideologies. It is still ideology which provides terrorists with the moral and political vision that inspires their violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, and defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions. This in turn forms their views as to who or what may be seen as a legitimate target, and to a degree it allows the terrorists to dehumanise those people whom they intend to harm seeing them as symbols rather than as flesh and blood human beings. By establishing such parameters, the influence of ideology is crucial in determining the range of terrorists' potential targets.

80. Drummond, J. T. (2002). From the northwest imperative to global jihad: Social psychological aspects of the construction of the enemy, political violence, and terror. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: A public understanding psychological dimensions to war and peace (Vol. 1pp. 49-95). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. Call Number: Published Abstract: How is it that one comes to embrace religio and ethno political violence? Answering that question from an interdisciplinary perspective that prominently features social psychology will be the focus of this chapter. Left at just that, however, the author would necessarily need to address killing done and intended by both state and sub-state actors. This chapter focuses primarily upon sub-state actors. So, while the focus of the chapter is on religio-political violence by sub-state actors, the concepts and processes explored may be widely applicable.

81. Dutter, L. E. (1987). Ethno-political activity and the psychology of terrorism. Terrorism, 10(3), 145-163. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors abstract: Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principle goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society’s ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno-political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non-democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno-political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.
-Recent studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for those instances in which generalization appears to be feasible.
-This paper focused on one such aspect, the political behavior of ethnic groups, which are, or course, a major source of threatening contingencies. Its principal goal is to elucidate more clearly, although briefly, the theoretical connections between a society’s ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno-political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning institutions in “democratic” as well as “non-democratic,” societies.
-Although still not fully understood, the development of a primordial “group” depends upon anthropological, economic, psychological, and sociological variables such as region or territoriality, means of livelihood, kinship, customs or way of life, religion, language and literature, and formal organizations. These group “markers” many of which can be objectively identified, typically evolve into a subjective “collective identity system” or group “consciousness,” composed mainly of moral and cultural values and beliefs, common perceptions and interpretations of historical events, and a set of well-defined rituals which, among other things, reinforce and perpetuate this consciousness.
-Contact with other groups stimulates the development of a we-they perception and transforms a group consciousness into the foundation of an “ethnic” identity. Ethnicity can then be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics, which derive principally from an individual’s birth and upbringing.
-Since the Renaissance we have seen the gradual development and spread throughout the world of the modern, European “nation-state” with, in the twentieth century, three main characteristics: 1) the identification of a specific geographic area and the demarcation of a physical boundary around it; 2)
within the boundary, the development of a centralized, complex government and administrative structures, an incumbent regime, which controls, monitors, or otherwise regulates the economic, military, political, and social affairs of that geographical area; and 3) an attitudinally, culturally, or ethnically homogenous population within that boundary which is “legitimately” or effectively governed by that incumbent regime.

- How does ethnic heterogeneity in a territorial-state get transformed into a conflictual, ethno-political heterogeneity. First and foremost, it depends upon the answers to five basic questions regarding the origin and composition of the territorial-state. First, did the development of its constituent groups precede the establishment of the territorial-state and how long before the state’s appearance did the groups appear? Second, how did its constituent groups come to be in the territorial-state? Third, how many identifiable groups does the territorial-state contain? Fourth, what proportion of the territorial-state’s population does each group constitute? Fifth, are group members regionally concentrated in their traditional “homelands” or widely dispersed throughout the territorial-state?

- A second major consideration is the formal structure of the territorial-state’s governmental and political institutions. In other words, what is its “constitution”?

- A final consideration, related to institutional formation and operations, is the general behavior of regime incumbents who occupy the key decision-making positions in those institutions.

- The first phase of ethno-political activity is the appearance of leadership “cadres” or ethno-political entrepreneurs, who engage in four major, overlapping, but analytically-separable activities: 1) defining ethno-political goals; 2) articulating these goals for and to group followers; 3) presenting these to regime incumbents; and 4) mobilizing and recruiting ethnic followers into organizations for political action in pursuit of these goals; which overlaps with the next phase.

- The second phase can be labeled “normal” politics. In the “democratic” context, resulting from the activities of ethno-political entrepreneurs, this phase includes, the appearance and development of organizations and political parties, as well a differential patterns of ethno-electoral behavior.

- The third phases can be labeled “abnormal” politics (e.g., the occurrence of ethnically-based, politically-motivated, and premeditated riots, assassinations, bombings, terrorism, coups, or civil war.

- For a given territorial-state, progression through the phases, especially the latter three, and the observed frequency and severity of activities subsumed under each depend upon five major factors. First, is there or has there been an external threat to the formulation and/or continued existence of the territorial-state and all of its inhabitants. Second, what is the nature of ethno-political goals? 1) substantive, 2) procedural, 3) symbolic, 4) constitutional, 5) fundamental. Third, to what extent are regime incumbents, especially key decision-makers, drawn from one ethnic group? Fourth, what are or have been the policy responses of regime incumbents to fully articulated ethno-political goals or demands? The fifth major factor, intergenerational dynamics, concerns repetitions of the phases.

- There are, or course significant differences between ethno-political terrorism and other forms such as those based on quasi-ideological movements (e.g., Baader-Meinhof, Red Brigades). First, while its proportion of the territorial-state’s population may be minuscule, the absolute size of the ethnic group in which the terrorists originate is likely to be large. Second, as a consequence, the amount of verbal and material support upon which the terrorists can rely is also likely to be greater. Third, these two differences will make it easier for an embryonic organization to gain initial recruits and later on, to obtain replacements for those captured, injured, disabled, or killed. Fourth, these first three differences typically lead to a greater frequency and/or severity of terrorist attacks, at least in the initial stages of the organization’s activities. Fifth, intergenerational dynamics give ethnically-based terrorism a much greater potential for long-run persistence. Finally, underlying everything is the hierarchy of values or goals alluded to earlier.

- Reviewing briefly, when faced with the potential or real prospect of ethno-political terrorism, an incumbent regime encounters four principle problems: 1) preventing or resolving immediate (e.g., hostage) situations; 2) apprehending and dealing with perpetrators; 3) formulating, adopting, and implementing preventive countermeasures; 4) formulating, adopting, and implementing policies (e.g., economic) designated to reduce incentives in the host group for future organized violence. Depending of course, upon ethno-political goals, it may be that “democratic” regimes have a greater potential for accommodation and eventual solution than “non-democratic” ones.

- The “strength” of the ethno-terrorist lies in the intensity with which he holds his perceived
grievances and his concomitant willingness to accept (physical) risks in pursuit of ethno-political objectives.


tactical option by having the global society view it with such legal, moral and political distain that it simply not considered as a viable option for any organized society or social movement. (2) Efforts to remove terrorism as a strategic option by choosing not to negotiate with terrorists under any circumstance. (3) Responding to terrorism with swift and overwhelming force, so that the perceived cost of terrorism act far outweighs any perceived potential gain. (4) Establishment of a condition wherein "justice" is perceived to be available to all.

-Psychological efforts to mitigate the adverse effects of terrorism may include: (1) Provision of pre-incident training and education. (2) Provision of "acute psychological first aid". (3) Provision of community "town meetings" to provide relevant operational updates, health education, and stress management. (4) Implementation of an integrated, multi-component system of crisis intervention and emergency mental health services.

85. Falk, R. (1988). The terrorist mind-set: The moral universe of revolutionaries and functionaries. R. Falk (Ed), Revoultionaries and Functionaries: The dual face of terrorism (pp. 70-94). New York: E. P. Dutton. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is essentially a philosophical piece that cautions all against legitimacy or justifying, illegitimate violence. "No matter how laudable the motivations or goals and no matter how destastable the other side may seem, a common renunciation of impressive violence must take precedence in our thinking." The remainder of the chapter describes how we can be seduced away from this premise. Revolutionaries declare total war on an entire society. Fundamentalism allows one to act on revealed truth or justifications with no regard for perceptions of others. Demonization in used "as a justification for resort to violence that is not conducted by normal legal and moral limits." "Demonization is a death sentence imposed on the adversary." The realist if effective can and should be used. "the terrorist mindset is dominated by its melodramatic preoccupation with the destruction of evil. It rejects self-doubt, ambiguity, human solidarity, moral and legal inhibition, constitutionalization. It is a law unto itself and bearer of some higher moral to be established later on." A thoughtful peace. Points about demonization and fundamentalism are particularly well made. Limited operational value.

86. Ferracuti, F. (1985). A psychiatric comparative- Analysis of left and right terrorism in Italy. Psychiatry: The state of the art (Vol. 6pp. 399-406). New York, NY: Plenum. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Written by leading Italian terrorism researcher at a time when terrorist comprised 3% of the country's population, this article provides a dynamic, psychiatric formulation of the comparative "psychopathology" of left and right wing terrorists. They also provide some data correlating certain social indicators such as balance of payments from international trade and unemployment rates with "terrorist output" (a scare combining attacks and lethality). While rejecting disorder/psychopathology as an explanation for terrorism, they do formulate a dynamic among left wing terrorists of engaging in a "fantasy war" against the state, and among right wingers having the fascist view that the world is divided among "enemies" and "heroes" a dicotomy that reflects an essential "borderline" dynamic. Written for a mental health audience. Not operationally focused.

87. Ferracuti, F. (1982). A sociopsychiatric interpretatio n of terrorism . M. E. Wolfgang (Ed.), International terrorism: The annals of the American Academy AAPSS (Vol. 463pp. 129-140). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In the following discussion, only political terrorism will be considered, and within this category, criminal or frankly psychopathological subjects will also be excluded. Typologies are also of questionable values. To be useful, they must be at least descriptive, inclusive, discrete, endowed with forecasting or prognostic value, policy-generating, possibly ethological, and theoretically grounded. No such taxonomy exists for terrorism. McClure's types by cause are of some help in identifying the main motives, but they stop at a very superficial level of ideological commitment. He lists five major types of "Cause" 1. Resistance to colonial rule 2. Separatism 3. Internal-political 4. Ideological 5. Supporing external takeover. The five types may merge and the identification of the terrorist group may attempt to encompass more than one type.
Yet forecasting requires theory, to get out of actuarial straitjackets and to allow for planning. In terrorism two kinds of forecasting obviously coexist. On one side, limited, short range forecasting, which does not tamper with major variables but only with predictable terrorists' and other "actors" activities and behaviors essentially a police or criminalistic operation, is better solved by such tested tools as simulation games, association charting, and profiles or psychobiographies. On the other hand, middle and long-range forecasting imply a different set of operations to be conducted using the full array of the social planner's and policymaker's tools. Another problem in forecasting is the difference between 1. the prediction of future actions by individuals, or the identification of prospective terrorists, their entry into the groups, their careers and the forced or spontaneous termination and 2. the analysis of future behavior of groups, or the forecasting of destabilization. Forecasting group behavior has been a relatively large body of studies, particularly by political scientist for the correlates and predictors of destabilization.

Whatever theory emerges, it should admittedly be interdisciplinary.

A.C. Hazelpin has tried to determine the unity in the principles of terrorist, and their adherence to the same principles. The 12 principles are the following: 1 Violence is necessary to overthrow oppression. 2. There is no limit to the extent of violence justifies. 3. Actions should clearly convey their purpose. 4. Repraisal killings are counterproductive. 5. Ruthlessness and extraordinary violence are essential to terrorist success. 6. Government failures can be used to gain popular support. 7. Terrorism exposes the repressive side of government. 8. Secrecy is important to terrorist operations. 9. Systematic planning and execution are critical to terrorist success. 10. Smale-scale, persistent attacks are most effective. 12. Terrorists are dedicated to destruction for the sake of their cause.

Another common element in ideological terrorism is as A. Koestler indicated, the urge to dedicate oneself to a cause, a leader, an ideology. This can be a needed replacement for one anomic or for an existential vacuum, which may drive other individuals to drifting or to entering the drug culture.

To understand the differences among terrorist, "normal" citizens, and criminals, it may be useful to analyze the elements that allow one to live in a fantasy state of war within a reality of peace and democracy.

Terrorism is fantasy war, real only in the mind of the terrorist.

A fantasy war is neither accepted nor acknowledge by the other group who, in effect tends to deny it. Even fantasy war needs the existence of at least two groups, distinct and organized.

Terrorist group claims power of life and death over citizens, engages in criminal activities while claiming their lawfulness. A crisis is necessary. And the existence of a love object, perceived in danger, is also necessary.

The process of singling out and alienating the enemy is identical to what takes place in real war.

Lastly fantasy war, as real war, is carried out by executing projects of destruction.

Two possible scenarios exist in fantasy war: either it changes into real war, and thus ends with the defeat of one contestant; or it stabilizes itself into terror.

Available theories: Salert has summarized the four main theories. Briefly, they are as follows:

1. Olson Theory, or revolution as a rational choice. Revolution is the best alternative, given the prevailing social circumstances.

2. A Psychological theory. This is mostly based on frustration-aggression.

3. A theory of the unbalance of the social system. Proposed by C. Johnson, this is homeostatic, "system" approach.

4. Marxist Theory. This is the most difficult to synthesize its various interpretations. Its elaborations have followed different paths.

None of the four theories analyzed by Salert fulfills the criteria of sound theory or provides adequate basis for forecasting and planning.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Written in 1981, this chapter begins with an overview of terrorism trends in Italy in the 1970's, and argues that there are significant terrorist contingents on the left (red) and right (black) wings of the political spectrum.

The authors emphasize the need to view and understand terrorism in Italy on its societal context. According, they provide illustrative examples.
While not forming terrorism as a manifestation of psychiatric pathology, the authors do speculate about some differences between the neo-Marxist types on the left and neo nazi types on the right. Left wing terrorist rarely suffer from personal defeats. Normally, they demonstrate a good capacity to withstand stress to organize themselves into groups, to sustain one another and to disseminate their ideologies. Their adherence to their beliefs is firm and often unshakeable.

Among right wing terrorist, disturbed borderline, or even psychiatric personalities have a much higher incidence. They are often individualistic; unable to stand stress, such as imprisonment; and unable to organize themselves into a structure, except for loose psuedomilitary hierarchies. Their basic psychological traits reflect authoritarian-extremist personality.

Attempts to construct a model of "Psychopathological terrorism", integrity, individual, and environmental variables- adding a dynamic model centering around the model of anomie.

Material on specific individuals and groups is dated. The authors descriptive distinctions between left and right wing terrorists are intriguing, but their empirical basis is not clear. The proposed models are not particularly useful from an operational perspective.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Common sense and experience can tell us that people who are badly treated, and/or unjustly punished, will seek revenge. It should be not be surprising, then, that young adolescents, who have themselves been terrorized, become terrorists, and that in a situation where they are afforded social supports by their compatriots reacting against the actions of an unjust government, the resort to terrorist tactics becomes a way of life.

According to my findings over eight years of study in the Northern Ireland, the children there have suffered severe disruption in the development of moral judgment, a cognitive function and are obsessed with death and destruction about which they feel helpless, and against which they feel isolated and hopeless.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This presents a comprehensive review and critique of typologies of terrorism developed through the mid 1980's. They argue "the primary utility of typologies can be found in their ability to make use of underlying variables in discovering relationships." Most existing typologies categorize groups on the basis of factors such as motivation, objectives, size, consistency, and outside support. Group based typologies: use multidimensional (such as right-wing v. left-wing) instead of undimensional concepts masking important differences; rely on general information that is never subjected to empirical scrutiny, use imprecise terms (e.g. psychotic). Motivational typologies typically attempt to distinguish between bluntly between terrorism for or against the state; fail to distinguish revolutionary and antiestablishment terrorism; fail to extend to repressive or regime terrorism. Origin based approaches employ categories that are too broad and unrepresentative of reality and lack of clarity about which specific classification should fit. In light of these shortcomings the authors propose that a typology scheme should operate in the following way: (1) precisely define and only include political terrorists; (2) consider political orientation (i.e., ideological orientation, territorial orientation, or state repression); (3) geopolitical orientation (i.e., indigenous, foreign, or colonial); (4) focus of attention or leitmotif (i.e., social revolution, single issue, anarchy and repression). Very scholarly review with an extensive appendix describing existing typologies. The notions of classification here are driven more by specific parameters and objectives than operational ones.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Mass murder involves the slaughter of four or more victims by one or a few assailants within a single event, lasting but a few minutes or as long as several hours. More than just arbitrary, using this minimum body count as opposed to a two or three victim threshold suggested by others (e.g., Ressler et al., 1988, Holmes and Holmes, 2001) helps to distinguish multiple killing from homicide generally. Moreover, by restricting our attention to acts committed by one or a few offenders, our working definition of multiple homicide also excludes
highly organized or institutionalized killings (e.g., war crimes and large-scale acts of political terrorism as well as certain acts of highly organized crime rings). Although state-sponsored killings are important in their own right, they may be better explained through the theories and methods of political science than criminology. Thus, for example, the definition of multiple homicide would include the crimes committed by Charles Manson and his followers, but not those of Hitler’s Third Reich, or the 9/11 terrorists, despite some similarities in the operations of authority.

- For the years 1976 through 1999, an estimated 497,030 people were murdered in the United States. Of these, 3,956 were slain in incidents claiming four or more victims.

- Most of these cases entail unplanned fatalities, and should arguably be eliminated from consideration. After this exclusion, the 24-year period yields 599 mass killings, involving 2,800 victims and 826 killers.

- On average, two incidents of mass murder occur per month in the United States claiming more than 100 victims annually.

- Mass murders do not tend to cluster in large cities as do single-victim crimes, but are more likely to occur in small town or rural settings.

- Not surprisingly, the firearm is the weapon of choice in mass murder incidents, even more than in single victim crimes.

- Mass murderers infrequently attack strangers who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. In fact, almost forty percent of these crimes are committed against family members, and almost as many involve other victims acquainted with the perpetrator.

- Mass murderers are overwhelmingly likely to be male, are far more likely to be white, and are somewhat older.

- An analysis of numerous case studies (see Levin and Fox 1985; Fox and Levin 1994a) suggests a range of factors that contribute to mass murder. These factors cluster into three types: 1) predisposers, long-term and stable preconditions that become incorporated into the personality of the killer; 2) precipitants, short-term and acute triggers, i.e., catalysts; and 3) facilitators, conditions, usually situational, which increase the likelihood of a violent outburst but are not necessary to produce that response. The first class of contributors predisposes the mass killer to act in a violent manner. Included here are frustration and externalization of blame.

- The third and final class of contributory factors consists of facilitators, which increase both the likelihood and extent of violence. With respect to likelihood, mass killers are frequently isolated from sources of emotional support.

- Incorporating many elements of earlier classification schemes (Dietz, 1986; Holmes and Holmes, 1994), we have constructed a typology of mass murder using five categories of motivation applicable to mass killing: revenge, power, loyalty, terror, and profit.

- Many, if not most, mass killings are motivated by revenge, either against specific individuals, particular categories or groups of individuals, or society at large.

- Even where revenge seems to play a primary role in motivating mass murder, there is also frequently a craving for power and dominance in the thinking of a killer.

- Unlike mass murder for power or revenge, the remaining forms are more instrumental than expressive. A few multiple murderers are inspired to kill by a warped sense of love and loyalty a desire to save their loved ones from misery and hardship. Certain family massacres involve what Frazier (1975) describes as “suicide by proxy.”

- Some mass murders are committed for profit. Specifically, they are designed to eliminate victims and witnesses to a crime, often a robbery.

- Some multiple homicides are in fact terrorist acts in which the perpetrators hope to “send a message” through murder.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This was an ambitious book when it was written in 1983. It contains 17 chapters divided into four sections: Psychological Dimensions of the Terrorist; The Terrorist in Profile; Hostage Taking and Its Aftermath; and Responding to Terrorism. This volume put a heavy emphasis on the need to understand terrorism. The chapters relevant to the scope of this review are all covered in separate annotation.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: There is substantial agreement that the psychology of terrorism cannot be considered apart from political, historical, familial, group dynamic, organic, and even purely accidental, coincidental factors.
- Politics can be an important factor in the psychology of terrorism in a variety of ways. We must caution that there are many kinds of terrorism and many kinds of terrorists.
- Harry Stack Sullivan says that all men are more human than otherwise.
- The terrorist is more likely than the non-terrorist to be an individual who sees politics as highly relevant.
- Projection of personal problems into the arena of the outside world may be seen as serving the defensive function of avoiding insight into the origins of the problem, but of course it can be also seen as a desirable shift from egotism to altruism.
- Even in the cases of the terrorist who is clearly psychotic and delusional in his thinking, awareness of political realities can play a significant role in determining behavior.
- Since the terrorist act involves high degree of danger for the perpetrator, he must be a person willing to risk his life.
- Death-seeking or death-confronting behavior suggests a depressive component in the terrorist personality, and this has indeed been noted by many observers. The terrorist often is a person who feels empty anhedonic (incapable of enjoying anything), and incapable of forming meaningful interpersonal relationships on a reciprocal level.
- The terrorist's interpersonal world (as with borderline and narcissistic personalities who are not terrorist) is likely to consist of three categories of people; the idealized heroes on who he models himself, including perhaps a small group of comrades who share his ideals; the enemies (a category to which his heroes may be switched if he becomes disillusioned with them); and a large world of shadow figures (people who seem to him not quite alive, the population of expendables from whom his hostages may be taken).
- We are left to ponder what events may be the ones that make a potential terrorist cross the line into actual violence, or possibly even lean to terrorist activity on the part of someone whom one would not have described as particularly terrorism prone. Such factors may include experiences of profound disappointment because of a personal failure or disillusionment with an ideal; the killing or imprisonment of a family member or comrade; being introduced into a setting where terrorism is a long-standing tradition or a response to current political crisis; or contact with a group that influences the way in which one cognitively restructures and reevaluates the political situation, with membership in that group being something that meets personal needs and participation in terrorist activities merely one of the conditions one has to fulfill for membership.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: A convenient framework for the analysis of the antecedents of political terrorism can be designed on the basis of three generalizations. First terrorism is a group phenomenon. Second, political terrorism has its roots in intergroup conflict. Third, "insurgent terrorism," unlike "state terrorism," which will not be discussed in the present chapter, is a "strategy of the weak."
- As for empirical support, to date there is no compelling evidence that terrorists are abnormal, insane, or match a unique personality type. In fact, there are some indications to the contrary.
- The critique of the attribution of terrorist behavior to individual idiosyncrasy or pathology is not meant to imply that individual predispositions play no role whatsoever in the emergence of terrorist groups and in eruptions of terrorist action. However, as will be argued later, the influence of individuals has to be examined as an element of group and intergroup processes.
Underprivileged groups are likely to reject their disadvantaged status, and will move to improve their lot when (a) the social system is viewed as unstable and (b) inequitable distributions of power, rights, and resources are deemed illegitimate.

Social psychological and sociological explanations of group violence, civil strife, and rioting, as well as explanations advanced by political scientists, draw heavily on the frustration-aggression (FA) hypothesis.

Sociologist and political scientist substituted the FA formulation with the conceptually close notion of "relative deprivation" (RD). Ted Gurr's proposition has been more influential or, at least the widely quoted: "Relative deprivations" (RD) is the term used to denote the tension that develops from the discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction.

First the group must articulate its discontent and develop a unifying ideology that gives meaning to its grievances.

Leadership, of course, plays a critical role in the crystallization and channeling of group discontent. Second, violent group action must be seen as an intergroup process. Any attempt by one group to alter a political or social status quo necessarily elicits an attempt by another group to preserve it.

Individuals' dispositions have a relatively minor effect on a group's turning to terrorism, under the three conditions (1) deprivation is intense, the group is denied satisfaction of basic needs and the exercise of elementary rights; (2) the group has articulated and ideologized its discontent; and (3) group members have a strong group identity and the group is cohesive and clearly differentiated from outgroups.

Individual dispositions, particularly the disposition to violence, become paramount when (1) the radical group does not aim to satisfy specific basic needs or to reclaim elementary rights but rather to implement a general social ideology; (2) the ideology is incoherent and unrealistic; and (3) the group lacks a unique, separate identity.

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Call Number: Key Quote Summary: As the political philosopher Michael Walzer has noted, until the middle of this century, terrorist actors were primarily engaged in political assassination.

There are basically two kinds of political terrorists. The most prevalent at the moment, and during the recent past, is the so-called terrorist liberationist, or political secessionist, whom the media frequently mislabels "guerrillas" involved in wars of national liberation. This category includes such terrorist organizations as the PLO, ETA, IRA, SWAPO, FAML. and Moro National Liberation Front.

The second group is fundamentally nihilistic and anarchistic, intent on destroying an entire state structure, often motivated by a distorted messianic idealism, and believing that a new Zion can only be created out of the fire and flame of the old order. To the political nihilistic, revolutionary violence is necessary means of moral purification.

Political terrorism is often a manifestation of ideological fanaticism. Terrorist of the left maintain they are fighting an anti-imperialist war, while terrorist of the right consider liberal democracy as being spiritually bankrupt, racially decadent, and economically stagnant as well as crumbling from powerful corrosive communist elements.

At times, certain ideological terrorist entities mask themselves in the trappings of political bandits who rob from the state and its dominant socioeconomic class in order to provide the downtrodden, needy and homeless.

Terrorism in fact and in theory, has become a psychic religion. Those who worship at the altar of force ultimately make a force itself the greater truth. The very act of terror has been ritualized, and destruction becomes confused with salvation.

Anonymity is not only the protective shield of political terrorist, but it is frequently characteristics of their method of operation.

Like their political counterparts, psychologically disturbed terrorist actors are both alienated and fanatic. In fact, all three terrorist categories are bound together by cruelty, wantonness, and reckless indifference to the value of human life.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: This article argues that criminal and deviant behaviour can be productively viewed through an action system framework. The idea is developed by considering two forms of destructive behaviour: arson and barricade-hostage terrorist incidents. Two studies are presented, the first study tests the hypothesis that different forms of arson will reflect the four dominant states that an action system can take; integrative, expressive, conservative, and adaptive. A smallest space analysis was performed on 46 variables describing 230 cases of arson and the results identified the four themes of action system functioning. An examination of the personal characteristics of the arsonists also produced four variable groupings and a combined analysis of the four action scales and four characteristics scales also supported the structural hypothesis of the action system model. The second study applied the action system model to the study acts of terrorist barricade-hostage incidents. A smallest space analysis of 44 variables coded from 41 incidents again revealed four distinct forms of activity, which were psychologically similar to the four modes of arson identified in study one. Overall, these two studies provide support for the appropriateness of the action system framework as a way of classifying different forms of deviant behaviour.

- Based on a general system approach (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and developed by Talcot Parsons (1953), the action system model as applied to human behaviour has a number of key components, outlined by Shye (1985). He defines a system as a collection of members that maintain interrelationships among themselves. To the extent that such system is active, open, organized, and stable it can be regarded as an action system.

- Shye (1985) points out that in order to model all action systems which re-open it is necessary to consider (a) the sources of the action and (b) the effect or desired target of action. Both of these aspects of the action system can be located internally or externally.

- Shye has illustrated in a number of studies that the combination of (a) the internal and external sources of action with (b) agent or environment as the targets of the action gives rise to four basic modes of functioning of action systems that Shye labels adaptive, expressive, integrative, and conservative.

- **Adaptive Mode**—Functioning in this mode, the action system responds to external events in the environment by making adjustments to that environment.

- **Expressive Mode**—The dominant style of operation here is the demonstration of internal psychological aspects of the agent on the external world.

- **Integrative Mode**—This is the mode that describes adjustments that take place within the system itself.

- **Conservative Mode**—Shye describes this as ‘events [that] constitute a fundamental aspect of [the systems] identity and gives an examples the adoption of a constitution by an American state, or perpetuation of religious events.

- Previous work on hostage-taking has tended to focus on specific events factors such as the outcome of the siege or negotiation success of the terrorist personality and motivations. Most motivational typologies of terrorist incidents suffer the same lack of theoretical and empirical basis as those of arsonists, and, again, contain overlapping categories.

- This study analyzed data on barricade-hostage incidents.

- The material used for the study came from the book *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*. A total of 56 barricade-hostage incidents were reported. The detail were taken from multiple sources including international news agencies. Fifteen incidents were excluded from analysis. The 41 remaining barricade-hostage incidents were content analyzed to produce 44 variables.

- Examination of terrorist activity indicated that the action system model could be employed to explain variations in the interactions between terrorists and authorities. The practical implications of this are primarily in relation to projected negotiation outcomes of the various forms of terrorist barricade hostage incidents.

- The expressive mode of functioning therefore represents poor control exercised by both authorities and terrorists.

- The integrative mode of functioning entails the most negative results by injuries and deaths to all sides involved in the barricade-hostage event.

- The ability of negotiators to carefully elicit the terrorist’s reasons for the attack, may be of use in
situations where the terrorist motives, intentions, and demands are unknown, such as with the integrative incidents.

97. Galvin, D. M. (1983). The female terrorist: A Socio-Psychological perspective. *Journal of Behavioral Science and the Law*, 1, 19-31. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Reviews what little information was known on female terrorists in 1983. Main parts suggest that female terrorists are quite diverse in psychological physical characteristics, organizational roles, and motivation. Examples given are from earlier groups such as IRA, and SLA, which in combination with historical effects, could make some of the conclusions less applicable in a contemporary environment. Some discussion of role of sexuality in the terrorist group. No particular theoretical or conceptual model presented.

- Suicide attacks are attractive to terrorist organizations, as they offer them a variety of advantages.
- Suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage.
- Suicide attacks attract wide media coverage.
- Suicide tactics guarantees that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location.
- Suicide attacks require no escape plan.
- Since the perpetrator is killed during the course of suicide attack, there is no fear of him being caught afterwards.
- The shahid improves his social status after their death as well as that of his families.
- The family of the shahid is showered with honor and praise, and receives financial rewards for the attack (usually some thousands of dollars).
- The reason for committing a suicide attack for most of the shahids is therefore first and foremost religious fanaticism combined with nationalist extremism, and wish for revenge, but not personal despair.
- Usually a shahid does not volunteer for his missions. The shahid may be selected by his Islamic religious teacher at the mosque and Islamic education centers in Gaza and the West Bank.
- After the potential shahid is selected, he usually participates in long training sessions.
- Subsequently the shahid usually “disappears” from his home without farewell, while he begins several days of intensive training.
- Standard explosives run to about 3-15 kilograms of TNT or homemade explosives.

99. Gautier, C. Some problems in the characterisation of violence in politics: the example of fanaticism and its cause. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article focuses primarily on how violence has been characterized in political conflicts throughout history. It touches only lightly upon psychological concepts and has no practical, operational value. Discussion of “extreme violence” is by no means straightforward.
- In the term “extreme violence”, the adjective should serve to concentrate our attention on forms of violence of one particular type, which are liable to invalidate, at least apparently, the standard analyses in terms of utility and function.
- First of all, hatred works intentionally, and its unfolding effects are never those of mere happenstance: they are much more in the way of a result. Second, if we are to understand hatred properly, this implies that we must consider the aspect of the emotions and passions involved in individual and collective behaviour.

100. Gaylin, W. (2003). *Hatred: The psychological descent into violence*. New York: Public Affairs Publisher. Record. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book presents one psychiatrist’s view of the dynamics of hate and the role of hatred in facilitating violence. The perspective is heavily, though not solely influenced by psychoanalytic theory. The foundation is that hate is an intense and dark emotion
hate is also a psychological condition, characterized by distorted perceptions of a quasi-delusional nature; and hate requires an attachment to an object. He explores emotions that he sees as precursors or associated features with hate feelings such as deprivation, betrayal, frustration, injustice, and humiliation. At the collective level, Gaylin distinguishes between a “culture of hatred” (a natural community with shared history and experiences that breeds and encourages hatred) and a “culture of haters” (an artificial community of people often without a shared culture who share a common feeling of hatred toward a target ally with one another. This book invokes examples involving Al Qaeda and terrorism (among many other types of violence), but the explanations provided are insufficient to lend any sophisticated, new understanding of the phenomenon.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The author begins with an acknowledgement that historically women have played a relatively limited role in terrorism and that the scientific knowledge based on their involvement is minimal. He then describes several terrorist organizations that have female leaders or a strong contingency of female members. He offers a laundry list of explanations that have been offered to account for the involvement of women in terrorism, and while mindful of the distinction between associated and causal factors, posits the potential influence of structural-functional changes in gender roles that have occurred at a societal level. He argues these changes may have contributed to an increase in female criminality more generally. The basic tenets of his formulation are as follows: (1) women, with a few exceptions historically have had a relatively limited role in terrorism; (2) their involvement in lone-wolf and group-related extremist violence is likely to increase in the future; (3) female input in terrorist acts is tied in part to feminist demands and practices; (4) contemporary female terrorists are likely to exhibit male personality and physical traits; and (5) terrorist acts by females now and in the future will become more instrumental and less expressive. One of the first views of this issue through a feminist lens. Since this was written, we have seen an increase in participation by women, though the theoretical formulation per se has little operational utility.

Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter explores the beliefs and lives of terrorists. It presents three types of terrorists: the political strategist, the radical theorist, and the militant activist. Bibliographical sketches of Timothy McVeigh, Theodore Kaczynski, Bommi Baumann, Velupillai Prabhakaran, Abimael Guzman, and Osama bin Laden, are presented to explore the combination of psychological, social, economic, and political forces that led several historically important individuals into terrorist careers.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This was Goldstein’s final book before his death in 2002. Its focus is on “aggression” more broadly (e.g., bullying, teasing, mob behavior), not terrorism specifically. In fact, it does not directly address terrorism at all. That said, there are some features of this book that one could find helpful in understanding terrorist groups and behavior. In particular the first chapter provides a solid, but concise, research-based overview of group structure and behavior. There is nothing new, nor is it applied directly to terrorism, but it does review the fundamental of group dynamics. There is also a chapter on Gangs (Chapter 4) that may be of interest to persons seeking parallels between terrorist groups and delinquent gangs. Beyond this, there is little contained in this book that speaks to the psychology of terrorism.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Conventional teaching on suicide indicates that the vast majority of those who deliberately kill themselves are suffering at the time from some form of mental disorder.
-Suicide is contrary to Islamic law (Chaleby, 1996); its frequency in Muslim societies is low (Racy,
including in the Palestinian population (El-Sarraj, 1991).
- The act of ‘suicide’ bombing, although an act by an individual, is one that usually occurs in a social
or collective context, subject to ultimate sanction by sections of the community to which the
individual is affiliated.
- A senior Arab psychiatrist in Gaza, Dr Eyad El-Sarraj, in an unpublished study quoted in a British
newspaper (Silver, 2001) concluded that religion was crucial, but not the only reason for the
phenomenon of martyrdom, the other components being a need to identify with a symbol of power
and a thirst for revenge.
- There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon
can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally
disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002).

160-166.
Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Combines Mann's typology of terrorist acts (raw terrorism and
hostage episodes) with Hacker's typology of terrorist (criminal, crazies, and crusaders) to develop 6
categories of acts (e.g. criminal destruction, criminal hostage taking, crazy destruction, and crazy
hostage taking, etc)
- Argues that statements by experts such as Hacker and Wilkinson about terrorists lack of constraint
and "lust for revenge" are alarmist and inaccurate.
- Author suggests that terrorists are constrained by the attitudes and perceptors of their constituents
and potential supporters. If they engage in "raw" terrorism such as bombings it is because they are at
war with a hostile and powerful enemy. Thus, the action is justified as being either (a) regrettable,
but necessary, or (b) an essential part of the fight.
- Author sees clarity to logic of hostage taking to revenge an exchange at home, but sees logic of
destruction as less clear.

32-37.
Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Child units have featured prominently in international and
internal conflicts in recent years, serving in both state and non-state forces in countries such as
Liberia, Cambodia, Sudan, Guatemala, and Myanmar. They are featured in at least a third of the 50
odd internal conflicts that were ongoing in 1977, most of which have continued into 1988 and many
with increasing intensity.
- The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) highlighted the Sri Lankan rebel group’s practice
of aiming its specifically at schoolchildren.
- The LTTE is a leading-edge rebel group fighting for an independent Tamil mono-ethnic state in
northeastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE estimated to be 14,000 strong, employs adults and children as
rank and file.
- Now in its 24th year of existence and 15th year of combat, the LTTE is assessed by the international
security and intelligence community as the deadliest contemporary guerilla terrorist group. Sri
Lanka’s Directorate of Military Intelligence estimates that 60 percent of LTTE fighters are below the
age of 18. Even if this figure is exaggerated, an assessment of the LTTE fighters that have been
killed in combat reveals that 40 per cent of its fighting force are both males and females between
nine and 18 years of age.
- The Sri Lankan experience reveals that children are receptive to high levels of indoctrination,
willing to engage in high-risk operations and are obedient.
- Origins of the child fighters. After the ethnic riots of July 1983, sparked by an LTTE ambush of 13
soldiers, there was a massive exodus of civilians to India.
- Establish a training base in the state of Pondichery in India for recruits under 16. Initially, the child
soldiers affectionately referred to as ‘Tiger cubs’ received non-military training, mostly primary
education and physical exercise. By early 1984, the nucleus of the LTTE Baby Brigade, or Bakus,
was formed.
--The LTTE began to seriously recruit women and children to its ranks only after it declared war
against the 100,000 strong IPKF in October 1987.
- The LTTE focused on the politicization of its people through propaganda (public events, leafleting,
print media, radi, TV etc) to encourage them to support the LTTE campaign for an independent Tamil state.

-LTTE has established spectacular memorial parks and beautiful gardens with monuments of its martyrs. A striking feature of these parks are the children’s see-saws with toy automatic weapons mounted on the handles.

-The great hero families received a special status wherever the LTTE were in control. They paid no taxes, received preferential treatment in job interviews and were allocated special seats at all the public functions organized in LTTE-controlled areas. Economically deprived families thus did not object to their children joining the LTTE.

-The LTTE has an unwritten rule that every family should give a son or daughter to the cause.

-Another feature that attracted young minds to the LTTE was the glamour and the perceived respect it was paid by society.

-LTTE members regularly visited schools addressed students of the need to participate in the ‘struggle’ and screened films of their successful attacks against Sri Lankan forces. Those fighters entrusted with indoctrination and recruitment would often ask that students supporting the struggle of independence raise their hands and, without giving them an opportunity to hesitate, would drive them to a training camp.

-Other than projecting the military successes of the LTTE, a powerful image that attracted many youngsters to join the LTTE, was the screening of films depicting Sri Lankan government atrocities.

-A typical unit of children is trained for four months in the jungle.

-There is no communication between the camp and the children’s homes during the training period.

-The LTTE code forbids alcohol and sex and offenders are punished with death. Homosexuality, which occurs, is a punishable offence.

-The LTTE training curriculum is frequently reviewed and modified to meet the changing nature of battle.

-The physical and psychological war training of children as a formidable lethal weapon is an innovation of the LTTE. The high point of LTTE achievement in this direction was the formation of the elite Sirasu puli, or Leopards Brigade. The members of the brigade were children drawn from the LTTE-managed orphanages. Within the LTTE ranks, this brigade is considered to be its most fierce fighting force. All LTTE recruits swear an oath of allegiance to the LTTE leader once every morning and evening, but Leopard fighters have an incomparable loyalty to Prabhakaran. Most see him as a father figure and equate a request from him to a directive from heaven.

-Like their adult counterparts in the LTTE, child fighters are required to consume a phial of potassium cyanide either when capture is imminent or when they are injured in the field. Enforcing the cyanide rule has, understandably been difficult with children.

-As a result, there are more teenage than adult LTTE fighters in government custody.

-The only study on the role of the children in LTTE is a sociological analysis by Peradeniya University sociology student Chamarie Rodrigo. Her thesis, based on published literature and interviews, confirms the failure of the state to address the “misuse of children by power hungry leaders.”

-The ideological experiment of motivating children as combatants has been a highly successful one. The LTTE has been able to enhance its performance in battle by deploying child units. Therefore, it is likely that other contemporary groups will now emulate the success of the LTTE.

-The most devastating result of this practice has been the recovery of small sized suicide body suits.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Until recently many political scientists tended to regard violent civil conflict as a disfigurement of the body of politics, neither a significant nor a proper topic for their empirical inquiries. The attitude was in part our legacy from Thomas Hobbes’s contention that violence is the negations of political order, a subject far less for study than for admonition.

-This article proposes, first, that civil violence is a significant topic of political inquiry and, second not only that it is capable of explanation, but that we know enough about the sources of human violence to specify in general, theoretical terms some of the social patterns that dispose men to collective violence.

-There is little value in pseudo-psychological speculation about revolutionaries as deviants, fools, or the maladjusted.
- Nor can a general theory of civil strife rest on culturally specific theories of modal personality traits, though it might well take account of the effects of these traits. Some cultures and subcultures produce significantly more aggression-prone than cooperative personalities.

- Psychological Theories of Aggression:
  - There are three distinct psychological assumptions about the generic sources of human aggression: that aggression is solely instinctual, that it is solely learned, or that it is an innate response activated by frustration.
  - The universe of concern, civil violence, is formally defined as all collective, non-governmental attacks on persons or property, resulting in international damage to them, that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit.
  - Parsons attempts to fit civil violence into the framework of social interaction theory, treating the resort to force as a way of acting chosen by the actor (s) for purposes of deterrence, punishment, or symbolic demonstration of their capacity to act.
  - Stone criticizes any emphasis on violence as a distinguishing or definitional property of civil strife on grounds that it is only a particular means, designed to serve political ends.
  - The crucial point is that rationalization and organization of illicit violence are typically subsequent to, and contingent upon, the existence of frustration-induced anger.
  - If anger implies the presence of frustration, there is compelling evidence that frustration is all but universally characteristic of participants in civil strife: discontent, anger, rage, hate, and their synonyms are repeatedly mentioned in studies of strife.

- The primary object of this article is to demonstrate that many of the variables and relationships identified in social psychological research on the frustration-aggression relationship appear to underlie the phenomenology of civil violence.

- These propositions are of two types: 1. Propositions about the operations of instigating variables, which determine the magnitude of anger, and 2. Propositions about mediating variables, which determine the likelihood and magnitude of overt violence as a response to anger.

- My basic premise is that the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between the value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled.

- A further distinction is necessary between two general classes of deprivation: that are personal and those that are group or category experiences.

- Propositions I.1: The occurrence of civil violence presupposes the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of individuals in a society: concomitantly, the more severe is relative deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence.

- The proportion of a population that participates in collective violence ought to vary with the modal strength of anger.

- This line of argument suggests that magnitude of civil violence has three component variables: the degree of participation within the affected population, the destructiveness of the aggressive actions, and the length of time violence persists.

- Dollard and others initially proposed that the strength of instigation to aggression (anger) varies with "(1) the strength of instigation to the frustration response, (2) the degree of interference with the frustration response, and (3) the number of frustrated response-sequences."

- First it appear from examination of specific outbreaks of civil violence that abrupt awareness of the likelihood of frustration can be as potent a source of anger as actual interference.

- Second, it seems evident that the sense of deprivation can arise whether from interference with goal seeking behavior or from interference with continued enjoyment of an attained condition.

- Analysis of the sources of relative deprivation should take accounts of both actual and anticipated interference with human goals.

- The first suggestion derived from psychological theory is that the more intensely people are motivated toward a goal, or committed to an attained level of values, the more sharply its interference and the greater is the consequent instigation to aggression.

- Proposition I.2 The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the intensity of commitment to the goal or condition with regard to which deprivation is suffered or anticipated.

I.2a: the strength of anger tends to vary directly with the degree of effort previously invested in the attainment or maintenance of goal or condition.
I.2b: The intensity of commitment to a goal or condition tends to vary inversely with its perceived
closeness.

-Proposition I.3: The strength of anger tends to vary inversely with the extent to which deprivation is
held to legitimate.

-The environment in which people strive toward goals has two general characteristics that,
frustration-aggression theory suggests, affect the intensity of anger: the degree of interference with
goal attainment and the number of opportunities provided for attainment.

-The Feierabends devised "frustration" measures, based on value capability characteristics of sixty-
two nations, and correlated them with a general measure of degree of political stability, obtaining a
correlation coefficient of .50.

-Much evidence from studies of civil strife suggests that the greater are value opportunities, the less
intense is civil violence.

-Proposition I.5: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the proportion of all available
opportunities for value attainment with which interference is experienced or anticipated.

-Whether or not civil violence actually occurs as a response to anger, and its magnitude when it
does occur, are influenced by a number of mediating variables.

-Social Control: The Effects of Retribution

Good experimental evidence indicates that anticipation of retribution is under some circumstances an
effective regulator of aggression. It also has been proposed, and demonstrated in a number of
experimental settings that if aggression is prevented by fear of retribution or by retribution itself, this
interference is frustrating and increases anger.

-Proposition M1: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary curvilinearly with the
amount of physical or social retribution anticipated as a consequence of participation in it, with
likelihood and magnitude greatest medium levels of retribution.

M.1a: Any decrease in the perceived likelihood of retribution tends to increase the likelihood and
magnitude of civil violence

-Proposition M.2: Inhibition of civil violence by fear of external retribution tends to in the short run
to increase the strength of anger but in the long run to reduce it.

M.2a: The duration of increased anger under conditions of inhibitions tends to vary with the intensity
of commitment to the value with respect to which deprivation is suffered.

-Several aspects of displacement theory are relevant for civil violence. Miller's basic propositions
about object and response generalization is the formulation that the stronger the fear of retribution
relative to the strength of anger, the more dissimilar will the target of aggression be from the source
of interference and the more indirect will be the form of aggression.

-Object generalization is a crucial variable in determining who will be attacked by the initiators of
particular acts of civil violence, but is only peripheral; to the primary concern of the theory, the
determination of likelihood and the magnitude of violence as such.

-Proposition M.3: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary inversely with the
availability of institutional mechanisms that permit the expression of nonviolent hostility.

-Social Facilitation: Cognitive Factors:

A number of experiments indicate that the presence of stimuli associated with anger instigators is
necessary for most aggressive responses to occur.

-The literature on civil violence suggests at least four specific modes by which such experiences
facilitate violent responses to deprivation. They can (1) stimulate mutual awareness among the
deprived (2) provide explanations for deprivation of ambiguous origin, (3) specify accessible targets
and appropriate forms of violence, and (4) state long-range objectives to be attained through
violence.

-Proposition M.4: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary directly with the
availability of common experiences and beliefs that sanction violent responses to anger.

M.4a: Given the availability of alternative experiences and beliefs, the likelihood that the more
aggressive of them will prevail tends to vary with the strength of anger.

-Social facilitation: Sources of Group Support for Violence

One can distinguish at least three modes by which groups affect individual's disposition to violence:
(1) by providing normative support, (2) by providing apparent protection from retribution, and (3) by
providing cues for violent behavior.

-Propositions M.5: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary directly with the
extent to which deprived occupy organizational and/or ecological settings that provide (1) normative support through high levels of interaction, (2) apparent protection from retribution, and (3) congruent models for violent behavior.

- The theoretical framework comprising the ten propositions is formally restricted to physically violent collective behavior.

- Proposition F.1: The characteristic form of civil violence tends to vary with the differential incidence of relative deprivation among elite aspirants and masses: (1) mass deprivation alone tend to be manifested in large-scale civil violence with minimal organization and low intensity; (2) elite-aspirant deprivation tends to be manifested in highly organized civil violence of high intensity.

F.1.1: Whether organized and intense civil violence is large scale or small scale is a joint function of the extent of mass deprivation and the strategic access of deprived elite aspirants to the incumbent political elite.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The audience is as vital to the terrorist as it is the actor on the stage.

- If he is to succeed in his larger revolutionary goals, he must convince a large number of influential people that he is really very strong.
- The terrorist's profound and terrorizing effect derives from his willingness to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that are inherent in civil life; accordingly, there is a real need to establish the psychological profiles of typical terrorists, so that they can be identified and headed off from the defenseless groups, passengers, shoppers.
- When we direct our gaze solely to the terrorist, we confirm for himself and for us his own self-regard and his personal myth; we confirm his public relations, his view of himself as the ultimate center of action, the pivot of history.
- Solzhenitsy, also views the terrorist as a product of his liberal audience, a creature of the permissive rather than the oppressive society.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: “Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies” was perhaps the first major popular press release on the psychology of terrorism. Hacker is a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and although his formulations do have a psychodynamic bent, they are also much broader than his contemporary writers. This is the work that introduced the now popular and colloquial terrorist typology of Crusaders (idealistcally inspired and acting in service of a higher cause), Criminals (who simply use terrorism for personal gain) and Crazies (often motivated by false beliefs and perceptions arising from their mental illness). Hacker notes immediately (and correctly) “of course, the pure type is rarely encountered.” Nevertheless, this effort introduced the notion that there were differences among terrorists and that the phenomenon and the actors were not monolithic. In Chapter Six, Hacker provides an intriguing analysis of strategies and techniques that can be (and are) used to indoctrinate extremist ideology and to dehumanize the enemy (what he calls “rape of the mind”), including sensory deprivation, brain drilling, creation of “family” environment, having a monopoly on interpretations, and sense of group belonging.

- In the final section, Hacker draws some general conclusions on the psychology of terrorism many of which have stood the test of time-for example: that “remediable injustice is the basic motivation for terrorism”; that “modern expressions of violence are indissolubly tied to justification”; that terrorism “is neither senseless, mindless, or irrational. It is the purposeful use of strategic aggression to achieve its objectives.”; that “although terrorism, guerrilla warfare tactics and war strategies may merge, there are differences between them”; that “the progress of technology and gadgetry tends to equalize the power differences between the big and the small”; and that “terrorism is a growth industry that demands little investment.” Hacker’s view of solutions tend to favor the “root cause” arguments, but this work did break new ground in understanding the complexity of terrorism. Probably provides no new insights for intelligence analysts, but historically, it is an interesting read.

Scholarly Resources.

Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: Hacker again attempts to make terrorist acts more comprehensible by exploring their psychological bases. He touches on a couple of topics (1) Terrorism is theatre and the public like to view violence and (2) The sometimes fine line between extreme political views and delusions before introducing his main thesis, which is that terrorists are “justice collectors.” By this he means, that in response to perceived grievances, terrorists become “insatiable in collecting justice in retaliation.” He views this as proceeding through four stages: (1) Awareness of an oppression; (2) Oppression no longer viewed as natural and unavoidable it is social; (3) It is possible to act against the oppression, therefore one should act against it; (4) “self-help by violence” is seen as the only effective action. He sees the “root cause” as perceived actionable injustice. Hacker also proposes that key dynamics in affiliating with terrorist and doing terrorist acts are: (1) attraction to the excitement and action; (2) Desire to escape cognitive complexity thus reverts to a world where all things are black and white, us versus them; and (3) fulfilling a need for belonging. His conclusion is that terrorist tactics should depolarize, deescalate, deglamorize and defuse.” Hacker does not dwell here on esoteric nuances of psychoanalytic theory (though that is his orientation), nevertheless his positions are derived from experience, not empirical evidence. They may be useful as heuristics, but not as facts.


Call Number: Published Abstract: Addresses the personality profile, including diagnosis and defense mechanisms, of the 4 types of terrorist (psychopathic, political ethnogeographic, religious ethnogeographic, and retributional). The author focuses on the retributional terrorist, who is found to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This person has had no history of pathology and was not inclined to membership in any particular group, yet suffered a deliberately planned major atrocity against self, family, community, or all. The author suggests that the terrorist or terrorism-at-large can be best understood by looking at each individual through a holistic model (cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and physical factors), and by considering the effects of the environment on the total person. An appendix lists significant terrorist incidents from 1961 to 2001.


Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: Authors Abstract: There are important controversies over dynamics of terrorism which have not yet been formally addressed in quantitative social research. We suggest a class of stochastic models for social contagion which may help to shed light on theses controversies. Empirical estimates of model parameters were obtained from data on international terrorism in 16 countries over 1968-1978. We find some evidence suggesting that the tendency of acts of terrorism to incite further violence is more easily reversed in less democratic, poorer, and less well educated societies. This suggests that reversal of a terrorism ‘epidemic’ is more likely under conditions facilitating repression than reform, and that more open societies face particular difficulties in responding to terrorism effectively.

-Quantitative empirical studies of terrorism are still in their infancy; to date, they have consisted mainly of whether straightforward tabulations or of attempts to fit simple models of social contagion. Theoretical formulations have for the most part been preoccupied with issues of definition and topology.

-Although these authors disagree on the consequence of terrorism, they are in general agreement that sits origin lies in the oppression and inequities of the system.

-Recent academic studies have employed a paradigm of terrorism dynamics which is quite distinct from those encountered above. This paradigm, considers the possibility that terrorist incidents may encourage further violence through a process of imitation or diffusion, giving rise to a dynamics of terrorism analogous to that observed in the spread of contagious disease. Heyman and Mickolus (1981), for example, have developed a conceptual scheme for the actual mechanisms by which terrorism could diffuse internationally and used adjacency mapping techniques to demonstrate that it does so.

-More recently a chronology of over 3000 incidents of international terrorism has been compiled by Mickolus (1980).
The necessary dependence on new-service sources for incident reports creates inevitable biases in favor of countries with well-developed and unrestrained news media.

A second limitation of the data is that they refer only to incidents of international terrorism in which two or more states were somehow involved.

These bivariate analyses support the general conclusion that terrorism is least reversible in relatively open and affluent societies.

We believe that our results offer a preliminary indication that the forces which produce a reversal of terrorism are stronger in repressive environments than they are in environments more conducive to moderate reform. Democratic, affluent, and well-educated states seem to have particular difficulty in reversing terrorism, whereas autocratic poor, and uneducated countries do not.

-Despite some tactical successes, terrorism in recent decades can rarely be said to have achieved its strategic objectives; often its results were opposite of those intended.

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Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Suicide terrorism is the outcome of an individual rational choice. In the context of an oppressive society, a terrorist organization that compete for resources provides young people with an incentive to invest in an identity that is rendered more valuable by death. From this viewpoint acts of suicide terrorism are analyzed as the outcome of a self-enforcing contract between the young person and the terrorist organization that recruits him or, less commonly, her. Solutions to a number of empirical puzzles are suggested.

Finally, the phenomenon of suicide attacks is placed in the wider context of terrorism.

-The idea that suicide attackers are acting out religious convictions, although plausible at first sight, is weakened by three facts. First, most religions, including most versions of Islam, specifically prohibit both suicide and wanton killing. Second, the idea suicide troops and the cult of a warrior’s glorious death are not confined to Islam. Third, the voluntary giving up of one’s life is encountered frequently in many cultures, including our own, but often it is has nothing to do with religion.

-We choose our identities. This identity has a value because it enables us to function to society. The value of identity is not a new. Economists since Carl Shapiro have analysed “reputation” as an asset. Reputation is related to identity in the following way: it covers those aspects of my identity that I make visible to others through my actions. Why is reputation valuable?

-Like anything else that has a durable value, identity is an asset.

-The logic that drives voluntary acts of self-destruction is therefore as follows. Each person who chooses the death of the self does so because at the given moment death will maintain her most valuable asset, the identity that she has selected and invested in through her life, but living on will damage it irreparably. The moment is such that by choosing life she must abandon this identity.

-To grasp the logic of the suicide terrorist, therefore, we need to comprehend the forces that drive someone to abandon the life-loving identity for which we are selected and instead invest in one that can only be sustained by premature death.

-It seems that three elements are involved in this: young people growing up, a conflicted, oppressive environment, and a terrorist faction. The first element is young people growing up.

-Another factor that appears necessary is a social environment that is conflicted and oppressive to the point that it has partly crushed the life-loving aspects of the child’s nascent personality, eroding his capacity to sustain enduring relationships with other human beings.

-The third element that is necessary for suicide terrorism to become established as an outcome of the adolescent identity crisis is the presence of an organized faction under a leader willing to exploit terror to build power in society.

-Recent research by Merari concludes that the terrorist faction does not create the young person’s predisposition to die, but it creates the conditions that convert this predisposition into action.

-More generally, it would seem that a long-term, prerequisite for reducing the potential for recruitment of suicide terrorists is the easing of communal oppression in the societies from they may be recruited.

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Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: The terrorist is analyzed by examining the sociological factors that have led privileged members of the middle class to become involved in
terrorism. Sociological aspects of rapid social change are discussed in relation to the current wave of terrorism, which is traced to its roots in the 1960s. Both a psychological interpretation and one tracing its philosophical base to various forms of Marxism are considered. In addition, the attraction of women to the terrorist movements and the cooperation of a variety of terrorist groups on an international scale are examined. The article includes a prognosis of increases in terrorist attacks on United States targets both at home and abroad and in the possibility of seizure of nuclear material. The role of the FBI in countering these threats is presented.

-A psychological phenomenon has been observed when traditional values appear threatened by rapid social change; for some there is a hardening of established attitudes, a move to a reactionary posture. Thus there is a polarization of attitudes and a psychological blueprint for deviant, even violent, behavior. The psychology of the group involved in protest, demonstrations, and even rebellion can be traced by some to the humans being’s secret love of violence, which is often denied and which they tend to repress, but which becomes manifest in activities as diverse as lynching, boxing, and football. One form of mental illness that seems most applicable to the terrorist character is paranoia. However, middle-class idealistic students are most fascinated by Marxism, especially the words and thoughts of Trotsky, Lenin, and Lao Tse-tung, but by traditional communism, which they perceive as merely another form of bureaucratic repression. The left-wing terrorist movement has been marked by the inclusion of women, not only in traditional menial tasks, such as running the mimeograph machine, but in activist and leadership roles. Women have been included in combat assignments in nearly all of the various organizations. Among the women in clearly leadership positions in the left-wing terrorist milieu are the following: Bernadine Rae Dohrn of the Weather Underground; the recently deceased Ulrike Meinhof, and Gudrun Ensslin and Angela Luther of the West German Baader- Meinhof gang; and Fusako Shigenobu of the Japanese Red Army. All of these women have planned and led combat operations and have been the tacticians and intellectual theorists of their groups. There is a type of self-aggrandizement that appears to be endemic in the various terrorist movements, and it seemed to be particularly important to the disaffected young who involve themselves in terrorism.

115. Haynal, A., & Molnar, M. d. P. (1983). Fanaticism: A historical and psychoanalytical study. New York, NY: Schocken Books. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Chapter Three (Fanaticism and Civilization: The Psychoanalysis of Fanaticism) of this text is the main section that addresses issues of psychological relevance. The authors seek to use psychoanalysis as a method for investigation, not necessarily to find “an answer.” In essence, the authors view fanaticism as a megalomaniacal condition, rooted in “narcissistic pathology.” The main pathological manifestation is a sense of (superhuman) omnipotence. “He regresses to the stage of infantile omnipotence, which implies satisfaction of desires at the expense of reality, as perceived through knowledge and the limits of human possibilities.” They further explain that the “all or nothing” or “black and white” thinking of the fanatic (often a feature of paranoia) “engenders radicalization of thought, channeling aggression toward an enemy.” There is some further consideration of the role of civilization and numerous case studies, but overall this work is not oriented to the practical analyst.

