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IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Executive Summary

Title: The Use of Cultural Studies in Military Operations

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Thesis: In conflicts where ideas or perceptions are pivotal to establishing lasting resolutions, meaningful cultural understanding is the corner stone to success. Culture is at the crux of this issue, therefore we must develop a method to evaluate various cultural norms and present them in a direct way to the operational forces heading into unique environments.

Discussion:

Operational units, regardless of their size or composition, always have to deal with gaining an understanding of the unique cultures that they will be operating in during a deployment or military operation. Understanding the intrinsic values of an enemy's ideology, the civilian population, and the friendly forces that we will encounter will enable our forces to make decisions that will minimize unintended consequences and maximize our intended influence in the most positive manner possible. In a war where perception is more important than bullets, cultural cognizance at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels are vital to achieving a long lasting peace.

Our cultural understanding of a future operational area comes from a variety of sources such as the CIA Country Factbook and Country Handbooks produced by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. There are a variety of other sources that could be referenced to complement the official regional literature, but how we translate that information in a tangible manner to our leaders and troops is critical. If we cannot parley this information clearly and concisely, it becomes problematic for the troops that are tasked with operating in the region and difficult to relay to units that will assume that same battle space in the future. One aspect to always keep in mind, the output model or brief will only be as accurate and useful as the data that is used to create it.

Conclusion:

A simple graphical model that grades cultural dynamics against each other and backs up the conclusions with referenced research could help bridge this information gap. The dynamic model can be created with initial information on a specific area and updated as new information is gathered through research or experience. As cultural awareness is enhanced, it can be leveraged with various communication methods to shape perceptions and future events, as well as highlight operational culture friction points before an incident occurs. Operationally, the model could be used for a unit to maintain cultural awareness and communicate cultural considerations for future units that will take over their area of responsibility.

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Preface

While attempting to not over simplify cultural dynamics, I hope to create a starting point that will spark some thought on methods to develop cultural values understanding. Deep rooted research should produce information that can be used, as it applies to any given region or small groups of people, to shape perceptions through well crafted communications that will resonate with targeted audiences. Anyone that has studied Counter-Insurgency Operations realizes that civil operations, based off of cultural understanding, are a vital front towards denying the insurgency the critical popular support required to sustain their operations. In order to affect positive long lasting change, we have to be able to understand the current cultural framework so that we may influence changes to that culture in a meaningful way and, often, in very subtle manners towards strategic goals. The final metrics that will determine if we are successful in using cultural knowledge and understanding will be determined by establishing and maintaining meaningful communication with a group of people that hold on to an historically different value system and minimize the effects of natural culture friction points between the host nation's norms and our own.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In all cultures there exist intrinsic values with varied degrees of emotional ties. It is through these values that people identify themselves, guide their actions, and perceive the world around them. The value system of any group of people derives from both formal and informal pressures and is specific to that group people. Understanding the priorities, their degree of significance, and their relationship to the dynamics of a region would enable U.S. military forces to be more lucid of our actions in the context of our environment and reduce the unintended consequences. The question then becomes, how do we access cultural values and present the information in an easily understandable format? Prior to deploying overseas, a military unit receives information on the countries and regions that they will be entering. The information comes from country handbooks, CIA country fact book, independent study, professional reading, and from regional experts.

The quantity of information can be daunting to the average person and filtering the information to make it meaningful to the average military personnel is difficult at best. In order to distill the information and present it in a usable fashion to operational units, we can employ a model that grades the most important aspect of a culture and presents the finding in a graphical representation. The purpose is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the culture and highlight possible friction points when taken in conjunction with our own value system. In addition, the model should be flexible enough to change as information is gathered and refined to a granular level to more specific groups of people (i.e. sub-regions, cities, ethnic groups, or religious groups).

