Planning for Diversity. Options and Recommendations for DoD Leaders

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Preface

This report is intended to lay the initial groundwork for the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) development of a strategic plan to accelerate its effort to achieve greater diversity among its active duty and civilian leadership. While DoD components have begun their own efforts to increase diversity among their leadership, a department-wide plan is needed to guide, support, and streamline these efforts. Each chapter of this report elaborates on a specific element of a strategic plan; from vision, mission, and goals to strategies and evaluation. This report outlines DoD’s various options for each element, with related empirical and anecdotal evidence gathered from the literature and the DoD Diversity Summit, an event that brought together experts from DoD, academia, and the public and private sectors. This report should be of interest to military policymakers, specifically the senior leadership, as well as those interested in issues related to diversity.

The research was sponsored by the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted by the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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Summary

With this report, we aim to assist DoD leaders in their effort to develop a strategic plan to achieve greater diversity among DoD active duty and civilian leadership. In order for the strategic plan to be effective, DoD leaders must define diversity and explain how they intend to measure progress toward greater diversity and how they will hold themselves and others accountable for such progress. Major institutional changes may be required to improve diversity among the senior leadership. Therefore, the highest level of DoD leadership, not just from the personnel community but also from other functional communities, needs to be involved in this effort. To aid DoD leaders’ deliberation, we provide policy options and recommendations based on discussions at the 2007 DoD Diversity Summit\(^1\) and a review of scientific literature on diversity management. The strategic plan that emerges from this current effort will guide the departmental effort in achieving diversity of the leadership of DoD’s total force (both civilian and military personnel) in all components (the Military Departments as well as the Fourth Estate\(^2\)).

This report describes distinct aspects of strategic planning: vision, mission and goals, strategies, and evaluation. Each section poses specific questions for DoD leaders, summarizes insights found in diversity

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\(^1\) The 2007 DoD Diversity Summit was sponsored by the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity and coordinated by RAND and was held February 27–28, 2007, in Arlington, Va. We provide a condensed version of the transcript in the appendix.

\(^2\) The Fourth Estate consists of the defense agencies, DoD field activities, and defense-wide programs.
literature and experiences shared at the 2007 DoD Diversity Summit, and explores implications of the various options for each element of the strategic plan.

**Vision: Diversity and Diversity Management Defined**

“What kind of organization do DoD leaders want the department to be?” To answer this question, the leaders must adopt a standardized definition of *diversity* for the department and specify a style of diversity management that is consistent with the adopted definition.

Based on the literature on diversity management and discussions at the DoD Diversity Summit, we identify three possible definitions of *diversity* for DoD:

- The first definition focuses on representation of certain groups, commonly based on U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) categories, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and disability.
- The second definition is broader and encompasses a multitude of attributes that can influence the effectiveness of DoD in executing its mission.
- The third definition is a combination of both. It calls for prioritizing representation of certain groups and includes attributes based on DoD’s needs and mission-readiness.

In this report, we discuss aspects of each definition in detail and recommend that DoD adopt a vision based on the third definition. This will result in a vision that will have historical credibility and a clear “business case.” Both are essential elements of an inspiring vision. Having historical credibility is important, because internal and external stakeholders—minority and female civilian employees and service-members, members of Congress, and civil society at large—may perceive a vision without historical credibility as a way to avoid improving

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3 We provided a summary of the discussion in the appendix.
representation of minorities and women among the leadership. This perception would be reinforced by the fact that DoD’s estimates indicate virtually no prospect of an increase in representation of minorities or women in the higher ranks (flag and Senior Executive Service [SES]) for the next decade, while minority populations are expected to grow significantly in the near future (Defense Human Resources Board, 2005). Having a clear business case is essential, because a vision without a clear business case will fail to instill diversity as one of the core values of DoD in the workforce. This will weaken the implementation of the strategic plan.

Literature on diversity shows that organizations need to manage their diversity to reap its benefits. In fact, studies show that, without management, diversity may have no impact or, worse, a negative impact on work performance. In the report, we expound on two competing objectives: assimilation and inclusion. Assimilation implies unity and conformity; inclusion implies preserving identity and maintaining individual differences. While assimilation is important for unit cohesion, inclusion is an essential value for a diverse workforce.

**Mission and Goals: Who and What, Prioritized**

Once the vision articulates DoD’s future direction regarding the diversity of its workforce, the next step involves establishing the mission and goals. This step will specify the parameters for implementing the vision by defining the agent and scope of work and prioritizing the strategic action. Specifically, the mission can be either for the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO), a policy office within OSD, or for the entire DoD. If ODMEO is tasked exclusively with the mission, the existing organizational infrastructure will require little change and will further cement diversity as a human resources issue. If the mission is written for the entire DoD, there are two approaches to the mission: The mission can address diversity separately, or it can integrate diversity into the overall mission of DoD. Both approaches may require major institutional changes, including policies and practices, but addressing diversity separately will treat diversity as an end
goal, whereas the latter approach will treat diversity as a means toward accomplishing the core mission of DoD. Finally, the goals—derived from vision and mission—will communicate the leadership’s priorities to the rest of DoD, serving as a guide to implementation and resource allocation. DoD leadership can emphasize improving representation, the overall climate, or capacity to carry out operations through diversity. We do not recommend a particular approach, for the choice is contingent on how DoD leaders define their diversity vision. However, it is essential that mission and goals also be consistent with the scope of diversity vision.

**Strategies: Main Vehicles to Implementing the Vision**

Strategies must be tightly linked to the established vision, mission, and goals. Diversity strategies can be grouped into two broad categories:

- *process strategies* that are related to operational elements, including but not limited to accessions, development, career assignments, promotion, and retention
- *enabling strategies* that involve functions that are more far-reaching in nature, such as leadership engagement, accountability, and culture.

The impact of the strategic plan on the ways DoD does business will depend directly on the strength of enabling strategies. In other words, enabling strategies are necessary conditions for the success of process strategies. This is because the essence of diversity management calls on individuals to go beyond the comfort of familiarity and uniformity.

For example, consider a situation in which a supervisor is faced with a hiring decision in which she must choose between two equally qualified applicants, and one of the applicants comes from a different (unfamiliar) background. The background characteristics need not be limited to race, ethnicity, or gender; they could be religion, socioeconomic background, educational level, specialty, career field, or mili-
tary experience. Hiring the applicant with the different background will increase the diversity of her work unit, but the supervisor may consider this action risky for her mission at hand. If she has received a clear direction from her top leaders that taking a measured risk for achieving greater diversity is one of the core values of DoD, she will be empowered to overcome her discomfort of unfamiliarity. Increasing the diversity of DoD requires that thousands of decisionmakers in a similar situation go beyond the comfort of familiarity in favor of diversity.

**Evaluation: Measures to Guide Progress**

Evaluation serves as the link between strategic planning and implementation by tracking the progress of on-the-ground efforts and informing accountability processes. Metrics for evaluation ought to be derived from the vision, but this is not currently the case with diversity because the field lacks appropriate metrics. Various metrics are available or under development to measure

- diversity in a group
- organizational climate
- intermediate (process) and final outcomes.

Many of these metrics are untested or not feasible to apply in the field. Most organizations, including DoD and its components (the Military Departments and the Fourth Estate), default to measurement of demographic representation and climate surveys, even though they have adopted a broad vision of diversity that goes beyond demographic diversity. This mismatch between the vision and metrics results in confusion and dilutes the impact of diversity initiatives. A more strategic approach for DoD would involve (1) determining what needs to be measured according to the leadership’s vision and mission for diversity and (2) employing and/or developing metrics that support the vision and mission. Head counting, for example, is appropriate for measuring representations of certain groups, but it will not completely capture the
most important aspects of a diversity vision that emphasizes inclusion. DoD must be creative and innovative when developing new metrics that focus on mission-readiness.

**Choices for DoD Leaders**

DoD leaders face critical choices in each aspect of the strategic plan. DoD leaders may choose a strategic plan with a narrow scope, which is conventional and compatible with the current organizational structure. Or they may craft an expansive plan that will further integrate diversity management into all aspects of the organization. For example, DoD leaders may choose a vision based on representations of groups based on EEOC categories. This choice will certainly provide a familiar setting for the institution, but the choice will not instill a direct link between diversity and the emerging operational environments that DoD faces (and will face in the future). Therefore, it will be difficult for DoD leaders to make a business case for diversity beyond its recruiting needs. On the other hand, going beyond a familiar definition of diversity based on EEOC categories, leaders will need to determine which attributes DoD wants to protect and foster. The discussion will need to involve top leaders from a wide range of professional/functional backgrounds. The effort will place the institution in an unfamiliar setting. The vision emerged from this process, however, will have a broad base of support and a tight link to operational needs.

Fortunately, most choices are not mutually exclusive; leaders may combine various features of alternative options to achieve optimal results.

**Recommendations**

We provide the DoD leadership with six recommendations:

1. Have the Secretary of Defense spearhead the strategic diversity effort.
2. Create an oversight committee with top DoD leaders from a wide range of professional/functional and personal backgrounds.

3. Adopt a vision that combines attention to traditionally protected groups with aims for creating an inclusive environment.

4. Expand strategies beyond accessions.

5. Invest in and develop rigorous metrics on all dimensions that support the strategic vision.

6. Design and apply a comprehensive accountability system with real rewards and consequences for individuals and groups.

We begin with recommendations that set a strong enabling environment for successful development of the strategic plan and its effective implementation. The personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense provides a clear signal to the workforce that ensuring diversity is a core value of the department and that managing diversity is a top priority. The Secretary should do more than issue a diversity statement and occasionally refer to diversity in speeches and press conferences. We recommend that the Secretary personally lead an oversight committee that approves and monitors the progress of diversity initiatives.

Consistent with our first recommendation, we recommend that DoD form an oversight committee of top leaders from a wide range of professional/functional and personal backgrounds to oversee the development of the strategic plan and its implementation by regularly meeting with DoD diversity managers. The members of the committee will provide insights from their vast experience and inputs from their functional communities. In addition, these leaders can serve as powerful champions for diversity.

As for strategic planning, we recommend that diversity be defined with attributes that are relevant to DoD’s mission, with race/ethnicity and gender prioritized. A definition of diversity without these historically significant attributes will not gain the credibility needed for successful implementation. We also recommend that DoD’s management approach be shifted toward creating an inclusive environment, with careful preservation of DoD’s unique values and norms. The mission may be best applied to all of DoD, and not just ODMEO, to ensure that diversity is not treated simply as a personnel issue.
In developing strategies, we recommend close alignment between the chosen vision and mission. It is critical that DoD employ strategies beyond those related to accessions. Moreover, it is essential that any major initiative, such as Develop 21st Century Leaders, explicitly address how it will achieve greater diversity among DoD civilian leadership.

The quality and effectiveness of an evaluation and accountability system depend on rigorous metrics. We recommend that DoD apply the most rigorous metrics available for all areas of interest, as reflected in the goals. If such metrics are not available, we recommend that DoD invest resources to develop them with experts in diversity measurement.

While this report mainly sets the stage for DoD leadership’s strategic planning, we encourage the leadership to carry the momentum behind planning and into implementation, within a reasonable yet swift timeline, to ensure that the next generation of leadership does not face the same challenge. Participants at the DoD Diversity Summit noted that diversity issues have been discussed at length in the past without any marked progress and therefore major institutional changes may be required for diversity goals to be realized. This report concludes with various strategies to transform the strategic plan to action.

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4 Develop 21st Century Leaders is an initiative that aims to address the challenges of the changing dynamics of the DoD (i.e., evolving from the Cold War paradigm in the midst of a downsized department and looming retirement among the baby boomer generation) by developing new and progressive strategies to recruit and retain a quality workforce.
We are grateful to Clarence A. Johnson, the principal director of Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, and James Love, Colonel James Campbell, and Marilee Perkal of our sponsoring office for the support and assistance they provided during this research. This work benefited from interaction with the Diversity Working Group and other representatives from DoD components.

This research also benefited from the assistance and intellectual contributions of many RAND colleagues, including James Hosek, Margaret Harrell, Greg Ridgeway, Lawrence Hanser, Beth Asch, and Susan Hosek.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFQT</td>
<td>Armed Forces Qualifying Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>chief executive officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>civilian labor force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Center for Naval Analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEOMI</td>
<td>Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHRB</td>
<td>Defense Human Resources Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>diversity management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWG</td>
<td>Diversity Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>equal opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEO</td>
<td>equal employment opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEOC</td>
<td>Equal Employment Opportunity Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLBT</td>
<td>gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIH</td>
<td>National Institutes of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODMEO</td>
<td>Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORRB</td>
<td>Officer Requirements Review Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLF</td>
<td>relevant civilian labor force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>Senior Executive Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFI</td>
<td>Total Force Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>U.S. Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
President Harry S. Truman ended racial segregation in the military by issuing Executive Order 9981 in 1948. Over the past 60 years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has overcome numerous challenges in maintaining and promoting racial and ethnic diversity, and the department has served as a model for racial integration, providing a “bridging environment” for minorities seeking upward mobility (Moore and Webb, 2000).

Contemporary military leaders regard effective diversity management as critical to national security. In fact, in 2003, 29 former military and civilian leaders of DoD—including several retired four-star generals, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and secretaries of defense—filed an amicus curiae brief, successfully urging the Supreme Court, in the case of Grutter v Bollinger, to uphold the University of Michigan law school’s affirmative action plan. Most observers agreed that the brief is “one of the most important Amicus Curiae Briefs ever submitted to the Supreme Court” (Groner, 2003). In the brief, the military leaders traced the history of race relations in the U.S. military and asserted that maintaining a highly qualified, diverse military leadership is essential to DoD’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security.

For these former DoD leaders, the negative effect of failure to maintain racial and ethnic diversity among the leadership on the department’s ability to execute its mission is “not theoretical, as the Vietnam era demonstrates.” They recounted that, during the Vietnam War, “the armed forces suffered increased racial polarization, pervasive
disciplinary problems, and racially motivated incidents in Vietnam and on posts around the world,” because the percentage of minority officers was “extremely low” relative to the percentage of African-Americans among the enlisted ranks (Becton et al., 2003, p. 6).

Coincidently, increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of the senior leadership has become a priority for DoD, from both external and internal perspectives. Many outside DoD have voiced concerns about underrepresentation of minorities and women among DoD’s top flag leadership. Members of Congress have inquired about DoD’s efforts on diversity, and others have highlighted DoD’s challenges with retention and promotion of minorities and women on several occasions (Lubold, 2006; Hosek et al., 2001; Baldwin, 1996; Meek, 2007). On the civilian side, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Management Directive 715 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2003) has been an incentive to create the infrastructure necessary to increase representation of currently underrepresented but protected groups in the DoD workforce. According to the directive, all federal agencies under EEOC’s domain must annually report on representation of protected groups, as well as any structural barriers that may be hindering their recruitment, promotion, and retention.

**Impetus for a Department-Wide Strategic Plan**

Momentum for change has also been developing from within the DoD. In May 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a directive to “put much more energy into achieving diversity at senior levels of services” (Diversity Working Group, 2005). The directive calls for improving the representation of minorities and women among senior active duty and civilian leaders in all components of DoD, the Military Departments, and the Fourth Estate. Despite future projections of minority growth in the United States, a recent senior-leader diversity forecast by the Defense Human Resources Board (DHRB) indicated virtually no prospect of change in representation of minorities or women in the higher ranks (flag and Senior Executive Service [SES]) for the next decade (DHRB, 2005). Participants at the DoD
Diversity Summit noted that these diversity issues have been discussed at length in the past without success, and therefore major institutional changes may be required for diversity goals to be realized (appendix, pp. 75, 93, 96–97).

In addition, the directive called for establishing a means for the Services to exchange effective diversity strategies. Responding to the directive, the Diversity Working Group (DWG) was established to coordinate the Services’ diversity efforts. The group, led by the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) and composed of representatives from the military departments and the Fourth Estate, has been meeting regularly to report progress and exchange ideas. As DWG continued to meet, it soon became clear that coordination and integration was needed at the department level. Components appeared to be pursuing different diversity goals yet expending resources to develop implementation capacities that could potentially be streamlined. Also, the components appeared to be struggling with similar issues, especially in areas of leadership involvement, development of future leaders, and analysis of diversity efforts. Table 1.1 illustrates a basic snapshot of the components’ initiatives along various dimensions of diversity strategies that have been identified as important for the success of diversity initiatives in organizations.

It is important to keep in mind that every component is in the early stages of long-term efforts and that this snapshot is not designed for evaluative purposes. It demonstrates, however, that cooperation and coordination are needed within DoD to ensure that these serious efforts benefit from department-wide guidance on diversity. After similar discussions within the DHRB, Secretary Rumsfeld called for a departmental strategic plan, one that would integrate Service strategies and programs into a department-wide course of action.

