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SCRATCHING THE SURFACE: Expectations of USAFRICOM

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
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Abstract

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Thesis: Africa has become an increasingly important region to the United States from a national and global security perspective. Moreover, Africa's security problems are complex, ranging from traditional concerns such as resource competition to non-traditional issues such as health, environment, and terrorism. Addressing such problems is an overwhelming undertaking that requires much more than narrow military focused approaches. In response, the U.S. is taking a different approach with the formation of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). USAFRICOM has been launched with high expectations and much fanfare in the U.S., but it remains to be seen whether or not it will succeed. Is USAFRICOM fully prepared to meet the challenges of Africa and live up to expectations?

Discussion: The United States' development of an Africa focused regional command is intended to extend and enhance American foreign policy, serve as a display of power projection, and take the pivotal first step towards establishing a permanent footprint in Africa. History, humanitarianism, business opportunity, and incremental solutions to The Long War strategies are all practical motivators for the development and implementation of the USAFRICOM. American policy-makers recognize the integral role of the continent's part in not only the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), but more importantly, as an untapped resource in the eyes of the business world. In addition, USAFRICOM will not only help the U.S. achieve its foreign policy and humanitarian goals but give the world a glimpse of American commitment and zeal for success in Africa.

Conclusion: The United States' acknowledgment of the need for a persistent presence on the continent of Africa is just a small step. Implementation of ideas and decisive action will be the costliest of milestones and challenges; if not done correctly, the cost may be paid in American lives and further destabilization within Africa. In the long run, providing solutions to today's issues in Africa will not meet the needs of tomorrow's Africa in a timely manner. The establishment of USAFRICOM will assist the U.S. in achieving its foreign policy, achieving a balance of global strategic risk, and solidify the world perception of American success in Africa.

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INTRODUCTION

Africa has become an increasingly important region to the United States from a national and global security perspective. Moreover, Africa's security problems are complex, ranging from traditional concerns such as resource competition to non-traditional issues such as health, environment, and terrorism. Addressing such problems is an overwhelming undertaking that requires much more than narrow military focused approaches. In response, the U.S. is taking a different approach with the formation of the United States' Africa Command (USAFRICOM). *USAFRICOM has been launched with high expectations and much fanfare in the U.S., but it remains to be seen whether or not it will succeed. Is USAFRICOM fully prepared to meet the challenges of Africa and live up to expectations?*

The United States' development of an Africa focused regional command is intended to extend and enhance American foreign policy, serve as a display of power projection, and take the pivotal first step towards establishing a permanent footprint in Africa. History, humanitarianism, business opportunity, and incremental solutions to The Long War strategies are all practical motivators for the development and implementation of USAFRICOM. American policy-makers recognize the integral role of the continent's part in not only the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), but more importantly, as an untapped resource in the eyes of the business world. In addition, USAFRICOM will not only help the U.S. achieve its foreign policy and humanitarian goals but give the world a glimpse of American commitment and zeal for success in Africa.

Now is the critical time when USAFRICOM can help the nations of the world better recognize and understand the profound challenges confronting Africa's lesser-

developed countries (LDCs) in efforts to provide assistance before things fall apart. Let the policy makers not forget that success in Africa will be measured by enhancing regional stability, curbing and/or eliminating transnational terrorism, and inculcating positive systems to meet the varied needs for Africans to organically development their human capital. Africa's heterogeneity however, will complicate U.S. efforts on the continent.

American commitment to its partners in Africa will leave a legacy for future generations while bringing focus and scrutiny on the current state of affairs in Africa from throughout the international community. USAFRICOM has the opportunity to be a stabilizer for the region by providing aid to LDCs and assisting against non-state transnational security threats.

AFRICA : THE NEXT HOT TOPIC

"Africa certainly has had an unlucky history and faces many unfavorable structural factors that impede its development."¹ Today the continent faces many complex and intricate problems. "[Africa is a] continent characterized by a high degree of income inequality and is prone to conflict"² internally threatening its people. Furthermore, transnational threats, competition for resources, and health issues have a greater global significance since these problems pose a wider threat to humanity.

"The NEW Scramble"³

Since colonial times Africa's most important challenge has been development. Specifically, the development and/or exploitation of Africa's human capital, education and training, infrastructure, land, and natural resources have provided mixed blessings.

Abundant opportunities have not reached the people due to corruption in government and lack of ability on how to positively and successfully implement programs for the people on a scale sufficient to the extent of Africa's problems at the local and intermediate levels of government.

Today (as in the past), there are many underhanded, unscrupulous characters in this world. In the global community, African LDCs are highly vulnerable to the selfishness of the powerful; especially since there is no African organization fully capable of defending the fifty-three nations against those actors (ie. nation-states, non-state actors, and/or organizations, etc.) seeking to prey on the continent's capital and natural resources.