If you want to know someone, you have to know what is important to that person. If you want to know how to interact with that person, then you must be able to compare your values to

that person's values. These ideas apply to personal relationships as well as diplomatic relationships between sovereign nations and should be leveraged to assist with establishing better working relationships with our allies as well as civilian populations, enemies, and those who have yet to take sides. Only through the use of a detailed repeatable methodology can we accurately baseline the value system of any given region and make it useful to operational commanders on the scene as it applies to the human terrain of his battlespace. In the 1940's *Marine Corps Small Wars Manual*, one section specifically states that we must be mindful of three fundamental considerations:

- 1. Social customs such as class distinctions, dress, and similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration.*
- 2. Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed.*
- 3. [A] respect for religious customs.¹*

The underlining requirements in the Small Wars Manual outlines the need for the US Military units to gain a familiarity and respect of the local culture- to include the language, political and social structure, and economic factors- in order to prevent unintentionally creating a hostile environment and to methodically promote "the spirit of good will."²

II. MILITARY APPLICATION OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 expands upon the premise of cultural application by stating that "Civil Considerations" is an essential part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and is "critical to the success of operations."³ Although the cultural aspect of operational

preparation is now becoming a standard in planning, it is even more vital in respect to Counterinsurgency operations where influence of the masses will ultimately achieve victory or result in defeat. The manual specifically calls out six “socio-cultural” factors that should be analyzed to get a clearer picture of the people in your Area of Operation: society, social structure, culture, language, power, authority, and interests.⁴

As we conduct our in depth cultural analysis, it is inevitable that we will discover certain aspects that are more prominent and influential in a given culture. Societies are built off of political authority, territory, and shared identity with varied degrees of importance. By assigning numerical values to the critical aspects, we can begin to quickly differentiate cultural variations within the same region. This would apply to social structures that are created as a result of tribes, religion, nationality, and ethnic identity.⁵

Even amongst coalition partners that speak the same language, cultural differences can affect operations and relationships in significant manners. During WWII, the British and American soldiers experienced a great deal of friction over perceived cultural insensitivities, such as the way they spoke to each other or the way they interacted with members of the opposite sex from different nationalities. In a study of “The Application of Anthropology to Cross National Communications”, Dr Meade discovered differences in child rearing that manifested themselves in adulthood through the manner in which we communicate.⁶ Although the British and Americans shared the ideal that the strong are obligated to help the weak, they developed misconceptions of each other due to more and less aggressive methods of communication. The interpretation was the Americans liked to ‘boast’ and the British were ‘arrogant’. We shared the same goals in the war and many common cultural values but learned habits from childhood translated into communication gaps that resulted in misplaced animosity.⁷

The idea is to evaluate how a member of a cultural group sees himself, what is important to him and consider it when developing our operational objectives, goals, and the methods we use to achieve them. The way it is defined by the United States Marine Corps' *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* manual is that Operational Culture is "Those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operation."⁸ The fruit of this type of research is ultimately an increase in the quality and effectiveness of our communications with various competing groups of people in any given area of operation.

III. MARKETING YOUR MESSAGE

When commercial industries market their products overseas, they complete a comprehensive study to aid them in sending the correct message to specific parts of the world. They understand that a message that resonates well in the U.S. may not have the same effect in a different culture. As a result, they understand that the difference between success and failure is determined in large part by the way they market their product to appeal to the unique local perception as it relates to their culture. We in the military have a message that we often want to convey to unfamiliar people. The effectiveness of transferring our message can likewise be equated to operational success or failure.

An example taken from the commercial sector can be taken from Chrysler's campaign to market the Jeep in France and Germany. The company hired a cultural anthropologist by the name of Dr. Clotaire Rapaille to conduct research and make recommendations to guide them in this area. During the course of his research, he used a model known as the "Culture Code" to assist him. The idea of "the code" was to be able to determine three things: 1) how we see

ourselves, 2) how others see themselves, and 3) how others see us. When it came to the Jeep, the end result was that the French and Germans could very easily be endeared to the product by using historical references. The Jeep, to the French, reminded them of the American military coming into France and ridding them of the tyrannical German occupation. For the Germans, the jeep conjured up emotions of the Americans rescuing them from their darker days. On the recommendation of the anthropologist, the Jeep model was renamed from the Wrangler to the Liberator. It was “the code” that worked for both nations equally and resulted in a very successful marketing campaign based off of images of hope and the end of difficult days.⁹ This code system was used for various other products with the idea that values and beliefs shaped by our culture give objects and actions meaning. But, the actual meaning varies greatly depending on the cultural values of a given group of people.