116. Heskin, K. (1980). Northern Ireland: A psychological analysis. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The analytic lens applied in this book is “psychological” in a broad sense. It does not use clinical concepts and avoids any imputation of mental abnormality or psychopathology. Most of the pure psychological constructs used come from social psychology. They are applied here to examine the attitudes and perceptions that people in Northern and Southern Ireland (and that Irish Protestants and Irish Catholics) have of one another and to explore the social functions those attitudes serve. Heskin argues that although terrorists often commit horrible acts, the terrorists themselves (at least in the Northern Ireland context) are not necessarily horrible or psychopathic people. Rather the social forces that facilitate terrorism among cadres in that region are the same forces that operate generally in “conflict oriented groups.” The discussion of “conflict oriented groups” may be the greatest practical value from an operation perspective, but it is hardly sufficient by itself to form a basis for any intelligence estimate. Beyond this, Heskin presents a rich description of the evolution of the political unrest Northern Ireland using essentially a psychohistorical approach and analyzing the complex relationships between religion and politics as
it relates specifically to the region.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: This study examined political violence, focusing on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, particularly that of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The study argued that the parameters of such behavior are similar in some important respects for all conflict-oriented groups, whether national armed forces or paramilitary organizations. The motivation, personal characteristics, and proximate situational influence involved in the violence in Northern Ireland are considered. The analysis draws on concepts and research from social psychology and attempts to construct a tentative psychological framework to facilitate an understanding of political violence.
- The term political violence although sometimes used as if it were synonymous with terrorism, has a broader definition.
- Political violence (hereafter understood as unofficial) will be discussed under three headings: motivation, predisposing personality characteristics, and proximate situational determinants. The primary purpose of this study is to examine concepts and research, particularly within the convenes of psychology, that seem useful to an understanding of political violence.
- Motivation to Political Violence: Despite the attention that the topic of aggression has enjoyed in psychology, in recent years it has been left largely to political scientists and other nonpsychologists to use psychological theories of aggression in an attempt to understand the dynamics of political violence. Probably the most comprehensive psychological study is that of Gurr (1970). His central concept was relative deprivation, defined as a perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.
- The concept of relative deprivation, however, does not inherently contain the full explanation of the onset and development of political violence, even at a macrolevel of analysis.
- Eckstein (1965) drew a distinction between precipitants, those vents that actually start a conflict, and preconditions, those circumstances that make it possible for precipitants to bring about political violence.
- Motive moves us along the road to an understanding of political violence, tells us why it comes about at a general level, but does not address the question of how it happens, at least at a psychological level.
- Predisposing Personality Characteristics: After motivation, the next question that arises is that of predisposing personality characteristics. Explicitly, is there any evidence that those who join conflict-oriented groups are more capable of perpetrating the sort of behavior that intergroup conflict characteristically demands?
- In the case of terrorist groups, one particularly tenacious, if not tenable notion is that such groups have a high percentage of psychopaths among their members.
- The vulnerability of this lone of thought has been outlined in some detail elsewhere.
- The idea, however that conflict-oriented groups in general will attract certain types of individuals is not unreasonable.
- It would seem likely that conflict oriented groups should contain a higher percentage of authoritarian individuals.
- The authoritarian personality as described by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), seems ideally suited to military or paramilitary life, with an exaggerated respect for authority, strong hostility toward outgroups, reliance on convention, and an emphasis on the importance of force in human affairs.
- The evidence for authoritarianism among terrorist organizations is also slender.
- After all, authoritarianism is not an uncommon or pathological characteristic. Many people broadly share the motivation of terrorist organizations without resorting to atrocities behavior.
- Two areas of research in social psychology appear to offer assistance in an understanding of these proximate situational determinants: role theory (Shaw and Costanzo, 1982) and obedience research (Milgram, 1974).
- All conflict oriented groups have role requirements that involve callousness, brutality, and cruelty on demand.

The chapter will address itself mainly to a consideration of the psychology of republican paramilitary involvement.

- The chapter will concentrate on four key areas of the problem, namely the behavioral domain in question, possible personality characteristics predisposing the individual to this sort of behavior, sources of motivation towards paramilitary involvement in the Irish context and finally, proximate situational determinates of the behavior.

- What exactly is terrorism and what distinguishes it from other forms of violent behavior not called terrorism.

- In summary, therefore, the behavioral domain of terrorism involves atrocities behavior but it difficult to draw a rational psychological distinction between terrorist behavior and what appears to be ‘normal’ behavior in conflict situations.

- Personality characteristics: What sort of person becomes a terrorist? The typical train of thought here is that since terrorist are psychopathic, then they are predisposed to activities such as those which terrorism is involved and there activities afford them some form of outlet for their anti-social tendencies which would, in normal circumstances, result in their running foul of the law.

- On the basis of the evidence, it is argued that the single most likely personality characteristic predisposing an individual to paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland is authoritarianism, although one not arguing that all terrorist are authoritarian anymore than one would argue that no terrorist is a psychopath.

- Motivation: Why do people join terrorist groups? One potential source of motivation for paramilitary involvement in Northern Ireland lies in the high levels of unemployment, poor standard of housing, high prices and low incomes characteristic of the province in comparison to the areas of the United Kingdom.

- All of the evidence tends to suggest the diversity of backgrounds from which members of Republican terrorist groups come, and the importance of life-events in motivating young people to join these organizations. Clearly, it is perfectly possible in Northern Ireland for a young to have a good upbringing in a good family, with or without Republican traditions, to have normal interests and pursuits, to be hard-working and still to perceive, in the light of his experience, that paramilitary activity is the only solution to the problems.

- Proximate situational determinants: How can people commit terrorist acts?

- If the individual has a personality suited to the demands of a conflict oriented group, and if his background, for one reason or another, has provided a motivation to engage in paramilitary activity, there are still remains a formidable hurdle to cross to arrive at the sorts of behavior mentioned in the first section of this chapter. How can normal, everyday people cross this hurdle? The key to this puzzle, I believe, can be found in experimental social psychology.

- Research by Stanly Milgram (1974) in the United States has shown very clearly that ordinary individuals are quite capable of very cruel behavior in the right circumstances.

- They have also been replicated with similar results in other countries (Mantell, 1974; Kilham, and Mann, 1974; Shanab and Yahya, 1977).

- A revealing experiment by Zimbardo and his associates (1973) also gives us pause to reflect from a somewhat different angle.

- So how do people break the grip of those norms and the effects of years of social training inculcating such values as kindness and consideration for others? Milgram (1974) has suggested some interesting reason why his subjects behaved the way they did.

- First, Miligram proposes that the experimental situation and inherent binding factors such a politeness to the had experimenter, the obligation to fulfill a promise to participate and the awkwardness and embarrassment of withdrawal.

- Second, Milgram proposes that there were ‘adjustment factors’ which served to distance the subject from the effects of his behavior on his victim. Subjects became involved in the technical aspects of their task.

or class of phenomena, within a given environment over time. The topic of our discussion is the diffusion of transnational terrorism within the international system.

This chapter explores new analytical techniques for understanding how and why terrorism diffuses in the international system. We, infer on the basis of our research, that terrorism does, in fact diffuse. The acts which confront us are not random occurrences arising out of spontaneous generation. Our inference is bolstered with a discussion of adjacency maps which illustrate the spatial distribution of transnational terrorist incidents. We will also explore a new application of Markov chains to determine the stability of the international system, and find the equilibrium states of terrorist activity within certain geopolitical regions of the world.

Conceptually, diffusion describes or "explains" changes in the observed spatial distribution or location of a phenomenon over time.

We can identify four types of diffusion processes: relocation, expansion, contagion, and hierarchical. The first two deal with the pattern movement, while the latter two deal more directly with the mechanics of the diffusion process.

Contagious diffusion is the spread of phenomenon through direct interpersonal contact between diffusers and adopters.

Hierarchical diffusion, on the other hand, applies where distance is not the strongest influence on interaction. Hierarchical diffusion describes the spread of new innovations, or commands through a structured network.

Markov chains show the probable movement of a process between states. Markov chains consist of a set of undefined states, and a set of real numbers called transition probabilities.

The following observations can be made from the adjacency maps and the two sets of Markov chains: 1) The diffusion process is hierarchical between regions at first, and then becomes contagious within the regions, 2) the rate of contagion varies according to region, and according to the type of incident. 3) Incidents tend to diffuse more rapidly in Latin America. Western Europe tends to have the highest levels of activity. 4) Border contiguity appears to account for a large amount of diffusion. 5) Some regions seem immune to particular types of incidents. 6) Theoretically, the diffusion of any phenomenon within a finite population will reach a saturation point. 7) The highest level of activity, aggregated by region, moved over time from Latin America, to the Middle East, and then to Western Europe. 8) The Markov chains show that Western Europe is prone to high levels of activity over the long run. 8) The Markov chains also indicate a long-term tendency for the international system to absorb increasing numbers of transnational terrorist incidents.

Four hypotheses to account for the diffusion of transnational terrorism: 1) Spontaneous generation: This explanation posits that there is no connection between the various incidents or location of terrorist incidents. 2) Cooperation between groups (hierarchical expansion). 3) Actual transport (hierarchical relocation). 4) Influence and imitation (contagious expansion).

Summary: Bringing the concept of spatial diffusion to the study of terrorism generates the following hypotheses. First, it suggests that spontaneous generation is a random component of the diffusion process. Second, it suggest that terrorism diffuses throughout the international system by means of imitation, by direct interpersonal contact, and by the relocation or movement of individual terrorist to new locations.


but one process involved in the apparent diffusion of terrorism.
-Principal among these as they relate to terrorism are (1) intergroup cooperation—such as when terrorist meet with one another to exchange idea, intelligence, training, funds, and support—and (2) transport of terrorism from one location to another by terrorists who move to where their victims are weakest or where they can maximize the impact of an incident.
-Evidence suggests that transportation as well as contagion was active in the spread of terrorism from Latin America to Europe.


-Testing and Profiling Individual Targets- It may seem strange to think of administering psychological tests or otherwise developing useful psychological profiles on individual terrorists who are on the other side of a barricade or who, worse still, we haven’t even identified.
-Profiling Groups- Many of the same techniques that are used for classifying or profiling individuals can be used to profile and understand groups of people.
-It is also possible to work from written products of terrorist or other criminal or dissident groups. Terrorism is, after all, an act of political theater. No terrorist group can achieve its goals without communicating with the rest of the world. Those communications can be analyzed to tell us who the writers are as well as what the writers want.
-Selecting Members for the Counter-Terrorist Team- The successful SWAT member is a rugged, independent, self-reliant, and self-sufficient person: but he is now a loner. He is very responsive to the real world, he knows what’s going on, but he doesn’t get overwhelmed by it. Emotionally, the successful SWAT member is “cool” and detached.
-The Psychologist in Relation to the Counter-Terror Team- Should the psychologist be a member of the action team? - His primary role is support he should be an “on board” member of your management team.
-Selecting Psychologists who are Suited to the Task- I think it follows from what I’ve been saying, that you are looking for someone who can be a comfortable part of your team—both for the team and for him.
-In order to support you operationally, your candidate psychologist should have: a background in psychological assessment , a background in indirect assessment , a willingness to research the relevant areas of psychology, sociology, criminology, and related disciplines for background that he can bring to bear on your critical problems, a sense of values that will not be in conflict with the practical realities of police work, a willingness to accord you top priority in crisis situations , a sincere interest in police work.


-The aim of this chapter is to look critically at some of the assumptions made about terrorism by some writers on that subject, and to explore briefly several social factors that might protect society from this form of violence. The author focuses specifically on terrorism in South Africa from a community psychology perspective and ecological understanding of society. Civil violence and terrorism are examined historically and culturally. The prevailing manners of responding to terrorism in South Africa, the "denial" and "ingroup policing" strategies are examined.


-Discusses how much existing psychological theories can explain and control the behavior of terrorists. Classical aggression theories and traditional individual psychology have had little success. Better answers may be provided by a social theory of action in which acts of violence are interpreted as rational in the sense of being a means to an end. Important
progress in the analysis of terrorism, its causes and background, is expected from interdisciplinary research.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is a practical, well-informed account of the evolution of modern terrorism in its various manifestations. Hoffman offers his forecast (as of 1998) for future trends many of which have been realized. Despite having a chapter titled: “The Modern Terrorist Mindset” there is not much psychological or behavioral perspective here on terrorist behavior. Nevertheless, a good historical and “big picture” narrative of terrorism.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Hoffman determines the logic behind suicide terrorism. The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombing, and its strong attraction for the terrorist organizations behind it are universal. They are less complicated and compromising than other kind of terrorist operations. The suicide bombers have produced psychological effects that reach beyond the immediate victims of the attack.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Contrary to both popular belief and media depiction, most terrorism is neither crazed nor capricious. Terrorists use violence (or the threat of violence) because they believe that only through violence can their cause triumph and their long term political aims be attained.  
- Terrorism is also a means to communicate a message.  
- All terrorists groups seek targets that are lucrative from their point of view. As such, they employ tactics that are constant with their overriding political aims.  
- All terrorists have one other trait in common: they live in the future, that distant yet imperceptibly close point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their political destiny. For the religious groups, this future is divinely decreed and the terrorist themselves specifically anointed to achieve it.  
- David Rapoport, for example estimates that the life expectancy of at least 90% of terrorist organizations is less then 1 year and that nearly half of those that make it that far cease to exist within a decade.  
- In modern times ethno-nationalist terrorist groups typically have lasted the longest and have been most successful.  
- Success for ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations has rarely involved the actual realization of their stated long-term goals of either self-determination or nationhood.  
- The resiliency of these groups is doubtless a product of the relative ease with which that are able to draw sustenance and support from an already existent constituency  
- The ethno-nationalist's comparative success, however, may have as much to do with the clarity and tangibility of the envisioned future  
- The articulation of so concrete and comprehensible a goal is by far the most potent and persuasive rallying cry.  
- The inability to coherently, much less cogently, articulate their future plans possibly explains why the left-wings' terrorist campaigns have historically been the least effectual.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Although the conventional wisdom previously held that terrorists were more interested in publicity than in killing, recent terrorist attacks such as the 1995 nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway and the bombing of a federal government office building in Oklahoma City have either crossed into the domain of use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or involved the deliberate infliction of large numbers of casualties. This paper examines three reasons that may account for terrorism's increasing lethality: (1) the proliferation of religious terrorism, in which violence assumes a transcendental dimension; (2) the rise of "amateur" terrorists loosely organized groups of individuals with particular grievances who are able to gain WMD
expertise from publicly available sources; and (3) the growing sophistication and competence of professional terrorist organizations. A confluence of new motives, opportunities, and capabilities could impel any of these groups to employ a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon or radioactive device. Given even the possibility of future terrorist use of such weapons, no nation can afford to consider terrorism to be among its least serious or complex of security issues.

128. Holloway, H. C., & Norwood, A. (1997). Forensic psychiatric aspects of terrorism. R. G. Lande, & D. T. Armitage (Eds), Principles and practice of military forensic psychiatry (pp. 409-445). Springfield, IL: Charles, C. Thomas. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter is written to provide a broad introduction to the topic of terrorism for the military forensic psychiatrist. As such, it mostly summarizes what has been repeated by others and does not present any new data or theories.

129. Horgan, J. (2003). The case of first-hand research. A. Silke, & G. Ilardi (Eds), Researching terrorism: Trends, successes, failures. London: Frank Cass and Co. Call Number: Published Abstract: Social science efforts to systematically research terrorist behaviour have yet to convincingly demonstrate their greater potential. It is unfortunate that much academic research on terrorism, despite (or perhaps because of) its increasingly prescriptive nature, remains misinformed, skewed in nature but perhaps most significantly, unsupported by empirical enquiry. Reasons for this include a general reluctance to admit that our analyses (however plausible) remain limited in part by our perceptions both of the concept and phenomenon of terrorism, this in turn markedly influenced by our reluctance to engage in first hand research with people who are, or have been, involved in terrorist violence the very prospect still remains unpalatable to many. This Chapter modestly presents a variety of practical issues for consideration in the hope that it may ultimately help lead to an increased acceptance that field research on terrorist behaviour is not only viable, but represents a research tool which we need to seriously exploit and subject to comparative analysis (e.g. of individual researchers’ experiences to begin with). A case study of the author’s experiences in Ireland illustrates a variety of themes, but seek to assert that exciting data with subsequent extensive hypothesis testing and theory formation will become an inevitable implication of employing such methodologies. Given the perennial problems highlighted by scholars of political violence, the space to vocally develop such avenues deserves support and researchers should be encouraged to disclose their experiences of first-hand research.

130. Horgan, J. (2003). Leaving terrorism behind: An individual perspective. A. Silke (Ed), Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 109-130). London: John Wiley. Call Number: Published Abstract: It is no secret that most psychologically based commentary on terrorist behaviour has primarily focused on understanding why people become terrorists. Despite how relatively little progress we have made via a now sterile yet persistent debate about individual terrorist pathologies, it is at the expense of valuable opportunities being explored that this issue remains perceived as the forefront of ‘what psychologists have to say about terrorists’. Despite this, the issues surrounding how and why people leave terrorism behind are as fascinating and important as the more frequently asked questions about terrorist behaviour. Despite our apparent advances in understanding terrorism more generally, exceptionally little is known or understood about what happens to influence people to leave terrorism behind. This chapter represents a modest attempt both to shed light on what is such a rarely addressed area and to suggest a variety of issues that may contribute to a research agenda.

131. Horgan, J. (2003). The search for the terrorist personality. A. Silke (Ed), Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 3-27). London: John Wiley. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter addresses only the mostly academic issue of the ‘terrorist personality’, its uncomfortable presence in the literature, and its increasingly comfortable relationship with conventional wisdom and common sense neither of which are very useful in understanding the terrorist. By and large, however, there remains little to support the argument that terrorists can or should be necessarily regarded as psychopathic owing to the nature of the offences committed.
-Loyalty in the face of continuing hardship and unrelenting commitment to the greater ideological cause and movement are qualities that go hand in hand with being a member of an illegal, underground organization.

-A distinct body of research in support of the argument that the terrorist is psychologically dissimilar to non-terrorists. Some of this research is dated (a few considerably).
-In the context of a scientific study of behaviour (which implies at least a sense of rigour) such attempts to assert the presence of a terrorist personality, or profile, are pitiful.
-According to Tittmar (1992), we ought to consider the Frustration Aggression Hypothesis (FAH). Although Friedland (1992) finds this explanation ‘compelling’ (p.83), several limitations of the model do exist. Ferracuti (1982) criticized this psychological approach, as well as derivatives of the FAH, as potential explanations of terrorist and other political violence on the grounds that: “this moves the problem from the social universe to the idoverse, and motives and countermotives are superficially handled” (p.139).
-The adaptation of the FAH in understanding terrorism was, it seems, ‘..done by various authors with little apparent regard for modification that the transition from the individual to the group might necessitate’ (Friedland, 1992, p.85).
-The FAH and its derivatives (e.g. the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis initially proposed by Gurr (1970) (see also Birrell, 1972; Friedland, 1992 and Heskin, 1980, 1984)) must remain seriously limited analytical tools in the context of explaining terrorism, both on the individual and collective bases.
-Attempts to portray ‘narcissism’ as central to terrorist motivation (popular in political psychology) have been common since the original West German study that suggested it.
-Peralstein regards the theory of narcissism aggression as a worthy successor to the FAH, and cites references to narcissism as a supportive theme in explaining why people turn to terrorism.
-Konrad Kellen (1982) was one of the first to emphasize the applicability of psychodynamic theory, and in examining the case of former West German terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein.
-Others have incorporated one or more elements of psychodynamic theory within their research in other ways (e.g Kaplan, 1982; Lacqueur, 1977), some subtle, others not, but an attractive (and somewhat less contentious) focus for several researchers has been on “identification” or “Identity”, still rooted in psychodynamic theory (with less emphasis on stricter Freudians notions).
-In a helpful review, Silke (1998) argued that ‘most serious researchers in the field at least nominally agree with the position that terrorists are essentially normal individuals’ (p.53) (Emphasis added).
-First, one can identity evidence in support of the position that terrorist are not necessarily characterized by distinct personality traits.
-Gustav Morf (1970), in one of the very first studies to inform terrorist psychology, neither observed nor recorded distinct personality traits in his analysis of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada. Rasch (1979), a German psychiatrist, studies 11 male and female members of the Baader-Meinhof group, his conclusions revealing a complete absence of any indications of paranoia, psychopathy, fanaticism, or any other psychotic or neurotic illness in his subjects.
-Corrado (1981) could find no reliable systematic evidence in support of such claims, and the Italian Red Brigades were also unlikely candidates for psychological abnormality.
-In the Irish context psychiatrists Lyons and Harbinson found that in a study to compare 47 ‘political murderers’ with 59 ‘non-political murderers’, the politically motivated killers generally came from more stable backgrounds and the incidence of psychologically disturbance was much less than in the ‘ordinary criminals’.
-The rigour of research pointing to either explicit or implicit abnormality, or to the existence of a ‘terrorist personality’, is such that its propositions are built on unsteady, theoretical and conceptual foundations.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Highlights complexity of terrorism and how its manifestations and participants have changed over time. Suggests there are likely numerous pathways by which people enter, remain, or leave a terrorist organization.
-Seach for root causes seeks single explanation
Also wrong to think that eliminating terrorists grievence will eliminate terrorism
- Frames some questions of social and psychological factors in terrorism that could be investigated empirically

   Call Number: Dissertation Classified and Not Available

   Call Number: Editor's Annoation: Emphasis need to understand the development and manifestations of terrorism in context.
   - Reiterate that there is no single cause and that most terrorists do not result from psychopathology.
   - Encourages viewing religious ideology as a terrorist tool.
   - Suggests efforts to uncover a terrorist profile or personality are ill-conceived.
   - What we know of actual terrorism suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision to become a terrorist; most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure toward extreme behavior.
   - Factors influencing decisions to enter, assume a particular role or even to leave a terrorist organization may be distinct and unrelated to each other.

   - Becoming, Remaining, Leaving
   - Argues for the value of "talking to terrorists" in CT research and that there is value to studying groups even when not active.

   Key Quote Summary: A popular approach to terrorism by academia has been to attempt to profile terrorists, whether in a psychological sense or across socio-political dimensions, experience suggests it has little value in the case of terrorists.
   - Given the diversity of terrorist behavior and function, there can be little or no predictive utility in using personality traits to understand terrorists.
   - What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behavior.
   - A fundamental distinction can be made then in analysing the factors at work at the different stages of becoming remaining and leaving or terminating involvement.
   - It is a necessary step to listen to what terrorists have to say first hand.

   Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Abstract: The provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has long been regarded as one of the most highly organized and sophisticated terrorist groups the world has seen. The command and functional structure of this large, hierarchically-organized movement is outlined here. The adaptability of the PIRA is noteworthy as demonstrated through a major structural and functional reorganization accentuated by external pressures. While the threat of PIRA terrorism continues, recommendations are emphasized for understanding and encouraging analyses of the command and functional structures of an organization such as this.
   - The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has had the longest running paramilitary campaign the modern world has yet seen.
   - This largely ideological split saw the emergence of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), and the Official IRA. The Provisionals, or Provos, have since followed a much more violent campaign aligned with political struggle than their occasional counterparts.
   - The PIRA, allied with their political wing, Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), or Sinn Fein, are an overly nationalist movement seeking the removal of British rule from Northern Ireland.
   - The PIRA’s modus operandi has incorporated bombings, shootings, attacks, beatings, high-profile assassinations and kidnappings. The movement has been extensively involved in extortion and armed robberies, and has a sophisticated financial network not unlike that of any large business.
   - PIRA tactics have changed, indeed evolved, remarkably throughout its current almost 30-year long campaign. During the 1970s, the organization’s tactics often appeared quite indiscriminate, incurring many civilian casualties in its sometimes spectacular bombing attacks. The PIRA has become more discriminate in the wake of Sinn Fein’s elevation as an acceptable representative of the
Republican electorate and also with the development of a sophisticated organizational strategy which now belies almost all PIRA activities.

- **Command and Functional Structure** - The PIRA has a cellular-based, hierarchically-organized authoritarian structure ensuring both operational and non-operational efficiency. The active membership of the movement does not exceed a few hundred at any one time.
- **Non-operational members** have roles to play in hiding weapons and in moving weapons away from a scene.
- ‘Safehouses’ often offer refuge to a member who may be ‘on the run’ following an incident.
- Taylor draws our attention to Robert Clark’s study of the Basque ETA, an organization quite similar to the PIRA. He notes Clark’s illustrations of the complexity of ETA by reference to an organizational table bearing remarkable similarities with the functional organizational chart of a large business.
- **PIRA** - an organization having numerous roles to fill, as in any large business, each role having specific responsibilities while still allowing for accountability to ‘same-level’ peers or higher authorities.
- **General Army Convention** - More often than not, we regard the PIRA leadership as being what we know as the ‘Army Council’. However, the General Army Convention (GAC) is the organization’s ‘Supreme Army’ Authority. In actual practice the purpose of the GAC is simply to elect (by ballot) ‘Army Executive’ (a body of twelve members) who in turn elect the Army Council.
- The GAC is often mistakenly viewed as a distinct body, or unit, within the PIRA command structure, but it is important to note that it is not: it is simply an organized meeting of delegates.
- **Army Executive** - Next in line is termed the ‘Army Executive’. This is a board of 12 senior and very experienced PIRA veterans, said to meet ‘at least once every six months’.
- **Army Council and General Headquarters**
  - The PIRA’s Constitution describes the ‘Army Council’ as ‘…the Supreme Authority when the General Army Convention is not in session’. In practice however, the Army Council organizes and controls the strategy and tactics of the PIRA’s war efforts.
  - Once elected by the Army Executive, the seven Army Council members select a Secretary, Chairperson, and a Chief of Staff.
  - We must now distinguish the Army Council from Northern Command and Southern Command which in turn must be distinguished from GHQ.
  - ‘Northern Command’ refers to both a PIRA operational area and a definite command structure.
  - The relevance of Southern Command areas to Northern Command’s operational successes is debatable.
- A **General Headquarters staff** of usually 50-60 people is responsible for the overall maintenance and conduct of PIRA activities, as directed by Army Council policies. These are not ‘full-time workers’ in a traditional sense - General Headquarters is currently based in Dublin and it consists usually of 10 departments. Each department is then composed of ‘Director’, or ‘Officer’ and 4-5 staff members, or subordinate assistants.
  - **Department of Quartermaster and the Quartermaster General**
  - The Quartermaster General, an Army Council delegate, has as his main role control over the procurement, transportation and storage of PIRA armaments.
  - **Security Department and the Adjutant General**
  - Issues of internal security and discipline are the responsibility of the ‘Adjutant General’ (AG) and his staff. There is tentative evidence to support the notion that the PIRA does in fact make use of individuals of a particularly brutal nature for the conduct of punishment attacks (and beating in particular): in the words of a former PIRA gunman, to deliver a beating was described as a task for ‘someone else’ in that ‘I could never do that’.
  - The person in charge of this department is known as the Operations Commander, or Director of Operations. At the time of writing, sources indicate that he is responsible for overseeing all PIRA operations.
  - **Foreign Operations** - The head of this department (sometimes referred to as the ‘England Department’) is known as the Foreign Officer.
  - He is currently thought responsible for the co-ordination of primary and incidental operations in England (e.g. bombings and armed robberies) and remains in strong liaison with the Operations Commander in Dublin. The Foreign Officer is responsible for overseeing the recruitment of so-called ‘sleepers’
- Finance- PIRA (and some PSF) funding requirements are the responsibility of this department. The PIRA has been involved in extensive fund-raising activities, some of which demonstrate considerable sophistication. Sources of funding include armed robberies (not necessarily confined to Ireland, it must be noted) from banks, post offices, and building societies. Activities also include money-laundering, fraud, extortion and trade in counterfeit goods (e.g. video-tapes, CDs, brand-name jeans)- PIRA annual income is currently estimated as at least IR10 million.

- Training- This GHQ department is responsible for organizing adequate training of all PIRA recruits.- Training camps are thought to be located in remote areas, sometimes in isolated farmland (often donated for ‘use’ by sympathetic locals) or in mountainous areas. For new recruits, training may involve military drill and weapons training, physical exercise, engineering lessons (for those instructed in bomb-making) and even educational guidance.

- Engineering- The Engineering department occupies a key role in determining PIRA operational successes and co-ordinates research and development of all armaments.- Intelligence and Training and Continuing Education in Intelligence- Intelligence is vital to both the operational successes and organizational survival of the PIRA

- During Volunteer training, recruits are educated and informed of ways in which they are expected to both evaluate information and report it.- An example of how important the PIRA views the security of its organization is that a full assessment and ‘screening’ of all recruits or potential recruits is made.

- Education and Publicity- These two Departments sometimes involve considerable overlap.- The Publicity department has apparently emerged as one of ‘increasing importance’ to the PIRA through the evolution of PSF’s political activities.- The Active Service Unit (ASU) contains the PIRA’s Volunteers, that is the individuals who directly carry out military operations such as shootings or bombings.

- Overall, there generally appears to be two different ‘types’ of PIRA Volunteer.
- First, there is the part-time Volunteer. These include men and women who hold ‘regular’ work positions in their communities but who adopt operational membership.- Second, there are full-time Volunteers, who are fewer in number than the part-time members.
- These Volunteers do not have regular ‘ordinary’ jobs.
- they receive a weekly allowance from the organization.- There is no ‘profile’ of a Provisional IRA Volunteer and certainly, we must acknowledge that there is no meaningful psychological profile of Volunteers. Activists vary in age and background. Most are male. White and Falkenberg White noted the age for Volunteers as ranging from ‘roughly 15 to 40 or so years of age’, with some members in the 1970s being as young as 11, 14, and 15 (p.111). Generally, the youngest of today’s recruits are about 17-18 years old.- ASUs are generally trained and designed to specialize in specific tasks, e.g. robberies, shootings, bombings, internal security, intelligence-gathering on specific targets, etc.

- each ASU is composed of usually four Volunteers and one OC. This OC has at his/her disposal a group of staff including an IO (Intelligence Officer) and Education Officer (who turn up at training camps and gives lectures, advice and training in computer-interrogation). Each cell is currently believed responsible for arranging its own financing for various operational costs which it may incur.
- For operational purposes, the PIRA distinguishes between rural and urban ASUs.
- Communication between cells is confined where possible to the OC of each cell.- Security sources acknowledge and currently emphasize that to understand and appreciate the PIRA’s military successes (in the form of ASU-executed operations), we must understand the origins of the role and function of this command structure.
- Operational Consideration and Functional Efficiency- The present cellular structure was adopted as part of a major internal reorganization for the PIRA between 1976 and 1978
- In the time leading up to this reorganization, it had become obvious to the PIRA that to survive, the organization strongly needed to change.
- The structures as they stand today strongly mitigate against the damaging losses incurred through the informant procedures while also guarding against suffering heavy losses through infiltration.
- During operations, ASUs are required to operate away from the areas from which the Volunteers came.- Garda sources confirm to there being ‘no shortage of young, dedicated Volunteers to fill the ranks’ of the PIRA. This has been highlighted with recruitment which continued throughout the
recent 1994-96 cease-fire.- certain qualities are sought- dedication and commitment are attributes which potential recruits must appear to have as the following comments from 2 former ASU members ( the second now a Command figure) indicate: When you join the ‘Ra, you’re told straight up, you’ll either spend a long time in jail or you’ll die.

- If, Volunteers are plentiful and never in short supply, it may appear unusual that we do not observe a greater incident rate than we do- A number of factors explain why the PIRA are seen as to be restrained in this.

- First we note that attacks are not carried out unless there is a high probability of successes.- Second, we must note that the prevailing political and organizational climate controls the frequency and indeed type of operations which are conducted.

- ASUs continue to operate to some extent with a degree of autonomy.- The PIRA in this sense has become more decentralized- the leadership paradoxically having ‘less control over strategy and thus less power to prevent the civilian casualties that provoke public opprobrium and internal dissent.

- In theory, of course, the larger hierarchic group is more efficient, secure, organized and effective. This becomes clear when we examine decision-making processes in the context of group and organization structures and dynamics. The smaller groups have a much looser structure than the larger groups. This automatically accentuates leadership disputes. In a small group, decision-making cannot be encouraged if there are many different voices expressing conflicting views. As Post notes, the group is thereby less secure: it is too susceptible to the problems of group decision-making.


Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: This is an edited text arising from a series of lectures delivered at the University of California, Irvine during the 1989-90 academic year. Three or four chapters address topics of psychological interest. Those are: (Ch. 3) Middle Eastern Terrorism: Its Characteristics and Driving Forces by Khalid Duran; (Ch. 4) How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism by Martha Crenshaw; (Ch. 5) Becoming a Terrorist: Social and Individual Antecedents by Nehemia Friedland; and (Ch. 8) Law-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare in the Coming Decades by Bruce Hoffman. Chapters four and five each have their own annotation in this compendium. Duran’s contribution in chapter three presents a decent argument that terrorism is not unique to, nor inherent in Islam. It does not, however, provide new operationally relevant insights into Islamist ideology. Hoffman’s chapter gives his prognostications about the form that terrorism is likely to take in the future (written in 1990) drawing parallels, forecasting (accurately, as we now know) how terrorism is likely to manifest in the form of insurgency and guerrilla warfare. He does offer some general recommendations for counterterrorism policy, which although strategic, are not particularly psychological.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Despite its title, this chapter does not focus on psychoanalytic explanations for terrorism. Surprisingly, the author, who previously has written on the topic from a psychoanalytic perspective, now offers a much more biological view focusing specifically on the roles of epinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins on human behavior. The discussion does not emphasize anything unique about terrorism and the arguments reach beyond what was then (or is now) known about psychological bases of behavior. No scientific or heuristic significance for operational personnel.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This early work by psychiatrist David Hubbard attempts to apply a psychoanalytic understanding to illuminate the psyche of the skyjacker. In fairness, this is one of the first psychological explorations of terrorist behavior; it was written during a time when psychoanalytic theory was more dominant in the psychiatric community; it does include some systematic analysis from small samples (albeit limited); and he leads with the following disclaimer: “It must be made clear that the conclusions I have drawn are speculative and intuitive…” The seeds of his theory lies in the observation that the skyjacker simultaneously defies two key realities. “Flight is the defiance of physical gravity, murder/suicide the defiance of emotional gravity. In the process, he sets himself against the total environment (reality) at the risk of death.” Hubbard believes murder, rape and suicide have common even interchangeable elements. He highlights commonalities in the parenting of skyjackers from case studies (violent father and religious mother); explores unconscious sexual elements to their behavior; and draws inferences about a sense of failure arising from their inability to identify with or defeat their violent father figures. These hypotheses have little or no value to current operational professionals.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the types of individuals and groups that are prone to terrorism in an effort to help improve U.S. counterterrorist methods and policies. The emergence of amorphous and largely unknown terrorist individuals and groups operating independently (freelancers) and the new recruitment patterns of some groups, such as recruiting suicide commandos, female and child terrorists, and scientists capable of developing weapons of mass destruction, provide a measure of urgency to increasing our understanding of the psychological and sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals. The approach used in this study is twofold. First, the study examines the relevant literature and assesses the current knowledge of the subject. Second, the study seeks to develop psychological and sociological profiles of foreign terrorist individuals and selected groups to use as case studies in assessing trends, motivations, likely behavior, and actions that might deter such behavior, as well as reveal vulnerabilities that would aid in combating terrorist groups and individuals. Because this survey is concerned not only with assessing the extensive literature on sociopsychological aspects of terrorism but also providing case studies of about a dozen terrorist groups, it is limited by time constraints and data availability in the amount of attention that it can give to the individual groups, let alone individual leaders or other members. Thus, analysis of the groups and leaders will necessarily be incomplete. A longer study, for example, would allow for the collection and study of the literature produced by each group in the form of autobiographies of former members, group communiqués and manifestos, news media interviews, and other resources. Much information about the terrorist mindset (see Glossary) and decision-making process can be gleaned from such sources. Moreover, there is a language barrier to an examination of the untranslated literature of most of the groups included as case studies herein. Terrorism databases that profile groups and leaders quickly become outdated, and this report is no exception to that rule. In order to remain current, a terrorism database ideally should be updated periodically. New groups or terrorist leaders may suddenly emerge, and if an established group perpetrates a major terrorist incident, new information on the group is likely to
be reported in news media. Even if a group appears to be quiescent, new information may become available about the group from scholarly publications. There are many variations in the transliteration for both Arabic and Persian. The academic versions tend to be more complex than the popular forms used in the news media and by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Thus, the latter usages are used in this study. For example, although Osama bin Ladin the proper transliteration, the more commonly used Osama bin Laden is used in this study.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary The problem of the limits of the permissible is the central issue to be faced in any discussion of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, in terror and counter-terror, revolution and counter-revolution. Some people present it as the problem of the means and the ends.

-Trotsky's unfinished biography of Lenin.
-Nowhere in the history of revolutionary movements were the problems of morality so relevant and binding as they were in the "People's Will" party, the "Narodnaya Volya" and its descendent, "The Social Revolutionaries."
-Such then, were the characteristics of the terrorist nerve center: moral questioning, an unwilling acceptance of violence, organization, and discipline that sprang from absolute necessity alone, and a constant probing of the question as to the boundaries of what was permitted.
-Three minimum conditions were laid down for the cessation of terrorism: full freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, and organization.
-For the underground fighter, the trial serves as a stage upon which to justify his actions, to engage open public confrontation.
-He who embarks on terrorism, like he who clings to power, knows where he beings but never knows how or where to finish. The terrorists dream of a final, redemptive blow, the dream of both totalitarian and individual terror is a false dream.
-Terror flourishes in a step-by-step struggle, whether it is embarked upon as a stage in some overall, long term strategy, or perceived from the outset as a sole and total weapon.
-A further lesson that emerges from the study of terror movements is the rise and fall of such movements in a wavelike curve.
-Revolutionary terror paves the way for a terror far more powerful: the counter-terror of the totalitarian state.
-Yet another lesson to be learned from the history of individual terror is the decisive role played by society in its prevention and eradication. Society must live up to its responsibilities even when this involves abandoning its tranquil ways and its illusions of safety.
-This means and their realization must be determined by humble and critical attitudes toward the aims. Aims cannot justify all means. We must not abandon the balancing of means against ends, but this balancing must be free of religious fanaticism and rigid dogmatism. Only thus will we prevent moral degeneration and universal horror. Even though war and violence cannot be entirely eliminated, it is still possible to reduce them and restrain them. The real danger lies in abstract goals, in impatient messianism, for they are responsible for peoples, races, and classes becoming the targets for extermination; their roots, the soil on which they grow, exist as much in the world of the spirit as in the instincts of men.


Call Number: Translation not Available


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The article looks at Red Brigades (BR) recruitment in the early 1970s via the infiltration and ‘lubrication’ of far left groups based in the factories of Northern Italy. The author describes the passage from extremism to terrorism and the criteria imposed by the BR for entry. Initial imitation of the Latin American guerilla model was gradually replaced by a series of
organizational and disciplinary structures based on first-hand experience. The strict regulations laid down by the BR were generally adhered to and were a vital factor for survival, although the weakest link was in personal relations. The restrictions of clandestinely created personal and political crises which deepened after 1978, when the battle between state and terrorists intensified. The greater commitment required of members made dissent and exit corresponding more traumatic. In the end, attempts to preserve unity by increasing discipline proved to be counterproductive.

In order to survive as an effective attacking force, a terrorist organization needs to develop a series of procedural and disciplinary control intended to filter out irresponsible or insufficiently committed members, to prevent infiltration and most importantly, to ensure that damage done to the group by the arrest of one or more members will be kept to a minimum.

The passage from the extremism of CUB and the Gruppi di Studio into active armed struggle came about through a series of stages.

With the progression came the gradual move into illegality. A sympathizer would be given the task of distributing BR propaganda documents around his factory department, or store material money or even weapons in his home. Later he might be asked to spray graffiti on the factory walls, leave intimidatory messages in offices or at homes of factory management. These were known as ‘individual illegal actions’. Naturally not all those who began in the Gruppi di Studio or CUB went some or even any of the way down the line into the BR; for those who did the process would take place over a period of weeks and months, such that the entry into illegality was carefully planned and monitored through a series of tests as to the candidate’s suitability. Entry was not determined by factors such as ideological proficiency in Marxist-Leninist texts or excellence in shooting but first and foremost by commitment to the cause of proletarian revolution.

Another test of commitment as the militant coped with the unaccustomed demands and strain of concealing not only from fellow workers but also from friends and family the intensification of political commitment.

Until 1975 there were no formal written rules drawn up by the Red Brigades, although they quickly learned from experience.

The BR structure is best understood as a pyramid, whose apex or ultimate authority was represented by the Executive Committee of four, responsible amongst other things for sustaining relations with non-Italian revolutionary organizations. In addition to the cells and brigades which comprised the columns, formed in specific cities or areas, the organization maintained a number of fronts whose overall function was to co-ordinate political management on a national level. The organizational rules allowed only a limited autonomy to each column.

Arrests and infiltration in 1974 forced the BR to develop a series of procedural and behavioural rules covering all aspects of clandestine living.

Both bases and cars were assets of the organization, and thus, only ‘in the custody of’ the members concerned.

The fact that the BR did have such strict codes of conduct for every sphere of their activities was a major factor in their survival. The rules regarding the security of bases and of appointment keeping were strictly adhered to, as were those of personal behaviour and general comportment. The area in which the BR were most strict was in that of finance every three months the Executive Committee met to examine all the costs and expenditures, submitted by each of the columns from which full accountability was expected.

The first few months of living in clandestinely was a critical time for Red Brigades members, and almost inevitably produced two ‘crisis’ one at three months and the other at six. These usually emerged in the form of political dissatisfaction, but were in reality expressions of personal insecurity and uncertainty.

Paradoxically, many of the aspects of the Red Brigades which most appealed to prospective members the tight structure, discipline and the concept of the ‘military vanguard’ were often the factors which caused dissent and eventual exit from the group. During the first half of the 1970s, the rules for dissenting members of the organization who wanted to leave were fairly simple: irregular members posed relatively little threat since they did not know the names of the regulars or the whereabouts of any of the organization’s bases; if on the other hand the dissenter was a clandestine member and had information which could seriously imperil the rest of the groups he would be accompanied abroad, usually Switzerland, by a BR member, given two months salary and entrusted to sympathizers for a month or two whilst all the bases known to him were dismantled. He was then
reaccompanied back to Italy where he could no longer pose a threat, and could return to legal living. -Having reached active membership of the BR in the late 1970s, if anyone did draw back it was exceptional, and thus traumatic for the dissenter and for the group as a whole. Strenuous efforts, including direct threats, were used to prevent exit. -After Moro’s murder Morucci and Faranda became more openly hostile to the strategy of the BR, frequently holding up meetings with obstructive arguments and criticisms. -In 1980 and 1981, as the state equipped itself with new laws and more efficient means to fight terrorism, the Rome, Naples, Veneto and Milan columns squabbled amongst themselves as each tried its own formula for survival. They began to kidnap and kill in desperation and form rivalry. -The spasmodic outbursts of terrorist violence since the BR’s ‘strategic withdrawal’ of 1983 have shown a desire by the latest generation to restore a sense of social conscience to the armed struggle. -In one sense the collective identity of any group of prisoners is by definition ‘survivalist’, yet that of the Red Brigades has evolved through three phases ‘social’, ‘existential’ and survivalist’ both inside and outside prison.

143. Jamieson, A. (1989). The heart attacked: Terrorism and conflict in the Italian state. London: Marian Boyers. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Provides a detailed account of the events surrounding the 1978 armed kidnapping of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades. It illustrates nicely the socio-political context and reasoning of left wing revolutionary extremist groups of the era. Perhaps of greatest interest from a psychological/behavioral perspective is the transcript of the author’s interview with Adriana Faranda, an imprisoned Red Brigade operative. She has come to see the error of her choices, but still recalls her mindset at the point she made some critical decisions within and about the group. That piece is worth reading but still may not parallel the contemporary experience of many terrorists.

144. Jamieson, A. (1990b). Identity and morality in the Red Brigades. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2(4), 508-520. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: The article provides a brief background to the activities of the Italian Red Brigades. Then examines the groups development in terms of three phases, social, existential and survivalists. A perceived social and political identity in the early 1970s gave the organization an illusory security and the self-confidence to step up the attack on the state. As the level of violence increased the BR became separated from their social base and created an auto-identity based on self-delusion and political alienation. Armed struggle was simplified to existential abstractions of myth and symbol. By the early 1980s the effects of legal and police repression, popular rejection and internal conflict reduced the remaining militants to a strategy of simple survival. The irreversible degeneration of the group’s morality accompanied the process of social estrangement. -It is the purpose of this study to examine the development of the Red Brigades in terms of the organizations moral identity and to demonstrate how the gradual degeneration form rigid principles to survival pragmatism has led to the collapse of group identity and the virtual destruction of the organization -The Italian Red Brigades were formed in 1970 in Milan with the fusion of a group of former young communist party members from Reggio Emilia (expelled from the parent party for their extremist views) with a Milan-based group whose members were employed in factories. -I. 1970-1974 The Social Period The Red Brigades began 1970 with a not inconsiderable moral baggage: They felt themselves to be torch bearers of the partisan revolutionary tradition, champions of a working class abandoned by the PCI to the mercies of rampant capitalism, and the front line of defense against an enemy which was both fascist and institutional. -II. 1975-1979: The Existential Period The degree to which as terrorist identifies himself with the ideology of the group is commensurate with the sacrifices and risk he is prepared to make on its behalf, up to and including his life. -III. 1980 Onwards: The Survivalist Phase In 1980 and 1981 as the state equipped itself with new laws and more efficient means to fight terrorism the Rome, Naples, Veneto and Milan columns squabbles amongst themselves as each tried
its own formula for survival. They begin to kidnap and kill in desperation and form rivalry. As long as a terrorist remains within the protective identity of the group in which he belongs and has faith he has the moral courage to withstand the hardships of clandestinely or prison. As long as he feels his actions are group actions, performed on the basis of collective decision, he can avoid the sensation of personal responsibility. But if the group identity falls away he is forced to assume his individually see himself as a murderer, and is left alone with his guilt. The immediate reaction of many of the BR prisoners was to see suivice as a realistic and even attractive way out.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: It has long been known that when people are exposed to external danger they show a remarkable increase in group solidarity. That is, they manifest increased motivation to retain affiliation with a face-to-face group and to avoid actions that deviate from its norms.

-Most of the hypotheses to be presented are based on psychoanalytic theory and make use of concepts derived from clinical psychoanalytic observations.

-According to Freud’s theory of group behavior, much of the motivation for group solidarity comes from the strong emotional bonds established between each member and the leader.

-In addition to the foregoing dependency phenomenon induced by reality threats, the propensity to develop affectionate ties with an authority figure and with comrades is probably augmented whenever a group is socially isolated.

-Perhaps the most essential feature of transference from the standpoint of group dynamics is the tendency to overestimate the power of the surrogate person, which heightens sensitivity to his expressions of approval and disapproval.

-Next we shall consider additional needs for reassurance that are directly stimulated by external danger and that are satisfied through interaction with fellow members of the primary group.

-The damage to a man’s self-esteem is minimized by the opportunity to perceive that other men are equally frightened.

-An opportunity for mutual self-revelations with relatively little danger of being censured or humiliated.

-When a man airs his private fears and grievances he will sometimes elicit comments from others which have a corrective effect on his appraisals of the external dangers.

-Comments about mourning reactions suggest that the blood price paid by units in active combat may contribute a powerful unconscious source of motivation to group conformity.

-This pathogenic development seems to involve a regressive process that could be considered as a form of reactive narcissism.

-First, the loss of comrades through injury and death may be unconsciously equated to being abandoned by them at a time when they sorely needed.

-Secondly, the longer the duration of suffering and deprivation, the greater the likelihood that the leader and other members of the group will be unconsciously perceived as failing to use that power to terminate the suffering.

-We know that the members of a highly cohesive group sometimes support each other in ignoring authoritative demands from outside the group and participate in delinquent actions without experiencing the intense feelings of social anxiety and guilt that would obviously develop if each man were alone. Redl and Wineman have specified the following factors as necessary conditions for the “contagious effect” of delinquent or countermores behavior in a peer group: (a) an initiator must openly “act out” in such a way, that he obviously gratifies an impulse that the rest of the members have been inhibiting; (b) the initiator must display a lack of anxiety or guilt; (c) the other members who perceive that initiator’s actions must have been undergoing for some time a intense conflict with respect to performing the forbidden act

-Thus, according to Redl and Wineman it is the sudden perception of fearless and guiltless enjoyment of what they have been longing to do that sways the members of a group to become psychologically infected by a delinquency carrier.

-I shall now attempt to draw some inferences concerning the conditions under which the member of a local group will mutually support each other in repeatedly violating the organization’s norms.

-The following four conditions seem to be the most obvious antecedents of persistently deviant
behavior on the part of a local unit: (a) most men in the unit have specific grievances against the subordinate organization, and feel resentful toward the top leadership for neglecting their needs, for inflicting unnecessary deprivations or for imposing extraordinary harsh demands which menace their personal welfare; (b) the members perceive their group as having no channel open for communicating their grievances to the top levels of the hierarchy or are convinced that such communications would be wholly ineffective in inducing any favorable changes; (c) the organization is perceived as having little or no opportunity for detecting the deviant behavior in question; and (d) one or more central persons in the local unit communicates disaffiliative sentiments to the others and sets an example contrary to the organization’s norms or by failing to use his power to prevent someone else in the same group from doing so.

146. Johns, M., & Silverman, B. G. How Emotion and Personality Effect the Utility of Alternative Decisions: A Terrorist Target Selection Case Study. 10th Conference on Computer generated forces and behavioral representation, SISO. Call Number: Published Abstract: The role of emotion modeling in the development of computerized agents has long been unclear. This is partially due to instability in the philosophical issues of the problem as psychologists struggle to build models for their own purposes, and partially due to the often-wide gap between these theories and that, which can be implemented by an agent author. This paper describes an effort to use emotion models in part as a deep model of utility for use in decision theoretic agents. This allows for the creation of simulated forces capable of balancing a great deal of competing goals, and in doing so they behave, for better or for worse, in a more realistic manner.

147. Johnson, P. W., & Feldman, T. B. (1992). Personality types and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives. Forensic Reports, 5(4), 293-303. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The authors applies Kohut's theory of "self psychology" to explain the attraction and influence of terrorist groups "the self may be understood as the seat of an individuals identity, aspirations, and ideals. Its development arises from early interactions of the child with significant figures in the environment. If this occurs in a supportive/empathetic environment the child is able to incorporate elements of others to form a unique and coherent sense of self. If not the self is "fragmented" and relies excessively on others to maintain itself. Fragmentation also causes anxiety "membership in a terrorist group provides a sense of identity or belonging for those personalities whose underlying sense of identity is flawed. For the person who is damaged it is better to have a relationship/attachment/acceptance that is pathological than to experience the emptiness of having none at all. The specific attachment of a terrorist group (as opposed to another kind) is that (1) they appear to be very close knit (2) they offer a strong coherent set of beliefs and (3) they offer glamour, excitement, and danger. While this broadly falls into the category of psychoanalytic speculations, it does provide a more coherent framework, linking individual and group factors. Among the dynamic formulations, it has reasonable heuristic value

148. Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Jurgensmeyer embarks on a sociological exploration in search of the roots and meaning of religiously-motivated violence. He argues that “cultures of violence” emerge within religious traditions, and that religious doctrine is used as a lens through which those cultures construe events and come to view violence as justifiable or even necessary. He specifically examines such cultures as they have developed within Christianity (particularly Christian Identity and Dominion/Reconstruction Theology); Judaism; Islam; Sikhism; and Buddhism (the case of Aum Shinrikyo). His research has involved personal interviews with leaders and actors involved in acts of terrorism ostensibly driven by religious motive. Among his central arguments is that terrorism is not solely a tactic borne of political motivation; but rather that persons of deep religious conviction may engage in violence without either political interest or justification. The alternative “frames” he poses for the “logic of religious violence” include: Theatre (using violence to stage an event whose meaning is more symbolic than instrumental, in order to deliver a particular religious message) and Cosmic War (viewing their role in religion as part of a greater struggle between good and evil, using war as a metaphor to frame and justify their violent acts). He argues that demonizing the enemy
(non believers) facilitates violence, and that adopting the role of religious or holy warrior gives one (particularly one without direction or opportunities) a sense of power and meaning that reinforces their militant actions. His analysis is thoughtful and theologically well-informed; however, elements of today’s religious terrorism (and ideological terrorist movements) it seems could be persuasively argued to deviate substantially from Jurgensmeyer’s prototypes.


acts of terror, and the childhood circumstances of the terrorist.

- The purpose of this essay is to examine how the big figures, men like Osama bin Laden, are themselves shaped and in turn shape others.
- For terrorism to succeed it demands firstly a rigid adherence to a simple idea. The mind that questions, debates opens itself to challenging ideas, will prove a source of division for a terrorist movement in the heat of battle.
- Sticking to a rigid orthodoxy offers security and justification to people committing acts of terror.
- To service terrorism needs a constituency of psychological approval.
- It is too much to speculate that at least part of his hatred of modernity is a hatred of his own background and upbringing, in a very real sense a hatred of part of himself?
- Most of the people who demonize American and Western values will not become terrorist supporters, but a crucial minority will take further steps, out of community of acceptance and into that of involvement. They may become active terrorists, they could end up providing funding and safe houses, or they will provide a vocal moral constituency that enables the likes of bin Laden to claim (however erroneously) to be acting for the oppressed of the Islamic world.
- So it would be wrong to interpret the case of Al-Qaida as an isolated psychological phenomenon. What differs is the scale of their atrocity and the use of violence as a 'hold' end in itself. Michael Ignatieff has called the 'apocalyptic nihilism' of men with no political programme, only a desire for the destruction of their enemies in a war blessed by God.
- bin Laden teaches that the mind of the new 'super terrorist' must be immune to pity and need not be concerned with political compromise or worries about talking human life.
- No leader since Adolf Hitler has been so powerfully able to extend the reach of terror or to seduce so many with his' beautiful' words and simple promises as bin Laden.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This examines a variety of aspects of terrorists and terrorism. It attempts to define the terrorists and to gauge their motivations; it examines their socio-economic backgrounds and their driving ideologies; it probes into elements that may aid the cohesion of terrorist groups, as well as elements that drive toward disintegration.

- The purpose of the inquiry is not simply to sum up certain things that have been learned about terrorists and terrorism, but also to investigate what aspects of the problem have been studied in various parts of the world; what methods have been used, who has performed the studies; and what conclusions have been reached. The note aims to show Rand's efforts in the domain of terrorism research are to some extent geared to the efforts of others who are attempting to refine and further develop methodologies for studying this subject.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter draws on existing biographical and autobiographical narratives of terrorist from the 1970's five in particular: Michael Braumann; Hans Joachm Kelin; Zuenko Busic; Kozo Okamoto; and Horst Mahler. His general conclusion are as follows:

- Reasons for joining- two decisions (1) to break with the bourgeois society and (2) to join a terrorist group. Disillusionment with daily life (humdrum) or with police was a factor for some for rejecting society. Special skills (e.g. weapons fascination) was a factor for others for joining a terrorist group.
- Satisfactions with terrorist life: some like the lifestyle others enjoy the "cause" some like both (i.e., action or money). Tendency to be somewhat xenophile. "Hypersensitive to sufferings and mistakes of the world at large, but totally insensitive to the immediate, palpable suffering around him, especially if he has produced it himself." No real consistency in perceived happiness or sense of self.
- Reasons for quitting: "of the five terrorist examined here, one quit because the job had run its course ,one quit because disagreed on the use of violence and fell into disgrace over it; and three are in prison. Of those in prison one indicated that his views on violence had changed and he would no longer be a terrorist if freed.
- Leadership: Individual actions have leaders, the group may or may not. Operational planning and target selection appeared haphazard defectors were to be killed many do not appreciate the gravity and irreversibility of their decisions when they first join the group. Periods of inactivity to
disagreements and disharmony. There are many different types of terrorists.

-Vulnerabilities:
1. Most terrorists, according to statements cited in this paper, join a group without fully considering how fateful a step they are really taking. As Klein put it: "There is no exit except via the cemetery." New joiners, says Klein disregard this in their eagerness to join but when the trap door has closed, anxiety sets in, particularly when disillusionment of one kind or another is experienced.
2. Because they impose such an extreme penalty for defection, terrorists cannot trust one another. Klein reports that for purely practical reasons it took his a long time to defect. In other words, he was a hostile element in their midst.
3. The tensions to which a terrorist is exposed in a group are many are extremely severe. "Actions" are exciting, but they are few and far between. The intervening long periods of inactivity, when group members are cooped up somewhere underground, lead to great tensions and violent quarrels.
4. There are big differences of opinion among terrorists on almost all subjects - tactical; ethical; the use of force; strategy and tactics; the proper assessment of past actions; and so on.
5. Leadership, discipline, and planning and execution of actions are often quite lax.
6. Terrorists do not know what to do about declining readiness on the part of the governments to be intimidated by abductions, such Schleyer's, or to give in to barricade and hostage situations, as in the case of Germany's Stockholm embassy.
7. Terrorists are sensitive to the perceived loss of sympathizers at least in Germany and to a general decline in public attention.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: In this paper the role of ideological thinking in shaping the mind-set and motivations of terrorists is examined. How do terrorist protect themselves emotionally from the consequences of gratuitous, indiscriminate violence? How do ideologies help to mold the conceptual and cognitive processes that give sense to terrorist models of the world? This paper explores these psychosocial processes and seeks to show that participation in terrorism involves a complicated interplay among rational, logical calculations and psychological impulses. It also describes some of the cognitive processes that go into the construction of terrorist social models. The paper concludes with some observations on how social research can inform conflict resolution processes by offering informational resources that may provide alternatives to terrorist-inspired solutions.

-Nothing is ever done in this world unless men are prepared to kill for it. Roberspierre 18 Fructidor, Year II -The Role of Ideology: Ideologically inspired political programs drive contemporary movements that have been labeled “terrorist”. Their doctrines, principles, concepts, and ideas serve psychological functions in much the same way that religious ideas organize believers socially and culturally by affording emotional relief and gratifications.
-Ideologies would appear to be basic foundational elements in cultivating the motivational structure and “mind-set” of the believer. Adherent, through immersion in the ideational system, the individual goes through an epistemological transformation and a cognitive re-ordering of his or her world-view. An ideology is a “world-making” apparatus that lays out the parameters of reality.
-The importance of ideology resides in its power to communicate, ideals, evaluations, and goals among members of groups.
-Psychologically one might say that the significance of ideology in mobilization is not that it causes one to do anything or provoke one into a particular course of action but that it gives one cause for doing.
-Ideologies are concerned with things to come.
-How the future is conceived will be greatly influenced by how the present and the past are understood (Habermas 1985).
-The biographies of revolutionary heroes in the twentieth century reflect two main themes: their pivotal role interpreting the collapse of social systems driven by corruption, massive inequities, crime and disorder; and the detailed analyses of the state’s betrayal of the people.
-According to Bandura: The conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants is not achieved by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather it is
accomplished by cognitive restructuring the moral values of killing, so that the killing can be done free from self-censuring restraints (1990, 165).

- The question becomes why is it that some individuals, but not others similarly situated, formed in part by their experiences within social institutions that condemn it, nonetheless disobey many of the important rules of those institutions and do so even when society has made it clear that will punish that disobedience? At this juncture psychological theories may be useful.

- Over the past decade, many social scientists began to explore economic theories of rational choice in attempts to explain criminal and deviant activity.

