

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 31-10-2008		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Time for a New Dance Partner: Phase Zero Engagement of NGOs in PACOM's Security Cooperation Plan				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Bernard P. Wang Paper Advisor: Professor David Carrington				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Our national strategy envisions the preservation of human dignity and humanitarian assistance as a strategic objective. The U.S. military increasingly finds itself the executive agent in this humanitarian strategy. The strategy recognizes that human suffering and systemic breakdowns in a state's ability to provide for human needs is a security matter we cannot ignore. Although U.S. military forces have always played a pivotal role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, they tend to be ad hoc in nature or brief. Addressing humanitarian conditions requires a long-term commitment that the military alone cannot fill. The military is not the only player in this strategy; there is the interagency as well as a number of international, private, and non-governmental actors. These actors provide the long-term solution in the humanitarian sphere. This paper examines the changing dynamics of humanitarian assistance and the nature of NGO-military interaction in the context of the rising trend of non-traditional security threats replacing traditional threats. This paper will recommend the incorporation of NGOs as a part of Pacific Command's Security Cooperation Plan phase zero shaping activities to address long-term humanitarian needs the U.S. and NGO community are after.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Nongovernmental Organizations, NGOs, Pacific Command, PACOM, Security Cooperation Plan					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
c. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			Chairman, JMO Dept
				25	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Time for a New Dance Partner:
Phase Zero Engagement of NGOs in PACOM's Security Cooperation Plan**

by

Bernard P. Wang

Commander, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

31 October 2008

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Strategic Imperative for Humanitarian Engagement	1
Military Humanitarian Operations During Phase Zero Shaping Operations	3
Soft Power Alone is Not the Answer	3
Smart Power Requires Non-traditional Partners	6
NGOs Are Present and Will Remain Long After the Military Leaves	7
NGOs and Military Conflict over “Humanitarian Space”	8
Military Operations and Their Impact on Humanitarian Space	10
The Odd Couple Needs Each Other	12
The Odd Couple Must Respect Each Other	14
The Odd Couple May Need a Chaperon	15
Conclusions and Recommendations	15
Endnotes and Bibliography	18

Abstract

Our national strategy envisions the preservation of human dignity and humanitarian assistance as a strategic objective. The U.S. military increasingly finds itself the executive agent in this humanitarian strategy. The strategy recognizes that human suffering and systemic breakdowns in a state's ability to provide for human needs is a security matter we cannot ignore. Although U.S. military forces have always played a pivotal role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, they tend to be ad hoc in nature or brief. Addressing humanitarian conditions requires a long-term commitment that the military alone cannot fill. The military is not the only player in this strategy; there is the interagency as well as a number of international, private, and non-governmental actors. These actors provide the long-term solution in the humanitarian sphere. This paper examines the changing dynamics of humanitarian assistance and the nature of NGO-military interaction in the context of the rising trend of non-traditional security threats replacing traditional threats. This paper will recommend the incorporation of NGOs as a part of Pacific Command's Security Cooperation Plan phase zero shaping activities to address long-term humanitarian needs the U.S. and NGO community are after.

Introduction

The list of essential tasks outlined in the National Security Strategy mentioned "champion aspirations for human dignity," and "transform America's security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century."¹ Similar language is contained in the current Maritime Strategy that suggests American military forces will conduct more humanitarian assistance missions to meet new 21st Century challenges.² The U.S. military has always engaged in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, although being a champion for human dignity is not a traditional use of the military. Humanitarian aid and development are the traditional work of the Department of State and the many International Governmental Organizations (IGO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). This paper will focus on transnational NGOs involved with humanitarian assistance and development efforts in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although this thesis is applicable to all combatant commands, the paper will focus on the PACOM AOR. The presence of military forces conducting humanitarian operations as part of phase zero shaping operations requires ongoing engagement of NGOs in the theater as part of the Security Cooperation Plan in order to achieve unity of effort and to facilitate the effective and efficient accomplishment of our humanitarian objectives.

The Strategic Imperative for Humanitarian Engagement

The National Security Strategy of 2006 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that same year introduced the idea of addressing issues of human dignity and humanitarian engagement as part of our national objectives.³ Humanitarian engagement has always been a feature of U.S. military activities, but now it has a strategic framework to guide its application.⁴ The humanitarian element of our strategic objective and its purpose is in the 2007 Maritime

Strategy where it states, "We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars."⁵

While it is important to the U.S. strategic objective, NGOs may view U.S. military participation as eroding their humanitarian charter, especially when conducted where there is no active conflict in which the U.S. is a party.

The QDR called for the military to conduct humanitarian engagement because "alleviation of suffering and responding to crisis in their early stages will not only demonstrate the goodwill of the United States but also the spiraling effects of these events into conflict or crisis."⁶ The motivation for military engagement in humanitarian crises is determined by orders from civilian leadership.⁷ The core competency of the military is winning wars. Although the DOD has been providing humanitarian assistance as part of its operations, it is the job of various agencies, especially the Department of State and USAID to render humanitarian assistance.