There are remarkable similarities between China's, India's, and the United States' piqued interest in Africa today and David Livingstone's "four C's: Commerce, Christianity, Civilization, and Conquest"⁴ that characterized the first 'Scramble for Africa.' Under the guise of civility and aid, discovery and development, liberation and religiosity, the Europeans of the late 19th century were unknowingly setting the stage for today's problems. As such, China, India, and the U.S. are using the avenues of aid, development, research, and training to get a foothold in Africa which will lead to setting their own stages for national prosperity at the cost of those nations in Africa willing to partner with them. Africa's history is replete with examples of how the Europeans who arrives as in the guise of explorers, missionaries, and well-wishers were unmasked as greedy imperialists. Promulgation of the slave trade, diamond discovery, the Suez Canal, and colonization were issues of the time (1876-1912) in Africa.⁵

Today, Africa has become a new frontier for multinational corporations as it was for imperial powers during the first 'Scramble.' All the countries on the continent can provide a surplus of manpower available for minimal costs. Like their European predecessors of the first 'Scramble', the Chinese and Indians are competing for business opportunities in Africa (ranks second on China's list of outward FDI recipients⁶). So although FDI leads to "improved macroeconomic and political stability for a number of countries," for Africa, it provides possibilities for corruption of the small percentage of people holding positions of power and has provided little trickle down benefits for the people. Even though most of the civilized world, today, is adamantly against slavery, the nations that come to Africa in hopes of capitalizing on uneducated laborers use a new type of slavery by creating an unspoken dependency on those outsiders.

One of the main reasons behind today's 'New Scramble' today is oil. African oil production is on the brink of exponential increases. In fact, Africa is already a quiet powerhouse of crude oil extraction. Oil -aka Black Gold- is a staple of gross domestic product (GDP) for Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and Sudan.⁷ Nigeria is the 11th largest oil producer in the world and with its five brethren African oil producing countries they collectively account for the production of 5.8 million barrels/day and reserves of 41.043 billion barrels.⁸ Angola has in fact become "China's main supplier of crude oil."⁹ West Africa is a particularly rare gem in the world of oil production since "[its oil] is typically low in sulphur and thus ideal for refining – [and it is] easily accessible by sea to Western Europe and the U.S."¹⁰

However, in countries such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola, oil wealth has also been a curse. The curse takes several forms such as the "exacerbation of pre-

existing armed conflict, encouragement of corruption, and neglect of traditional industries and agriculture.”¹¹ For example, although China, India, the United States, and Western Europe are key buyers of African oil, poverty and civil strife continue to devastate Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and Sudan.¹² Despite oil’s value it creates dependence in producer countries. This dependence is not on the oil itself, but rather comes from the influx of capital into monetary systems that are not equipped to secure payments, sustain investments, build infrastructure, and provide basic domestic/national amenities for their constituents.

Current U.S. Interest and Policy Directions in Africa

“The Bush Administration has underscored the links between U.S. and African security and prosperity. Africa is a growing source of U.S. petroleum and raw materials, an important trading partner, and an enormous untapped market for American investment. However, the continent faces some serious political, economic, and social challenges and thus remains outside the mainstream of economic globalization and wide digital connectivity. Failure to address these problems will only increase the need for further American and international assistance and involvement.”¹³

Currently, the two main United States interests in Africa are: oil and counter-terrorism. In fact, according to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the U.S. is recognizing the vitality of Africa since it currently “provides 22 percent of U.S. imported oil. [Also,] China’s expansion in Africa has dramatically intensified competition. U.S. policymakers share in the international consensus that African states require an improved capacity to manage their peacekeeping requirements, curb

piracy and criminality, and strengthen policies and institutions to sustain economic growth and good governance, as Africa approaches a population of 1.2 billion by 2025.”¹⁴ Furthermore, the U.S. aims to draw down its reliance on Middle Eastern oil. “U.S. military sources estimate that up to a quarter of all foreign fighters in Iraq are from Africa; mostly from Algeria and Morocco.”¹⁵

Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, one of the key efforts by the U.S. to curb terrorism and stabilize oil imports was the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG),¹⁶ which was established to “work on a new energy security policy that will see Nigeria displace such Middle East countries as Saudi Arabia as major crude oil supplier to the American market...based on the growing fear of insecurity that the continued supply of crude oil from the troubled Persian Gulf, posed to the U.S. market.”¹⁷ Another key effort was, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative,¹⁸ which is an offshoot of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) designed to keep terrorists from building networks in the vast unguarded regions in Africa.

Although the United Nations, not the United States, may be better suited (or more welcome) for leading international development and, when needed, military interventions on this continent, it seems that the U.S. must play the lead role since the U.N. does relies on its member-nations to provide military forces. However, U.S. Presidential visits to Africa have been rare (see Appendix A), yet military incursion has been substantial (see Appendix B). HIV/AIDS, civil wars, and threats to U.S. Embassies in Africa have been key reasons for a hands-on involvement by the United States.