In this Freedman observes that: A psychological profile of a model terrorist cannot be drawn. The contexts and circumstances within which terrorism, both and ecclesiastical, has been carried out are diverse in chronology, geographically motive (1979, 390). There is also information from the terrorists themselves: though it must be read and self serving. These accounts, coupled with scholarly studies, make it possible describe not a terrorist personality as such but rather a terrorist sensibility modality of interrelated feelings and beliefs common to diverse person. What figures most prominently in this psychological orientation is what…thought was a haunting sense of vengeance and despair.

- Doubtlessly, there are individual psychological benefits derived from participation in terrorism. Crenshaw (1990; 1986) points out that analysts have examined a range of possible incentives from the thrills of high risk and excitement to the intoxicating sense of power the individual participant experiences. There are also the socially induced needs of identity, belonging and approval that a close-knit, conspirational organization promotes that may play a vital role in luring some into terrorist groups.

- We now turn to techniques of emotional concealment that enable the violent to rid themselves of the terrorist taint.

Rhetorical Discourse: Abstractions help to put psychic distance between policy and pain. Revolutionaries rely on the engaging language of liberation in an effort to lift their violent tactics above moral and legal scrutiny.

- Doubling: It would be rare to find anyone disagreeing with the proposition that the bloody side of terrorism is repellant to our moral sensibilities. Most of us need to maintain our illusions of decency intact and we do so by putting distance between ourselves and systematic violence that may be carried out in our name.

Lifton (1986) relies on the concept of “Doubling,” a Jekyll and Hyde notion, is a self willed splitting of the personality: a case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing: that allows one part of the self to participate in unspeakable acts while the other appears to retain its compassion and humanity.

- Fundamentalism and Emmification: Most terrorist subscribe one way or another to “revealed truth”. The rhetoric of demonization that denudes the adversary of humanity releases the terrorist from socially instilled inhibitions; it is as if a hunting license were issued or a death sentence imposed. Total War: A total war mentality would seem to be a key ingredient in the terrorist mind-set. In war, total war, where the entire society is mobilized, almost anything is allowed from atrocities on the collective level to individual acts of cruelty.

- Conceptual and Cognitive Processes: The choice of particular linguistic terms, the embrace of doctrines and ideologies asserting political and social truths, the emotional division of the psyche, and the resort to melodramatic actions constitute some of the psychological strategies that mold the terrorist for action.

A. Composition and Decomposition: Much, by no means all, terrorist “world making” consists of taking apart and putting together, often conjointly, elements of the social and political system.

B. Weighing: Terrorists live in the same social world as everyone else, it is just that their perspective focuses on elements and entities they believe to be more pertinent to their projects than others.

C. Deletion and Supplementation: That we find what we are prepared to find, and that we are likely to be blind to what neither helps nor hinders our pursuits, are commonplaces of everyday life and amply attested to in the psychological laboratory. In analogical ways, terrorists may choose to dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be lifted into the architecture of the social world they wish to create.

D. Deformations: Finally, the examination of terrorist rhetoric suggests that they readily attempt reshaping and deformations of those aspects of reality they wish to change: the class system, ethnic
autonomy, colonial liberation, racial equality, and so on.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This essay explores the intellectual artifacts and mechanisms that enable terrorists to do what they do—kill indiscriminately in the name of political, social or cultural causes.

-While it is widely recognized that there are no neat explanations of terrorism, that has not deterred research that seeks to discover underlying causes in the make-up of the terrorist personality.

-Without presuming too much, it is fair to say that a psychologist begins with an individual whose characteristic way of behaving is formed out of a complex interaction between emotional and neurological materials and social experiences.

-In his comprehensive review of terrorism (Laqueur 1987), notes that the analyses of motivations are as numerous and diverse as are the definitions and myriad forms of the phenomenon.

-Freedman observes that: “A psychological profile of a model terrorist cannot be drawn. The personalities are disparate.”

-We now turn to techniques of emotional concealment that enable the violent to rid themselves of the terrorist taint.

-To engage openly in indiscriminate violence, the individual must “morally disengage.”

-In this regard, Bandura’s model of the socio-psychological process is instructive.

-The “conversion process” of the socialized into dedicated revolutionaries is not only achieved by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or even moral standards. By cognitively restructuring the moral value of crimes committed against specific groups so that they can be done free from censuring doubt, the tasks of making violence morally defensible is facilitated.

-Responsibility can also be diffused such that an emotional division of labor can occur. Terrorist organizations are created and this means that there is a fractional compartmentalization of tasks. Moreover, decision-making in a hierarchy of authority may easily induce otherwise sensitive individuals to behave inhumanely because no single person need feel responsible for policies arrived at collectively or imposed by distant, unknown others in the organization’s leadership cadres.

-Immersion in the group’s ideology, specifically in its dehumanization of the enemy, can deaden moral sensibilities.

-The mesmerizing power of an ideology is not limited to politically desperate and naive individuals ready to cling to any set of ideas that promise relief from despair.

-Unlike more group-restricted or privatized paradigms, ideologies are a rhetoric of public discourse and produce what may be called “dramaturgic accentuation”.

-Ideologically inspired political programs drive contemporary movements that are labeled “terrorist”. Ideologies would appear to be basic foundational elements in cultivating the motivational structure and “mind-set” of the believer/adherent.

-The importance of a socially inspired belief system resides in its power to communicate, ideals, evaluations, and goals among group members. A major feature of ideological thought is the historical consciousness it breeds among those who embrace it.

-Ideologies are thus concerned with things to come. As a method of interpretation ideologies must possess some logic.

-As programs of actions, terrorist insurgencies are rarely isolated phenomena: they tend to reflect diffuse sympathies, desires and aspirations of larger segments of society.

-Ideology plays a role in sculpting the social universe: it aids by providing names, predicates, gestures, pictures, and interpretations of events. The “recipe knowledge” of ideology rewrites history in the interest of a political agenda, and enables the terrorist to re-structure social reality in ways that lend themselves to revolutionary interventions.

-To the extent that the organization and its social and political theories become the grounding of identity, the task of the terrorist then is not simply an empirical one of proselytizing; more is involved. First there is the job of spreading the word; secondly, one must do what is needed, which often entails defending the group against those who seek to discredit it.

-Whether the strategies of disobedience involve only symbolic protest or lead social movements, they seek to persuade the political leadership that it must attend to the opposition’s proposals so that modifications and changes satisfactory to all parties can be achieved.
- If a group believes it is treated unjustly, if the political process is unresponsive and offers little realistic hope for reversing or changing laws and policies that are deeply resented and offensive, and finally, if non-violent acts of civil disobedience do not work to produce desired results or prospects of change, then, given the strength of the group's convictions and the realistic appraisal of demographic and political considerations, terror would seem to be the ultimate resort to weaken, to arouse, and to stimulate others to action.

- The civil disobedient accept the responsibility of lawbreaking, but deny the responsibility of blameworthiness. They differ from the terrorist not only in their non-violence, but also in another factor: the road to the goal.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Two types of religious orientations, Islamic and Christian Fundamentalism, are examined in relation to whether or not, and to what degree, their ideas and doctrines promote terrorism. It is argued that totalitarianism forms the taproot of political violence. "We dream much of Paradise, or rather of a number of successive Paradises, but each of them is, long before we die, a Paradise Lost, in which we should feel ourselves lost also."


Call Number: Unable to Locate


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Here we are interested in a particular kind of explanation, which we call psychodynamic. It concentrates upon the inner motives of the terrorist, as opposed to the intellectual justification of his behavior. Our purpose should be to discover and unmask the terrorist in everyone.

- In the terminology made use of by E. Fromm in his important work. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, terrorism may be described as 'malignant aggression' as opposed to 'instrumental aggression.'

- The terrorist is made not born. Behind the behavior of the terrorist is a certain character, which (as we have contended) may find expression in terrorist behavior in the presence of social legitimating.

- We may hypothesize that at least three kinds of factors are needed to make the terrorist. The first is a family background contains forces which produce a violent and murderous rage in the child. The second is a revolutionary, nationalistic or even deeply conservative ideology, which legitimates and even glorifies personal violence in the service of a cause which is given absolute value. The third is a political situation of conflict.

- The murderous impulses acted out by the terrorist must be supposed to have originated in childhood.

- As Fromm has also shown, group narcissism is at work in promoting the fanaticism which characterizes a community which will willing legitimate and use action of terrorist.

- Although the murderous hate which later leads to terrorism begins in childhood and its origins are deeply repressed, it is potentiated when young people already loaded with hatred are kept together for lengthy periods in economic, political and personal frustration in refugee camps.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This book hailed now by some as a “classic” provides a thoughtful and broad analysis of the rise of modern (1960s forward) “extremist” movements and groups in Egypt. Kepel defines the ideology and objectives of the movement, and argues that the causes of this trend lie mainly with macro-level social failures by the Egyptian government, including economic policies and strategies that have made poverty, unemployment and demoralization rampant. He outlines the poor conditions of education, health care, housing, and local services that make Egypt a fertile breeding ground for extremism. The contribution of political repression is also emphasized. The author describes the evolution of these conditions under Nasser, then Sadat ultimately leading to Sadat’s assassination at the hand of militant Muslims an event that first signaled the serious threat to government that extremist could pose. The Muslim Brotherhood is
introduced as the seminal, grass roots, militant organization whose ideas were made accessible to the masses through the writing of Sayyid Qutb. Then other groups and factions emerged and grew, including al-Jama'at al-Islamiyyah and Takfir wa-l-Hijrah. The general tenor is neither supportive of these groups, nor condemnatory. Interesting as historical-political context for understanding Islamism, but very little strategic, tactical or behavioral information on the acts of terrorism committed by these organizations.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: We approach the psychology of the torturer and the executioner, the dynamics of total 'deobjectalization' described by Green (1993), the characteristics of the 'anal universe' described by Chassegue-Smirgel, the dynamics of the total identification with a violence fundamentalist ideology described by Dicks, and the characteristics of absolute social power described by Sofsky.

-Chasseguet-Smirgel has described the perverse 'anal universe' of patients with severe narcissistic pathology, which I have referred to as the syndrome of malignant narcissism. Unconsciously, they desire a world devoid of all restrictions.

-Dicks (1972), in his study of German concentration camp guards observed that they found their sense of personal value and meaning in submission to the authorities of the SS. Their cruel and murderous control of the inmates was carried out without any doubt or guilt, with a clear conscience derived from their conviction that they were operating according to the just and unquestionable, socially accepted Nazi ideology.

-Typically they described their fathers as extremely sadistic and controlling, their mothers as unloving or unavailable.

-Sofsky applies a sociological analysis to the nature of 'absolute power' that complements the preceding two analyses. In ordinary despotism or tyranny, terror is meant to intimidate to crush resistance.

-In contrast absolute power as realized in this concentration camp is power over those who are already totally crushed. It transforms its victims into aggregate mass.

-Fundamentalist ideologies divide the world into ideal and evil realms; their own ideology belongs to the ideal realm. The ideas beliefs and behavior of the realm of evil are immoral, dangerous, destructive, and threatening. Typically, such an ideology projects all aggression on to the evil social group, while justifying aggression against the infidel as a necessary defense and retribution if not a moral imperative.

-Volkan (2001a) (2001b) has stressed that religious fundamentalism, typically implies the wish to return to an original and idealized past, involving a pessimistic outlook regarding the present.

-Terrorism is a type of socially directed violence committed against the surrounding social group by individuals and groups who live in relative loneliness, secrecy and defiance, united by a fundamentalism ideology. Their fervor is reinforced by a personal disposition to primitive hatred, ruthlessness, sadism, and cruelty, totally rationalized in terms of the corresponding fundamentalist ideology. Their hatred is expressed in the commitment to destroy the infidel.

-Toward the 'in-group', the terrorist presents both absolute submission to the leader and to the leader's delegates.

-In the relation to the 'out-group', the enemy world, the terrorist is committed to its destruction as his main or only victim or only objective life.

-Rapid ascendance of primitive splitting mechanisms under conditions that promote dividing the world into 'good' and 'bad' segments.

-Fundamentalist systems usually accentuate the responsibility of the individual toward the collective, reduce the freedom for privacy and autonomy and attempt to regulate the life of the sexual couple.

-Most authors seem to agree that the causes of terrorism are multiple, and cannot be reduced to any single thing.

-Laqueur in agreement with other authors, points out that terrorist tend to escalate terrorist actions until they obtain a significant reaction from the enemy.

-Once terrorist lose their support from silent sympathizers, terrorists have difficulty surviving, and this reinforces the effectiveness of cutting them off from sources of international funding and logistic support.
Call Number: Published Abstract: Fulfilling peak experiences. Psychopathology is dismissed as a possible easy explanation for the behavior. This heroism and sacrifice are aimed at a domestic audience. The author suggests that although recent attacks have targeted Western countries, the real goal is the terrorists' own homeland, where groups of like-minded citizens are oppressed and bypassed. The chapter discusses the opinions of 2 Islamic thinkers: F. Ajami and A. Hamid El-Ansari. The present wave of terror and destruction threatens to create chaos everywhere. 
The chapter looks through the eyes of I. Prigogine. He sees the rotation of order and chaos as an inevitable part of the universe. In discussing the use of suicidal terrorism, we range from the individual living in an oppressive regime, struggling to achieve personal gratification, to a world that is indifferent to these struggles and prone by its very nature to cycles of order and chaos.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Dr. Rederick initially emphasized two dimensions for classifying individual categorizes of terrorists, namely selfish/unselfish self-protective/non-protective. 
-The crusader is non-protective and unselfish; the criminal is self-protective and unselfish; the criminal is self-protective and selfish, while the crazies is non-protective and selfish. He fails to discuss the fourth possible classification, one who is unselfish but self-protective. The author chooses to call this theoretical classification, one why is self-protective but unselfish, the calculator. 
-Dr. Hacker doe snot speculate but we would suggest that the crusader is obedient to a calculator, in at least some circumstances.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter represents an effort to help fill this void in our knowledge of the terrorist and his motivations. The data presented here are derived from an ongoing project in which an attempt is being made to evaluate all prisoners in United Stares federal prisons who have been convicted of committing a crime for a political purpose. 
-From the life histories available for terrorists (see especially Morf 1970), it is clear that these individuals are acting upon values into which they have been comfortably socialized both directly by teaching, and indirectly by life experiences of themselves and important others. However, these social-cultural-political values which are sanguine to a revolutionary terrorist identity are a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in the formation of the terrorist. 
-Equally important to the acceptance of a revolutionary terrorist identity are psychological needs intensively pressing for actualization through behavior and commitment. 
-This chapter will focus on the process by which socialization, personal needs, and severe life disappointments eventuate in one person's assumption of the identity of a revolutionary terrorist. 
-Busic relates that he made a firm emotional identification in his mind between his own plight, that of Croatian immigrants generally and -equally important- the plight of Croatia: powerless, friendless, and with an identity that will be extinguished unless it is constantly defended. 
-Busic recognizes that the critical point, however was his isolated and threatened conditions. 
-Yet in spite of Busic's emotional and intellectual awareness of this tragedy, he is unable consciously to accept feelings of anger or revenge in others or of guilt in himself. He is bewildered and disturbed by the anger expressed by the maimed officers during his trial. 
-The life of Zvonko Busic well illustrates the complex, multivariate pathway which eventuates in political behavior and the specific causal nexus which can lead to assumption of a negative political
identity over personal and familiar values and in the case of this type of actor, never comfortably or fully assumed. First of all, there was a consistent socialization into the Croatian cause and an identification of that cause with both righteousness and helplessness. Second there were personal psychological factors. First is his obvious discomfort with violent or sadistic impulses his reaction formation against such violence. Second there is his non awareness of fear and his counterphobic behavior in which he repeatedly places himself in fearful situations. Third in discussion had lost his left eye, it could have been saved if he had prompt medical attention. It is unlikely that this personal style and an individual psychodynamics interacted with his reaction-formation to his own potential for violence to eventuate in the tragic bombing.

-This need to struggle is closely connected with a fear of passivity and a rejection of his passive, noninvolved father's style of relating to life.
-There is an additional theme which relates to very personalized distaste for injustice.
-In order to understand the psychology of the terrorist at the movement before the event, it is important to realize that he perceives himself as having no alternative.
-The terrorist act is perceived as the end of options, the final statement after all alternatives have been exhausted.
-It is critical for those who wish to reduce the threat of terrorist acts to understand this feeling of having no other place to go, psychologically or politically.

163. Knutson, J. N. (1980). The Terrorists Dilemmas: Some implicit rules of the game. Terrorism, 4, 195-222. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Knowledge of certain dilemmas faced by terrorists may serve to narrow the options available to the opposing parties and aid in varying government response to terrorist acts. Such dilemmas are the identification with violence, the problem of attacking or seeking a negotiated incident, choice of level of terror, maintenance if one’s objectivity within a group characterized by conformity, and retaining one’s identity and a history.
-Even before the terrorist event is set into motion, the potential terrorist is confronted with a series of crucial decisions. The initial dilemma is a conflict that involves the terrorists’ assessment of their inner readiness for violence. At the beginning of the revolution, terrorist acts are generally perpetrated by the ideologues and are carefully orchestrated to delimit the enemy and the cause. The need to identify with violence poses a primarily intrapsychic and moral dilemma for these ideologue-terrorists. This dilemma is resolved by adoption of a “soldier” perspective or, alternatively, by the employment of sham violence. The second conflict concerns the dilemma of whether to attack the authorities through a fait accompli or to begin an ongoing, negotiated act in which there exist multiple possible outcomes and uncertainty on both sides. According to the compendiums cited above, the fait accompli is decidedly more popular in terrorist circles; the preference for a “hit-and-run” act of violence is overwhelming. For there is another rule which is implicit in the game but non-obvious to most governments and that is, the game is continuous. Indeed, this is the most important rule of the terrorist game. While government tends to play as if the game is discrete and what matters is merely the reestablishment of the total monopoly of force (hopefully, but not necessarily, without bloodshed), the terrorists know that the game is continuous and that it is the government’s modus operandi, not the vent’s outcome, which is the real issue. The dilemma of fait accompli versus negotiated act is compounded by many factors. (In addition, it is likely that each type of event appeals to psychologically different players, with the negotiated event run by those terrorists higher in efficacy and in verbal and abstracting abilities.)
-After choosing a fait accompli versus a negotiated incident, the next dilemma which the terrorists face is how to establish adequate strength and credibility vis-à-vis the government in order to force negotiations and, hopefully, an acknowledgment of their viewpoint. This dilemma is buttressed by an extremely critical rule of the game covering terrorists’ behavior, which states that there is a maximal and a minimal degree of terror, which may be employed. To fall below the minimum is to risk being ignored by the press and being met by government forces who are willing to react only to criminals or to mentally unbalanced actors, and in no case to political actors. On the other hand, to threaten too great a degree of violence forces the government in to a position of swift, extreme retaliation, in the certain knowledge that the public will support any effort to alleviate the anxiety which is (or can be construed to be) posed by the threatened action. Further, non-target publics also influence the latitude of terrorist activity. There is a basic human willingness to “go along” with violence, as long as some “acceptable” rationale can be found. As Miron and Goldstein [1979, p.18]
note: “As a society we applaud violence when the violence is made to appear justified. A dilemma which is unrecognized by most active terrorists that of maintaining objectivity. The initial lack of consideration of alternative explanations of reality and, particularly, of cause and effect relationships of reality and, particularly, of cause-and-effect relationships within the polity and society in general, is quickly embedded in other distortions because of the social isolation imposed by deviant views and clandestine because of the social in general, is quickly embedded in other distortions because of the social isolation imposed by deviant views and clandestine activity. This isolation fosters a process of “groupthink” personal opinions, values, and reality-testing ability “for the good of the group” in a largely unconscious process which winnows out objections to generally held group views.

-Even before the beginning of a terrorist event, both the intellectual and the emotional atmosphere of the terrorist group is one of enforced conformity and a continuing narrowing of breadth. It is also necessary for the terrorists and, by implication, the public which they seek to represent to solidify an identity of historic victim. In their perceptions (which is the critical factor), they are politically impotent, nonefficacious, and terribly frustrated. In their perceptions, every nonviolent effort to achieve change has failed. Powerlessness breeds violence. As Miron and Goldstein [1979, pp. 78-80] wisely note: “The essential characterization of what one means by a terrorist act, the illegitimate use of forceful coercion as against legitimized and sanctioned force, may well reside in the degree to which the act is motivated by perceptions of importance.”

-Summary: By analyzing the terrorist event as a structured sequence of decisions made by only one element the terrorists it is possible to understand more clearly both the constraints under which this “team” operates as well as the range of possibilities which are open to it, depending upon the countermoves by the government. In addition, as has been hopefully illustrated above, each decision by the terrorists provides information about their values, their personalities, and about the ways in which they structure their world.

164. Knutson, J. N. (1984). Toward a United States policy on terrorism. Political Psychology, 5(2), 287-294. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: This essay on terrorism and the one following were written in February 1981 by Jeanne N. Knutson. At that time, approximately 10 months before her death, Dr. Knutson was Executive Director of the International Society of Political Psychology. While slightly dated now in some of their empirical allusions, these recently unearthed essays contain potentially significant ideas. For this reason, and because of their personal interest to many members of the Society, the essays are being published in The Forum now. The editors have chosen not to try to rewrite them for current topicality, but to let them stand, with only slight editing, as Dr. Knutson wrote them. For approximately 3 years prior to writing these essays, and through the remainder of her life, Dr. Knutson carried out an extensive research project on the psychology of political terrorism. That project involved many social, political, and clinical interviews in prisons in various countries with individuals who had been convicted of crimes committed for political goals.

-Certain conclusions can be drawn about the necessary ingredients of a rational, comprehensive policy to combat the certain rise in terrorist activities in the coming years. First, in the case of nationalist dissident groups, we are faced with a clear choice. One option is to continue to assign at least one undercover agent to each of the literally hundreds of dissident groups operating within the United States.

-Our other choice is to concentrate our security efforts on the extremely small fraction of dissident cells with a history of violence.

-Second, a sensible policy requires us to turn a deaf ear to the myriad proposals which now inundate funding officers for spending vast sums of U.S. government monies to stimulate further embassy takeovers and other “plots with a new twist.”

-Third, after hard data have been collected, what is then needed is a continual social-psychological-political assessment of issues and opportunities for issues which can be deflected and resolved so as to creatively undercut bases for terrorist incidents.

-A useful place to begin a policy for dealing with terrorism would be to accept the basic premise of terrorists whom I have evaluated in depth: that their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy formation processes.
Finally, a comprehensive policy to deal with the increased threat of terrorist activities requires the U.S. government, at home and abroad, to energetically enter the market for men's minds. There are answers to terrorist rhetoric which, if persuasively prepared and persistently broadcast, will undercut the tacit support generally offered by both the pool of belief-sharers from whom the terrorists emerge and the romanticized sympathy of the public-at-large.

At base, we are faced with a clear choice in dealing with the increased threat of terrorist activities at home and abroad a choice that will affect greatly the quality of the American polity in the years ahead. One choice is to adopt the Israeli model of a garrison state and to answer force with more force.

The other choice clearly is more creative and more consistent with American ideals and American political values: this choice requires a suspension of judgment about nationalist aspirations and the protection of dissidents' legal rights to seek massive changes in established political systems in nonviolent ways, along with an energetic, focused, and consistent law enforcement strategy aimed at eliminating the remaining roots of violent dissent.

Call Number: Published Abstract: A burgeoning area of scientific inquiry uses psychological perspectives to understand traumatic events. This research has led to the identification of psychological symptoms and disorders frequently experienced in response to traumatic events. Many of the events having traumatic effects on large numbers of persons are of interest to political psychologists, such as the Holocaust, war, terrorism, captivity, torture, political migration, living as a political refugee, and assassination. Same interpersonal forms of trauma, such as rape and incest, also may be viewed with a political perspective. Although a number of studies have examined psychological consequences of political events, this area of inquiry is rarely explicitly considered within the domain of political psychology. Adopting an explicitly political psychology perspective on traumatic events may enrich our interdisciplinary understanding of, these events and inform the design and evaluation of intervention programs to reduce psychological distress resulting from these events.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The investigation of Shi'ite radicalism has a long tradition in Islamic studies. Almost since the advent of Islam, varieties of Shi'ism have provided the fuel for movements of protest and rebellion.
-We need a fuller appreciation of the origins and explicit ideology of those Shi'ites committed to political violence which only a reading of the modern radical texts can provide.
-The Najaf Connection: The Sources and structure of contemporary Shi'ite radicalism cannot be grasped without an understanding of the religious and political climate of Najaf, a Shi'ite shrine city dominated by massive domes and minarets, until recently, Najaf was also home to the most renowned Shi'ite academies of learning.
-It was in this setting of pious fastidiousness that contemporary Shi'ite extremism first took place. Najaf in the late 1950s and the 1960s was a place of great intellectual ferment, fueled by the fears if Shi'ite clerics-the ulama-that their Islamic values and religious autonomy were threatened by Westernizing influence. Their response was to elaborate a theory of an Islamic State that could offer a satisfying alternative to the doctrines of nationalism and communism that has made inroads even in Najaf.
-In the charged intellectual climate of Najaf, Shi'ite ulama subjected the existing political order to a withering critique and formulated an alternative in the revolutionary Islamic state.
-What are often called Shi'ite extremists or terrorist organizations are in fact men of religion in the circle of their disciples. It is the disciplines, fired by the vision elaborated by the men of religion, who take action, with the certain acquiescence and possible foreknowledge of their inspirational leader.
-Three of these groups warrant description as examples of the ideological and structural variation in Shi'ite radicalism today.
-Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyys the oldest of the radical Shi'ite groups is, in fact Iraqi, and was founded
in Najaf in 1959. Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya—the "party of the Islamic call"—the distinguishing feature of al-Da'was is that its establishment predates the rise of Khomeini, and in this it takes a special pride. Al-Da'wa represents an autonomous Iraqi Shi'ite movement. It is therefore possible to detect a certain tension between al-Da'wa and Iran, differences not over method or means, but on ultimate aims.

Islamic Action Organization

munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami, the "Islamic Action Organization." White al-Da'wa has its roots in Najaf, Islamic Action traces its origins back to Karbala, yet another Shi'ite shrine in Iraq. He has spent most of his last decade an Lebanon, and quite a few of his followers were Lebanese Shi'ites.

Hizballah: Any discussion of Lebanon's radical Shi'ites must begin with an obvious but important observation: The leaders of Lebanese radical groups are not ensconced in Tehran as exiles. The groups in Lebanon operate with hardly any impediment in that country's climate of rule by militia. In the Iranian view Lebanon is ripe for Islamic revolution.

Hizballah—the "Party of God: has appeared over the last year and a half as a generic name for all of the various radical Shi'ite groups operating in Lebanon.

Hizballah appear to be a coalition of groups that owe some sort of fealty to the Imam Khimenei as wali al-faqih, the preeminent political and legal authority in Islam.

Both the subservient and autonomous activists in Hizballah are prepared to use violence and have done so in the past.

The best insight into the political doctrine of Hizballah is afforded by the group's platform, unveiled at a public rally in Beirut in February 1985. This is a document of unrelieved extremism, which calls upon all Muslims to revere Khomeini, violently denounces the United States and France, and calls for the obliteration of Israel.

Radicalism represents a mode of thinking; terrorism a method of action.

Nearly all of the radical organizations and ulama are careful to build a wall of deniability between themselves and acts of political violence that bring retribution upon them.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This books does not really focus on terrorism as a tactic or strategy; instead it pores into what the author hypothesizes as being the underlying "cause" of such atrocities: "Mass hate." Kressel examines entire cultures and societies in which human atrocities— including genocide—were committed on a relatively large scale by diverse members of the constituent societies. Specifically, he examines ethic “cleansing” in Bosnia; Muslim jihadist antipathy toward the United states leading to the first attack on the World Trade Center; genocide in Rwanda; and the rise an following of Nazi-ism. The psychological dimensions of this book are concentrated in its chapters 6 & 7, which deal respectively with contributions from situational and personality factors. Although both chapters draw on psychological research, they do not reach any new conclusions or elucidate any new implications for understanding terrorism. The “situational” explanations focus on obedience and Milgram’s studies. The “personality” explanations focus on the authoritarian personality, along with its precedents and successors.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Muslims have been using religion sanctioned suicide as an effective tool against the West for several centuries. In keeping with this practice, Islamic suicide bombers attack a superior Israeli military and government. Suicidal terrorism is actually an act of martyrdom that can trace its origins back 13 centuries to the battle of Karbala. Appealing to tradition, recruiters enlist potential bombers from schools and mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Bombers study religion, politics, and explosives. Students willingly become martyrs to secure a future for their families. Understanding that suicidal terrorism is not anathema to a significant proportion of the Muslim population is the first step in countering the problem.

-Stephen Frederic Dale notes, religiously sanctioned suicidal attacks are not unique to the modern period or confined to the Middle Eastern region. Similar types of assaults are known to have occurred over a span of several centuries in three little known Muslim communities in the Indian Ocean region: Those on the Malabar coast of southwestern India, Atjeh in northern Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines.
-It would be naive to think of suicidal terrorists as merely fanatics. Fanatic, like terrorist is a pejorative term that “is applied to the state of mind of those who are wholeheartedly committed to a set of a beliefs and condemned for it. In this way, the term fanatic becomes a descriptive label, rather than an explanation.
-Today’s suicide bombers perform an act of martyrdom that was first documented 13 centuries ago, following the death of Muhammad.
-A badly outnumbered Hussein disregarded the premonition and knowingly marched to his death near the village of Karbala.
-Given that there is no distinction between church and state in Islam, an act or religious devotion, such a suicide-becomes an instrument of state policy for the militant Muslim.
-Viewing suicide as a form of religious devotion allows the uniformed to make sense of the bizarre features of the actions of suicide bombers.
-Evidence exists that suicide bombers are not necessarily recruited from a life of poverty.
-The selection of recruits is made by Hamas.
-The selection process begins with members of the Izzadin el-Kassam even the Palestinian Islamic Jihad circulating among the organizations’ schools and mosques during religious instruction. The recruiters broach the subject of dying for Allah with a group of students and watch the students’ reactions. Students that seem particularly interested in the discussion are immediately singled out for possible special merit.
-These potential bombers, who range in age from 12 to 17 years, almost invariably have a relative or close friend who was killed, wounded, or jailed during Israeli occupation.
-The potential bombers attend classes in which trained Islamic instructors focus on the verses if the Qur’an and the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad that form the basis of Islamic law and idealize the glory of dying for Allah. Students are promised an afterlife replete with great palaces, sumptuous feasts, and virgin brides.
-Aside from religion, the indoctrination also includes wild farragoes of anti-Israeli propaganda.
-Graduates of these suicide schools know that their supreme sacrifice will see their families protected for life.
-Hamas pays for the resettlement of all families of suicide bombers who lose their homes as a result of Israeli retribution.
-The Mission: The suicide bombers leave for their missions directly from their mosques, after having complete many days of chanting the relevant scriptures aloud with their spiritual handler, A favorite verse reads “Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. No they live on and find their sustenance in the presence of their lord.”
-To ensure the utmost secrecy, a bomber only learns how to handle explosives immediately before the mission.
-The different actors within the suicide team have no knowledge of each other. Each does a specific job, and they know that they accomplished the act if the bomb goes off.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary Since the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, there has been much curiosity about the make-up of a suicide bomber or terrorist.
-Because there are no simple answers, we must go beyond the conventional, the obvious, and the observable to explain the motivational forces in history. Psychohistory ventures further into the political, social, and psycho cultural aspects of history and reviews such intrapsychic unconscious motivations as primitive defenses, unresolved oedipal conflicts, and other psychodynamics.
-That the terrorists were "evil," as characterized by President Bush, seemed insufficient to satisfy our curiosity as to their motives.
-Robins and Post in Political Paranoia (1997) view terrorist acts as a perverse was of connecting to the world. They maintain that people are fueled by paranoid delusional leaders and glom onto a piece of reality to "justify" their causes -e.g., the enviable or "evil" American.
-This paper discussed the suicide bomber from a mythological, psycho historical, and psychoanalytic perspective as an extension of an age-old conflict. Expressions of interlocking dynamics and configurations are communicated through such primitive defenses as shame, fear of dependency, unresolved oedipal issues, omnipotent denial, and magical thinking. I attribute the underlying
conflicts in Islam as having their origins in identification with the absent father, a syndrome compatible with the collective borderline personality.

-Psychohistory offers two important venues to explore as we delve further into the mind of the suicide bomber and its linkage to terrorist. First, is the role of psychohistory plays in helping us understand cultural patterns handed down from generation to generation. Second is the exploration of the role that group-fantasies play and the way they are enacted through identification with group leaders who play out the group myths, ideology, and omnipotent fantasies.

-The salient characteristics of a terrorist or a suicide bomber can best be examined within the matrix of the borderline personality.

-Borderlines are dominated by same/blame defenses, have defective bonding and dependency needs, are extremely envious, and will retaliate at any cost. They are lacking in impulse control, have poor reality testing, and impaired judgments. They do not have a sense of a real-self, are heavily invested and fused with their objects, and have never reached the developmental stage of separation-individuation.

-One of the most striking features is the borderline's tendency to distort, manipulate, and misperceive reality. When they do something "bad," they claim that something bad was done to them.

-Envy is one of the most dominant features of the borderline personality.

-Finally, the discussion of omnipotence and dependency is important in this analysis.

-To ward off intolerable feelings of smallness and helplessness, one develops a grandiose, omnipotent self.

-These regressed groups share one thing in common: they all need a scapegoat, someone to project their hatred and rage onto, someone to blame for all their shortcomings.

-The patriarchal perspective of Arab society means that females are relegated to a low position in all aspects of their existence, including their private lives.

-Thus, a suicide bomber offspring becomes the perfect instrument to redeem women's status in society.

-One might conclude that violence toward women is rooted in repressed envy emanating from feeling threatened and persecuted-enacted by adult men deprived of maternal affection, fueling sadistic ties with victimized women.

-Group Psychology and Group Leaders: -Individuals dominated by primitive defenses often form a trance relationship or an intense identification with a charismatic leader who best offers the promise to:1) play out the group's mythological fantasies, and 2) play out the group's aggression.

-Often these charismatic leaders are paranoid, schizophrenic, and pathologically disturbed.

-Groups form identification with leaders who know how to play out the groups ideologies, mythologies, and collective group fantasies.

-Martyrdom and The Search For Love: The suicide bomber is a synthesized version of a fanatic leader. They are walking time bombs, symbols of an entire sexually repressed society that repudiates women and any semblance of freedom, which is felt to be a national threat. The suicide bomber yearns to return to the fertile breast, the land of where mommy and baby were once one, a revisit with the lost Biblical maternal figures.

-To die a martyr is the highest form of achievement in Islamic countries.

-Suicide bombers are not always lonely and depressed as might be imagined, but are indoctrinated in their cause (Good, 12 September 2001).

-Explains Jerrold Post, a professor of political psychology at George Washington University. "But above all, I would say that the manual is a good example of how cult mentality can hijack and manipulate legitimate religious beliefs and turn them into fanatical tenets. (Psychohistory Internet Discussion Group, October, 2001).

-."It's the fitting of the fragmented persona of a true believer into a group identity that benefits the organization. Once that's in place, the terrorist can be aimed like a missile," Post says.

-Suicide bombers share many of the group dynamics of gang members.

-Suicide bombers are not a far cry from gang members who turn to others to project their anger, rage, and pain into hostile aggression.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: It is the intent of this article to help prepare the hostage
The negotiator for the specific situation wherein the hostage-taker has been previously diagnosed as an antisocial personality.

-Hostage takers also have been divided by behavioral motivation into two major classifications: those engaging in instrumental behavior and those engaging in expressive behavior.
-If the antisocial personality is motivated by a need for stimulation-seeking activity perhaps what is to be avoided in the hostage-taker's obtaining stimulation from the hostage via assaults and other abusive acts.
-Words and actions of the negotiator should be carefully chosen to avoid any appearance of "ego threat."

The antisocial individual expects to control any situation in which he finds himself. The negotiator should, therefore, avoid any appearance of indecision or ambivalence.

-Helpful in building rapport to match negotiator and subject as to race, religion, nationality, and/or education when possible.
-The antisocial individual tends to "act out" tensions and problems rather than worry about them. While he may be hostile and aggressive he appears most incapable of anxiety and possesses little or no sense of guilt.
-He will tend to view hostages as mere pawns and disregard their needs, rights, and well-being.
-The antisocial personality can also be characterized as a chronic liar.
-Avoid discussion of jail sentences and "help" meaning hospitalization when negotiating with the antisocial personality.
-The egocentricity of the antisocial personality makes the formation of the Stockholm syndrome, particularly the third element, very unlikely.
-The antisocial personality lacks emotional depth.
-The antisocial hostage taker should be made aware if he is not already that keeping the hostages in good physical condition is in his own self interest.
-The stalling tactic while probably not having the same impact on the antisocial personality as on other personality types, is still recommended in negotiating with the antisocial personality.
-The authorities should not provide alcoholic beverages, even small quantities to the anti-social hostage-taker.
-Emotions are inhibited in the antisocial personality, and as a result, the likelihood of suicide is diminished.
-When negotiating with the hostage taker to "always get something in return for something provided"
mission of the subcommittee is to examine how psychologists can address both the threat and the impact of terrorism and thus be a key element of the response.

- Early in 2002 a conference was held with APA member psychologists and other social scientists and the FBI academy; this conference was followed by a congressional briefing.

- There are many other ways in which psychologists can be involved in addressing the impact of terrorism: (A) Psychologists can use their scientific and professional expertise to address such issues as the rising number of anti-Islamic and anti-Middle Eastern hate crimes, racial profiling, and the potential for the erosion of civil liberties; (B) Psychologists with relevant expertise can help develop preparedness programs for possible biological and chemical terrorism attacks, such as the recent anthrax, which took on the character of the workplace; and (C) psychologists involved in disaster response can assess how future terrorist attacks might have different impacts on different segments of our pluralistic society (e.g., postal and mail-room employees are often members of ethnic minorities; older adults have a higher degree of resilience, etc.)


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Adolescents and even children have been inextricably involved in terrorist activities in Iraq, Northern Ireland, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and all points in between. Youth are remarkably susceptible to ideologic and passionate solicitations. Elsewhere we (and others) have written of the propensity of young people to feelings of alienation, demoralization, and low self-esteem. Further, we have elucidated that, in the trajectories of adolescents and young adults, four crucial elements, arbitrarily designated as the four Bs (being, belonging, believing, and benevolence), serve as intrinsic needs at that stage, as monitoring milestones of one’s life, and, much later in the life span, as cornerstones for assessing (in retrospect) the worth and meaningfulness of one’s life. Adolescents thrive in groups, and all groups exert some of the above characteristic influences on their members. However, it is only within groups that have intense ideologic rationales and belief systems, and charismatic, controlling, and committed leadership that the propensity and susceptibility exists for violent expressions toward perceived enemies.

- If, at this crucial juncture (or critical period), they are exposed to the ministrations and solicitations of individuals and groups who seemingly offer “antidotes” to their melancholic miasma, they may be particularly susceptible to those invitations. These groups offer to their members sense of: 1. being - they feel intrinsically better, more worthwhile, more esteemed, and more fulfilled. 2. belonging they feel that they are an integral member of a group, a community, of respected, caring, like-minded individuals; 3. believing - they feel that they have a ‘raison d’etat,’ an important meaning to their lives beyond subsistence and materialism; and 4. benevolence - they feel that they are contributing to the betterment and the well being of their fellow human beings. In interviews with hundreds of cult and other intense group members, it became obvious that although there were many rationales offered or joining, usually along ideologic lines (ostensible), the psychological (defacto) factors prevailed in most instances.

- There is also good evidence that no matter what the ideologic rationale for joining these groups, the committed members feel better. Although groups can and do provide a vable source of the four Bs, there is a propensity for some to escalate along the following continuum: values-ideals-beliefs-zealotry-violence

- Combinations of such things as radical, inflammatory leadership, passionate polemics, perceived wrings, prejudices, and personal needs come together to form a culture of confrontation: constructive dialogue is cut off and the rationale for violence is given a “civilized” façade. This is clearly seen in studies of cults, where the “half-life” is less than 2 years (ie by the end of the second year of membership, approximately 95% of the members have left the group).

175. Linn, R. (1988). Terrorism, morality and soldiers motivation to fight- An example from the Israeli experience in Lebanon. Terrorism, 11(2), 139-149.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: This paper focuses on motivation of soldiers to fight against terrorists. On a theoretical level it discusses the specific nature of this type of war as compared to a conventional war. It delineates the interplay of the justice laws of war and the different types of fighting against terrorists. On a practical level, it presents the specific example of the Israeli ways of fighting the terrorists and attempts to learn from the experience of soldiers who
refused to fight in the Lebanese war and about the sociomoral factors which discouraged them.

-There are two ways in which war can and should be judged: first, in regard to the justice of the war’s objectives ("Jus ad Bellum"); and second in regard to the conduct of the war ("Jus in Bello”).

-When compared to terrorism, conventional war has clear norms.

-When we abandon the cliché that one person’s terrorist is the other’s freedom fighter, we can better understand (or adopt) Jenkin’s definition that: “One man’s terrorist is everyone’s terrorist”.

-The moral distinction between conventional warfare and terrorists’ actions is important not only for the understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism per se, but for the understanding of our moral right to fight it and what might make those who are obliged by society to do so, refuse.

- O’Brien delineates two modes of active responses to terrorism that are often used by the victimized society (particularly terrorism emanating from foreign countries: retaliation or preventive campaign).

- Quotes by the Israeli selective conscientious soldiers, may reveal some sources of discouragement:
  1) The moral ambiguity embedded in an active, preventive war.
  2) Lack of consensus regarding the definition of the enemy as terrorists.
  3) Lack of confidence in the military power as the appropriate mode of resolution to the terrorist problem.

-The unsolved moral dilemma of fighting among civilians.


-Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In the 1980s, the common explanation of suicide bombing, such as that which occurred in Beirut at the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983, was that it was conducted by religious fanatics seeking martyrdom. Yet, religious fanaticism as a factor was neither adequate nor sufficient to explain suicide bombing; indeed, most bombers during the 1983-86 period were members of secular groups linked to Syria.

-Merari found that those who became suicide bombers from the Palestinian community had very little in common other that that they were young (average age 22) and unmarried; they were not overly religious; none had psychiatric problems; they had not been involved in other terrorist activities. It does not resemble other suicidal behavior.

-The main point of his presentation was that suicide bombing requires an organizational structure and process to carry it out. It is not a personal phenomenon, but an organizational phenomenon.


-Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors use existing social-psychological models as a framework to explain the 9/11 attacks. They assert that the power of group norms to influence attitudes and behavior is often underestimated. Social identity theory suggests that people who behave according to the norms of a group, not because they make an explicit decision that the norms are "right", but because the norms define what behavior is appropriate in the situation. They adhere to the norms simply because they identify with the group. If the action is "pro-group", a cost-benefit calculus may not be applied. It is possible for an out group to influence behavior of an in-group through rewards and punishment, but the out group must have control over the contingencies. While identifying with in-group norms is one way to achieve a positive identity, another way is through "reactance" against out group norms.

-Technically written with limited value for analysis beyond a basic understanding of social identity principles.


-Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The "Cold War" is over.

-Who then is the enemy?

-The intent of this article is to identify the enemies and determine how to face the challenge of the future for America in the world.

-Rather than trying to define terrorism an attempt should be made to develop a theory about terrorist
organizations and how they differ from other similar organizations.
-What will be discussed here is state supported terrorism, where one or more nations carry out
surrogate warfare against a greater power or perceived enemy for the purpose of achieving political
or geographical goals.
-Shi’ite Muslims- The intent is to establish a new Islamic world order. Many Arab countries do not
see eye to eye on many issues, but one common thread binds them together, the Muslim faith.
-A second unifying factor, apart from the Muslim faith, is the common enemy that came into
existence in 1948 when Great Britain and the United States, through the United Nations, helped
establish the nation.
-In order for a terrorist movement to service it must have three elements:
(1)Access to funds, weapons and explosives.
(2)Military knowledge and training.
(3)Safe Havens, which only are possible if there are supporting states that protect the terrorist behind
their borders.
-That is why terrorism is the most widely practiced form of modern warfare; it is low cost, low risk,
and has total deniability.
-Ashmawi is a retired judge in Egypt and a Muslim, he has done research on Islamic law and is
convinced there is no foundation for the 'fundamentalists' beliefs in the Koran. He states, 'the
militants' doctrine is not a faith-it is a political ideology.'
-This is suggestive that militant fundamentalists of Islam do not have accurate understanding of their
own faith since they are blinded by their political movement.
-Following the lead of other Islamic fundamentalist organizations, most all such terrorists have three
things in common. (1) A religious head, or leader. (2) A military leader who is usually part of the
group. (3)The soldiers or followers who are the terrorist themselves.
-There are several common features terrorist soldiers seem to possess. These features are very
similar to the type of individual who joins a religious cult.
-The typical terrorist organization is comprised of a high proportion of angry paranoids. They have
a tendency to externalize, to seek outside sources to blame for personal inadequacies.
-Though every terrorist group is different and has different goals, one common similarity is the blind
allegiance they have toward their cause.
-The real cause or psychological motivation for joining is the great need for belonging, a need to
consolidate one's identity. A need to belong, along with an incomplete personable identity, is a
common factor that cuts across the group.
-The common thread among terrorists, then is the strong need to belong. This fulfillment in
belonging is the linchpin of psychological identity.
-It is generally accepted terrorists do not become terrorists overnight. They follow a general
progression from social alienation to boredom, then occasional dissidence and protest before
eventually turning to terrorism. The "personal pathway model" on how a terrorist becomes a
terrorist was developed by Eric D. Shaw. He confessed the difficulty supporting a psychopathology
model of terrorism, but makes a good case for four components of the pathway of a terrorist into this
malevolent profession. These are: 1) Early socialization processes 2) Narcissitic injuries 3) Escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police 4) Personal connections to terrorist group
members.
-To leave the organization would be to give up one's identity.
-Also attacks on the group become a personal attack, thereby increasing significantly the cohesion of
the group when it is attacked from the outside forces it opposes.
-There have been over 109 definitions of terrorism between 1936 and 1981. Additional attempts at
defining terrorism continue.

Ireland. Medicine, Science and Law, 26, 193-198.
Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: The case records of 106 persons charged with
murder and referred to the authors of psychiatric assessment between 1974 and 1984 were examined
and a 140-item questionnaire completed. Political murderers were found to be generally more stable
than non-political murderers. Significant differences also emerged in the recommendations made by
defense and prosecution psychiatrists.
It has been our impression from frequent contact with political and non-political murders that the two groups differ in what could be described as criminology.

The period of study is from 1974-1984. All those included had been charged with murder and were interviewed by one of us.

There were 106 subjects, 98 males, and eight females. They had a mean age of 32 years. Over half were single (57 percent) and relatively few married (30 percent). Educational attainment was generally poor. About half (52 percent) had previous convictions, mainly for theft, robbery with violence, and alcohol-related offenses. A large number showed evidence of personality disorder (36 percent) and intoxication at the time of the offence (42 percent). A large percentage had a family history of criminal behavior (38 percent) and a high incidence of alcohol-related problems and alcohol dependence (49 percent) were evident in the personal histories.

Forty-seven of the offenders had killed for political or terrorist reasons and 59 for non-political reasons.

There are 9 main differences: Political murder showed a peak in the hours of 6 a.m. to noon, which non-political murder was more frequent in the hours after midnight.

Likewise, political murder tended to be scattered throughout the week-days, Monday to Friday, amounting to 68 percent whereas two-thirds of non-political murder was at the weekend.

The difference in the place of killing was highly significant, the home being a dangerous place for non-political victim. On the other hand, the victim of political murder was traveling in 74 percent of cases.

Also highly significant was the method of killing used; firearms being much the commonest method used by the political murderer (81 percent).

The characteristics of the victims differ in several respects. Terrorist rarely killed females; they often have more than one victim; while in non-political killings females are equally at risk and multiple killings are rare.

At the time of the killing over half of the non-political murderers were intoxicated while only 10 percent of the political murderers were.

As regards to family history, the non-political murderers appear to come from a rather more unstable family background and a much greater number of non-political murderers showed evidence of mental illness (58 percent)

Comparisons between political and non-political offenders are hampered by the fact that the sample is biased. Not only are we dealing with murderers who have been caught as opposed to those who are at large, but also those who have been referred, for whatever reason for psychiatric assessment.

The fact that significantly fewer political murderers had a family history of personality disorder, and that significantly less of them were found to suffer from a psychiatric illness would lend support to the original hypothesis that they form a more stable group.


Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter explores 3 levels of causation of terrorism, each calling for solutions or responses appropriate to its own level. These might be called (1) immediate causes, in this case the purposive actions of men who are willing to die as they destroy other lives in the process; (2) proximate causes, the human pain and socioeconomic breeding ground of such desperate behavior; and (3) deeper causes, deriving from the nature of mind, of consciousness itself. The chapter also discusses what is to be done about coming to terms with the dualistic mind.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Relevant sections address explanations for participation in religious rituals and compliance with religious rules. Three factors that maintain religious participation:

1) Hearing that one's existing practice will produce spiritual as well as materialistic reinforcements.
2) No longer hearing that one's current practices are producing negative sanctions.
3) Hearing that our enemies are in supernatural trouble
Compliance with religious rules maintained only by "escape contingency" - reduction of the guilt of fear the religion has caused the noncompliance to evoke.

182. Margolin, J. (1977). Psychological perspectives in terrorism. Y. Alexander, & S. M. Finger (Eds), Terrorism: interdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 270-282). New York: John Jay Press. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The behavioral approach to terrorism has usually been preempted to a narrow, parochial and highly questionable effort to apply conventional psychiatric methods to the personality of skyjackers. Much effort has been directed to the pathology of terrorist on the unproven assumption that the terrorist is “sick”.
- Two levels must be considered. The macro-level includes the psychological and sociological bases of the large international and transnational issues. The micro-level is responsive to the study of specific terrorist and terrorist acts.
- Research in terrorism has been characterized by a series of contradictory assumptions about the terrorist. We are at one moment led to the belief that the terrorist is a psychotic, at others times a fanatic, and still other times that he is a highly rational individual governed by good planning and armed not only with modern weapons but with a firm ideology and sound information about his objectives.
- Whether rational or irrational, he is governed as we all are by the same laws of behavior.
- No one terrorist or hostage is governed by purely behavioral principles.
- Much of the behavioral approach in the study of terrorism has been derived from abnormal psychology and psychoanalysis.
- However, the almost exclusive emphasis on psychopathology has resulted in a paucity of attention to the many elements of psychology and sociology that operate in daily behavior and play. These psychological and sociological elements can explain a significant part of almost every phase of the terrorist act.
- An approach through abnormal psychology may at times be counterproductive.
- The goal gradient is an interesting psychological analogue to the law of gravitation. It states that the closer the individual approaches a desired objective, the stronger is the individual’s need for satisfaction.
- When the curve of intensity of need increases sharply as an individual approaches a positive goals, the curve of avoidant feelings increases even more sharply as one approaches a negative goal, or a situation that is feared or disliked.
- Another relatively well-known psychological principle is the Zeigarnik effect of the interrupted phenomenon. Simplified, it suggests that the interruption of tasks, which the individual has begun, will have a profound effect on what he remembers to be important as well as on his level of tension and on the establishment of new motives and values. An individual’s need to complete a process that has been interrupted may be greater than the original motivation to do it.

- Dr. Max Manwaring of the strategic studies Institute of the U.S Army War College poised four characteristics that define the new economic and political order facing our global community: First the world has seen and will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous and uncomfortable threats in the "gray area" between war and peace. Second as a consequence there is a need to redefine "enemy", "power," and "victory". Third, these ambiguities intrude on the "comfortable" vision of war in which the assumed center of gravity has been enemy military formations and the physical capability to conduct war. Fourth, the conflictual means to secure, maintain and enhance interests abroad have become multi-dimensional, multi lateral and multi organizational. Conflict is no longer a military to military confrontation.
- The numerous definitions of terrorism converge around certain points: Terrorism is broadly viewed as (a) the use of force or violence (b) by individuals or groups (c) that is directed toward civilian populations (d) and intended to instill fear (e) as a means of coercing individuals or groups to change their political or social positions.
Many efforts have been made to categorize different types of terrorism on the basis of the terrorists' motive (e.g., religious, political), goals (e.g., instilling fear, destruction), and methods (e.g., bombs, weapons of mass destruction).

Langholtz noted that there is a need to include "capability" in considering distinctions among the various groups proposed by Post.

The methods available to terrorists for executing their operations are numerous and varied.

International terrorism probably will continue well into the 21st century, because many of the root causes of terrorism are not being addressed as much as they should be by developed and developing nations. Among the conditions that encourage terrorism are the following: 1. global poverty, 2. racism, 3. oppression, 4. Israel, 5. Unstable nations, 6. Rogue nations.

When psychology's relevance for understanding terrorism is examined, a sizable literature emerges with regard to possible explanatory concepts that are rooted within major personality and social psychology views of human nature.

Another view on the determinants of terrorism that must be considered has been presented by Hedges (2003). Hedges is not a major psychological theorist. However in his 2003 book he has raised the possibility that for all sides war may be an addiction that releases us from the humdrum of daily life and gives us a new sense of meaning and purpose.

Early classical psychological studies of authoritarianism, dogmatism, tolerance of ambiguity, prejudice, trust, alienation, and conformity, and other personal predisposition and inclinations can still provide a firm conceptual and empirical foundation for contemporary efforts.

Insights into the mind of the terrorist and the origin of terrorist organizations are also provided by studies of the various defense mechanism that are so basic in our studies of the human psyche, particularly the ego defense mechanisms of projection, denial, repression, displacement, rationalization, and reaction formation.

Not until September 11, 2001, did psychologists display a sudden and dramatic interest and writing about terrorism and terrorists. This is likely to continue for four reasons: (a) terrorism is now considered an important and timely topic for exploration and understanding, (b) terrorism will continue despite recent successes in attenuating its fiscal and military foundations, (c) psychology has much to contribute to our understanding and prevention of terrorism, and (d) government leaders and decision makers want and need psychological input.

For the terrorist, their hatred, contempt and resentment are fueled, in part, by their perceptions of the massive, dislocating societal changes and questionable political and economic policies they feel the United States is imposing on the non-Western world through the forces of globalization, for its efforts to impose its commercial interests on others.

The materialistic culture of the West is a threat to Islamic spiritual values and religion-based practices. Modernization is change, but change does not mean progress.

The Arab and Islamic world was at certain points in history among the dominant civilizations of the world. Then it collapsed and the search for blame turned not to its own limitations but to the Western colonial powers.

To these problems must be added the perennial problem of the Middle East, the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

For Muslims and Arab communities the United State's disproportional support of Israel cannot be rationalized.

The root causes of terrorism continue to remain a subject of great debate. Yet, without identifying and addressing its root causes, terrorism is likely to continue to pose a major risk.

Military responses to terrorism will never be sufficient to contain the problem of terrorism because they do not address the root conditions that spawn it.

We must go beyond indictments of villainous individuals bent on satisfying evil impulses for their own sake. We can destroy villains, but we cannot stop terrorism, because its roots are deep and complex. They reside in the past and in the present; they reside in anger but also in envy; they reside in religion but also in economics, politics, and culture; they reside in the rapidly changing dynamics of the emerging world of global inequality, racism, poverty, and ignorance-especially ethnocentric bias and ignorance; they reside in the rapidly changing dynamics of the emerging world of global independence which seems to be pointing toward a uniform and mass society with little respect or tolerance for the past.

In his classic volume, The True Believer (1951), Eric Hoffer pointed out the importance of belief...
Belief provides meaning and purpose—it reduces uncertainty and facilitates adaptation and adjustment. It offers "deep assurance" and "communion" with others. Of special significance in this syndrome is the inability to tolerate doubt and uncertainty. The classical research studies by Stanley Milgram (1963) on blind obedience and Philip Zimbardo and Herbert Kelman on dehumanization also are important starting points for studies of contemporary terrorism.

What motivates terrorism? We find that there is not single motive. Volkan (1997) offered a psychodynamic perspective on the role of the groups in influencing terrorist behavior. He argued that terrorist groups may provide a security of family by subjugating individuality to the group identity. A protective cocoon is created that offers shelter from a hostile world.

We need to increase the cross-cultural study or the psychological and behavioral determinants of terrorism, and we need, especially, to encourage the study of different non-western and indigenous psychologies.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Some persons with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) are terrorists, and some terrorists suffer from ASPD. Many terrorists demonstrate diagnostic features of ASPD without possessing the actual disorder. Individuals with ASPD have some characteristics in common with terrorists such as social alienation, early disturbance of social development process, narcissistic rage and hostility/violence. In this paper, the characteristics of terrorists with ASPD and link between terrorist attitude and ASPD are examined in order to provide a more profound basis for forensic psychiatric assessment and treatment of this subcategory of terrorists. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that it is useful to consider the terrorist with ASPD as a distinctive category. It was concluded that more research is needed into the specific neurobiological and psychosocial correlates of this phenomenon in order to provide adequate treatment and prevention programs.

- In this article, an attempt is made to investigate (a) the characteristics of terrorist with ASPD, and (b) the link between antisocial personality disorder and a terroristic attitude, in order to enhance the understanding of this phenomenon of terrorist with ASPD and to increase the effectiveness of assessment and treatment of this subcategory of patients.

Suicidal terrorism is seen, from the viewpoints of such humanistic psychologists as E. Becker and A. Maslow, as heroism that mega-overcompensates for inferiority and as a search for fulfilling peak experiences. Suicidal terrorism can also be considered further as an expression from the individual living in an oppressive regime, struggling to achieve personal gratification, to a world that is indifferent to these struggles and prone by its very nature to cycles of order and chaos.

Pearlman suggest that terrorism could also be the result of envy and humiliation, and it might be linked to a traumatic reenactment; reenactment through projective identification; intersubjectivity, role reversal, and perverse empathy.

- Goertzel, Kressel and Meloy et al. suggest that many terrorists are violent true believers. Hoffner (1951) called the true believer a man who is ready to sacrifice his life for a holy cause. Violent true believers are characterized by stereotype thinking, belief in the superiority of their belief system, indifferent attitude to people with other belief systems, arrogance and disdain, fanaticism, hostility, justification of their violent behavior and lack of critical self-reflection and rigidity.

- Individuals who become terrorists (TER) and persons with ASPD share characteristics such as: social alienation, disturbed early socialization processes, aggressive, action-oriented, stimulus-hungry, narcissistic attitude, impulsivity and hostility, suffering from early damage to their self-esteem, defensive attitude, primitive defenses as shame, fear of dependency, unresolved oedipal issues, omnipotent denial in ASPD, escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police in ASPD, intolerant of criticism in ASPD, arrogance and disdain, belief of superiority of their own belief system, indifference to other people belief systems, hostility, lack of self-criticism, justification of their violent behavior in ASPD, suffering from deep trauma in ASPD, moral disengagement by dehumanizing victims in ASPD.