Upon further studies in 2005, this anthropologist made general codes for these countries as a starting point toward market research. The French were generally confused by the Americans. The Americans were filling a role in the world that they thought belonged to them, spreading ideas of democracy and freedom, even though they didn't think that the Americans were fit for that job. At the same time, the French generally associated the landing on the moon, Hollywood, and Disney like fantasy with the United States. Essentially, Americans are “childlike” and “naïve” but also very powerful. The code for America that Dr Rappaille came up with is “Space Traveler”.¹⁰

The Germans, known for being very methodical and organized had a different view of the American culture. In their eyes, they appreciated and admired the American accomplishments and leadership in the world, but expressed disbelief in our abilities. Americans approach things in a “haphazard” manner, but they manage to accomplish amazing things in the world and do the

morally right thing. The associate code for the way the Germans see the Americans is “John Wayne”. Strong, tough, and never shoots first. The strain with the Germans since Operation Iraqi Freedom is a result of this cultural image. In the minds of the Germans, “we shot first” in Iraq and our purpose for invading appears dubious. In essence, our actions are contradictory to the code that they have for us and it is that clash in expectations that is causing so much angst with the German popular view of America.¹¹

The German response to Operation Iraqi Freedom shows stark contrasts with the manner in which the British responded. The British see Americans as “big, loud, powerful, vulgar, extreme, and determined to win at any cost.” They also “admire our confidence, passion, record of success, and can-do attitude.” When talking to Brits, they think of America in terms of size. Large houses, vast land, and doing things in big ways. The code for the British attitude towards the United States was labeled as “Unashamedly Abundant.” In this respect, our response to the events on September 11, 2001 and the military operations into Iraq were in line with their code for us and the Brits have maintained a generally favorable opinion of the United States when other ally countries have seen opinion polls drop dramatically.¹²

There is no doubt that the “Long War” or “Global War on Terror” is in essence a War of Perception. Tactical and operational decisions often have strategic implications when the media, friendly or adversarial, gets a hold of a series of events and broadcasts it with “their spin”. Although it often appears that we are failures in this realm, the fact is that the United States is a master in this area as shown by our political election campaigns and commercial marketing abilities. Waging a successful war requires the use of all the elements of national power. In the realm of information, we have yet to use all the resources available to us to shape our message

and present it in a fashion that will resonate throughout the various communities throughout the world and take vital public support away from our enemies.

IV. CULTURAL VALUES DEFINED

The choice of a point of view is the initial act of any culture.

- José Ortega y Gasset¹³

Cultural values are significant to anyone that is attempting to interact with a group of people. Politicians are masters of understanding these traits and exploiting them to win influence and action from people.

“Values matter in how they guide social action. They do so by accounting for the world as it is constructed- making sense of it and why we should even act in it at all in a meaningful way... Values serve different functions for different people.”¹⁴

What is perhaps most important in the above statement is the fact that values vary greatly in regard to different groups of people. That is why when someone is conducting research for a cultural evaluation; you can never assume that a macro snap-shot can be directly applied to the micro or tactical levels of operation. The larger the scale the cultural study, the more general and inaccurate the conclusions or analysis will be.

Of the various cultural values, some researchers believe that it is the “Structural Beliefs” that are most important. Structural beliefs “usually involve an entity or entities which are related to but are in some senses outside the world in which we live, have at least some improbable and counter-intuitive characteristics, and are usually independent of time”¹⁵ such as religion and

tribal identity. These beliefs are taught from a very early age and are absorbed due to a process known as “imprinting”. As a result, these beliefs or learned behaviors are very difficult to change, unlike learning that occurs later in life. These imprinted beliefs will be among the ones held onto the strongest, and by inference, could take generations to change or evolve.¹⁶ These beliefs are emotionally binding often in the form of ethereal concepts such as “life after death” as a part of their religious “faith”.¹⁷

The premise is that our belief system directly affects how we see what the “truth is” and how we rationalize the concept. If people are told something that contradicts their beliefs, it is easy to understand why they would view the information with suspicion and come to the conclusion that the information is false. (Ref Appendix A)¹⁸ To think that a group of people will see the world in the same way as the American service members would be to assume that they share our same beliefs. Regardless of our similarities, it is unlikely that we will share all of our beliefs in the same manner. The fact of the matter is that a group’s belief systems will shape their perception, and perceptions are more important than what we consider to be the truth, especially when we are working in a counter-insurgency environment where the popular support is the key to success.

Cultures evolve. They develop and change over time in order to survive and flourish as the world around it evolves. One theory suggests that cultures that are unable to grow, don’t survive.¹⁹ Some cultural evolutionary theorists conclude that when cultures clash, over the long run the larger complicated culture will win out over the smaller simpler cultures. Internal bonds are strengthened by cultural tendencies such as moral codes, religious rituals, speech patterns, and clothing. These internal bonds strengthen the resolve of cultures during clashes.