ODMEO, in turn, selected RAND to assist in facilitating this plan and collaborated in bringing together diversity experts from academia and the public and private sectors to meet with DoD representatives for two days of discussion and inquiry.
Table 1.1
Snapshot of Diversity Efforts Within DoD, by Component, Spring 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Strategic Plan</th>
<th>Track Progress</th>
<th>Top Leadership Involvement</th>
<th>Accountability Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Under development</td>
<td>Under development</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy—Active Duty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—campaign plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—CNO policy</td>
<td>CNO accountability reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy—Civilian</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Under development</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—CNO policy</td>
<td>Each commissioned officer held accountable for EEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Integrated —ORRB</td>
<td>Integrated campaign plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Estate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES: This snapshot is intended to demonstrate the efforts underway within DoD; none of the specific items have been evaluated for quality or effectiveness; “n.a.” (not available) reflects insufficient information for assessment. ORRB = Officer Requirements Review Board; CNO = Chief of Naval Operations; EEO = equal employment opportunity.

DoD Diversity Summit

On behalf of ODMEO, RAND convened a conference at the RAND office in Arlington, Va., on February 27 and 28, 2007. Representatives from DoD components, as well as experts from academia and the public and private sectors, gathered to present research findings, best practices, and on-the-ground updates on diversity efforts. Topics covered include defining diversity, using the right metrics for tracking and monitoring diversity efforts, determining the appropriate leadership competencies and programs to develop future leaders, and involving the leadership to spearhead diversity efforts. Panelists represented a
nevertheless, the introduction to the discussion of the different aspects of strategic planning: vision, mission and goals, strategies, and evaluation. Each section poses specific questions for DoD leaders, summarizes insights found in diversity literature and experiences shared at the 2007 DoD Diversity Summit, and explores implications of the various options for each element of the strategic plan.

This report has evolved into an outline of the strategic plan for two reasons: The literature indicated, and the conference confirmed, that (1) there is no a single, normative approach to diversity that is appropriate for all organizations and (2) the involvement of top leadership is critical to the success of any diversity effort. As such, the report is structured along the elements of a strategic plan, each with an array of options and discussion of the relevant research and practices. It is intended to inform senior DoD decisionmakers on issues affecting diversity and the implications of each course of action. With finite resources and time, it is imperative for DoD leadership to define an evidence-based roadmap that will not only produce desired results but also align those results with DoD’s overall mission and manpower planning.

The case for strategic planning is well supported. The diversity movement has grown over the past several decades to encompass mul-
multiple definitions and countless products that promise to revolution-
ize every part of an organization, from recruiting to exit interviews. The diversity industry, in and of itself, is a multibillion-dollar industry catering to organizations that want to be effective in diversity manage-
ment (Hansen, 2003).

In recent years, however, many have challenged the return on investment of diversity programs, especially in the absence of appro-
priate metrics that can provide scientific evidence of the value. For instance, in a recent five-year study on the impact of diversity on busi-
ness performance in large corporations, Kochan and colleagues report no association between gender or racial diversity and business perfor-
man ce (Kochan et al., 2003). Similarly, in a recent review of research (published between 1997 and 2005) on how work group diversity—
defined in numerous ways—affects group process and performance, van Knippenberg and Schippers concluded that the potential positive effect of diversity of work group performance is still inconclusive (van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). A more relevant review for DoD was conducted by Riche et al., who reviewed existing diversity man-
agement literature for the Air Force. They conclude:

There is qualified empirical support for the business case approach to diversity. Workforce diversity does have a measurable impact on corporate performance and can improve corporate outcomes, but the diversity-performance relationship is context dependent. Therefore, there is no empirical support for an organizationally optimal amount or type of diversity. There is, however, a strong case for diversity management to create conditions in which the negative effects of diversity are mitigated and the positive effects can be fully realized, especially for groups charged with innovation or decision-making. (Riche et al., 2005)

Applied correctly, strategic planning can help DoD create a suc-
cessful diversity management program, in terms of both processes and outcomes. Specifically, DoD leadership is positioned to define what diversity means, envision a future based on that definition, and select strategies that are most likely to bring about that vision. Without stra-
tegic planning, DoD could end up investing in an array of random
programs whose outcomes may or may not work toward achieving diversity goals. The results of the latter approach—not involving strategic planning—could be a diverse workforce that is not well managed (Thomas, 2006) or a workforce that is diverse in talent but not in demographics.

While strategic planning is a well-known tool used by many types of organizations, experts frequently note that it is often poorly executed and irrelevant in day-to-day decisions (Goodstein, Nolan and Pfeiffer, 1993). Some have referred to this phenomenon as the “knowing-doing gap,” which describes an all-too-common situation in which organizational leaders have acquired knowledge but are unable to translate that knowledge into change for their organizations (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000). In fact, Pfeffer and Sutton assert that technology and information accessibility have advanced to the point that the ability to act on knowledge, rather than knowledge itself, is the most common barrier to institutional change. While the top-down management structure of DoD is often effective in implementation, two factors may lead DoD to experience a knowing-doing gap with respect to diversity. The first factor relates to the quality and alignment of the strategic plan. The second relates to difficulties with implementation. Both are discussed below.

Avoiding the Knowing-Doing Gap

Most plans tend to lack the creativity required to envision a new and different future and fail to emphasize strategic over tactical elements. For DoD, it is especially vital for the plan to be strategic in nature so that each Service can translate it into tactical items according to its norms and infrastructure. Another important element of the strategic plan is its suitability to furnish criteria against which all related programs can be evaluated. Without a sound evaluation plan in place, organizations will not know whether or when they have achieved the vision.

In implementing institutional change, there are several potential pitfalls that can stall organizations (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000). These include when talk substitutes for action; when institutional memory is left intact; when fear of change pervades the organization, preventing
action; when measurement obstructs good judgment; and when internal competition creates ill will within the organization. Furthermore, competitive environments also make diversity management more difficult and make it more likely that increasing representation of previously underrepresented groups will actually impose costs rather than bring benefits. Given the historically sensitive and ambiguous nature of the topic and the size and complexity of DoD, it is possible for DoD to encounter one or more of these barriers. Much of the information in this report may appear to be common knowledge or repeat what many within DoD already know; however, the bigger challenge for senior leaders will begin once a strategic plan for diversity is in place.

Organization of This Report

This report is organized to mirror a strategic plan. Each chapter elaborates on a specific element of a strategic plan, laying out the various options with related scientific and anecdotal evidence gathered from the literature and the summit. The discourse is intended to help DoD leadership draft a roadmap that moves the organization into the future—a future that it will define. In its entirety, the plan ought to answer the set of key questions depicted in Figure 1.1.

Chapter Two begins to answer the first question with vision, which is the creative platform central to the strategic planning process. Vision sets strategic planning apart from long-term planning; it is about seeking a new, compelling future, not an extension of the old. Chapter Three continues with the mission and goals, with the former articulating the organization’s reason for being and the latter setting priorities. To be relevant, a mission statement that incorporates diversity must be congruent with the vision of the future workforce and the core values of DoD. Goals ought to provide a short list of tangible milestones for the organization to target. Chapter Four discusses strategies, which relate to the third question in Figure 1.1, “How does DoD bring about desired changes?” Strategies represent vehicles that will achieve the goals. They must take into account available resources, feasible incentives, and
DoD’s organizational culture. Chapter Five addresses the fourth question, “How will leaders assess how the department is changing?” by covering *evaluation*. Implementation implications are discussed in this chapter, as is the need for evaluation, in order to track progress at regular intervals. Finally, Chapter Six presents the RAND team’s analysis and recommendations to the DoD.
In its simplest form, the vision answers the questions, “Where do you want to go?” and “What will success look like?” It serves as the anchor to the strategic plan, differentiating it from long-range planning by depicting a new, idealized image of what the organization can be in the future. This responsibility falls entirely on the top leadership, who are positioned to initiate and sustain institutional change. Effective vision statements—those most likely to be implemented and adapted over time—are comprehensive yet detailed, such that they inspire action from all corners of the organization.¹ The vision ought to be broad enough so that everyone, rather than only some sectors, can identify with it. It also ought to employ terminology that is well defined, so that confusion does not arise in implementation.

When it comes to diversity, envisioning becomes especially important. According to the Defense Human Resources Board, the vision of DoD diversity is “to maintain a diverse, capable and ready civilian and military force” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, undated-a). This vision statement must be revisited to reflect the leadership’s intentions toward the future of the DoD workforce regarding what *diverse* means. Within DoD and elsewhere, the idea of diversity is not well defined. At the summit, each of the Services appeared to be operating under its own working definition of diversity. As an integral step toward articulating a diversity vision, DoD leadership must define what diversity means to all of DoD. Unless diversity is uniformly defined, the details

¹ Amanda Kraus, one of the summit presenters, also confirmed that the vision ought to be articulated in a way that makes it compelling to *all* members (see appendix, pp. 78–79).
of the plan that follows will be too abstract and not actionable for DoD components; diversity will connote different things to different people.

The term *diversity* has evolved over decades to refer to an array of attributes—from the traditional categories of race and ethnicity, gender, age, religion, disability, and national origin—to other categories, such as sexual orientation, language, talent, experience, paradigm, and even personality (Stockdale and Crosby, 2004). Clearly, some of these attributes are ascribed, while others can be achieved. The dynamics of diversity span the spectrum as well. Some consider representation to be a measure of diversity at work or a response to equal employment opportunity issues (Powell, 1993), while others value differences, managing diversity, and inclusion as a new institutional paradigm (Golembiewski, 1995; Thomas, 1996; Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich, 1999). Then there are the connotations and varying perceptions of these ideas, which are also significant. In a survey of employees in a branch office of a government agency, 45 percent of white men and 18 to 28 percent of minorities and/or females viewed the term *diversity* as a code word for affirmative action (Soni, 2000).

The process and outcomes of diversity efforts can vary greatly, depending on the definition of diversity that DoD chooses to adopt. Without a common definition of diversity and agreement on approach to diversity management, a strategic plan would default to a tactical plan that may or may not affect decisions made at the Service level. In this context, we discuss three possible definitions of diversity for the future of DoD. As a means to start the discussion about these different definitions, we begin with a summary of the current understanding of diversity, as reported during the summit. The purpose of presenting such information at the summit was to inform the non-DoD panelists and participants, with the intention of encouraging a meaningful dialogue, rather than for evaluation purposes. We encourage DoD to undertake a more comprehensive analysis as part of the strategic planning process.
Current State of Affairs: Rhetoric Versus Reality

DoD currently has no standard definition of diversity, and DoD components are not in sync. Table 2.1 summarizes the official and working definitions presented by each DoD component. Some of the definitions refer only to the differences among individuals that ought to be protected and fostered in the workforce; none go beyond to include how these differences should be managed and leveraged.

While it appears that the Services tend toward broader definitions of diversity (beyond race/ethnicity and gender), discussions that stem from the rhetoric suggest that efforts on the ground are focused on legally protected groups, mainly based on race/ethnicity and gender. (People with disabilities were also mentioned, but tangentially. Clearly, this group is relevant mainly to the civilian DoD workforce.) There may be several reasons for this disconnect between the visions and specific activities. One may be that the definitions are too broad and difficult to act on. Another may be the historical link between diversity and the civil rights movement that led to the rise of equal opportunity

Table 2.1
Definitions of Diversity, Provided by DoD Components at DoD Diversity Summit, February 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Component</th>
<th>Definition of Diversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>“Differences in Soldiers and civilians that can have a positive impact on mission effectiveness in the Army”(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>“All the different characteristics and attributes of individual Sailors and civilians which enhance the mission readiness of the Navy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>“An inclusive culture that recognizes and values the similarities and differences of individuals to effectively meet the goals of the organization”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Builds on equal opportunity; encompasses not only gender and race/ethnicity, but also cultural knowledge, language ability, geographic awareness, education, and related characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Estate</td>
<td>“Valuing the similarities and differences of our workforce and maximizing on those traits”(^a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Working definition.
in the workplace. Yet another reason may be the measurable nature of the key demographics as opposed to less measurable attributes. Alternatively, the working premise for the Services may be that talents are uniformly distributed among different groups and that striving for key demographics will lead to diversity in other dimensions. Finally, it may be a matter of timing—race/ethnicity and gender may be the logical point to begin to institutionalize diversity efforts that will incorporate other attributes in time. In particular, because the empirical evidence suggests that diversity dimensions other than race/ethnicity and gender need to be managed, it is possible that learning how to manage race/ethnicity and gender will help with managing other dimensions of diversity.

Regardless of the reason, the disconnect between the stated definitions and the implementation of diversity strategies poses several challenges for the components. If this disconnect remains, either the definitions will be rendered irrelevant or the efforts will be deemed unsuccessful at increasing diversity along the broader dimensions. For example, if the disconnect reflects belief in the premise that talent is normally distributed regardless of race/ethnicity or gender, then the components will be demonstrating the validity of that assumption, with real consequences that may either fuel or undermine the momentum behind diversity efforts. If the disconnect is undesired, DoD components will need to focus on attributes that are less quantifiable and develop ways of measuring progress.

A department-wide definition of diversity that is comprehensive and yet detailed can play a critical role for the future of all component diversity efforts. It can clarify and narrow the direction that DoD is to adopt for the future of its workforce—toward legally protected groups, a multitude of attributes, or a combination of both. Once the components are able to clearly visualize the target workforce, they can use the resources necessary, including the initiatives already under way, to make that vision a reality and stop pursuing goals that are derivative and/or outside the scope of the definition. A department-wide definition may also help leadership track progress and maintain the course, even when certain programs and/or practices are unsuccessful; it ought to outlast individual initiatives. Finally, a department-wide definition
of diversity can enable the exchange of ideas among the components as many sectors strive to implement the same goals. It is important to note that a department-wide definition is not, however, intended to restrict the ability of components to adopt certain strategies that are targeted to their particular circumstances.

**Definition**

**Demographic Diversity: Focusing on Legally Protected Groups**

Defining diversity as representation of members from various demographic groups—in particular, the legally protected groups (or protected classes) used by the EEOC—is the first option for DoD leadership to consider. The legally protected groups are defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, national origin, age, and physical and mental disabilities. While the demographic definition of diversity is not as broad or inclusive as some suggest that the concept of diversity ought to be, others argue that the demographic definition is grounded in history, well understood, socially relevant, and measurable (Cox, 1994). And many assert that not enough strides have been made to correct the power imbalances among these groups—racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; females; and the disabled—to warrant inclusion of other, less well-defined groups (Cross, 2000; Linnehan and Konrad, 1999).

According to representatives from the components at the summit, minorities and females are clearly underrepresented at the officer ranks and in the SES—the pipelines that produce top leadership. This is reflected in DoD’s recent estimates indicating virtually no prospect of an increase in representation of minorities or females in the higher ranks (flag and SES) for the next decade (DHRB, 2005). Pending success of the diversity strategic plan and campaign, accessions and retention of the traditionally underrepresented groups will improve, eventually leading to a DoD workforce that may indeed proportionately reflect the general population at all ranks, including the very top. This eventual success will be consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld’s directive that this report aims to support.
Finally, emphasis on representation through inclusion in a definition would help close the gap between rhetoric and reality in DoD’s diversity efforts, which are already focused on underrepresentation of racial/ethnic minorities and women. At the summit, representatives from the components presented representational statistics of protected groups, even though their definitions contain no reference to protected groups.

Notwithstanding the advantages of focusing on legally protected groups, DoD leaders need to consider the potential negative implications of this approach. A camp within the diversity debate may perceive a narrower definition of diversity to be conflating EEOC issues with diversity. And they may feel that it unfairly excludes groups that are gaining legitimacy in some realms, such as the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) community. Others may extend the prevailing negative view on affirmative action to DoD’s policies. In application of a demographic definition, diversity efforts, including accessions and development, may reveal apparent skill gaps between groups that will require significant resources and time to eliminate. These gaps may, in turn, undesirably affect the military’s mission-readiness in the short run. More importantly, by concentrating exclusively on protected groups, diversity initiatives may remain a Personnel and Readiness issue.

It is important to note that the issue of female representation is complicated. While it is clear that the civilian DoD workforce can strive to mirror the general population in terms of gender, this is not as straightforward with the military, as women are not permitted to serve in combat occupations. This can have a significant impact on women’s ability to acquire top-ranking leadership roles. For instance, in the Army, generals predominantly come from the combat arms communities, which are restricted to a great extent for women. Some closures to women are by unit, while other closures are by occupation. Thus, there do exist certain units in artillery, which falls under combat arms, that are open to women, although this is largely insignificant. Army women are permitted to fly, so aviation, with the exception of the handful of artillery units available, is essentially the only path open to women to
Because of these structural barriers to women in the military, DoD leadership must be extremely explicit when defining demographic-diversity goals for the military.