Today, however, because Africa has become more strategically important, the United States must identify how to “best help African countries address key challenges to

their security and become stronger partners in dealing with costly regional crises, global terrorism, and other transnational threats.”¹⁹ USAFRICOM’s military professionals will augment the international organizations and host nation partners by working diligently to build and sustain a peaceful Africa.

Employing USAFRICOM & the Instruments of National Power

The Bush Administration’s Africa Policy states, “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States -persevering human dignity- and our strategic priority - combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.” Fundamentally, the U.S. will have to focus on four key areas in order to analyze the *big picture* and achieve its objectives: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). Following is an overview of some *big picture* concerns and objectives using the DIME model:

Diplomatic: “The political instrument of national power is the execution of a nation’s foreign policy through diplomatic means. Diplomacy arises out of the “fundamental character of the nation-state system, with its basic assumption that nation-states are sovereign, but divergent in their interests and unequal in their power.” Diplomacy is dependent on the power of persuasion, convincing others to take actions that allow for the successful prosecution of a nation’s foreign policy.”²⁰

Diplomacy is needed to achieve Clausewitz’ basic concept of ‘winning hearts and minds’. U.S. policy makers must ask themselves ‘*Can we win the hearts and minds of 53 nation-states?*’

Information: “The informational tool of national power is the collection and denial of information about the world or an adversary combined with the ability to disseminate this information. The role of the U.S. national intelligence community is to gather valid and current information about potential adversaries and disseminate this information to the appropriate decision makers. It is the responsibility of the decision makers to act on this information. The United States also maintains an intensive security apparatus to protect critical information from being obtained by these same

adversaries. And finally, the use of "propaganda" vehicles [ie. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe] allows the United States to spread the message of democracy to people who would otherwise be denied this information."²¹

Ambassador Dan Simpson wrote in August 1994, that Africans believe in the colonial strategy of organizations dividing up of nation states into piles; with all the world powers gathering their building blocks for setting up shop in Africa.²² This has created a negative stigma of outsiders in Africa and that can lead to getting the wrong impression of what the U.S. endeavors to accomplish in Africa. In post Cold War Africa, the U.S. must be mindful of reactions to its plan for introducing "American supported principles of democracy, market economies, and sensitivity to environmental and human rights concerns."²³ This keen synopsis by Ambassador Simpson a clear and poignant direction for policy, yet it has taken the U.S. thirteen years to work towards implementing his recommendations and it has come in the shape of USAFRICOM.

Regrettably, the U.S. also does not always pursue information campaign designed to garner support from its own population on the importance of Africa. This is important because many of the region's issues are culturally unimportant to the majority of Americans. Often, doing the right thing is tossed aside in choice of doing nothing. When it comes to Africa, the message that is generally portrayed by the U.S. is a triad of poor impressions: "(1) low-level of attention paid to African issues, (2) [U.S] assumption of European responsibility, and (3) [Cold War ideals of] East-West dimension of the situation [on Africa]."²⁴

Military: "Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of national power towards the accomplishment of the political objectives of the overall national strategy. The departure point for military strategy, therefore, is the objectives of the national strategy. From there, military strategy must identify a military goal or objective that will lead to accomplishment of the political objective. The military objective then provides the basis for the identification of specific ways to accomplish that objective. The selection of one of these courses of action and its further development results in a strategic concept that embodies the key components of the chosen military strategy. The military strategy is not developed in isolation from the other instruments of

national power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives and strategies. In order to formulate and implement an effective military strategy, they must understand the ends and means of the larger national strategy as well as the strategies of the enemy, allies, and related neutral parties."²⁵

Africa has plenty of weapons; according to the African Union, "out of the estimated 500 million small arms and Light weapons in circulation world-wide, 100 million are found in Africa," many of which are in the hands of untrained indigenous peoples and warring rebels.²⁶ A pointed look towards Darfur gives scope of one large problem, genocide. The most recent estimation of casualties in the Darfur conflict lists an estimated 200,000-400,000 dead and upwards of 2.5 million displaced persons.

Currently, the U.S. does not provide enough partnership for military training that would focus on organic military issues faced by the foreign officer, but rather, focuses on "US values and democratic processes."²⁷ Although the U.S. can lend assistance, building indigenous military capacity, as well as facilitating cooperation in efforts of combating African civil violence and genocide relies on African national governments, down to the local levels.