Technology increases cultural cohesion and larger groups tend to be more innovative in creating and adapting technology.²⁰ This means that we cannot accept a perceived cultural obstacle as a constant that cannot be changed. Change is both possible as it is inevitable.

As we look deeper into culture as an imperative to conducting successful operations in asymmetric environments, we will not be fully capable of accomplishing the cultural part of the task with the personnel that we have internal to our services as they are currently structured and trained. Culture and civil conflict are directly related. One theory even suggests that it is the first of six stages in the escalation to civil war. Differences in culture result in differences in interests, resulting in tension followed by conflict, violence, and civil war.²¹ Only with the assistance of dedicated historians, anthropologists, city planners, and sociologists can we even begin to understand the complicated and, often, very “strange” environments in which we will be tasked to conduct military operations and make meaningful changes.

V. PROBLEM STATEMENT

When the United States military deploys overseas, whether it is in the capacity of humanitarian relief or counterinsurgency, it is imperative that we understand the cultural values of the region, so that we can avoid making strategic errors and enhance our ability to be a positive influence in the world. In most cases, the commanders are left to rely on “Country Handbooks” or open source material that, although informative, does not necessarily provide the information in a usable fashion that would be required by the operational forces to track value trends and adjust them to their specific area of operation. In addition, a proactive commander will need the ability to present the information in a manner specific to the region, sub-region, or

group of people in his area of responsibility. Once he is able to achieve cultural situational awareness, it must then be transferable laterally as well as vertically to subordinate unit leaders. The objective of our cultural studies is to achieve the ability to effectively communicate our message through out the levels of operation to our target audience.

VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. INTRODUCTION OF SOLUTION

This research paper will introduce a Cultural Values Model that can be leveraged as part of the human terrain preparation for any given region prior to commencement of military operations. In addition, the model provides a vehicle to communicate a perspective of these cultural influences to other units or individuals that will be operating in the same area. The *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications* serves as an excellent starting point for cultural studies. The five dimensions that are outlined in the manual are: Physical Environment, Economic System, Social Structure, Political Structure, and Beliefs and Symbols. The details under those dimensions will provide the anthropological background and guidance for the evaluation process.²² The model would be developed and maintained outside of the Intelligence section, so that professional participation by regional experts and anthropologies would not be placed in a situation that would put them at ethical odds with their professional ethos. It is a fact that the only way to properly refine this type of model and ensure its accuracy would be to use regional experts in its development. The initial template would include major items for consideration, but it would not be restricted to those specific items. Flexibility, simplicity, and understandability are key elements to a successful representation of a value

system. The final product will serve to define the cultural battlespace for the commander to use during the Marine Corps Planning Process.

The model could be applied by starting with a national or regional level model and then be refined to the micro level as needed to cover significant groups of people or regions. For example, in situations like Iran, a model would be created for the country as a whole, the major cities, and rural areas. A national level model would reveal the significance of their historical heritage. As the model was refined to smaller regions, the importance of their history would continue to be a significant factor.²³ In contrast, when examining the role of women, we would see indications in Tehran that women are afforded the opportunity to achieve prominence and share a great deal of equality with men that is unmatched throughout most of the rest of the Middle East; where as people in rural Iranian regions may not value this as much. The reason for this is that Tehran is considered to have been more influenced by westernized values than the rural parts of Iran where traditional male dominated norms have been maintained.²⁴ As regional research moves forward, we will see that there are diverse cultural groups with dissimilar values in areas that we might have other wise expected to be more homogenous. Specifically in Iran, the population could be categorized along the various geographic, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or tribal lines. Each category clearly shows the magnitude of the diversity of the Iranian population.²⁵ As the models are refined for smaller geographic regions or groups of people, they will increase in accuracy.

B. APPLICATION OF SOLUTION

Based on a scale of zero to ten, assessed values will be graded by the value that the local regional populace generally place on that category. The higher the number, the more valued that

item is in the local culture. “Zero” would equate to no significant value and “Ten” would equate to an item that would be fiercely defended to the point of being willing to kill or die for if offended or threatened. Each value would require two narratives: one that defines the topic and one that gives a detailed justification for the graded value.




Figure 1

Once the model is complete, an analysis would be conducted to assess where the greatest potential for friction points would exist. Friction points would be activity that would result in local strain as a result of individual or group action. Friction points can be divided into natural and operational.