**Going Beyond Demographic Diversity**

On the other side of the diversity debate is the all-encompassing view of diversity as including attributes that anyone, regardless of, for example, racial/ethnic or gender-group membership, brings to the organization. Championed by R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr. (1996, 2006; appendix, pp. 86–87), this perspective on diversity considers the differences that all individuals bring to a group. Thomas wrote,

*Diversity* refers to the differences, similarities, and related tensions that exist in any mixture. Note especially that the term includes differences and similarities. Diversity is not limited to issues of race and gender, nor is it confined to the workforce. (Thomas, 2006, p. xi; emphasis in the original)

For Thomas, “diversity is not solely—or even primarily—about improving racial and ethnic relations in the midst of pluralism. Diversity refers to *any* set of differences and similarities in *any* setting” (Thomas, 2006, p. xiii; emphases are in the original). Those advocating this view contend that diversity must apply to everyone in the organization in order to produce the intended effect. As long as there is a distinction between groups, says Thomas, the crusade for diversity will plateau. In short, diversity is about individuals, not groups.

Definitions currently used by DoD components (reported in Table 2.1) seem to be influenced by this broad definition of diversity. Therefore, potential negative consequences of this course must be carefully considered. A major result of a broader definition may be an increasing gap between the demographics of the military and the population it

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2 Restrictions on women are not consistent across Services. While roughly only two-thirds of overall positions are open to women in the Army and Marines, 9 out of 10 positions are open to women in the Navy, and nearly all positions are open to women in the Air Force. In the current system, women have a much great chance of promoting to top leadership positions in the Navy and Air Force as opposed to the Army and Marines (Harrell and Miller, 1997).
is meant to serve. As the population becomes more diverse in demographics, DoD’s workforce composition may remain or regress toward a white male majority, in the absence of a more targeted diversity definition. While inherent talent may be normally distributed independently of race/ethnicity or gender, research suggests that development of such talent differs along racial/ethnic and socioeconomic lines; members of racial/ethnic minority and low-income groups are more likely to get a later start in education and never catch up to their racial/ethnic majority and higher-income group counterparts, lagging behind in national standardized tests in every subject (Viadero and Johnston, 2000). If the pipeline to Service academies and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) programs is already disproportionately white, it is hard to imagine how a broadly defined diversity program can lead to a demographically diverse force. In fact, internal and external stakeholders—minority and female civilian employees and servicemembers, members of Congress, and civil society at large—may view the broad definition as an indicator that DoD leaders have abandoned any effort to improve representation of minorities and women among senior active duty and civilian leaders (for example, see Masar, 2006).

In addition, diversity initiatives will be difficult to track and it will be difficult to hold leaders accountable for their effective implementation, since the broad definition does not specify which differences and similarities DoD would like to foster in its workforce. This definition will be the most difficult to digest and implement. In fact, some may even argue that DoD has already achieved diversity according to this definition, for the Fourth Estate alone is made up of the Washington Headquarters Services and its 16 serviced components, as well as 14 distinct DoD Agencies.

**Combined Approach: Prioritizing Race/Ethnicity and Gender Within a Broader Definition of Diversity**

This definition combines the previous two options such that DoD commits to building and developing a workforce that is diverse in many aspects while emphasizing the importance of adequate representation of race/ethnicity and gender. In doing so, DoD would forge a new path in diversity management—one that integrates the historical
remnants of inequality still visible in today’s workforce with a multi-cultural approach that incorporates individual differences and similarities. A combined approach must not be confused with what some may categorize as a transitional model of diversity, implying that DoD is on the road to becoming a fully inclusive organization. The intention behind this definition is to purposefully strike a balance between the two approaches so that the diversity elements most pertinent to DoD are emphasized.

For instance, the Air Force has identified two attributes that are related to the mission of the Air Force: foreign-language skills and cultural awareness. And the Marines have a working group that has been studying ways to include cultural awareness as a part of military operation training. These are attributes that anyone can acquire, regardless of their demographic characteristics. As the reserve components become more integrated into day-to-day military operations and also participate at a higher level in operational missions, DoD leaders may consider certain aspects of “structural” diversity to be included in their diversity mission. (We will provide a definition of structural diversity shortly.) By including these nondemographic dimensions of diversity in their vision, DoD leaders can clearly communicate to the workforce how diversity enhances the department’s mission capabilities.

While this combined approach is largely untested in the public or private sector, this mixed model may best serve the unique needs of DoD’s mission and be most congruent with DoD’s culture and values. This will result in a vision that will have historical credibility and a clear “business case.” A vision with historical credibility can assure all DoD stakeholders that its leaders are committed to improving the representations of minorities and women among the top active duty and civilian leaders. A vision with a clear business case will enable DoD leaders to instill diversity as one of the core values of DoD in the workforce. From an implementation perspective, this definition provides a practical blueprint for the way forward, with flexibility for each component to determine whether any additional attributes are relevant and important to them.
Diversity Management

The three definitions of diversity answer the question, “What will the force look like?” However, the vision would be incomplete without also matching the definition to the dynamics of how the force would behave and function as a group to fulfill its mission. In research and practice, this aspect of organizational behavior is known as diversity management. As Roosevelt Thomas stated at the DoD Diversity Summit,

Diversity management is the craft or process of making quality decisions in the midst of differences, similarities, tensions, complexities, etc. The distinction between diversity and diversity management is important. If you do not properly manage diversity, you can lose representation. (appendix, pp. 86–87)

Anne S. Tsui and Barbara A. Gutek went one step further. They wrote,

The reality is that diversity is a liability until and unless processes are in place to manage the negative dynamic and to release diversity’s hidden potential. . . . In an increasingly competitive global environment, overcoming this liability may be a key to long-term survival. (Tsui and Gutek, 1999, p. 143)

In their review of empirical research on the effects of diversity on workforce outcomes, Tsui and Gutek (1999, p. 113) documented how various types of diversity can be a liability for workforce outcomes. They found that there is “consistent support for the negative effect of diversity on individuals and on relationships between individuals.” Studies show that an increase in demographic (racial/ethnic and gender) diversity is often associated with less interpersonal communication, poorer social relations, lower psychological commitment to the organization—especially among “the dominant majority and usually among high status individuals”—and higher turnovers (Tsui and Gutek, 1999, p. 113). (See Table 2.2.)

Similarly, rigorous diversity management is essential to reap the potential benefits of diversity on military mission performance.
A group of researchers from the CNA Corporation has studied the impact of diversity on Air Force mission performance. They examine four dimensions of diversity in their studies (Kraus et al., 2007; Riche, Kraus, and Hodari, 2007):

1. **demographic diversity**: personal characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, religion, and gender
2. **cognitive diversity**: personality types, such as extrovert/introvert and Type A/Type B, and thinking styles, such as quick, decisive thinking versus slow, methodical thinking
3. **structural diversity**: organizational background characteristics including Service, work function, and component
4. **global diversity**: national affiliation other than U.S. (e.g., members of foreign military services and foreign nationals).

Amanda Kraus and colleagues summarize the findings:

Respondents were slightly more likely to perceive that demographic, cognitive, and global diversity had a positive rather than a negative impact; only for structural diversity were respondents
more likely to perceive a negative impact. Indeed, there were two consistent negative themes for structural diversity. The first was lack of trust and lack of understanding between the USAF’s [U.S. Air Force’s] active and reserve components. The second was difficulties creating unit cohesion among newly formed functional diverse teams in the time available during deployment (Kraus et al., 2007, p. 2).

Hence, these studies suggested that active management of structural diversity will enhance the effectiveness of USAF operational initiatives such as Total Force Integration (TFI) and Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21).

There are two main tendencies to diversity management: assimilation and inclusion. DoD has experience with assimilation, as recruits initially undergo an extensive basic-training program to learn the ways of being a part of the U.S. military, with the focus on individuals adapting to fit into the role of servicemember. Inclusion, which promotes the preservation of individualism and associated attributes, may be more difficult for DoD to implement within the greater context of military norms and culture. Regardless, diversity management is a critical component of the vision—changing the way people relate to one another can be the catalyst for major institutional change.

**Assimilation**

In academic research, the concept of assimilation describes a phenomenon occurring in both the labor force and the population. Assimilation is the process by which a minority group, whether it be females in a male-dominant workforce or immigrants in a new country, adopts the language, customs, and attitudes of the majority group. DoD’s traditional basic training is an example of assimilation. As a result of gravitating toward the norm, members of the minority group often lose attributes that previously characterized an important part of their identity. Some view assimilation as one of the earliest models of diversity management, a first response to issues surrounding equal employment opportunity (Powell, 1993; Cox, 1991). Under this paradigm, initiatives to manage diversity would entail targeted accession, promotion, and retention of minority groups and assistance in adapting to the major-
ity group’s norms. The organization would focus on compliance with federal equal employment opportunity regulations, fair treatment, and recruiting.\(^3\) Assimilation best describes the focus of most of DoD’s current activities on diversity management, although there may be exceptions. While many strides have been made to create an accepting environment for members of minority groups at the lower ranks, personal experiences of high-ranking members of senior leadership suggest that more needs to be done (appendix, pp. 66–70, 85).

**Inclusion**

The idea of inclusion—valuing and integrating each individual’s differences into the way an organization functions and makes decisions—is now standard in the rhetoric of most diversity programs in the private sector. Despite its prevalence as a goal, it is extremely difficult and slow to achieve and hard to find in practice. According to R. Roosevelt Thomas, even the most diversity-friendly organizations have plateaued in their efforts to manage diversity, having achieved the “numbers” but not maintaining them or not moving beyond demographic diversity in a meaningful way (Thomas, 2006).

By definition, an inclusive organization views diversity in the broad sense and adopts a flexible approach to management that preserves heterogeneity at all levels (Wheeler, 1999). It is akin to Thomas and Ely’s learning and effectiveness paradigm (Thomas and Ely, 1996), which describes organizations that constantly change to internalize the differences that individuals bring to bear on their work. In a pure inclusive setting, EO/EEO concerns would be secondary to resolving tensions and harnessing differences that individuals bring to the organization. Thus, the main challenge for DoD is to make inclusion possible while maintaining cohesion among the workforce. Creating and sustaining teams may take longer and require more effort, and DoD will need to develop creative ways to integrate its command structure with an inclusive environment. CNA studies on the impact of diversity on USAF mission capabilities showed

\(^3\) At the summit, Amanda Kraus of CNA characterized this model as “Paradigm 1: Discrimination and Fairness.” Her classification is based on Thomas and Ely (1996).
an essential ingredient in successful Total Force Integration (TFI) is integrating decision-makers by component, rather than simply integrating the components that decisions will affect. . . . [They found] examples of the value of including multiple perspectives to develop more innovative solutions to problems. (Riche, Kraus, and Hodari, 2007, p. 2)

Summary

Vision is central to strategic planning, providing the answer to the key question, “Where do you want to go?” For the vision to anchor a strategic plan, it must be comprehensive and yet detailed, availing itself to all within an organization. DoD’s current vision for diversity can be clarified and strengthened in two ways: (1) by identifying a common definition of diversity and (2) by managing diversity. In both, DoD’s operational needs, norms, and values need to be taken into account. Additionally, the department needs to explicitly identify why it cares about diversity, regardless of how it is defined.

We summarized three possible definitions of diversity that DoD can adopt. The first definition focuses on EEOC-protected groups. The second definition is broad and encompasses all attributes. The third definition is a combination of both, calling for prioritizing protected groups and including attributes based on DoD’s needs and mission-readiness. For diversity management, which deals with ways in which people and groups relate to one another and how management decisions are made in the midst of the differences, similarities, and tensions among groups, we highlighted assimilation and inclusion. Assimilation strives for unity and conformity, while inclusion promotes preservation of and the ability to leverage individual differences.
The mission articulates the identity of the organization, its reason for being (Goodstein, Nolan, and Pfeiffer, 1993). For members of the organization, it serves as a unifying thread that ties their day-to-day work with the organization’s purpose and role in society. Some key questions that ought to be answered in developing a mission are

- What function does the organization perform?
- For whom does the organization perform this function?
- How does the organization go about fulfilling this function?
- Why does the organization exist?

Within the strategic planning process, the mission (if preexisting) is often tested, or sometimes even re-created, to ensure alignment with the newly developed vision.

For DoD, mission formulation for a diversity strategic plan raises critical organizational structure issues, such that another question must be answered first: “Which organization is adopting the strategic plan?” The entity can be the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, which is part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the entity can be the entire DoD. For the latter, the mission can be either separate or integrated into the broader mission of the organization. There are many reasons to support adoption of each of these options, which will lead to different trajectories of possible diversity outcomes (though in all three cases, ODMEO can play a key role in implementation). Thus, it is important for the senior leadership to
consider the pros and cons of each option and make a choice that strategically serves DoD and the overall vision of the diversity effort.

Once the mission and the appropriate entity for ownership are established, the senior leadership can articulate diversity goals, which will form the framework for implementation and communicate DoD’s priorities to those within and outside of the organization. Goals will not only help guide resource allocation; they will also set the stage for monitoring progress of diversity efforts.

Mission: Identifying Ownership

We present three potential approaches to the diversity mission, involving two entities: The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity and the greater DoD. The first approach would redefine ODMEO’s identity and function, causing all diversity efforts to be generated from ODMEO. The other two approaches involve diffusing diversity responsibilities to all units within DoD. The three approaches are

- Align the mission with ODMEO.
- Create a new DoD-wide diversity mission.
- Integrate diversity as facet of DoD’s existing missions.

We discuss each of these approaches in more detail below.

Align the Mission with the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity

ODMEO is a policy office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, whose mission is to “develop policies and plans, issue guidance, conduct analyses, define strategic direction, and provide oversight and evaluation for DoD-wide equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity programs and plans that impact all Department of Defense military and civilian personnel” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, undated-b). Since the push for diversity began within DoD, ODMEO has pro-
vided coordination among the DoD components through its Diversity Working Group, established in 2004. Since then, DWG has been successful in data collection and compilation of DoD component initiatives and has taken the lead in seeking a strategic framework to mobilize all of DoD toward a shared vision. The DoD Diversity Summit and this report are direct results of ODMEO’s efforts. Hence, ODMEO is a prime candidate to be at the center of strategic planning and implementation. In this case, ODMEO would become the main vehicle charged with achieving the vision set by the senior leadership, and the mission of ODMEO would evolve to match the strategic plan.

This approach offers several advantages, especially with regard to existing infrastructure. The vision articulated through strategic planning would naturally extend and clarify the activities of ODMEO and strengthen its position and reach via visibility. For instance, ODMEO’s roots in equal employment opportunity and its existing capacity to collect and manage demographic data can inform strategic activities moving forward. From DoD’s perspective, having ODMEO at the center of this effort will require very little, if any, organizational change and associated resources.

However, ODMEO may not be the most appropriate entity to own the mission of this strategic plan, especially if DoD leaders adopt a vision that goes beyond EEOC-protected groups and includes managing structural diversity among active and reserve components and/or among functional communities. There was a general consensus at the summit, mirrored in the literature, that diversity is not just a human resources (HR) issue. Diversity discussions and efforts must move beyond HR and penetrate all aspects of organizations, structurally and substantively. According to Madelyn Jennings, a member of the DoD Business Board and a presenter at the summit, an important lesson learned from the private sector’s experiences with diversity is to not make diversity a stand-alone HR program or initiative; it must be seen as “a line responsibility” (appendix, pp. 82–84). Therefore, unless ODMEO is successfully recast as an integral unit—relevant to the responsibilities of all other units and accessible to them—there is a distinct possibility that diversity, like equal opportunity, will be perceived
as a separate HR issue, and the implementation of the strategic plan will face serious challenges.

Another related factor is ODMEO’s proximity to senior leadership. While there is clearly an established line of communication between ODMEO and DoD’s top leadership, it would not be as efficient as other alternatives that would keep the top leadership directly engaged in diversity efforts. A study by the Government Accountability Office (2005) found that evidence of leadership commitment, often visible through communication, resource allocation, and the instillment of the importance and business relevance of the issue in senior management, is an important aspect of diversity management (appendix, pp. 86–89). Moreover, a RAND study of best diversity practices among major corporations reported that, in a majority of major corporations known for their effective diversity practices, the chief executive officers (CEOs) were directly responsible for starting the diversity programs in their companies, and they were either chair or co-chair of a diversity council that approves and monitors the progress of diversity initiatives (Marquis et al., 2007, p. 14). While it is certainly possible for the leadership to take an active role under the current organizational structure, our experience at the summit suggests that repositioning the diversity mission at the center of DoD may be more effective in engaging top leadership. As an example, the most senior official in attendance at the DoD Diversity Summit was the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness—clearly an indication that top leadership is not heavily involved in the diversity mission under its current location in ODMEO. However, if ODMEO is chosen to be the torchbearer of this strategic plan, the mission ought to reflect its new role and capacity, its jurisdiction, and a changing focus from equal opportunity to managing diversity (as defined by the vision).