- According to Martens (1997), the attitudes of antisocial terrorists might be underpinned by revolting...
drives that are brought about by (a) narcissistic injury and rage, and (b) hate of and/or disdain for: authority, upbraiding rules, fearful, dull, obident and easy to manipulate people; spoiled individuals, persons who are not authentic, narrow-minded moralistic people.
- Most persons with antisocial personalities demonstrate (comorbid) narcissistic traits.
- As a specific manifestation of narcissistic rage, terrorism occurs in the context of narcissistic injury (Johnson & Feldmann, 1992). Pearlstein (1991) also applies the psychological concept of narcissism to terrorists. He observes that the political terrorist circumvents the psychopolitical liabilities of accepting himself or herself as a terrorist with a negative identity through a process of rhetorical self-justification that is reinforced by the group’s groupthink.
- It also seems questionable according to Pearlstein (1991) that terrorist suicide bombers, who deliberately sacrificed themselves in the act, had a narcissistic personality.
- After analysing data of antisocial persons with rebellious tendencies (Martens, 1997), the author hypothesizes that narcissistic rage of terrorists with ASPD might be the result of: hidden suffering and correlated awareness that they remain always outcasts and that their real character will never be accepted by other normal people, envy because they do not have the possibilities to lead a normal and happy life, feelings of revenge, because most of them have a history of being neglected, rejected, abused, humiliated, and/or lack of guidance, support, love/warmth, protection, environmental structure, and safe “nest” suppressed depression.
- The author concludes that it is useful to consider antisocial terrorists as a distinctive category of ASPD because this group has its own specific characteristics such as: terrorist antisocial persons show in contrast to other categories antisocial patients a violent, hostile, impulsive and reckless attitude which is mainly or exclusively targeted towards government, rather than towards individuals; ability for loyalty and commitment to members of a group, "Other categories of antisocial persons demonstrate rather solitary attitudes; political and ideological awareness and interests that are mostly absent in non-terroristic antisocial personalities; most are well educated and belonging to good milieu in contrast to non-terroristic antisocial personalities; ability to planning ahead;" Not all correlates of the relationship between ASPD and terrorist attitude are clear. In order (a) to gain insight into the complex structure of the phenomenon of the antisocial terrorist and (b) to provide adequate treatment and prevention programs, profound research is needed.

185. Mason, D. (1982). Individual participation in collective racial violence and terror: A rational choice synthesis. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia. Call Number: Published Abstract: This dissertation study from the early 1980s focuses on rioting and looting behavior, rather than on terrorism. The author uses the “rational choice” theory of deviance and criminality to argue that rioting/looting are motivated not only by the looters desire to gain goods from himself (because he lacks possessions and the money to acquire them), but also by motives related to “public goods,” including the elimination of factors relating to racial discrimination. The empirical model has only modest support. The rationale may have more relevance to understanding insurgency than terrorism, but regardless, the data are very preliminary.

186. McCarthy, S. (2002). Preventing future terrorist activities among adolescents through global psychology: A cooperative learning community. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: Programs and practices in response and prevention (Vol. IVpp. 131-156). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter first briefly summarizes relevant research in developmental and social psychology that support the assertion that the conscious incorporation into education and socialization of strategies designed to minimize tendencies toward stereotyping that lead to prejudice, hate and violence will prevent the spread of terrorism. Then, promising educational strategies to incorporate into classrooms are reviewed. Finally, the Global Psychology project, developed through the American Psychological Association P3 Project (McCarthy, 2001), Division 2, and the First International Conference on Psychology Education (Karandashev, 2002) is described. Areas discussed include the influences of identity development and attitude formation, media, peers, role models and social learning, stereotyping and prejudice. Areas that need to be addressed in the education of youth in this arena include anger management, mentoring programs, critical thinking skills and metacognitive awareness, and global cooperative learning.

Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter begins with a brief effort to put modern terrorism in context. Thereafter, the chapter is divided into 2 main sections. The first section deals with psychological issues involved in understanding the perpetrators of terrorism, including their motivations and strategies. The second section deals with the US response to terrorism, including issues of fear and identity shift in reaction to the events of September 11, 2001.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In a global war on terrorism, it is important to ask what we mean by terrorism.
- The distinction between combatants and non-combatants between people in uniform and people not in uniform has been eroding since the French Revolution.
- A common suggestion is that there must be something wrong with terrorists. Terrorists must be crazy, or suicidal, or psychopaths without moral feelings or feelings for others. Thirty years ago this suggestion was taken very seriously, but thirty years of research has found psychopathology and personality disorder no more likely among terrorists than among non-terrorists from the same background.
- The trajectory by which normal people become capable of doing terrible things is usually gradual, perhaps imperceptible to the individual.
- There is no special association between religion and violence.
- In brief, the psychology behind terrorist violence is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that link cause with comrades.
- Psychologists recognize two kinds of aggression, emotional and instrumental.
- Terrorists particularly hope to elicit a violent response that will assist them in mobilizing their own people.
- Since the first bombing attack on the World Trade Center, the U.S. response to terrorism has shifted from criminal justice finding, trying and punishing perpetrators to waging war. This shift has psychological consequences.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Two major problems involved in defining terrorism are reviewed: the degree to which the term conveys a negative evaluation rather than an objective description of behavior, and the possibility that the range of behaviors referred to under this term is so diverse making the category useless for research purposes. It is argued that a tight definition of terrorism is not necessary in order to begin to learn from prototype examples of the category. Then a number of generalizations from recent research are considered, these are relatively simple but not always been obvious. Together these generalizations indicate that policy-makers might usefully consider the potential value of a ‘no terrorist response’ to terrorist challenge. Finally, a number of suggestions for future terrorism research are offered.
- Two concerns that may usefully be distinguished. One is a matter of evaluation: to call an act of violence unavoidably an evaluation of the acts as unacceptable, unjustified, and wrong.
- The second concern is the usefulness of the category of terrorism as a social science construct.
- Experienced terrorism researchers at the conference were confident that they could and did use the word terrorist without evaluation.
- The issue of evaluation became more complicated, however, when the visitors from Washington joined the discussion.
- Conventions against chemical and biological warfare have not been conspicuously successful, at least not with regards to wars in and between less developed nations.
- Whatever the problems of the CBW agreements, they at least admit an objective definition of what it means to use chemical or biological weapons.
- The researchers will use the term terrorist as a research category while the policy makers use it to express evaluation: each side is likely to forget that the other attaches a different meaning to the
-Consider now the value of terrorism as an analytic category for terrorism researchers. The goal of any category for purposes of theory building is to put together instances of behavior that are similar in some way that permits order and understanding.
-Crenshaw’s is a theory of the life-cycle dynamics of groups that have reached the extremity of terrorism.
-The easiest reaction to behavior that we do not understand is to call it crazy. The next easiest is to call it fanatic.
-Rather it is the case that terrorism is the work of normal persons.
-The terrorist group is only the apex of a pyramid of supporters and sympathizers. The relatively few terrorists depend on the much larger numbers below them in the pyramid in many ways—for information, refuge, money, silence—most particularly recruits.
-There are often multiple terrorist groups competing for the same sympathizers, that is, more than one apex of the same pyramid.
-A question that re-appeared a number of times during the seminar, in the midst of discussion of a variety of issues, was whether doing nothing in response to a terrorist challenge might actually be the best policy. The issue came to be referred to in shorthand as the question of the no-response, and there was some argument that this alternative should be taken more seriously.
-First, is the question of how people react to rare but highly salient events.
-A second line of research that might be helpful focuses on how minorities sometimes succeed in influencing majorities.
-Third, terrorism research might find it useful to distinguish between internalization or private acceptance of persuasion, on the other hand, and compliance or public agreement without private acceptance, on the other hand.
-A fourth direction of research would be to apply what has been learned about the motivation and behavior of men in combat to understanding the behaviors of terrorists.
-Fifth, there is a distinction between instrumental and expressive aggression that might be of use in the study of a terrorist violence.
-Sixth is the possibility of finding something useful about anti-social extremism of terrorism by looking at research on the prosocial extremism of those who risk their lives to help others.
-Seventh and last in a research implication of Sprinzak’s theory of the individual trajectory to terrorism (this volume). Sprinzak suggests that government could learn enough about political opposition groups to provide early warning of the transition to terrorism.
-The common denominator of these suggestions for research on terrorism is the recognition that terrorists are normal people behaving abnormally.
-The premise of cognitive psychology is that people respond, not to the world as it is, but to the world as perceived.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter focuses on understanding terrorism as a group phenomenon. Drawing on social psychology literature, the author reviews the following: religious conversion to cults, extremity shift in groups and individual extremity shift in obedience studies. Involvement in extremists causes may happen gradually through affiliation with a series of groups or it may evolve as the group itself undergoes radical change. The authors assert there is a specialization and hierarchy of violence in extremist groups but their evidence is based only on groups from the 1970's and 1980's. Conflict (internal and external) is constant and persuasive in terrorist groups.
-Inter-group conflict leads to tension among members. Rewards for terrorist group membership include: money, emotional needs (actions over words, vengeance, family substitute), cognitive (sense of mission and self-righteousness), social rewards (increased status and admiration by family and peers).
-Terrorist objectives-two types: ultimates (ideological/political goals) and proximate (well being of group and movement toward ultimate)—often proximate objects take precedence and terrorism (to sustain the group) becomes an end unto itself.
-Cult recruitment: "Perceived deprivation establishes the pool of potential converts to a particular
cult, but social networks determine who among the many in the pool are likely to be among actually recruited. Why remain? They feel less stresses, social bands with other members, material and social rewards. Cults tend to have less inter-group conflict than terrorist groups.

- Group Extremity Shift: Groups tend to evolve naturally to more extreme positions over time. In part because they are swayed by the rational arguments of theirs and also because group members admire those who are more extreme and more to be at least "average" extremely on an issue.

- Individual Extremity Shift: Drawing on Migrans's obedience studies ("administering shocks") offers rational of on "agentic shift" from being responsible for their own behavior to being responsible to the experimenter. Also to refuse would cause one to question what they did so for causing dissonance. Small gradators in escalation also contributed to success.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: We restrict our analysis to what Laqueur has called terrorism.

- Terrorism is a group phenomenon.
- A few demographic generalizations can be made with confidence, among them the fact that terrorists are predominantly male.
- Terrorists are also young, usually in their (often early) twenties, although leaders may be in their thirties and older. Most terrorist come from middle class or professional families. Many have at least some university education.
- Psychological generalizations are more elusive. Perhaps the best documented generalization in negative: terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology. According to Crenshaw, "the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is the normality."
- Attempts to delineate a terrorist personality have not been fruitful.
- Something more powerful than ideology is at work. Bollinger has suggested that social deficits in West German terrorists' personal lives may have been a key factor in their attraction to group membership in the RAF; Post believes that joining an extremist group represents above all an attempt to belong. As Crenshaw explains, "The group, as sector and interpreter of ideology is central."
- It is important to recognize that their radical behavior is acquired gradually.
- It is also possible that an individual member becomes more extreme as the whole group undergoes radical change.
- Bollinger discusses a process of "double marginalization" among members of the RAF, first in leftist student movement, and then beyond the limits of that into a distinct subculture in which a separate system of norms gradually developed.
- There is specialization and hierarchy of violent behavior in terrorist groups.
- An important factor in the psychosocial reality of terrorist groups is constant and pervasive conflict.
- Inter-group conflict is also not unusual.
- Finally, perhaps most important, intra-group conflict leads to constant and powerful tension among group members.
- As Zawodny notes, an important function of external violence is to restore cohesion within the terrorist group. Without action and external threat, the group may destroy itself.
- Members do in fact leave, Post cites findings that as many as 23 percent of the RAF dropped out.
- Sometimes a group of dissatisfied members will leave to form a splinter faction.
- Crenshaw cites a high rate of attrition in terrorist organizations, which makes stable membership unlikely.
- The group offers powerful incentives to remain. One class of reward for membership is material.
- Beyond the material rewards are emotional, cognitive, and social gains of group membership.
- Finally, the group offers powerful social rewards.
- Terrorist objectives can be divided into two categories: ultimate objectives (i.e. the grievance the group claims to redress or ideology it vows) and proximate objectives (well-being of the group)
- In the pursuit of recognition and attention, a major (sometimes only) aim of terrorist action is media coverage.
- Post appears to have been the first to recognize that cult recruiting can provide a useful model of terrorist recruiting.
The interaction of deprivation and social networks in predicting cult recruitment is nowhere better represented than in some remarkable studies of the UC carried out by an investigator with the cooperation of church leaders.

What keeps the recruits in the cult? Cult members feel themselves less stressed than they were before joining. The importance of personal ties.

Another aspect of the experience of cult groups worth noting is the constant flux in the member's identities and levels of commitment.

A big difference between cults and terrorist groups appears to be the relative lack of intragroup conflict in the cults in comparison with the high levels of conflict reported within the terrorist groups.

An observation about terrorist groups is that they become more extreme only gradually over a period of time.

First the shift to extremity occurs as a function of change in the membership of the group.

Another and maybe a more impressive way: the same membership may become more extreme over time.

Individual extremity shift in terrorist groups can also be understood by reference to Milgram's studies of obedience. Milgram theorized about the power of his situation in terms of structure of authority and an agentic shift in which subjects moved from seeing themselves as responsible for their behavior to seeing themselves as responsible to the experimenter.

To the extent that social influence in the group involves the individual in behavior more extreme than he would prefer alone, the pressure of self-justification will erode inhibitions against violence and conduce to another more extreme step.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary Authors Abstract: How do terrorists and terrorist groups make decisions? And what influence do terrorist decision-making styles have on the course of a terrorist campaign? Efforts to answer these questions have centered on three sets of theories. In order of generality, these are (a) strategic theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism and related forms of political violence is considered to be an instrumental choice; (b) organizational theories, in which the sources of violence are found in the internal dynamics of the terrorist group itself; and (c) psychological theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism is explained within the framework of individual psychology. Most observers agree that these lines of inquiry are not mutually exclusive, but each offers a distinctive approach to terrorist decision making. This essay examines each of these theoretical approaches in turn. It concludes with a brief discussion of the decision-making constraints that help shape terrorist life cycles.

- Terrorism has a long and diverse history.
- Scholarly interest in the subject did not begin in earnest until the early 1970s, spurred by the sharp increase in terrorist actions carried out in the previous decade.
- With a few notable exceptions, the interest of these early theorists was tactical rather than intellectual.
- The goals of modern research have changed, but terrorism has remained a contentious field of inquiry.
- Schmid & Jongman identified over 100 separate definitions of terrorism in 1988, and the situation has not improved much since.
- Two competing philosophies of terrorism developed during these formative years that continue to define terrorist behavior to this day. The first was a philosophy of rationalism. To the rational terrorist, violence was a means to an end.
- Coexisting and competing with this utilitarian perspective was the view that terrorism was a means of individual expression. Terrorism, according to this line of argument, was a redemptive act, or, as Bakunin put it, an act of “redemptive destruction.” Apart from its political function, it also served the individual and collective psychological needs of the terrorists themselves. The resort to terrorism was an existential choice.
- These two philosophies of violence took on an increasingly ideological cast during the latter part of the nineteenth century. “Rationalists” tended to be attracted to the developing doctrine of revolutionary socialism. Socialist theory, in turn, promoted the rational use of violence.
- “Expressionists,” by contrast, tended to be attracted to the doctrine of anarchism. Anarchist theory, in turn, found terrorism attractive because it was “spontaneous, reckless, and in a sense, irrational”. Emotive acts of terrorism, in this view, were the “archetypal form of human resistance : : : and the medium through which heroic values can most fully be expressed”. These two schools of thought, not surprisingly, gave rise to two distinct models of terrorist organization. The rationalists, as might be expected, were better organized. Terrorism, in their view, was a collective enterprise that required a high level of organization and careful planning to succeed. Mainstream “organization” within the anarchist movement evolved in a very different direction. At a philosophical level, the idea of subjective individuals to the discipline of a hierarchical organization, even for a revolutionary purpose, was antithetical to the movement’s libertarian principles. It remains useful to distinguish between rationalists and expressionists: between those who employ terrorism on behalf of an external goal and those whose goal is to carry out acts of terror.

- Some early efforts to examine the contextual sources of terrorism (and other forms of insurrectionary violence) made a useful distinction between the “preconditions” that lay the groundwork for terrorist activity and the “precipitating” factors that help explain the actual outbreak of violence. Building on this distinction, Crenshaw suggested that terrorist groups also depend critically on “enabling” or “permissive” factors to create the tactical opportunity they require to conduct operations.

- In general, theoretical work in this area can be divided along three levels of analysis depending on the nature of the (primary) independent variable that is used to explain terrorist behavior. Each, arguably, explains a part of the puzzle. In order of generality, these are (a) strategic theories, in which the decision to employ terrorism and related forms of political violence is an instrumental choice made by a rational organization attempting to achieve a defined set of external objectives, (b) organizational theories, in which the sources of violence are found in the internal dynamics of the terrorist group itself, apart from its stated goals, and (c) psychological theories, in which the decision to resort to terrorism is explained within the framework of individual psychology. Although most observers agree that these lines of inquiry are not mutually exclusive, each constitutes a distinctive approach to terrorist decision making. I briefly examine each in turn.

- The Strategic Frame As Schelling once observed, the most important division among students of conflict lies between those who approach the problem “as a pathological state and seek its causes and treatment,” and those “who take conflict for granted” and study it sources and effects.

- The strategic frame has been readily adapted to the study of terrorist decision making. Terrorism, in this view, is an instrumental activity designed to achieve or help achieve a specified set of long-run and short-run objectives.

- The decision to act (or not act), in this view, depends on the answers to four questions: What alternative courses of action are available? What are the expected effects of each of these alternatives? How are these expected effects likely to influence group objectives? What decision rule will be employed to decide among the alternatives?

- A second feature of the strategic model is the simplifying assumption that terrorist groups act with a “collective rationality”.

- The “procedural” theory of strategic decision making, by contrast, assumes that although terrorist groups may act rationally according to their beliefs about the world around them, these beliefs are incomplete reflections of reality.

- For analytical purposes, the link between a terrorist action and its (intended and unintended) consequences can be broken down into a series of steps. In step 1, an action is carried out against a specified target. In step 2, the action is interpreted, packaged, and retransmitted by the media. In step 3, the “mediated” message is received and interpreted by the group’s target audience(s). In step 4, it is hoped, the target(s) of influence respond in a way that advances group interests.

- In the end, the strategic approach to terrorist decision making offers what Schelling once called a “cheap theory.” Analyzing a group’s likely course of action, as noted above, only requires putting ourselves in its place, defining its objectives and operating constraints, and then choosing as it would choose to
maximize its expected political return. The simplicity of this approach is both its strength and its weakness.

- The Organizational Frame in contrast to the rational choice model, which argues that terrorism represents a calculated and instrumental attempt to achieve an external set of political objectives, the organizational model suggests that much of what terrorists do on the outside can only be understood by looking inside the group itself. A terrorist organization is not a black box but a living system, subject to a range of influences that may be only tangentially related to its stated strategic objectives.

- This approach begins with the observation that terrorist groups, for reasons of survival, are clandestine organizations. This clandestine requirement, furthermore, is a hard constraint.

- As terrorists go deeper underground, group decision making can become an increasingly closed, rigid, and inward-looking process.

- Terrorists wage a “fantasy war”. One common feature of this fantasy is the belief that, as militants, they are acting as soldiers, in a fashion similar to those of their government opponents.

- A second common illusion is the belief that their actions are defensive. Terrorists almost always “claim to act in defense of a larger community whose integrity and well-being [are] at risk”. They avoid responsibility for their actions by blaming their opponents.

- The problem this poses for strategic decision making is often compounded by a bias toward action.

- Terrorist behavior can also be influenced by interorganizational competition. Terrorist organizations, in this view, act as political interest groups. They frequently compete with each other in radical rivalries for political market share.

- This action bias, coupled with the “hothouse” internal environment of terrorist groups, also encourages risk taking.

- The problem of “group think” can be easily reinforced by the tendency toward self-censorship and consensus building that occurs naturally in closed, “primary” collectives. Terrorists everywhere share a strong group dependency.

- Questioning the direction or decisions of the group, or any other aspect of its collective perspective, can be interpreted as an act of disloyalty and a threat to the organization’s existence.

- Drawing on Collins & Guetzkow, Crenshaw has argued that it is often the “inter-personal” rewards of group membership, rather than the “task-environmental” rewards associated with a terrorist group’s political mission, that draw individuals to the close quarters of underground life.

- Over time, it is suggested, the need to preserve the group can actually begin to supplant its political mission altogether.

- These and similar dynamics can undermine a terrorist group’s ability to sustain itself over time. Individuals typically enter the underground through preexisting social networks.

- The Psychological Frame The psychological study of terrorist decision making has focused on the role of cognitive and affective distortions in shaping terrorist behavior. (This has been true of political psychology in general; see Mandel 1986.) “Cognitive distortions,” in this case, are perceptual deviations that can be attributed to the simplifying models that individuals use to interpret the world. “Affective distortions,” by contrast, are emotional factors or other personality characteristics that undermine an individual’s ability to see things as they really are.

- Research in this area has largely clustered around four lines of inquiry. The first of these efforts, not surprisingly, attempted to uncover any psychological traits that terrorists might share in common.

- With a number of exceptions, most observers agree that although latent personality traits can certainly contribute to the decision to turn to violence, there is no single set of psychic attributes that explains terrorist behavior.

- It is also generally agreed that most terrorist activity is not due to mental pathologies.

- A second line of analysis has focused on the relationship between frustration and aggression.

- This argument was first advanced over 60 years ago and was subsequently extended to the problem of political violence and terrorism. Frustration-aggression theory was brought squarely into the realm of individual psychology with Gurr’s concept of “relative deprivation” (1970a,b).

- A parallel set of efforts to explain the psychological sources of terrorist behavior has employed
“narcissism-aggression” models of violence. The possible linkage between narcissism and terrorism was first advanced by Morf and subsequently discussed by Lasch, Crayton, Haynal et al., Post, and Pearlstein.

- A fourth important body of work on terrorist psychology has approached the subject as an interactive and developmental problem. The “developmental” argument has been advanced, in various forms, by a wide range of commentators. Terrorism, in this view, is not the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a larger political environment involving the state, the terrorist group, and the group’s self-designated political constituency. The interaction of these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions.

- An important variant of this approach has been developed by Bandura, who has sought to explain how terrorists justify their actions through a process of “moral disengagement” over time. “Self-sanction,” Bandura suggests, “plays a central role in the regulation of human conduct.” Individuals refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards because such behavior would bring self-condemnation (Bandura 1990, p. 161).

- A related developmental model has been advanced by Sprinzak. The process radicalization that pushes some individuals toward violence (and leaves others behind) occurs over time in a sequential manner. This conversion, he argues, involves a cognitive transformation that unfolds in three stages: through (a) a “crisis of confidence,” (b) a “conflict of legitimacy,” and (c) a “crisis of legitimacy”.

- One unifying theme that underlies the psychological study of terrorism is the important behavioral role that is attributed to the individual’s belief system. As suggested above, terrorists view themselves and the enemy in stereo typical ways.

- As suggested above, it is also commonly agreed that terrorist belief systems are influenced significantly by intragroup dynamics.

- It is reasonable to ask whether the individual psychology of terrorism can be separated from its larger cultural and social context. If not, is it reasonable to expect to find a psychological common denominator that links, in more than a casual way, individual terrorists from such radically disparate environments as Northern Ireland, northern Idaho, and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan?

- What distinguishes terrorists psychologically from the general population is their belief system, which places them at the center of a Manichean struggle between good and evil.

- The study of terrorist psychology has advanced significantly in the past two decades, but much more needs to be done to develop a true psychology of terrorist decision making.

- Of particular interest, in this respect, is the psychological basis of group factionalism, the psychology of escalation and de-escalation, and the cognitive evolution that can lead an individual to eventually leave the faith and renounce terrorism altogether.

- Terrorist Life cycles Terrorist groups, it is generally agreed, emerge out of larger radical social movements.

- Once a group has made the transition to terrorism, it must navigate between two objective constraints if it is going to stay in the game. The first is a security constraint. The second constraint is an influence constraint. Terrorists must maintain a minimum “violent presence” to remain effective.

- The influence and security of a group depends in part on its choice of targets, tactics, and timing, but in competing ways.

- As we can see, a fundamental tension exists between terrorist influence objectives and their basic security requirements.

- Terrorist decision-making process can be evaluated abstractly as a “feedback control system” that attempts to identify and execute the best course of action given the group’s competing influence and security objectives on the one hand, and the nature of its operating environment on the other. Two factors that influence this process are (a) the degree to which terrorist decision makers believe that the operational choices they make in the short run can help shape their range of strategic options over time, and (b) the degree to which they are willing to forego current gains in an effort to improve the group’s future position and thereby increase its expected long-run returns.

- Examining terrorist decision making as a “system control” problem can provide a number of
insights into the underlying dynamics of terrorist life cycles.

- In summary, a terrorist group’s life cycle is shaped by its changing environmental constraints and by the degree to which it is able to continue to operate within these fluctuating constraints. Over the long run, the terrorist group’s strategic space (TSTI) defines the limits of the possible.

-Conclusions: Terrorist decision-making processes vary widely. The organizational and psychological approaches to terrorist decision making do not generally suggest that terrorist groups cannot operate with strategic intent, only that the strategic model is incomplete.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Written in the mid-1980's, this article argues that psychological Operations (PSYOP) techniques can and should be used more effectively in anti- and counter-terrorism operations. The yields are potentially very high and the cost of failure and mis-estimation are less than for tactical operations. After framing terrorism itself as a type of PSYOP, the author outlines procedures for propaganda analysis including: Source, content, audience, media and effects of analysis. Then describes the none counterpropaganda techniques in Army Doctrine: Direct refutation, indirect refutation, forestalling, immunization, diversion, silence, minimization, restrictive measures, and deception. The premise is intriguing and well-taken, but the analysis provided is very basic and does not account for the evolved nature and the current terrorist threat.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is book is apparently written as a popular press title. It is not a “study” and contains no references or citations. There is no systematic or integrative analysis of behavior or psychological concepts as they relate to terrorism. Instead, the book is composed of an introduction and eleven chapters each describing the terrorist acts or actors of a different group, ranging from the PFLP to the Japanese Red Army. The accounts are dated, but not uninteresting, although they lack much operational value.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article is based on a "master lecture" at the annual meeting of the society for personality assessment. He first reviews the construct he and his colleagues have developed of the "violent true believer". He goes on to suggest that the component traits can be inferred through indirect assessment, relying on others observations and personal productions (e.g. writing, drawings, etc) by the subject. This assessment can be made using an idiographic approach (a "bottom up" approach built data from an extensive case study and applied inductively) or a nomothetic approach (a "top down" approach where components of a construct are identified and applied deductively to an individual case). He presents case studies of Timothy McVeigh (idiographic) and Mohammed Atta (nomothetic), and briefly reviews the risks and issues using this approach.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article evolved from an uncommissioned paper developed by the authors during the week following the 9/11 attacks on America. The authors acknowledge that it is not a scholarly submission and offer no supporting references. In it, the argue for the concept of a “violent true believer” (drawing in part on Eric Hoffer’s terminology) and what they call his “homicidal and suicidal state of mind” (which they refer to by the acronym HASSOM). They begin by outlining the types of incidents in which homicide and suicide co-occur, then go on to characterize their co-occurrence as exemplifying: a tactical understanding of suicide as a weapon; envy; helpless dependency; omnipotence; despair and depression; entitlement; grandiose fantasy; “some psychopathy,” callousness and emotional detachment; violent true beliefs; predatory violence; paranoia; and a sense of foreshortened future. They then offer a composite “profiling advisory” of “The Violent True Believer: HASSOM,” which includes stable traits as well as suicidal and homicidal indicators. Even setting aside the potential for prematurity, it is not even clear whether, or the extent to which, the research on (and dynamics of) “murder-suicide” (most of
which comprise elderly men who kill their infirm wives before taking their own life) would apply to suicide terrorism, or how the psychological hypotheses and profiling advisory might be operationally useful

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: A review of the research on the motivations and behaviors of bombers is presented. The methodology consisted of a computer search of eight databases, book reviews, and telephonic interviews with local and federal law enforcement. The data were then compared to the substantial research on psychopathy. The authors conclude that a federally funded research effort is necessary, and should incorporate various structured interviews, history gathering, and psychological and physiological tests of incarcerated bombers, theoretically guided by the concordance between the known motivations and behavior of bombers and the concurrent and predictive validity of the construct, psychopathy.
-In the present review article we compare the similarities and differences between the criminal behavior of bombing and the psychopathic personality
-We first gathered information on bombers from a variety of sources that included computer databases, books and articles, and interviews.
-The findings of the FBI indicate that there were 3163 bombing incidents reported in 1994. That figure represents, on average, nearly nine new cases each day.
-The FBI Bomb Summary further breaks down the bombing incidents by type of target. The four most frequent targets are residential properties (52%), commercial business and vehicles (11%), open areas (7%), and academic facilities (4%).
-Most known bombers are caucasian males. Most bombers are also single or reportedly involved in a marriage of convenience. There are no data available on the average age of bombers. Our examination of anecdotal data suggests that the age range is very broad, and varies from adolescence to individuals in their sixth decade of life. None of these data is useful for profiling unidentified subjects in bombing incidents, however, since most individuals who are violent are males, most males in the U.S. are caucasian, and most people who live in the U.S. are between the ages of 12 and 50.
-The increase of bombings in the U.S. begs the question of its appeal. What is it about bombing that makes it such an attractive form of terrorism for both individuals and groups? Poland identified five reasons which account for this increase: Bombings are the most effective way of attacking an ‘enemy.’ They are lethal, indiscriminant, and ‘cold-blooded.’ Explosive and bomb technology, including manuals, are readily available to terrorists at low costs. One person with the required expertise can make bombs. Improved timing devices reduce risk and allow terrorists to escape injury and detection. Terrorists have learned that the bigger the explosion, and the greater the casualties, the more intense the coverage by the news media.
-The available research on bombers, meager as it is, does not support any one specific profile of individuals who commit these crimes. As one researcher wrote, “Priests and gangsters, police officers and criminals, bricklayers and psychologists, men and women of all trades and professions have been arrested for these crimes. The personalities of bombers are as varied as their explosive devices’.
-One of the most significant contributors to the early study of bombers was the work of Brussel. In 1953 he used his knowledge of psychopathology to add a new dimension to criminal investigation: criminal profiling.
-Brussel wrote, “by studying a man’s deeds, he could deduce what kind of man he might be”, the central premise of contemporary criminal profiling.
-In 1977 Macdonald applied these same basic principles, although with known subjects, in his book, Bombers and Firesetters. His research was based upon the study and interviews of more than 30 bombers and 100 arsonists. the compulsive bomber, the psychotic bomber, the sociopathic bomber, the political bomber, the Mafia bomber, and the military bomber.
-Two classes of repetitive bombers have been hypothesized by Dietz. Like Macdonald’s compulsive bomber, Dietz identified a type of bomber “whose motives are based in delusions which, if true, would be grounds for animosity, a desire for revenge, or other motives found among nonpsychotic bombers”. A second type of repetitive bomber is “obsessed with explosive devices, go(es) to great
lengths to secure materials and technical information, demonstrate(s) an inordinate fascination with explosives, and occasionally report(s) sexual or other emotional arousal or gratification associated with explosions”.

-Dietz theorized that there were four possible explanations: psychopathy, intoxication, life stressors, or intense emotional states.

-There are a number of definitions of psychopathy. Hare empirically defined psychopathy as “composed of two correlated factors, one reflecting the personality traits widely considered to be descriptive of the syndrome, and the other reflecting socially deviant behavior.”

-One area of divergence in the data between bombers and psychopathy is avoidance. Hart and Hare found that psychopathy was negatively correlated with ratings of avoidant personality disorder.

-Another point of divergence between psychopathy and bombing is the degree to which the political bomber is committed to his belief system and the cause that motivates his behavior (measured by Item 15 of the PCL-R: Irresponsibility).

-Our hypothesis is that the greater the degree of psychopathy in a bomber, the less likely he is to be genuinely motivated by political beliefs. In a similar sense, all terrorists are not psychopaths, but there are certainly psychopathic terrorists.

-None of the investigative procedures and typologies we have mentioned have been empirically tested.

-We would make the following recommendations: 1) The FBI/ATF and NCAVC study that we have mentioned be immediately funded.

-2) Methodologies incorporate structured interviews, history gathering independent of the subject, psychological and neuropsychological tests, and physiological measures, such as skin conductance, resting heart rate, and EEG. 3) Personality measures be utilized, including the MMPI-2, MCMI-III, PCL-R, and Rorschach. 4) Researchers, clinicians, and forensic investigators alike, should consider psychopathy a genotype that may be phenotypically expressed, in kind and degree, in bombers.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Since 1968 international terrorism has grown considerably, despite governments effort to curb it. Part of this failure is attributable to the inadequate contribution of academic research to government policy making on terrorism. The paper identifies three problem areas that hinder academic influence on government policy making in this field. These are: (1) Terrorism is a difficult subject for research because its diversity makes generalizations questionable and empirical data are hardly accessible for the academic researcher. (2) By and large, terrorism has remained outside the interest of the mainstream social science. Academic contributions on terrorism have often been occasional and amateurish, lacking in factual knowledge of the subject matter. Many of them are too theoretical to have an applicability value and some are too speculative to be reliable. (3) For a variety of reasons, including resistance to extreme influences in general and suspicion of academia in particular, government officials have failed to utilize even sound knowledge and competent professional advice of academics. In some demonstrable cases this neglect has had deleterious effects on the quality of government decisions concerning terrorism. In order to improve the utilization of potential academic contribution to policy decisions on terrorism, governments should selectively support academic research on terrorism that has a high practical promise. Preference should be given to subjects of study where academic has a relative advantage over government in depth and rigor. It is also suggested that academic influence on government decision making would be served best by exchange of people between academia and government.

-This paper deals with a specific aspect of failure, namely, the inadequate contribution of academic research on terrorism to governmental policy making. In treating this topic, it focuses on the following constituents of the problem: difficulties stemming for the nature of terrorism; problems relating to the state of academic research on terrorism; and the interface between government and academia. The final section of the study ventures some conclusions and suggestions.

-It is often mentioned that terrorism is a young phenomenon.

-Even if we exclude the application of terrorism by repressive regimes against their own citizens, we are still left with a great variety of terroristic phenomena from below that seem to have very little in common. At best, there are terrorisms, a broad spectrum of violent attempts to attain political, social
or religious objectives by sub national groups that may or may not enjoy state support.  
- The customary tools of psychological and sociological research are almost always inapplicable for  
  studying terrorist groups and their individual members.  
- Psychological studies of captured or repented terrorists suffer from inherent artifacts, since it is  
  doubtful that the conditions of these studies represent the normal terrorist's habitat and that the  
  individual subjects are a representative sample of the active uncaptured terrorist population.  
- My own experience suggests, after all, that the loss of information due to secrecy is not so great,  
  since the kind of information collected by intelligence outfits is a far cry from the accepted minimum  
  for scientific research or for reliable clinical assessment.  
- Until recently, the academic community paid very little attention to the phenomena of terrorism.  
- The psychological abstracts, the most authoritative compendium of academic publications in  
  psychology, listed no reference to terrorism or to related terms, such as 'hostages' or hijacking', until  
  the end of 1981. By this criterion, academic psychology recognized terrorism as a subject worthy of  
  consideration only in 1982. In that year the Psychological Abstracts listed ten publications under  
  this topic [Merari and Friedland, 1985]  
- It seems that the majority of the academic contributions in this area have been done by people  
  whose main research interests lie elsewhere, who felt that they had something to say on this juicy  
  and timely subject.  
- Usually, a contribution of this kind is well-grounded in the empirical and theoretical findings of the  
  writer's particular area of expertise, but lacking in knowledge of terrorism.  
- In the absence of systematic and first-hand information, the prevailing academic notion of the  
  psychological and sociological characteristics of terrorists and terrorist groups is often largely  
  speculative.  
- Even empirical studies rest heavily on secondary, partial sources that suffer from severe limitations.  
  A case in point is the study by Russell and Miller [1977]. This study merits special mention because  
  it is one of the most comprehensible efforts of its kind, it has been widely quoted, has been reprinted  
  several times, and it has led to some of the common misconceptions in the field. This study is an  
  attempt to portray the profile of terrorists, using data on 350 terrorists that belonged to 18 groups of  
  various nationalities. The authors reported that they collected their data from newspapers, some  
  academic works, and government publications. The basic problem with the study is sampling bias.  
- The characteristics of Palestinian terrorist who had been sent to Israel for the purpose of carrying out  
  high-risk missions (hostage-taking and/or mass killing) and were captured in the course of their  
  mission, are also quite different from those described by Russell and Miller.  
- The damage done by studies of this kind is not limited to factual errors about the characteristics of  
  specific terrorist groups, but may lead to basic conceptual mistakes.  
- This study essentially claims that terrorists are basically alike, and by extension, terrorism is by and  
  large a homogeneous phenomenon.  
- As Gurr observes, "with a few clusters of exceptions there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of  
  empirically-grounded research on terrorism'. This may well be an understatement.  
- Calling the attention of government officials to the existence of a potential problem and to the need  
  to think in advance about possible solutions is usually long enough to make them act upon it.  
- A considerable part of the academic writing on terrorism is simply irrelevant to government  
  decision making.  
- I have no real ground to complain in general about governments' disregard for academic wisdom on  
  terrorism and combating terrorism. The existing corpus of scientific knowledge about the  
  phenomenon does not justify a more serious attitude on the part of decision makers.  
- A natural first step should be to identify those areas of research that should be encouraged.  
- In determining what type of research should be promoted, the following criteria should be taken  
  into account. (1) Relevance for public policy decisions. (2) Relative advantage of academia over  
  government in the particular type and area of research. (3)Accessibility of data.  
- In my opinion, research areas which merit encouragement are of two main kinds: (1) In-depth  
  studies of the specific terrorist groups, describing ideology, motivations, structure, decision-making  
  processes, demographic and personality characteristics, etc. (2)Problem oriented studies cutting  
  across time and places. There are basically comparative studies looking into issues such as  
  conditioned leading to escalation in the level of terrorist violence, anti terrorism legislation, the  
  utility of deterrence as applied to terrorist groups and to terrorism-sponsoring states, factors
influencing the success of amnesty programs for terrorists, political negotiations with terrorist groups, hostage negotiations, etc.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Estimates of the number of currently active terrorist groups around the globe range between about a hundred and two hundred. Unquestionably, not all of these groups are made of the same skin. They differ in ideology, geographic sphere action, size and composition, to mention only a few variables. Typological attempts to bring order to this chaos has mostly centered on group ideology (e.g., distinguishing between rightist and leftist organizations), on group purpose or raison d’etre (e.g., separation from a mother state, independence from a foreign rule, domestic revolution), and on psychological motives.

-By and large, they lack a functional meaning. In the context of terrorist groups, the most significant criteria of functionally or usefulness are the ability to predict future behavior and events and to project the efficacy of possible countermeasures.

-In an attempt to depict a simple-yet functional-classification of terrorist groups, I shall divide them into two elementary kinds of organizations in the basis of their target populations: those that fight against some foreign government, organization, or population, either at home or abroad, and those that conduct a domestic political struggle against the government or rival political organization. The first type will be designated as xenofighters, and the second, homofighters.

-Each of these two basic types, however, can be further subdivided in terms of its base of operation. Some fight from a domestic base, and some, from a base abroad. Altogether, this classification can be depicted in a 2x2 table, in which each cell is characterized by the type of terrorist target population and by the place of the terrorist bases.

-Those that fight foreigners from a base abroad are quite common and active.

-The following list of operational goals suits this type of terrorist organization. 1) Attraction of international attention. 2) Harming the relations of the target country with other nations. 3) Induction of insecurity, damaging the economy and public order in the target country. 4) Building feelings of distrust and hostility toward the government among the target country’s population. 5) Causing actual damage to civilians, security forces, and property in the target country.

-The following list of goals is characteristic of organizations that conduct terrorist activities against their own countrymen. 1) Undermine internal security, public order, and the economy in order to create distrust in the government’s ability to maintain control. 2) Acquiring popular sympathy and support by positive action. 3) Generating popular repulsion from extreme counterterrorist repressive measures. 4) Damaging hated foreign interests. 5) Harming the international position of the existing regime. 6) Causing physical damage and harassing persons and institutions that represent the ruling regime.

-The following generalizations can be derived on the basis of the present classification. 1) Xenofighter terrorist groups tend to adopt more indiscriminate tactics than homofighters. 2) Foreign-based terrorist groups tend to perpetrate international terrorism. 3) Foreign-based terrorist organizations are mostly dependent upon foreign countries’ support.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The expectation that terrorism may disappear under a new world order is anchored in two fallacious premises. The first is the supposition that, by large, terrorism is perpetrated by states, directly or indirectly. The second fallacious premise is that terrorism is an abnormality—a form of social and political disease—that would disappear if a remedy were found.

-Terrorism however, had not changed in the course of a century, and virtually not at all during the last 25 years.

-The stagnation is astonishing, considering the fact that in the late nineteenth century, Russian terrorists adopted new explosives as soon as they were invented.

-My argument is that the organization features of terrorism cannot change, and that the use of technology in terrorist warfare is limited, partly by the psychological, social, and political context within which terrorists operate.

-The organizational characteristics of terrorist operations are inherent in this form of struggle. The need to maintain clandestineness dictates a compartmentalized organization, selective-and therefore
limited-recruiting members, and operation in small teams. These in turn, limit the tactics available to terrorists.
-Claims that terrorism is changing for the worse find support in the notion that terrorist attacks have consistently become more life-threatening in the course of the last three decades.
-The statistics on which the seeming increased threat to life trend is based only relate to international terrorism, whereas most terrorist activity is domestic. The number of incidents in these statistics is small and therefore easily skewed by single events.
-Moreover the "trend" is inconsistent. There are fluctuations from year to year that can only be explained by regional or local political developments, rather than by universal change in the nature of terrorism.
-Indiscriminate attacks cannot be attributed to stricter moral values in the past, but to differences in the agendas of the terrorist groups that were in the focus of public (and academic) attention.
-The motivation to resort to terrorism can be analyzed in two ways: the ideology that impels the use of violence by a group of people i.e., the group's raison d'etre, and the psychological drives that make some people opt for violence rather than alternative, non-violent courses of action. Terrorism is a means not a goal.
-The motivations to use terrorism are, therefore, inherently diverse, as they reflect the whole spectrum of human striving.
-Personal motivation for resorting to terrorism may be different from the declared ideological goal. In itself, ideology is not enough to convince a person to engage in terrorism.
-I shall briefly discuss the purported danger that is currently as the focus of public futuristic alarm; the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by terrorists.
-The worries are understandable but seem to be grossly exaggerated. One occurrence does not constitute a trend.
-The extreme rarity of NBC terrorism suggest that only special types of perpetrators and/or unique circumstances may invoke the use of WMD. The rarity should be attributed to lack of willingness rather than the lack of capability.
-Is it not better to be a little over-cautious than to be guilty of negligence. This approach is accompanied by two problems. The first is related to the size of expenditure. The second problem of augmented attention to WMD terrorism is that it may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
-The present public preoccupation with these weapons makes them mundane and may paradoxically reduce inhibitions to use them. The constant preoccupation with the subject grants it legitimacy and an air of feasibility, thus increasing the likelihood of its implementation.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter examines social psychology's potential contribution to the study of terrorism and the development of means to cope with it.
-The student of terrorism has to overcome three major obstacles: a scarcity of data, the heterogeneity of the phenomenon, and the ambiguity surrounding its causes. These are discussed in the first section of this chapter. The second and third sections define a role for social psychology by portraying terrorism as a sophisticated form of psychological warfare. As such, terrorism employs fear induction to maximize its attitudinal impact on target publics. A social psychological analysis of determinants of this impact is presented in the fourth section. The fifth section evaluates the potential contribution of social psychology to designing procedures whereby target publics’ ability to withstand this impact can be bolstered.
-In sum, as a social political, and psychological phenomenon, terrorism is very heterogeneous, and there is not sound, a priori reason to assume much in common between different terrorist groups.
-Explanations of the phenomenon range from in-depth psychological analyses of individual terrorist to general sociopolitical interpretations.
-The fact that terrorist share certain characteristics or traits by no mean implies that any person who has these traits is bound to become a terrorist. This kind of irreversibility also limits the usefulness of statistical profiles of the “typical” terrorist, such as Jenkin’s conclusion that the typical terrorist is male, in his early twenties, single, from a middle-to-upper-class urban family, well educated, and has some university training.
The great diversity of terrorism and the ambiguity surrounding its notwithstanding terrorist of all nationalities, races, religions, and ideological or political learning’s employ the same tactics and strategy. All of them wage a sophisticated form of psychological warfare.

A successful terrorist incident is one that maneuvers authorities into no win” situations.

This proposition highlights the potential contribution of social psychologists to the struggle against terrorism. The challenge is twofold: First, social psychological methods should be harnessed to investigate factors that determine the potency of terrorism’s effect on public opinion. Second, social psychologist should formulate principles and devise means for bolstering public resilience to the attitudinal effects of terrorism.

Factors influencing public attitudes toward terrorism: Though definitions of terrorism vary, all stress the induction of fear and intimidation as the means used by terrorist to effect political change: for example, “coercive intimidation”.

-These definitions pose two fundamental questions to the student of terrorism. One, is terrorism an effective mean of political influence? Two, is the extent of attitude and behavior change induced by terrorists linearly to the intensity of fear elicited by their actions?

-Historical precedents show that the above questions cannot be answered in the affirmative. The number of cases in which political change can be unequivocally attributed to terrorist activity is rather small.

-Although most terrorist activity in the later half of the century may be categorized as domestic, in only six instances did terrorists carry out successful campaigns that overturned existing regimes in their native countries (Cuba, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Laos, Iran, and Rhodesia).

-There is reason to believe, however that two conflicting processes shape individuals’ willingness to change their attitudes and behavior as a function of the intensity of attempts to effect such change. On one hand, utilitarian considerations and the cost of resistance to change tend to produce a positive relationship between individuals readiness to change and the intensity of raw power that is brought to bear on them. On the other hand, the perception of threats as illegitimate means of influence might promote reactance and resentment.

-Beyond a certain threshold of suffering, however, public steadfastness is likely to erode, and then the greater the severity of terrorist’s assaults, the more inclined toward concession the public is likely to be.

-The effect of the intensity of terrorism on public steadfastness interacts with two additional factors: the importance of the issues at stake, and public hopefulness.

-If public opinion is the key to terrorists success or failure, than its constant monitoring can provide authorities with “intelligence” needed to combat terrorism.

-The validity of public reaction assessments can be further enhanced by increasing individuals perceived involvement in relevant situations.

-Social psychologists’ second potential contribution to the struggle against terrorism involves planning interventions designed to bolster public resistance to the effects of terrorism. After extensive thought on this topic, we have concluded that existing social psychological knowledge offers little help here.

-Their contribution is mostly limited to their inducement of cognitive resistance to persuasive arguments.

-The fear of terrorism can be considerably alleviated by making terrorism known, that is by disseminating valid and accurate information about terrorism, terrorists, and their capabilities.

-Active coping with terrorism can take a variety of forms. On a elementary level, individuals can be taught and encouraged to take certain precautionary and defensive actions that, aside from the practical utility, could also ward off feelings of helplessness.

-Underneath the desire for action, revealed by our research and that of others, there lurks an elementary psychological phenomenon: namely the helplessness-reducing or stress-reducing quality that actively, whether instrumental or not, can have in threatening situations.

-To reiterate, authorities should pay closer attention to psychological processes that could enhance the public’s ability to withstand terrorism.


Call Number: Published Abstract: This study examines the spread of international terrorism from
1968 to 1974. Using Poisson and negative binomial probability models, a diffusion of international terrorism was found in the first segment of the time period (1968-1971) and contagion as a direct modeling process in the second (1973-1974). Accordingly, the theory of hierarchies in which the diplomatic status of a country predicts its degree of imitability was found to operate among Latin-American countries during the second portion of the overall period, but not during the first. An inverse hierarchy is suggested as an explanation for the contagion of violence from Latin-America and other third world countries to Western Europe. Autocorrelation functions were used to assess which forms of terrorism were most contagious in which regions.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The notion of politically motivated violence refers to a wide variety of violent acts which in recent years become increasingly dangerous to national and international order because of their co-ordination with more specific international terrorist activity. The aim of the terrorist is to provide an intensification of political violence at all levels of society and to encourage the process of “direct action” by revolutionary and subversive groups, to weaken the consensual attachment of the citizen to his national regime or international system.

-It is necessary to distinguish between political violence and terrorism. Political violence refers to “collective attacks within a political community against the political regime. Its actors—including competing political groups as well as incumbents or policies”; while terrorism may be described as a “symbolic act entailing the use of threat of violence and designed to influence political behavior by producing a psychological reaction in the recipient. This reaction is designed to create fear, anxiety and uncertainty and to demoralize the national society.

-The process of terror is extremely powerful because it is able to exploit basic tenets of democracy particularly the general exception of non-violence.

-A further socio-political problem is produced by the nature of government reaction to a perceived terrorist threat, because part of a terrorist strategy is to produce, though sustained provocation a backlash by governmental authorities which will demonstrate the inherently “terrorist” nature of the target regime and thus serve further to legitimate their activities.

-Sociological theories explaining terrorism and political violence tend to seek cause in terms of social strain when political deprivation results in the alienation of a particular group.

-Psychological theories about the origins of human aggression seem to provide an explicit motivational explanation for the suggested casual link between relative deprivation and collective violence. These theories indicate that aggression is either instinctual, learned or is an innate response due to frustration.

-Political ideologies provide “Frames of reference for interpreting and acting on discontent”

-Ideology is also used to relieve the perpetrator of a terrorist act of responsibility for his actions.

-It had been pointed out above that the essential feature accompanying present day terrorist violence is the capacity of political motives to transform an act having the capacity to create feelings of moral guilt with the actor into an act of “liberation” attracting praise from the actors primary reference group.

-Here one must distinguish between two types of terrorist. The first, and the most dangerous is the political existentialist who is continually able to redefine both his personality and ideological commitment through redemptive acts of violence.

-The second terrorist type is the individual who operates within an organization accepting its philosophies and working towards group objectives. His concern is not personal liberation as such but the liberation of subject peoples as he perceives them.

-We feel it is quite apparent that the causes of terrorism are complex and deep.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book serves as a fine introduction to the history, tenets, activity, and structure of HAMAS, but despite the name does not provide any behavioral or psychological analysis of the group or its affiliates. Much of the discussion focuses on the role and position of HAMAS in relation to the Palestinian National Authority, and the HAMAS impact on Oslo Accord negotiations, and their rise to political power.
Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Argues that there are discernable cognitive processes that govern the thinking of Islamic fundamentalists and which differ from those of non-fundamentalists. Understanding these processes is central to understanding how fundamentalists perceive situations and consequently how they behave.
Qualitative study with limited methodology. Data composed of interviews concluded with 14 people, 5 of which were converted Islamic fundamentalists in Orange County Florida, known through personnel contacts. Also 5 "matched" non-fundamentalists Muslims and interestingly 4 Lebanese fundamentalists one of who was the spiritual leader Hizballah.
Authors Abstract: How can we best understand Islamic fundamentalism? As fundamentalism has become an increasingly significant political force, many different interpretations have been offered, with fundamentalism explained as both a rational relation against modernity and as a pathological retreat from reality. We argue here that part of scholarly failure to understand and deal with growth of religious fundamentalism results form a failure to recognize the importance of cognitive differences in worldviews held by fundamentalists. By providing an empirical analysis of how fundamentalists see the world- what we identify as a fundamentalist perspective- we hope to supply an important missing piece in the literature on fundamentalism. To do so, we utilized a narrative and survey interview technique to contrast the worldviews of fundamentalists with those of comparable Muslims who are not fundamentalists. Our analysis suggest Islamic fundamentalism attracts because it provides a basic identity, an identity which in turn provides the foundation of daily living. The fundamentalist perspective itself is best understood through reference to a worldview which makes no distinction between public and private in which in truth is revealed by revelation and reason is subservient to religious doctrine. Religious dictates dominate on all basic issues, and only within the confines of the fundamentalists identity are choices decided by a cost/benefit calculus.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: We write this piece to expand the meaning and categories of terrorism.
-First the meaning of fear-creating political violence focuses on episodic direct harmfulness and leaves out structural invisible violence. Structural violence refers to unequal social systems that prevent huge numbers of collectivities from satisfying basic human needs.
-We posit that U.S supported terrorism is one category of terrorism.
-Social scientists point out the power of media in shaping public meanings.
-Media shape the public image of terrorism through selective attention and support of existing beliefs.
-Mass media's linking of terrorism with Muslim and Arab peoples smears the image of Muslims and Arabs worldwide.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Mainly technical and now dated, overview of chemical and biological weapons, with no substantive discussion of motive or behavior.
Key Quote Summary: This paper examines the view in terms of the means of mass destruction which exists in a technologically advanced society, what broad properties characterize such means, the resources required by a terrorist or terrorist group to implement them, and characteristics of terrorism adversaries, who may be considered potential implementers.
-One objective of this paper is to place the potential for mass destruction terrorism into a perspective tempered by recent and historical events relative to demonstrated terrorist capabilities and motivations.
-In summary the clandestinely diverted military nuclear device could be more of a threat to various power elites than to the general public; since the terrorist possession of such a weapon does not automatically imply that it is functional in such hands with one exception.
-The antipersonnel effects of chemical and biological weapons are strongly dependent on the modes of their dissemination.
-Another factor that has influenced the nature of the discussion of chemical agents is the relative
availability in the open literature of information concerning them.
-When discussing potential biological agents however, the discussion is usually limited to a specific organism, or product of that organism.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book provides one of the early and empirical (although qualitative) accounts of the role of women in violent political organizations and movements. The book is based on files and interviews with terrorists in Italy. There are some unusual categories and classifications used to describe different terrorist actors based on Italian law, although the author does explain these terms. Psychoanalytic theory provided the “conceptual framework” for the inquiry, and the author views the role of women through a feminist lens. There is a brief review of the role of women in crime. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the second half (Appendices), which is composed of the “raw data” from transcribed interviews and questionnaires. There are certainly factors pertaining to the context and political focus of this study that would make one quite cautious about inferring from it any general principles. Although this certainly is an important topic, there is little here of relevance to analysts or case officers.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this paper I will attempt to develop a speculative and theoretical framework that may begin an understanding of the intrapsychic and group dynamic depth psychology matrix for the motivations behind a terrorist act. I will also summarize what little is known about the childhood and adolescent development of terrorists and the effects on.
-My point is that media or the above cultural and parental devaluations cause terrorism, but both form a potential element of motivation in the form of creating an ethos of narcissistic splendor or vulnerability-injury, where partial motivations for terrorism can fester or flourish.
-Kohut, spoke about a deep-rooted preoedipally-based "group self" He said, "The notion of a nationally, ethnically, or culturally determined 'identity' must be differentiated from the concept of 'group self.'
-The terrorist feels himself or herself to be the active personalization of ethnic or nationalistic expression of a groups fantasized liberation or historical destiny.
-Shaw gives us solid evidence for what he calls "The personal pathway model," by which terrorists enter their malevolent profession. The components of this pathway include 1.Early socialization processes; 2.narcissistic injuries; 3escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police; and 4. personal connections to terrorist group members.
-Fields has studied groups of terrorists from a Northern Ireland paramilitary organization, members of the P.L.O and a South African terrorist Organization. Their elevated scores on trait and state anger are matched by their low scores on state and trait anxiety. There is no emotional conflict about expressing or experiencing their anger.
-Fields concludes that the above circumstances where children have been socialized in a climate of constant intergroup violence, fear and anger about annihilation, yet low anxiety about their anger higher than average curiosity, will invariably and increasingly become terrorists. "It is the personality dynamics combined with the individual needs and circumstances that mandate the conversion of the terrorized into the terrorist".

Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter attempts to point to the dilemma of human relationships, when we confuse comparisons of opposite and conflicting absolutes with the group identities of "us" and "them," and raise difficult questions. It invites others to explore these issues with the hope of finding viable solutions. Particularly given the current state of global affairs, it is no stretch to say that addressing such all-to-human psychological and historical questions is not simply desirable but vital to our survival. Therefore, this chapter addresses the issue of concept formation, perceptions of the "other," and their relation to destruction.

Call Number: Published Abstract: Discusses how the manner in which terrorists organize themselves may affect the bargaining process in a hostage situation. Of particular interest are factors that generally affect the behavior of political organizations: the size of the (terrorist) group, the presence of coalitions, leadership, risk aversion, internal cohesion, membership goals, and recruitment. In addition to purposive goals, terrorist activity is driven by a number of political and selective goals, the particular mix of which determines the number and kind of demands made during a terrorist act, as well as the overall level of terrorist activity. The issue for negotiation strategy is how this mixture of demands affects the possibility for a peaceful outcome.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In recent years, a number of studies have focused on the organizational characteristics of terrorist groups. Wolf, for example, discussed the cellular structure of most urban terrorist groups and its impact on their activity. Waugh looks at both the purposive and organizational goals of terrorist groups. Crenshaw uses political; organization theory to explain terrorist behavior.

-I have argued that terrorist groups are political organizations because their goals generally take the form of collective public goods.

-It is the fact that the political demands, if granted, will result in public goods that makes the terrorist group a political organization. The activities of terrorist organizations in pursuit of public goods may produce externalities which affect other segments of the population. Externalities are simply costs (negative externalities) or benefits (positive externalities) which result from the activity of another over which an actor has no control.

-I have gone on to look at the effects of two key variables-group size and the presence of terrorist coalitions-on the behavior of acting terrorist groups during the commission of a terrorist act.

-Crenshaw lists three ways in which terrorist groups may decline and fail: 1. Defeat. The organization is destroyed physically 2. Strategic shift. The group makes a rational decision to abandon terrorism in favor of other modes of political behavior. 3. Internal disintegration. Internal factors, e.g., dissatisfaction of members, attrition through death, result in the organization's demise.

-Ross and Gurr outlines a similar set of reasons for the decline of terrorist organizations: 1. Preemption. The authorities make it impossible for the group to act. 2. Deterrence. The authorities increase the costs and risks to the group. 3. Burnout. Members commitment to the organization and its goal diminish 4. Backlash. Political support for the organization declines.

-The focus of this paper is on the possible effects of specific organizational factors in both the formation and disintegration, or end, of terrorist groups. The same factors that aid in the formation of terrorist organizations may also be related to their decline. Among the organizational factors that may affect the ability of a terrorist group to form, become active, or decline with other groups; outside support, both political and financial; internal and external competition; and internal cohesiveness.

-Irrespective of their ideological commitment, the job of the leadership in the formative stage of the organization is to develop selective incentives that are sufficient to attract members.

-Group formation requires a political cause but also requires both entrepreneurial and political leadership sufficient to attract members and induce them to commit acts of political violence. The loss of leadership may bring about the disintegration of the terrorist group.

-Without political leadership, the group may lose its sense of political direction. The end of organization as a unified political movement does not necessarily mean the end of terrorist activity by its members. When the leadership of a group disappears, the group may fractionalize into several smaller groups with new leaders. The need of one organization may even lead to an increase in political violence as the smaller groups become active and develop their own demands.