Natural Friction points would be determined by comparing the analysis charts to our own values. Any actions that our personnel would consider “normal” by our standards while at the

same time possibly offensive in the eyes of local cultural norms, would be natural points that could result in friction and unintended consequences. These encompass many of the “do’s and don’ts” that would normally be briefed as part of a cultural indoctrination. Any areas where the differences in values from the U.S. culture and the local culture were greatest would be considered significant and require special emphasis when briefing units prior to operating in the region.

As an example of Natural Friction from the model above, Sex is given a high mark. Sex would be defined as the constraints placed on people according to their sex. Women might have few rights and not be allowed to speak to males in casual conversation in public. This could easily be a friction point for U.S. troops that didn’t understand the local culture surrounding the interaction of women and men. The effects could result in wide spread disdain from locals towards U.S. forces for their lack of respect for this cultural taboo. Any organized resistance to the presence of U.S. forces could easily leverage this event to further resistance to U.S. efforts.

Operational Friction is the result of military activity and could be intentional or unintentional. One of the goals of this model is to help limit the unintended consequences and maximize our influence through positive action. Operational Friction, once understood and calculated, can be assessed for cultural risk. For example, if a unit commander has a meeting with a local Imam at a mosque, he may determine that it is worth the operational risk (or break from operational Standard Operating Procedures) to take his shoes off prior to entering the mosque for the meeting. On the other hand, if a squad chases an enemy sniper into a mosque, they would enter without hesitation and without removing their footwear. In understanding that it is forbidden to enter a mosque with shoes, the unit leader would want to consider apologizing

for the intrusion on the way out in order to convey respect for the religious tradition and reduce the amount of friction incurred. This, of course, is assuming that the Imam was not complicit with the enemy sniper. Showing respect and reestablishing honor sends a very strong message.

By identifying the friction points ahead of time, we can make a drill down model to identify specifics in that category. The number of layers can be determined by the features of the model or as the situation requires. Using Figure 2, the hypothetical model depicts religion as the most significant value category and, as a result, would warrant more information. Religion is then expanded by creating a separate model with categories that relate directly to religion in that region.




Figure 2

When examined in respect to the way the United States population might value these same items, tribal identity shows the greatest contrast in value. This would indicate an area where Americans would have the least natural understanding or appreciation. To a commander, it would be an area that would be identified immediately as a cultural training requirement. The

lack of preparation for dealing with tribal areas could easily result in unintended friction (or Operational Friction) with the local population and leadership.

VII. CASE STUDY

As a case study model, the following is a values model created from the information found in the standard United States Marine Corps' *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations for Kuwait* produced by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.²⁶ This is indicative of the type of information that would be typically available to an operational unit prior to gaining physical access to a new operational area. Even by limiting ourselves to this information, we can build a baseline model to brief operational units and make cross culture comparisons to other operational environments. The categories and values were selected by reading through the entire Kuwaiti brief and analyzing the information for common themes in the Kuwaiti population. Although the information is often qualitative in nature, at some point the analyst will have to make judgment calls when creating the model. Conclusions that appear to be uncertain should trigger the analyst into conducting further research to increase the level of accuracy. In this case, Kuwait was picked because it is geographically small in size and the population is relatively homogeneous in comparison to most other countries in the world. (see Figure 3)




Figure 3

The above model provides the basis for a concise briefing to explain what is important in the Kuwait Operational Area (see Figure 3) and how their main points compare to our own. An important note when examining the Kuwait model is that National Identification is the most significant aspect of culture. This is significant for two reasons. One, it is only recently that this became a reality in the culture. The invasion of Kuwait in 1991 by Iraq had a galvanizing effect on the citizens of Kuwait. What makes this significant is that Tribal Identity in the region is typically more significant than National Identity. Kuwait is one of the rare examples where this is not the case due to the 1991 Invasion and an active program on the part of the ruling al-Sabah family to supersede tribal affiliations and loyalty to merchant families.²⁷

In addition, the graph depicts the importance Kuwaitis place on various groups of people. For example, the pecking order that came out when creating the graph starts with Male Kuwait Citizens, followed by Female Kuwait Citizens, Arabs, skilled foreign workers and, at the bottom, unskilled foreign workers.²⁸ (see Figure 4) A major source of tension in Kuwait is with their overwhelmingly large group of foreign workers. The model clearly shows why there

would be tension in this area. Foreigners are not held in very high regard and, although they are transient, they make up about 50% of the population.