**Diversity as a Distinct DoD-Wide Mission**

Another approach to developing a diversity mission is to tie it to the greater DoD but keep it separate and solely focused on diversity. Hence, such a mission would be in addition to the core mission of DoD, which is “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and
to protect the security of our country.”¹ Such an approach commits the entire DoD, and not just ODMEO, to the task of achieving greater diversity of senior leadership. But its distinction from the core mission again depicts diversity as a separate personnel issue, because the mission is still not tied to the overall mission of DoD. This model is not uncommon in public and private sectors; universities and professional firms frequently issue diversity mission statements and refer to them in public venues.²

There are some advantages to having a separate diversity mission. The distinction raises awareness of diversity and enables organizations that may not be motivated primarily by performance to make diversity a priority. For DoD, a diversity mission would certainly complement the core mission, since people, its most important resource, are the common thread linking the two together. Additionally, a mission statement on diversity would reinforce DoD’s role in American history as the facilitator of minorities seeking education, training, and fulfilling careers (Gaul, 2002).

Implementation of this approach would require substantial buy-in and institutional change within DoD. For instance, with this approach, ODMEO could continue to coordinate implementation efforts, but the senior leadership would have to exhort and practice diversity management in everyday affairs. While it would not be central to the core functions of DoD, the senior leadership would need to follow through on the commitment to making diversity a high priority. Programs would also have to reflect this reassignment of mission ownership; many of the policy- and oversight-related tasks that were traditionally performed by ODMEO would be transferred to the senior and/or Service leadership. This type of approach to mission is more likely to suit

¹ Published on DefenseLink, the official Web site of DoD (Department of Defense, undated).

² Verizon’s diversity mission statement, included as part of a presentation at the 2007 DoD Diversity Summit, serves as an example: “At Verizon, Diversity means embracing differences and cultivating an inclusive organization that reflects the marketplace and leverages the diversity of employees, customers, suppliers, and community partners because it’s the right thing to do and drives business success” (Verizon Communications, 2007).
a vision that defines diversity more narrowly than one that promotes seamless integration of diversity and core operations.

**Integrating Diversity Within the Overall DoD-Wide Mission**

Many in the diversity management field would advocate for the third option, which is to incorporate diversity into DoD’s core mission of “provid[ing] the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country” (Department of Defense, undated). Diversity would be integrally tied to DoD’s mission, and this approach would communicate that link to all within and outside of DoD. This would be the biggest institutional shift for DoD, one that would effectively eliminate diversity as a stand-alone DoD objective. The mission would be altered to describe diversity management as a means to achieving security and well-being for the United States. This contrasts with other alternatives for the mission, which depict diversity itself as an end goal.

Merging diversity with the core mission of DoD would be consistent with theories about diversity and the military that are gaining currency. In light of unconventional conflicts and tension emerging around the globe in the past decade, some assert that immigration and labor force diversity ought to be viewed as foreign-policy assets (Wilson, 2004; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). According to Werz (2006), “identifying, teaching, and leveraging cultural competence is not an idealist proposal, but falls squarely within the national interest.” Thus, some may argue that a combined mission is DoD’s natural evolution in response to global changes.

Another premise on which a combined mission would rest is the belief that inclusive diversity—one in which differences and cultures are preserved and managed—will not compromise the unity and obedience that is necessary to enable DoD to be effective (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Schlesinger, 1992; Thomas, 2006).

A fully integrated mission may be most appealing in theory, but it is also the most difficult in implementation. As Thomas (2006) asserts, this approach will require everyone in the organization, regardless of rank and file, to develop the capacity to manage diversity. As one of America’s largest and oldest institutions, meeting this condition will
require a fundamental institutional change, from HR processes (e.g., accessions, promotions, retention) to operations (e.g., combat and peacekeeping). Another challenge concerns evaluation and accountability, both of which require appropriate metrics to monitor. In the absence of metrics that can capture the effect of diversity on national security, DoD will have difficulty using evaluation and accountability as mechanisms to guide implementation.

**Goals**

Once the mission is set, it can be translated into goals. Goals articulate the accomplishments needed to realize the mission, taking the strategic plan closer to implementation. Observers often lament that one of the biggest problems with strategic plans is that they are not implemented; strategic planning is often viewed as a top-level management task that does not affect the day-to-day operations of an organization. Goals help bridge this gap by actively engaging the rest of the organization in striving for the new vision (Goodstein, Nolan and Pfeiffer, 1993; McNamara and Bromiley, 1997). Identification of goals also prompts senior leadership to prioritize, which can guide resource allocation.

Under the proposed options for vision and mission, the possibilities for goals are numerous. The challenge for DoD will be discerning which goals are appropriate for the chosen vision and mission. This is the primary reason for setting the vision and the mission first, so that the goals, which are often the common starting points, do not determine where the organization is headed.

If the vision concerns protection and preservation of underrepresented minority groups, a reasonable goal would be to improve their representation in the workforce, starting with groups that are most underrepresented. If the vision employs a broader definition of diversity, one goal may be to simultaneously improve representation along several dimensions—race/ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, discipline, geographic location, experience, and structural characteristics. If the vision explicitly concerns the senior leadership, a related
representation goal would be to focus on leadership development of underrepresented groups in the pipeline.

Other goals can target the diversity management aspects of the vision, as defined by the senior leadership. Diversity management is affected by policies and programs that affect recruitment, development, promotion, and retention, as well as DoD norms and values that shape individual behavior. A vision that calls for a broader definition of diversity with an inclusive environment may prioritize goals that target the climate of DoD over representation goals. Factors that affect the climate or the environment can include those captured by Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)’s Organizational Climate Survey and/or others, as deemed appropriate by the leadership.3

If the leadership incorporates diversity into DoD’s core mission, then the goals will speak less to diversity and more to national security (e.g., readiness or other related performance metrics). An example would be an improved ability to mitigate cultural conflicts that arise in peacekeeping efforts around the world. Additionally, diversity management helps with increasing innovation and creativity, which is necessary in this new security environment. While it does not concern representation or attitudes toward minority groups, it captures the role that diversity would play in helping DoD better perform in its core mission.

**Summary**

DoD leaders face three choices in defining the department’s diversity mission. They may choose to define the mission just for ODMEO or for the entire DoD. If ODMEO owns the mission, the existing organizational infrastructure will require little change, but this will further cement diversity as a human resources issue. If the mission is written for the entire DoD, there are two approaches to the mission: The

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3 DEOMI’s Organizational Climate Survey, available to unit commanders within DoD, is a proactive management tool that covers three areas: military equal opportunity, civilian equal employment opportunity, and organizational effectiveness. More information is available at the DEOMI Web site (Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2008).
mission can address diversity separately, or the mission can be integrated into the overall mission of DoD. Both approaches will necessitate major institutional change, but the former will treat diversity as an end goal, whereas the latter will treat it as a means toward achieving the core mission of DoD. Finally, the goals—derived from vision and mission—will communicate the leadership’s priorities to the rest of DoD, serving as a guide for implementation and resource allocation. DoD leadership can emphasize improving representation, the overall climate, or capacity to carry out operations through diversity.
This chapter explores strategies, which will give shape to implementation of the strategic plan and provide a roadmap for achieving established goals. A strategy can be defined as a specific policy deriving from the “strategy formulation process” (Goodstein, Nolan, and Pfeiffer, 1993). In other words, a policy is a strategy if it is deliberate and is associated with a bigger picture of where the organization is headed. This definition reinforces the top-down process of strategy development, so that strategies do not steer the organization in an unintended direction. This is a critical point, because strategic plans are often derailed when the process is reversed and the actions are no longer driven by strategy.

Given the immense size and complex organization of DoD and its components, strategies that are conceptual in nature may be more helpful than ones that are prescriptive. The Services differ from one another along many dimensions, and what works for one Service may not work well for others. Conceptual strategy would also encourage Services to be innovative in their interpretation and implementation, resulting in valuable lessons that can be transferred from one sector to another.

There are two broad categories of diversity strategies to consider: those that concern the processes affecting diversity outcomes (process strategies), and those that enable and facilitate movement toward the diversity vision (enabling strategies). Process strategies can be related to operational elements, such as accessions, development, career assignments, promotion, and retention; enabling strategies involve functions that are more far-reaching in nature, such as leadership engagement,
accountability, and culture. While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it identifies the prominent levers that must be engaged in some manner and scope in order to have systematic progress toward defined diversity goals.

**Process Strategies**

Process strategies aim to influence the department at key decision points, such as accessions, development, and retention. Reports from DoD components at the summit indicated that there is heavy reliance on accessions as a dominant strategy to change the racial/ethnic workforce composition within DoD, using similar tactics. The Army has invested in efforts to recruit Hispanics and those with knowledge of Middle Eastern languages with some success (Garamone, 1999; Eldeib, 2007). The Navy interacts with K–12 schools, colleges and universities, and affinity groups to attract a racially and ethnically diverse talent pool. The Navy is also undertaking a pilot program to target wounded soldiers and others with disabilities for civilian jobs. The Marine Corps reaches out to colleges, universities, and affinity groups as well. In addition to the minority outreach, the Air Force is specifically trying to increase the number of African-American pilots and disabled veterans in its civilian workforce, as well as those possessing technical skills. In addition to outreach, the components also use incentives to recruit. Incentives, such as financial bonuses and college tuition benefits, have historically influenced members of minority groups to enlist, and they can continue to complement the outreach tactics in recruiting efforts. This strategy can and does extend to groups other than race/ethnicity and gender, such as those with specific technical skills (i.e., medical and information technology professionals). While offering incentives can be quite effective in meeting accessions goals and attracting a diverse set of employees, incentives for 1.4 million active duty personnel, 1.2 million reserve personnel, 670,000 civilians, and about 2 million veterans can be extremely costly to DoD and the American

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1 Joseph Guzman’s presentation at the summit on February 27, 2007.
people. While the Army offers $5,000 to non-prior-service recruits, it offers as much as $150,000 for special recruits (CBO, 2007). Even then, it appears that financial bonuses are not as effective in recruiting as increasing the number of recruiters and intensifying outreach efforts (CBO, 2007).

While accessions are an important strategy and certainly one that the components are familiar with, DoD’s concerns with diversity in senior ranks suggest that strategies for developing personnel may require more attention than accessions. As an organization that promotes from within, DoD’s top leadership is dependent on the pipeline of junior officers developing the skills required to become top leaders. It takes 20 to 30 years in the military to develop the leadership competencies required to face future challenges. One opportunity for DoD to promote diversity in senior leadership in the immediate future is to focus heavily on improving the development of future leaders who are already in the military today. (There are other factors, such as retention, that will be discussed later.) Adding or reinforcing diversity elements in all training and development policies and programs may yield good results, as some private-sector firms have experienced. IBM, for example, has explicitly adopted a succession-planning program called Executive Resources—a bottom-up, proactive approach to identifying and developing demographically diverse talent. Using Executive Resources, IBM monitors development of more than 11,000 executives and high-potential nonexecutives.2

Summit attendees frequently mentioned mentoring as a potentially effective development strategy to improve the quality and diversity of the pipeline.3 Salient points were made on this topic, including the need to identify leaders early, the usefulness of cross-group and within-group relationships, and having mentors who do not belong to the same social group (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender) as the mentees. This

2 Ron Glover’s presentation on IBM at the summit on February 28, 2007 (see appendix, pp. 90–91).

3 John Butler, LtGen. Ronald Coleman (USMC), CAPT Ken Barrett (DON), Frank Dobbin, and RADM Clifford Pearson (USCG) all spoke to the need for and/or effectiveness of mentoring as a development strategy. (See appendix, pp. 76–77, 85, 89–90, 91–92.)
strategy would be a critical component to match a diversity definition that emphasizes diversity of leadership. Dobbin’s research on diversity management best practices (presented at the summit) suggests that, while mentoring is not as popular as diversity training or the establishment of a diversity task force among corporations, it is positively associated with managerial or leadership demographic diversity.

Career assignments within DoD components were identified during the summit as an area for further examination. Hanser elaborated on officers’ ascent to senior leadership in DoD, which can be partly attributed to a phenomenon called “professional elites”4 (appendix, pp. 77–78). Within DoD and other organizations, career assignment and development are not just by-products of meeting competency requirements; Hanser asserted that such decisions are made also for other reasons, such as symbolism, future assignments, and skill-banking. The notion of professional elites suggests that, within DoD, a single occupational group (elite segment) often controls the key line positions and remains the main source of its leadership (i.e., fighter and bomber pilots in the Air Force and surface warfare officers, pilots, and submarine officers in the Navy). In a closed system in which leadership is cultivated from within, the current career assignment system may have implications for demographic diversity.

The promotion process is another key area that significantly affects the diversity of the workforce, particularly the senior leadership. In order for promotion policies and practices to support a diversity vision, DoD must ensure that there are no barriers based on race/ethnicity, gender,5 or other employee characteristics. Barriers can exist as a result of policies and/or practices adopted by decisionmakers. If improving the diversity of senior leadership and the pipeline are a priority, DoD may want to invest in developing the analytical capacity to evaluate the promotion process among all DoD components.

Retention may also be an appropriate focus for DoD, the success of which depends on the quality and stability of the DoD workforce.

4 Hanser referred to Frederick Mosher’s framework of “professional elites” to describe manpower planning in the DoD.

5 Structural barriers to women in the military were discussed earlier in this report.
There are many factors affecting retention that may be worth investigating. At the summit, attendees heard that attrition rates for females are quite high. Research in this area may identify changes that can be made to policies and procedures, such as those related to diversity and work/life issues, so that greater numbers of talented minorities and females will consider a lifelong career with the military. Many corporations are beginning to recognize the importance of retention over accessions and are shifting the focus of their investments to leadership training and other retention efforts (Sappal, 2004).

If diversity is tied to the overall DoD mission and the department includes attributes such as language skills and cultural awareness in its diversity definition, process strategies must also address these aspects of diversity. For instance, through incentivizing young cadets at the Service academies and in ROTC programs at universities to study relevant languages and cultures, a pipeline of junior officers possessing these attributes can be achieved. Attention should be paid to encouraging these young personnel with mission-imperative skills to be successful throughout their careers so that they are able to achieve top-ranking positions. The focus should not be on attaining a leadership with, for example, a certain number of generals with Arabic-language skills, but rather on developing a leadership who have the overall capability to respond to mission needs in an effective way.

**Enabling Strategies**

A GAO study (2005) on leading diversity management practices confirmed the consensus in the field that involvement by senior leadership is often the single most important element of successful diversity initiatives (Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich, 1999; Wentling and Palma-Rivas, 2000). This notion is also supported by the organizational theory literature, which identifies leadership engagement as a critical factor in transforming an organization’s culture and behavior (Burke, 2002; Nadler and Tushman, 1990).

While more evidence is needed to discern which practices are most effective, firms and agencies appear to converge on several
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Top-down communication through policy statements, newsletters, speeches, and other means is often the first step. Leaders of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and U.S. Coast Guard stand out as examples of leadership commitment. In addition to the standard media outlets mentioned previously, they practice diversity management in day-to-day management and routinely interact with other leaders on diversity issues. Another way for the leadership to make diversity a priority is to institutionalize it within the organizational structure. Leaders often establish diversity task forces and/or appoint a senior-level diversity manager, and both have been shown to be effective at achieving diversity at the leadership level in the private sector (Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006). Resource allocation is yet another way for senior leaders to support diversity efforts. While the magnitude of investment in diversity is certainly important, it is also important for the investment to be consistent and evidence-based; adopting a popular diversity program or trainer may earn goodwill with the employees, but it may not be productive or beneficial for DoD.

Accountability is also frequently cited as a vital enabling factor for diversity management, along with most other organizational initiatives (Defense Business Board, 2004; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006). Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly’s (2006) study of private-sector firms’ diversity practices found that establishing responsibility leads to the most improvements in the diversity of leadership and enables other tools, such as diversity training and evaluations, to be effective. Some common approaches to introducing accountability are linking leaders’ personal financial success with diversity progress: basing management bonuses on the setting and achieving of diversity goals within departments, and a 360-degree performance review that includes manage-

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6 The director of NIH has made appointments from diverse groups to management positions and created a culture that is more unified and less hierarchical (GAO, 2005); the Coast Guard commandant encourages routine, unfiltered interaction with senior leadership to solicit feedback on diversity initiatives (RADM Clifford Pearson’s presentation at the summit, February 28, 2007; see appendix, pp. 91–92).

7 Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly’s (2006) research indicates that implementing a diversity task force is more effective than appointing a diversity manager.
A top concern highlighted across components at the summit was the lack of appropriate metrics to use in accountability. Many representatives from the Services said that they want to incorporate accountability into diversity efforts but are struggling with the measurement component. Kraus pointed out that the method of head counting, often used in diversity measurement, does not illuminate the relationship between diversity and performance (appendix, pp. 78–79). This issue becomes especially relevant if the leadership adopts a vision that hinges on the business case for diversity and a diversity definition that incorporates attributes related to mission-readiness. In this case, the benchmark for accountability should be whether the capability to effectively respond to on-the-ground mission needs exists, rather than a metric focused on head counting. DoD would be remiss in establishing responsibility with real consequences without also establishing valid and objective metrics, since this is a topic that is likely to be contentious.