The continued participation of the military in humanitarian engagements is causing a great deal of concern within the NGO community.⁸ Nevertheless, despite the concerns from the humanitarian community, until it is changed, the United States will make humanitarian engagements a central part of its foreign policy. This trend, although alarming for the humanitarian community, should not be seen as a threat. It should be seen as an opportunity for the two to come together to address interrelated issues of development and human security. The military and NGOs bring capabilities that complement each other, especially during peacetime operations. It is through unity of effort that both achieve their strategic objectives effectively and efficiently. In order for the nation to "achieve the social, political, and economic goals to which they are committed they must effectively engage with civil-military partners -- including NGOs, aid organizations, and commercial firms outside of the DOD enterprise. Such engagement is not

a nice-to-have adjunct to the kinetic phases of war; it must be a core part of national and military strategy."⁹

Military Humanitarian Operations During Phase Zero Shaping Operations

The military has been executing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions around the world in recent years and especially in the PACOM AOR. These are generally phase-zero humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions under the Security Cooperation Plan (SCP). These activities are often characterized as the exercise of "soft power." Most in the humanitarian community would rather see civilian and civil governmental organizations exercise soft power, while military institutions do not participate at all.

PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan¹⁰ places the center of focus on building capacity with allies and partner nations through the military. The nature of the NGO community's work within the theater is important to the accomplishment of the humanitarian objective of our strategy. The NGO community is one powerful partner we cannot overlook. In order to apply power to influence nations and events, the U.S. military must be open to non-traditional partners.

Soft Power Alone is Not the Answer

To understand soft power, we must understand "power." According to Armitage and Nye, "power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability."¹¹ "Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion."¹² While power to influence can be gained by force, to use soft power, the nation trying to exercise this power must have legitimacy:

Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes. Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to and the costs of using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others'

values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.¹³

It is conceivable that whenever you have uniforms and weapons in a mission, the people to whom we are directing our efforts may conclude that the military lack legitimacy to carry out humanitarian goals and objectives. This is the predominate view of the humanitarian community and some in our targeted populations. It is a paradox to be a "Peace Corps with Guns."¹⁴

U.S. foreign policy is still struggling to develop soft power instruments, especially when the center of gravity is the "hearts and minds" of a people. Diplomatic tools and foreign assistance are often directed toward states, which increasingly compete for power with non-state actors within their borders. In the cases where governance is weak, these non-state actors may be providing the very humanitarian services states are supposed to do.¹⁵

While soft power instruments are often lacking, the civilian institutions are still the lead providers of it, not the military. This is often not the case. According to the CSIS' report on Smart Power, "the reality is that the U.S. military is the best-trained and resourced arm of the federal government. Therefore, it is often called upon to fill the voids, even when it should be filled by other agencies."¹⁶ There are appropriate uses of the military in the execution of the United States' "soft power." The military was central in the response to the 2004 tsunami and the Pakistani earthquake. "It should come as no surprise that some of the best-funded and most appreciated soft power tools have been humanitarian operations carried out by the U.S. military... since these operations produced results that were clear, measurable, and unassailable."¹⁷

Military presence in peacetime humanitarian engagements has been described by traditional humanitarian sectors as the "securitization of aid." This is reflected in new military doctrine, strategy, organization, and approaches on the ground. It affects civilian aid agencies

and budget priorities by decreasing their impact. A leading critic of this practice is OXFAM International.

The US government is asking soldiers not just to fight and win wars, but to prevent wars from happening and to rebuild countries afterward. New military doctrine embraces “Phase Zero,” in which soldiers are expected to provide capacity building to partner nations to help them prevent or limit conflicts, efforts traditionally labeled as “diplomacy” or “development assistance.” Evolving US military strategy contends that development is essential to winning the wars of the 21st century and that the military has a key role to play in development.¹⁸

The increased participation of the military in human security matters from disaster and humanitarian response to phase zero shaping activities result in more civilian agencies getting caught in military efforts. They are recruited under the concept of unity of effort and essentially became players in the greater War on Terror. OXFAM International, in their report "Smart Development" said of USAID:

This trend is seen in the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) current strategic plan, which focuses on counterterrorism; weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons; security cooperation and security sector reform; conflict prevention, mitigation, and response; and transnational crime. These activities are a far call from building schools and health clinics, helping farmers break into new markets, strengthening public-private partnerships, and other such efforts that have been the hallmark of USAID.¹⁹

In the context of PACOM AOR, the U.S. is not the only player in the “soft power” game. China and India have realized that it is important to have soft power as well. This may be due to their economic interests, but may also reflect a desire to take their seats as global powers. China has both strengthened its hard power resources while expanding its soft power influence.²⁰