Economic: "The economic instrument of power is the leveraging of a nation's wealth to influence the behavior of others. The more global the world's economy becomes, the more important the use of economic power becomes—and the more effective. Unlike the ideological conflicts that dominated the world throughout the entire 20th century, economic concerns now tend to dominate decisions and priorities. U.S. decisions concerning the changing of financial policy, which not long ago would have primarily impacted the U.S., now impacts the entire world. The loosening or tightening of the U.S. money supply has enormous worldwide implications."²⁸

Even after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. continues, "(1) reinforcement of the historical tendency to treat Africa as a 'back-burner' issue, (2) [trimming] already reduced levels of economic and military aid, (3) [using] national security bureaucracies as the primary driving forces of U.S. Africa policies, (4) [to build] rising perceptions of the threat posed by the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, (5) [U.S. as a constrained]

Great Power involved in the resolution of regional conflicts, and (6) rising debate over making multiparty democracy a precondition of closer U.S. ties.”²⁹

HERE COMES USAFRICOM

In February 2007, when the U.S. government announced the decision to create U.S. Africa Command with Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany as its interim headquarters. Over a period of two to five years, a cadre of personnel will be assembled and the command’s mission and vision will be refined.

“Africa is growing in military, strategic and economic importance in global affairs. However, many nations on the African continent continue to rely on the international community for assistance with security concerns. From the U.S. perspective, it makes strategic sense to help build the capability for African partners, and organizations such as the Africa Standby Force, to take the lead in establishing a secure environment. This security will, in turn, set the groundwork for increased political stability and economic growth.

The United States Africa Command, also known as USAFRICOM, is a new U.S. military headquarters devoted solely to Africa. USAFRICOM is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters that is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries.

U.S. Africa Command will better enable the Department of Defense and other elements of the U.S. government to work in concert and with partners to achieve a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place. U.S. Africa Command is consolidating the efforts of three existing headquarters commands into one that is focused solely on Africa and helping to coordinate US government contributions on the continent.”³⁰

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) stated “the Pentagon has greater financial and personnel resources than the [U.S.] State Department, which has long been considered the main instrument of Washington's [D.C.] Africa policy”³¹ which solidifies the need for USAFRICOM to emulate the combatant command model.

The mission for USAFRICOM is extremely unique. In order to deal with the complexities of the African security environment and U.S. interest on the continent, it

will be equal parts combatant command, coalition command, interagency command, and unified command. USAFRICOM must juggle its balance of priorities as well as, if not better than, any U.S. Ambassador and projecting military order and power that every Combatant Commander portrays to their area of responsibility (AOR).

Challenges of the 'African' Reaction

As is the case when any guest shows up uninvited, African reactions to USAFRICOM have not been as welcoming for the United States. All change brings consternation and apprehension; especially for those with very little voice in the happenings in remote locations. Does the stand up of USAFRICOM represent driving U.S. policy towards war capability in Africa rather than providing aid and development?

Achieving *buy-in* from fifty-three nations for the standup of an entity (USAFRICOM), which another autonomous nation (U.S.) is pushing, can be an impossible task. Even more important is garnering and sustaining American support. The U.S. must sell the message that USAFRICOM reflects American interests and priorities. Overall, American support will be essential to the funding that will drive U.S. success in Africa.

"Africans are nervous that USAFRICOM will sanction the militarization of diplomacy and severely undermine multilateralism on the continent," warned Wafula Okumu, head of the African Security Analysis Program at the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies.³² Mr. Okumu also stated "most African nations will not want to [partner] with USAFRICOM because they 'will be criticized for violating Africa's common positions on African defense and security', which discourages the hosting of foreign troops on African soil."³³

On the other hand, many Africans have asked “(a) why American troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwandan genocides (in 1994)?, (b) why [did] the U.S. forces remain anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the nearest thing America ever had to an African colony, faced brutal disintegration in 2003?, [and] (c) why the U.S. has not supported the African Union Mission in Somalia and instead supported the Ethiopian intervention through airpower from the U.S. base in Djibouti?”³⁴

Now is the time for the U.S. to reassure Africans that USAFRICOM’s goals are sincere. Now is the time to emphasize that aid, development, and diplomacy take precedence over militarization and war footing. Now is the time for the U.S. to openly support proactive solutions by African leaders that enable African nations to partner with African multilateral and multinational organizations to promote peace, security, and stability.

Making USAFRICOM Work: What will be done?

In consideration of political protocol and respect for Africans, USAFRICOM will work closely with the African Union, while building smaller alliances with regional African institutions and implementing training relationships with the individual nations. There is little need for USAFRICOM to take lead roles since the overall goal is “to provide unique *value-added* capabilities to enhance already existing U.S. and international programs.”³⁵ USAFRICOM’s implementation of two Deputy Commanders is unique to say the least, but is the *BEST* way to achieve mission success. This allows the U.S. Department of State’s Deputy Commander to have greater impact on the region by having direct, immediate influence on the USAFRICOM Commander and his/her

staff, while still maintaining military order and chain of command with the Military Deputy Commander.