Finally, leadership can consider making adjustments to the overall culture of DoD that would encourage diversity initiatives to flourish. Some common approaches to changing the culture include diversity training, employee networks, and work/life policies and practices. With diversity training, it is important to be aware that training programs, while expensive, are the least effective in improving leadership demographic diversity (Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006). But that may also be attributed to the poor design of diversity training programs. Some suggest that training programs that encourage behavioral changes can be more effective than those that aim to change attitudes (Karp and Sammour, 2000).

Employee networks are also helpful in creating a culture that is diversity-oriented. IBM maintains nine diversity task forces (Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American, Men, Women, GLBT, Work/Life, and People with Disabilities) that have served as forums for peer support, networking opportunities, and discussion of issues to be raised.
with management. This approach, however, must be undertaken with care, under a vision that hinges on a broad definition of diversity. There is a danger of moving away from inclusion and unity once groups are defined along the common dimensions. Additionally, if DoD includes structural diversity (i.e., different components) in its definition, efforts must be made to effectively integrate, for instance, reservists into an active duty unit. When interviewing deployed Air Force personnel, Kraus et al. (2007) found that respondents identified a lack of trust between active duty and reserve component personnel as a barrier to mission achievement. For effective component integration, efforts must be made to encourage understanding of the unique contributions of each component to the mission.

Finally, work/life policies can also affect the work culture in significant ways. The most prominent example involves flexibility in work hours, which has shown to reduce absenteeism by 50 percent (Katzoff, 1997). In DoD’s case, work/life issues will need to be carefully aligned with the unique demands of DoD’s mission; flex time cannot be an option for many military members, especially during times of deployment.

Summary

This chapter summarizes strategies that can be grouped into two broad strategies: process strategies that are related to operational elements, such as accessions, development, career assignments, promotion, and retention; and enabling strategies that involve functions that are more far-reaching in nature, such as leadership engagement, accountability, and culture. At face value, all of these strategies are relevant to DoD, regardless of the vision and mission that the leadership adopts. But targeted investments, according to the chosen vision and mission, will be more effective in making the vision a reality for DoD. Some strategies will be more effective than others in supporting the leadership’s vision: Accessions, for example, will be a major strategy for a vision

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8 Ron Glover’s presentation on IBM at the summit, February 28, 2007 (see pp. 90–91).
that focuses on representation of certain groups, whereas development and career assignments will better facilitate a vision that emphasizes the core mission of DoD. Other strategies are prerequisites for success regardless of the vision and mission, such as leadership involvement, accountability, and culture.
The strategic planning process does not end once the tasks have been determined and assigned. It continues with a plan for monitoring and evaluating the implementation, which will inform the planners of its progress and address the question, “How will you know you got there?” Too often, diversity initiatives suffer in the long run or are prematurely ended because of the absence of empirical evidence of effectiveness. Evaluation will also help identify efforts that appear to be more effective than others; information on returns on investment is especially helpful in resource allocation decisions. Additionally, evaluation and assessment can be the basis of motivation and accountability, as well as the rationale to mobilize resources and support.

Creating an evaluation plan, however, will be challenging. Both the literature and the summit attendees attest to the scarcity of rigorous assessments of diversity initiatives in the field, mainly due to the lack of appropriate metrics. DoD, therefore, has an extraordinary opportunity to take the lead in this field by developing and utilizing metrics to manage diversity.

According to Kochan et al. (2003), quantifying the results of diversity programs is difficult because relevant data simply are not collected; existing human resources data cannot appropriately capture the processes that lead to results or the results themselves. This assertion is especially relevant for DoD if the senior leadership decides to adopt a broader definition of diversity. While certain attributes, such as race/ethnicity, gender, and foreign-language skills, can be easily observed,
cultural knowledge, for instance, would be more difficult to measure with objectivity.

In this report, we frame metrics and evaluation as tools to achieve the vision of diversity that senior leadership adopts, a vision that is contingent on a standardized (or an explicit) definition of diversity. In the field, however, we observe that this sequence is often reversed. Many strategic plans for diversity exist without ever concretely defining diversity. Other plans define diversity but employ metrics that do not match the definition. In such cases, diversity is implicitly defined through the metrics that are applied to measure progress.

Usually, the most popular metrics are those that are the easiest to observe. For instance, simple head counting along race/ethnicity lines and benchmarking against representation in the U.S. population suggests that diversity is defined in terms of race/ethnicity. A strategic plan that is based on an explicit definition, therefore, can prevent DoD’s efforts from succumbing to this pattern. The leadership must select or encourage development of metrics that appropriately support and quantify dimensions of diversity as defined by and according to their vision.

At the summit, Kraus categorized diversity metrics in a useful way: those that describe the group, those that indicate the diversity climate, and those that assess outcomes, including intermediate process outcomes (appendix, pp. 78–79). This chapter expands on the context, use, and options for each of the categories.

**Measuring Diversity in a Group**

This group of metrics attempts to answer the question, “How much diversity is present in a specified unit?” These metrics are descriptive in nature and not tied to process or performance. The most prevalent indicator that captures the amount of diversity in an organization is simple tabulation, also called head counting, usually along race/ethnicity or gender lines. The history of diversity measurement sheds light on this practice and also informs the way forward for DoD. According to Blau (1977), a pioneer in the field, diversity becomes meaningful only for
dimensions that imply rank order or relative standing with social consequences. Blau defined inequality using interval- or ratio-level data, leading toward diversity dimensions that are quantifiable. Prime candidates for this type of comparison are measurable differences that affect compensation, promotion, or other similar outcomes. Blau’s concept of inequality has greatly influenced the evolution of affirmative action and diversity management to this day. Harrison and Sin (2007), however, argue that today’s predominant perception of diversity as inclusion is broader than Blau’s paradigm, which emphasizes inequality. In other words, head counting is at best insufficient, and at worst counterproductive, for organizations that want to adopt an inclusive vision of diversity.

DoD has many reasons for pursuing diversity, and those reasons will be prioritized and combined to create a vision for DoD’s diversity. If one of the primary reasons for achieving greater diversity concerns inequality and its implications in the military, the available metrics can be applied to illuminate these issues. If the senior leadership favors a vision based on a broader, more inclusive definition of diversity that includes status-neutral dimensions, DoD will need to investigate further to find or create appropriate indexes that will shed light on these constructs.

Within the scope of head counting, or representation, there are some areas needing technical improvement. The summit highlighted the importance of comparing representation against the appropriate benchmarks, especially for DoD (appendix, pp. 72–73, 75). DoD requires all officers to be U.S. citizens, which significantly alters the composition of the benchmarking labor force. A GAO report (2006), for example, illustrated the effect of citizenship on representation in the permanent federal workforce. While the GAO study confirms that Hispanics are underrepresented in the federal workforce, the gap is actually very slight once the citizenship requirement is accounted for in the benchmark population. DoD has job requirements similar to those of the federal workforce. To be an officer in the military or a manager in the DoD civilian workforce, one must be a citizen and a college graduate. The common benchmark used for comparison, however, is the U.S. civilian labor force (CLF), the use of which is prescribed
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for all federal agencies.¹

DoD has options in conducting benchmark analysis to learn about representation in the workforce. One option is to use the flag and pipeline representation index, used by the Defense Business Board (2004). The index uses the college-educated population identified in the census as the benchmark. A more precise approach is to use a methodology such as the propensity score analysis, which was presented at the summit (appendix, pp. 71–72). The propensity score analysis effectively controls for the unique employment requirements of DoD, allowing for a more appropriate analysis of representation. Such comparisons can inform important management decisions, such as accessions and retention, so it is vital for the comparisons to be methodologically sound. Another approach is to compare units within DoD, thus benchmarking internally. If descriptive indicators are to be used for accountability purposes, internal benchmarks can be constructed to compare units that are similarly situated in terms of the labor market. Internal benchmarks have been used to detect discriminatory conduct based on race/ethnicity, holding other factors constant (Ridgeway et al., 2006).

Moving beyond demographic diversity dimensions that are easily measurable toward dimensions that are psychological or perceptional in nature, the options for measuring team diversity are complex, underdeveloped, and mostly untested in practice. Researchers have developed several empirical indexes that capture team diversity as a composite of many attributes. They are dependent, however, on the availability of valid metrics for all dimensions to be considered. While these approaches advance the field of measurement in research, their applications within organizations will require further modification and development. If senior leadership wants to proceed with a broader definition of diversity as part of its vision, they may want to invest in development of such tools to ensure that progress can be monitored. Many

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¹ The Census Bureau, in collaboration with the EEOC, has developed a data tool to help federal agencies construct the appropriate benchmarks for comparison (see Census Bureau, undated).
of these indexes depend on metrics of the underlying construct, some of which will have to be developed.

In this report, we have discussed the inclusion of attainable, rather than just ascribed, characteristics in the DoD definition of diversity. As previously mentioned, these attributes could include foreign-language skills and cultural awareness. To measure these types of diversity, head counting, no matter what the population benchmark, is not an appropriate metric. It is not important, for example, to track how many servicemembers per unit speak a certain language. Many units would never have the need to use such skills. What is crucial, however, is that these types of skills exist to meet operational needs. Thus, the benchmark becomes the ability to meet the mission needs rather than, for example, meeting a certain quota for the number of Arabic-speaking servicemembers per unit.

**Measuring Organizational Climate**

DoD already has experience assessing the diversity climate, through DEOMI’s climate surveys and other similar tools. Measuring the diversity climate entails gathering information on employees’ and employers’ perceptions of how their organizations value diversity through policies, programs, attitudes, and conduct. Hurtado et al. (2000), for instance, have identified the following dimensions of diversity climate that can be captured through surveys: structural diversity (representation), legacy of past inclusion/exclusion (policies and practices), psychological climate (perceptions and attitudes), and behavioral dimension (interactions). Higher education institutions, in particular, have extensive experience with diversity climate surveys.

In addition to organization-wide climate surveys, at the summit, Whinfrey also emphasized exit interviews as another key tool for understanding the diversity climate of an organization, calling them

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2 DoD has utilized multiple surveys, such as the Defense Manpower Data Center Survey of Active Duty Personnel, the Navy Argus, the Air Force New Directions Survey, the Coast Guard Career Intentions Survey, gender surveys, and military-spouse surveys, to understand a multitude of factors that directly or indirectly capture diversity elements.
“opinion” metrics (appendix, p. 74). Knouse (2001), who has studied exit-survey efforts in the civilian sector as well as in the military, recommended institutionalizing exit interviews with exit surveys and ways to improve both in order to learn how diversity influences service-members’ decisions to leave or stay in the military.

While these types of subjective measurement cannot stand alone or be given the greatest consideration, they can be quite informative in helping management understand general perceptions that influence employees’ actual behavior, such as respect, dignity, opportunities, and fairness. Retention of females among the ranks, for example, is a critical issue for DoD. Attendees at the summit suggested that more can be done to understand and act on why women are making the decision to terminate their military careers. Additionally, if DoD opts to include structural diversity (i.e., different components) as part of its definition, climate surveys will be key to assess this type of diversity. For example, the number of reservists versus active duty personnel that compose a unit is not particularly important. Rather, assessing how these reservists are integrated into the unit and how the different components work together is essential. One way this can be measured is through expanding climate surveys to evaluate reservists’ perceptions of inclusion into a unit or whether they feel undervalued by active duty servicemembers. Again, rather than a head-counting type of benchmark, we are tying the successful integration of different components to mission effectiveness.

One of the challenges for DoD is to incorporate the climate survey tool into the broader diversity-evaluation context. Another will be to determine how the information will be used to bring about institutional change. DoD may need to develop the capacity within each Service to not only administer such assessments but also analyze and infer courses of action that are aligned with the broader vision of diversity.

Measuring Outcomes

One of the most repeated themes at the summit was accountability—the need for it, struggles with designing it, and challenges of imple-
menting it. The Navy, for example, is in the final phase of a three-phase diversity plan but has just begun to make progress in holding leaders accountable (appendix, pp. 66–67; Department of the Navy, 2006). Accountability can happen at all levels, from the individual to the entire organization. Just as individual managers can be rewarded or admonished for performance through an accountability system, on a larger scale, units or the entire organization can profit or lose through accountability. Outcome measurement is necessary, however, to enable accountability. Without valid measures of results that matter, senior leadership would be hard-pressed to systemically and fairly reward or penalize those who are being held accountable. Among various approaches to evaluations, outcome-based evaluation would be best aligned with the strategic plan, tying the vision, mission, goals, and strategies to results.

If DoD leadership opts for an inclusive vision of diversity that will enable the force to perform better (akin to a business case for diversity), outcomes that are to be measured must be tied directly to DoD’s mission. For corporations, such outcomes are often synonymous with the bottom line: profit or increase in stock value for their stockholders. Most diversity-friendly firms, however, still view diversity as an HR issue and do not conduct evaluations to confirm the business case for diversity (Kochan et al., 2003). For DoD, determining and measuring final outcomes may be difficult; the safety and security of U.S. interests are not easily quantifiable. When benchmarks are tied to meeting operational needs, measuring outcomes must involve assessing whether DoD has the capability to meet those needs generated from the ground. For instance, if there is an event in a certain part of the globe that requires DoD attention, does DoD have the language skills and cultural-awareness capability necessary to address the problem? In terms of accountability, rather than tying each individual commander’s performance to, for example, the number of servicemembers with foreign-language skills in his or her unit, the focus needs to be on overall DoD capability. And as operational needs change, DoD must continue to have the capability to respond. For instance, the latest Army operations manual (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008) puts forth that, in the current operational context, stability operations
are often as important as offensive and defensive operations. Stability operations require DoD to interact more extensively with local cultures, thus highlighting the need for appropriate language skills and cultural understanding. The ability of DoD to meet the capabilities required for stability operations will determine success.

If DoD prefers that the strategic plan be concerned only with improving representation among the senior leadership, then outcomes will be equivalent to a descriptive measurement of diversity, discussed earlier in this chapter. But adding process outcomes to measurement of diversity would provide more information about efforts to change the organization. While the final outcome may be about increasing the proportion of racial/ethnic minorities and females among the senior leadership, process outcomes will measure diversity present along the different decision points in the pipeline: accession, career assignment, development, promotion, and retention.

Every strategy applied (see Chapter Four) ought to be measured, in order to pinpoint where in the pipeline barriers exist. Hence, process outcomes can be deduced from every strategy. One way to measure process is Lim’s propensity score methodology, presented at the summit. Lim demonstrated that propensity score analysis, also known as look-alike analysis, can ascertain whether observed gaps in promotion outcomes are attributed to observable factors such as race, ethnicity, education, and gender (appendix, p. 71). If the gaps can be fully explained, one can perform a process outcome analysis to measure the relative importance of the multiple factors that are affecting the likelihood of the outcome and design policy interventions targeted at those factors. Examples include intensified training or education, different policies in the career-assignment process, and mentorship. If the gaps cannot be explained by the observable factors, an omitted-variable analysis is required to collect data on other potential factors that may be influencing outcomes. This methodology can be applied to all process outcomes that involve measurement of diversity along the pipeline.

Apart from measuring diversity at pipeline intervals, DoD can also utilize quantitative and/or qualitative methods to measure other process outcomes, such as group conflict, cohesiveness, and communication. These must be differentiated from climate surveys, which focus
on the environment and not on specific processes. Metrics that objectively assess process elements of work groups are certainly important for DoD, whose work fundamentally relies on teamwork to be effective in missions. As Riche et al. (2005) suggest, demographic diversity left unmanaged may yield negative effects, which can be mediated by diversity efforts. The Services, for instance, may find themselves working increasingly together on joint operations that require skills to manage cultural and other differences. The ability to measure such outcomes can greatly enhance the Services’ cultural competencies.

**Summary**

Evaluation serves as the link between strategic planning and implementation by tracking progress of on-the-ground efforts and enabling accountability processes. Metrics for evaluation ought to be derived from the vision, but that is often not the case with diversity because of the scarcity of appropriate metrics. While most organizations default to measurement of demographic representation and climate surveys for their ease and accessibility, a strategic approach for DoD would involve (1) determining what needs to be measured according to the leadership’s vision and mission for diversity and (2) employing and/or developing metrics that support the vision and mission. Head counting, for example, will not measure the most important aspects of a diversity vision that emphasizes inclusion. This chapter explored various metrics that are available or under development along three different categories: measurement of diversity in a group, measurement of organizational climate, and measurement of final and process (intermediate) outcomes.
The scope of our work is to facilitate the development of a strategic plan to achieve greater diversity among DoD active duty and civilian leadership. This report is intended to provide senior DoD leaders strategic options in developing the plan for department-wide diversity. Recognizing that the senior leadership’s full and sustained ownership of the strategic plan is critical for its success, we offer some recommendations on both the planning process and subsequent implementation. These recommendations are based on what we have learned from the literature, the presentations and discussions at the DoD Diversity Summit, and our previous work with DoD on diversity and related issues. The first set of recommendations pertains to the strategic plan, and the second set of recommendations relates to implementation.