-Recruitment: The formation of a terrorist organization depends on the ability of the leadership to recruit and retain a committed membership. Members may have complex motivations for joining a terrorist group. Some may join simply because of political goals of the organization. Others may join for selective materials and social incentives in addition to its purposive goals in order to attract a large membership. Like any other political organization, the terrorist group must aim its selective incentives at its target audience. The selective incentives which are likely to pay off for a terrorist
group are those that will appeal to young, single males. Crenshaw lists several specific types of incentives designed to induce potential members to join the terrorist group: a sense of group identity, social status, comradeship, and excitement, and material benefits. Ideology will not generally be sufficient to induce large numbers of individuals to join a terrorist organization. An active terrorist organization must continue to recruit new members to replace those who leave the organization for whatever reason. In order to extend its life cycle beyond a few year, a terrorist organization must be able to attract a new cohort of young members to replace its original membership. Crenshaw points out that a group's leader may even alter the purposive goals of the organization in order to maintain the group and recruit new members. Recruitment, thus, is a key to viability of the terrorist organization. Recruitment thus is a key to the viability of the terrorist organization. Recruitment itself depends to a great extent on the ability of the leadership to package its selective incentives and purposive goals in a way that will be attractive to young males.

-Coalition Formation: Terrorist coalitions, i.e., two or more groups acting together in the commission of a terrorist act, are rare. One reason is that coalitional activity makes more people outside of each group aware of the other groups membership and activity. The groups are more likely to have different goals and coalitional activity, therefore requiring negotiation and concession. Finally the two groups are likely to have personality and ideological differences which make joint activity difficult. Coalition formation can give a terrorist organization the capability to carry out the kinds of terrorist acts it cannot conduct on its own.

-Outside Support: The sources of outside support are generally either sympathetic governments or other terrorist organizations. Alexander and Kilmarx discuss the types of aid which a group may obtain from other groups or from friendly regimes. The types of support are financial, training, weapons, organizational, and operational. A group must be able to raise the resources necessary to provide sufficient incentives to attract and maintain a membership. Outside support is especially crucial to continuance of small terrorist groups.

-Competition The existence of these rewards can result in competition for leadership on a successful organization. Competitors have two avenues of approach open to them. They may challenge the organization's existing leadership from the inside. Alternatively, rival leaders may attempt to form another organization and compete with the first group for the same potential membership. Competition is not unusual among terrorist organizations. Another consequence of competition between terrorist organizations may be increased level and kinds of demands by the groups during the commission of terrorist acts. The more successful a group is at attracting members, the more likely it is to face competition. Competition, in turn, may result in the decline of the successful terrorist organization.

-Internal Cohesiveness: Internal cohesiveness in a terrorist organization is simply how much concurrence there is between members and between leaders and members on the purposive goals of the organization. There may be a great divergence of opinion on precisely what goal should be pursued, which ones are the most important, and how the group should pursue them. Crenshaw notes factionalism within large terrorist organizations is common. When factionalism develops, the organization may cease to function and become instead a number of smaller groups, with each pursuing its own political agenda. When a lack of internal cohesiveness leads to competition, it can also lead to the decline of the organization. Internal struggles for the leadership of the organization are likely to divide the organization into factions and lead to its decline as well.

-It is the focus on violence as a tactic that distinguishes terrorist organization from other political organization, not the motives of their members.

-One of the most likely theories to explain the behavior of terrorist organizations is interest group theory.

213. Oots, K. L., Layne, K., & Wiegele, T. C. (1985). Terrorist and victims: Psychiatric and physiological approaches from a social science perspective. Terrorism and the International Journal, 8(1), 1-32. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: This paper reviews psychiatric and physiological approaches to the study of terrorism from a social science perspective. First the paper reviews psychiatric studies of terrorism. Next, a physiological approach is used to develop an individual level model of terrorist contagion. The effects of terrorism on its immediate victims are considered next, followed by a discussion of the possibility of panic among the general public resulting from terrorist acts. Finally, the policy and theoretical considerations raised by the
physiological and psychiatric approaches are discussed.

-Ferracuti and Bruno (1981, p.209) list nine psychological traits common to right-wing terrorists:
1. Ambivalence toward authority
2. Poor defective insight
3. Adherence to conventional behavioral patterns
4. Emotional detachment from the consequences of their actions
5. Disturbances in sexual identity with role-uncertainties
6. Superstition, magic and stereotyped thinking
7. Etero and auto destructiveness
8. Low-level educational reference patterns
9. Perception of weapons as fetishes and adherence to violence subcultural norms

-The above set of traits make up what Ferracuti and Bruno (1981, p.209) call an “authoritarian-extremist personality”
- Hubbard’s psychiatric study revealed several common traits among skyjackers (1971, pp.184-195):
1. Violent father, often an alcoholic
2. Deeply religious mother, often a religious zealot
3. Sexually shy, timid, and passive. In their first sexual encounter the skyjackers were involved with girls from two to twenty years older than themselves, and the girl was the aggressor.
4. Younger sisters toward who the skyjacker acted protectively
5. Poor achievement, financial failure, and limited earning potential.

-Scharff and Schlottman (1973, 93.287) report that already angered individuals become more aggressive after they are exposed to verbal reports of violence. Their research suggests that susceptible people in an angry state who are predisposed to violence may actually become more violent if they are exposed to violence.

-If aggression is a learned behavior, then terrorism, a specific type of aggressive behavior, can also be learned. Potential terrorists can learn the methods, the goals, and the rhetoric of actual terrorists and be inspired or aroused by their exploits. Moreover, potential terrorist can see the result of terrorist activity.

-The potential terrorist need not experience gratification himself, he need only see that terrorism has worked for others to become aggressively aroused.

-Social scientists who seek to understand terrorism should take account of the possibility that biological or physiological variables may play a role in bringing an individual to the point of performing an act of terrorism.

-If the physiological model of terrorist contagion is correct, terrorism is a psychiatric, physiological, and political phenomenon. Social scientists must be sensitive to the fact that biological and psychiatric variables may influence and be influenced by the sociopolitical variables which form the subject matter of the social sciences.

- No understanding of terrorism can be considered complete or even realistic until both sociopolitical variables are included.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but the most common explanations do not help us understand why. Religious fanaticism does not explain why the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a group that adheres to a Marist/Leninist ideology, while existing psychological explanations have been contradicted by the widening range of socio-economic backgrounds of suicide terrorists. To advance our understanding of this growing phenomenon, this study collects the universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, 188 in all. In contrast to the existing explanations, this study shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Moreover, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. In all but the case of Turkey,
the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Thus, Western democracies should pursue policies that teach terrorists that the lesson of the 1980s and 1990s no longer holds, policies which in practice may have more to do with improving homeland security than with offensive military action.

Before the early 1980s, suicide terrorism was rare but not unknown. However, since the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, there have been at least 188 separate suicide terrorist attacks worldwide, in Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. The rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, to 53 in 2000-2001 alone (Pape 2002).

The rise of suicide terrorism is especially remarkable, given that the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide fell during the period, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to a low of 274 in 1998, with 348 in 2001 (Department of State 2001).

Initial explanations are insufficient to account for which individuals become suicide terrorists and, more importantly, why terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on this form of attack (Institute for Counter-Terrorism 2001). First, although religious motives may matter, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic Fundamentalism. World leader's in suicide terrorism is actually the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)- LTTE alone accounts for 75 of the 186 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001. Even among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account to about a third of these attacks (Merari 1990; Sprinzak 2000). Second, although study of the personal characteristics of suicide attackers may someday help identify individuals terrorist organizations are likely to recruit for this purpose, the vast spread of suicide terrorism over the last two decades suggests that there may not be a single profile.

Now we know that suicide terrorists can be college educated or uneducated, married or single, men or women, socially isolated or integrated, from age 13 to age 47 (Sprinzak 2000).

In contrast to the first-wave explanations, this article shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic. Even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not.

To examine the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, this article collects the universe suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, explains how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of these attacks, and evaluates the limits on their coercive utility.

Five principal findings follow. First, suicide terrorism is strategic. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual fanatics but, rather, occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal. Second, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination. Every suicide terrorist campaign since 1980 has been targeted against a state that had a democratic form of government. Third, during the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays. Fourth, although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate concessions, these more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may well fail completely. Finally, the most promising way to contain suicide terrorism to reduce terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target society.

Demonstrative terrorism is directed mainly at gaining publicity, for any or all of three reasons: to recruit more activists, to gain attention to grievances from softliners on the other side, and to gain attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side.

Destructive terrorism is more aggressive, seeking to coerce opponents as well as mobilize support for the cause. Destructive terrorists seek to inflict real harm on members of the target audience at the risk of losing sympathy for their cause.

What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is that the attacker does not expect to survive a mission and often employs a method of attack that requires the attacker’s death in order to succeed (such as planting a car bomb, wearing a suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building).

Suicide terrorists’ willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks- The 188 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001 killed an average of 13 people each, not counting the unusually large number of fatalities on September 11 and also not counting the attackers themselves. During the same period, there were about 4,155 total terrorist incidents worldwide, which killed 3,207 people (also excluding September 11), or less than one person per incident. Overall, from 1980 to
suicide attacks amount to 3% of all terrorist attacks but account for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism, again excluding September 11 (Department of State 1983-2001). Second, suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come, because suicide itself is a costly signal, one that suggests that the attackers could not have been deterred by a threat of costly retaliation. Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorists to increase expectations about escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence.

To characterize the nature of suicide terrorism, this study identified suicide terrorist attack from 1980 to 2001 that could be found in Lexis Nexis’s on-line database of world news media (Pape 2002). Examination of the universe shows that suicide terrorism has three properties that are consistent with the above strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior: (1) timing—nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated or randomly timed incidents; (2) nationalist goals—suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of what the terrorists see as their national homeland territory, specifically at ejecting foreign forces from that territory; and (3) target selection—suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been aimed at democracies. There have been 188 separate suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001. Of these, 179, or 95%, were parts of organized, coherent campaigns, while only nine were isolated or random events. Every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2001 has had as a major objective, or as its central objective, coercing a foreign government that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out. The target state of every modern campaign has been a democracy. The United States, France, Israel, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Russia were all democracies when they were attacked by suicide terrorist campaigns, even though the last three became democracies more recently than the others.

The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause about half the time. As Table 1 shows, of the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns relate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals. Coercive success is so rare that even a 50% success rate is significant, because international military and economic coercion, using the same standards as above, generally works less than a third of the time (Art and Cronin 2003). During the 1980’s and 1990’s, terrorist leaders learned that moderate punishment often leads to moderate concessions and so concluded that more ambitious suicide campaigns would lead to greater political gains. However, today’s more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are likely to fail. In international military coercion, threats to inflict military defeat often generate more coercive leverage than punishment.


known about the childhood and adolescent development of terrorists and the effects on.
-My point is that media or the above cultural and parental devaluations cause terrorism, but both
form a potential element of motivation in the form of creating an ethos of narcissistic splendor or
vulnerability-injury, where partial motivations for terrorism can fester or flourish.
-Kohut, spoke about a deep-rooted preoedipally-based "group self" He said, "The notion of a
nationally, ethnically, or culturally determined 'identity' must be differentiated from the concept of
'group self.'
-The terrorist feels himself or herself to be the active personalization of ethnic or nationalistic
expression of a groups fantasized liberation or historical destiny.
-Shaw gives us solid evidence for what he calls "The personal pathway model," by which terrorists
enter their malevolent profession. The components of this pathway include 1. Early socialization
processes; 2. narcissistic injuries; 3. escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police; and 4.
personal connections to terrorist group members.
-Fields has studied groups of terrorists from a Northern Ireland paramilitary organization, members
of the P.L.O and a South African terrorist Organization. Their elevated scores on trait and state
anger are matched by their low scores on state and trait anxiety. There is no emotional conflict
about expressing or experiencing their anger.
-Fields concludes that the above circumstances where children have been socialized in a climate of
constant intergroup violence, fear and anger about annihilation, yet low anxiety about their anger
higher than average curiosity, will invariably and increasingly become terrorists. "It is the
personality dynamics combined with the individual needs and circumstances that mandate the
conversion of the terrorized into the terrorist". This chapter explores the intersubjective dimensions
terrorism and its transcendence. Topics discussed include thinking outside the box; what terrorism
teaches us about being human; the formulas; human suffering, trauma, and healing; psyche and
system; repeated trauma and psychological mutation; the dynamics of leaders and recruits; the
politics of envy and humiliation; terrorism as a traumatic reenactment; reenactment through
projective identification; intersubjectivity, role reversal, and perverse empathy; terrorism as a
perversion of the desire for truth, freedom, and justice; punimania and the urge to retaliate; from
victim to master of one's fate; systems theory and terrorism as asymmetrical warfare; paradox and
the limitations of counterterrorism; trauma, gender, and the splitting of opposites; a work against
nature; conscious politics and political evolution; metaforce; transcending terrorism, a quantum leap;
and liberation from retaliation.

217. Peters, R. (When devils walk the earth: The mentality and roots of terrorism and how to respond [Web Page].
January 21].

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: There are two basic types of terrorists: The practical and the
apocalyptic.
-For all his violence, the practical political--terrorist is a man of hope. The religious, apocalyptic
terrorist is a captive of his own rage, disappointments and fantasies.
-Practical terrorists, with whom we long have struggled, may behave savagely, but they have
tangible goals and a logical approach to achieving them.
-There usually are lines the practical terrorist will not crosssome groups he wishes to protect, certain
tools he will not employ, or some self-imposed limitations upon the scale of his actions
-The practical terrorist’s hellish counterpart, the apocalyptic terrorist, is mentally divorced from our
world and its values, and from any respect for flesh and blood.
-Despite the media-driven image of Islamic terrorists representing hordes of the Faithful, apocalyptic
terrorists, such as the members of al Qa’eda, tend to act out of intensely-personal disaffection and a
sense of alienation from social norms, while the practical terrorist is more apt to feel driven by group
grievances
-The practical terrorist is impassioned and imagines that his deeds will help his brethren in the
general population, while the apocalyptic terrorist is detached from compassion by his faith and only
wants to punish the “sinful,” whom he finds ever more numerous as he is progressively hypnotized
by the dogma that comforts him.
-The practical terrorist punishes others to force change. The religious terrorist may speak of changes
he desires in this world, but his true goal is simply the punishment of othersin the largest possible
numbers an offering to the bloodthirsty, vengeful God he has created for himself.
-No change in the world order will ever content the apocalyptic terrorist, since his actual discontents are internal to himself. 
-Osama bin Laden has been able to convince countless Muslims that his vision is of the purest and proudest Islamic form. This should be a huge warning flag to the West about the spiritual crisis in the Islamic world.
-The belief systems of practical terrorists are often modular; some such men can learn, evolve, synthesize or re-align their views. But the apocalyptic terrorist cannot tolerate any debate or dissent: all divergent opinions are a direct threat to his mental house of cards.
-Perhaps the most routine commonality between the practical and apocalyptic terrorist is the male terrorist's inability to develop and maintain healthy, enduring relationships with women—although the practical terrorist is more apt to idealize members of the opposite sex, who then disappoint him, and to imagine himself re-created as a storybook hero of the sort he believes would appeal to his fantasy woman (Timothy McVeigh), while the apocalyptic terrorist fears, despises and hates females.

218.  Piven, J. S. (2002). On the psychosis (religion) of terrorists. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: Theoretical Understandings and Perspectives (Vol. 2pp. 119-148). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter explores religion as a psychosis of terrorists. Topics discussed include religion and fantasy; the genesis of murder, misogyny, and vengeance; dedication, madness, and survival; and masochism and eschatological fantasies of rebirth.


220.  Post, J. (2001). The mind of the terrorist: Individual and group psychology of terrorist behavior. Subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities, senate armed services committee. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Terrorism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. There is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation and decision making structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather of terrorist psychologies.
-Considering the diversity of causes to which terrorists are committed, the uniformity of their rhetoric is striking. Polarizing and absolutist, it is a rhetoric of "us versus them.' 
-Individuals with particular personality traits and personality tendencies are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers—in particular, frustrated individuals, who tend to externalize, seeking an external cause for their difficulties. Unable to face his own inadequacies, the individual with this personality style needs a target to blame and attack for his own inner weakness, inadequacies and lack of success.
-Social revolutionary terrorism, also known as terrorism of the left, includes those acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order.
-Nationalist-separatist terrorism, also known as ethno-nationalist terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a new political order or state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity.
-Nationalist-separatist groups operating within their nation are particularly sensitive to the responses of their internal constituency, as well as their international audience.
-The generational dynamics of these nationalist-separatist terrorists are the very opposite of the social revolutionary terrorists discussed earlier. They are carrying on the mission of their parents and grandparents who have been damaged by, or are disloyal to, the regime.
-This is in vivid contrast to the social revolutionary terrorists who are rebelling against the generation of their parents who are loyal to the regime. They are leading an underground life.
-But in the past decades, no responsibility has been claimed for upwards of 40% of terrorist acts. We believe this is because of the increasing frequency of terrorist acts by radical religious extremist terrorists. They are not trying to influence the West. Rather the radical Islamist terrorists are trying to expel the secular modernizing West. And they do not need recognition by having their name identified.
-The radical cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence, which is uncritically accepted by his "true believer" followers, so there is no ambivalence concerning use of violence, which is religiously commanded.

-Note it is not Osama bin Laden who is ordering his followers to kill Americans. It is God!

-Right-wing terrorism includes those groups seeking to preserve the dominance of a threatened ethnic majority or to return society to an idealized "golden age" in which ethnic relations more clearly favored the dominant majority.

-Because of this dehumanization of their enemies, discriminate attacks on target groups, such as blacks, or, in Europe, on enclaves of foreign workers, are justified by their ideology. Because of their delegitimation and dehumanization of the government, discriminate attacks on government facilities are certainly feasible by such groups.

-Inssofar as the individual submerges his own identity into the group, the group's moral code becomes the individual's moral code.

-The position argued in this paper that political violence is driven by social psychological forces follows a different line of reasoning. It does not view political violence as instrumental, as a means to an end, but as the end itself.

-The central argument of this position is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.

-In the long run, the most effective antiterrorist policy is one that inhibits potential recruits from joining in the first place.

-As important as it is to inhibit potential terrorists from joining, so too it is important to facilitate terrorists leaving.

-In the long run, the most effective ways of countering terrorism is to:
1. Inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group
2. Produce dissension within the group
3. Facilitate exit from the group,
4. Reduce support for the group.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Using semi-structured interviews, 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists have been interviewed 21 Islamic terrorists representing Hamas (and its armed wing Izz a Din al Qassan), Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah, and 14 secular terrorists from Fatah and its military wing, PFLP and DFLP.

-The purpose of the research was to understand their psychology and decision-making in general, and with special reference to their propensity towards weapons of mass destruction. The material elicited from the terrorists who were interviewed vastly exceeded our expectations. It provides rich contextual detail on their individual pathways into terrorism and the power of the group, the commitment to armed struggle, and the spectrum of rationalizations and justification for their acts of terror.

-Somewhat counter-intuitive, the backgrounds of the interview subjects varied widely and did not materially influence their decisions as to whether to join the group. Most had some high school, and some had education beyond high school. The majority of the subjects reported that their families were respected in the community.

-The families were experienced as being uniformly supportive of their commitment to the cause. The vast majority of both secular and Islamist group members reported that there were no family members in the organization when they joined (70 percent secular and 80 percent Islamist) although several reported that younger brothers followed them. In most cases where a family member (father, older sibling) was already a member of an organization, the sons were more likely to join that same organization, and were more often members of the more militant, or armed, wing. We found that the vast majority of secular group members (almost 85 percent) reported that their family was active at an average or below average level. Some 68 percent of Islamist group members reported a similar experience. However, over 30 percent of Islamist group members reported extensive or radical involvement by their family. Of those Islamist group members reporting a radical family background, all joined the militant armed wing of their respective organizations. In the secular groups, only 15 percent report coming from radically active families and there is no correlation
between radical family involvement and members joining the mainstream or militant wing of their organizations.

-It was clear that the major influence was the social environment of the youth. As one terrorist remarked, “Everyone was joining”. The peer group was of much greater influence, and in many cases it was a friend or acquaintance in the group who recruited the subject.

-For the secular groups their social environment centered around school and social clubs, while for the Islamist group members, their social environment was dominated by the mosque, religious organizations and religious instruction. Some 64 percent of the secular group members, while only 43 percent of the Islamist group members, report that the group they joined was the most active in their community. Over 50 percent of the secular group members cite the involvement of their community or a youth club, such as Shabiba, as the primary influence in their recruitment. For the Islamist groups, almost 50 per cent cite the Moslem Brotherhood or other religious influence as central; another 20 percent cite their experience at the University or other professional school as of primary importance. Only 30 percent of the secular group members and not quite 20 percent of Islamist group members report their families as a central influence in their decisions to join an organization. Over 80 percent of the secular group members reported growing up in communities that were radically involved and slightly more than 75 percent of the Islamist members report a similar experience.

-The recruitment process is predominantly a causal or informed process among both secular and Islamist groups with only 15 percent of secular group members reporting a formal recruitment process and 30 percent of Islamist members reporting a similar experience. Two Hizballah members reported the most formalized recruitment process. Over half the members of each group type knew their recruiter prior to recruitment. 23 percent of the secular and 16 percent of the Islamist group members reported not knowing their recruiter before being approached about membership.

-Surprisingly, there was little attention to obtaining WMD weapons, but a desire to produce the largest number of casualties possible was evident. The secular terrorists sought an independent state, but the Islamists sought eradication of Israel in order to bring about the establishment of an Islamic state. ------The Islamist terrorists believed that self-martyrdom (‘suicide-bombing’) was the most valued technique of jihad. Several Islamist terrorist commanders interviewed called the ‘suicide bomber’ holy warriors carrying out the highest level of jihad.

-The prison experience was intense, especially for the Islamist terrorists. It further consolidated their identity and the group or organizational membership that provided the most valued element of personal identity. The impact of the prison experience showed more divergence between the secular and Islamist groups. Only a small percentage of either group stated that were less connected to the group after their incarceration. 62 percent of secular group members reported returning to activity with their organization, compared to 84 percent of the Islamist group members who returned or plan to return upon their release. The prison experience also reinforced negative perceptions of Israelis and Israeli security forces.

-No regret was expressed by any of the terrorists for their actions; the majority expressed intense pride in their acts, and only regretted getting caught. For the secular terrorist, their acts were justified because they were at war. For the Islamist terrorists, their acts were in defense of their faith and commanded by their faith, and they received religious absolution for their acts. They could questions detail, but not whether or not the authorized act should be carried out. The feelings of victimization, of being evicted from their family lands and the sense of despair concerning their people’s destiny referred to in the family background section contributed to the readiness to merge their individual identity with that of the organization in pursuit of their cause. Once recruited, there is a clear fusing of individual identity and group identity, particularly among the more radical elements of each organization.

-Most interviewers reported not only enhanced social status for the families of fallen or incarcerated members, but financial and material support from the organization and community for these families as well. With no other means to achieve status and success, the organization’s success become central to individual identity and provides a ‘reason for living’. As an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making. Individual self-worth is again intimately tied to the ‘value’ or prominence of the group. As the individual and group fuse, the more personal the struggle becomes for the group members. An overarching sense of the collective consumes the individual. This fusion with the group seems to
provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant loss of felt responsibility for the individual member. By belonging to a radical group, otherwise powerless individuals become powerful.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: There is a heightened concern in the United States over the specter of a catastrophic domestic chemical or biological terrorist attack.

-There is a major disconnect between the weapons technology community and the community of academic terrorism experts, with the former being focused on vulnerabilities of our society and what might happen in terms of technological possibilities, and the latter, who study terrorist motivation and decision making, being overwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most-but not all-terrorist groups.

-This testimony is in the service of differentiating the threat, focusing on which groups are significantly constrained from committing such extreme acts, and which groups might be less inhibited and indeed might find incentives to commit such acts.

-Terrorism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. There is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation, and decision-making structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather terrorist psychologies. Studies of political terrorist psychology do not reveal severe psychiatric pathology. Indeed, political terrorist groups do not permit emotionally disturbed individuals to join their groups.

-Five levels-large scale casualties with conventional weapons, sham CBW attacks, low-level casualties (under 20), large scale casualties (20 to hundreds), and catastrophic or super terrorism, in which thousands of casualties may result. The crucial psychological barrier to cross concerns not the choice of weapons, in my judgment, but rather willingness to cause mass casualties, and this threshold has been crossed for some groups.

-Writing in Disorders and Terrorism: Report of Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, more than 20 years ago, Mengel (1977) distinguished four different means by which terrorists attempt to achieve their goals. He observed that there is a distinct difference between discriminative and random target selection.

-Groups motivated to cause mass casualties, in Mengel's (1977) estimation, are characterized by a group's realization of the following:
  1. They do not have a position of strength from which bargaining can be successful.
  2. The public will no longer respond to state-(propaganda-) related attacks.
  3. Popular support has been lost because of the social paralysis caused by previous attacks.

-Weapons experts regularly identify weaponization as a major constraint to mass CBW terrorism.

-Social revolutionary terrorism, also known as terrorism of the left, included those acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order. They would be significantly constrained from indiscriminate acts that cause significant casualties among their own countrymen, or cause negative reactions in their domestic and international audiences.

-Nationalist-separatist terrorism, also known as ethno-nationalist terrorism includes those groups fighting to establish a new political order or state bases on ethnic dominance or homogeneity. Nationalist-separatist groups operating within their nation are particularly sensitive to the responses of their internal constituency, as well as their international audience. This provides a constraint against acts so violent or extra normal as to offend their constituents.

-Religious extremists is characterized by groups seeking to maintain or create a religious social and political order and included two types of groups and organizations; those adhering to a radical fundamentalist interpretation of mainstream religious doctrines and nontraditional religious groups representing "new religions"

-In the 1970s and 1980s, most of the acts of terrorism were perpetrated by nationalist-separatist terrorists and social -revolutionary terrorists, who wished to call attention to their cause and accordingly would regularly claim responsibility. However in the past decades, no responsibility is claimed for upwards of 40% of terrorist acts.

-These organizations are hierarchical in structure; the radical cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence that is uncritically accepted by his "true believer" followers, so
there is no ambivalence concerning use of violence that is religiously commanded. These groups are accordingly particularly dangerous, for they are not constrained by Western reaction, and indeed often wish to expel secular modernizing influences.

-Nontraditional religious extremist groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, must also be considered. These generally closed cults are in a struggle for survival against a demonized enemy that must be destroyed.

-What he declares is moral and required is moral and required. The followers yield their individual judgment to the leader and become deskilled, acting as if they have no independent critical faculties of their own.

-Right-wing terrorism included those groups seeking to preserve the dominance of a threatened ethnic majority or to return society to an idealized "golden age" in which ethnic relations more clearly favored the dominant majority. These groups generally espouse fascist ideologies, including racist, anti-Semitic, and antigovernment "survivalist" beliefs.

-Because of this dehumanization of their enemies, discriminate attacks on target groups, such as blacks, or, in Europe, on enclaves of foreign workers, are justified by their ideology. Because of their delegitimation and dehumanization of the government, indiscriminate attacks on government facilities are certainly feasible by such groups, including attacks on the seat of the Federal government.

-Reviewing the spectrum of terrorist groups in terms of motivation, incentives and constraints, for nearly all groups, the feared catastrophic CBW superterrorism against the prospect of which the United States in preparing, would be highly counterproductive.

-Given the severe constraints against catastrophic CBW terrorism for most groups, this argues for continuing to protect against the greatest danger-conventional terrorism- and to devote significantly increased intelligence resources to monitoring much more closely the groups at risk for CBW terrorism, right-wing extremist groups and religious extremist groups, both nontraditional cults similar to Aum Shinrikyo and especially religious fundamentalist terrorist organizations.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This review, accordingly, necessarily reflects a strong point of view and is often distinctly subjective, as it draws on personal experiences.

-In weighing whether and how to respond, psychiatrists will find themselves caught between the Scylla of public service and public education and the Charybdis of the ethical prohibitions that are spelled out in section 7 of The principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry.

-As I have devoted my career to applications of psychiatry to international affairs and the field of political psychology and wish to conduct my professional activities in an ethical manner, this principle has regularly concerned, confused, confounded, and constrained me.

-Apparently, an article about personality profiling drawing on the Hussein profile, which appeared in the Science News section of the New York Times, had led to several letters complaining that I had violated Section 7, for I had presented a professional opinion publicly about Hussein without interviewing him and without his authorization.

-The profile is not a psychiatry expert opinion. It is a political psychology profile, informed, to be sure, by my education style, crisis reactions, negotiating style, relationships with leaderships circle, etc.

-“Moreover,” I went on, “I think there is a duty to warn, involving a kind of Tarasoff principle that is guiding politics seem, to me, to be off, and policy decisions are being made based on errant perceptions that could lead to significant loss of life.

-During the 1964 presidential campaign, Fact Magazine surveyed APA members asking whether the republican candidate, Barry Goldwater, was fit for office. The results led to a front-page headline: “1189 psychiatrists say Goldwater is psychologically Unfit to be President.

-The poll gave American psychiatry a black eye.

-In a press release from the APA medical director, the APA disavowed the survey and criticized both Fact Magazine and the naiveté of the members who responded, citing embarrassment to the profession.

-In 1968 a National Enquirer headline shouted: “Three psychiatrist Experts Tell Why Jackie Married
Onassis and How it Will Affect Her Children.” This impelled APA ethics Chairman Dr. Hardin Branch to send an open letter to all members of the APA addressing the problem.

- The APA appointed a task force on “The Psychiatrist as Psychohistorian,” lumping together within its purview the psychologic profiles developed by US Government security agencies as well as psychohistories and psycho biographies.

- As for psychohistory, the Ethics Committee generally agreed that it was not unethical if it was scholarly, if data sources were presented, if scientific conclusions were drawn, if the historian maintained concern for the interest of the subject and his family, and if it was published so that the subject had a right to challenge it or seek legal redress if he felt he had been offended. The Ethics Committee found it difficult to distinguish between psychohistory and psychiatric profiles, and suggested the same guidelines might apply.

- In the course of examining the use and potential for abuse of psychiatric profiles, the psychohistory task force carefully considered the use of profiles in national security. The report made an exception for psychiatric profiles that were prepared for the use of the government, indicating that they not only were considered unethical but also singling them out as positively contributing to the national welfare.

- Thus, the annotation as written does not seem to permit flexibility, and assuredly has been chilling to my own and, I presume, others’ ability to contribute to the national dialogue.

- The APA Ethics Committee did revisit the principle in 1995 and amended the blanket prohibition against offering a professional opinion when psychiatrists are asked for an opinion about an individual in the light of public attention by adding the language “In such circumstances, a psychiatrist may share with the public his/her expertise about psychiatric issues in general.” This does not help at all.

- In attempting to guard against the excesses of the Goldwater imbroglio, a principle has been enshrined that constrains the ability of serious psychiatrist to contribute to public discourse and to society. I would argue that the time is long overdue to revisit the principle, perhaps abandoning it entirely or, as Lazarus suggested, to relegate the discussion of issues and concerns to the commentary section of the code of ethics.

- To address the hazards of injudicious opinions by psychiatrists and yet permit useful contributions, the probation might be replaced with guidelines to the effect that such professional opinions should be based on research consistent with psychiatric principles and knowledge; be conveyed in a responsible manner that is mindful of the responsibility to society; and treats the subject with respect.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Our understanding of terrorist psychology is primitive at best. Nevertheless, behavioural scientists attempting to understand terrorist psychology are making encouraging if halting progress in developing an evidence-based knowledge base concerning the psychology of terrorists. In the balance of this chapter, I will attempt to integrate some of the disparate materials bearing on terrorist behaviour and suggest the outlines of a psychological theory of terrorist psychology. I will then suggest implication for counterterrorist policy.

- In dissecting terrorist psycho-logic, it is necessary to utilize three different levels of analysis: individual psychology, group psychology and organizational psychology.

Individual Psychology: Comparative studies of terrorist psychology do not indicate a unique ‘terrorist mind’. Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric diagnostic category. Indeed, most would be considered to fit within the spectrum of normality. Nevertheless, individuals with particular personality dispositions are drawn to the path of terrorism. A feature common among many terrorists is a tendency to externalize.

- Other prominent traits were a defensive grandiosity, an exaggerated self-absorption with little regard for the feeling of others.

- There are data which suggest that as a consequence of troubled family backgrounds many terrorists have an incomplete psychosocial identity and an exaggerated need to belong.

- The major study sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior of West Germany is illustrative.

- I find it useful to distinguish two major categories, which have quite different psychosocial
dynamics the ‘anarchic-ideologues’ such as West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF) and the
Brigate Rosse (BR) of Italy, and the ‘nationalist-secessionists’ groups such as ETA of the Basques
and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Alienation from the family
is characteristically found among the ‘anarchic-ideologues’. They are dissident to parents loyal to
the regime.
-In apparent contrast, the ‘nationalist-separatist’ are carrying on a family mission; they are loyal to
families dissident to the establishment.
-But while essentially normal psychologically, there are psychosocial wounds which predispose
them to seek affiliation with like-minded individuals who share their tendency to externalize and
blame society for their own personal shortcomings.
-Group Psychology: This combination of a strong affiliative need coupled with an incomplete
personal identity, provides the foundation for especially powerful group dynamics.
-Belonging to the terrorist group becomes for many the most important component of their
psychosocial identity.
-Andreas Baader, a founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang, by threatening expulsion was able to
ensure compliance.
-Thus there are great pressures for compliance and conformity, for muting dissent.
-But there is a psycho-logic to the reasoning if one accepts the basic premise that what the group
defines as good is desirable, and what the group defines as bad is evil.
-This explains the extent of violence and viciousness which terrorists can justify. The standards of
the group take over and become the norm
-The rhetoric of terrorism is absolutist, idealizing and de-valuing- polarizing ‘us versus them’, good
versus evil.
-Throughout the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, no matter how diverse their causes, the
absolutist rhetoric of terrorism is remarkably similar.
-The substantive content of terrorists rhetoric is not what attracts the aspiring terrorist.
-For the underground group isolated from society, group cohesion develops in response to shared
danger.
-Terrorist groups require enemies in order to cope with their own internal tensions, and if such
enemies do not exist they create them.
-The predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the internal dynamics of the terrorist group.
-This cluster of traits which Janis has labeled ‘groupthink’ would seem to epitomize the decision
making of the terrorist group. Of particular importance are the reduction of critical judgment, the
assumption of the group’s mortality and the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive risk-
taking.
-The primary requirement for any group is to survive.
-For the autonomous cell where the group is relatively small, simple, and undifferentiated and plans
and conducts its own operations. The dynamics of such a group, where leadership and authority
reside within the group, differ insignificant ways from those of terrorist groups which are elements
of a larger organizational structure.
-A basic principal of organizational psychology that the survival of the organization is the highest
priority applies fully to terrorist organizations.
-As a general proposition, the more autonomous the terrorist group, the more counter-productive
reactive retaliation is likely to be. It will strengthen group cohesion, exaggerate the importance of
the group, reduce internal tensions and justify its world view.

the terrorist- An international challenge (pp. 25-30). Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice.
Call Number: Published Abstract: Describes 2 major categories of terrorists: (1) anarchic-
ideologues, who wish to destroy the world of their fathers and (2) nationalist-separatists, who carry
on the mission of their forerunners. It is suggested that, despite the diversity of terrorists and causes,
there is a uniformity of terrorist behavior in that groups draw their membership from marginal,
isolated, inadequate individuals from troubled families, so that for many, the terrorist group is the 1st
group to which they have truly belonged. Polarization (i.e., viewing the group as all good and society
as all bad) is central to the group's ideology and is the rationale for committing acts of violence
against the establishment.
Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Post posits a distinction between two types of terrorists: anarchic ideologies and naturalist secessionists. He sees each attempting to "heal a split" and compensate for personality defects. The former is attempting to destroy the world of his father and the latter seeks to carry on the mission of his father.
- He reviews social characteristics from that generation of terrorists and inserts Suellwold's ideal that two types of people emerge in terrorist groups, the psychopath and the paranoid personality. At the group level, he suggests: "the need to belong, the needs to have a stable identity" I believe this an important bridging concept, which helps to explain the similarity in behavior of terrorists in groups of widely different exposed motivations and composition. In addition, he suggests that the importance of the group and power of the group mind produce strong pressure to conform and not to question. He also draws some parallel in understanding religious cults. Analysis: Even if the formulators are true (and there is good reason to believe they are (overly-deterministic)), it is not clear that they would apply to the contemporary terrorist threat, although general points about the sense of "belonging" in groups is well-taken.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: A common theme in comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism is the need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like-minded individuals with a similar world view. The need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may instead reinforce the mindset of the terrorist. Identifying the locus of control is crucial for estimating the effects of counter-terrorist policies on a terrorist group. The most effective anti-terrorist policy is one that makes the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Because of the diversity of terrorist groups and causes, there is no one terrorist “mindset”. Within this diversity it is useful to distinguish two major categories: the “anarchic-ideologies,” such as the Red Army Faction, committed to destroying the world of their fathers; and the “nationalist-secessionists,” such as ETA of the Basques, who carry on the mission of their fathers. There is a tendency for marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled family backgrounds to be attracted to the path of terrorism, so that for many belonging to the terrorist group is the first time they truly belonged, and the group comes to represent family. This creates powerful pressures to conform within the group, for to disagree is to be seen as disloyal, and to risk losing the group. Organized against society, the group is seen as all good, and the outside society as all bad, this being the rationale for committing violent anti-society acts.
-Kaplan has provided interesting hypothesis on the psychodynamics of terrorism. He describes terrorists as pursuing absolute ends, and sees a lack of self-esteem underlying actions which provide them with a renewed sense of masculinity. There would seem to be a profound difference between terrorism bent on destroying their own society, the “world of their fathers,” and those whose terrorist activities carry on the mission of their fathers. To put it in other words, for some, becoming terrorists is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents; for others, it is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents; for others, it is an act of retaliation against society for the hurt done to their parents. For some. This would suggest more conflict, more psychopathology, among those committed to anarchy and destruction of society, less conflict and greater personality integration among those committed to carrying on the mission of their parents by joining nationalist or secessionist movements.
-The noted sociologist Gerhardt Schmidtchen studied the life histories and careers of 250 terrorists 23 right-wing extremists and 227 left wing terrorists. Analysis of the statistical data concerning the left-wing terrorists- the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement, which grew out of the Baader-Meinhof Gang is instructive and suggestive, Schmidtchen found a pattern of incomplete family structure, especially during adolescence, with some 25 percent of the leftist terrorists having lost one or both parents by age 14, a much higher figure than among their peers. Loss of the father in adolescence had an especially marked effect. Moreover, 79 percent reported severe social conflict,
especially with the parents (33 percent), and the father, when present, was described in hostile terms. Fully one-third reported conflicts with society leading to conviction in juvenile court. He also observed a disproportionate pattern of educational and work failure relative to society as a whole. The terrorists were seen as “advancement oriented and failure prone.” Schmidtchen has characterized the terrorist career as “the terminal point of a series of abortive adaptation attempts.”

-Suellwold has delineated two personality types, which are particularly attracted to terrorist groups. She finds a high frequency of extreme extroverts, as described by Eysenck- the self centered individual with little regard for the feelings of theirs. The type as delineated by Suellwold has many features of the narcissistic personality. The second group, which she identifies as having the syndrome of neurotic hostility, shares many features of the paranoid personality.

-Drawing upon a remarkable series of in-depth interviews, Bollinger has developed fascinating clinical material on a small group of imprisoned left-wing terrorists who agreed to be interviewed. He found in his subjects histories of childhood deprivation and narcissistic wounds; he vividly describes individuals who came to young adulthood with a deficient sense of self-esteem, and inadequately integrated personalities. Loners, alienated individuals who blame for their own inadequacies. For these alienated individuals from the margins of society, joining a terrorist group represented the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of rejection, and the terrorist group was to become the family they never had. The need to belong the need to have a stable identity, to resolve a split and be at one with oneself and with society. I believe this is an important bridging concept which helps explain the similarity in behavior of terrorists in groups of widely different espoused motivations and composition. The goal of belonging so that sustaining the group and one’s acceptance by it assume major, indeed preeminent important.

-Bion proposes that in every group there are two opposing psychological tendencies, what he calls the “work group” is that aspect of the group which tends to its job, acts in a goal-directed way to carry out its stated task. But however healthy the group members, groups do not behave as if they are acting under particular psychological assumptions what Bion calls the “basic assumption group.” Bion elaborates three such psychological assumptions which regularly come into play in groups he has observed three emotional states by which group members act as if they are dominated: the dependency group, the pairing group, and the fight-flight group. The dependency group turns to an omnipotent leader for security. In the second assumption state the pairing group the members act as if the goal of the group is to bring forth a Messiah, someone who will save them there is an air of optimism and hope that a new world is around the corner. And finally, the fight-flight group which acts oppositional in relationship to the outside world a world which both threatens its existence and justifies its existence.

-The importance of group membership and the power of this group mind are associated with strong pressures to conform. For individuals who find the world uncertain, and are plagued by inner doubts and questions, it is psychologically very attractive to find a group where certainty is the rule and doubt is unacceptable. Eric Hoffer, the longshoreman philosopher, wrote a compelling portrait of the “True Believer,” the man who knows, and feels only contempt and pity for those who have not found their way to The Truth as her come to know it. The elegantly designed studies of the social psychology of members of the Unification Church by Dr. Mark Gallanter are particularly stimulating in this respect. Gallanter observes that members of large charismatic groups typically (1) share a consensual belief system, (2) sustain a high degree of social cohesiveness, (3) are strongly influenced by group behavioral norms, (4) impute charismatic (or divine) power to the group or its leadership, and (5) reject participation in the majority culture. The more contacts and friendships and strong family ties the inductee has outside the sect, the more likely he is to drop out during the induction process. Thus while tactical prudence might warrant sitting tight because of the security situation, a leader who counsels inaction may risk being displaced by another man more willing to act. Zawodny concludes that the group’s actions are much less determined by external political or military events than by the group’s needs to act in order to reduce internal tension and to restore its sense of purpose; he also holds that group dynamics are the principal determinant of group actions for underground organizations, especially when there is no centralized control. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence and in order to maintain its cohesion. The path to joining a terrorist group tends to be slow and gradual, from sympathizer, to passive supporter, to active supporter, and finally joining the group itself.
Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset. A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like-minded individuals with a similar worldview that “it’s us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justices their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mindset of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of controls of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter-terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state-supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect served as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter-terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatory policies can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti-terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.

In the long run, however, the most effective anti-terrorist strategy is one which diminishes the attraction of the oath of terrorism and deters potential recruits from joining.

Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric diagnostic category.

A feature in common among many terrorists is a tendency to externalize, to seek outside sources to blame for personal inadequacies.

The “anarchic-ideologies” the goal of the group is to destroy the world of their fathers. Their acts of terrorism are acts of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents. The second category- the “nationalist-separatists”- are carrying on the mission of their fathers; they are retaliating against society for the hurt done to their parents.

A major premise of this study is that the need to belong coupled with an incomplete personal identity cuts across group differences and provides the basis for especially powerful group dynamics.

This strong need to belong and to achieve a stable identity is deep-seated and springs from circumstances in the period before entering the terrorist group.

Indeed, belonging to the group for many is the most important component, the linchpin of psychosocial identity.

In joining a terrorist group, a member tends to become dependent upon the group for emotional support. The move outside to inside the terrorist group means a profound alteration in life style.

The perceived legitimacy of the group is critical; it is the glue which holds the group together and gives meaning to belonging.

What differentiates those who drop out from those who stay relates at one level to the degree to which they buy into the group’s ideology.

In particular, the language is that of absolutism, of black and white with no shades of gray, no room for ambiguity. It is a rhetoric of “us” versus “them,” good versus evil, with an idealization of “us” and a projection onto “them” of all that is wrong. The causes for stress are to be found in society; society is the only seriously pathogenic factor.

Having identified the establishment as the enemy, as the cause of society’s )and the terrorists’) problems, it is not only immoral to attempt to destroy the establishment, it is indeed the highest order of morality, for by the terrorists’ upside-down logic, destroying the source of evil, and only good can
result.
-The world is divided into two camps—enemies and friends—and he who is not totally with us is against us.
-With each step further toward the center, toward full belonging, the new recruits needs to demonstrate his fidelity towards the ideals of the group, a process which entails buying into the ethos and the extremist ideology.
-The dynamics of the terrorist group then have all the ingredients of a classic—indeed an exaggerated—version of the “fight-flight” group as described by Wilfred Bion.
-It is important to distinguish two different structural forms characterizing terrorist organizations: horizontal and vertical.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: This chapter does take significant issue, however, with the propositions that terrorists resort to violence as a willful choice and that terrorism as a course of action is an intentional choice selected from a range of perceived alternatives. Rather, it argues that political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. Thus the principal argument of this essay is that individuals are drawn to path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence, and their special logic, which is grounded in their psychology and reflected in their rhetoric, becomes the justification for their violent acts.
-Considering the diversity of causes to which terrorists are committed, the uniformity of their rhetoric is striking. Polarizing and absolutist, it is a rhetoric of “us versus them.” It is a rhetoric without nuance, without shades of gray. “They,” the establishment, are the source of all evil, in vivid contrast to “us,” the freedom fighters, consumed by righteous rage. And if “they” are the source of our problems, it follows ineluctably, in the special psycho-logic of the terrorist, that “they” must be destroyed. It is the only just and moral thing to do. Once the basic premises are accepted, the logical reasoning is flawless.
-The author’s own comparative research on the psychology of terrorists does not reveal major psychopathology.
-Nor does a comparative study reveal a particular psychological type, a particular personality constellation, a uniform terrorist mind.
-Several authors have characterized terrorists as action-oriented, aggressive people who are stimulus-hungry and seek excitement. Particularly striking is the reliance placed on the psychological mechanisms of “externalization” and “splitting,” psychological mechanisms found in individuals with narcissistic and borderline personality disturbances.
-And a great deal has gone wrong in the lives of people who are drawn to the path of terrorism.
-For many, belonging to the terrorist group may be the first time they truly belonged. As Bion has persuasively demonstrated, when individuals function in a group setting, their individual judgment and behavior are strongly influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics.
-Given the intensity of the need to belong, the strength of the affiliative needs, and, for many members, the as-yet incomplete sense of individual identity, terrorists have a tendency to submerge their own identities into the group, so that a kind of “group mind” emerges.
-Doubts concerning the legitimacy of the goals and actions of the group are intolerable to such a group. The person who questions a group decision risks the wrath of the group and possible expulsion.
-Extreme pressure to conform has been reported by all who have discussed the atmosphere within the group.
-The group ideology plays an important role in supporting this conformity-inducing group environment.
-The position argued in this essay: it does not view political violence as instrumental, but as the end itself. The cause is not the cause. Individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.
-What, after all, are freedom fighters if they do not fight? A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence.
-For any group or organization, the highest priority is survival. This is especially true for the terrorist group. To succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of survival.

-Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: In this second of two linked articles describing an integrated framework for the analysis of risk for terrorism of a radical group, a subset of observable indicators for each of the 32 variables within the integrated framework is presented. On the basis of an expert knowledge acquisition process, five types of terrorist groups nationalist separatist, religious fundamentalist, new religions(other religious extremists, including millenarian cults), social revolutionary, and right wing are compared in order to identify which indicators are of greatest importance for each terrorist group type. Historical, cultural, and contextual features can be assessed effectively through the use of open sources and experts. Group characteristics, processes, and structures were consistently rated as highly important across all five group types. Ratings for new religions differed most consistently from those of other group types.

-This article applies the framework to the five principle types of radical groups nationalist separatists (NS), social revolutionaries (SR), religious fundamentalists (RF), nontraditional religious extremists, including “new religions” (closed religious cults; NR), and right wing groups (RW) to further hone the usefulness of the framework by identifying those indicators most relevant to the evaluation of risk for each group category.

-The typology of terrorism employed was drawn from A.Schmid and A.Yongman.

-Nationalist separatist terrorism. Also known as ethnonationalist terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a geographically separate political state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity.

-Social revolutionary terrorism. Also known as terrorism of the left, social revolutionary terrorism refers to groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order.

-Religious fundamentalist terrorism. Among all of the “People of the book,” Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, there are extremists seeking to “force the end.”

-Religious extremist terrorism. Both religious fundamentalist terrorism as well as new religions terrorism are included here. In both cases, religious belligerents are defending their faith against enemies of their faith, responding to the interpretation of scripture by radical clerics who endorse killing in the name of God.

-Nontraditional religious extremist groups, also known as “new religions, are generally closed cults in a struggle for survival against a demonized enemy that must be destroyed.

-Right wing terrorism. This type comprises those groups seeking to maintain an extant political order or to return society to an idealized “golden age” of the past in which ethnic relations more clearly favored the dominant majority.

-The method employed was an elaboration of the method used in developing the integrated framework, in which a panel of experts in the field of terrorism and political violence was systematically interviewed and reinterviewed, supplemented by a literature review. The Delphi panel separately evaluated each indicator in terms of either High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) relevance as a predictor of terrorism for each of the five types of radical groups.

-Indicators of High Importance by Group Category:

-Within this conceptual category, 1.0 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features, and two variables, 1.1 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence, and 1.2 Current Communal Conflict were judged to be of high significance nearly across the board for the four major terrorist group categories:

-For the variable 1.3 Political, Economic, and Social Instability, 1.3 B Political Unrest, was judged to be of high significance for the four major groups.

-1.3 Social Instability was particularly important for both NS and RW groups.

-For this category, 2.0 Key Actors Affecting the Group, when the regime (2.11) discriminates against a secular or religious minority, it is of particular significance for NS and RF terrorism. When there opponents physically attack group members or their property (2.12 E), it is of high significance across the board. The variable 2.20 Constituents and Supporters, which addresses support or
pressure from supporters, internal or external, to move in violent directions, is of high significance for the major groups.

This category, 3.0 The Group / Organization: Characteristics, Structures, and Processes, concerns the inner workings of the group or organization, and, in general, is of high importance for all groups. Unlike categories 1.0 and 2.0, which are concerned with external, and thus more easily observable and measurable behaviors, the variables associated with the internal characteristics, structures, and processes are not so easily observed.

- 3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures

- The consensus judgment was the variables with in this category are extremely important because they reflect the actual behaviors of the group in contrast to the political, economic, and social conditions that serve as a broad but general risk indicator. Of the nine variables within this category, a number were of high significance across the five radical group types. In this category were: 3.10 Ideology and Goals, concerned with violent, extremist ideologies and absolutist goals; 3.20 Group Experience with Violence; and 3.70 Group Psychological Progression Towards Violence. Within the variables, a number of specific indicators were also judged to be of high significance across the board. These included: under 3.30 Leader Personality, 3.34 Malignant Narcissism, and several subindicators under 3.32 Paranoid Personality and 3.33 Sociopathic Personality; under the variable 3.40 Leadership Style and Decision Making, 3.41 C, concerned with a group with charismatic properties whose leader has a history or interest in violence;

- Training and so on were of high importance for the four main terrorist groups types; and within 3.90 indicators of movement toward terrorism, a number of highly salient indicators including 3.91, Assessment that benefits of terrorism Outweigh the risks, 3.92 Formation of Fighting Units, 3.93 B Planned Acts of Violence Against Opponents, and 3.94 Final Preparation for Violence and Terrorism

- Under category 4.0 The immediate Situation, a triggering event of high significance across the board was 4.10 A, the arrest, torture, or assassination of an idealized group leader or groups members by the regime.

- Conclusions: Historical, Cultural and Contextual Features, rated as important to the prediction of terrorism for all but new religion groups, can be assessed effectively through the use of open sources and experts.

- Group Characteristics, Processes, and Structures were consistently rated as highly important to the prediction of terrorism across all five group types.

- Ratings for new religions differed most consistently from those of other group types.

- The expert panel was least confident regarding their ratings for new religions reflecting the relatively small number of these groups and the recency of their entry into terrorism.

- The expert panel consisted of Ronald Crelinsten, University of Ottawa, Canada, Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University, Connecticut; Theodore Gurr, University of Maryland; Bruce Hoffman, St. Andrews University, Great Britain; Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, Israel; and Ehud Sprinzak, Hebrew University, Israel.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: On the basis of a systematic expert knowledge acquisition process, a framework has been developed that takes into account critical variables internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the group under examination that are understood to increase risk for escalation toward political violence. The indicators identified are grouped within four conceptual categories: (1) External factors, including historical, cultural, and contextual features; (2) Key actors affecting the group, including the regime and other opponents, as well as Constituents and Supporters; (3) The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures, including an examination of such factors as leadership style and decision making, group experience with violence, and group ideology and goals; and (4) Characteristics of the Immediate Situation, including Triggering Events. A total of 32 variables were identified within the 4 categories to establish the overall integrated framework. This framework provides the basis for the rigorous analysis of a radical group's risk for terrorism.

- Causal analyses of terrorism have focused predominantly on three areas: (1) political, economic and social conditions that correlate to increased incidences of politically motivated violence, (2) group
dynamics related processes that facilitate radicalization and an increased risk of violence in previously nonviolent protest groups, and (3) psychological traits and characteristics of group members that predispose them to seeking membership in violent organizations such as terrorist groups. However, these factors have generally been studied in isolation, with few attempts to integrate these approaches to create a comprehensive and dynamic risk model reflecting the radical group in the context of both external (structural) and internal (group dynamics and psychological) factors.

Several terrorism scholars have addressed parts of the problem, notably Crensten, Crenshaw, Della Porta, Gurr, Ross, and Sprinzak. Crenshaw recognizes that “the causal chain that leads to the commission of acts of terrorism is complex.” Ross has identified structural and psychological causes of terrorism and developed a complex model linking the two. Crensten has developed a framework for the analysis of terrorism based on the conceptualization of terrorism as political communication, focusing analysis on the dynamic relationship between the “controller, (i.e., the state), and the “controlled” (i.e., the substate protest group). Della Porta has devised a model describing the radicalization process for European social revolutionary groups that integrates environmental and group dynamics variables. And although Gurr has developed an assessment tool for evaluating risk for ethno-political rebellion that focuses on collective incentives, the capacity for joint action, and external opportunities, his model largely leaves out psychological and group dynamics variables critical to evaluating risk in radical protest groups.

There has been little progress in developing a comprehensive and systematic method for evaluating the terrorism potential of specific radical groups.

An exception is the recent work of Sprinzak, who has assembled a collection of critical variables into a formal risk-assessment methodology specific to the prediction of terrorism. Within the context of the radicalization process, he enumerates 11 early warning indicators designed to predict the transition of radical groups from nonviolent protest to terrorism.

This article presents an integrated framework of indicators for the analysis of a radical group’s risk for terrorism that substantially builds and expands on Sprinzak’s 11 key indicators, incorporating them into a larger, more comprehensive, and dynamic model representing the radical group in context. Drawing on Lewin’s field theory, the radical group is conceived of as existing and behaving in a “field of forces.” Thus the framework consists of four overlapping and interacting fields: (1) the historical, cultural, and contextual features that give rise to the group and form the backdrop against which the group operates, (2) the key actors affecting the group, (3) the group itself, including the characteristics, processes, and structures that define it, and (4) the immediate situation confronting the group that can trigger a change in tactics to increasing levels of violence or terrorism.

In this article, the first of two linked articles, the integrated framework is characterized in generic form. In the second article (also in this issue), the framework is applied to the five principal terrorist group types: nationalist-separatists, religious fundamentalists, other religious extremists (including nontraditional religious extremists), social revolutionaries, and right-wing extremist groups.

The integrated framework was constructed by employing a systematic expert knowledge acquisition exercise that used a modified Delphi procedure with six experts in the field of terrorism and political violence. Each expert was asked independently to submit to the authors a list of factors indicative of risk for terrorism corresponding to three categories group-specific, environment-specific, and interaction-specific (dynamic) factors identified by the authors from the literature review as broadly representative of the likely categories of critical variables. The submissions from each expert were then combined and factor analyzed, eliminating redundancy before a combined list was sent back to each expert for final evaluation and prioritization.

The framework offers a conceptualization of the radicalization process that takes into account critical variables internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the group under examinations that are understood to increase risk for escalation toward political violence. The framework, with its four macro categories and numerous subcategories, attempts to present the most complete picture of risk-variables to give an analyst sufficient guide points to assess the risk of terrorism.

The purpose of the framework is to sensitize the analyst to the width and breadth of conditions and characteristics that increase the risk that a radical group will move toward terrorism.
- 1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Contextual Features Historical, cultural, and other contextual features interact to shape radical groups and direct them toward or away from violence.
- 1.10 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence
  - Certain regions of the world have long accepted violence as a quasi-legitimate means of expressing discontent.
  - Groups seeking to affect political change under such circumstances are more likely to perceive violence as the necessary means for implementing their agenda.
- 1.20 Current Communal Conflict
  Conflict between domestic groups provides an environment conducive to the emergence of protest movements and radical political groups at risk for terrorism.
- 2.00 Key Actors Affecting the Group
  No radical political group exists in isolation. A group’s relationship with a regime or government, opponents, supporters, rivals, and competitors can either move the group toward violence and terrorism or deter it from taking that path.
- 2.10 Opponents
  The character and intention of a radical group’s opponents strongly influences the nature of struggle between them.
- 2.11 The Regime
  Regime or government actions to block a group’s access to resources, political power, or decision-making structures can motivate a group to escalate to violent activity.
- 2.12 Other Opponents
  A regime is not the only opponent a group might face.
- 2.20 Constituents and Supporters
  Radical groups often identify themselves as affiliated with, supportive of, or representing a segment of a community or constituents.
  - The group may receive support from local sympathizers or nonresident group supporters. Being familiar with sources of support is important because they offer clues to the group’s intentions. Furthermore, a group’s constituents or supporters can either deter or encourage terrorist activity.
- 2.30 Competitors
  Rivalry between extremist groups often results in a spiral of escalation to violence and terrorism. Two or more radical groups with similar goals competing for constituents, resources, and recruits can create a dynamic resulting in rapid escalation toward terrorism as the groups’ leaders find increasingly violent behavior the only means of dominating the radical environment and maintaining their position of power.
- 3.00 The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures
  Although historical, cultural, and contextual features, along with the key actors affecting the group play an important role in assessing a group’s risk for terrorism, the ultimate indicators of the group’s progression toward violence and terrorism will be reflected in the group itself. The group’s ideology and experience with violence, along with the type of leader and the way in which the group or organization’s decision-making processes are structured reveal a great deal about the character and terrorism potential of the group. Organizational processes and activities, such as recruitment, selection, socialization, training, assignment, promotion, and attrition of group members also provide critical clues, especially as these basic processes change in support of increased radical activity and violence. Finally, a group progressing toward violence and terrorism will display characteristic psychological and behavioral signs that can tip off an analyst as to the group’s intentions and directions.
- 3.10 Group Ideology and Goals
  One of the richest sources of group indicators will be a group’s ideological and goal statements, often found in interviews with and publications by group members and leaders. If the group’s goals include overthrow of the regime or elimination of its opponents, it will be more likely to turn to terrorism following the failure of other nonviolent means. In addition, changes in ideological statements over time redefining group members, opponents, goals, justifiable means, and sense of urgency can indicate an increased risk of terrorism.
- 3.20 Group Experience with Violence
Past violent behavior is the best predictor of future violence. A group composed of members previously engaged in violent campaigns or led by individuals with a known history of violent activity signals a predisposition within the group to resort to violence.