As USAFRICOM opens for business, it must not lose sight of the key fundamentals that will ensure early success; careful consideration of African partners' needs and selling how the U.S. will help develop/meet the stated needs, as well as continual engagement to refine requests and follow-up with results. Another key focus will be finding strategic locations in Africa for implementation of operational nodes to serve as the USAFRICOM Commander's eyes and ears among the indigenous people of the continent.

Structure as well plays an important part in the standup of USAFRICOM. Gone are the days of shoot first, ask questions later. Instead, this new concept of a unified command will serve as a more responsible agent. The incorporation of side-by-side relationships with the interagency is the primary course of action by the U.S., which will lead to enhanced mission focus and understanding, as well as spreading the message of security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity for Africa. Comparatively, a standard combatant command may have a very small interagency cell dedicated to its mission; and the cell may not necessarily be located onsite with the combatant command.

USAFRICOM greatly differs in that it will clearly reflect an integrated/unified staff structure, one who's Deputy Commander is not a three-star General or Admiral, but a civilian from the U.S. Department of State. Currently, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, a former ambassador to Ghana, serves as the Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, U.S. Navy serves as the Deputy Commander for Military Operations.

The remainder of the USAFRICOM Headquarters will closely integrate other parts of the U.S. government as key members of the staff. Principle agents of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will play integral roles in leading policy and development efforts through USAFRICOM. Overall, the focus must remain whole-heartedly vigilant on “security cooperation activities with African nations, [continued development] capabilities of African nations to help solidify [U.S.] relations [in] achieving mutual goals, and providing a bright future full of promise and opportunity for Africans everywhere.”³⁶ The unique structure of USAFRICOM can be attributed to keen foresight and paradigmatic thinking; however its ultimate success will be determined by African acceptance and weighed on the global scale of scrutiny.

Leadership is fundamental! Leading is about building relationships and trust. The intrinsic value of the masses’ faith in those appointed to lead is the foundation of success. The unique composition and dynamic of USAFRICOM’s workforce will dictate that the Commander be cultured, distinguished, educated, and have an influential personality. A decisive, pointed leader with keen foresight and a penchant for diplomatic relations is needed to guide the men and women that will comprise the framework of the USAFRICOM staff. The appointment of the USAFRICOM Commander will have effects resonating worldwide.

“Location, location, location.” It’s what every real estate agent preaches to their clients and where to headquarter USAFRICOM is a serious point of contention. Is there a viable location in Africa?

Any regional command should be located in roughly the same geographic area where the bulk of its responsibility lies. Ms. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for African Affairs, "noted specifically that Liberia, Botswana, Senegal, and Djibouti have expressed support for USAFRICOM. Liberia has, in fact, offered to host the headquarters of the Command, which is scheduled to become fully operational by October 2008."³⁷ However, definitive recommendations for establishment of a headquarters on the west coast of Africa (whose area of operations would encompass portions of southern Morocco and northern Western Sahara, including Laayoune, as well as key training team nodes at port cities in Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, and Sudan) have yet to surface. In the meantime, USAFRICOM will operate its headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany.

CONCLUSION

The people of Africa and the African Union (AU) are making valiant efforts to address the continent's issues. Many of Africa's problems cannot simply be solved; rather, they must be mitigated for the present time, analyzed, courses of action proposed, solutions adopted, and policies implemented.

Aid and development money is not always the answer to problems. In fact, money more often than not brings to bear the evil ways of the business world. Unfortunately, this inevitably causes more harm than good to the intended recipients. All too often, economic reform, debt burden, and debt relief have played a large part in Africa's woes. Many impoverished nations aim to do what is right for their people, yet it never seems to be enough. Nonetheless, USAFRICOM will not provide international aid,

but will be a key facilitator for many of the global and non-government organizations' (NGOs) who provide a basis for subsistence in many of the poorer countries in Africa.

In fact, USAFRICOM's role as facilitator is just one small approach to managing the many issues facing the continent. In keeping with its power projection role, USAFRICOM will provide a basis for regional stability as well as providing professional training to enhance military and commercial tradecrafts among the African nations which leads to a first step in a united front against transnational aggressors. Also, the African Union can steadfastly charge on with progressive human capital development initiatives with the support of USAFRICOM, which as a partner, will aptly lend a helping hand not only militarily, but by serving as the U.S. interagency partner on the ground. This will sharply enhance success for the A.U. and many of the poorer African countries' efforts to redesign and revitalize their diplomatic and economic infrastructures.

Ostensibly, this is good business on behalf of the U.S. since it enables a rapport of *good neighbordom*. Political protocol and humane righteousness aside, USAFRICOM can incorporate smaller alliances throughout the countryside and ungoverned hinterlands in Africa to build the integral outposts with which to consolidate the U.S. instruments of national power and take focus on the more unilateral U.S. interests. This is where the real value of having a U.S. footprint in Africa will pay off since neighborly partnerships can ensure inevitable friendly negotiations for natural resources.