According to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, China's soft power campaign will continue to grow. However, this should not be a potential ground for Sino-American conflict over global influence. China's soft power may be limited by its own internal factors, but there

are also a number of areas that U.S. and China have mutual interests. Areas such as energy security and environmental management are good examples. "China can only become preeminent if the United States continues to allow its own powers of attraction to atrophy."²¹

Smart Power Requires Non-traditional Partners

Given the strategic importance of human security, soft power alone may not be the right instrument. The lack of resources in other agencies has resulted in the military executing more of the nation's soft power than they like. Additionally, the military may often lack the legitimacy to exercise soft power, especially outside of disaster response. A new paradigm is necessary. A new direction has been proposed and gaining traction as a priority. It is the use of "smart power" in the international arena.

Smart power is neither hard nor soft--it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action.²²

Smart power requires an understanding of what is to be done, to whom the power is directed, the broader and global context, and finally, an understanding of all the tools to be used as well as how and when to deploy them individually or in combination.²³

Smart Power is based on three main principles. First, America's standing in the world is important to our security and prosperity. Second, today's challenges can only be addressed with capable and willing allies and partners. Finally, civilian tools and not military can increase the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of U.S. Government policies. This is why there should be a new strategy where hard power is combined with soft power to influence the behavior of the others to get a desired outcome.²⁴

What is the purpose of smart power? The CSIS Report on Smart Power summed it best:

The United States can become a smarter power by investing in the global good--providing services and policies that people and governments want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership. This means support for international institutions, aligning our country with international development, promoting public health, increasing interactions of our civil society with others, maintaining an open international economy, and dealing seriously with climate change and energy insecurity.²⁵

The military must work with other institutions and partners in order to be part of the “smart power” solution to 21st Century problems. It is critical to bring in partners who are dedicated to long-term development. The NGO community fills this role.

NGOs Are Present and Will Remain Long After the Military Leaves

The above phrase comes from the recently issued U.S. Army “Stability Operations” manual.²⁶ It is a good way to sum up one of the critical characteristics of humanitarian NGOs. This is the reason why the NGO community is a critical player in the delivery of smart power and the execution of our human security strategic objective.

NGOs adhere to a strict set of principles that includes every human being has the right to humanitarian assistance when affected by a natural or man-made disaster. They also believe in independence of action, which means that an NGO cannot knowingly allow themselves to be used by governments or other groups for non-humanitarian purposes. The final principle is impartiality in providing assistance according to need and no other factors.²⁷ NGO's approach to development and humanitarian assistance requires them to acquire a deep understanding of local societies, make a long-term commitment, employ largely local staff, and design projects with community participation and cultural sensitivity to ensure sustainability.²⁸

It has been suggested that NGOs augment the military force on the ground, but that is a wrong conclusion because it compromises their humanitarian principles. "The military, therefore,

should not consider NGOs as ‘force extenders’ or assume their cooperation, and should leave development and most humanitarian response to NGOs as much as possible.”²⁹

To the NGOs, the military may be a necessary partner in crisis humanitarian assistance and disaster response, but the military is detrimental in long-term humanitarian engagement and development projects. "...because of its security focus and lack of specialized expertise. Well-intended projects may have negative consequences and are often unsustainable due to the military’s short-term goals and high turnover. Relief activities by the military also compromise the security of NGO staff in or near conflict areas by blurring the lines between humanitarian and military personnel.”³⁰

The NGO community's reluctance to accept military participation does not extend only to the U.S. military. They are as adverse to the military forces of the host nation that they work. They view any military presence as a threat to their core principles.³¹ In order to have successful NGO-Military interaction, one key issue must be resolved.

NGOs and Military Conflict over “Humanitarian Space”

There are cultural differences between the NGO community and the military, but the biggest and the source of conflict is not ideologies, but competition over the notion of "humanitarian space." The NGO community is threatened as the U.S. military participates more in humanitarian assistance and development during phase zero operation especially in the PACOM AOR and Africa.

What makes this clash more difficult is that there is no clear and agreed upon definition of “humanitarian space.” "The confusion is based on the term ‘humanitarian,’ which is used to describe a military intervention as well as medical assistance to wounded people in the middle of

a conflict."³² One author tried to define this concept of humanitarian space and it seems to be the best in the context of NGOs and military forces.