We offer six recommendations:

1. Have the Secretary of Defense spearhead the strategic diversity effort.
2. Create an oversight committee with top DoD leaders from a wide range of professional/functional and personal backgrounds.
3. Adopt a vision that combines attention to traditionally protected groups with aims for creating an inclusive environment.
4. Expand strategies beyond accessions.
5. Invest in and develop rigorous metrics on all dimensions that support the strategic vision.
6. Design and apply a comprehensive accountability system with real rewards and consequences for individuals and groups.
Leadership

First and foremost, we recommend that the strategic planning process be top-down rather than bottom-up; whether DoD adopts a diversity strategic plan (either through ODMEO or as the entire organization) or a strategic plan that fully incorporates diversity into the core mission of DoD, its success depends on the leadership’s ability to champion the effort, monitor its progress, and follow through on accountability measures. The personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense provides a clear signal to the workforce that managing diversity and ensuring that it is a core value of the department is a top priority. This involvement is essential to bring about the institutional changes necessary to achieve greater diversity. The Secretary should do more than issue a diversity statement and occasionally refer to diversity in speeches and press conferences. We recommend that the Secretary personally lead an oversight committee that approves and monitors the progress of diversity initiatives. As such, we recommend that DoD form an oversight committee of top DoD leaders from a wide range of personal and professional/functional backgrounds (e.g., intelligence, combat arms, Joint Chiefs of Staff) to oversee the development of the strategic plan and its implementation, providing both insights from their vast experience and inputs from their functional communities. More importantly, the members of the committee will become the public faces of the department’s diversity-related efforts. Therefore, we strongly recommend that the committee be equipped with adequate resources to carry out its mission. While the Global War on Terror (GWOT) exacts heavy demands on the leadership, diversity has potentially great implications for both DoD’s present and future force readiness, which in turn will affect the safety and security of U.S. interests. Given the long gestation required for diversity efforts, the current leadership’s lasting legacy will, in part, be contingent on efforts to manage diversity in the military.
Vision

We recommend that the leadership adopt a definition of diversity that combines both the traditional consideration of underrepresented groups (race/ethnicity, gender) as well as the forward-looking concept of inclusion, which aims to leverage all differences and similarities within an organization. From a societal perspective, it is fundamentally undesirable for DoD and its leadership to look different from the population they serve. At the same time, ignoring other dimensions of diversity may institutionalize diversity as a peripheral concern, one that is not universally applicable. In determining other attributes to include in the definition of diversity, we recommend that components develop and use criteria (e.g., cultural background, exposure to geographic regions, socioeconomic background) that reflect their operational needs and mission readiness.

Mission and Goals

We also recommend that the mission be tied to the Secretary of Defense and not ODMEO, an office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Diversity stands a better chance of bringing about necessary institutional change if it is not framed as a human resources issue. ODMEO, however, can play a key role in supporting the Secretary of Defense by coordinating the implementation of the strategic plan.

Strategies

We recommend that DoD invest heavily in strategies other than those related to accessions, particularly if the chosen vision moves beyond protection of underrepresented groups. Development and retention have been overlooked thus far in many diversity efforts, which has not improved the pipeline situation for DoD. Being a closed system, DoD must retain, develop, and promote more members of diverse groups in
order to achieve diversity at the very top. Moreover, it is essential that any major initiative related to leadership development must explicitly address how it will contribute to greater diversity among DoD leadership. For example, Develop 21st Century Leaders, a major DoD initiative, aims to address the challenges of the changing dynamics of the DoD (i.e., evolving from the Cold War paradigm in the midst of a downsized department and looming baby boomer generation retirement) by developing new and progressive strategies to recruit and retain a quality workforce. These new strategies are intended to transform the department’s basis for defense planning from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, undated-a). A major initiative such as this must address diversity and diversity management issues. Additionally, if DoD adopts a diversity definition tied to the overall department mission that includes attributes such as language skills and cultural awareness, actions must be taken both to incentivize young recruits to attain these relevant skills and promote a career path toward the top-ranking leadership for such individuals. If DoD includes structural diversity (i.e., different components) in its definition, efforts must be made to effectively integrate all components (active duty, reserve, and civilian) encouraging a better understanding of each component’s unique contribution to the mission.

Additionally, we recommend that accountability become a critical strategy for DoD’s diversity, regardless of the chosen vision and mission. Implementation of any strategic plan is truly a daunting task for any organization; given its size and historical standing as part of the nation’s fabric, transforming DoD will not be an easy task. For DoD, financial and nonfinancial incentives for individuals and components, derived from a well-designed accountability system, may be effective in changing norms and behavior. Without them, institutional change will not be possible. Also, the accountability system should be designed to give the Services flexibility and autonomy in achieving department-wide goals.


**Evaluation**

Finally, we recommend a careful alignment between evaluation metrics and the rest of the strategic plan. We recommend that every goal be measured based on the strategies chosen to achieve those goals. This will help discern which strategies are more effective than others. Given DoD’s size and organizational structure, not every strategy will work for all components. We anticipate that each component will need to develop the capacity to analyze data and enforce accountability. Metrics that are currently available are often applied incorrectly, and much of what DoD may want to assess is not yet measurable. For strategies that lack obvious metrics, we recommend that DoD allocate resources to develop rigorous metrics. Academic research proposes several options for measurement, but many are not tested in the field.

**From Planning to Implementation**

While this report mainly sets the stage for DoD leadership’s strategic planning, we encourage the leadership to carry the momentum behind the planning into implementation, for improving diversity among the department leadership will require a sustained effort. Participants at the DoD Diversity Summit recalled that the department had engaged in a similar discussion to improve representation of minorities and women among senior leadership 20 years ago (appendix, pp. 75, 93, 96). The summit participants were particularly concerned for change, as DoD foresees no prospect of an increase in the representation of minorities or women in the higher ranks (flag and SES) for the next decade.

DoD leaders can create a seamless transition from strategic planning to implementation by using the diversity oversight committee as the main agent of change. As we recommended earlier, the oversight committee should consist of top leaders from diverse professional and personal backgrounds and oversee the strategic planning and its implementation. To gain momentum, the Secretary of Defense should announce the formation of the committee and its core mission to the workforce as soon as possible. Members of the oversight committee
should follow up with a communication campaign to explain elements of the strategic plan to the workforce. The communication campaign should include large community meetings in which the committee members field questions and comments from the workforce. Engaging the workforce in the diversity effort will increase awareness of diversity issues among the workforce. In addition, understanding of these issues and the advantages and disadvantages of various policy options among all levels of the department will ensure that the strategic plan that emerges from this effort will be widely accepted by the workforce. In fact, this can be considered an important first step in bringing about lasting institutional change toward a greater diversity among the DoD leadership. Once the committee finalizes the strategic plan, the Secretary of Defense should unveil it to the workforce and immediately issue directives to implement the plan. Such a collective effort by this generation of top DoD leaders will transform DoD from an exemplary institution of racial integration to a leading institution of diversity and diversity management.
On behalf of ODMEO, RAND convened a conference at the RAND office in Arlington, Va., on February 27 and 28, 2007. Representatives from DoD components, as well as experts from academia and the public and private sectors, gathered to present research findings, best practices, and on-the-ground updates on diversity efforts. Topics covered include defining diversity, using the right metrics to track and monitor diversity efforts, determining the appropriate leadership competencies and programs to develop future leaders, and involving the leadership to spearhead diversity efforts. Panelists represented a rich set of experienced organizations from the public, private, nonprofit, and academic sectors.

“Panel 1: The Current State of Diversity” included presentations from the Army, the Navy, Navy civilians, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Fourth Estate Agencies on the status of the component’s representation statistics and diversity initiatives. This generally included each component’s definition of diversity, diversity goals, and how the component is planning to achieve those goals.

“Panel 2: Analysis” delved into how to examine bias and factors affecting minority representation. Panelists included Nelson Lim of RAND, presenting a look at barrier analysis; Greg Ridgeway of RAND, examining propensity score analysis; Anthony Lofaro of GAO, reporting the findings from a GAO report examining Hispanic representation in the federal workforce; Michael Dole of Veterans Affairs, exploring barriers to Hispanic representation in his organization; and Judith
Whinfrey of Hewitt Associates, examining analytical methods that can be used to grow a diverse leadership pool.

“Panel 3: Development” explored methods for developing more diversity in an organization. Panelists included John Sibley Butler of the University of Texas at Austin, touching on the history of minority representation in the military and the new challenges to increase minority participation; Lawrence Hanser of RAND, discussing the development of a diverse senior leadership; Amanda Kraus of CNA, presenting three paradigms of strategic diversity management and the associated metrics to assess diversity outcomes; Beth Asch of RAND, examining options for improving Hispanic representation in the military; Magda Yrizarry of Verizon Communications, presenting a private-sector company’s take on how diversity is achieved and managed; Madelyn Jennings of the Cabot Advisory Group, presenting findings from her involvement in the Defense Business Board’s study on increasing diversity in DoD’s flag and senior executive ranks; and LtGen. Ronald Coleman of the Marine Corps, touching on aspects of leadership and mentorship that are necessary to achieve a diverse force.

“Panel 4: Leadership” focused on the leadership effort that is involved in successfully managing diversity. Panelists included Roosevelt Thomas of Roosevelt Thomas Consulting and Training, distinguishing between diversity and diversity management and suggesting approaches to successfully manage diversity; Vasiliki Theodoropoulos of GAO, presenting a GAO study that examined the diversity management programs of several federal agencies; Frank Dobbin of Harvard University, presenting his study examining the effects of different diversity programs at private-sector firms; Ronald Glover of IBM, offering tactics for success with diversity as employed by IBM; and RADM Clifford Pearson of the U.S. Coast Guard, discussing the successes the Coast Guard has achieved with diversity and the path to this success. The summit concluded with a closing session, summarizing the discussions of each of the panels.

The text that follows is a summary of the summit discussions. This text does not necessarily reflect the views of the authors of this report but instead presents the views of summit attendees. These discussions were used as empirical data in the analysis of this report.
Opening Remarks

DoD needs to care about diversity because we want to attract and employ people with assets and we need a senior workforce that better reflects the population we represent. If DoD were simply concerned about complying with the law, then we would be at the end of the road. But diversity is mission- and business-imperative. In the GWOT, linear thinking is not the way to go. The DoD needs a diverse group of people to optimize our programs and policies—this is important for readiness. At this summit, we want to tease out why diversity is business imperative.

Preliminary Discussion

From their perspective, African-Americans do not have a compelling reason to join the military. But from a geopolitical standpoint, there is a reason to look at this. The military are often the first ambassadors to developing countries abroad. The United States needs to show them that the United States truly is the home of the free and has diverse leadership. Thus, diversity is important for geopolitical reasons.

If the military serve as ambassadors, then DoD must consider the Middle Eastern community when thinking about diversity. The military typically does not think to focus on recruiting from the Middle Eastern community despite the military presence in the region. Perhaps the way the military is considering diversity needs to be expanded beyond traditional minority groups.

Retention issues with minorities also exist. The military needs to determine what is causing this churn and whether it is related to a lack of mentors or role models.

In terms of diversity, the talent pool for recruiting will look different in the future. If certain groups do not look at DoD or the military favorably, resulting in a lack of access to those groups for recruiting, that is bad for the future. DoD needs to set benchmarks today for where we want to be in 15–20 years.
There is a demand for developing desired competencies in DoD leaders, regardless of race or gender. But DoD needs to determine the supply of these competencies, if these competencies are being developed, and the policies, initiatives, or programs that make sense in developing these competencies. The focus needs to be on making supply meet demand.

There does not need to be more of a reason to promote diversity than the fact that it is a good thing to do. But there are other reasons to be concerned with diversity. First of all, the United States needs to not just talk the talk but also walk the walk in regard to diversity. Secondly, individuals from different backgrounds have different knowledge and opinions that need to be tapped into. Satisfying EEO requirements is easy; it is preparing the forces to meet the upcoming challenges that should be the focus. There needs to be a move from the planning stage to the execution stage—determine how to implement what we already know needs to be accomplished.

Diversity is necessary, for example, in the Coast Guard because they need language skills and an understanding of other cultures when boarding international ships. There are EEO complaints in the Coast Guard. If you have people, for instance, who think a woman on a ship is bad luck, then you have a mission-readiness problem.

It is imperative to define diversity and differentiate between diversity and representation. There are differences, similarities, and tensions in a group of any type. DoD does not necessarily need more diversity; instead they need to better manage diversity. In terms of execution, there must be intense involvement of leadership. Accountability goes with leadership—without accountability, there is no leadership. Communication from leadership is important. If human resources representatives are the only ones talking about diversity, it is not effective. The leadership must push it. Also, diversity objectives can be linked with business objectives in order to be more effective.
Panel 1: Current State of Diversity

Army Representative

The Army has a working definition of diversity that is not yet sanctioned by the chief of staff. This definition is “differences in soldiers and civilians that can have a positive impact on mission effectiveness in the Army.” The Army’s diversity goals include

- determine whether any personal, cultural, or occupational biases exist in Army organizational practices
- ensure that there are no unintended, diversity-insensitive consequences in Army policies
- identify workforce diversity outputs that directly support the Army Diversity Vision
- structure and synchronize for success in achieving the Army Diversity Vision while transforming the Army.

The Army Diversity Working Group meets to come up with recommendations, which will be briefed to senior leaders on how to proceed in executing the Army’s diversity goals. They hope to complete the decisionmaking process by the end of spring or early summer 2007. Further work that needs to be done includes a comprehensive workforce assessment by statistical analysis, a climate analysis of those who experience the effect of the current policies, and a review of all policies.

Women and minorities are not currently in the military occupational specialties (MOSs) that tend to promote to senior leadership. The Army needs to focus on the pipeline, how to grow these skills, and outreach for key occupations, such as science and engineering.

The Army is currently working on targeting youth, and their intern programs have been very successful. The Army also has a program to target Middle Eastern languages. In addition, they have the “March to Success” program, which is a Web-based course that helps students prepare for standardized tests. The Army also has a Hispanic-access initiative that includes advertising in Spanish.

The Army wants working toward diversity goals to become a part of everyday tasks, not a separate task. Working toward diversity goals
should be incorporated into every day’s activities, and effective communication about this is key.

**Navy Representative**

The Navy has developed the following definitions of diversity:

- **Rhumb Lines**: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individual sailors and civilians that enhance the mission readiness of the Navy.
- **CNO Policy**: Diversity is a strategic imperative for the U.S. Navy, critical to mission accomplishment, and a leadership issue where everyone is a leader. CNO guidance states that diversity is a focus area for 2007.

The Navy is currently in phase 3 of a three-phase diversity plan (Phase 1: Assessment, Phase 2: Decisive Actions, Phase 3: Sustainment and Accountability). Phase 1 identified the following areas for improvement: leadership accountability, mentoring, training, outreach, and communication. Phase 2 looked further into these problem areas and determined that diversity is not something that people are held accountable for; the Navy is focused on recruiting (contact to contract) and does not look much beyond this stage; the people from diverse populations who need mentoring are not getting it; training is not consistent across all levels; and there is no consistent, compelling message about diversity being communicated.

In terms of diversity, the Navy is doing pretty well on the enlisted side but has more of a challenge with the officer ranks. To increase diversity at the flag officer level, the Navy must now address the pool of people who will take this path or they will never get to the flag level. Therefore, technical-degree graduates need to be targeted now. The Navy needs to determine where minorities who are flag officers come from and whether it is largely the Naval Academy or whether they need to focus on ROTC as well. Looking at who promotes the most and who the flag officers are will determine where the Navy should focus its efforts. At the Naval Academy, four aspects are tracked for diversity: applications, offers, acceptances, and completion. Also, it is important
to look within occupation for diversity. For example, when looking at gender, if you take out the nurse corps, the overall group will look very male.

Accountability reviews have been put in place where a person is responsible for briefing his or her boss on how they are doing on diversity and if the numbers do not look good, what they are doing to fix it. However, it is not clear how to hold people accountable. It was suggested that diversity performance be included in the consideration for promotions. The Navy has planned sustained engagement with K–12 schools, colleges and universities, and affinity groups to target and attract a diverse talent pool. The Navy will soon launch a mentoring program combining formal and informal elements. It was suggested that the mentor should be held accountable for the success of the mentee. In comparing to the corporate world, a study examining several hundred companies using performance evaluations on diversity found that this was not a very effective method and does not lead to changes in diversity. The study found that a good data system and “task force” type of initiatives did have good results. However, it is volunteered in discussion that a separate study found that bonus plans for management based on EEO goals did have good results for diversity.

**Navy Civilians Representative**

“Equality of opportunity is essential to attracting, developing and retaining the most qualified workforce to support achievement of our strategic mission.” When trying to increase diversity, the first answer is to focus on recruiting, but the recruiting pool is full of diverse candidates. The problem is selection—do not just pump up the recruiting pool numbers.