Furthermore, USAFRICOM's most viable approach for overcoming African suspicions will be to break free from the historical *monkey on the back*, colonialism. The United States most assuredly does not want to colonize any country in Africa and needs to adamantly testify to this fact. History -written by the swords and rifles of the British,

French, and Germans- has put a mark of suspicion on the efforts of the western world to come to Africa. USAFRICOM must be coalesced into existence by the African nations rather than the U.S. just showing up and ringing the doorbell. Avoiding the stigma of baggage is the greatest solution USAFRICOM can employ.

Fundamentally, the United States' acknowledgment of the need for a persistent presence on the continent of Africa is just a small step. Global market competitors are eyeing the African continent and gathering competitive business footprints so as to make the move on being "the first'us with the most'us" in many of the countries open to outside developers. The United States, backed by keen analysis, savvy business thinking, and intelligence gathering capabilities, is obviously taking an earnest interest in these other global market competitors. Even more importantly, the U.S. has the opportunity to provide a framework of success for African organizations and nation-states to become viable global competitors. What better way for the U.S. to keep an eye on competition than to be where they are; in Africa.

Designing, building, and staffing a regionally focused command -USAFRICOM- to address the issues which vex the continent is a challenge within itself. Engaging all the key players, large and small, will prove to be the largest challenge. Implementation of ideas and decisive action will be the costliest of milestones and challenges; if not done correctly, the cost will be American lives.

The United States stands committed to nations suffering on a massive scale. General Kip Ward stressed to the Senate that "USAFRICOM's exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance efforts across the continent must occur in ways that demonstrate value-added through its existence."³⁸ Side-by-side with global partners, the continent of

Africa will one day be without conflict, raging disease, deceitful dictators, and further self-destruction. "The U.S. holds innocent lives, human dignity, and the law of morality in high regard and aims to see all nations of the world accomplish the same level of understanding and respect for their countrymen and neighbors."³⁹

In closing, although there are many challenges in Africa, the intent of the U.S. policymakers is to enhance foreign relations in Africa. The establishment of USAFRICOM will assist the U.S. in achieving its foreign policy, achieving a balance of global strategic risk, and solidify the world perception of American success in Africa.

¹ Moss, *African Development*, p. 244

² Broadman, Harry G.. *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier*. New York: World Bank Publications, 2007, p. 60.

³ Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-1912*. NY, NY: Random House, 1991.

⁴ Ibid., pp. xxii-xxiii

⁵ Ibid., pp. 681-694

⁶ Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road*, pp. 94-95

⁷ CFR article by Esther Pan. *China, Africa, and Oil*. 26 Jan 2007. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557#4>

⁸ Ibid., (Angola reserves not calculated.)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ http://www.blackagendareport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=255&Itemid=37

¹¹ Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil*, p. 95

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Morrison, Dr. Stephen J. Director, Africa Program & Kathleen Hicks, Senior Fellow, International Security Program. "LAUNCHING AFRICOM", 05 Oct 2007.

¹⁵ http://www.blackagendareport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=255&Itemid=37

¹⁶ Ghazvinian, John. *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil*. New York: Harcourt, 2007, p. 89

¹⁷ <http://www.iasps.org/nbn/nbn554.htm>

¹⁸ Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative [TSCTI] <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>

¹⁹ <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/africa2005/africa.htm>

²⁰ <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Hyten/html/contents/sectVIII.html>

²¹ <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Hyten/html/contents/sectVIII.html>

²² Simpson, Daniel H.. *U.S. Africa Policy : Some Possible Course Adjustment*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994, p. 2

²³ Ibid., p. 3

²⁴ Schraeder, Peter J.. *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 15

²⁵ <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcdp1-1/chap2.htm>

²⁶ http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Small_Arms.htm

²⁷ U.S. Foreign Military Assistance, <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm>

²⁸ <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Hyten/html/contents/sectVIII.html>

²⁹ Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, pp. 250-258

³⁰ <http://www.USAFRICOM.mil/AboutUSAFRICOM.asp>

³¹ Africa News, *U.S. Allays Fears Over New Military Body*, 14 Aug 2007

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Africa News, *U.S. USAFRICOM Officially Functioning*, 01 Oct 2007

³⁶ Gen Ward's statement to Congress, Africa News, *U.S. USAFRICOM Officially Functioning*, 01 Oct 2007

³⁷ Africa News, *U.S. Allays Fears Over New Military Body*, 14 Aug 2007

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ <http://www.vinylarmy.com/home/help/president.swf>

APPENDIX A

Presidential Visits to Africa (1906-2006)*

January 13, 1943

United Kingdom, Bathurst (The Gambia)

Overnight stop en route to Casablanca.

January 14-25, 1943

Morocco, Casablanca

Casablanca Conference with Prime Minister Churchill.