“Humanitarian space” means the access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet humanitarian needs. Humanitarian actors are guided by the principles of humanity, which requires the preservation of the humanitarian nature of operations. They are also guided by the principle of independence, which requires independence from political and military actors. Impartiality is a key principle that requires humanitarian action to respond to need without discrimination. Finally, humanitarian actors are guided by the concept of neutrality that requires them to avoid giving military or political advantage to any side over another.³³

Put another way, humanitarian space “can only work if there is unhindered access to people in danger; independent evaluation of their needs; independent and impartial distribution of aid according to the level of need; and independent impact monitoring.”³⁴

From the majority NGO perspective, military intervention can never be classified humanitarian. The military follows political objectives. The military cannot adhere to the principle of impartiality and independence. Calling military interventions “humanitarian” confuses the situation. The presence of the sometimes-divergent objectives of giving aid between NGO and military in the same conflict or relief area poses significant danger for NGOs and erodes their humanitarian space.³⁵

Some NGOs would rather find other ways to render aid than to work with the military. The current trend of military participation in humanitarian assistance and development makes it inevitable that NGOs and military work in the same physical space. The goal of both humanitarian NGOs and the military is preservation of human security, and the military must respect NGO humanitarian space. This should be done before the military embarks on any humanitarian mission. “NGOs recognize that communication is mutually beneficial when conducted in a neutral space.”³⁶

Military Operations' Impact on Humanitarian Space

In order to solve the issue of preservation of humanitarian space for the NGO, we must understand how a military force affects the humanitarian space in the context of disaster response and of long-term humanitarian assistance and development during phase zero shaping activities. Civilian leadership gives the motivation for military engagement in humanitarian crises.³⁷ There is a causal link between military participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and accomplishing national objectives. "The latest evidence of recognition of a connection for this can be found in the U.S. military role following the 2004 tsunami and 2005 Kashmir earthquake, when major American military support helped prompt surges in public approval of the United States in key Muslim-majority states."³⁸

"Militaries have a clear advantage over civilian agencies when it comes to the quick delivery of logistical, air and water transport, and engineering services. These are most effective when coordinated with civilian expertise, which can be found at USAID, the UN and NGOs."³⁹ Civilian leadership favors military responses in cases of disaster relief because these missions carry fewer political complications.⁴⁰ It is for these reasons that militaries end up in disaster response.

Despite the clear advantages the military brings, the NGOs still view this participation to be contentious. "Many civilian observers worry that U.S. military involvement threatens the principles of neutrality that are supposed to guide humanitarian response, and many in the military remain uneasy about taking on a role outside the traditional war-fighting mandate."⁴¹

To the NGO community, the presence of the U.S. and other military forces erodes their humanitarian space. Their neutrality and their freedom to assess the situation and deliver aid impartially are affected. Many will argue that the advantage the U.S. military brings in the area of disaster relief outweighs the cost in humanitarian space. This may be a very strong argument

for military intervention, but if the efforts are not coordinated, the military may cause more harm than good. "An improvement in perceptions towards the U.S. following relief operations will result only if the aid produces tangible results. Showing up is vital, but providing concrete aid that improves lives is paramount."⁴² If NGOs and responding military forces conflict over the manner that aid is given, it may be more detrimental than good.

NGOs may view U.S. military participation in disaster relief missions as eroding their humanitarian space, but it is more objectionable when the U.S. military humanitarian engagement is done as part of phase zero shaping operations. The QDR called for the military to conduct humanitarian engagement because "alleviation of suffering and responding crisis in their early stages will not only demonstrate the goodwill of the United States but also the spiraling effects of these events into conflict or crisis."⁴³ Globalization is the main driving force behind the need to conduct more engagements to address human security. This is necessary in order to prevent or limit the spread of non-traditional security threats. "As the incidence of natural disasters intensifies and demonstrates links to political crises, broader potential consequences for global stability will become apparent. In short, the nature of humanitarian crises in the future will force an expansion of the traditional concept of security to encompass humanitarian threats, implicating a role for the military in both natural and political crises."⁴⁴

What drives U.S. interests in humanitarian engagements is the idea that problems need to be contained early in order to prevent conflict or wars. It is desirable to have the military render aid in all areas of human suffering, but the engagement envisioned by the QDR and other national strategies are those in areas where conflict is present either in the form of insurgencies within partner nations or in peacekeeping missions. This is the main complaint of the NGO community regarding the shrinking of their humanitarian space. When the military injects itself

on a conflict situation, NGOs feel their very security threatened. "NGOs rely on perceived impartiality and the trust of the communities they work in for their security. In conflict situations, NGO staff will generally keep their distance from the military unless deemed necessary to address civilian needs. This should not be viewed as hostility to the military, but as a necessary and vital measure for security."⁴⁵

The Odd Couple Need Each Other

General Shalikashvili once said, "What's the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs... that might have been working in a crisis torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."⁴⁶ Exercise of smart power requires the nation to look at how we combine our hard and soft powers to influence others. However, the challenges, especially those coming from non-traditional security threats, require partnership beyond just those of States and institutions of state.