The workforce profile numbers look particularly bad at the higher levels. SESs are largely selected from retired O6s and above, so if diversity is not at these levels, then there will be a problem having a diverse group of SESs. Former military are the second most popular source for SES candidates, but that should not outpace regular recruitment. However, it is particularly an issue for certain fields, such as the intelligence community, that recruit significantly from former military.
The commanding officer (CO) in each department serves as the EEO director for the department and is held accountable for EEO compliance. EEO is being integrated into the agency’s strategic mission, and they are starting to look at the “why” behind the workforce numbers for the first time.

The Department of the Navy is including people with disabilities as a target for improvement. They will collaborate with the Department of Labor and the Department of Veterans Affairs and have a pilot to try to hire these people, understanding the barriers. There are no affirmative action handcuffs for people with disabilities, so the Department of the Navy is aggressively recruiting wounded soldiers.

The Navy civilian side wants to leverage the military more effectively—they do not think that the two organizations always need to work separately. The civilian side does not have as much CNO visibility, so they need to leverage that from the military side.

**Marine Corps Representative**

When you have small numbers, like in the Marine Corps, you have to manage those small numbers.

You can bring in all the individuals you want, but if they feel that they do not have equal opportunity, then you will not have diversity.

In terms of the total active duty, the demographics for race/ethnicity closely resemble those of the general population. However, when isolating officers, the numbers look much worse.

The Officer Requirements Review Board meets twice a year to address these issues and includes membership from every division involved in manpower. One of the actions of the ORRB was to ensure appropriate staff diversity at entry-level schools because this is where new recruits need to look for people that look like them who have been successful.

The Marine Corps also participates in affinity group community events. When at these events and working with these groups, marines generate leads to transfer to recruiters and allow diverse groups to see marines out in the public, creating awareness of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is also targeting diverse media for advertising and recruiting.
To address how to manage diversity once it is achieved, the Marine Corps has instituted the Minority and Female Officer Career Database. This database tracks the career progression of minority and female officers, whether they are keeping up with their peers, and their suitability for promotion. The database gives the Marine Corps the opportunity to manage this small population.

The Marine Corps Climate Assessment Survey (MCCAS) is conducted to measure not only sexual harassment and discrimination but also command climate, such as whether people think they have a chance to succeed. They also get continual feedback from the Defense EO Climate Survey (DEOCS), which includes feedback on the mentoring program.

There needs to be accountability to make sure there is the right MOS mix. The Marine Corps wants diverse individuals to come in and stay in. But the Marine Corps is a very young force, and it is difficult to balance to get diversity in the senior ranks.

There has been more of a focus on foreign languages and language-training programs in the Marine Corps. There was a program where, in six weeks at Howard University (a historically black college), people got to an intermediate level of a language. The Marine Corps is thinking about a partnership with Howard University.

**Air Force Representative**

The Air Force views diversity as something over and above EO. The Air Force wants to strive for a mission focus for diversity because, if diversity is tied to an extension of equal opportunity, there is the risk of people questioning its necessity. Instead, the Air Force needs to say that diversity is necessary to meet mission requirements, not just equal opportunity targets. Outcome-based and a mission-focus is where the Air Force is going with diversity.

The Air Force wants to define diversity broadly but not turn its back on EO. They are looking more broadly at the categories defined in EO and treating EO as the canary—if an organization is not doing well in EO, it cannot be expected to do well in all the immeasurable characteristics of diversity.
The Secretary of the Air Force identified diversity as mission imperative and put it in his goals. The diversification of cultural skills is explicitly stated in the Air Force Strategic Plan.

The Air Force Academy had the most diverse class ever this year. Air Force diversity initiatives include a recruiting program to increase the number of African-American pilots and a program for disabled veterans. The Air Force is also working toward the diversification of technical skills.

**Fourth Estate Agencies Representative**

The Fourth Estate Agencies have not formalized a plan for diversity. The presentation at the diversity summit was a “concept” to make a plan of action. There are numerous agencies, so it is a big challenge to bring everyone together. However, many of the agencies already have their own individual diversity plans. The Fourth Estate Agencies’ unsanctioned, working definition of diversity is “valuing the differences and similarities of our workforce and maximizing on those traits.”

The Fourth Estate Agencies say that, based on GS-13 through GS-15 workforce demographics, the pipeline for a diverse SES group exists. However, retired military are also a recruiting source. If retired military are a large pool for SES, then the Fourth Estate may not have the pipeline for a diverse SES group. (Former military who are not retired military and entered at, for instance, the GS-4 level and worked their way up are not considered retired military in the statistics.)

The way forward for the Fourth Estate Agencies is to establish a senior-level Diversity Program Manager who will in turn establish a Fourth Estate Diversity Working Group. This working group will develop an action plan to execute DoD’s Diversity Strategic Plan so that the Fourth Estate Agencies can speak in one voice instead of at the individual agency level.

**Summary Statement for Morning Panels**

The diversity effort for all of the Services and for the civilian and military sectors needs to be integrated for a DoD total force effect.
Panel 2: Analysis

Nelson Lim, RAND: Evidence-Based Diversity Management

The diversity vision must be formulated by leadership; the analysis comes after the vision is identified. The analysis process works no matter how the vision is changed or what definition of diversity is being used. Every process or factor you can think of has influence on shaping the composition of leadership.

For barrier analysis, there must be good data at every stage of the process—from recruiting through promotion. Also, a multivariate methodology must be used. For example, when analyzing promotions, an individual’s characteristics should be tracked as well as contextual factors, such as the characteristics of their work units and career fields. All three stages of promotion should be tracked—those who applied, those who were referred to the top pool, and those who were selected.

When doing barrier analysis, it is crucial to look at equally qualified groups; therefore, look-alike groups must be created. Once look-alike groups are created, comparisons can be made. If the gap in promotion rates, for example, can be explained through the look-alike analysis, then the next step is to move to outcome analysis. If not, then an omitted-variable analysis is necessary. This entire process encompasses a barrier analysis, which will lead to a policy action.

Greg Ridgeway, RAND: Propensity Score Analysis: Methods for Assessing Differences in Personnel Processes and Manpower Management

This presentation looks at the methodology behind building the look-alike groups that Lim discussed in his presentation. To build these groups, use a propensity score analysis.

To compare groups, data are weighted to make, for example, skill groups match among races. Propensity scores generalize this idea of weighting the data. Propensity scores can account only for differences in observed features and cannot address any biases that may occur. For example, maybe there is bias against blacks for even becoming engineers in the first place. But the analysis can eliminate certain variables as reasons for causing the gap.
An attendee challenges the methodology saying that this is a multivariate analysis. The race variable is extremely sensitive in regression models. He asks why Ridgeway does not just control for variables, and Ridgeway responds that he is doing that. Ridgeway says that all the factors that would go into promotion can be added in.

DoD needs to focus on collecting good data throughout all phases in order to identify barriers. There is also the issue that race is self-identified and cannot be challenged.

As an example, at Tuskegee University ROTC, they are producing hardly any pilots. They have identified the problem as low Air Force Officer Qualifying Test (AFOQT) scores.

Anthony Lofaro, GAO: The Federal Workforce: Additional Insights Could Enhance Agency Effort Related to Hispanic Representation (GAO-06-832)

The study examined several federal agencies, identified and analyzed factors affecting Hispanic representation, and examined the steps EEOC and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are taking. The study looked at a segment of the civilian labor force that looked more like the pool for the federal workforce.

The study found that citizenship has the greatest effect on Hispanic representation (35 percent of Hispanics 18 and older in the CLF are not citizens) and that education also has a significant effect (39 percent of Hispanics 18 and older have less than a high school education). The study also pointed out that EEOC and OPM do not assess factors contributing to representation differences and that their benchmarks do not take citizenship into account.

When looking at these types of studies, careful attention must be paid as to what the appropriate benchmarks are. For example, it must be determined whether the DoD wants to look like the overall population or just the CLF. If the federal government is limited because of citizenship, this may mean that benchmarks should be changed. If the federal government has to have college-educated citizens, it is limited compared with the CLF. If the federal government’s recruiting pool looks the same as the CLF, this indicates that recruiting methods need
to change. But if the federal government’s recruiting pool looks different from the CLF, then that is a different issue.

DoD also needs to consider whether citizenship should be required for federal employment. Many Hispanics come to the United States to get an education but then return home because of the citizenship barrier. Maybe the government should tap into this pool. Hispanics who are not citizens but are living in the United States will have children who are citizens, and they should be targeted now. The federal government could also focus on Puerto Ricans. They are U.S. citizens but are still educationally disadvantaged.

Michael Dole, Veterans Affairs: Possible Barriers to Hispanic Representation
Veterans Affairs are particularly low in the areas of white females and Hispanic females when compared with the relevant CLF (RCLF). When the data are broken down by occupation group, it is revealed that education is not the issue, because the largest underrepresentation of Hispanics (males and females) is in wage workers, whereas white collar jobs show appropriate Hispanic representation compared with the RCLF. There has been a lot of success in increasing African-American representation, and Veterans Affairs has a great number of programs with historically black high schools, community efforts, etc. However, there is no parallel effort to bring in Hispanics. With recruiting veterans, citizenship is not an issue, so it is clear that this is an outreach problem. The Department of Veterans Affairs has established programs to work on outreach in the Hispanic community.

Judith Whinfrey, Hewitt Associates: Growing a Diverse Leadership Pool: How Advanced Analysis Can Optimize Results
One of the biggest barriers to success in organizations is the lack of attention span that can be largely attributed to the revolving door at the top of the organization. There is a tendency to look for quick results instead of changes that need to be implemented for the long haul.

In terms of accountability, if the reward (bonus, etc., for diversity performance) is small, it is meaningless. A great way to achieve accountability is to publicize the results by department and by leader.
Additionally, the people working with data in an organization must be tied to the outcomes or purpose or they will get bogged down in the data.

All four of the following types of metrics are necessary to be effective:

- **Operational metrics.** These address what is getting accomplished and how it is getting accomplished. This is like a report card—there is no insider analysis, just the numbers. Try to tell a story with operational metrics to get more out of them.
- **Comparative metrics.** An example of this type of metric is comparing current numbers to the previous year’s numbers. These used to be the only kind of metrics used. Comparative metrics also get at identifying best practices. Although you have to be careful what you compare, comparative metrics do promote cross-learning.
- **Opinion metrics.** These are the climate surveys that DoD uses and also include exit interviews. These data are important but cannot stand alone, because they are not 100 percent true. How this information is obtained and what kind of survey instrument should be used is not important—just focus on getting some type of this data.
- **Predictive metrics.** These create a process for evidence-based decisionmaking and are based on the actual behavior of people. These will help to build a case for a more rigorous foundational change in an organization. Predictive metrics combined with the other three types of metrics listed above will promote mission-driven outcomes. Search for the predictors that will help you answer questions.

**Panel 2 Q&A and Discussion**

In analysis, a critical issue is what to do if the variable being used is itself biased, such as testing—minorities generally do not perform well on standardized tests. Measures must be validated and it must be ascer-
tained whether a certain test or other variable has predictive power. Mixing together a number of flawed variables can also cause problems. If your look-alike analysis fully explains a gap, you can stop analyzing data and go on to an outcome analysis. If it does not fully explain it, then an omitted-variable analysis needs to be performed.

In terms of benchmarks, DoD and the military need to determine whom they are comparing themselves to. But they must be careful about having a standardized benchmark (especially if civilians are included) because not all groups within DoD should be compared with the same benchmark. The military is discriminatory—for example, the military has weight restrictions. A significant percentage of youth do not qualify for the military because of this restriction. The military does accept GEDs, and there is more of a trend for people to drop out of high school and get GEDs. However, people with GEDs tend to have higher attrition and other negative attributes. But as the military moves forward, they will have to recruit where they normally do not recruit and put resources where they normally do not put resources. For example, the Marine Corps traditionally recruits from just certain colleges, and that will need to be expanded. An attendee suggested that benchmarks be set on the basis of requirements for skill. When DoD cannot meet that benchmark, wave a flag at the Department of Education, etc. You have to have something—a benchmark, a baseline—to say “this is what we want to look like.”

DoD needs to consider whether it should be more aggressive in developing a compelling force-shaping methodology. There has to be a narrowly defined compelling interest in order to focus. When the focus is on recruiting a certain percentage or number of minorities, this is a red flag—quotas. When it looks like a quota, it is hard to establish that it is a compelling interest. The key is to increase the pool from which to select. DoD has to put time and effort into increasing that pool, and, legally, DoD needs to be careful about benchmarking. The key is not to turn other individuals away because there is a target to recruit someone else.

These same conversations were going on in DoD 20 years ago. DoD must not fall into the same trap they fell into that causes every-
one to be here again today. DoD needs to come up with results—the U.S. military is one generation from not being here.

**Panel 3: Development**

The military must be representative of the society it represents. There needs to be an update of the 1999 pipeline report that addresses the officer side. The military needs to focus on how to retain and grow qualified candidates.

**John Sibley Butler, University of Texas at Austin: Defending America: 21st Century Management Issues**

A distinction between equal opportunity and diversity must be made. The University of Texas football team has no diversity, but the coach wants to win with what he wins with. There is equal opportunity to join the team, because the coach would never deny anyone who has the skills, but the result is an almost all-black team with no diversity.

Leaders have to understand how their organizations operate in order to lead. The military started out as more of an institutional format, similar to the priesthood. Now the military format is becoming more similar to an occupational format, so the military has to start relating to how other companies are recruiting people, keeping in mind that today’s youth has no civic awareness.

When the first blacks joined the military, it was not because the military wanted to create opportunities for black men. It was because they needed bodies. Opportunities were a by-product. While the history of blacks in the military can be tracked, the same cannot be done for Hispanics, because they were coded as whites until the 1980s.

In an all-volunteer force, the military is competing with the marketplace. Butler suggests creating enlisted military academies that would be an analog to West Point but at the enlisted level, for example. Kids should be given the choice to go to college or go to a military institution.

The military should focus on ensuring opportunities for all groups rather than trying to eradicate racism, sexism, or other “isms.”
Butler says that the biggest focus should be immigrants—the military needs to concentrate on new Americans and how to get these individuals into military service. Hispanic youth have a higher propensity for interest in military service (as told through surveys) and are less likely to attrite boot camp.

There is a cost of discrimination and discriminating from the recruitment pool from an economic sense.

**Lawrence Hanser, RAND: Maintaining Diversity in the Development of Senior Leaders**

Generally, if you look around and everyone looks like you, that is not a good thing.

DoD needs to try to understand the skill requirements of leaders today and prepare individuals to rise to the top levels of leadership. They need to identify who leaders are, for example, Air Force senior leaders are pilots and Navy senior leaders are surface warfare officers, pilots, and submarine officers. DoD needs to start focusing on getting diversity in these occupations. Also, DoD should put occupations that promote to senior leadership in educational-leadership positions not because they are the best educators, but for symbolic reasons.

Unlike corporations who can hire outside, the next senior leaders are already in the military today. If the military are going to have representative senior leadership, they need to pay attention to selection decisions early on and in large enough numbers so that they have choices later on. There is no reason to believe that talent is anything other than randomly distributed, even though it may be different kinds of talent. If the military gets a diverse population into the elite professions (MOSs), then senior leaders being from elite professions is not a threat to diversity.

**Amanda Kraus, CNA: Beyond Head Counting: Strategic and Operational Diversity Management for Improved Performance**

There are three diversity paradigms for strategic diversity management. Paradigm 1, Discrimination and Fairness, focuses on benefits to the individual and society at large but not the organization. This paradigm involves tracking recruiting, retention, and promotion rates
versus benchmarks and results in increased employment of women and minorities and the promotion of fair treatment, but encourages assimilation and does not embrace differing viewpoints. Paradigm 2, Access and Legitimacy, focuses on benefits that diversity provides to the organization, such as better access to labor and customer markets. This paradigm will also track sales and market-share growth and results in women and minorities being in positions that are tenuous and tend to be cut out. Additionally, as women and minorities replace white men, these occupations become lower paying and less respected in society. Paradigm 3, Integration and Learning, focuses on the value of diverse ideas and perspectives in enhancing work. This paradigm is the first to show sustained performance improvements, assuming good diversity management, because it attaches the diversity of ideas, not just the diversity of people, as the focus.

Cultural change happens slowly and with difficulty, but tying diversity to mission will help. Both negative and positive effects can occur with diverse workgroups, depending on how well diversity is managed. Diversity needs to be managed. Unmanaged diversity creates the same business cost as unmanaged demographics. Good management metrics that tie diversity to work processes and performance are

1. metrics that capture the nature and/or amount of diversity in the work group
2. indicators of diversity climate—how do people classify or view their diversity environment?
3. metrics that assess outcomes (both intermediate process and final).