January 26-27, 1943

Liberia, Monrovia

Informal visit; met with President Barclay.

November 20, 1943

France, Oran (Algeria)

Disembarked en route to Cairo.

November 22-21, 1943

Tunisia, Tunis

Overnight stop en route to Cairo.

November 22-26, 1943

Egypt, Cairo

Attend First Cairo Conference with PM Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

December 2-7, 1943

Egypt, Cairo

Attend Second Cairo Conference with PM Churchill and Turkish President Inonu.

December 7-9, 1943

Tunisia, Tunis

Conferred with General Eisenhower.

December 9, 1943

France, Dakar (Senegal)

Re-embarked for the U.S.

February 13-15, 1945

Egypt, Great Bitter Lake, Suez Canal, Alexandria

Met with King Farouk, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud, and PM Churchill.

February 18, 1945

France, Algiers (Algeria)

Brief U.S. Ambassadors to the UK, France, and Italy on the Yalta Conference.

December 17, 1959
Tunisia, Tunis
Met with President Bourguiba.

December 22, 1959
Morocco, Casablanca
Met with King Mohammed V.

June 12-14, 1974
Egypt, Cairo, Alexandria
Met with President Sadat.

January 4, 1978
Egypt, Aswan
Met with President Sadat and German Chancellor Schmidt.

March 31-April 3, 1978
Nigeria, Lagos
Met with President Obasanjo; first visit of a U.S. President to sub-Saharan Africa.

April 3, 1978
Liberia, Monrovia
Met with President Tolbert.

November 22-23, 1990
Egypt, Cairo
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Mubarak.

December 31, 1992-January 2, 1993
Somalia, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Baledogle
Visited international relief workers and U.S. military personnel.

October 25-26, 1994
Egypt, Cairo
Met with President Mubarak and PLO Chairman Arafat.

March 13, 1996
Egypt, Sharm al-Sheikh
Attend the Summit of the Peacemakers.

March 23, 1998
Ghana, Accra
Met with President Rawlings; visited a Peace Corps project.

March 23-25, 1998

Uganda, Kampala, Kisowera, Mukono, Wanyange, Entebbe
Met with President Museveni and with the Presidents of Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Congo.

March 25, 1998

Rwanda, Kigali

Met with President Bizimungu; delivered a public address.

March 25-29, 1998

South Africa, Capetown, Johannesburg

Met with President Mandela; addressed joint session of Parliament.

March 29-31, 1998

Botswana, Gaborone, Kasame

Met with President Masire; visited Chobe National Park.

March 31-April 2, 1998

Senegal, Dakar, Thies, Goree Island

Met with President Diouf; visited Senegalese peacekeeping troops; delivered several public addresses.

March 23-25, 1998

Uganda, Kampala, Kisowera, Mukono, Wanyange, Entebbe

Met with President Museveni and with the Presidents of Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Congo.

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March 31-April 2, 1998

Senegal, Dakar, Thies, Goree Island

Met with President Diouf; visit Senegalese peacekeeping troops; deliver several public addresses.

August 26-28, 2000

Nigeria, Abuja, Ushafa
Met with President Obasanjo and addressed the National Assembly.

August 28-29, 2000
Tanzania, Arush
Met with former South African President Mandela to promote a peace agreement for Burundi; also met with President Mkapa.

August 29, 2000
Egypt, Cairo
Briefed President Mubarak on the Middle East Peace Process.

October 16-17, 2000
Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh
Attended Israeli-Palestinian Summit Meeting.

June 2-3, 2003
Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh
Attended the "Red Sea Summit" with leaders of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas.

July 8, 2003
Senegal, Dakar, Goree Island
Met with President Wade.

July 8-10, 11, 2003
South Africa, Pretoria
Met with President Mbeki.

July 10, 2003
Botswana, Gabarone
Met with President Mogae. Toured Mokoldi Nature Reserve.

July 11, 2003
Uganda, Kampala
Met with President Musaveni.

July 11-12, 2003
Nigeria, Abuja
Met with President Obasanjo.

**The data presented here were collected by Evan M. Duncan of the Policy Studies Division, Office of the Historian.*

APPENDIX B

Historical Military Engagements in Africa**

1801-05 -- Tripoli. The First Barbary War included the USS George Washington and USS Philadelphia affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few Marines landed with United States Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli in an effort to free the crew of the Philadelphia from the Barbary pirates. Tripoli declared war but not the United States, although Congress authorized US military action by statute.

1815 -- Algiers. The second Barbary War was declared against the United States by the Dey of Algiers of the Barbary states, an act not reciprocated by the United States. Congress did authorize a military expedition by statutes. A large fleet under Captain Stephen Decatur attacked Algiers and obtained indemnities.

1815 -- Tripoli. After securing an agreement from Algiers, Captain Decatur demonstrated with his squadron at Tunis and Tripoli, where he secured indemnities for offenses during the War of 1812.