Figure 4

Interestingly enough, with the emphasis on Kuwaiti identity there is very little distinction that is drawn between the social classes. Another area that westerners might find a bit difficult to understand without research is the concept of trespassing. Based off of Bedouin traditions, Kuwaitis have very little regard to respecting personal property lines. As a result, Kuwaitis do not readily see an issue with people walking across property that does not belong to them.²⁹ A foreign company operating in Kuwait could easily draw negative attention if they did not understand this and tried enforcing a different set of norms.

Regionally, Kuwait is unique in many historical ways which in turn makes its cultural values a bit distinctive to the surrounding Middle Eastern nations. Since the nation was never subjected to colonialism, there is a lack of social baggage that seems to endure with former

colonial subjected nations. A model of Iran would show that unlike Kuwait, their national identity is very strongly connected to their historical lineage to "the great Persian Empire".³⁰

When examined in terms of cross-cultural comparison with the United States, we see some distinctions that are worth noting. For example, Kuwait is a male dominated society. Although the argument can be made that the U.S. is also male dominated, the degree is far less than in Kuwait. On the other hand, both cultures have a low sense of class structure. There will always be certain categories that are important to one group and do not register with another one. In the case of Kuwait and the United States, the al-Sabah family and tribal structure would not appear at all prominently with Americans. In cases like this, we would use these findings as indicators of cultural gaps. These gaps would be areas that would be very unfamiliar to the average American.

Like it was mentioned earlier, this model is a baseline that would be open to refinement expansion as more information is gathered or as experts add their perspective. The information for this section is a product of one single official Marine Corps source. When this model was presented to Dr Amin Tarzi, Director of Middle Eastern Studies for the Marine Corps University, he quickly noted several inaccuracies. For example, in Dr. Tarzi's experience, there are clearly pronounced distinctions between social classes in Kuwait. This is one example of how inaccurate sources will produce inaccurate models. Kuwait is a small nation where a national model would be feasible. In most nations, if there are significant differences between geographical regions or groups of people, the model would have to be tailored to fit those specific scenarios.³¹ As a result, the model was created to be flexible so that it could be changed as needed and as more reliable information is available.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Cultural understanding is more than knowing the “do’s” and “don’ts” of a given region. It occurs when a person is able to grasp how someone else perceives the world around them and can anticipate their reaction to events that have yet to occur. The only way to reach that point of cultural enlightenment is through intense study and assistance from professionals that have conducted research in this specific discipline. It is unlikely that very many military leaders will have the opportunity to reach the point of regional expertise combined with PhD level scholastic education in professional disciplines such as cultural anthropology in the near future. Regardless of the circumstances, we have an obligation to build the organizational structure to institutionalize culture as a formal line of operation.

For the average Marine, a usable model that defines the values of a region would be very useful before entering a region with a culture vastly different than our own. In order for that model to be functional, the information that is used to build it must be accurate. All models rely completely on the input of valid data. If the input data is flawed, regardless of how it is analyzed or processed, the output will also be flawed. Inherently, any solution will fundamentally require the inclusion of anthropologists and regional experts to take part in a detailed evaluation process.

The only certainty in any analysis of the human condition, is that it will never be completely accurate. Culture is constantly evolving. When cultures come into contact, they evolve even faster. Capturing cultural values and differences can be significant factors in conflict resolution. As shown in this paper, some theorists’ believe that differences in culture to be the root of many conflicts. To neglect culture when attempting to resolve violence makes any resolutions unlikely to have long term success.³²

The implications of enhancing our communication abilities through cultural studies are not limited by any means to the operational level. From tactical decision making to Information Operations to Strategic Communications, detailed cultural understanding plays a significant role. We have the ability to leverage a great pool of civilian talent to market our message to the world wide communities and tailor messages to specific regions of interest. In the War on Terror or Long War, we should be able to do a better job with Middle Eastern regions by marketing our position in manners that will resonate with their cultural values and perceptions. This world wide effort is a war in which the most important front is the battle with Islamic extremists to influence Muslim perceptions of the West and Islam.