### 3.30 Leadership Personality Characteristics

When group leaders have one of several political personality constellations, especially in extreme forms, they are particularly likely to shape the group in a manner that can lead the group in the direction of political violence, including terrorism. These types include:

- **3.31 Narcissistic Personality.** These leaders are vulnerable to biased information processing so that they overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strength of opponents.
- **3.32 Paranoid Personality.** Paranoids view themselves as surrounded by enemies. Paranoids have a deep-seated need to externalize blame to scapegoats for their own difficulties. Paranoids are highly represented among right-wing racists and ethnic separatists. Their lack of empathy for others and the ease with which they dehumanize and devalue enemies makes the transition to violence and terrorism less difficult for this type of leader.
- **3.33 Sociopathic Personality.** Sociopaths lack concern for the impact of their actions on others, are untroubled by moral constraints, and view violence as just another tool to use to accomplish their goals. This is a common personality type among criminals. These individuals tend to be highly represented among the membership of many terrorist groups, but are less likely to rise to leadership positions unless the group has a significant criminal population. The presence of a sociopathic leader increases a group’s risk of violence.
- **3.34 Malignant Narcissism.** The malignant narcissist represents the most dangerous personality constellation in terms of the risk of violence and terrorism. This leadership personality can best be thought of as a combination of the three traits described earlier: narcissism, paranoia, and sociopathy.

### 3.40 Leadership Style and Organizational Decision Making

Two prominent leadership styles at opposite ends of the spectrum are authoritarian/totalitarian and democratic, both with significant implications for the group’s risk of violence and terrorism. Factionalization and splintering within authoritarian and democratic leadership structures can also provide essential information as to the group’s likely course.

- **3.41 Charismatic Leader Follower Relationships.** In a charismatic system, the followers endow the leader with superhuman, god like characteristics, give uncritical allegiance to the leader, give him uncritical emotional support, believe uncritically what he says, and uncritically follow his directions.
- **3.42 Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making.** Groups with authoritarian/totalitarian leadership are characterized by closed decision-making bodies and processes that are restricted to the leader and personnel designated by him. The authoritarian leader tends to see the world in black and white, friend or foe terms, demands loyalty and obedience and tolerates little, if any dissent. Authoritarian leaders characteristically develop hierarchical organizations with tight central control. Whether an organization is at risk for terrorism depends on the disposition of the leader and the group’s ability to exert control over its members. Of particular concern are authoritarian leaders advocating violence who consolidate decision-making control over the group, allowing them high levels of control over the direction and development the group takes from nonviolence to terrorism.
- **3.43 Communities of Belief.** It is useful to specify cells or individuals with no organizing central authority in addition to the spectrum from authoritarian central control of decision making to democratic decision making. These are referred to as Communities of Beliefs for the purposes of this model. Community of belief refers to scattered groups or individuals that share common values and philosophies regarding a social problem but lack a coherent command structure.
- **3.44 Factionalization and Split.** Factionalization often occurs over the appropriate means to accomplish organizational/ group goals or maintain group security, with a more extreme subgroup supporting violence or terrorism. In organizations with strong, competitive leaders displaying distinct personality differences, factionalization can occur due not to ideological differences, but primarily as a consequence of...
personal rivalry
- An extremist faction within an otherwise moderate organization that displays weak control over decision making may leave to pursue its own more violent goals.
- 3.34 Open vs. Closed Group. This indicator refers to the extent to which the group and its members are in continuity with society or restricted from outside contact and thereby walled-off and isolated from society. In general, the closed group, in which members are restricted from contact with the outside world, is particularly prone to extremist thought and action.
- 3.50 Organizational Processes
Several organizational processes are necessary for group survival and growth recruitment, screening, socialization, training, assignment and promotion, and attrition. Specific changes in these processes serve as indicators of preparation for violence and terrorism.
- 3.51 Recruitment.
Groups that recruit from pools including violent, disgruntled, disenfranchised, victimized, or radicalized personnel, or personnel with specialized training or experience suitable to violence are more likely to pursue violence and terrorism. Recruitment of younger activists is also a risk factor.
- A shift in a group’s recruitment tactics can also indicate an increased risk of terrorism or violence.
- 3.52 Screening and Selection. After recruitment a group must select the personnel it wants and screen out undesirable candidates. Groups who are a risk for terrorism are more likely to select and screen more selectively; select in individuals such as those described earlier; and screen out individuals who are not capable of coping with the stressful demands of violence, and terrorist operations and lifestyle.
- 3.53 Socialization. After members enter the group they must become familiar with group culture, including the rules, practices, philosophy, and decision-making and other regulatory functions. Group socialization practices that emphasize obedience to authority, absolute loyalty to the group and leader and the need for sacrifice while suppressing dissent can contribute to violence and terrorism.
- 3.54. Training.
Groups that are more likely to pursue terrorism provide members with training designed to promote military discipline and coordinated group action against opponents.
- 3.55 Assignment and Promotion.
A shift in assignments and promotion criteria toward individuals who have demonstrated ability to engage in confrontation or violent behavior may be indicative of a group move toward terrorism.
- 3.56 Attrition.
Individual members can decide to leave or be forced out for being insufficiently radical. When this occurs, the group becomes ever more extreme.
- 3.60 Groupthink and Polarization
Groupthink refers to the conformity-seeking tendencies of decision-making groups, when “members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” Polarization refers to the tendency for groups to adopt more extreme positions than would have been predicted based on knowledge of individual member positions, also called the “risky shift.” Polarization is often increased when the group is led by an authoritarian leader, the group’s decision-making structure is hierarchical, and strong support for more radical activity or positions exists within constituents or supporters of the group.
- 3. 70 Group Psychological Progression toward Terrorism
The transition from protest to terror group is a gradual one. Groups and organizations that reach terrorism generally do so at the end of a process of radicalization during which the balance progressively shifts from psychological constraints against violence to incentives for violence, to viewing violence/terrorism as the only course. Indicators that reflect the group’s psychological progression toward terrorism are presented next.
- 3.72 Sense of Threat.
Immediacy magnifies threat level and increases the risk of terrorism by reducing group decision time and range of perceived options. Highly threatened groups are more likely to pursue high-risk strategies. It should be emphasized that this indicator is derived from perceptions and feelings of the level of threat and immediacy of threat as perceived by group member and leader rather than the actual threat or risk posed or perceived by others.
3.80 Type of Support
The type of support a group receives can range from ideological, financial, and material to operational, including weapons, training, logistics, advisors, and troops. Changes in the type of support a group receives, particularly as support changes from more ideological and financial to weapons and operational assistance, are of particular concern.

3.90 Behavioral Indicators of Movement toward Terrorism
- The presence of fighting units does suggest a willingness to resort to violence if necessary.
- Formation of Fighting Units.
- As the group comes closer to terrorism, its activists will intentionally seek and provoke violent confrontations.
- Final Preparations for Violence and Terrorism. These preparations include operational and contingency planning and dry runs of actual attacks.

4.00 The Immediate Situation
The radical group, operating against the backdrop of historical, cultural, and contextual features and interacting with other key actors in the environment, must deal with and react to the immediate events that challenge it. In particular, physical attacks on the group, its leaders, or its constituents act as triggering events that have propelled groups to violence and terrorism. This section describes events that can trigger a group to engage in terrorism.

4.10 Triggering Events
Triggering events are single events, or a series of events happening in close succession, that trigger within the group the conviction that acts of violence and terrorism by the group are necessary. A triggering event is the “last straw” beyond which the only recourse is violence.
- Insofar as the framework represents cumulative expert knowledge, the indicators are not merely theoretical but represent cumulative experience. Nevertheless, the framework has not yet been tested against specific cases.

Call Number: As its title suggests, this book is essentially an extensive bibliography of published works on terrorism. There is an introductory chapter that addresses the definition, history, purpose, and tactics of terrorism. It exists mostly to provide some context to the topic. The range of topics covered in the bibliography is quite diverse and includes section on particular commanders/theorists and countries. The remaining brief chapters list databases (which is dated), journals (many of which are still published) and book dealers and sellers. Despite its extensive listings, the book is nearly 10 years out of date in a rapidly changing field.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Clearly, there are no easy answers to the current political problems that exist in so many corners of our planet. We know that we have not seen the end of terrorism or of the many other forms of violence that have pervaded the historical record and continue to this day to be staples of our daily news. In the face of these facts, rather than give in to hopelessness, we should unquestionably continue to do what we can to reduce the prevalence of "man's inhumanity to man." However, we each have a limited time on this earth; and so, at the individual level, we suggest that the more pertinent matter is how to do what we can to help others while making the best of our own lives.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: The behavioral interaction model offered provides a social psychological framework for examining the intra-and intergroup dynamics of terrorist behavior over time. These dynamics should be studied at different levels of analysis: at the levels of the individual terrorist, the group to which he or she belongs, the organization in which these groups are often embedded, the society they live in and the associations they have with
national governments. At this preliminary stage of its development, the model has mainly a
descriptive, mapping function. It tries to identify the various cognitive, emotional, motivational and
normative orientations of the individual, group or any other relevant social system which interacts
with the different components of the environment. The model may increase understanding of
terrorist behavior.

-In April 1985 the National Resistance Front, a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon, proudly
announced that Sana Mahaidali had become the first women suicide car bomber to perish in action,
Before setting out Sana announced on videotape her reasons for her mission to kill Israeli soldiers.
She said: “I am very relaxed as I go to do this operation… I am from a group that decided on self-
sacrifice and martyrdom for the sake of liberation of land and people.”

-The first question which comes to mind is of course how can a girl of 16 year do this to herself and
other human beings?

Despite these difficulties, the aim of this article is to present a Behavioral Interaction Model which
may provide a systematic way of studying terrorism. This preliminary model offers a social
psychological framework for examining the intra-and intergroup dynamics of terrorist behavior over
time. The development of this model was stimulated by laboratory and field research on group
conflict and aggression and is meant as a general theory of group conflict. It was not specifically
designed to deal with the problem of terrorism.

The study of terrorism is rapidly growing field. Despite the abundance of literature, the
development of theory has lagged behind.

-A Behavioral Interaction Model: A Brief Characterization: Consistent with the interactionist
position of Kurt Lewin, the model, presented, make the assumption that the behavior of an actor (an
individual, group, organization, nation, or any other social system) is a function of the interaction of
the actor (or party) with its environment.

1. The environment- According to the model, the environment consists of three components: the
physical (space and task) environment, the internal and external social environment (the behavior of
other people within and outside the group or social system), and the structure of interdependence
between the actors or parties.

2. Psychological orientations- These three components space and task environment, internal and
external social environment, and interdependence structure elicit various cognitive, emotion,
motivational and normative orientations. The main function of these psychological orientations is to
reduce the uncertainty or enhance the environment’s predictability to such a level that it enables the
actor to cope with it and manage it effectively.

-Action tendencies, intention and behavior: Consistent with expected utility models, it is assumed
that among competing tendencies toward specific actions, for example, the tendency to engage in
violence or not, that particular action will be chosen for execution (1) which appear so result in the
realization of highly desirable outcomes or goals, (2) which the actor believes can be implemented
with a high probability of success, and (3) which compares favorably to the possible costs or negative
consequence the actor or other friendly parties have to bear as a result of engaging in the intended
action.

-According to the theory of reasoned action, the intention or commitment to perform or not to
perform an action is the best predictor of behavior.

-Evaluation of goal achievement: Thus action or behavior is in an outcome or state which has to be
evaluated against the desired future state or goal the actor wants to achieve. When no discrepancy is
observed between the present and desired state, the action is terminated. When the discrepancy still
remains, the actor has to revise or reconsider the psychological orientations and meaning
(interpretive) systems that generated the behavior.

-Like other action-control models, our model can be considered a self-regulating, negative feedback
system modulated by multiple feedback loops, which results in a continuous reorganization of
meaning (interpretive) systems, action tendencies, behaviors and other kind of goals the actors wants
to achieve in interaction with other parties until some equilibrium is reached among them.

-The basis assumption of the model is that it is equally applicable to describe the terrorist behavior
of an individual, a group, organization, nation state or any other social system.

-After listing a number of profiles of ‘terrorist personalities’, Schimid et al., have emphasized the role
of vengeance based on identification with the oppressed in persuading an individual to become a
terrorist, but vengeance does not necessarily explain what keeps terrorist going on afterwards.
- Social psychologists have studied intra-group such as conformity pressures and obedience, centralization of leadership, social facilitation, modeling, group polarization, deindividuation and groupthink.
- Intergroup conflict induces intergroup processes such as a glorification of the in-group and derogation of the out-group, the development of mutual stereotyping, identity formation, intergroup hostility, and many other processes which have been studied by social psychologists.
- The organizational perspective on terrorist behavior raises the usual questions about organizational structure, the nature of the human resources (recruitment, skills, assessment, careers), organizational culture and the change development, and termination of the organization. Research indicates that conflicts between individuals and groups in organizations are affected by size, degree of task specialization, jurisdictional clarity, member goal capability, leadership styles, rewards systems, and the degree of interdependence and differentiation between the groups in the organization.
- The Physical (Spatial) Environment- Obviously, when referring to the physical environment we are thinking not only about geographical or ecological circumstances, which may facilitate or hamper the development of terrorism. Physical environment also refers to the historical, social, cultural, religious, economic, and political factors associated with living in a particular territory.
- Schmid, et al., following Eckstein, have made a distinction between the precipitants of violence and the preconditions which make it possible for the precipitant to bring about violence.
- The preconditions are subdivided into permissive factors, which enable a terrorist strategy: and direct situational factors, which motivate terrorist’s actions.
- The Social Environment- For group and organizations a distinction can be made between the internal and external social environment: the behavior of people within and outside the boundaries of the group, organization or any other social system.
- In our view, the ‘instrumental’ and ‘organizational’ perspectives which Crenshaw has distinguished are not incompatible with one another. On the contrary, both approaches are needed to explain the behavior of any group or organization, including a terrorist organization’s actions.
- Interdependence Structure: Different types of interdependence can be distinguished within and between groups. Members of terrorist groups are usually positively interdependent on each other with respect to achieving their goals and outcomes.
- By contrast, terrorists often maintain a negative interdependence (win-lose) relationship with the governments they want to influence in order to achieve their objectives.
- Psychological Orientations: In the model, different psychological orientations have been distinguished: (1) cognitive, (2) emotional, (3) motivational and (4) normative orientations. Cognitive orientations and related concepts such as scripts, schemas, hypotheses, attributions and prototypes refer to the structure and expectations and organized beliefs people have about themselves and others as they interact (with the different components) of the external environment. The way terrorist perceive their world is essential for an understanding of their actions.
- The justification of terrorism and violence is also a central issue for non-religious groups.
- Emotional orientations refer to subjective experience and perceptions of relatively sudden changes (emotions) or more slowly evolving fluctuations (moods) of psychological arousal in the autonomic nervous system. Emotional orientations have cognitive as well as motivational functions.
- Motivational Orientation orient people to the possibilities of gratification or frustration of certain kinds of drives, needs, urges, and concerns as they change over time in interaction with the environment. Motives propel and direct people toward the achievement of desirable goals or to avoid unpleasant outcomes.
- At the level of the individual, several motives have been discussed which may mead to joining a terrorist group. Including vengeance, revenge, prestige, recognition, and self-esteem; and needs for solidarity, belonging, comradeship, and action, a coherent vision of ones world: loyalty to one’s family, friends or country: and other cognitive, social, emotional, and normative gains that membership in a terrorist groups may entail.
- There are multiple paths to becoming a member or a terrorist organization.
- We may have an instance here of how relational needs for comradeship, solidarity, recognition, and attention may in time become more important than achieving instrumental and ideological goals external to the social relationships within the terrorist group. These relational motives may become more important reasons that members stay on. Group cohesiveness may become a goal in and of itself.
Normative Orientations directs people to rules and regulations that govern their attitudes and behavior in a given relationship. They are enforced by positive and negative sanctions, which may be implicit or explicit. Norms have a moral or evaluative quality.

Meaning (interpretive) systems are patterns of psychological orientations that enable individuals, groups and organizations to construct and negotiate a physical and social reality with one another, which more or less corresponds to the objective’ or consensually validated external environment.

Instrumental and relational orientations refer to the usual distinction which has been made between an instrumental-task or an agentic orientation on the other hand: and a relational-evaluative, socio-emotional or communal orientation on the other hand.

The distinction between instrumental and relational orientations closely resembles the distinction which Martha Crenshaw has made between instrumental’ and ‘organization’ approaches to the study of terrorism.

Action Tendencies, Intention, Behavior and Evaluation Consistent with the theory of reasoned action, it is assumed that, among competing action tendencies, that action will be chosen for execution which appears to result in the realization of highly desirable goals which can be reached with a high probability of success (the same holds, or course, for the avoidance of highly undesirable outcomes).


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This brief work is Rapoport’s first book. Written in 1970, he seeks to provide an historical overview and introduction to the phenomenon of assassination, particularly its use as a political tool. He does this quite concisely. He then breaks down assassination in two phases: preparation and execution and attends to challenges pose in each. He concludes that assassination as a tactic for political change is usually attempted only by those without resources and in a position of lesser power. He also views the “lone wolf” as the most difficult type to defeat because he finds it easier to get into a “striking position” and fewer conspiratorial encumbrances in the preparation phase. Contrary to popular perceptions at the time, he emphasizes “that the personal histories of lone assassins suggest only that a sizeable minority show traces of insanity…” a fact borne out by later empirical research. Despite the title, apart from his analysis on the use of assassination as a political tool, there is not much that speaks directly to its use in terrorism.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: “Terror,” Kropotkin wrote is, "propaganda by the deed."
- For the holy terrorist, the primary audience is the deity. They intend their victims to experience terror and to express it visibly for the pleasure of Kali, the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction. Thugs strive to avoid publicity.
- Evidence that thugs existed in the seventh century, and almost all scholars agree that they were vigorous in the thirteenth, which means that the group persisted for at least six hundred years.
- Few estimates of the number of people killed by Thugs. Sleeman (1933) offers a conservative figure of one million for the last three centuries of their history.
- They did not or could not threaten society for the simple reason that their doctrine made them attack individuals rather than institutions.
- Estimated that each Thug participated in three murders annually.
- No one retired until he was physically unable to participate in expeditions.
- New recruits came largely from the children of Thugs, and the deficiencies were made up by outsiders. The children were initiated into the tradition early by carefully calculated gradual process-a circumstance that contributed to their resoluteness.
- For obscure religious reasons Thugs attacked only travelers, and although they confiscated the property of their victims, material gain was not their principal concern.
- A striking feature of Thug operations was that virtually all activity was hemmed by self-imposed restraints.
- Specified victims, methods of attack, divisions of labor, disposal of corpses, distribution of booty, and training, lists of persons immune from the attack.
- Whatever purpose these rules were designed to serve, they could not be altered even if the life of
the brotherhood was at stake, because they were perceived to be divine ordinances.
-Thus originally signified deceiver.
-Thugs literally lived two very different sort of lives. For the greater portion of the year (sometime
11 out of 12 months), thugs were models of propriety, known for their industry, temperance,
generosity, kindliness, and trustworthiness.
-Their victims were never abused.
-Thugs believed that death actually benefited the victim, who would surely enter paradise.
-Unlike the Thugs they had political objectives; their purpose was to fulfill or purify Islam.
-Assassins seriously threatened the governments of several states, especially those of the Turkish
Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria.
-Islam has always been preeminently dedicated to delivering a moral message aimed at transforming
social existence in this world.
-Their opportunities to do so will be maximized if the assailant breaks down, or even if he tries to
evade arrest.
-His weapon was always a dagger.
-"Usually made no attempt to escape; there is even a suggestion that to survive a mission was
shameful.
-Martyrdom, the voluntary acceptance of death in order to "demonstrate the ...truth" to man, is a
central, perhaps critical, method of message-giving religions, used both to dispel the doubts of
believers and to aid proselytizing efforts.
-Fidayeen-consecrated or dedicated ones.
-Islamic millenarian movements are largely associated with the Shia (the minority), who believe that
eventually a Mahdi (Messiah or Rightly Guided One) would emerge to lead a holy war (jihad)
against the orthodox establishment to cleanse Islam.
-But not until the Mahdi arrives are they allowed to "draw the sword"
-For the first time in history, perhaps a state found its principal raison d'etre in organizing
international terror.
-Victims were orthodox religious or political leaders who refused to heed warnings, and therefore
provoked an attack by being scornful of new preaching.
-So prematurely did this immunity from personal or ordinary feelings seem to orthodox Muslims that
they have described the group as "hashish eaters" (hashashin), the source of our term assassin.
(Although there is no evidence that drugs were used, the ability to use the doctrine of taqiyya and the
fact that training began in childhood may help explain fiydayeen behavior.)
-Assassins, the Sicarii (daggersmen) were identified with a particular weapon, and both rebellions had
an international character.
-The Zealots-Sicarii survived for approximately 25 years.
-The nature of their messianic doctrine simultaneously suggested the object of terror and permitted
methods necessary to achieve it.
-Jewish terrorist activity appeared to have to purpose: to make oppression so intolerable that
insurrection was inevitable, and, subsequently, to frustrate every attempt to reconcile the respective
parties.
-Zealot and Sicarii both derive from a much easier model in Jewish history, Phineas, a high priest in
the days of Moses.
-The Sicari committed murders in broad daylight in the heart of Jerusalem
-They engaged military forces openly, often slaughtering their prisoners.
-Their Hebrew name signified the righteous indignation that Phineas personified, but they rarely
plotted assassinations. Phineas was also know for audacity, which Zealot-Sicarrii assaults often
reflect.
-The atrocities occurred on the most holy days to exploit the potential for publicity therein.
-The Zealots and the Sicariii saw themselves not as propagators of a doctrine but as revolutionary
catalysts who moved men by force of their audacious action, exploiting mass expectations that a
cataclysmic messianic deliverance was imminent.
-Large passive demonstrations against authority tend to produce violence unless both sides have
discipline and foresight. When some on either side prefer violence, or when passive resistance is
viewed not as an end in itself, but as a tactic seem more productive, explosions will occur.
-To focus on popular insurrection as the principal object, however, is to misconstrue the Zealoyt-
Sicarii views. Insurrection was only a sign of messianic intervention.

-Our obliviousness to holy terror rests on a misconception that the distinction between it and the modern form is one of scale, not of nature or kind. A most conspicuous expression of this misconception is the conventional wisdom that terrorist operations require modern technology to be significant.

-Sacred terrorists find their rationale in the past, either in divine instructions transmitted long ago or in interpretations of precedents from founding periods of the parent religions. Their struggles are sanctified with respect to purpose and with respect to means; this is why their violence must have unique characteristics.

-Modern terrorism has two unique, dominant features. Organizations and tactics are constantly modified, presumably to enhance effectiveness and terror is used for very different ends, ranging from those of anarchists with millenarian visions to anti-colonialists, to individuals who simply want to call attention to a particular situation that they find offensive.

-The people attracted to it may be so intrigued by the experience of perpetrating terror that everything else is incidental.

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Call Number: Key Quote Summary: The first notable discussion of space and conflict appears in *The Federalist*

-The Federalist* emphasizes physical geography, that is the nature of the terrain, the distances within and between states, issues especially important to the new American successor state.

-These dimensions of space (that is, physical, political, and moral geography) influence the course, conduct, and consequences of ethno-religious violence. This article will discuss patterns since the 1880s, highlighting the period since 1945 to focus on several questions: what is the relationship between the massive redrawing of political boundaries occasioned by the fall of great empires and the steady expansion of the number of these conflicts?

-The conventional wisdom that the world-wide profusion of ethno-religious conflicts is a peculiar post-Cold-War phenomenon is false, for the number grew steadily throughout the past century. Ethno-religious concerns inspired over half of the violent struggles within states from 1945 to 1960. The proportion increased to three-quarters from 1960 to 1990.

-No reliable count of such conflicts in the world before 1945 exists; my own estimate is that between 1875 and 1914 15 percent were ethno-religious, a percentage increasing to around 25 between 1918 and 1945. The figures for the two periods before and after 1945 demonstrate constant, albeit uneven, growth.

-Simultaneously, a similar expansion in the number of states occurred. Nearly five times as many states exist today as in the 1880s.

-The overwhelming majority of new states are successor states deriving either from great land empires or from sea empires with scattered territories.

-Obviously, violent ethno-religious struggles are not restricted to successor states.

-But successor states are more vulnerable than others because spatial reconfigurations exacerbate existing ethno-religious tensions.

-Space shapes distinguishing features of wars: their length, intensity and purpose. Most ethno-religious struggles are a species of internal wars, wars *within* rather than *between* states; and, characteristically, internal wars are longer than international ones, six times longer in the twentieth century. Today internal wars persist six times longer than they did a century ago. One reason is that since 1945 most internal wars have been ethno-religious, and as the proportion of such struggles keeps growing so does the length of internal wars. Normally, length and intensity (casualties and numbers participating) are inversely related. But internal wars with ethno-religious issues witness more attempts at genocide and more frequent abuses of human rights.

-Space is so closely connected with identity that whole lands particular sites often appear sacred.

-Historically, contending parties in an internal war usually aim to capture or hold the government in order to dominate all the state’s available space.

-The doctrine that every people has a right to a space adequate to govern itself, as its genesis in the
American and the French Revolution suggests, is intimately connected with the idea of democracy. When majorities and minorities are identified in ethno-religious terms they tend to become permanent entities; and permanent majorities and minorities, *The Federalist* observed, are extremely prone to violence. Violence within states is an important, perhaps the most important precipitant of wars between them. The physical properties of space, namely proximity to neighbours is an important—perhaps decisive—concern, one ignored too often.

**Physical Space: the Importance of Proximity**

According to conventional wisdom, the most powerful states intervene most often. One can make a good *a priori* case for proximity as being the decisive circumstances. The boundaries of ethno-religious communities generally overlap those neighbouring states, creating persistent waves of sympathies and antagonism transcending borders. Related activities provide another reason for seeing neighbourliness as most important. Richardson and Wilkinson’s study of wars between 1820 and 1945 concluded that 94 percent occurred between neighbors, and that by far the most important element associated with all wars studied was contiguity. Even the number of frontiers a state possessed related directly to the number of wars it fought.

- But where does the weight of historical evidence lie concerning neighbourhood versus power? Evidence from the first half of the century is inconclusive.
- Ethno-religious violence became less significant for global tensions after World War I, partly because Western empires had absorbed so much of the world and therefore the opportunities for neighbors to intervene in troubled territories declined.
- After 1945, when so many empires dissolved, the earlier link between power and neighbourhood was ruptured.

- Although aid to rebels was almost invariably covert, the statistics demonstrate that neighbouring states more frequently and more persistently intervened in secessionist struggles.
- Ethno-religious conflict rarely begins by demanding secession. As succession becomes more explicit, neighbours become more uneasy for two reasons: many have their own secession potentialities, and the integrity of existing states is a cardinal principle of the international order.
- A government will normally get more generous support than rebels will, especially from neighbours with territories adjacent to those controlled by that government.
- Governments rarely recognize a secessionist group’s claim to be a state.
- Rebels bent on secession are strategically weak; they need their neighbours more than their neighbours need them.

- Once violence occurs, pressures on foreign states to become involved seem irresistible.
- The contention that space is more important than power becomes quite compelling when states shorn of their empires are compared.
- There are two significant spatial differences between the Western empires and the Soviet one. The former were sea empires, while the Soviets had a land empire, one with wholly contiguous territories resembling its Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian predecessors. Russia’s size is unprecedented too: no previous metropolitan core remained a neighbour of virtually all its successor states.
- Space helps to explain that issues contended too. Boundary disputes are inevitable legacies of imperial disintegrations.
- Land boundaries are generally more permeable than maritime ones.

**Moral Space: the Development of Moralpolitik**

In declaring that self-determination was a prerequisite for all other rights, a UN Resolution created the basis for moralpolitik. Moral politik had striking implications for three important matters: conquest, imperialism, and human rights.

- Irredentist claims are made less often than those for self-determination, partly because they require the active support of kindred foreign states and are more likely to produce international war.
- Violence within states always disturbs relations between them, and ethno-religious violence, perhaps the most troubling form, has spread steadily since the late nineteenth century.
- As the great multi-ethnic empires collapsed, each successor state sought to link itself with a nation, a course which usually produced both violence and failure.
To have a space of one’s own is a crucial ingredient in identity; but participants in internal struggles have to cohabit a territory afterwards. 
-Distances between states help to explain who intervenes, why, how, and the probability of success. 
-Proximity makes some states much more crucial than conventional estimates of power would have us believe. Neighbours have substantial interests in the outcome of violence next door. 
-The importance given to the ‘right to space’ obviously shapes intervention patterns in decisive ways too. 
-In November 1993 (before the most recent floods from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) one out of every 130 persons in the world was a refugee. The long-run consequences of this ever-increasing flow affects us all, albeit unequally.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is truly a landmark book in the field of terrorism studies. While it is not specifically about the “psychology of terrorism,” it, as the name suggests, it is intended to focus on “organization and context” as key variables in understanding terrorism. The chapters in the first edition (1988) began as a collection of essays for a special issue of the “Journal of Strategic Studies.” It was noted that the literature was virtually devoid of any scholarly exploration of terrorism issues beyond analyses of counterterrorist policies. That collection of essays was re-cast as a book and subsequently spawned a new journal “Terrorism and Political Violence,” that became one of the leading scholarly outlets in the field. Some of the contributions themselves, such as those by Crenshaw and Jurgensmeyer, have become seminal works. The second edition includes a new chapter on “leaderless resistance” that parallels the quality of the others. Apart from Crenshaw’s chapter, the psychological; dimension of the contribution is relatively modest; nevertheless, it is a classic for the field.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: A most arresting and unexpected development in recent years has been the revival of terrorist activities to support religious purposes or terror justified in theological terms, a phenomenon that might be called “holy” or “sacred” terror. 
-No one yet has distinguished the characteristics of holy terror from those of political or secular terror. My aim here is to discuss aspects of that problem by focusing on one group, popularly known as Al-Jihad. 
-Martyrdom, the voluntary acceptance of death in order to “demonstrate the truth,” is a central and perhaps critical element of the message giving religions (especially Christianity, Islam, and, to a lesser extent, Judaism), for it dispels the doubts of believers and aids proselytizing efforts.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Most striking development in recent years has been the use of theological concepts to justify terrorist activity, a phenomenon which I have called holy terror. Holy terror seems new to us, but prior to the French revolution it was the dominant, perhaps the only, form of terror, and holy terror, whenever it appears, is linked usually to messianism. Two well known historical examples are the Assassins or Fidayeen of Islam and the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii. 
-My question is, why does messianism produce terror or better still, what are the psychological and logical links between messianic motifs and terror? It is common knowledge among the historians and sociologists of messianic movements that those movements can produce terror. 
-A messianic belief is one which visualizes a day in which history or life on this earth will be transformed totally and irreversibly from a condition of perpetual strife which we have all experience to one of perfect harmony that many dream about, where there will be no sickness and no tears, where there will be wholly liberated from all rules, condition of perfect freedom. History ends because God has promised us that it would; and at his appointed time he will intervene in our affairs. 
-The details or the content of various messianic beliefs differ. 
-Its significance depends initially on two conditioned. Believers must think that the day of
deliverance is near or imminent, and they must also think human action can help consummate the process. When these conditions are fulfilled, six substantive elements of a messianic doctrine will shape decisions to employ terror: (a) the nature of the desired action, (b) the cause or character of the messianic aspiration, (c) the proof that believers think may be necessary to demonstrate sufficient faith, (d) the moral qualities ascribed to participants in the messianic struggle, (e) the 'signs' or 'portents' of a messianic intervention and, finally, (f) the character of the deity's involvement.

The hope which a messianic vision supplies is obviously important for the orthodox revealed religions. Orthodox religious leaders attempt to forestall messianic anxieties and explosions in a variety of ways. The orthodox religions find it necessary even to deny the possibility that one could ever know the time for a messianic epoch, and they sometimes make strenuous efforts to prevent individuals from thinking or publicizing contrary views.

Under what circumstances does a messianic appearance seem imminent? This, of course is a crucial question. But the problem of the chapter is the relationship of messianic motifs and terror, and it would divert us too much to tackle the question directly. Messianism is always associated with the presence of "signs", and in our day it is easy for the believer to see two of the most prominent signs in messianic eschatology. In most Jewish, Christian, and Islamic messianic visions, the "Last Days" emerge in context of world catastrophe.

A second sign is the restoration of the state of Israel, a common theme in apocalyptic prophecies. Islam, too, has been experiencing religious revivals which must also contribute to anticipations that a Mahdi will come.

There is still no reason to think action must ensue unless the believer thinks that he can influence messianic events, which means he must deny the teachings of the religious establishments on this issue.

When a sense of immense takes root, some believers must find it psychologically impossible to regard their actions as irrelevant. One can speak of a range of actions which seem to make sense. Some activities are obviously non-violent, proselytising is common. One may give property away to discharge debts, finance proselytising and show one's love for humanity as the Millerites did.

Action to signify a change of identity or the purification of community often accompanies migration.

In Islam where the term Mahdi connotes rising from concealment and/or rebellion against constituted authority, the groups which withdraw almost invariably intend to find a better and more secure base to organize their violent onslaught on society.

The two dominant images in those doctrines are of the suffering servant and of the avenging angel. If a messianic believer thinks that he must participate in a struggle to force the end, the nature of the messianic aspiration itself or the cause will become a factor conductive to terror; and this is our second doctrinal condition. When the stakes of any struggle are perceived as being great, the conventional restraints on violence diminish accordingly.

A third doctrinal element is the evidence needed to demonstrate faith. If hypernomian behavior seems ineffective, new tests or new attempts to prove moral worthiness are contrived.

The fourth doctrinal element is the signs or visible proof that a deliverance is in process. Most messianic visions associate the destruction of the old order and the birth pangs of the new with a series of cataclysms so profound and so unique that they appear to dissolve both the laws of nature and of morality.

The fifth doctrinal element is the description provided of the participants moral nature. Justifications for unlimited violence are strengthened when we see ourselves and not simply our cause, as wholly righteous, an essential feature of antinomianism, indeed, part of its very definition.

The sixth and final element is the character of divine intervention.

Let me conclude quickly. Once a messianic advent appears imminent doctrine guides the expectations and therefore, the actions of believers, doctrines which, for the most part, are the creation of the dominate or orthodox religious cultures-Judaism, Christianity, Islam and so on.

Yet in every case powerful impulses towards terror are inherent in the beliefs of a word to be destroyed, the gains imagined, the character of the participants and God's methods. Beyond all this, and I cannot emphasize the point enough, terror is attractive in itself to messianists just because it is
outside the normal range of violence, and for that reason represents a break with the past, epitomizing the antinomianism or complete liberation which is the essence of the messianic expectation.

242. Rasch, W. (1979). Psychological dimensions of political terrorism in the federal republic of Germany. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 2, 79-85. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The author a psychiatrist who has clinically evaluated members of the Red Army fraction offers his professional view on the phenomenon of terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. It begins by refuting the notion that terrorism is caused by mental abnormality, citing on evidence 10 evaluations he personally conducted as well as a study conducted for the federal police of 40 people wanted for terrorism. He then turns to the psychological functions provided by group affiliation and to the possible failure of the state, during the student protest movement, to listen to the student and address the social concerns they raised. He concluded suggesting that these latter concerns must be addressed to prevent further terrorist movements in Germany.

243. Reich, W. (1990). Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind. England: Cambridge University Press. Call Number: Published Abstract: What makes terrorists enter a life whose primary goal is the spectacular violation of the ordinary rules of civilized behavior? What enables them to carry out murderous acts against innocent people without feeling that they have violated their own standards of moral conduct? Vital as they are to the understanding of terrorist behavior, these questions would be hard to answer even if all terrorists had the same political goals and the same ideological, religious, and national backgrounds.

-This book is an effort to understand terrorist behavior by acknowledging and systematically exploring terrorism's complexity and diversity. In these original essays, distinguished historians, behavioral scientists, and specialists in ideology and religion examine the ways in which the various forms of terrorism develop and sustain themselves. The authors describe the psychological (and sometimes religious) mechanisms that enable terrorists to convince themselves that their actions are moral. In addition, "Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind" identifies the ways in which government leaders respond sometimes with catastrophic results to terrorism.

-This ground-breaking study, organized under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Institute of Mental Health, examines and explains the nature and sources of terrorists' beliefs, actions, goals, worldviews, and states of mind. In so doing, it addresses one of the most vexing intellectual and political challenges of our time.

244. Reid, W. H. (2002). Controlling political terrorism: Practicality, not psychology. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: A public understanding psychological dimensions to war and peace (Vol. Ipp. 1-8). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this chapter, Reid (a psychiatrist) takes a decidedly non-clinical approach to countering terrorism. He immediately points out the diversity in terrorism and quickly dismisses the notion that mental disorder or common personality traits provide any useful explanation. He describes the goals of terrorism as follows: Disruption, Deflection of Purpose, Drain of Resources, Attention Gathering, and Organization Profit. Attempts to placate terrorists' grievances are ineffective. His suggestions for controlling terrorism include understanding the limitations of target hardening and enemy attrition, and considering how to increase the “costs” for using terrorism.

245. Robins, R. S., & Post, J. M. (1997). Political paranoia: The psycho politics of hatred. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Robins and Post cast “paranoia” as the central feature and chief cause of political conflict and violence. They frame paranoia, not as a rare condition found only in persons with mental illnesses, but as a ubiquitous, powerful force in all societies and cultures (they provide examples of individuals, cultures, subcultures, movements and nations dominated by paranoia). Terrorism, per se, is not their focus, rather they address political behavior, broadly
conceived and group leadership (e.g., to include Jim Jones and David Koresh).

-They begin with a discussion of the seven elements of paranoia: extreme suspiciousness, centrality, grandiosity, hostility, fear of loss of autonomy, projection and delusional thinking. Then they apply these concepts to political behavior, referencing Tucker’s notion of “warfare personality” characteristic of leaders who “induce societal paranoia for political aggrandizement through group manipulation.” The essential qualities of the “warfare personality” are: portrayal as the leader of a fighting bureaucracy; self-dramatization by pretending to be group centered; delusion of enemies and conspiracies approximate reality; focuses group's energies on defeating a demonic enemy. Their explanation for paranoia is part sociobiological (from evolutionary theory) and part psychoanalytic (creating “bad others” to distinguish one’s own identity).

-In a brief discussion on the dynamics of terrorism, they pose the underlying position of terrorist groups as “us versus them” and argue that this ethos attracts paranoid people and cultivates paranoid ideas.

-Chapter Seven provides an interesting overview of how various religious ideologies (from Islam to Christian Identity) are, and have been, used to justify violence. The psychological dimensions, however, lean heavily on psychoanalytic interpretation.

-The final third of the book applies the concepts and arguments presented in the context of a series of case studies of political and social leaders and movements throughout history. It is intriguing, but it is not clear that paranoia even if it is present is the master “cause” of the behaviors they describe. Conversely, if paranoia is such a ubiquitous social dynamic, then as an explanation it has little to offer to explain extremist violence, which occurs more rarely.

246. Rogers, M. (2003). The psychology of cyber-terrorism. A. Silke (Ed), Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 72-92). London: John Wiley. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Rogers defines a cyber-terrorist as "an individual who uses computer/network technology to control, dominate, or coerce through the use of terror in furtherance of political or social objectives." Initial topics in the chapter, covering, media, communications, recruitment, and justification focus more on the internet as a tool, rather than as a weapon. In attempting to explore the mindset of the cyber-attacker, he draws on principles of social psychology, focusing on the advantages of some of having anonymity. He describes the nature of critical infrastructures that could be targeted in a cyber-attack and argues that a successful siege would have an enormous impact.

247. Ronfeldt, D., & Sater, W. (1982). The mindsets of high-technology terrorists: Future implications from an historical analog. Y. Alexander, & C. K. Ebinger (Eds), Political terrorism and energy: The threat and response (pp. 15-38). New York: Praeger. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: A recent Rand report concluded that "we are a liable to see cohesive actions in the nuclear domain intended to cause widespread alarm and increase the leverage of a terrorist group making demands on government." The report further hypothesized that nuclear terrorism "would be more likely among the most fantastical and violent terrorist groups, those with more millennial aims as opposed to a concrete political program."

-In searching for potential historical analogs that may provide insights into possible future nuclear terrorism, we noticed that during the late nineteenth century an earlier generation of "high-technology terrorists" specialized in the using of dynamite, which was the premier scientific explosive of their time. These individuals saw dynamite as possessing special, even mystical, powers in addition to its real physical properties.

-Our methodology relies heavily on readily accessible data on individuals who advocated or practiced "dynamite terrorism." Such information, unfortunately, is scarce and incomplete.

-Human capacity for destruction made a quantum jump following the invention of nitroglycerine in Italy in 1846. At first, nitroglycerine suffered from one major defect: its chemical instability made it hazardous for the user. However, after Alfred Nobel tamed the powerful compound in 1867 by mixing it with wood pulp and sodium nitrate, the resulting invention, dynamite, could be employed with little risk.

-The proliferation of dynamite coincided with the first great wave of terrorism in the late 19th century. In Europe, three terrorist groups who used dynamite proved unusually violent for the times: the Russian People’s Will, the transnational Anarchists, and the Irish Fenians.
Various governments sought to curb the weapon. Unrestrained by such penalties, various anarchists who wanted dynamite to become the laborer's weapon of self-defense disseminated information on how to fabricate, purchase, or simply steal the explosive. Many proponents of dynamite terrorism argued that dynamite could endow the ordinarily powerless person with enormous political strength, magnifying the power of individuals and small groups and forcing recognition by the masses as well as by the authorities. A good part of dynamites appeal came from the fact that it was then the ultimate scientific weapon. Some extremists believed that dynamite would elevate terrorism to the status of a vanguard scientific movement. For some terrorists, dynamite represented a moral weapon for political education whose use would enable them to elevate assassination above ordinary murder. Some terrorists stressed the use of dynamite for avenging past injustices by engaging in reprisals to punish the wrongdoers.

Some proponents of dynamite politics emphasized dynamite's utility for defending and preserving the rights and liberties of the laborer. Many proponents of dynamite politics emphasized its importance as an instrument of last resort. Dynamite appealed to some anarchists and terrorist as a means to annihilate the very foundations of the ruling system, namely, state and property. For them, reform was impossible; revolutionary was essential. The following implied powers played a role in the past and may be relevant for future terrorism: Super explosives were interpreted to represent "power to the people," for use against the state. Super explosives represented scientific power. Super explosive terrorism represented a moral form of power because it elevated violence above the level of common criminality. Super explosives were claimed to constitute a humane form of power. Super explosives were seen to impart a mystical, magical kind of power. Some of these notions might be appealing for present-day terrorist who wants to justify using nuclear power.

The following themes recurred among the early advocates of super-explosive terrorism: Super explosives were useful for attracting attention to demands, while simultaneously publicizing the identity and ideal of the perpetrators. Super explosives were deployed to avenge unjust acts. The use of super explosives was justified as an instrument for self-defense. Super explosives were sometimes regarded as offensive weapons for introducing sweeping reforms in a "system". Super explosives held special attraction for some of the terrorists whose grandiose aim was to eradicate the existing social order. Historical analogy suggests that we should expect similar patterns and variations to accompany the possible emergence of nuclear terrorism. We cannot suggest from historical analogs how nuclear terrorist groups might take form. Nonetheless, two models seem possible. In the first, a nuclear prone minority group emerges from a conventional terrorist group. The second model is of a nuclear terrorist group forming from fresh recruits. In either model, the most dangerous outcome would be for the new group to have an apocalyptic or millenarian cast.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon have accentuate the threat of terrorism. However, it appears that the attackers are popularly thought of as mentally deranged individuals who are evil. This article suggests that such an understating is a misperception of these people and may interfere with an adequate response to prevent future attacks. This article reviews the extant literature on psychological theories of terrorism and concludes that terrorist are not dysfunctional or pathological; rather, it suggests that terrorism is basically another form of politically motivated violence that is perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives. The only real difference between terrorism and conventional military action is one of strategy. Terrorist lack the necessary resources
to wage war in furtherance of their political goals.

One can group the theories of terrorist behavior into two broad theoretical camps that use different models to understand terrorism. It is recognized that these two camps are not empirically derived discriminates.

The first camp includes theories that portray terrorism as the result of defects or disorders in one’s personality structure. The first group of theories that approach the phenomenon of terrorist behavior as a form of political violence perpetrated by people who do not sufficient military resources to carry out conventional forms of political violence. In contrast to the first camp, this one view terrorism as a psychologically normal activity. It relies on basic social learning theory to explain terrorist behavior.

The personality defect model is based on the premise that terrorist have fundamental and pathological defects in their personality structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self. These defects are said to result from unconscious forces in the terrorist’s psyches. For instance, Feuer (1969) and Kent and Nichols (1977) believed that terrorism is a reflection of unconscious feelings of hostility toward parents that this feeling is an outgrowth of childhood abuse or adolescent rebellion.

Kaplan (1981) used the pathology model in an attempt to differentiate between the “reasons” and “causes” of terrorism by proposing that reasons are the social variables that facilitate or help rationalize terrorist behavior. On the other hand, the causes lie within the terrorist himself/herself. Kaplan proposed that is an overreaction to childhood experiences of humiliation as the hands of an aggressor, resulting in a sense of individual failure and lack of self-esteem. Accordingly, the soon-to-be terrorist’s personality is defective and is not resilient enough to cope with life stress using socially appropriate means.

According to Kaplan’s view, terrorist will always find a “reason” to commit violence, since violent behavior and association with like-minded individuals are the only things that will maintain the terrorist’s self-esteem and sense of identity.

Strentz (1981) studied that Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) of the 1970s and proposed three types of personalities based on roles the SLA members performed for the group.

Strentz’s first type of terrorist is the leader. The second of Strentz’s roles is that of an opportunist. Lastly, there is an idealist.

In addressing behavior that has no apparent external or immediate reinforcement, Bandura said, “it is people’s self-reactions to their own performances that constitute the principal source of reward”

Crenshaw (1988) expanded on the idea that terrorist need to cope with the recognition that they kill people by employing a belief system that protects against feelings of guilt and anxiety.

Lowered self-awareness in groups can lead to reduced inhibitions towards behaviors, including aggression, and individual groups members often conform to perceived group standards, especially when the costs of nonconformity are great.


be older (i.e., 40's-50's)
-Sex: Predominantly male. Over 80% of ops conducted by men. Females mainly in support role. In Baader Meinhof and movement two June women are 30% of operational force
-Martial: 75-80% are single
-Rural vs. Urban: Most are natives or long time residents or major metropolitan areas
-SES: Middle class-upper class (more then 2/3)
-Education: 2/3 attended or graduated from university-mainly humanities
-Student is the dominant occupation
-Recruitment: Universities are primary recruiting grounds. Some also in prison
-Political Philosophy: Nationalism was primary in only 3 of 18 groups heavy, for most others it is a blend of Anarchism and Marxism
-Methods: Study methodology is weak with data collected from secondary published resources. Data presented is only descriptive no analysis of behavior or operation. Data also describes terrorists of more than 30 years ago-many trends in terrorism has changed
-Beginning with an acknowledged need to better understand the types of individuals engaged in urban terrorism the authors seek to identify and compile “common characteristics” of known terrorists in furtherance of that objective.

Call Number: Published Abstract: Pathbreaking. Combining his skills as a political scientist and a psychiatrist, Sageman dissects the lives of nearly two hundred al Qaeda members and provides unprecedented insight into terrorist ideology, motivation, and action. More than anyone else, Sageman understands the staying power of robust terrorist networks, and he proposes a multipronged response to target al Qaeda. He deftly dismantles the pet and dangerously mistaken theories of both the terrorism 'experts' and those in our government charged with defending against terrorists: that al Qaeda is an organic replica of a Mafia crime family, and that the tactics used against organized crime will somehow work against our new adversaries. Sageman tells us not only who these people are who seem unafraid to die as they seek to harm us, but why they do what they do.
-For decades, a new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. America's ability to remain oblivious to these new movements ended on September 11, 2001. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate.
-Understanding Terror Networks gives us the first social explanation of the global wave of activity. Sageman traces its roots in Egypt, gestation in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, exile in the Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including detailed accounts of life within the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned attacks on the United States.
-U.S. government strategies to combat the jihad are based on the traditional reasons an individual was thought to turn to terrorism: poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance. Sageman refutes all these notions, showing that, for the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own.
The latest theory recognized by sociological research in terrorism and violence. 

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Latest research completed by our institute is primarily dealing with four complexes which are descriptive in such areas as (1) hostage taking, (2) kidnapping, (3) extortion, and (4) terrorism.

-1. The Motivation for the Act: Until now, sociological science has been based on direct relative association between the motivation for the act and the form of crime. However our studies are suggesting that proceeding in such a mode does not greatly serve the purpose. The motivation for the act itself has really only some sort of release function for the act. By studying the actual motivation for the act, the following complex number of motives arises:

-Exaggerate urge for self-realization

-Frustrating experience with paramount reference personalities;

-Inability to bear failures;

-Emotional deficiency of relations.

-Indeed these motivations alone are not yet sufficient for a person to become violent in fact; they still require an outside cause for functional release, to be converted into action.

-2. Behavior of Perpetrators: The behavior of the perpetrators is clearly concentrated on reaching their objective. If the perpetrators subjectively feel that things are developing within their interest, they are relatively quite, balanced, and conciliatory

-3. The Course of Action: The course of any act is essentially determined by the excitation stage. The excitation stage arises up to the emotional stage which marks the height of controlled actions. As the perpetrators get the impression that the course of the act is progressing towards their objective, the curve declines slightly. However, the perpetrators are still at an excited stage between the feeling of stress and frustration. If the grade of frustration becomes too strong, the curve rises again and becomes close to the emotional stage, and the behavior of the perpetrators is overly affected by the incentive stage.

-4. Perpetrator-Victim Relations. The relations between the perpetrators and the victims are important for the course and the outcome of any act. The behavior of the victim is the main factor deciding how violent the act is going to be.

Modern suicide is aimed at causing devastating physical damage, through which it inflicts profound fear and anxiety.

Between 1980 and 2002, an estimated 340 suicide homicide terrorist acts have been reported, with an estimated number of victims varying from none to 3000 per incident and number of suicides ranging from 1 to a many as 16 in a single act of suicide terrorism. There are currently ten religious and secular groups that are known to have used suicide-terrorism acts as a tactic against their government or against foreign governments.

The terrorist mind is dark but not unfathomable.

However it is not clear from the available literature whether mental illness among suicide terrorists is any higher than in the general population. It is possible that those who have demonstrated mental illness were ill before joining the terrorist organization.

The primary aim of suicide terrorists is not suicide, because to the terrorist group suicide is simple a means to an end with motivation that stems from rage and a sense of self-righteousness. They see themselves as a higher purpose and are convinced of an eternal reward through their action. Two major motivations can be identified in the vast majority of suicide terrorist acts: the first is anger and a sense of hopelessness; the second is a deep religious belief that better life awaits in paradise.

Women fighters of the Liberation Tigers on Tamil Ilam: The martial feminism of Atel Palancinkam. South Asia Research, 14, 163-183.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: An unofficial but popular name for armed women in the
liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)

-Fundamental objective for the Tamil women is to bring about by armed struggle the independence of Tamil Ealam that they signal in their designation birds of independence.
-There will be equality for women without an independent state.
-The ideal role of a female fighter in contemporary liberation struggles was reinforced and reformulated in 1983, in written form in Tamil and English, by an Australian (white) women, Atel (Adele) Palacinkam (Balasingham), who is the wife of (Anton Balasingham) an advisor to the LTTE, in reality its chief ideologue. Published a book in 1983/4 called women revolution. It is a kind of basic manual for young women. In October 1993 she published another book in English, entitled Women fighters of liberation tigers. Although a trained nurse in the far-off past, she has on various occasions made it known in interviews that she has trained hundreds of Tamil Women in guerrilla warfare. She is an attractive target for the Sinhala forces and anti-LTTE Tamil groups, but she also carries a cyanide capsule and will therefore not be captured alive. She is seriously dedicated to the study of all aspects of Tamil culture. I have called her set of idea martialfeminsim. Her martial feminism insists on civil rights for women and on the taking up of arms, and connects the demand for civil rights for women with a demand for the liberation of the homeland from what is regarded as an illegitimate occupying force.
-The number of Tamil female fighters who died for the LTTE between 1982 and the end of 1991 was 296, or 6.8% of the total of 4353 fighters killed. The proportion of female fighters in the LTTE was small until June 1990, but increased rapidly thereafter.
-The major battlefields on which women met their deaths are regarded as "historic" by the LTTE.
-It should be noted that the LTTE women play a quite different role from that women in European martial cultures like Italian Fascism and German Nazism. In both cultures the stipulated identity of sex and gender was fully exploited in extreme forms of womb mysticism. The role of women in arms was not promoted.
-Both the INA and the LTTE have an organized suicide squad. Within the LTTE this death squad is called karuppulikal the black tigers.
-Concept of armed struggle for women, the key person who introduced the issue within the whole Tamil movement in the early '80s was a Tamil women by the name of Nirmala Nittiyanantan, one of the key figures in the formation of the Tamil female militancy. She was imprisoned by the Sri Lankan forces in the early 1980's broke out of jail and left for exile.
-A new book Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers profiles the military activities of the Tiger women but it also contains some reflections on feminism and some information in the history of militant women’s movement.
-They are always presented in their martial role.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: There are four substantive chapters in this work, which occupy roughly the first 200 pages of the book. The remaining 500 pages include an extensive bibliography of political terrorism, and a world directory of terrorist (and related) organizations. This 1988 version is the second edition of a book first written in 1975. The first chapter provides a detailed and exhaustive examination of definitional issues in terrorism and a review of typologies based on actor, political orientation, purpose and other dimensions. It is scholarly and thoughtful, but probably of less concern to operational personnel. The second chapter on theories of terrorism is largely unchanged from the 1975 version because, in their view, few developments had occurred. The authors review some myths about terrorism and provide a rich description of psychological and sociological theories, using Gurr’s “relative deprivation” model as a beginning platform. The state of the art in theoretical development, although well-reviewed, was not and is not very advanced little of this would have any operational value. Chapter three and four cover data and databases on terrorism as well as the literature on terrorism. Both nicely written for their time, but notably outdated for any contemporary investigations or research.

256. Schorkopf, F. Behavioral and social science perspectives on political violence.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Scientific Enquiry and its Difficult to Respond: 1. The belief that the causes of terrorism are rooted in environmental factors on the national and international level is the main approach of political science and sociology. In contrast, psychology focuses on the micro-level of the individual or the group. The psychological approach is concerned with the study of terrorist of terrorist per se, i.e. it is interested in the recruitment and introduction of personas into terrorist groups, their personalities, attitudes, motivations, intentions and careers as terrorists. 2. This short overview on the basic concerns of the major social science disciplines indicates that research on terrorism is characterized with each other to a greater or lesser extend, a consensus on research strategies and common propositions among the academic disciplines can hardly be reached.

-Rational discourse on terrorism is aggravated by a lack of terminology clarity.
-Individuals and Groups and Their Rational or Pathologic Choice: Any thinking and interpretation on the causes and reason of terrorism has to acknowledge that so far no grand theory has been accepted. Another fruitful research approach is the analysis of terrorist behavior on the grounds, that it is accessible to rational explanations. This approach of collective rational choice turns the attention on the motives and preferences of the terrorists. The weakness of these rational-choice patterns is the assumption of stable actors and the fixed scheme of preferences.
-The Role of the Media: It is a general conviction that terrorist strategies rely on the media.
-Turning an Eye on the Victims: Many judicial systems have during the last few years discovered the victims of aggression. Once in many societies the “forgotten persons” in the administration of justice, a recent trend allocates a considerable amount of attention to this group. The study of victimization in respect to terrorist acts has two facets: firstly the traditional approach regarding the consequences of terrorist activities as harm suffered individually or collective like any other form of violence including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss. Secondly the “treatment” of collective reactions to traumatic disaster like shock, intense emotion, fear, guilt, anger, and resentment, depression etc.
-Counter-measures and Responses to Terrorism:
-New Forms of Terrorism-A New Terrorism? A survey of non-judicial publications on terrorism strongly suggests the general conviction, that modern terrorism has already and still is changing its characteristics. Its changed forms are specified by new actors, means and ideology. Secondly one has to take into account the enhanced role of ideology, especially religion. The social anthropologist Richard Antoun defines fundamentalism as a particular world-view and ethos characterized by the quest for purity in an impure world. Fundamentalists view the world as an eternal struggle between good and evil, adhere to tradition and stand firm against the rapid change of the 20th century coupled with opposition to the ideology of modernism and the secularization of society. Furthermore, it is argued that the forms of terrorists activities have changed. The terrorist are organized in small durable cells interconnected to networks, makes it much more difficult to fight the organizations as whole.
-The causes of new terrorism are seen in different developments. Firstly, it has essentially been understood as a reaction: the information age requires singular, dramatic acts, in order to receive the desired attention, foremost by the mass media. Secondly, modern societies, which are dependent on
electronic communication and information, and their institutions deploying public services, are more susceptible to acts of violence and therefore face an increased vulnerability. Thirdly, a segmentation of the societies led to the fact that larger parts of the population understand themselves as losers and others as winners. This asymmetries of economic, political and social power fosters discontent.

-Summarizing Remarks: -Cases of political violence have to be reviewed in their social context. The analytical capacities of general explanatory theories are limited, as are further generalized approaches that attempt to profile potential perpetrators.

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257. Schweitzer, Y. Suicide terrorism: development & characteristics. International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Over the past two decades suicide terrorism has become an ever-widening phenomenon. Fifteen different terrorism organizations in twelve different countries resorted to the use of suicide tactics against their enemies. As of February 2000 about 275 suicide incidents occurred.

-However, contemporary suicide terrorism differs from such historical tactics, just as the phenomenon of terrorism differs from ancient modes of warfare.
-Modern suicide terrorism is aimed at causing devastating physical damage, through which inflicts profound fear and anxiety. Its goal is to produce a negative psychological effect on an entire population rather than just the victims of the actual attack.
-For the purposes of this paper a suicide terror attack is defined as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission.