1820-23 -- Africa. Naval units raided the slave traffic pursuant to the 1819 act of Congress.

1843 -- Africa. - November 29 to December 16. Four United States vessels demonstrated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and sailors) to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory Coast, and to punish attacks by the natives on American seamen and shipping.

1851 -- Johannis Island (east of Africa). - August. Forces from the US sloop of war Dale exacted redress for the unlawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig.

1860 -- Angola, Portuguese West Africa. - March 1. American residents at Kissebo called upon American and British ships to protect lives and property during problems with natives.

1882 -- Egypt. - July 14 to 18. American forces landed to protect American interests during warfare between British and Egyptians and looting of the city of Alexandria by Arabs.

1903-04 -- Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the US Consul General while he negotiated a treaty.

1904 -- Tangier, Morocco. "We want either Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." A squadron demonstrated to force release of a kidnapped American. Marines were landed to protect the consul general.

1956 -- Egypt. A Marine battalion evacuated US nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis.

1964 -- Congo (Zaire). The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.

1967 -- Congo (Zaire). The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.

1978 -- Zaire (Congo). From May 19 through June 1978, the United States utilized military transport aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire.

1981 -- Libya. First Gulf of Sidra Incident On August 19, 1981, US planes based on the carrier USS Nimitz shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international waters by the United States.

1982 -- Sinai. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military personnel and equipment to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. Participation had been authorized by the Multinational Force and Observers Resolution, Public Law 97-132.

1983 -- Egypt. After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic surveillance plane to Egypt.

1983 -- Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces.

1986 -- Libya. Libyan Patrol Boats On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported on March 24 and 25, US forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with missiles.

1986 -- Libya. Operation El Dorado Canyon On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in the Libyan capitol of Tripoli, claiming that Colonel Qadhafi, who had ousted oil-friendly King Idris, was responsible for a bomb attack at a German disco that killed two U.S. soldiers.

1989 -- Libya. Second Gulf of Sidra Incident On January 4, 1989, two US Navy F-14 aircraft based on the USS John F. Kennedy shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles north of Libya. The US pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile intentions.

1990 -- Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional security to the US Embassy in Monrovia, and that helicopter teams had evacuated US citizens from Liberia.

1991 -- Zaire. On September 25-27, 1991, after widespread looting and rioting broke out in Kinshasa, US Air Force C-141s transported 100 Belgian troops and equipment into Kinshasa. US planes also carried 300 French troops into the Central African Republic and hauled evacuated American citizens.

1992 -- Sierra Leone. On May 3, 1992, US military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone, where military leaders had overthrown the government.

1992-95 -- Somalia. "Operation Restore Hope" Somali Civil War On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed US armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a UN Security Council Resolution. The operation came to an end on May 4, 1993. US forces continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). (See also Battle of Mogadishu)

1996 -- Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported that on April 9, 1996 due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens" in Liberia he had ordered US military forces to evacuate from that country "private US citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the US Embassy compound...."

1996 -- Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported the deployment of US military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of "private US citizens and certain U.S. Government employees," and to provide "enhanced security for the American Embassy in Bangui."

1997 -- Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of US military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security and to be available for any necessary evacuation operation.

1997 -- Sierra Leone. On May 29 and May 30, 1997, US military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain US government employees and private US citizens.

1998 -- Guinea-Bissau. On June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-

Bissau endangering the US Embassy, President Clinton deployed a standby evacuation force of US military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to evacuate from the city of Bissau.

1998 - 1999 Kenya and Tanzania. US military personnel were deployed to Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

1998 -- Afghanistan and Sudan. Operation Infinite Reach On August 20th, air strikes were used against two suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical factory in Sudan.

1998 -- Liberia. On September 27, 1998 America deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 US military personnel to increase the security force at the US Embassy in Monrovia.

2000 -- Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000 a US Navy patrol craft deployed to Sierra Leone to support evacuation operations from that country if needed.[RL30172]

2002 -- Cote d'Ivoire. On September 25, 2002, in response to a rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire, US military personnel went into Cote d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens from Bouake.

2003 -- Liberia. Second Liberian Civil War On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped US military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to help secure the US Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.

2003 -- Georgia and Djibouti "US combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."

2004 -- "War on Terrorism": US "anti-terror" related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea.

2007 -- Somalia. Battle of Ras Kamboni. On January 8, 2007, while the conflict between the Islamic Courts Union and the Transitional Federal Government continues, an AC-130 gunship conducts an aerial strike on a suspected Al-Qaeda operative, along with other Islamist fighters, on Badmadow Island near Ras Kamboni in southern Somalia.

***Not necessarily authoritative as sourced from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_military_history_events_and_portions_of_the_Congressional_Research_Service_report_RL30172.*

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