These challenges put a premium on strengthening capable states, alliances, partnerships, and institutions. In this complex and dynamic world of changing demands, we greatly benefit from having help in managing problems. But we can no longer afford to see the world through only a state's narrow perspective. Statehood can be a fiction that hides dangers lurking beneath. We need new strategies that allow us to contend with non-state actors and new capabilities to address faceless threats--like energy insecurity, global financial instability, climate change, pandemic disease that know no borders. We need methods and institutions that can adapt to new sources of power and grievance almost certain to arise.⁴⁷

The NGO has to take advantage of the military in this new threat environment in order to be successful. Especially true is the military's expeditionary capabilities to deliver essential relief to inaccessible areas. For the military, it is just as important to participate in order to get the public approval from the impact of assistance in the "hearts and mind" campaign.⁴⁸

The military can avail themselves of the unique capabilities of the NGO because of their nature to work within communities. They are valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes.⁴⁹ This is an area where the military is weak. In order to have long-term impact, the military must either invest in developing this area or leverage the abilities of the NGOs. This partnership exists in both the country level as well as the theater-strategic level. Reports have said even when field forces have good working relationships with in-country NGOs, there may still be conflicts at the higher headquarters level. Therefore, it is critically to have the field forces as well as headquarters planners understand and work with NGOs.⁵⁰

Combatant Commanders are responsible for engaging the nations within their area of responsibility through execution of the Security Cooperation Plan (SCP). The PACOM SCP aims to, among other things, improve partner nations' ability to address problems involving human security and non-traditional threats. The NGO community is also trying to influence their host governments through influencing the people they serve to advocate for stronger institutions.

Under the Hyogo Protocol, an international strategy for enabling nations and communities to address disasters, "each State has the primary responsibility for its own sustainable development and for taking effective measures to reduce disaster risk, including for the protection of people on its territory, infrastructure and other national assets from the impact of disasters. At the same time, in the context of increasing global interdependence, concerted international cooperation and an enabling international environment are required to stimulate and contribute to developing the knowledge, capacities and motivation needed for disaster risk reduction at all levels."⁵¹

21st Century threats are more likely to come from non-traditional sources than traditional ones. Therefore, the prevention of them must be a combination of State action and transnational

coordinated action. Most states in developing nations are following a state-centric model of protecting human security, and with the exception of a few, the NGO is the only transnational actor that has some regional view of the problem.⁵² All non-traditional security threats have the potential to become much larger transnational catastrophes. "Complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) are human-made crises and natural disasters requiring an international response that extends beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and that include a military element for purposes of civilian safety, relief security, or logistical expertise."⁵³

The goal of both the SCP and NGO community is to enable local governments to effectively respond to human security threats. The military's mission is to enable partner and allied nations' military to conduct effective foreign internal defense and disaster response. The goal of the NGO community is to ensure that through advocacy and grassroots action that the local governments are able to provide for the human welfare within their borders. Not every humanitarian crisis will involve the U.S. military. The host nations have responsibility for domestic disaster response and internal defense. One of their key partners is the NGO community within their borders. Therefore, PACOM must ensure through its SCP engagements with partner nations include building the capacity for host militaries to respect and protect the humanitarian space of the NGOs. It is also critical that through U.S. military-to-military engagements that host nation militaries learn to work with NGO in disaster relief.

The Odd Couple Must Respect Each Other

In recent years, we have seen the NGO-military synergy at work. The 2004 tsunami was such a case. Despite the extensive human tragedy, the NGO-Military team was able to prevent more destruction and deaths in the days that followed. "Two things became clear very quickly. First, the military can work with NGOs when they share a common purpose. After all, who is in favor

of a tsunami? Second, the U.S. military has capacities that no other organization in the world can match."⁵⁴

In addition to sharing common purposes, the military and NGO must respect the objectives of the other. The military must ensure that the impact to NGO humanitarian space is minimized and the NGO must understand the military needs to meet a broader strategic goal of threat and conflict reduction. This goal sometimes cannot be done without military participation.

The Odd Couple May Need a Chaperon

When the military and NGO are engaged in humanitarian actions, the military involvement should be approved by civilian agencies and activities should be coordinated and led by civilians. Inside a country, the ambassador should be the lead and USAID consulted. The most important of these recommendations is that clear and specific security and development objectives are understood before undertaking any of these projects.⁵⁵

Conclusion and Recommendations

Preservation of human security throughout the PACOM AOR should be a PACOM end state. An important objective is to engage NGOs as key partners with common humanitarian goals. PACOM is the appropriate theater for this process because of the mature nature of the relationship between PACOM and the NGO community. PACOM has been working with NGOs in response to disasters and in phase zero engagements. Building on experiences from the 2004 tsunami, the Pakistan earthquake and the USNS MERCY deployment, PACOM has demonstrated that it can work with in-country NGOs. Now the focus should be at the theater level to ensure that long-term humanitarian assistance and development can be effective and efficient. PACOM forces have a great deal of capabilities that will complement the NGOs in disaster relief. NGOs have the long-term vision and endurance required to accomplish

development. When both PACOM and NGO community planners can work together, the U.S. and NGOs can influence change and improve human conditions. Although it may never be possible to achieve unity of command with NGOs, unity of effort is critical to the execution of the national strategy.