-This paper portrays a general overview of the modern history of suicide terror activity worldwide, focusing on its main characteristics and the various aims and motivations of the terror groups involved.
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-Suicide terror attacks started in Lebanon in April 1983. A small-and until and then unknown group by the name of Hizballah directed a number of suicide attacks against Western targets.
-Lebanon had seen around 50 suicide attacks between ’83-’99. The Shiite organizations, Hizballah and Amal were responsible for about half of these. The second half is attributed to five other groups espousing a non-religious nationalist ideology.
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The LTTE is unequivocally the most effective and brutal terrorist organization ever to utilize suicide terrorism. Between July 1987 and February 2000 it has carried out 168 suicide terror attacks in Sri Lanka and India leaving thousands of innocent bystanders dead or wounded. Its suicide unit, “The Black Panthers” is comprised of both men and women. One characteristic unique to the LTTE is the fact that every member of the groups carries a cyanide capsule around his/her neck, which he of she may consume upon capture in order not disclose the group’s secrets.
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The LTTE has directed its attacks primarily against the highest Sri Lankan and Indian political and military personnel. It is the only organization that succeeded in assassinating two heads of states. Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in May 1991 by a female suicide-bomber while campaigning for re-election. Sri Lanka president Prendesa was assassinated in 1993.
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-In Israel, suicide terrorism started in 1993. The Hamas (Harkat el-Mukawma el Islamiya or “The Islamic Resistance Movement”) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) carried out about 30 suicide terror attacks which caused about 120 fatalities and wounded hundreds.
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The Egyptian groups also contributed their share to the suicide phenomenon. Each of the two leading groups, the Gama’s al-Islamiya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Jihad Group) carried out one attack.
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-It should be noticed that both groups avoided using such tactics on Egyptian soil. This can be attributed to their reluctance to alienate their constituency in Egypt by causing the indiscriminate death of innocent bystanders.
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-Another group that has used suicide terror attacks in the past is the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The PKK has carried out a total of 21 suicide attacks or attempted attacks (15 attacks were actually carried out and 6 were intercepted.
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The PKK resorted to suicide terrorism at a time when it was facing heavy military setbacks in Southeast Turkey.
Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden, is the last group to have resorted to suicide attacks and has a close operational connection to the Egyptian groups.

Women’s share in suicide attacks was in high percentage: In the LTTE they participated in about 30% to 40% of the group’s overall suicide activities. In the PKK, women carried out 11 out 15 attacks, while the perpetrators of 3 out of 6 attacks were intercepted were women (a total of 14 out of suicide attacks, or 66% of the total). In the P.P.S./S.S.N.P. (Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party) women took part in 5 out of the group’s 12 suicide activities.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Presupposes that lack of social equity is root cause of terrorism
-Uses data from Ingleharts 1997 World Values Study.
-Use of the term "mental" is somewhat misleading analysis is more macro-level in focus.
-Heavy emphasis on spirituality.
-Methadology to support conclusions seem weak and unclear.
-No procedural implications for operational personnel.
-Links to understanding terrorism are not well articulated.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is the introductory chapter to the newest, comprehensive handbook of political psychology. It introduces and defines the discipline but without providing an overview. It also defines the purpose of the book, distinguishes it from others in the field and prefaces the following chapters. No mention of terrorism specifically.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article reviews the empirical evidence demonstrating the lack of a link between terrorism and psychopathology. He then argues that there are dangers for adopting a "psychopathology model" as a casual explanation for terrorism, emphasizing the "fundamental attribution error". Finally he argues that there may be common developmental pathway by which terrorists enter their profession. The elements of the proposed pathway are: (1) early socialization processes, (2) narcissist injuries (a critical life event that negatively effects self-image or self esteem), (3) escalatory events (often a confrontation with police offering a perceived provocation), (4) personal connections to terrorist group members. The author also discusses the psychological forces influencing group joining, including a sense of social role/identity and sense of potential: Personal development pathway is an interesting heuristic potentially operational relevance although the model may not fit for those whose introduction to rationalization later in life.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this chapter, Silke takes on the question of why people become terrorists. From the outset, he avers that psychopathology does not inform a meaningful explanation. There is no evidence of a genetic link and biological explanations have been spurious at best. Instead, he focuses on the effects of social identification, particularly among marginalized groups. The psychology of vengeance by, and on behalf of, such groups plays a central role. While terrorist actions require a personal sacrifice (possible death or incarceration), the benefits are seen in status and personal rewards among other "in-group" members and supporters. Silke also recognizes the important role of opportunity in understanding why some adopt terrorist ideas or engage in terrorist behavior.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Offender profiling is one of the most distinctive areas in contemporary forensic psychology. It is also one of the most controversial. It is unlikely that there
any other topic on which so much has been written on the basis of so little research.
Recent years in particular have seen forensic psychologists begin to dominate the literature on the subject more. However, it is a somewhat worrying sign that this growing contribution from psychologists is primarily taking the form of books, rather than research articles in peer reviewed journals.
As we shall see, there are a number of well-documented cases describing how profiles of terrorists have been produced in an effort to assist in police investigations. This chapter reviews the success and failure of these profiles and considers the implications for future offenses.
What exactly is offender profiling? This is becoming an increasingly difficult question to answer. As a result, the conceptual framework should hold together lacks rigorous. No solid benchmarks or conceptual definitions have been established, so there is no widely agreed context for new writers or researchers to place their work into.
This chapter though follows the succinct view of Hazelwood, Ressler, Depue, and Douglas (1995) that a “profile (characteristics and traits of an unidentified person) is a series of subjective opinions about the unknown person(s) responsible for a crime or a serious of crime”. The traditional account of profiling is that it works on the premise that an offender’s behavior at the crime scene can reveal aspects of his or her personality, work background, family history, social life, criminal history and age.
Conceptually, it is probably fair to say that there are currently three broad approaches in use. The first approach can be termed FBI method. Having collected the raw crime scene data, the profiler then draws upon past experience of similar cases to reach a conclusion regarding the characteristics of the offender.
The second approach could be broadly described as the statistical method. This standpoint has been pioneered mainly within the UK (e.g. Canter, 1994.). Profiles using this approach are derived based on probabilities which are known from experimental research. Large databases of specific types of crime are created and analyzed to identify relationships and patterns which can be used to make predictions of future crimes.
The final main approach can be described as the clinical method. It is objective in that it draws upon established principles in clinical psychology and forensic psychiatry and also draws heavily on personality theory but it does not rely on probabilities. Instead, each case is treated as unique.
It is somewhat disturbing to learn that, despite the increasing popularity of profiling, very little research has been carried out to check its effectiveness. More disturbing still is the realization that what little research does exist supplies less than impressive results.
Successful case studies are frequently cited in defense of profiling.
The most cited study on the effectiveness of profiling was one conducted by the FBI’s Institutional Research and Developmental Unit (IRDU) in 1980. The IRDU surveyed user agencies as to the investigative value of profiles prepared in 192 cases.
The actual success rate was just 7.8% (Hazelwood, Ressler, Depue, and Douglas, 1995)
A similarly poor performance was found by Copson (1995) who reviewed 184 cases where profiling was used in the UK. Copson’s study was a more detailed one than the earlier FBI effort. He found that in only 2.7% of cases did the profile lead to the identification of the offender.
The FBI recoded that “all users overwhelmingly agreed that the service should be continued” (Hazelwood et al. 1995, p.125) and Copson’s more detailed assessment found that 92.4% of the UK police officers would definitely or probably use profiling again.
Copson found that the success rate of individual profilers varied enormously. In a follow-up to the original research, Copson revealed that “the aggregate accuracy ration of the information contained in the profiles was found to be 2.2:1 (that is 2.2 points correct to each 1 correct)” (Gudjonsson and Copson, 1997, p.73).
What then is the potential for the technique with regard to terrorist offences?
Certainly some attempts to create meaningful profiles of terrorists have occurred in the past thirty years. For example, Russel and Miller (1977) surveyed the known membership variables of fifteen separate terrorist groups and produced a general terrorist profile.
That the potential to profile terrorist exists is something that actual terrorist themselves have to recognized. Consider the following statement from an IRA terrorist: There are certain traits and behavioral characteristics surrounding operations which identify the operators”.
The first documented case of offender profiling being used to help identify the individual behind a
terrorist campaign is also the first widely acknowledged case of psychological profiling. In the 1940s and 1950s there were a series of bomb attacks in New York city in what came to be known as the Mad Bomber case (Jackson and Bekerian, 1997).

- The Unabomber involves an even longer running bombing campaign.
- In 1995, shortly before the Unabomber’s capture the FBI released a twelve item profile of the suspected bomber. He matched this profile on seven of the twelve counts and there were some important points which the profile got very wrong. For example, the FBI’s profile predicted the bomber would be a neat dresser with a meticulously organized life.
- The problem with attempting to profile terrorist attacks are well demonstrated in the above examples. These problems can be roughly divided into two camps: (1) problems of accuracy and (2) problems of impact.
- The experiences outlined here demonstrate that while profiling has been used in terrorist cases, its impact has tended to be either negligible or detrimental to the investigation.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Using an encounter from Alice in Wonderland as a metaphor, this article examines the long-running attempt to apply a psychopathology label to terrorists. The disorders of greatest interest to researchers (antisocial, narcissistic, and paranoid personality disorders), are described in order to highlight their attraction for theorists. A review of evidence follows. The critique finds that the findings supporting the pathology model are rare and generally of poor quality. In contrast, the evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both more plentiful and of better quality. However, in response to a failure to find any major psychopathology, a trend has emerged which asserts that terrorist possess many of the traits of pathological personalities but do not possess the actual clinical disorders. This development has effectively tainted terrorist with a pathology aura, without offering any way to easily test or refute the accusations.

- Cheshire-Cat Logic: The cat believes only mad people could inhabitant Wonderland, so consequently anyone you met there must be mad.
- Terrorist violence is so unusual and runs contrary to the accepted standards of society, that it seems to suggest psychological anomaly.
- While terrorism researchers contend that terrorist psychopathology is a dead issue, resolved over a decade ago, the reality is that it had continued to survive as a resilient source of inspiration on which to base theories.
- As Schmid and Jongman (1988) noted, “The chief assumption underlying many psychological ‘theories’…is that the terrorist in one way or the other are not normal and that the insights from psychology and psychiatry are adequate keys to understanding.”
- In an early review of evidence, Corrado (1981) found virtually no data to support the view that terrorists were in some way psychologically abnormal and plenty of evidence just the opposite.
- Modern research efforts being channeled-productively-into a group and organizational focus(e.g. Post, 1987a; Crenshaw, 1990).
- Most serious researchers in the field at least nominally agree with the position that terrorist are essentially normal individuals. However, there is some dissension in the ranks.
- The question has always been, why did these particular individuals engage in terrorism when most of the compatriots did not?
- A concern with this recurring question perhaps explains why terrorists have persistently returned to the concept of psychological abnormality as a basis on which to build an understanding of terrorists.
- Turco (1987) noted that this mode of thinking was particularly rampant in the reasoning of law enforcement agencies, who unerringly focused in on the psychopathic personality.
- Suellwold (1981) proposed that there were two personality types particularly attracted to terrorism. The first displayed the characteristics of the narcissistic personality, while the second could be described as the typical paranoid personality.
- The temptation to view terrorism in terms of abnormality, particularly such forms of it as the antisocial, narcissistic, and paranoid personality types becomes very understandable once one realizes how appropriately terrorist can be viewed in these terms.
- The terrorist as psychopath: - Pearce (1977) regarded the terrorist as “an aggressive psychopath, who
has exposed some particular cause because extremist causes can provide an external focal point for all the things that have gone wrong in his life.”

- The terrorist as Narcissist: Both Lasch (1979) and Pearlstein (1991) have said that a narcissistic disorder lies at the heart of the terrorist personality, and others, such as Post (1987b) and Suellwold (1981), have indicated that traits characteristic of the narcissist, are common features of terrorist personalities. This lack of regard for the welfare of others, fits very well with the nature of terrorist attacks, where innocent civilians, frequently totally uninvolved with the terrorists’ real enemies and causes, are deliberately targeted. It is significant to note that one of the more common concurrent types involving the narcissistic is found in combination with the antisocial personality type.

- The terrorist as Paranoid: -The paranoid’s compulsion to strike at higher power seem to explain the terrorist’s need to attack the incumbent state. The hostility and aggression of paranoids when they are in the weaker position, also seems to account for the violence of terrorists.

- For all these personalities, we have seen time and again, their applied and implied connections to the terrorist. Every classification system of terrorists seems to have a place for the antisocial personality, most have roles for paranoids (especially among leaders), and roughly around half involve narcissistic personalities in some form. The reasons why terrorist have returned again and again to these personalities has been described above-their relevance is self-apparent. That may be so, but does the theory correspond to the reality.

- Largely, the terrorist who advocate the psychopathology model provide only anecdotal evidence to support their assertions.

- Efforts such as Pearce (1977), Cooper (1978) and Lasch (1979), are typical of the type of research used to support the notion of terrorist abnormality.

- Stronger evidence for abnormality is provided by Ferracuti and Bruno 1981). Among Italian “right-wing terrorists…disturbed, borderline, or even psychotic personalities have a much higher incidence.” Ferracuti and Bruno did not actually quote the figures or percentages behind their conclusions. Later, they would say that the incidence of abnormality among the right-wing terrorists was “limited” (Ferracuti and Bruno, 1983, p.307).

- Overall then, research supporting terrorist abnormality has been sparse and of questionable validity. In contrast, the research suggesting terrorist normality has been both more plentiful, and in general, of much greater scientific validity.

- This is an important point-those who suggest normality are by and large making this inference from research on secondary sources.

- On the other hand, those who say terrorist are not abnormal tend to be those who have direct contact and experience with actual terrorists.

- The current predilection seems to be one of placing terrorists in a twilight region bordering on pathology.

- Post and many others, have then been quick to switch the search towards finding some form of minor psychopathology.

- Post (1987b) is more certain that some form of abnormality exists, and he confidently states his belief that “individuals with particular personality dispositions are drawn to the path of terrorism.” Such dispositions as described by Post, are largely variants of the three major personality types already discussed.

- The first attempt in the 1970s was more direct, and because of its directness, its tenets were easily tested, and the concept was refuted. This second wave however, is more insidious. Its tenets are more subtle and less tangible, and it does not leave itself open to such direct testing. As such it is dangerously misleading. It encourages the notion that terrorist are in some respects psychologically abnormal.

- The issue of terrorist psychology is one of the vital importance.

- Believing distorted and deceptive characteristics must lead inevitably to flawed policies and bleak outcomes.

- Blatant abnormality is rejected by most commentators. Instead a pervasive perception exists that terrorist are abnormal in more subtle ways.

- While the attraction to view terrorists as being abnormal is understandable, for now, the evidence allows only one conclusion: terrorists are normal people. This is the hear of the whole Alice in Wonderland argument, that normal people can do abnormal things.

**Call Number:** Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: In a review in 1988, Schmid and Jongman identified a number of key problems in research on terrorism. These included serious concerns with the methodologies being used by researchers to gather data and with the level of analysis that was undertaken once data was available. Following on from this work, this article draws on a review of research published between 1995 and 2000. It was found that the problems identified in 1998 remain as serious as ever. Research is ultimately aimed at arriving at a level of knowledge and understanding where one can explain why certain events have happened and be able to accurately predict the emergence and outcome of similar events in the future. Terrorism research, however, has failed to arrive at that level of knowledge. This article outlines some of the causes of these continuing problems and highlights ways in which the situation can be improved.

- **What is the function of research?** Ultimately, all research is concerned with the creation of new knowledge. But the level of this knowledge varies, as do the methods, which are used to reach it. Psychologist Colin Robson noted that research was generally concerned with producing knowledge that could meet one of three purposes. The first was exploratory, the second descriptive and the third explanatory. The first problem is that terrorism quite simply is not a topic that is easily researched. Yet such issues as these are not the principal concern of this article. Instead, it is concerned with the research activity itself the practical nature of research on terrorism. The most important review of research and researchers into terrorism to date is that carried out by Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman and reported in their seminal book *Political Terrorism*. Schmid and Jongman surveyed the opinions, views and experiences of terrorism researchers and analysts.

- **Where did they obtain information on terrorism?** First, it was clear that there was a very heavy reliance on open-source documents. They were primarily reworking old material. Only 46 percent of the researchers said that they had managed to generate data of their own on the subject of terrorism.

- **This article presents the results of a review of the published output of the primary journals in the area for the years 1995-99.** Over 80 percent of all research on terrorism is based either solely or primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media (or media-derived databases), or other published documents. This figure seems to indicate that little has changed since the 1998 comment that the field was overly dominated by ‘integrators of literature.’

- **There are three main concerns with research that draws heavily from media sources.** The first concerns accuracy. The second issue is bias. A third concern with media reports is that of audience context.

- **Interviews account for the next most common source of data in terrorism research.** In total, for 22 percent of articles, the researchers conducted some interviews represent a very minor feature of the overall effort and contributed to no more than four per cent of the information contained in the article. There are disadvantaged. First, interviewing is an expensive method. 97 percent of interviews in terrorism research are not standardized or structured. 97 percent are carried out primarily through opportunity sampling.

- **The concerns expressed by Schmid and Jongman in 1988 about the quality of terrorism research remain.** Indeed, the situation does not appear to have improved noticeably in any respect. Researchers remain very heavily dependent on easily accessible sources of data and only about 20 percent of article provide substantially new knowledge which was previously unavailable to the field. Even though terrorism researchers tend to rely heavily on the ‘weaker’ uncontrolled data-gathering methods, in the past six years very little effort has been made to balance this by the use of statistical analysis. From 1995 to 1999 just over three per cent of research papers in the major terrorism journals involved the use of inferential analysis. Some 86 percent of research papers in forensic psychology and 60 percent of papers in criminology contain at least some form of statistical analysis. In both cases, inferential account for the majority of this analysis. Terrorism articles rarely incorporate statistics and when they do they are nearly five times more likely to be just descriptive statistics.

- **Barely one article in 30 unpublished in the past five years incorporated inferential analysis.** A previous review found that in the 1990s, only 9.4 percent of published research on terrorism was the result of collaborative effort.

- **Over 90 percent of the published work in the field was done by researchers working independently**
and alone. Ultimately, terrorism research is not in a healthy state. It exists on a diet of fast food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious. Part of the problem is that there are simply too few researchers. As already stated, over 90 per cent of research studies are planned, conducted, analyzed, and then written up by just one person working in isolation.

-A further problem and a related one is that a considerable proportion of the material product in the area is the work of transients: researchers out for a once-off publication and who have no real interest.

-Research by Avidash Gordon has shown that a slowly growing number of postgraduate researchers are doing dissertations on terrorism. In the past ten years, Gordon found that at least 160 research dissertations have been carried out in the area. Our knowledge of terrorism most certainly is deficient but the field shows no clear ability to improve this situation. After 30 years of study, we simply should know more about terrorism than we currently do. That we continue to languish at this level of ignorance on such a serious subject is a cause of grave concern.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland have been involved in vigilantism since the earliest years of the troubles. With the onset of the terrorist cease-fires in 1994, vigilante attacks dramatically increased in both frequency and severity. Showing no signs of diminishing, the vigilantism has now become one of the most sensitive and critical issues in the continuing peace process. This paper presents a detailed analysis of paramilitary vigilantism, describing first diverse range of activities which the practice incorporates. More importantly, the paper also focuses on the complex forces and motivations which lie behind the paramilitaries’ commitment to the vigilante role. The paper concludes with an assessment of the impact of the vigilantism on current developments in Northern Ireland.

- Since 1971, the main terrorist groups in Northern Ireland have involved themselves in often protracted campaigns of vigilantism. This is particularly true of the Provisional IRA.

-William Culberson observed that ‘Vigilantism, like conflict and politics, is a constant social struggle to contain victimization. Vigilantism is a part of politics because it is a desire to maintain an established social and legal tradition and at the same time a desire to bring about a prelegal condition for a new order.’ For the Irish terrorist groups, vigilantism is a result of their efforts first, to contain victimization among their own ranks and second, to contain victimization among their communities.

- Vigilantism in Northern Ireland is a remarkably sophisticated phenomenon, and it reflects both the diverse motivations of its perpetrator and the peculiar pressures they face both from without and from within the organizations.

-Not all forms of vigilantism in Northern Ireland are the same, nor has the vigilante activity of the paramilitaries remained constant over the last three decades.

-While the vast majority of outsiders only consider the beatings and shootings, the vigilantism incorporates a far richer diversity of activities.


-The warnings can be issued in face-to-face encounters between paramilitary members and the intended victim, or they can be issued more indirectly, for example as letters published in paramilitary newspapers or as leaflets handed out in local areas.

-After a warning has been issued, the first option available to the paramilitaries is to impose a curfew on the offender. Curfews are used fairly regularly for dealing with teenage offenders. They vary both on the severity and in the range.

-The paramilitaries have long realized that there is a need for non-violent methods of punishment, which go beyond simple warnings or curfews. One solution has been to impose fines on offenders.

-In other cases, the offenders are required to pay the paramilitaries.

-Public humiliation is the next most serious punishment available to the paramilitaries. In its less serious-and most common-form, it involves no physical injuries whatsoever against the victim. Again, this lack of injury means that it is frequently used when dealing with young offenders. Branding (or placarding as it is also known) is the most common form of this type of punishment.
-Tarring and feathering represents a much more serious form of public humiliation and was one of the first forms of vigilantism to appear in the current period of violence. Here the victim’s body and hair are doused with hot bitumen and then covered with feathers.

-Punishment Beatings: Official records show there have been over 1300 punishment beatings carried out by the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. This is almost certainly a gross underestimation of the real number. The more prevalent ‘minor’ beatings rarely make their way into official statistics.

-An extremely rare form of punishment is known as the ‘Black’n ‘Decka’. In this extreme scenario an electric power drill is used to inflict injuries in the victims limbs.

-Punishment injuries inflicted with guns were traditionally known as ‘knee-cappings’. Shootings can vary considerably on a number of different measures. The first of these measure is the location of the wound. The paramilitaries can increase the severity of the punishment by inflicting multiple gunshot wounds. The first variable is the caliber of the gun used by the paramilitaries in the shooting. ‘Norma’ shootings are usually carried out with a small caliber handgun (.22) which leaves moderate injuries.

-Paramilitaries on both sides issue ‘expulsion orders’ to individuals (with the accompanying threat of serious injury or death if they refuse to leave).

-The number of people given expulsion orders has always been one of the great unknowns in Northern Ireland.

-The expulsions orders are usually issued with just 48 hours notice, which obviously leaves victims with very little time to prepare, either in emotional or practical terms.

-The paramilitaries have a tradition of escalating the severity of punishment in the face of residence.

-Execution is the most severe punishment used by the paramilitaries. In the history of troubles over 112 people have been executed by the paramilitaries for alleged crime. Most of the victims, have been accused of collaborating with the security forces.

-Why should terrorist groups be interested in upholding law and order?

-The paramilitaries are ultimately reluctant vigilantes. Their raison d’etre revolves around entirely separate needs and their agenda are set by political ambitions.

-Ultimately, all of the acts which are policed by the paramilitaries are seen as directly or indirectly dangerous to them.

-To begin with, the paramilitaries use vigilante violence as a way to control-or attempt to control-the other paramilitary groups.

-Vigilantism can also be described against the large mainstream political parties.

-Probably the bulk of paramilitary vigilantism is directed at policing ‘civil crimes’. These crimes include serious offences such as rape, child abuse, physical assaults and muggings.

-That a terrorist organization would allocate resources to the policing of such behaviors seems bizarre, not only when one understands just how strongly the paramilitary groups are interconnected with the local communities.

-A substantial number of the victims of the vigilantism are targeted, not because of any alleged criminal activities, but because of how their behavior has impinged on the paramilitary organizations and their members.

-The paramilitaries also ‘punish’ people who do not co-operate with their political parties.

-The paramilitaries are very sensitive to perceived threats to their authority. One of the major incentives to become and remain a paramilitary member, is the degree of respect you gain within your local area.

-Clearly one result of this policy is that it is fairly easy to conduct personal vendettas under the guise of vigilantism.

-Developing an extensive and organized vigilante network benefits a terrorist group by increasing its dominion over a local population.

-Paramilitary vigilantism is also partly driven by political ambitions. Punishment attacks are popular. Harsh treatment for criminals is a popular anti-crime measure.

-Even though leading paramilitary figures have privately said that punishment attacks do not work, the paramilitaries cannot cease their involvement because of the popular support that exists for the vigilantism.

-The IRA perceives itself as ‘a mature and disciplined and caring revolutionary organization; and frowns on an unsanctioned behavior which may bring the movement into disrepute’.
Conclusions: The motives for paramilitary vigilantism are complex. The vigilantism revolves around a practical need to control criminal behavior as perceived by the community and to control behavior within the community which may threaten the authority of the paramilitaries.

266. Silke, A. (2003). The psychology of suicidal terrorism. A. Silke (Ed), Terrorist, victims, and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 93-108). London: John Wiley. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this chapter, Silke takes on the question of why people become terrorists. From the outset, he avers that psychopathology does not inform a meaningful explanation. There is no evidence of a genetic link and biological explanations have been spurious at best. Instead, he focuses on the effects of social identification, particularly among marginalized groups. The psychology of vengeance by, and on behalf of, such groups plays a central role. While terrorist actions require a personal sacrifice (possible death or incarceration), the benefits are seen in status and personal rewards among other “in-group” members and supporters. Silke also recognizes the important role of opportunity in understanding why some adopt terrorist ideas or engage in terrorist behavior.

267. Silke, A. (2003). Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences. London: John Wiley. Call Number: Published Abstract: In this book, editor Andrew Silke purposefully sets forth to contribute balanced and accurate accounts of the psychology of terrorism. The book is comprised of three parts. Part I, The Terrorists, tackles the fascinating topics such as whether or not there is a 'terrorist personality', how one becomes a terrorist, the psychology of hostage-taking, cyber-terrorism, suicidal terrorism, and finally, how one leaves the life of terrorism (or if it is even possible). Part II, Victims of Terrorism, includes essays on the psychological impact of isolated acts of terrorism, the impact of protracted campaigns of political violence on societies, terrorism and the media, and the impact of terrorism on children. Part III, Responding to Terrorism, contains articles on retaliating against terrorism, a psychological perspective on imprisonment in Northern Ireland, and lastly, an informative essay on deterring terrorism. The current author argues that Silke has indeed accomplished what he set out to do: to confront the reality of the state of research on terrorism and offer substantive, accurate information.

268. Sivan, A. (1985). Radical Islam: Medieval theology and modern politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University. Call Number: Editor’s Annotation: This is primarily an historical work that seeks to trace the intellectual history of Islamism in the modern era (post-1954), and to explain the nature of its existence and appeal. The study is limited primarily to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria (although the most recent edition includes a chapter on the Iranian revolution) and focuses almost exclusively on the Sunni branch of Islam. The teachings and works of Taymiyyah, and later Qutb, factor heavily into the discussion. Wahhabism is given only brief parenthetical mention, via discussion of Qutb’s influence. The central tenet of the book and in Sivan’s view of Radical Islam is a clash between the powerful and pervasive influences of Western modernity and the values of primitive Islam. Because modern advances and politics have failed many Arab countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, which remain under-developed, the anti-modernist views hold great popular appeal. Modern Islamism has been able to harness that popular sentiment and translate it into a particular type of political activism. This is well written and researched, but does not provide any new psychological insights for operational personnel, nor does it offer a framework for response.

269. Skitka, L. J., & Mullen, E. (2002). The dark side of moral conviction. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2(1), 35-41. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract- Moral conviction forms the foundation for strong, morally vested attitudes and belief (i.e., "moral mandates") that have high action potential because they are “oughts” and "shoulds." Although moral mandates may sometimes lead people to disregard procedural safeguards. This article briefly reviews research that indicates that people become very unconcerned with how moral mandates are achieved, so long as they are achieved. In short, we find that commitments to procedural safeguards that generally protect civil society become psychologically eroded when people are pursuing a morally mandated end. Understanding the "dark side" of moral conviction may provide some insight into the motivational underpinnings of engaging
in extreme acts like terrorism, as well as people's willingness to forego civil liberties in their pursuit of those who do.

-Moral conviction, therefore refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is wrong or right, moral or immoral. Moral convictions have a strong motivational component because they are "oughts" or "shoulds" that are closely connected to people's sense of themselves as fundamentally decent and good people.

-We define moral mandates as the specific attitude positions or stands that people develop out of a moral conviction that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral (Skitka, in press) Moral mandates share the same characteristics of other strong attitudes-that is, extremely, importance and certainty-but have an added motivational and action component, because they are imbued with moral conviction.

-People are most likely to express and defend moral mandates when under threat or when they have a need to prove themselves or others that they are authentically moral (Skitka, in press; Steele, 1988)

-We predict that when people respond to an event with moral conviction (e.g., that terrorists actions are fundamentally immoral), a need will be activated to privately and publicly reaffirm their belief that they (in contrast) are authentically good and moral. There are a number of ways people can accomplish this goal, including adopting moral mandates related to prosocial behaviors, adopting moral mandates related to the denigration and punishment of those who have behaved immorally or both.

-Having a moral mandate that is a strong attitude with an equally strong moral investment can facilitate proactive and generally prosocial behaviors, as well as provide justification for antisocial behaviors.

-Having a moral mandate has also been associated with a disregard for procedural protections and due process. For example, Skitka and Houston (in press, study 2) found that if people's desire for vengeance is morally mandated, they have little concern for how their vengeance is achieved.

-Moral mandates also play a role in how people view and react to real-world political controversies. Moral mandates appear to lead to the legitimatization of any procedure so long as the mandated end is achieved.

-Moral convictions and moral mandates can also form the psychological foundation and justification of any number of extreme actions to achieve a mandated end.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This study seeks to update the Russell and Miller's proposed terrorist "profile". The focus on American terrorist (indicated by FBI or charges in federal courts) in the 1980s they found most could be classified as left or right wing with prominent differences between the two. Left Wing: political/Communist ideology; pro-communist; based in urban areas; cellular structure; targetly seeks out government or government buildings. Right Wing: Religious/Christian identity ideology; anticommunist; based in rural areas; natural networking structure, Targets federal agencies and opposing racial and religious groups. Their demographic characteristics also differed. Left Wing: Average age 35; 73% male; 29% white; 54% college degrees; many in professional occupations; urban residence. Right Wing: Average age 39; 93% male; 97% white; 12% with college degrees; many unemployed or self employed, rural residence. A better methodological approach then prior studies, but an example of how profiles even if accurate many not have much operational value.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Psychiatrist offers recommendations regarding the possible role of MHPs as consultants to law enforcement in the area of terrorism. Author outlines three roles, but man focus is on helping victims of hostage/terror crisis presents results of a study of police officers and their coping with trauma. Empirical results not related to terrorism specifically. No explanation of terrorist behavior or of operational role for MHPs. Points out the commons problems encountered among those consulting on this area are (1) defining and monitoring role and boundaries; (2) possible identification (3) issues of confidentiality and publicity.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: October 23, 1983 was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism.
- Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal; arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over “conventional” terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain; and it has immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness).
- The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness.
- Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the “ultimate” terror weapon.
- The experience of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior state Department official once called a “frightening” problem, to which there are “no answers.”
- In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression.
- Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product or religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise.
- Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness.
- Acts of Martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances.
- After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers he concluded that there is no single profile of suicide terrorists.
- Merari maintains that no organization can create a person’s basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization.
- Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level.
- A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at lease six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and spiritual training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area.
- Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism’s strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances.
- At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. In rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War. Tamil Tigers are the only example to this phenomenon.
- The Black Tigers constitute the most significance proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom.
- Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization.
- Since the early 1980’s all LTTE fighters-male and female alike have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule’s contents if capture is imminent.
- The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from the shocking tactic.
The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs.

- Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a forging client state) approve of its use.
- The Achilles’ heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure.
- They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorist’s sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources.
- The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter provides a detailed case-study account of a large scale poison attack in the wake of WWII. A group of holocaust survivors, known as DIN, planned to launch a mass-casually attack against the German people in the immediate wake of the war. The original plan was to poison the water supply in several large German cities. This plan was "postponed" in favor of a plan to poison the bread of former Nazi SS Storm troopers held in an American run POW camp near Nuremberg. About 2300 prisoners became ill about 200 were hospitalized, but there were no report of fatalities. DIN was motivated by revenge and saw themselves as acting on behalf of those who had been slaughtered. DIN members came to view this as a necessary act to restore harmony to their lives. They were very cautious and concerned not to harm any non-Germans. This was an extraordinary context and set of circumstances and DIN is distinguishable from other terrorist groups in so many ways that it offers little in the way of generalizable lessons.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The premise of this article is that the limited global counterterrorism resources should focus on eradicating the terrorist group training camps where the conditioning takes place, rather than on trying to find terrorists after they have already been conditioned. Five phases of conditioning are described: depluralization, self-deindividuation, other-deindividuation, dehumanization, and demonization. All conditioning phases are supported by powerful group dynamics that reinforce the effectiveness of the conditioning. It appears that most terrorist groups use all or most of the social psychological conditioning and support processes described here. Since the cult-conditioned products of these processes are currently the most dangerous individuals on the planet, the article concludes with several recommendations for disrupting and possibly eliminating the groups and the training facilities, in order to stop the production of terrorist operators.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In this chapter I describe influences that contribute to mass violence, and I consider what is required to eliminate the social and cultural conditions and psychological processes that give rise to group violence.

- The conceptions of origins and prevention have been developed with a focus on genocide, mass killing, and what is currently called ethno political violence.
- One starting point for mass violence is difficult conditions in a society, such a severe economic problems, great political conflicts, rapid social changes, and combinations of these factors.
- Another starting point is conflict between groups, especially about "vital" interests.
- Conflicts between groups, especially intense and violent conflicts, frustrate basic human needs.
- When groups begin to experience relative deprivation and come to view their situation as unjust, the conflict may become a live one.
- One of the important "difficult life conditions' in the modern age is great and rapid cultural change.
- Self interest is another instigator.
- The desire to gain land or develop resources.
One way for individuals to handle difficult life conditions or groups conflicts that frustrate their basic needs is to turn to some group for security, identity, connection, to other people, effectiveness, or comprehension of reality in a changing or changed world.

In addition to gaining support and connection, they can elevate themselves by elevating this group its ideals, and actions. They can also elevate themselves by devaluing and then harming others.

Some people because of their individual life histories or specific circumstances or both, may be more affected and more inclined than others to join groups and ideological movements in response to social conditions.

Part of the elevation and affirmation of the self and the group happens through scapegoating another groups, which is banned for life problems or for the existence of conflict.

Ideologies are another important response to instigating conditions.

Ideologies are seemingly always involved in genocide and mass killing. They usually have a central role in terrorism.

Religion often has been used as a means of identifying others an enemies, even when the ideology itself is secular.

Islam is not unique in being used as a vehicle for violence.

As scapegoating and ideology turn one group against another, members of one begin to take hostile actions against members of the other. This sets in motion a process of evolution.

One may assume that an ideological movement or a terrorist group exists at least in part to serve the basic needs of its members.

Commitment is maintained by mutually reinforcing support within the group, the continued propagation of ideals, the idealization of leaders, an increasing separation from the rest of the world (and thus lack of corrective input , and even by sacrifices that members of the group make for fulfillment of goals.

As the group engages in more violence, the destruction of the enemy can become its highest goal.

Certain cultural characteristics are conducive to the emergence of psychological and social processes that initiate violence in response to instigating factors.

Cultural Devaluation: Sometimes two groups develop intense, mutual hostility, which I have referred to as an ideology of antagonism. This makes group violence more likely.

Inequality, Relative Deprivation, and Injustice: People who are poor or have limited power and rights sometimes can join forces in groups and movements with the declared aim of correcting the circumstances and the wrongs they entail. Their experience of relative deprivation and intensify.

Conditions in a society may limit opportunities and create a sense of hopelessness even in people whose background is not underprivileged.

Strong Respect for Authority: Strong respect for authority makes it especially difficult to deal with instigating conditions.

The more varied the values in a society, and the greater the extent that all groups can participate in societal processes, the less likely is the evolution toward mass violence.

Groups that have been victimized in the past, whether through genocide or in other ways, may feel deeply wounded psychologically, and they may see the world as a very dangerous place.

The combination of social conditions and culture set the stage, making group violence, including terrorism, more or less likely. The immediate circumstances of individuals their own personal life circumstances, associated with people with particular political or ideological orientation, and so on may lead them to join an ideological movement or a terrorist group. Other relevant factors include one's past history and personality, which may intensify the need for identity and community, the willingness to submit the self to leader, or the development of empathy and caring for others that may lead to the adoption of ideologies that offer a better life for people. Research on terrorist groups shows that the dynamics of the group are important.

The passivity of bystanders greatly encourages perpetrators. It helps them believe that what they are doing is right.

Internal bystanders (members of the population out of which the group arises that perpetrates the violence) often go along with or participate in discrimination and ignore the violence against victims.

External bystanders, outside groups, and other nations usually remain passive, continue with business as usual, or even support extremists or violent groups as they move toward or even engage in mass killing or genocides.
Preventive actions by bystanders or "third parties" are important to thwart the likelihood of mass violence.

The perception of justice by both parties following conflict and violence is also essential to stopping violence.

Testing our capacity to predict group violence is important.


Call Number: Published Abstract: Comments on the article by J. M. Post which discussed the categorization, motivation for and ongoing threat of terrorism. The current author briefly reviews what he considers influences leading to terrorism and what can be done to address these influences in ways to prevent terrorism.


Call Number: Published Abstract: Discusses Mohammed Atta's letter to the September 11 terrorists to illustrate the state of mind of a religious suicidal killer. Religious, psychological, and psychoanalytic aspects are examined. The themes of submissiveness, love, homoeroticism, sacrifice, and death are examined.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is brief biographical account of a young terrorist's involvement in a multi-national suicide attack. The attack was the result of a collaboration between the Japanese Red Army Faction and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. "On May 30, 1972, three Japanese students with sub-machine guns and hand grenades, killing 26 unarmed persons and wounding 80 more." Kozo Okamoto was the only one of the three to survive- the others caused their own deaths. The account provided is not a psychological analysis, but it does provide some suggestions about the complexity of terrorist motivations. Okamoto seemed to be attracted by the excitement of guerrilla training and the cachet associated with being a guerrilla. While he exposed the Trotsky-influenced rhetoric of global revolution- there is a sense that this is at best secondary to the lure of the action. Moreover, his escape exemplifies the ambivalence that would be suicide attackers often experience. Interesting historical note and case study, but no compelling psychological insight.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Argues that massacres and genocides are among the most important problems psychologist can study.

- Baumeister and Campbell have argued that evil acts often stem from the need to alleviate boredom through violent egotism.

- Baumeister has suggested for roots of evil and violence, three (and possibly even all four) of which might form a basis for hate. The first is an ideologically based belief that one's own side is good and that the side of enemy is evil. The second basis is the desire for revenge over injustices and humiliations one (or one’s group) has experienced, especially when threatened egotism has been involved. The third basis is greed, lust ambition, and other forms of self-interest in instances in which rival is standing in the way of what one wants. The fourth root, sadism, can precipitate brutal violence but typically may be less relevant to hate.

- Bandura has suggested that the moral disengagement that leads to inhumanity stems from a series of variables, including the cognitive restructuring of inhuman conduct into allegedly benign or worthy conduct by moral justification, sanitizing language, disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or placement of responsibility, disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one's actions, and attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of those who are victimized.

- Zajonc, underlying all of these factors and their contributions to massacres is a belief in a moral imperative. The mass killing of "others" is presented as a moral duty to those who are asked (or commanded) to carry out the killing.

- The duplex theory of hate is presented as a theory that applies to bother individuals and groups.

- The basic thesis to be presented here makes five fundamental claims. First, hate is very closely related psychologically to love. Second, hate is neither the opposite of love nor the absence of love. Third, hate like love has its origins in stories that characterize the target of the emotion. Fourth, hate like love can be characterized by a triangular structure generated by these stories. Fifth, and finally, hate is a major precursor of many terrorist acts, massacres, and genocides.

- Typically, perhaps, hate is thought of as a single emotion. But there is reason to believe that hate has multiple components. There are 3 components of hates. These components in actual situations. Negation of intimacy (distancing) in hate: Repulsion and disgust. Negation of intimacy involves the seeking of distance.

- Negation of Intimacy: Disgust
  Passion: Anger/Fear
  Commitment: Devaluation/Diminution

- Passion in Hate: Anger-Fear Intense anger or fear in response to threat.

- Decision-Commitment in hate: Devaluation-diminution through contempt Characterized by cognitions of devaluation and diminution through contempt for the targeted group.

- The three components of hate generate, in various combinations, seven different types of hate.

- Certain techniques seem to be common in the use of stories to incite hatred and whip up terrorism, massacres, and genocide. Main techniques: Intensive extensive propaganda, infusion of hatred and its resultants as an integral and necessary part of societal mores, emphasis on indoctrination of youngsters in school and through extracurricular groups, importance of obeying orders, diffusion of responsibility, calls to and rewards for action, threats and punishment for noncompliance, public examples of compliance and noncompliance, system of informers to weed out fifth-columnists, creation of an authoritarian cult of a leader.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Focusing on the “troubles” in Northern Ireland, this text does not present a broad view of the conflict, but rather a specific biographical account of one man’s journey through the UDA and indoctrination to be an assassin. It is written primarily as a popular press book, not as a scholarly work. This first person account has very little reflection or analysis that elucidates any general principles for understanding terrorist behavior (despite the fact that he now regrets having done at least some of the murders). Nevertheless, it provides the data for an astute reader to follow the sequence of events that led him into this extremist affiliation and to develop hypotheses about the question “why.”


Call Number: Published Abstract: Responding directly to 9/11, an outstanding interdisciplinary group of academics, clinicians, and activists from around the world united to produce this clear exploration of terrorism. Chapters address terror and violence perpetrated by children, compare terrorists to cultists, and separate the fact, fiction, and hysteria surrounding bioterrorism. Other topics include historical contexts, group dynamics, social and behavioral issues, psychological and psychopathological issues, evolutionary issues, forensics. Also presented are global perspectives on issues such as understanding and empathy; bias, prejudice, and racism; hate; and sexism. Additional subjects include state terrorism, countering international terrorism using perspectives from international psychology, and the role of resilience in terror's aftermath. This volume provides an overview of issues in a way to help the public, in general, better understand the various issues involved.


Call Number: Published Abstract: Describes ways of dealing with the emotional impact of terrorism. Second in a series presenting a range of terror-related issues, this book addresses terror and violence perpetrated by children, compares terrorists to cultists, and separates fact and fiction
surrounding bioterrorism. Chapters discuss historical contexts, group dynamics, social and behavioral issues, psychological and psychopathological issues, evolutionary issues, and forensics of terrorism. Global perspectives on issues such as understanding and empathy, bias, prejudice and racism, hate, and sexism are also presented. Additional subjects include state terrorism, countering international terrorism using perspectives from international psychology, and the role of resilience in terror's aftermath. The series presents knowledge and understanding as a framework for considering responses to terrorism.

Call Number: Published Abstract: Responding directly to the September 11th attacks on the US, an interdisciplinary group of academics, clinicians, and activists from around the world have united to produce this exploration of terrorism. The contributors present chapters that address terror and violence perpetrated by children, compare terrorists to cultists, and separate fact, fiction, and hysteria surrounding bioterrorism. Other topics include historical contexts, group dynamics, social and behavioral issues, psychological and psychopathological issues, evolutionary issues and forensics. Also presented are global perspectives on issues including understanding and empathy, bias, prejudice and racism, hate and sexism.

Call Number: Published Abstract: Responding directly to 9/11, an outstanding interdisciplinary group of academics, clinicians, and activists from around the world united to produce this clear exploration of terrorism. Chapters address terror and violence perpetrated by children, compare terrorists to cultists, and separate the fact, fiction, and hysteria surrounding bioterrorism. Other topics include historical contexts, group dynamics, social and behavioral issues, psychological and psychopathological issues, evolutionary issues, and forensics. Also presented are global perspectives on issues such as understanding and empathy; bias, prejudice, and racism; hate; and sexism. Additional subjects include state terrorism, countering international terrorism using perspectives from international psychology, and the role of resilience in terror's aftermath. (from the introduction)
This book offers various perspectives of psychological understanding and theory intertwined with culture, context, politics, globalization, and social injustice as well as diplomatic processes. The book also has a special section on the roles and impacts of religions that covers apocalyptic dreams, cults, religious archetypes, Islamic fundamentalism, and religious fanaticism.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: It is essential for law enforcement to try to understand something of the dynamics of the terrorist personality as it functions within certain roles in the group.
-Symbionese Liberation Army three distinct roles: 1. The leader: a person of total dedication, a trained theoretician with a strong personality.
2. The Activist-Operator: a person with an anti-social personality, frequently an ex-convict, an opportunist.
3. The idealist: usually the university with a life pattern of searching for the truth, the minor functionary.
-The leader shows the fewest signs of self-interest. This personality is rigid, dedicated, overly suspicious, and highly motivated. She or he projects personal faults and inadequacies onto others and ascribes evil motives to those who disagree. The leader is convinced of her righteousness and the underlying evil of those who oppose her. The leaders primary defense mechanism is projection. She specializes. The leader is dedicated, but not as delusional as the paranoid personality. She or he is not mentally ill. The leader can read people well and appeal to their needs.
-The opportunist: This is generally a male role held by one those whose criminal activity predates his political involvement. Antisocial personality. The opportunist is not mentally ill or crazy; he is oblivious to the needs of others and the unencumbered by the capacity to feel guilt or empathy. The opportunist is generally recruited from the prison population by the leader or the third functionary in the organization by the idealist. The opportunist role in group: The middle-class
student tells the convict his misdeeds were political and he is really O.K., thus directly and indirectly
admiring his masculinity, his "machismo." Gradually, the opportunist is brought into the political
fold as the strong-arm type. Without the opportunist, a group is radical only in rhetoric.

-The Idealist: The last personality in the group is almost normal. His innocence is exploited and
radicalized by the strong personality of the leader, subverted by rhetoric that sounds so perfect. In
extreme cases, the idealist borders on the inadequate personality classification. Between the points
of political naiveté and inadequate personality is the personality described in Eric Hoffer's book, The
True Believer. The terrorist group gives these individuals the answers they seek to the problems
of the world. The idealist role in the group is the soldier; the idealistic follower who reconnoiters
buildings prior to bombings, follows the opportunist into the bank, carries the messages, and is
generally the cannon fodder for the revolution. He is the desperate, dependent youth who is seeking
the truth and has fallen victim to the leader's rhetoric and the opportunist's deceit. He is the group
member most likely to become committed to the new ideologies; however he is unlikely to become
an informant. Of the three role types the idealist is the most salvageable.

11-18.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: SLA as a domestic example, I will use the Japanese Red Army
(JRA) as an international model.

Terrorism is different today than it was yesterday, and it will, like every dynamic organization,
change again by tomorrow. Terrorists learn new tactics and adapt and adjust to counter terrorism to
countermeasures developed governments or airlines.

Demographic Profile of the 1980's and 1970's Leftist Groups:
Leader: Male or Female
No specific race or religion
college education or attendance
25-40
middle class urban/sophisticated
multilingual
high verbal skills
well trained perfectionist
dedicated
strong personality
politically active prior to terrorist/criminal activity

Opportunist or Criminal Element:
Male
No specific race or religion
limited education
20-30
lower class
urban or rural with good street sense
literate in native language
high verbal skills
learned criminal skills
selfish
strong personality
Year of criminal activity/recruited from prison/politics are peripheral

Follower:
Male or female
No specific race or religion
college education or attendance
20-25
middle class urban/sophisticated
multilingual
good verbal skills
well-trained
- So today the middle east terrorists are mostly males who are unable to operate western security systems. While one should never consciously underestimate the enemy, neither one make them into superman.

- Demographic Profile of Middle East Leftist Groups in the 1980's

  **Leader:**
  Male
  no specific race or religion
  college education or attendance
  30-45
  middle class urban/sophisticated
  multilingual
  high verbal skills
  well trained perfectionist
dedicated
  strong personality
  Politically active prior to terrorist/criminal activity

  **Opportunist or Criminal Element:**
  Now an infrequent member as a specific entity

  **Follower:**
  Male
  No specific or religion
  poor educated/literate
  17-25
  lower class from a large family of 9-15 children
  refugees/not comfortable outside of middle east
  poor verbal skills
  unskilled worker
  training poor to none
  limited dedication
  criminally active in street gang
  politically naive

- A general profile of the membership of radical right wing groups

- Demographic Profile of the Right Wing:

  **Leader:**
  Male
  white protestant
  college education or attendance
  35-50 plus
  middle class
  urban/sophisticated
  literate in English
  high verbal skills
  well-trained perfectionist
  strong controlled paranoid personality
  politically active and articulate

  **Opportunist or Criminal Element:**
  Generally his skills are incorporated within the leader

  **Follower:**
  Male White Protestant
  Limited formal education
  20-50 plus
  lower and middle class
  urban or rural/unsophisticated
literate in English
Poor verbal skills
Poor work skills
weak personality/shared paranoid personality type
Politically naive

   Call Number: Author presents some conclusions based on a study of federal German left-wing and right-wing terrorists. She notes "it is more likely to be a matter of chance as to which a person in a susceptible phase comes into contact with" (p.407) She also notes that construing one self as "a person of contemporary history" has a powerful effect in defining oneself and how one is perceived by others. Media potentiates this effect. The notion she raises about "opportunity" influencing membership is important to bear in mind. Otherwise, the findings do not derive from a systematic analysis and have little operational value.

   Call Number: The pseudo-political terrorist uses ideological camouflage to cover individual psychopathology.
   -Although the popular belief is that terrorist activities lead to political changes, the inverse is often true; political changes give rise to terrorism by creating condition favorable for the expression of individual pathology under a political banner.
   -Pseudo-political terrorism is often counterproductive to the aims of the political movement which gave rise to it.
   -We have politicized psychopathology far more than we have pathologized political activism.
   -Psychopathic terrorist activities of the recent past too often have been viewed as political undertakings. Frequently they are expressions of psychopathology behind the guise of political pursuits.
   -The terrorist have a moral excuse for violent behavior.
   -Both political and pseudo-political terrorism have been made dangerous by the fantastic increases in destructive capacity accessible to the state and the individual.
   -Pseudo-political terrorism uses a political movement to achieve the primary goal of violence. Pseudo-political terrorism is thus a psychopathological entity.
   -Pseudo-political terrorists justify violence as a means to an end even though violence is to them an end itself.
   -In terrorism the psychopathic "rebel without a cause" acquires a cause. A cause transforms a violent psychopath into a political activist.

   Call Number: In this chapter we explore the role that psychological identity might play in fostering conditions that are conducive to the recruitment of terrorists. Specifically, we apply a theory of the self that emphasizes collective identity to define the circumstances that favor recruitment.
   -The legacy of the traditional social influence literature is that the power of conformity affects us all. From Asch’s famous (1956) experiments on group conformity to Milgram’s (1965) classic obedience experiments, one conclusion is inescapable: Ordinary people turn to their peers and legitimate authorities for basic information about appropriate attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior. After he or she is recruited the terrorist, like anyone else, is influenced greatly by the social group if it has clearly defined chain of authority and if the appropriate norms are articulated clearly and unanimously.
   -We focus our attention on the concept of the self because we believe it to be central for understanding human behavior. The self-concept, then, is a pivotal cognitive process that organizes experience, guides behavior, and provides the individual with meaning.
   -The self-concept is multidimensional, but two fundamental distinctions are central to the present analysis. The first important distinction contrasts identity and self-esteem. The identity component
(or alternatively, the descriptive, cognitive, or knowledge component) it is the one that describes who I am. In contrast, the esteem (or alternatively, the evaluative or emotional component) focuses on my evaluation of myself.

A second fundamental distinction must be made between an individual’s personal self and his or her collective self. The personal self refers to those characteristics or attributes that individuals believe are unique to them. Individual’s collective identity is that they refer to attributes that the individual shares with other members of the categories.

Taylor argued that collective identity has psychological priority over the other three components, and in turn, personal identity has precedence over personal (self-) esteem.

Collective identity is a description of the group to which individuals belong, which serves as the normative backdrop against which they can articulate their unique attributes. Each of us has many collective identities as the number of groups to which we belong and with which we share characteristics.

A cultural identity provides its members with a shared history and a set of broadly based and valued goals, along with detailed informal normative information about how to pursue the valued goals defined by the collective identity. Thus, cultural-religious collective identity is socially defined and represents the individual’s most pervasive and all-inclusive collective identity.

Leaders of terrorist organizations such as bin Laden must now engage in the recruitment process, and naturally their attention is going to turn to young men and women. These young people find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking to the future with the hope of engaging in a meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and get them ahead. Their objective circumstances including opportunities for advancement are virtually nonexistent; they find some direction from their religious collective identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of their community leaves them feeling marginalized and lost without a clearly defined collective identity.

First, no matter how disadvantaged a group is, there is always a segment of society that is privileged. Second, the majority of group members cling to the collective identity they know, even when that collective identity is not serving them well.

What a clear collective identity provides is a framework for individual behavior, that is, a clearly defined set of group norms. There are certain structural features to these norms that can be underscored when considering the collective identity is made salient in an intergroup context.

Research indicates consistently that for a minority to influence a majority, minority group members must speak loudly, repeatedly, and with one voice.

Focusing on the role of the outgroup norms for the collective identity of terrorist groups allows us to gain further insight into the structure of the collective identity with respect to in-group norms.

Louis and Taylor (2002) have argued that often an in-group focuses on an out-group not only for strategic reasons, but out of a psychological need to form a clear collective identity with respect to in-group norms.

First, we have stressed that terrorists themselves are motivated to understand the stressful conditions of disadvantage that their group confronts: An answer is needed to the question of why their group is suffering. A second insight concerning identity processes in terrorism, we argue, arises when we understand terrorism as fundamentally inactive.

The social influence literature, rejecting out-group norms because of their influence source rather than their content has variously been labeled reactance or anticonformity.

Research on stigmatized minorities within particular societies suggests that the defensive rejection of the out-group should be considered as a motivational force in addition to, or even instead of, positive attachment to the in-group.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This book provides a useful framework for understanding the connection between ideology and behavior and particularly what may drive ideologically-based political violence. The author defines ideology as “a common and broadly agreed set of rules which regulate and determine behavior.” A “rule,” in turn, described the link between a behavior and its consequence (or contingency in psychological terms). Thus, the way ideology controls behavior is by providing a set of contingencies that link immediate behavior (e.g., violence) to distant outcomes (e.g., new state, afterlife reward). The balance between distant and immediate contingencies is weighted heavily (distorted) toward the distant. The result is manifest as “fanaticism” with ten key
features: focusing; personalized view of the world; insensitivity; loss of critical judgment; inconsistency and tolerance of incompatibility; certainty; simplification; resistance to change; disdain/dismissal; contextual facilitation. Taylor makes a useful distinction between factors that might influence an individual to come under the control of an ideology (involvement) and factors that might influence a person to act. Specifically, he outlines the connection between ideology and violent action in the combination of three key factors: militant potential (i.e., whether violence is legitimized in the ideology as a means to an end); totality of the ideology (i.e., extent to which the ideology controls all behavior, not just specific religious or political elements); and perceived imminence in millenarian achievement (i.e., in secular and religious contexts attaining a future state of perfect being). Concepts are applied in two detailed case studies.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is one of the first “second generation” books on psychological approaches to understanding terrorism. It begins with an exploration of issues pertaining to definition and scope and dismissal of the relevance of psychopathology as an explanatory mechanism. He then discusses the construct and role of fanaticism, particularly as it relates to acts involving self-harm. He reviews the existing literature describing terrorists, noting limitations in its relevance. He navigates the common views regarding individual psychology, as well as the effects of groups and their dynamics. A thoughtful book that helped psychology “turn the corner” in its approach to understanding terrorism.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Written in 2000 there are 3 emerging trend likely to dominate the future of terrorism
   1. International terrorism from clashes of civilizations, which will more closely resemble conventional warfare.
   2. Focus issued based terrorism.
   3. Organized crime-related terrorism (terrorist tactics used ultimately for financial gain)
      - It will be driven by nationalism, religion, and ethnicity
      - Need to look for an individuals identity, rather than his politics
      -Follows Huntington's notion of "clash of civilizations" provides new ways of examining context of terrorism
      -Examples and applicators are provided.

   Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors Abstract: This article explores psychological and behavioral issues that may help our understanding of some important contemporary developments in Islam. The particular areas of immediate concern in this article are the behavioral bases of the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and violence. A more general issue, however, relates to how we might understand the nature of religious and ideological control over behavior. At the onset, general issues related to the concept of fundamentalism will be discussed. This is a very contentious term, and in some circumstances might be though to refer to more to the perspective of the beholder, rather than that of the believer. Subsequently, the concept of fundamentalism within the context of Islam will be considered, emphasizing the nature of fundamentalist ideology, while ways of understanding the processes of fundamentalism within a behavioral framework will be described. The broader the implications of this discussion will than be extended with particular reference to religious control over behavior.
   -Perhaps the critical quality of a fundamentalism is that believers take religion ‘seriously’. That is to say, not only is there a sense of truth and error in belief systems, but in recognizing truth it is the duty of the believer to follow religious prescriptions because they represent truth.
   -Bruce notes that amongst other things, we might characterize the features of this behavior as exclusive proselytizing and confrontational.
   -It is worth noting, of course, that despite the enormous literature by and about Islamic fundamentalism, comments on the psychological and behavioral issues that might be involved
remain sparse.
-Two broad classes of influence can be identified which seem to be associated with the discontent in Islamic societies-those concerned with the relationship between Islamic States and the wider world, which might characterize as external factors, and those concerned with Islam itself and its practices, which we might term internal factors.
-In the context of concern to us, four relevant qualities of Islam as a religion and as a social movement can be identified that sustain fundamentalism positions. These are: (1) its claims to universal validity; (2) its theoretical demands extending to all aspects of life; (3) the sanctification of Islamic law and its rulings; and (4) the general equation of the state with the implementation of Islam.
-Responses to these apparent challenges to the moral authority of Islam are a critical element of the fundamentalist position.
-It is interesting to note that fundamentalist analyses of the problems facing Islam never question the ideological bases of Islam.
-Many of the features of Islamic fundamentalist thinking can be interpreted from a millenarian perspective.
-Millenarianism describes a distinctive quality of the content of ideology, but it also relates to the way in which ideology may influence behavior. It relates to expectations of the attainment of the Millennium, an expected utopian end.
-Millenarianism play an important role in the development of political and religious movements and has been argued to be one of the significant factors in the development of certain types of political violence.
-In his analysis of the influence of millenarianism on Nazi ideology, Rhodes identified five fundamental but general qualities of millenarianism of relevance to our discussion.
1. An analysis of the world in terms of a real or impending catastrophe, which has an immediate effect on the individuals life;
2. A revelation that explains this taste of affairs, and which offers some form of salvation or redressing of ills;
3. As part of the revelation the possession of special knowledge that the disastrous state is the result of the action of malevolent forces (spiritual or secular) which conspire to corrupt and subvert the normal organs of society or the State. Through the possession of special knowledge, the holder has a unique and powerful capacity to fight the malevolent and corrupting forces.
4. A sense of timelessness for action, in that the forces of corruption are nearing completion of their tasks and finally.
5. A conviction that these forces can be defeated because of the special insights, and that the defeat of the forces of evil will result in the ushering in of a new and better world.
Many qualities of Islamic Fundamentalist thinking corresponds to Rhode’s qualities of millenarianism.
-A more recent example of political violence that can be argued to draw upon millenarian influences was the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in October, 1981.
-What is interesting and relevant from our point of view is the sense on which political and social issues are drawn into the theological argument, which as we will see later has direct behavioral consequences.
-Taylor has already argued in detail that the direction and organization of the behavioral of the politically committed related to the degree and nature of the ideological control over behavior. This analysis extends as readily to religious as political commitment in that both involve forms of ideology.
-Because such explanations ‘push’ accounts of behavior inside the individual (in terms of thoughts, attitudes, traits, etc.) there is a tendency to consider ideology as something separate from and outside of the broader, framework in which we seek to understand the controls of behavior.
-Of particular note is a failure in analyses of the psychological effects of ideology to make a fundamental distinction between ideology as a process (structuring and influencing behavior) and the content of particular ideologies.
-One useful way of explaining the effectiveness of control of delayed outcomes on present behavior is to propose some form of changing, whereby particular relationships of behavior and consequence are directly linked, one to the other, to the more distant.
-Even if idiosyncratic, the processes whereby a person becomes a member of a terrorist group, and the incremental approach towards a commitment and perhaps violence that might imply, may well be forcibly explained in these terms. Expressed generally, the starting point for an individual a sense of injustice, a particular precipitating event, or even more remotely a friendship—may appear very far removed from a terminal point, placing a bomb or shooting a police officer. But we could readily envisage a process whereby they would be linked through complex sequence of interlocking but idiosyncratic circumstances.