Operational Culture is an aspect of planning that will not be short lived. I expect that for the foreseeable future, cultural values assessments along with the application of that knowledge in information operations will play an integral role in all military operations. An agreement on the actual process will likely be a lengthy debate. Even within the anthropology community, there are many methods and disagreement concerning this topic. Like the model in this paper, field work or, in military terminology, operational experience is key to creating an accurate model.³³

Still in its infancy, this integration of academic studies with information and counterinsurgency operations based off of cross-cultural modeling will require a great deal of maturing. Ideally, one day it will become its own major component equal to Operations, Logistics, and Intelligence. Even more importantly, this discipline will form the nucleus of interagency operations, guiding how we allocate our precious resources to achieve holistic long term solutions to complicated problems.

IX. APPENDICES

A. STRUCTURED BELIEFS MODEL

When taking anthropology models for language and knowledge into consideration, we can see how it is important to understand culture vice judging it and how it ultimately leads to how people acquire knowledge and perceive truth. This is one example of how that concept is explained,

1. *People normally obey rules (default case)*

General cooperative rule is:

2. *Rule: Try to help, not harm.*

Combined with a belief such as 3, we can instantiate 2 as a Gricean conversational rule of informativeness, as in 4:

3. *Knowledge is beneficial, helpful. (Corollary: Misinformation is harmful)*
4. *Rule: Give knowledge (inform others); do not misinform.*

[The] model of knowledge and information gives us the following proof of 7 from 5 and 6:

5. *Beliefs have adequate justification.*
6. *Adequate justified beliefs are knowledge (= are true).*
7. *Therefore, Beliefs are true (are knowledge).*

7 allows us to reinterpret our helpfulness-rule 4 yet again:

8. *Rule: Say what you believe (since beliefs are knowledge); do not say what you do not believe (this = misinformation)³⁴*

B. NOTES

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- ¹ *Small Wars Manual*. headquarters: U.S. Marine Corps, 1990, page 19.
- ² *Small Wars Manual*, page 45.
- ³ Petraeus, David. *Counterinsurgency*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: HQ Department of the Army, 2006, section 3-3.
- ⁴ Petraeus, page 3-3 to 3-4.
- ⁵ Petraeus, page 3-4 to 3-5.
- ⁶ Mead, Margaret. *Anthropology: A Human Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, Nj D. Van Nostrand Company 1964, page 107-110.
- ⁷ Mead, page 107-110.
- ⁸ Salmoni, Barak, and Paula Holmes-Eber. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 2007, page 14.
- ⁹ Rapaille, Clotaire. *The Culture Code: An Ingenious Way to Understand Why People Around the World Live and Buy as They Do*. New York City: Broadway, 2007, page 3.
- ¹⁰ Rapaille, page 171-172.
- ¹¹ Rapaille, page 173-174.
- ¹² Rapaille, page 174-175.
- ¹³ Eller, Jack David. *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on Ethnic Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, page 49.
- ¹⁴ Harrison, Lawrence, and Samuel Huntington. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books, 2000, p. 148.
- ¹⁵ Coon, Carleton S.. *Culture Wars and the Global Village : A Diplomat's Perspective*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000, page 102.
- ¹⁶ Coon, page 102.
- ¹⁷ Coon, page 108.
- ¹⁸ *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, page 47.
- ¹⁹ Coon, page 58.
- ²⁰ Coon, page 58-59.
- ²¹ Schmidt, Bettina, and Schroder Ingo. *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (European Association of Social Anthropologists)*. New York: Routledge, 2001, page 179.
- ²² Salmoni, Barak, and Paula Holmes-Eber. *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 2007, page 51.
- ²³ Britannica, Encyclopedia. *Iran: The Essential Guide to a Country on the Brink*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 2006, page 45.
- ²⁴ *Iran: A Country Study (Area Handbook Series)*. New York: Government Printing Office, 1989.
- ²⁵ Price, Massoume. *Iran's Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook (Ethnic Diversity Within Nations)*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005, pages 93 – 131.

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- ²⁶ *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Kuwait*. Quantico, VA: MCIA, 2003
- ²⁷ *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Kuwait*. Quantico, VA: MCIA, 2003.
- ²⁸ *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Kuwait*. Quantico, VA: MCIA, 2003.
- ²⁹ *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Kuwait*. Quantico, VA: MCIA, 2003.
- ³⁰ Price, page 267.
- ³¹ *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Kuwait*. Quantico, VA: MCIA, 2003.
- ³² Bradford, James. *The Military and Conflict Between Cultures: Soldiers at the Interface (Texas A & M University Military History Series)*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997, page 205-211.
- ³³ Moore, Frank W.. *Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology*. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1966, pages 50-76.
- ³⁴ *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, page 47.

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