There are several recommendations that will enhance this engagement. The first is to leverage the existing institutions within PACOM. The Center of Excellence in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response is a place for NGOs and military planners to come together and learn about the other, just as International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a powerful tool for security cooperation.

A second suggestion is to include NGO participation in the planning of international exercise scenarios that involve humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Through this effort, partner nations and PACOM forces can gain an understanding of how to preserve humanitarian space for the NGOs.

Third, PACOM and NGOs have to work together to address non-traditional threats in the region. NGOs can provide the local context to help PACOM planners prevent threats from turning into crises through phase zero engagements. This process is described as "integrated operational mapping and early warning" and it is designed to combine "a variety of tools in order to anticipate and distribute responsibilities in vulnerable situations before a crisis occurs. These tools focus on identifying potential geographic, socioeconomic, and human risks in areas of recognized vulnerability. This approach requires the participation of official relief providers (i.e., those under government or UN control), as well as corporate partners."⁵⁶

Once threats are identified, PACOM and NGOs can work together to identify series of actions, responsibilities and relationships to address any human security crisis within the theater.

In CSIS's report "Responding to Catastrophes," the author proposed the creation of a matrix based on the probability of crises in identified zones of vulnerability and developed by relevant governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. Activities on this matrix would include clear responsibilities for activities such as information sharing, joint response assessments, coordination of logistics support and other coordination matters. Furthermore, these responses and scenarios can be incorporated into regional theater security cooperation exercises to involve local governments and to help allied and partner militaries preserve the humanitarian space for NGOs to function.⁵⁷

There are organizational efforts to bridge the cultural differences between the military and NGO communities. InterAction, a major NGO consortium based in Washington, has investigated practical approaches to the military for the humanitarian sector, culminating in a recent set of guidelines on NGO-military interactions. Although these guidelines generally apply to military and NGO interaction in conflict areas, there are a few recommendations that apply at the theater level.⁵⁸ The most important recommendation is that clear and specific security and development objectives should be made before undertaking any of these projects.⁵⁹ The guidelines also contemplate NGOs establish liaison offices close to the military headquarters to facilitate daily contact and information sharing between planners and NGOs at the combatant commander level.⁶⁰ The NGO community and PACOM do not have to be at odds over human security if there are effective communications and advance planning.

Endnotes

- ¹ The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2006)
- ² Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2007)
- ³ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Report 2006* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2008)
- ⁴ Randolph Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World*, by John Ratcliffe (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2008), 20.
- ⁵ Department of the Navy, *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century*, 4.
- ⁶ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 25.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.
- ⁸ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military Relations" (position paper, Washington D.C., September 2008), http://interaction.org/files.cgi/6457_Civil-Military_paper_FINAL.pdf (accessed October 10, 2008), 1.
- ⁹ Wells, Linton and Hauss, Charles, "Odd Couples: the NGO and DoD," *PS* (July 2007), 486.
- ¹⁰ The document is officially called "Theater Security Cooperation Plan," and it is the same as Security Cooperation Plan (SCP) in this paper.
- ¹¹ Armitage, Richard L., Nye, Joseph S. Jr., *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf (accessed September 13, 2008), 6.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ H. Allen Irish, "'Peace Corps with Guns:' Can the Military be a Tool of Development?," in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=0BD17FB7-E012-8DDA-6075-149C8EFE96A0&lng=en,53>
- ¹⁵ Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 8.
- ¹⁶ Richard L. Armitage Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform" (address, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., April 28, 2008), <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/NyeTestimony080424a.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2008), 4.
- ¹⁷ Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 9.
- ¹⁸ OXFAM America, *Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform* (Boston, MA: Oxfam America, 2008),

http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 25.

²¹ Ibid., 26.

²² Ibid., 7.

²³ Matt Armstrong, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power," MountainRunner: A blog by Matt Armstrong on public diplomacy and strategic communication in the 21st century, April 15, 2008,

http://mountainrunner.us/2008/04/hard_power_soft_power_smart_po.html (accessed October 18, 2008).

²⁴ Armitage, "Implementing Smart Power," 3.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Department of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), A9.

²⁷ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 1.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 2.

³⁰ Ibid., 1.

³¹ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 19.

³² Von Pilar, Ulrike, "Humanitarian Space Under Siege: Some Remarks from an Aid Agency's Perspective" (working paper, Symposium Europe and Humanitarian Aid- What Future? Learning From Crisis, Bad Neuenahr, Germany, April 23, 1999), <http://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/> (accessed October 20, 2008), 1.

³³ Guttieri, Karen, "Humanitarian Space in Insecure Environments: A Shifting Paradigm," electronic version, *Strategic Insights* (Monterey, CA) IV, no. 11 (November 2005), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/guttieriNov05.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2008)

³⁴ Von Pilar, "Humanitarian Space Under Siege:," 6.