-An alternative analysis from a behavioral perspective is to develop explanations in terms of what has been called rule following. The context exercised by distant outcomes that is so much a feature of all behavior, not just religious or political behavior, may well be better characterized as being mediated by a rule which related those distant outcomes to particular behaviors, rather than by an inevitable chain of responses and consequences.

-A rule is a verbal description of relationships between behaviors and consequences, especially aversive events and reinforcement.

-Rokeach defined ideology as “a common and broadly agreed set of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to regulate and determine behavior.

-Rules do not exercise perfect control over behavior.

-Likewise we need not assume that all rules when expressed are necessarily effective. Malott distinguishes between ‘hard-to-follow rules and ‘easy-to-follow’ rules. The easy-to-follow rule describe relationships where behavior will produce an outcome which is probable and sizeable, even if delayed. ‘Hard-to-follow’ rules in contrast, describe contingencies that are either improbable or have outcomes that are small (in terms of either aversive or reinforcing consequences).

-From this short analysis we can see how political or religious ideology can be seen as the expression of explicit and internally cohesive and logical contingency rules, helping to relate distant events to immediate behavior.

-The distinctive quality of fanatical religious behavior (which might be an appropriate term for fundamentalism) is the extent of control which is itself a reflection of all the embracing qualities of religion, in contrast to the limited scope of sport related rules, for example.

-We can distinguish between the processes that might allow the expression of ideology, and the qualities of a particular ideology. In one sense, behavioral rules refer to the broad set of contingencies relating distant outcomes to behavior. These higher order rules we might characterize as the process of ideology.

-This distinction enable us to identify a number of important qualities of religious ideology that can now be brought within the broader framework of rule following. At least three principle factors can be identified 1. The specific content of an ideology (in terms of military, injunctions at a micro-level, etc.); 2. A more diffuse and higher level aspect of content, particularly as it relates to millenarianism; 3. The process implied by extreme ideological control, which can be characterized as “lack of public space”

-Specific ideological content: The precise day to day injunctions of a religion are clearly one important element in determining religious behavior.

-The extent to which an ideology explicitly rejects a group, and expresses that rejection in militant terms, is clearly one aspect of the potential for violence within the ideology.

-Fundamentalist Islam quite clearly develops as part of the content of its ideological prescriptions militancy against Western life and western culture.

-In behavioral terms, we might characterize as the logic of Islam is no more than an expression of behavioral rules, which specify relationships between long term ends and immediate behavior.

-The Shari-ah specifies behaviors appropriate to situations at a variety of levels.

-For the Islamic fundamentalist, the Shari’ah is essentially an expression of behavioral rules.

-If the fundamentalist does take religion seriously, (as we noted earlier) and acts upon what religions requires, he implements and adheres to these rules in his everyday life. It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of behavioral rule following than the fundamentalist believer.

-Diffuse and higher level aspects of ideological content: Ideology can be seen as effecting behavior at a variety of levels.

-Millenarianism is at one level an aspect of the content of ideology, but at another level of analysis it has certain features that relates to more general processes.

-Hannah Arendt, in her analyses of the atrocities committed by the Nazis during the Second World
War, developed the concept of lack of public space. This concept addresses the issue of how people who were in other respects ‘normal’ could become involved in the appalling activities that characterized the Third Reich. Lack of public space relates to the inability of individuals to exchange and develop ideas in states where extreme control is exercised over life, most notable evident in totalitarian states.

- The extreme degree of social control required by Fundamentalist interpretations of Islam meet the requirements for lack of public space, in Arendt’s terms, and in consequence we might expect to see the lack of regard for the restraints on behavior towards enemies emerging within Islam.

- We can see from the above, therefore, that what we observe as characteristic behavior of the fundamentalist believer readily fits into the framework of behavioral rule following. In a sense the precise detail of religious observance required is of less importance than the fact that behavior is under close control of the religious ideology, expressed as rules. The rigidity of purpose, the insensitivity, the focusing, the intensely personalized view of the worked, the tolerance of what to the non-initiate is incompatibility, the simplification of the world view, the loss of critical judgment, etc. all seem to be qualities of the religious fundamentalist. They are also qualities that might be thought to illustrate behavior subject to extreme rule governance, as opposed to contingency control.

- There are other more explicitly psychological insights that complement the behavioral approach described above. One such relates to the concept of conspiracy.

- The notion of conspiracy is central to millenarianism.

- For the above, it can be seen that the processes involved in fundamentalism can be subjected to psychological analysis.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this book, Taylor draws on the lessons from his prior research with discrete terrorist groups to draw some general principles about terrorist behavior. Although Taylor claims the book is not about the IRA, per se, this group is disproportionately represented among the points of reference and case examples. There is a chapter on Arab and Islamic Terrorism. The book maintains that terrorists generally tend not to be mentally “abnormal,” but that they are a diverse group. He wisely suggests that becoming a terrorist be viewed as a process. He concludes that there are different phases in that process and the “causal” factors in each phase may be quite different and not necessarily related to one another. He discusses some ways in which terrorist groups may meet individuals’ needs (e.g., sense of shared experience, shared excitement, and shared purpose); the importance of ideology in guiding terrorists’ world view; the often evolving functions of terrorist acts (e.g., support the cause and support the group); and the role of a supportive milieu or environment in sustaining militant ideology. The book concludes with four assertions: (1) The active terrorist is not discernibly different in psychological terms from the non-terrorist; (2) In psychological terms, there are no special qualities that characterize the terrorist; (3) Political violence is the result of a complex interaction of social and psychological forces, which in some sense relate to the effects of ideology; and (4) Political violence is a learned behavior, and as such, is subject to the forces control all our behavior.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: It is often assumed that fanaticism is one of a cluster of attributes of the terrorist, and that this state is in some way related to the terrorist’s use of violence. We can see this assumption clearly in the following quotation from Laqueur (1977): “Terrorists are fanatics and fanaticism frequently makes for cruelty and sadism.” Whatever the etiology of fanaticism might prove to be, whether it reflects a “pathology of perfection” (Watzlawick 1977), elitism (Wolman 1974) or a flight from fallibility (Perkinson 1977), it is not something unique to terrorism. In psychological terms, the concept of the fanatic is not clearly understood. The concept seems to refer in part to rigidly held ideas and beliefs, expressed as actions that are little influenced by the immediate context. We may be able to identify links between fanaticism and other psychological processes. In particular, fanaticism seems to have a number of qualities in common with prejudice and authoritarianism, two related processes. The apparent paradox between the moralistic claims in the rhetoric of the terrorist (and the fanatic) and this inescapable feature of terrorism is often resolved in two related ways, either by reinterpreting the qualities of the victim making him or her conform to the overriding world view, or by denial of responsibility because
Some other agencies’ inaction. We might term this the paradox of morality. It may be possible to seek some understanding of the “paradox of morality” by exploring the theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957). This theory suggests that when attitudes and behavior are inconsistent, an unpleasant state of psychological dissonance is created, which results in its turn, in the individual seeking to reduce the dissonance by either changing attitudes, minimizing the importance of elements involved in the inconsistent relationship, or changing behavior. Perhaps a useful starting point is to make a distinction between the forces that might give rise to involvement in some cause or other (ideological or religious), and the circumstances which might surround the expression of a particular act. “Involvement: circumstances may well be quite different (although possibly related) to more specific “act’ circumstances. Once a member, it is not difficult to see how the attractions of, and forces confirming, group membership might explain the incremental process of involvement, and the increased focusing which might characterize the development of the fanatic. The reason for the expression of particular fanatical behavior might develop, might on the other hand be appropriately features of the immediate environment in which the fanatic finds himself. Viewed from the standpoint of Sh’ite culture and its Islamic context, however, such acts of self-destruction do not seem so pathogenic, and have as clear and appropriate a culture, historical, and religious, context as martyrdom, notably in the acts of the “Assassins”(Lewis, 1986; Rapoport, 1984). The Japanese have a long tradition of socially approved suicide in a range of circumstances, including warfare. To the West, the most infamous example occurred during the Second World War, and of those examples, the Kamikaze pilots probably remain the best known. Indeed, we now use the term “kamikaze’ as something synonymous with suicide attacks. The Kamikaze (or Divine Wind) pilots flew specially modified aircraft which were in effect flying bombs. Within traditional Japanese cultural contexts, suicide related to achieving some socially or personally defined end has a long and honorable history.

296. Tittmar, H. G. (1992). Urban terrorism: A psychological interpretation. Terrorism and Political Violence, 4(3), 64-71. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Explored are some psychological mechanisms by means of which it may be feasible to explain some of the terrorist activities so prominent today. The thrust of the argument is that lowering self-esteem and increased frustration mobilize a defensive response.

- Attempting an 'understanding of one’s enemy’ is an ancient practice taught to many a budding general. The classical thrust of this premise is to attempt to understand the fundamental logic of the opposition, and then to outmaneuver the impending move.

297. Toloyan, K. (1989). Narrative culture and terrorist motivation. J. Shotter, & K. J. Gergen (Eds), Text of identity (pp. 99-118). London: Sage. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: In that two-decade-old sub-field of political science that studies terrorism, the search for a schematic and exhaustive typology of terrorism and for the factors affecting it has been frustrated even as the field has grown rapidly.

- One way to begin is to address the problem of the terrorist's self-image and motivation, a problem neither purely psychological nor even psychological and political, but rather one that compels us to consider the cultural construction of individual motives under certain circumstances.

- In this chapter-the latter part of which focuses on Armenian political culture and Armenian terrorist.

- Whereas the imperative of a cultural analysis is frequently acknowledged, the acknowledgement too often takes the form of lip service. For example, Walter Laqueur (1977, p.120) speaks eloquently against generalizations about the terrorist personality which he deems of 'little validity', and insists on the importance of the 'historical and cultural contacts' of terrorism. He then proceeds to do two things: he lists dozens of different organizations and instances of terrorism, and then, the gesture towards heterogeneity completed, he moves on in one mighty leap to, make those general statements and analyses of terrorism for which his work is best known.

- The specific forms of narrative for which I shall be making large claims are the projective narrative and the regulative biography.

- For the present, a projective narrative is one that not only tells a story of the past, but also maps out future actions that can imbue the time of individual lives with the transcendent collective values.

- What seems striking about both Professor Wilkinson's otherwise very good analysis and a legion of
less creditable discussions of the same topic is the disciplinary rush to the politicization of terrorism. By 'politicization', I mean that the profession of political science seems powerfully impelled to turn enormously complex events into mere, or only, or just, political facts, which can then be seen as motivating other political acts, including terrorism.

What is crucially lacking in such a model is the concept of mediation, or a serious consideration of the possibility that past events, including the rare purely political events, are perpetrated, disseminated and experienced in a particular culture not as political events, but as narratives that transcribe historical factors into moral or immoral acts, vehicles of social values.

- We can venture one relatively safe generalization: terrorism with an authentically popular base is never purely political phenomenon.

- Neither political nor psychological explanations can compensate for a lack of analysis of the cultural milieu that provides the medium in which political facts are interpreted and engender new acts. Discussions of motivation and self-image that depend primarily on the manipulation of psychological and behavioristic categories inevitably trivialize the cultural matrix.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This brief chapter does not present any new information, but summarizes the views of others on typologies of terrorism. He begins with Post's general notion that "marginal, isolated and inadequate individuals from troubled family backgrounds tend to be attracted to the path of terrorism." He reviews Hackers typology (criminals, crusaders and crazies) and Suellwolds two categories (parasitic, extroverts with narcissistic features and suspicious, aggressive paranoids). He describes the terrorist group profile as comprising the leader, the activist operator (often with antisocial personality) and the idealist. Corrado distinguishes between emotional aspects of terrorists: those driven by mental disorder and those driven by political idealism. This article concludes with a discussion of Stockholm’s syndrome and hostage negotiation. Not current, sophisticated, or practical for analysis.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Turner proposes a typology of acts of terror differences in three factors: Target selection (selected vs. random); motivation (instrumental vs. affective); and intent (psychological disturbance vs. criminal vs. political) Focusing on the politically motivated attacks, this yields four types. 1) Political - instrumental - selected (primary purpose is bargaining) 2) Political - Instrumental- Random (purpose: social paralysis, making state appear impotent) 3) Political - Affective- Selected (purpose to make a political statement, no goal) 4) Political - Affective- Random (often mass causality don't care about political constraints) somewhat blunt for operational use.


Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: This article looks at three measuring instruments the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, the Social Dominance Orientation Scale, and the Attitudes About Reality Scale used to examine covert ideology and its relationship to social and political beliefs and behaviors. These scales share similar ideological components involving abdication of moral responsibility to an outside agent, belief that one’s own ideology represents the only form of truth, and negative beliefs about individuals who are not members of one’s own group. Evidence is provided to suggest that radical fundamentalists and some groups within U.S. society share ideological beliefs that differ in degree rather than kind. These beliefs make it easy for them to divide the world into “us” and “them” and exacerbate the present conflict. -A worldview may be defined as a set of covert values and beliefs that is not often discussed with others and, indeed, is rarely examined by the individual who possesses it. -In this article I will discuss three measures of covert ideology that seem to be particularly relevant to political attitudes and beliefs about intergroup conflict. These are the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA), the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO), and the Attitudes About Reality Scale (AAR).
The RWA is probably the instrument most frequently used by researchers to examine the relationship between covert ideology and political beliefs and attitudes. It was developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1988) to measure (1) degree of acceptance of established authority and law; (2) acceptance of law as the basis of morality; and (3) punitiveness toward “sanctioned targets” such as minority groups, social deviants, and “common criminals” (Christie, 1991). People who have strong beliefs in religious fundamentalism are also likely to score high in right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999). This relationship has been confirmed among individuals from a number of religious backgrounds-Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and Hindu (Hunsberger, 1996). It also appears in studies of other cultures.

Right-wing authoritarianism has been found to be associated with negative attitudes towards members of outgroups. The SDO is a newer instrument developed to examine the underlying dynamic of many social and political attitudes (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). It is conceptualized as measuring: the value that people place upon non-egalitarian and hierarchically structured relationships among social groups.

People who are high in social dominance orientation tend to endorse policies that give advantages to members of their own group in preference to members of groups other than their own.

Social dominance orientation has been found to predict in egalitarian beliefs cross-culturally. For nearly all groups, higher social dominance orientation was associated with more negative affect toward the lower status group. High scores in social dominance orientation are also associated with patriotism and a conservative political stance for members of dominant groups. It should not be surprising that a number of studies report that men, in general, score higher in social dominance orientation than women do (Pratto et al., 2000). This difference persists across ethnic, class, age, and religious groupings in the United States (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994). Although the SDO shares some variance with the RWA (Altemeyer, 1998), it predicts quite different relationships in terms of group identification. Thus, in contrast to studies using the RWA, social dominance orientation is not highly correlated with religiosity in either the United States or Israel (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).

The AAR is a more general measuring instrument than the RWA or SDO. This scale was designed to examine views about the relationship between subjective and external reality in a variety of conceptual domains (Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass, 1986). People who score high on this scale appear to have a positivist view of reality. They believe in the validity of external reality and the legitimacy of some form of authority external to themselves. They tend to believe that their own values and those of their source of authority are universally true, to favor the socio-political status quo within their own society, and to prefer deterministic rather than relativistic explanations of various social issues. Positivism has also been found to be associated with religiosity. Unlike the RWA and the SDO, however, no strong or consistent gender differences have been found in scores on the AAR.

People who score high in right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, or positivist attitudes about reality seem to share a similar pattern of undesirable personality traits. For example, those who score high on the RWA have been found to score higher in dogmatism (Altemeyer, 1998), to have less tolerance for ambiguity (W.J. Evans, 2000), and to show less self-awareness (Altemeyer, 1999) than people who score lower in this scale. Positivist individuals have also been found to be higher in dogmatism and the belief in a just world (Draper, 1990). And an inverse relationship between positivism and the use of principled moral reasoning has been found, but only in males (Walker, Rowland, & Boyes, 1991). There are fewer studies of the connection between social dominance orientation and personality variables, although social dominance orientation has been found to be negatively correlated with empathy, tolerance, communality, and altruism (Pratto et al., 1994).

An early study by one of the researchers who developed the SDO also reported that the greater an individual’s racism, the lower the level of his or her cognitive and political sophistication (Sidanius & Lau, 1989). It is difficult to disentangle the pernicious worldviews uncovered by the measuring instruments discussed above. One can only extrapolate that radical fundamentalists would probably score high on all three measures. These worldviews share certain features, including abdication of moral responsibility to a source outside oneself, maintenance of attitudes and behaviors that value one’s own group at the expense of other “deviant” groups, and closing oneself off from experiences and viewpoints that might influence the worldview one possesses. These ideology-maintaining
mechanisms make it easy for people to believe that there is no true worldview other than their own and to demonize others who do not recognize this “truth”. It is also important to recognize that situational factors are just as important as intrapsychic factors in altering sociopolitical views. We do not know the direction of causality between worldviews and our beliefs about specific social issues and political events.


students choose Communist student organizations. The students’ answer was: We choose them although they are Communist organizations because they will stand up for the students’ interests more than will other organizations. But the real motives lie deeper. They are to be found in a change of conscience of the upper stratum of the educated youth.

-Three motives for this type of negative sentiment are especially important. The first concerns the conflict between students and the production-oriented industrial society. The second motive for these negative sentiments is the crisis in the understanding of democracy within the upper stratum of the educated youth. The third motive for the negative conduct of the students concerns the crisis of authority. They looked in vain for effective authorities in a social order which was determined by the striving for profit. The motives, as they themselves identified them, were unpolitical. They actually belong more to the area of psychopathological disturbances. These students became terrorists because they suffered from acute fear and from aggression and the masochistic desire to be pursued.

-The answer to the question of how they became terrorists was amazingly simple: German terrorists were and are basically concerned with the solving of personal problems, be they family, sexual, or professional. The government was felt to be responsible for solving these problems, but since it was not capable of doing so, it was attacked in every possible way.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Terrorism is behavior. Psychology is the study of behavior. Ergo, psychologists should be studying terrorism. With a few exceptions academic and scientific psychologists have not been prominent in the study of terrorist behavior, either historically or contemporaneously.

-Peace psychologists as an arm of APA is well-positioned to contribute to our understanding of terrorism. Peace psychology “seeks to develop theories and practices aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence..and promotes the nonviolent management of conflict and the pursuit of social injustice.”

-In this chapter we present a peace psychological perspective on terrorism. We focus on the basic causes of terrorism, as well as what we consider the most effective responses to terrorist acts.

-What constitutes a “peace psychological perspective”? A common model espoused by many in the field recognizes (a) two types of violence-direct and structural and (b) three categories of responding to violence in an effort to prevent its recurrence or further development-peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building.

-Peacekeeping refers to efforts to stop ongoing violence, but without resorting to violence in the process.

-Peacemaking refers to attempts to reduce, manage, or resolve destructive conflicts.

-Peace building takes peacemaking a step further by promoting the conditions of social injustice and positive approaches to peace.

-A peace psychological analyses focuses on the group bases for the creation of terrorist collectivities.

-We see four different categories of motives or needs as basic to structural causes of the kind of unrest that singly or, more often, in combination can lead to terrorism. The first is what Staub referred to as difficult life conditions, that is, hunger, sickness, and shelter for oneself or one’s family. The second basic need is for security, the lack of which often leads to fear. The third basic need is for self-determination, that is, the ability to make one’s own decisions about “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The need for self-determination is, at base, an issue of power. The fourth basic need is for social respect, that is, others’ acknowledgement of the value of one’s social identity, of the ethnic, religious, or cultural membership group. Some conflicts based in the social need to respect have long histories.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Ken Wilber's integral perspective which included multiple dimensions, disciplines, and developmental levels. Integral analysis of our current global crisis makes clear that the state of the world reflects the state of our minds, that our global problems are
global symptoms of our individual and collective immaturity and pathology, that prevailing understandings of, and responses to these crisis suboptimal, conventional developmental levels. -Domains are divided primarily into four quadrants comprised of inner (subjective) and outer (objective), individual and collective. Developmental levels can be divided into various numbers of stages. The big three: the prepersonal, personal and transpersonal-or preconventional, conventional, and post conventional levels. -Detribalization is part of the transpersonal maturation process by which one moves from a conventional to a postconventional worldview. -Karma yoga uses work and service in the world as a way of awakening self and others. The essence of karma yoga or awakening service is three-fold: dedication, impeccability, and nonattachment.

307. Walters, G. D. (2002). Fear, belief, and terrorism. S. P. Shohov (Ed), Advances in psychology research (Vol. 10pp. 45-67). Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This scholarly conceptual article attempts to describe how fear serves to influence the behavior of terrorists and their intended victims. The author adopts an evolutionary theoretical model to explain these limits. As it relates to terrorist behavior, the general notion is that terrorist actions are presented as a path to "immorality" and therefore obviates man's extensile anxiety. Not intended or particularly useful for an operational approach.

308. Wardlaw, G. (1989). Political terrorism: Theory, tactics and counter-measures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This 1989 book is the Second Edition of a book first published by Wardlaw, and Australian criminologist, in 1982. It is fairly broad in its coverage of political terrorism, reviewing historical and tactical factors, and exploring the role of CT policy, media, military, and diplomacy in responding to the problem. One chapter in particular addresses psychological issues (Chapter 14): “Counter-measures against terrorism: The role of behavioural science research.” In it, he reviews possible research strategies and potential applications for social science research. In a specific discussion on the “psychology of terrorism” he reviews Max Taylor’s arguments about the inconsistencies between the features of psychopathy and the lifestyle and functional demands of terrorism. Wardlaw does not really provide new or original data here, but it is a solid review and synthesis of what was known as of 1989.

309. Warenka, T. H. (2002). The long shadow of our hidden dragon: Shared factors of terrorism and juvenile violence. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: Programs and practices in response and prevention (Vol. IVpp. 91-117). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call Number: Published Abstract; This chapter is written from the perspective of the author as a clinical counselor and based on the experience of working with aggression in children, adolescents, and their families. The author's intention is to explore some of the psychological similarities between terrorism and juvenile aggression in children and adolescents. It is noted that when examining terrorism and/or juvenile aggression, it is crucial to attend to contextual factors. Five of these psychological factors are focused upon: (1) misunderstanding the difference between feeling anger and acting upon it; (2) the paradigm of individualism; (3) shame; (4) negative projections; and (5) the role of power. The negative aspects of labeling/naming serve as projective functions, and is explored in the discussion of projection. Denial also provides a way of supporting negative projections, so it is examined as it related to keeping one's aggression hidden.

310. Wasmund, K. (1986). The political socialization of West German terrorists. P. H. Merkl (Ed), Political violence and terror: Motifs and motivations. CA: University of California Press. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: It would appear that anarchism is in diametric opposition to the German mentality. - The fact that terrorism has no tradition in Germany and made its breakthrough more or less overnight also serves to explain the extremely severe and rigid reaction by the state authorities and the German public to the terrorist challenge. -In comparison with other countries, the number of victims claimed and the damage caused by West German terrorist has been relatively low. -The political system at any rate has reacted to the terrorist challenge in the best possible German
state-oriented tradition: by taking liberal legislative measures and enlarging the police force and the police surveillance system. The balance sheet of West German terrorism in the first ten years (1969-1979) is as follows (Neidhardt 1982:437): 69 attacks on people, of which 25 cases resulted in death, 247 attacks of arson and bombing, as well as 69 other serious offenses.

- During the same period of time, seven German terrorists were killed while being pursued; another four died while on a terrorist mission. Seven died during imprisonment by committing suicide or as the direct outcome of a hunger strike. Seventy-seven acts of violence were registered in 1980. By 1981 the number of attacks had increased to 129.

- Meanwhile, unorganized terrorism in the form of Feierabendterrorismus - groups that are responsible for sporadic, “after working hours” acts of terrorism - has proven to be a greater dilemma for the police than the organized terrorism of the RAF. These are operations carried out by small groups of anarchists who do not live permanently in the underground but lead a legal existence.

- West German terrorism can only be explained against the background of the students’ protest movement of the 1960s.

- The student protest movement was a reaction to political and social developments in the new West German state in the 1950s and 1960s.

- At the center of the students’ protest was, first of all, the emergency law imposed and enforced exclusively by the Greta Coalition, the still unassimilated Nazi past, the abuses arising from life in a consumer society, the concentration of the press -“Expropriate Springer,” the West German press tycoon the hierarchical authoritarian structure of the universities and , last but not least, the American involvement in Vietnam and as a result, the process of taboos and repression, which affected both the masses and the political elite.

- The student movement simply opposed the “establishment,” a favorite term of the time, and saw itself, as being “undogmatic,” “antiauthoritarian,” and “radically democratic.” The breakup of the antiauthoritarian student movement had essentially three consequences: Most of the students were integrated. A second element went into extremely diverse and mostly dogmatic groups of political left-wing sectarianism. A third, relatively weak element preached open violence against the political system.

- One cannot, of course, denounce the entire West Berlin counterculture as sympathizers with the terrorist cause. On the contrary, it was precisely in these circles that, for various reasons, a great deal of criticism was voiced.

- THE ORIGIN OF THE RED ARMY FACTION AND ITS SUCCESSORS- On 2 April 1968 fires broke out in two department stores in Frankfurt. The fires in the department stores in Frankfurt can be regarded as marking the birth of the Red Army Faction. This act of arson by Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Thorwald Proll, and Horst Sohnlein was not a signal for society, as they wanted people to believe, but rather a signal for themselves, since by this step they had severed practically all connections with “bourgeois society.”

- The foundation of the RAF is not to be regarded as a result of political decisions aimed at changing the political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in a revolutionary way by the use of terror, but rather as a result of a gradual downward slide into violent crime, with political and private motives becoming intermingled. The first step on the path leading to terrorist actions was “violence against property” in the form of arson.

- The second step, however, the liberation of Baader with the aid of firearms, was by no means politically motivated but was based on private or personal interests: namely Gudrun Ensslin’s desire to free her boyfriend from prison.

- With the liberation of Baader, the basic pattern and the central motive for all future actions of the RAF and its successor organizations were established. That is, if one or more members of the organization were in custody, the others were to concentrate all their energies on the liberation of their comrades in prison.

- For the second and third generation of terrorists (Bewengung2. Juni and Revolutionare Zellen), in contrast to the founding generation of terrorists, one cannot speak of a gradual sliding into the terrorist scene. As far as these groupings were concerned, it was obvious from the very beginning that they made a conscious decision to employ “armed struggle,” which might explain the higher levels of violence and aggression in their members.

- Research into the cause of terrorism must be based on the development of a political personality as a product of the interaction between personality and political-social environment.
As part of a research project backed by the Federal Ministry for Domestic Affairs (Schmidtchen 1981), 227 life histories of leftist terrorists were analyzed. These biographies were taken mainly of members of the RAF and the 2d of June movement. Although according to this investigation there is admittedly no such thing as a typical terrorist career, there are nevertheless certain striking features evident in these biographies. What becomes apparent with regard to the social background of the terrorists is that they come mostly from the upper middle classes.

The level of education of the terrorists is correspondingly of an above average standard. Before joining the group, only 35 percent of the terrorists were employed on a full-time basis.

There are a great many cases in which stress and conflict were inherent features of their childhood and youth. Every fourth terrorist, over the age of fourteen, grew up in a broken home. Fifteen percent were father-less by the time they reached adolescence.

The relationship between the terrorist and the father can be described as trusting and open in only 8 percent of the cases (mother 20%) and as loving in 7 percent (mother 18%) (Schmidtchen 1981). In many cases, a breakup of personal ties preceded the step into terrorism, 28 percent left the family home and 12 percent were separated from their partner or even left their children (Schmidtchen 1981).

Clearly identifiable in the family structure is the combination, found in many homes, of two features - a certain lack of contact and emotion, and high achievement orientation the part of the parents for their children’s careers (Schmidtchen 1981).

No single set of circumstances can be identified in the primary socialization process that would necessarily lead to a terrorist career.

Deficits in primary socialization, which deny young people the chance to form their own identity, can, however, produce dispositions - like the longing for security and firm group ties which, combined with critical encounters later on, political and ideological learning processes, and corresponding opportunities to join various groups, finally lead to the decisive step of joining a terrorist organization. The decision to go underground was generally preceded by a phase in which such a step was prepare for consciously or unconsciously.

Disassociation with existing social links, such as the parental home, family, partner, place of residence, and habitual milieu, took home.

It is a break not only with internalized norms and values but with the expectations of other people with respect to a “bourgeois” career and future.

In almost every terrorist career, after the person in question has left the parental home or has separated from a partner, there is a phase marked by his or her joining one or another of many different groupings or left-wing subcultures or by friendships with people in direct sympathy with terrorists.

In the search for new life-styles during this disassociation period, the commune plays an important role as an agent of political socialization.

The pseudosecurity of radical groups with their claim to personal absoluteness has a very strong attraction, particularly for people with weak egos, or who have difficulties in getting into contact with other people. In such groups, people find their strong desire for community, personal contact, and human, relations satisfied.

One of the main characteristics of the communes and other sympathetic groups toward terrorism is that there is no separation of private and political spheres. In the group not only id there extreme isolation from other political opinions but also a mutual escalation of emotions.

The biographies of several terrorists demonstrate that their identification with certain persons who represent and articulate the ideology and goals of terrorist organizations prepares the ground for, and accelerates the step into, terrorism. These persons serve as a standard or model for those insecure and ego-weak group members who want to be like their idols.

Particular political events or personal traumatic experiences can play a key role on the path leading to the underground.

The death of a terrorist (in this case, after a hunger strike) may be such a key experience.

The fascination felt by sympathizers for spectacular operations carried out by Terrorists may also arouse the desire to join them. A case in point is the successful operation in 1975, when President Lorenz of the West Berlin parliament was kidnapped.

Going underground is a decisive turning point for all terrorists, since they leave their previous lives and start a new existence. But before disappearing into illegality most of the terrorists go through a
phase of semi legality.
- Helpers and sympathizers are of vital importance for terrorists living underground. Terrorist groups could not survive without them in the long run. They are the potential recruits which the underground uses to inject new blood and replace its casualties.
- The transition from the periphery of terrorism, the step from sympathy to direct action, starts with the role of a helper who takes advantage of his legality. The step into terrorism is immediately preceded by logistic errands, which serve as training for illegality.
- The political socialization of terrorists—as a process of permanent self-indoctrination by the group—finally leads to a total loss of reality and a complete miscalculation of the political and social environment.
- It is the clear definition of the enemy that makes terrorist actions legitimate in the eyes and minds of the group.
- By declaring your enemies “nonpersons,” and by denying their human qualities, moral scruples are blocked from the beginning.
- Another pattern in the thinking of urban guerillas is that they are at war with society and, consequently, terrorist actions are nothing else but acts of war. The rigid forms of interaction, latent conflicts, and aggressions within the group must inevitably be diverted to the outside.
- I shall use the term group ideology to describe the system of arguments and justifications, which “as a rule remain immune to falsifying facts” (Fetscher, Muenkler, and Ludwig 1981:29). Group ideology has a twofold function, namely, to give an outward expression of the group’s legitimacy and to act as a means of inner rationalization within the group itself.
- Through group ideology, a purely criminal act is reinterpreted into a “political act”
- Group ideology is a decisive factor in group cohesion. It welds the individuals into a tightly knit community.
- Precisely because group ideology affords terrorists a sense of legitimate and moral justification for their actions—the inhibition to kill is diminished through it and through it alone— it gains as it were a quasi-religious character, with a sacrosanct quality. Doubts are collectively suppressed.
- The chances of leaving a terrorists group are extremely limited, and for most members the prospect is not attractive.
- To leave a group with which one has identified oneself totally for some time and with which one has gone “through thick and thin” represents a tremendous psychological effort, since a break with the group is connected with a loss of identity.
- What is probably the greatest barrier, namely, the sanctions applied by the group itself. Like all conspiracies, secret societies, clandestine alliances, and underground organizations, the cadres of West German terrorist groups have no mercy for “traitors.”
- In all the biographies of terrorists we find the strong desire for community, for a group commitment. In the group they find the sense of security they have long sought. And so it would be no exaggeration to say that terrorists are in many ways “victims of group thinking.”

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This is a philosophical think-page that argues: "if things are not perfect, somebody has to be blamed.) Its essence is best captured in the concluding quote: "the more we clamor for perfection, the more imperfection we create, and the more the fanatic feels justified in his self righteous stance"  
Not intended to provide any practical implications for analysis.

Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article is the latest review of existing studies and literature on the relationship between mental illness and terrorism. Consistent with the others, it concludes there is not a casual connection and that mental illness per se does not produce terrorist behavior. The article goes on to suggest however that involvement in terrorist groups and activities can effect terrorist's mental health. Violent experiences can induce PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). Terrorist group conflict (which may become violent) as well as subjection to interrogation and harsh connections of confinement also can have a negative psychological effect. Beyond a general caveat to consider that negative mental health effects may emerge in terrorist, no operational insights are
Call Number: Key Quote Summary: So far as written work in the social sciences is concerned, political leadership as a topic clearly has persisted as a major subject of inquiry. The literature is so vast that no brief summary could possibly do it justice. Despite the massive attention, however, scholars interested in the study of terrorism have made, as yet, only modest contributions to the prevailing understandings.

-These contributions have been of three types. First, there have been psychologically informed analyses of individual leaders, such as the Croatian nationalist Zvonko Busic. Second, a number of studies, growing out of work on primary groups, have focused on leadership roles in small, clandestine bands and, in particular, on the incentives those playing them provide in sustaining group commitment and cohesion in often-perilous circumstances. Finally, there is some fragmentary information on the social backgrounds and psychological characteristics of leaders and what distinguishes them from other members of terrorist groups. Leaders, it has been learned, are often older and may be more extroverted, narcissistic and hostile than is true for average members.

-As one observer has noted recently: leaders present an interesting and completely uncharted subject group for the study of political leadership and political recruitment.

-Terrorist organizations may be sufficiently unusual so that leadership roles require insignificant predispositions. Instead, it may be the particular group situation or the way in which its members interact with one another that causes certain individuals, for peculiar or idiosyncratic reasons, to emerge as leaders. There is still another possibility: random chance. Since the attrition rate of terrorists due to death or capture is often high, it is conceivable that leadership falls to ordinary members who, up to that point, have evaded arrest but are otherwise indistinguishable from other terrorists.

-Modern terrorist organizations appear to have different types of leadership roles.

-The information we have available has led us to focus the inquiry on two aspects. First, we will investigate the extent to which leader-follower differences within terrorist groups correspond to or deviate from those found within more conventional political organizations. Second, we want to know if a terrorist group’s political ideology, that is, Left versus Right, influences the types of social backgrounds from which its leaders emerge. These matters will be explored within the context of one nation’s recent experience with political terrorism.

-Terrorists of the Left and of the Right have expressed different conceptions of leadership. The neo-Fascists’ view of leadership and the appropriate relationship leaders and led is a highly authoritarian one. In contrast to the value of hierarchy on the far Right and revolutionary Left carried a commitment to a participatory democracy and collective decision-making. Roughly ten percent, were identified as leaders. There were more leftist than neo-Fascists leaders in our compilations, 178 (71 percent) of the former versus 74 of the latter.

-The leaders were predominantly male, a slight majority of whom were under the age of 30 at the time they were apprehended or publicly identified.

-Somewhat more likely to have been born in places which became the sites for the highest incidence of terrorism. Information concerning their parents’ backgrounds is very limited.

-Many were likely to have experienced some geographic mobility in the course of growing up. The kinds of occupations in which they engaged before embarking on careers in terrorism run the gamut (except for agriculture pursuits) from petty street crime to business executive. There were a fair number of students. Over 20 percent of them were reported to have been members of conventional political parties; almost all these involvements were with parties at the far left (Communists) and far right (neo-Fascists, Italian Social Movement) ends of the Italian system. Further, close to half the leaders (48 percent) had belonged to one or another of the extraparliamentary movements that arose in Italy during the late 1960s.

-(14 percent of the total) had family ties to other members of the terrorists groups.

-When we cross-tabulated the various biographical characteristics discussed above by the type of groups to which the leaders belonged, a number of meaningful differences emerged.

-The neo-Fascist leaders were more likely to have been arrested/identified prior to 1977.

-The neo-Fascist leaders were significantly older than the leftist leaders. Specifically, 43 percent of
The neo-Fascists were over 40 years old at this point, versus slightly over nine percent of the leftists. The leftist groups were much likely to have recruited female leaders (18 percent of all leaders) than were the neo-Fascists ones. The latter were reported to have had only a single woman leader (1.4 percent of all leaders).

There were an abundance of students, manual workers, and even a few sub proletarians to be found among the revolutionary leaders. Individuals with these last two experiences were almost totally missing from the neo-Fascist ranks.

The observed intellectual bent of terrorist leadership in general now appears to have been largely a characteristic of the Left. It appears that positions within the leftist leadership were more open to people of diverse backgrounds than was true for the neo-Fascist terrorist elite. There were no meaningful differences in their parents’ religions or occupational backgrounds. And they were no more or less likely to have been related to other terrorists.

There were a variety of ways, however, in which the leaders’ backgrounds did differ from their followers within the same political groups.

- Both age and sex served to distinguish leaders from followers among the neo-Fascists. The latter were substantially younger at the time of their arrest/identification than their leaders. For example, 43 percent of the leaders, but only eight percent of the followers were over the age of 40.
- Neo-Fascist violence had little appeal to women. Nonetheless, close to eight percent of neo-Fascists group members (38 individuals) were females as against only a single person (0.2 percent of total membership) who played a leadership role.
- Over 13 percent of neo-Fascist group members had been manual workers and sub proletarians: none of their leaders were. It is true that the leftist leaders were significantly older than their followers, although the discrepancy was not quite as wide as within the rightist groups. But unlike the neo-Fascists, gender did not serve to discriminate much between leaders and followers. There was only a modest and statistically insignificant difference between the percentage of women (23.6 percent) present among the followers and their representations (18 percent) at leadership levels within these revolutionary organizations.
- Rank and file members of the revolutionary groups were much more likely to have been born in the less developed mezzogiorno, the poor southern regions of Italy, than their leaders.
- Leaders were no more or less likely than ordinary members to have joined a left-wing political party or movement before turning to terrorist violence.
- The leftist leaders, more often than their followers, had been teachers, free professionals and business managers. It seems clear, even in the absence of measurements of psychological predisposition, that leadership is not a matter of random chance. There were various elements in the backgrounds of the leaders which served to distinguish them from their followers.
- In general, the same kinds of backgrounds relevant for the attainment of leadership positions in non-violent political organizations seem to distinguish leaders from followers in terrorist ones.

314. Weinberg, L., & Eubank, W. L. (1977). Italian Women Terrorists. Terrorism and International Journal, 9(3), 241-262. Call Number: Published Abstract: Examined biographical information for 451 women (18% of a sample of 2,512 individuals for whom biographical data were obtained) who were arrested for engaging in or planning acts of political terrorism in Italy between 1970 and 1984. Most of the Ss were involved in leftist organizations; only 10% were involved in neofascist groups, 35% had been students prior to their involvement in terrorism, few had belonged to political parties or trade unions, and 27% had other family members involved in terrorism. Compared to males, females were more likely to become involved in terrorism later, both in terms of the cycle of terrorist activity in Italy and chronological age (CA). Once involved in terrorism, the Ss fulfilled much the same roles as did males. While women were underrepresented in leadership positions, this was largely the result of the dramatic under representation of women at the top of neofascist organizations.

315. Wessells, M. (2002). Terrorism, social injustice, and peace building. C. E. Stout (Ed), The psychology of terrorism: Programs and practices in response and prevention (Vol. IVpp. 57-73). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call Number: Published Abstract: This chapter discusses, from a psychological perspective, how effective the US approach is likely to be in preventing terrorism. The central thesis of this essay is
that the approach is inherently limited because it fails to address the causes of terrorism, which, if
left unattended, are likely to boost anti-US sentiments and produce new generations of terrorists. It
argues that issues of peace building and terrorism prevention are intimately connected and that
policy discussions about terrorism need to be enlarged accordingly. The chapter begins with a sketch
of the psychological atmosphere of the post-September 11 attack environment and analyzes why the
situation lends itself to predominantly military, punitive responses. Although such responses are
valuable, they are too reactive and limited to provide comprehensive terrorism prevention. This
essay attempts to show that the present approach fails to address the sources of terrorism,
particularly issues of social injustice. It suggests that a peace-building focus is needed to
complement the current approach and to construct a comprehensive, psychologically informed
strategy of terrorism prevention.

Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: This article explores apocalyptic theology in
four American extremist religions: Christian Identity; Nordic Christianity and Odinism; violent,
“freewheeling” fundamentalism; and Creatorism. It is argued that violent eschatology interacts with
criminology in the sense that politicized religions produce criminal behavior and, at times, terrorism.
A brief history of the relationship between religion and racist violence is presented as well as an
analysis of the social factors that produce political eschatology. The article concludes with an
examination of religious terrorism and technological weapons. Mass destruction is the greatest
threat of religiously motivated terrorism.

- Religious violence in the name of a holy cause is nothing new on the history of conflict, and
terrorism in the new millennium will be influenced by resurgent fundamentalism and religious
doctrines of violent intolerance. This will be especially true when religious dogmas embrace
eschatological or “end-of-time” theology. The purpose of this article is to explore criminological
aspects of eschatology as it is expressed in domestic, right-wing, racist violence and extremism.
Two methodologies are employed: historical-descriptive analysis and theological explication.
- Religious behavior is a factor that shapes social constructs, and it may be positive or negative,
social or antisocial. The term eschatology derives from the Greek word , a concept dealing with the
end of all material and purpose in time and space.
- The term right-wing religion, as used in this article, refers to belief systems that incorporate some
form of hatred or racism in their basic doctrines. There are four prominent forms of these theologies
in American today: Christian Identity, Nordic Christianity or Odinism, freewheeling
fundamentalism, and Creatorism. These theologies are extremist religions based on the
demonization of other racial, religious, or national groups.
- American right-wing extremism fell out of focus when left-wing violence grew in the 1960s and
1970s, but it experienced a rebirth around 1981. The rejuvenation came as shifting economic
conditions threatened the social status of working-class whites. Sapp (1985) describes the
resurrection in terms of three distinct trends: white supremacy, religious extremism, and survivalism. Federal gun control legislation sent an alarm throughout the extremist right.
- Weaver’s standoff at Ruby Ridge- (ATF) raid on the Branch Davidian compound at Waco, Texas,
in 1993.
- As the extremist movement intertwined racism with religion, common elements appeared in the
message. One of the most prominent features of the extremist right its rejection of modernity.
- Both fundamentalists and extremists tend to be premillenialists
- Another factor emerging from the history of the extremist right is the belief in a conspiracy of evil
forces.
- The most common theme running through the extremist right is anti-Semitism. A final
commonality can be found in the utter endorsement of firearms. Theological commonalities in the extremist right separate the realm of God from the realm of evil.

- Theology creates neither violence nor terrorist behavior, but it can provide an atmosphere that justifies an attack on social structures. Three circumstances must be present to motivate believers to move from thought to violent action: (a) believers must perceive a terminal threat to their religious values and attitudes; (b) a theology embracing cosmic salvation, universal love, or worldly peace must be transformed into a dogma of nationalistic, racial, or some other ethnocentrically based protectionism; and (c) the true believers among the faithful must embrace violence as a means for preserving the faith. When these three circumstances are present, terrorism becomes part of a theological process.

- Marty and Appleby (1991, 1993) argue that the movement toward intolerant fundamentalism is part of an international trend. In a lengthy project that resulted in a five-volume series on fundamentalists religions, Marty and Appleby (1991, pp.vi-xii) find that the retreat to traditional, militant religion is a global phenomenon. They argue that fundamentalism is a defense against forces of change and that people will defend themselves by grabbing the traditions of the past. Religion becomes the glue that provides group identity and cohesion. It copes with a confusing social situation by rejecting all threats. Only the fundamentals are safe; everything else is relegated to the realm of the unholy. Berger (1980, pp. 3-29) makes the same argument from a slightly different vantage point. He argues that the modern world is in collision with traditional values. People cope with this situation in one of three differing ways: rejecting change, coping with change, or seeking new ideologies that preserve tradition within change. Those who reject change may turn to militant protectionism. - For religion to play a dominant role in violence, it is necessary to transform a transcendent message of universality into ethnocentric protectionism.

- Why do some extremists cross the line from rhetoric to violence? H.H.A. Cooper (1977) provides the best answer in one of the early works on modern terrorism. All terrorists must feel justified in their actions, and religious zealots are no different. Cooper (1977) believes that terrorists are motivated by the same factors that influence everyone else, and they look for similar rewards for their behavior.

- Terrorists justify violence by convincing themselves that the injustices of society outweigh the amount of harm caused by their actions. Violence becomes necessary to save society from cosmic evil. Cooper refers to this as the “doctrine of necessity.”

- Religious violence, especially in the form of terrorism, is a result of politicized eschatological expectations.

- In an examination of the apocalyptic paradigm, Berlet (1998) argues that the extremist right’s capacity to restate mythology in terms of a cosmic struggle between good and evil is a prescription for violence.

- Political eschatology is not an abstract theological concept; it is a dangerous reality of the new century.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Research on the motives of those who engage in small group political violence typically takes a qualitative or quantitative form. I argue that researchers should seek to understand why people engage in small group political violence, and that the best way to achieve such understanding is to employ both. The advantages of this approach are discussed in this paper, as is the importance of recognizing that the activities of all actors in any given violent location, including state actors, should be accounted for in research.

- This article draws on the suggestions of others and offers additional suggestions, from a sociological perspective, on how research on why people become involved in small group political violence, ‘terrorism’, may be made more rigorous. My intention is to have students focus more on the methods that they employ and, ultimately, to help generate more valid research findings on a difficult and controversial topic.

- A central tenet of the approach advocated below is that our primary objective should be to understand those who engage in the behavior. It is not our job to condemn, to condone, or to find some objective ‘truth’.

- Instead of focusing on selected events, we need to examine small-group political violence in its entirety, in a specific political arena.
There is a body of literature on the collection of protest event data. Research by Charles Tilly may serve as a model for collecting protest event data. In Tilly’s work are key guidelines for conducting research based on protest events. First, Tilly’s work is longitudinal. Second, Tilly examines collective action in a broader context; for Tilly the state is an actor.

The best research on small group political violence is undertaken by researchers who, on some level, interact with the people being researched.

Research in the violent field is likely to yield better data, and an increased understanding of this kind of political behavior.

To understand why people engage in small group political violence, we should combine qualitative and quantitative approaches.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Authors who address the topic of guerrilla warfare argue that the ability to engage in political violence is predicated upon support from the local population and the capabilities of guerrilla organizations. We examine the applicability of these arguments for modern guerrilla warfare. We find that the provisional Irish Republican Army draws on individual, organizational, and environmental resources, and that the impact of these resources on the IRA has changed over time. Of these resources, the most important appear to be a combination of individual and organizational resources. Organizing into cell structure in 1977 made the IRA dependent on only passive support of the Northern Irish guerrillas guarantees that the IRA maintains this passive support.

-How well do the arguments of rural guerrilla strategist apply to modern urban warfare? Traditional guerrilla statements offer advice to the rural guerrilla noting the importance of several factors for waging political violence. We address these arguments with a case study of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, a modern guerrilla organization with a large urban component to the violence it perpetrates. We consider the different kinds of resources that are available to urban-based groups engaging in political violence, and then we examine the impact of these resources of the IRA’s campaign.

-The experiences of rural-based guerrillas suggest that waging political violence requires three different types of resources: individual, organizational, and environmental.

-Individual or personal resources are internal to guerrillas and cannot be shared by others. The literature on guerrilla warfare identifies three key personal resources that affect the individual-level abilities of guerrillas: adaptability, political awareness, and internal support networks.

-Organizational resources are beyond direct individual control, and affect individual guerrillas equally. William Gamson identifies organizational features that enhance the ‘combat readiness’ of social movement organizations.

-Centralized power structures limit the development of internal conflict in challenging groups, and make it less likely that a challenging group will experience the severe problem of fractionalization.

-Organizational flexibility, or ‘tactile innovation’, will be an important resource for guerrilla organizations.

-Environmental resources are also beyond individual control and affect social movement members equally. As we view them, environmental resources are similar to the macro mobilization resources of social movements that Charley Tilly describes, for example, funds available from external sources or the political opportunity structure that a social movement faces.

-Guerrilla careers are typically shortened by two events, death and capture. Both outcomes terminate guerrilla involvement, and both are costly for guerrilla organizations. We employ three indicators of the ability of guerrillas to wage political violence: (1) the length of individual guerrilla careers, (2) the yearly rate at which IRA guerrillas are killed, and (3) the yearly rate at which IRA guerrillas are arrested.

-The literature on guerrilla warfare suggests four resources that significantly influence the careers of individual guerrillas: support from the local population, physical dexterity and adaptability, interpersonal support networks, and political awareness.

-We consider three dimensions of the resource ‘support from the local population.’ One dimension is the ‘benign neutrality’, or passive acceptance, of the guerrilla by the local population. A second dimension is active support for the guerrilla from the local population. The third dimension is
geographical, and we consider it in our analysis of guerrilla careers.

-Our geographic measure of support from the local population is based on the size of the different Nationalist areas which Belfast guerrillas are based.

-Our indicator of adaptability and physical dexterity is the age of the guerrilla at the time of his or her recruitment into active service.

-Our indicators of interpersonal support networks is the martial status of each volunteer.

-Individual-level resources help guerrillas carry out their duties. Guerrillas do not operate in a vacuum, however they are members of organizations and they and their organizations exist in changing and hostile environments.


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This article draws on two key social-psychological concepts: Social identity (the component of one's self-concept that comes form membership in a group and characteristics shared with other members) on role identity (the component of self concept that locates the individual within the group and distinguishes him/her from others) Drawing from secondary analyses of activists accounts, the remainder of the article examines specific subgroups in the conflict, specifying whether social identities focus more on nationalism or religion and whether their view of the conflict is "us versus them" or "them versus them"


Call Number: Editor's Annotation: These justifications echo the rationale used by jihadi Salafis during the civil war in Algeria, which could foreshadow the future direction of al-Qaeda operations. During the conflict between the government and Islamists rebels, jihadi groups massacred civilians, assassinated public personalities (including Berber singers, feminist leaders and academics), and targeted members of the press. Between 1996 and 1998, civilians were killed en masse in a directed and purposeful strategy of total war that eventually claimed more than 150,000 lives (mostly civilians). The rationale used to justify these killings represents a chilling precursor to the 2002 al-Qaeda document.

As in the al-Qaeda justification, the jihadis in Algeria broadened the understanding of combat to include any individual or group seen as complicit in the regime's counterinsurgency efforts against the Islamists. In an interview with al-Djamaa, which claimed to represent the "official voice of the GIA in the West," GIA chief Abu al-Moudhir argued that civilians who fought against the jihad by "force, talk or with the pen" were legitimate targets, reflecting a doctrine of total war. As a GIA communiqué put it, "There is no neutrality in the war we are waging. With the exception of those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserve to die."

This Manichaean worldview condemned broad swathes of the civilian population to death. Reporters and the press were attacked as extensions of the regime used to "cover its crimes and rationalize its aggression." The jihadis supported killing those "who do not pray, who drink alcohol and take drugs, homosexuals, and immodest or debauched women." Seven Trappist monks were beheaded for "mixing with [the Algerian people], living with them, and blocking the way of Allah by calling people to Christianity, and these are the worst ways of fighting the religion of Allah and Muslims." Even children attending government-controlled schools were not immune to violence. The scope of the violence was startling, and no quarter of society was immune from attack.

Given the stark parallels between the justifications for killing civilians in Algeria and the 2002 al-Qaeda document, the Algerian conflict may portend the future direction of al-Qaeda operations. Algerian jihadis attacked civilians with machetes, burned people alive, and slit throats in a brutal violence rationalized through broad categorization of legitimate civilian targets. The murder of reporter Daniel Pearl, whose throat was slit by al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, mirrors the brutality of the Algerian campaign. Al-Qaeda has thus far relied mostly on bombs and planes, but it is clear from the 2002 document that the echoes of Algeria could become louder as the jihadis continue to expand their war against U.S. civilians.

321. Wilson, M. (2003). The psychology of hostage-taking. A. Silke (Ed), Terrorist, victims, and society:
Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequence (pp. 55-76). London: John Wiley. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: This chapter by Margaret Wilson explores how research in clinical and social psychology might contribute to understanding and managing terrorist hostage-takings. She structures the analysis with a useful framework for explicating “stages” of a hostage-taking incident (Pre-event; Initiation; Holding; Negotiation; Closure; and Post-Event) and what psychological research might offer at each stage. It includes suggestions from prevention (hostage avoidance/survival training) to tertiary care (post-incident debriefing). There are discussion of profiling and prediction, the Stockholm Syndrome, and the dynamics of negotiation. It provides a concise review of the limited available research, but does not address much about what may be unique about terrorist (as opposed to non-terrorist) hostage takings.

322. Wolman, B. B. (1982). Psychology of followers of terrorist groups. International Journal of Group Tensions, 12, 105-121. Call Number: Editor's Annotations: Speaker acknowledges having very little knowledge or experience on the topic. Sees terrorism in two categories: Sociopath (without conscience) and paranoid schizophrenics. Terroristic behavior involves "suspension of the superego." SOS students came from middle and upper class population and had higher than average student income. Digresses into speculation that society is to blame for giving young people "nothing to believe in." No review of research or any substantive information on the topic is provided.

323. Zawodny, J. K. (1978). Internal organizational problems and the sources of tension of terrorist movements as catalysts of violence. Terrorism, 3/4, 277-285. Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this article, Zawodny asks three main questions: What is the main characteristic of terrorist organizations that affects their infrastructure (i.e., internal organizational structure)?; What does the infrastructure look like?; How does this infrastructure affect the behavior of terrorists, on the analytical level of group dynamics? He finds the primary characteristic is small size. He argues that nature of the infrastructure is centrifugal with the leader at the center surrounded by members kept in range of direct control (he uses analogy of a solar system). He then identifies several patterns of behavior that flow from this structure: (1) the leader is not just a catalyst, but also a participant in actions; (2) centrifugal system secures more direct and rapid communication; (3) direct access to the leader increases tactical flexibility to deploy against targets of opportunity; (4) centrifugal systems develop more quickly and exist easily apart from societal supports; (5) direct access to the leader allows members to identify with his power and charisma; (6) leader is directly involved in selection and recruitment; (7) centrifugal groups seek alliances with other groups that they can dominate and manipulate; (8) centrifugal systems are more resistant to bureaucratic “bloating” in which incompetence is promoted; (9) in centrifugal groups, the leader has much more direct control of his members; (10) like hierarchical groups, leaders use the stress of external threat to keep the group together. This is an innovative effort to do a systematic analysis from secondary sources using the group as the unit of observation. One of the major limitations is that the infrastructure of contemporary terrorist organizations has changed substantially. Zawodny’s thesis, though, that structure can affect members’ behavior is important to bear in mind.

324. Zisser, E. (1996). Hizballah in Lebanon at the crossroads. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8(2), 90-110. Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Authors Abstract: Hizballah, the Party of God, burst onto the Lebanese scene in a whirlwind of violence at the end of 1983. Since then, it has become a power with considerable clout in the Shi‘i community of Lebanon. At the end of the 1980s it reached the height of its strength when it gained control of most parts of the Shi‘i concentrations in Lebanon. However since then, Hizballah has faced a series of challenges which threaten its continued activity, if not its very existence, including the Ta‘if agreement, the Middle East peace process and Iran’s increasing inability to support Hizballah. In the face of these challenges, Hizballah appears pragmatic, willing, it seems to abandon its goals, at least for the time being. This however, raises a key question: Can the organization truly change course and turn away from the ideological commitment and path of violence that have characterized it to date? Or do those aspects indeed define the organization? It is still early to lay odds on the organization’s future, but it seems that it may be in jeopardy.
-The violence struggle against the West, and particularly Israel, has since become one of the hallmarks of Hizballah activity.
-A survey of the factors that lead to the organization’s emergence lays bare one of the central dilemmas with which it has had to contend since its inception. Hizballah owes a certain debt to Iran for the support it has provided in establishing and sustaining the organization.
-Hizballah’s emergence was overshadowed by two cataclysmic events that took place in the Middle East at about the same time, events which facilitated the organization’s establishment and early activity and which may also explain the radical militant nature which characterized it from its start.
-The first of these was the Islamic revolution in Iran, which quickly became a source of inspiration and a role model for Shi’i religious leaders in Lebanon. The second critical event to influence Hizballah’s development was the Lebanon War of June 1982.
-Since its emergence as a political power in Lebanon, Hizballah has had to confront the central dilemma of its purpose and goals.
-From the beginning of its activity, Hizballah endeavored to construct itself an image of an organization based on broad and even spontaneous support within Lebanon. Nevertheless, one of the characteristics of the organization’s growth was the establishment of a hierarchical organizational infrastructure, similar in many ways to the model set by the Iranian revolution.
-The apparent contradiction between Hizballah’s true long term objectives and the mantle of moderation and pragmatism with which it cloaks itself is reflected in the internal conflict between those who are more radical. This conflict bears witness to Hizballah leaders’ awareness of the fact that organization does not function in a vacuum, but within the confines of the Lebanese reality which imposes certain restrictions on its freedom of action. The following factors come into play. First, Lebanese society is not homogeneous, but rather a mosaic of communities. Second, the Shi’i of the eastern shore of the Mediterranean (the ‘Levant’) have always been a small minority among a hostile Sunni population.
-Hizballah does not enjoy majority support even among the Shi’i community. Most studies show that, at most, a hard core 20-25 percent of the community supports Hizballah with Amal favored by more than 30 percent.
-The civil war was kind neither to the Maronites nor to the Sunnis. First with respect to demographics, during the war years the Shi’i community grew to be the largest in Lebanon, constituting, as of early 1995, approximately 35 percent of the country’s population. Second, with respect to the political and military aspects, toward the end of the war the Maronites and Sunnis were left without external support and protection.
-It would appear that in the long run, Hizballah’s decision to take part in Lebanese politics may force the organization to reconcile itself with the Ta’if agreement.
-Hizballah leaders have begun laying the ideological foundations for a shift from the violent struggle for power which has thus far characterized the organization to a political battle based on moderation and pragmatism within the general framework of Lebanon’s political system.

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