³⁵ Ibid., 9.

³⁶ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 2.

³⁷ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 24.

³⁸ Ibid., 21.

³⁹ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 1.

⁴⁰ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 21.

⁴¹ Ibid., 19.

⁴² Thomas Crowell, *Preventive Humanitarian Assistance and GWOT in PACOM* (master's thesis, Naval War College, 2006. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2006), <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463392&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2008), 8.

⁴³ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 25.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 1.

⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, comp., *Joint Publications 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, 2 vols. (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), II-1.

⁴⁷ Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, 3.

⁴⁸ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 21-22.

⁴⁹ Department of the Army, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, A10.

⁵⁰ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 19.

⁵¹ International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters* (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2005), <http://www.unisdr.org/> (accessed October 24, 2008), 4.

⁵² Amitav Acharya, *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Southeast Asia* (Paris, France: UNESCO, 2007), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001518/151821E.pdf>, 12.

⁵³ United States Institute of Peace, *Taking It To The Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 1.

⁵⁴ Wells, "Odd Couples: the NGO," 485.

⁵⁵ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 2

⁵⁶ Kent, *Responding to Catastrophes*, 38.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 19.

⁵⁹ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, "InterAction on Civil Military," 2.

⁶⁰ InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action, *InterAction Guidelines for Relations*, 1.

Bibliography

- Acharya, Amitav. *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Southeast Asia*. Paris, France: UNESCO, 2007.
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001518/151821E.pdf>.
- Allgauer, Roy. "The U.S. Military and NGO Relationship During Post-conflict Humanitarian Emergency Operations: How Can the U.S. Military Improve It?" Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 16, 2006.
- Armitage, Richard L. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Implementing Smart Power: Setting An Agenda For National Security Reform." Address, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., April 28, 2008.
<http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/NyeTestimony080424a.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2008).
- Armitage, Richard L. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf (accessed September 13, 2008).
- Armstrong, Matt, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power," MountainRunner: A blog by Matt Armstrong on public diplomacy and strategic communication in the 21st century, April 15, 2008, http://mountainrunner.us/2008/04/hard_power_soft_power_smart_po.html (accessed October 18, 2008).
- Arnold, Lindsey E. *Cooperation or Conflict the Interaction of U.S. Military Forces and Nongovernmental Organizations in Military Operations Other than War*. Master's thesis, U.S: Army Command and Staff College, 1996. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1996.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "Guidelines On ASEAN's Relations with Civil Society Organisations." Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
<http://www.aseansec.org/18362.htm> (accessed October 25, 2008).
- Budney, Michael. "Enhancing Theater Security Cooperation in the 21st Century: How the US Navy Can Help." Working paper. University of Pennsylvania Wharton School-Risk Management and Decision Process Center, Philadelphia, PA, January 2008.
- Chesbrough, Scott. "The US-NGO Relationship: Phase Zero Cooperation Enables Mission Accomplishment." Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, February 13, 2006.

- Crowell, Thomas. *Preventive Humanitarian Assistance and GWOT in PACOM*. Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2006. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2006. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463392&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2008).
- Crumpton, Henry "Hank." "Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Smart Power Series." Lecture, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., January 2008, 2008. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080114_smart_crumpton.pdf (accessed September 14, 2008).
- Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Report 2006*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006. <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2008).
- Department of the Army. *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008.
- Department of the Navy. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2007.
- Eden, John G. *The New Maritime Strategy- A Chance for Greater Relevance?* PhD diss., US Army War College, 2008. US Army War College, 2008. [http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE/CJOS/MaritimeTr/JUNNewUSMa/file/_WFS/New Maritime Strategy - A Chance for Greater Relevance.pdf](http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE/CJOS/MaritimeTr/JUNNewUSMa/file/_WFS/New%20Maritime%20Strategy%20-%20A%20Chance%20for%20Greater%20Relevance.pdf) (accessed September 26, 2008).
- Guttieri, Karen. "Humanitarian Space in Insecure Environments: A Shifting Paradigm." Electronic version. *Strategic Insights* (Monterey, CA) IV, no. 11 (November 2005). <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/guttieriNov05.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2008).
- InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action. *InterAction Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.
- InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action. "InterAction on Civil Military Relations." Position paper, Washington D.C., September 2008. http://interaction.org/files.cgi/6457_Civil-Military_paper_FINAL.pdf (accessed October 10, 2008).
- InterAction- American Council for Voluntary International Action. *Seeing the Whole Picture: Building a More Secure World With Effective US Foreign Assistance*. Washington D.C.: InterAction, 2006. <http://www.interaction.org/library/detail.php?id=4924> (accessed October 6, 2008).

International Academy for Reduction of Political Violence. "Violence Prevention Articles and Essays." <http://iarpv.blogspot.com/archive/2005/12/19/collaboration-among-military-forces-and-non-governmental-org.html> (accessed October 23, 2008).

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2005. <http://www.unisdr.org/> (accessed October 24, 2008).

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. "Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief." International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct> (accessed August 25, 2008).

Irish, H. Allen. "Peace Corps with Guns:' Can the Military be a Tool of Development?" In *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles*, 53-96. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=0BD17FB7-E012-8DDA-6075-149C8EFE96A0&lng=en>.

Interagency Transformation Education and Analysis (ITEA) at National Defense University, comp. *Civil Military Relations: Working with the Military*. DVD. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2005.

Interagency Transformation Education and Analysis (ITEA) at National Defense University, comp. *Civil Military Relations: Working with NGOs*, Part of series called Civil Military Coordination: A Series of Educational DVDs. DVD. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2005.

Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus. "Reduced Dominance is Predicted for the U.S." *The Washington Post*, September 10, 2008, 2. <http://ebird.afis.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20080910628127.html> (accessed September 10, 2008).

Joint Chiefs of Staff, comp. *Joint Publication 3-07.6: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_6.pdf (accessed September 7, 2008).

Joint Chiefs of Staff, comp. *Joint Publications 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*. 2 vols. Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006. CD-ROM.

Jones, Bob. "HA/DR: Recommendations for achieving the U.S. Navy's expanded core capabilities in the PACOM AOR." Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 23, 2008.

- Keating, Timothy J. "U.S. Pacific Command Posture." Address, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C., March 11, 2008.
- Kent, Randolph. *Responding to Catastrophes: U.S. Innovation in a Vulnerable World*. By John Ratcliffe. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2008.
- Maley, William. "Tsunami Diplomacy." *Diplomatic Bulletin*, February 2005, 4-5.
http://apcd.anu.edu.au/pdf/bulletin_feb.pdf (accessed September 4, 2008).
- Martinez, Miguel R. "Lessons From Significant Foreign Disaster Relief Operations Applied to AFRICOM." Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 23, 2008.
- Minear, Larry. "The Roles of U.S. Military Forces in the Humanitarian Sector: Beyond Preconceptions to Ground Truth." *Monday Developments: The Latest Trends and Issues in Humanitarian Assistance* 25, no. 11 (November 2007): 11.
- Movinsky, Beth Ann. "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Contingency Planning Collaboration Between Combatant Commands and Office of the U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance." Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 10, 2007.
- Nickle, C. John. *The Role of Health Services Support in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan: Do We Have It Right*. Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2004. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2004. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA426005&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed September 7, 2008).
- Ong, Yulin. "Employment of Military Against Non-traditional Threats." ScribID.
http://www.clickpass.com/embedded_buttons/login/GkXZrO7e1G?parent_url=http://www.scribd.com/doc/3670389/EMPLOYMENT-OF-THE-MILITARY-AGAINST-NON-TRADITIONAL-SECURITY-NTS-THREATS (accessed September 7, 2008).
- OXFAM America. *Smart Development: Why US Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform*. Boston, MA: Oxfam America, 2008.
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefing_papers/smart-development/smart-development-may2008.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008).
- Perito, Robert M, ed. *Guide For Participants In Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
- Rovegno, John S. *Achieving Unity of Effort With Nongovernmental Organizations in Peace Support Operations*. Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2002. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2002.

- Schoenhaus, Robert M. *Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations: Advancing Best Practices*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002.
- Seiple, Chris. *Square - Dancing Into The Future: The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship And The CMOC In Times of Humanitarian Intervention*. Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1995. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995.
- Sheffe, Richard C. "The development of the J9: An Operational Directorate for Stability & Security Operations for the Military." Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 10, 2007.
- Simon, Sheldon W. "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection." *NBR Analysis* 14, no. 2 (August 2003).
- Sweatt, Susan. "The Role of Humanitarian Relief Organizations in National Security Strategy." Paper. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 10, 2001.
- Thakur, Ramesh. "Thakur Diplomatic Update." Paper. Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, November 2006. http://apcd.anu.edu.au/pdf/Thakur_Diplomatic_Update.pdf (accessed September 4, 2008).
- The White House. *National Security Strategy*. Washington D.C.: The White House, 2006.
- U.S. Pacific Command. *U.S. Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation Plan*. Camp H.M. Smith, HI: U.S. Pacific Command, 2007.
- United States Institute of Peace. *Taking It To The Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.
- USIP, Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments
- Von Pilar, Ulrike. "Humanitarian Space Under Siege: Some Remarks from an Aid Agency's Perspective." Working paper. Symposium Europe and Humanitarian Aid- What Future? Learning From Crisis, Bad Neuenahr, Germany, April 23, 1999. <http://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/> (accessed October 20, 2008).
- Wald, Charles F. "The Phase Zero Campaign: New Thinking at EUCOM." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 43 (September 2006): 72-75.
- Wells, Linton and Hauss Charles. "Odd Couples: the NGO and DoD." *PS* (July 2007): 485-487.