The military already does numbers one and two, but there is nothing on the shelf to accomplish number three. It is more difficult in the military to measure number three because, unlike corporations, there are no profit, sales, etc., to measure. The military does have performance predictors, such as looking at how well the newly diverse force performs on operations or exercises. This is similar to looking at how joint units perform.
Also, policies such as “up or out” may be bad for diversity because these policies create more competition and a less cooperative environment. There is a lot of empirical work being done by consultants on these issues for corporations, but it is not published, so researchers are handicapped when trying to analyze the issues.

Beth Asch, RAND: Increasing the Representation of Hispanics in the Military

Given the growth of the Hispanic population, this is a potentially important pool of recruits. Options for improving Hispanic representation in the military include increasing the number of Hispanic youth who meet the current qualifying standards, recruiting qualified Hispanics more intensively, and varying entry standards, such as by using waivers or relaxing age standards. The study looked at the characteristics of the Hispanic population from which the military recruits and to what extent this group disqualifies for service. The study also examined the career outcomes for marginally qualifying Hispanics and, for qualifying Hispanics, their civilian work and education choices. The study looked at what it would take to recruit these people and what their other opportunities are.

This analysis is different from a civil-service analysis because the military has additional barriers to entry, such as weight, medical issues, age, don’t ask don’t tell, etc.

A large percentage of Hispanics are not qualified for service, with the main obstacles being high school graduation, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), and weight. Family background accounts for much of the difference in AFQT and high school graduate rate differences between Hispanics and whites. Since family background is the major factor, the policy response must focus either on improving the qualifications of the best marginal recruits or on relaxing standards.

Non-U.S.-born Hispanics have especially low high school graduation rates. Only 37 percent of non-U.S.-born Hispanics graduate high school, and roughly half of Hispanic youth are non-U.S.-born. Non-U.S.-born Hispanics also have more of an issue with English proficiency.
After accounting for education, AFQT, weight, dependents, convictions, and drug use, between 20 and 33 percent of Hispanic male youth, 33 and 41 percent of white males, and 15 and 27 percent of black males qualify for military service.

When analyzing whether Hispanic recruits below education, AFQT, and weight standards had worse career outcomes than white recruits, holding other factors constant, the study found that these lower-quality Hispanic recruits have as good retention as high-quality white recruits. It is conventional wisdom that minorities are more likely to stay in than whites. The study looked at the motivations behind this and whether the civilian opportunities are not as good for Hispanics. The study also found that lower-quality Hispanic recruits have higher promotion rates to the rank of E5 in the Army and Marine Corps than their higher-quality white counterparts.

Hispanics who qualify for military service have high college enrollment but low college completion. Employment is very common for this group, whether enrolled in college or not. Hispanic high school graduates in categories I and II have a lifetime wage growth 60 percent higher than those in category III. Hispanics in categories I and II are likely to be in high demand in the job market, and recruiting efforts must recognize qualified Hispanics’ outside opportunities.

The military needs to portray and communicate the military as a career, not just an opportunity for an education. Many Hispanics work during college for the income, but it affects grades and college completion.

If the AFQT and high school graduation requirements were relaxed, there would still be a big nonqualifying problem because of citizenship issues—there is a large interaction with high school graduation and citizenship. Low AFQT scores for Hispanics are likely largely an English-proficiency issue. The Army has a program, March to Success, that teaches potential recruits how to take the AFQT.

In terms of officers specifically, minority officers are more likely to stay in than nonminority officers.
Magda Yrizarry, Verizon Communications

Organizations have to be determined to perform at high levels of diversity. Diversity is evolutionary as much as occasionally revolutionary, and an interdisciplinary approach is critical. Organizations have to stop counting heads and make heads count. Like the military, Verizon also grooms its own leadership and is not very welcoming to new people at senior leadership levels because Verizon values that people are internally groomed. Verizon has high-level diversity policies even though its departments are very different.

Verizon is not in the business of changing how people feel at home, but rather changing how people act in the workplace. Verizon’s culture is driven by values such as integrity, respect, performance excellence, and accountability. The focus is on representation and utilization.

Verizon’s diversity mission statement is as follows: “At Verizon, Diversity means embracing differences and cultivating an inclusive organization that reflects the marketplace and leverages the diversity of employees, customers, suppliers, and community partners because it’s the right thing to do and drives business success.”

Verizon’s diversity framework includes workforce, workplace, communities, and suppliers as strategic components. Even though it may take longer to incorporate all of these components, the outcome will be better.

Verizon focuses on traditionally underrepresented groups in addition to creating an inclusive, high-performing workplace for everyone. Fifty percent of all promotions must go to women and people of color, but there are plenty to choose from. Verizon makes sure they do not disenfranchise any population—they do not make white males feel like a thing of the past. Instead, there is more opportunity for everybody.

To develop the next generation of leaders, Verizon will attract talent, assess performance and potential, build capabilities through training and development, and retain and renew leaders. In the past, Verizon was very ad hoc with executive development and just let it flow. But now they have a lot more structure focused on development actions.
Madelyn Jennings, Cabot Advisory Group

The U.S. armed forces have been called the most successful integration story in America, with the last racially segregated military unit abolished in 1954.

Jennings describes the experience of a Palestinian woman from Jordan who lived in Queens, New York, saw an ad for the Army in an Arabic-language magazine, and decided to join the Army linguist program. She was given 24 weeks to improve her English and, during that time, she became a squad leader and bay commander. She failed her final English exam and was discharged. Jennings questions why the Army did not find some way to use her Arabic-language skills and cultural knowledge.

Cedric Herring, a scientist at the University of Illinois, found that there is a linear relationship between diversity and business success (more customers, greater profitability, etc.). Jennings looks at how this can be applied to DoD.

Jennings is a member of the Defense Business Board and participated in a study on increasing diversity in DoD’s flag and senior executive ranks. The board spoke to 16 premier corporations and came up with the following conclusions to be applied to DoD:

- Diversity must be viewed as fairness and equity rather than conflict resolution, or progress will not happen.
- Best-practice companies define diversity as “an inclusive culture where differences in people are valued and performance is recognized, regardless of background.” Diversity has an amorphous, inclusive, and changing definition.
- In the firms examined by the board, diversity is seen as a business imperative for the following reasons:
  - Better business decisions are made when diverse points of view are considered.
  - Teams perform better when their members represent varied backgrounds.
  - Reaching out to a diverse population increases the pool of talent available and provides a competitive advantage in the war for talent.
Creating a culture of inclusion that leverages diversity leads to high employee morale, improving retention and productivity.

DoD should expand the categories of underrepresented groups beyond those minimally mandated to include those from different ethnic backgrounds, religions, and countries of origin. Those groups should be based on greater representation because of real requirements, such as current and future threat assessments, and the available, qualified population.

There are only 1,500 Muslims in the Army; however, there is no Army ROTC program in the Detroit area, a region with a large Muslim population. This is an example of a population that needs to be tapped.

Top leadership commitment and communication is key, as is line management accountability. Diversity cannot be seen as just an HR issue. Top leadership must tell women and minorities that they are stronger with them.

The firms interviewed in the board’s study identified the following “must haves” for success:

- leadership from the top
- progress review after actions are in place
- diversity must be a part of the organization’s mission, values, and culture
- must link diversity strategy with a strong business case to obtain buy-in from the organization
- must hire quality individuals who meet real requirements and promote individuals based on true merit
- must tie diversity progress and results to management compensation.
- must give women and minorities the opportunity to develop the competencies needed to compete for the critical jobs that lead to promotions.
Top lessons learned:

- Do not hire or promote only for numbers—the organization will become cynical.
- Do not make diversity a stand-alone HR program or initiative—it must be seen as a line responsibility, business imperative, and part of the organization’s strategy.

The board had the following recommendations:

- Measure progress not just against numerical goals for equal representation per se, but toward an inclusive, nondiscriminatory environment that values diversity, pluralism, and inclusion and creates opportunity for those of different backgrounds to contribute and be recognized and promoted based on their performance and capabilities.
- Such measures should be assessed qualitatively against time-line standards from climate surveys, 360-degree reviews, and exit interviews.
- Such measures could include tracking and reporting on the number of opportunities a manager had to hire/promote/train and confirm that he or she considered diversity in those decisions and selections.
- Reduce the diversity/EO reporting demands on the Services by starting afresh to identify a small number of essential reports and scrapping all others.
- Centralize the gathering and analysis of data within one organization.

The board’s report is available at http://www.dod.mil/dbb—look under HR management for diversity in management and SES ranks.

LtGen. Ronald Coleman, U.S. Marine Corps

LtGen. Ronald Coleman believes that President Jimmy Carter was wrong to go to an all-volunteer Army and that everyone should serve
our country in some capacity. At one time, blacks fought for the right to fight.

Leadership should be broken down into the following:

- Treat everyone with dignity and respect. Then they will follow you anywhere.
- Mentoring is very important. Take care of your folks and allow them the opportunity to grow.
- Train people so that, when older people leave, there is someone to fill the void.
- Keep track of talent.

People need to see role models like them. Your mentor does not need to look like you—anybody can be your mentor—but when nobody looks like you, that is a problem.

The military has good leadership, but they are lacking in mentorship, and this is not pushed enough. People do not understand that mentoring is a two-way street. Youngsters today do not run up to salute or talk to black officers like they used to.

LtGen. Coleman does not think that a formal mentorship program will work. It needs to be informal; when you get a feeling from a person, you can establish a mentor/mentee relationship. It needs to be someone you feel you can sit down and talk to, and, in this sense, rank hierarchy might get in the way. Coleman’s mentors were a fellow lieutenant; they were two of only a few black officers at the time and looked out for each other. Other than that, his mentors were white, because there were so few black role models.

Cultural awareness is a part of force protection. America does not do “cultural awareness” well. The Army is trying—they are going to Detroit looking for the right language skills and ethnic group. Army training includes Iraqi cultural villages that have been set up to simulate the situation. But the Army is still woefully lacking. DoD needs funding put toward developing competencies in cultural awareness.
Panel 3 Q&A and Discussion

Very little has changed since 1980—no more than a few percentage points. The number of female active duty officers has even declined.

Further explanation of CNA Paradigm 1 (Discrimination and Fairness): Women who go into business feel like they have to act like men; blacks feel like they have to act like whites. Women and minorities should not feel like they have to be soft and cooperative or that they have to give up their gender or ethnic identity.

Put the emphasis on the task and difficulties with diversity and the differences between people decrease. For example, if you make a group of Marines crawl on the ground under barbed wire for an hour, they will all love each other at the end of the task. Celebrate those things you have accomplished together. In celebrating that success, acknowledge that all kinds of people helped with that accomplishment.

Panel 4: Leadership

Roosevelt Thomas, Roosevelt Thomas Consulting and Training: Successful Diversity Management Leadership

Conceptual awareness is key to having true diversity. To move forward, an organization must differentiate between representation and diversity.

Thomas is not clear that the United States has said that it really wants diversity in this country. The United States invites you in but tells people to leave their differences at the feet of the Statue of Liberty and focuses on assimilation. Similarly, corporations have not said that they want diversity. There is a difference between representation (the presence of minorities, women) and diversity. When you leave your differences at home, you have representation without diversity. Diversity embraces the differences, similarities, tensions, and complexities that characterize a group. Diversity management is the craft or process of making quality decisions in the midst of those differences, similarities, tensions, complexities, etc. The distinction between diversity and diversity management is important. If you do not properly manage
Managing workforce representation has to do with mainstreaming minorities. Managing workforce relationships has to do with making sure these groups of people who are not used to working together have harmonious relationships that are conducive to productivity. Many organizations are stuck going between these two approaches. Managing workforce diversity is something different—not just about representation, like the first two approaches.

Changes in demographics lead to changes in representation. Changing attitudes about being different leads to diversity.

When giving training abroad, Thomas uses the word complexity instead of diversity, which is good to keep in mind.

**Vasiliki Theodoropoulos, GAO: Leading Diversity Management Practices**

Reasons why the federal government should be concerned about managing diversity include avoiding EEO-related payments and productivity losses, as well as potential benefits that come from effective diversity management, such as improved employee and organizational performance and improved employee satisfaction and retention.

**Definitions.**

*Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO):* A policy embodied in law that requires that employment actions be free from prohibited discrimination, including race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.

*Diversity management:* A process intended to create and maintain a positive work environment in which the similarities and differences of individuals are valued, so that all can reach their potential and maximize their contributions to an organization’s strategic goals.

*Workforce diversity:* Ways in which people in a workforce are similar to and different from one another. In addition to the characteristics protected by law, others cited by the literature include but are not limited to background, education, language skills, personality, sexual orientation, and work role.
Differences between EEO and diversity management: EEO is compliance-oriented and focused on legally protected groups, whereas diversity management is results-oriented and focused on all elements of diversity. EEO has a perception of preference and is grounded in assimilation, whereas diversity management has a perception of equality or equity and is grounded in individuality.

A GAO study (GAO, 2005) examined the diversity management programs of federal agencies whose programs ranked highest in a 2001 paper based on a 1999 government-wide survey.

Leading practices identified in the study included

1. Leadership commitment. This involves an attitude of leading by example and communication of the diversity vision/message by top-level management, by providing organizational resources to support the diversity effort and instilling in senior management the importance and business relevance of the issue. For example, the director of NIH frequently discusses diversity, holds town hall meetings, and wrote an article on diversity for the NIH newsletter.

2. Diversity as part of the strategic plan. Diversity must be a part of daily operations. If it is something “extra,” it will go by the wayside when things get busy.

3. Diversity linked to performance—the business case for diversity. Understanding that a diverse and inclusive work environment can increase productivity and improve individual and organizational performance is key. This practice involves improving bottom-line results, meeting the needs of a more diverse customer base, and increasing retention and improving employee morale.

4. Accountability. This focuses on ensuring that leaders are held responsible for diversity by linking assessments and compensation to progress on diversity initiatives.

There have been marked improvements in these areas. For example, a female scientist who worked at NIH in the 1960s was permit-
ted to publish only with her initials, not her name. She was given the opportunity for the job, but diversity was not being promoted.

Frank Dobbin, Harvard University: Best Practices or Best Guesses: Making Diversity Management Work

Dobbin’s study looked at different interventions from diversity programs and their effects on managerial diversity. 829 firms between 1971 and 2002 were included in the study.

Interventions that experts prescribe:

- Establish responsibility. Look at the problems and try to institutionalize solutions. This includes
  - diversity task force
  - diversity manager
- Combat bias. Try to change the hearts and minds of individuals. This includes
  - diversity training
  - diversity evaluations
- Combat social isolation. Combating the “high school cafeteria” (i.e., an environment dominated by cliques):
  - network program
  - mentor program.

Diversity training was used by the largest percentage of firms included in the study.

The study showed that the diversity taskforce, diversity manager, and mentoring interventions were the most effective. Diversity task forces and managers work because they ensure responsibility and accountability, reviewing progress reports and getting the statistics out there so that people are aware. These interventions also cite specific solutions and involve brainstorming to solve problems. Mentoring works because mentors provide insider knowledge and the keys to success. Mentees also develop connections to their mentors.

Diversity training, evaluations, and networking programs fail to have a positive effect on diversity. Training and evaluations fail because there is a backlash. White men have a negative reaction to training,
and some studies have shown that training actually increases stereotypical views. Evaluations increase job insecurity and produce a negative reaction. Knowledge of stereotypes and individual accountability do not do much to help. When looking at voluntary versus mandatory diversity training, mandatory training actually had adverse effects on diversity. For firms with voluntary training, those with legal content had adverse effects, while those with cultural-awareness content did not.

**Ronald Glover, IBM**

To be successful with diversity:

- Know your history and culture. (Do not fight the culture; the culture always wins.)
- Define the business case for diversity, which will enable you to achieve your mission.
- Understand your current processes and practices and leverage them.
- Clearly define where you want to end up and assess your progress.
- Create an environment that maximizes people’s ability to make a contribution.
- Give back (work/life flexibility).

The likelihood of success increases with partnerships both with your employees and the external world. Ask each racial/ethnic or gender group the following:

- What will it take to make this place more attractive to people in your constituency to come to work here?
- What is necessary for your group to feel welcomed and valued here?
- What can we do for your group to maximize your group’s productivity?
- What can we do to influence your group’s buying decisions?
• With what external organizations that address the interests of your group should IBM have a relationship?

Demographics will force you to do things but not necessarily the right things. IBM chooses to manage the tensions and differences that emerge.

**RADM Clifford Pearson, U.S. Coast Guard: Sustaining Leaders’ Commitment to Diversity**

**The Coast Guard’s Journey in Diversity (1987–present).**

• The “Accession and Retention of Minority CG Officers” study led to the development of the Minority Career Advisor and the Minority Advisory Council.

• The “Women in the Coast Guard” study to develop strategies to increase the number of women in the Coast Guard led to the creation of the Women’s Policy Advisor and the Women’s Advisory Council.

• A diversity staff was created within HR and now includes a staff chief, an ethnic advisor, and a gender advisor.

• The “Managing Diversity as a Process” study final report led to the development of the Strategic Plan, the Commandant’s Diversity Policy Statement, the Workforce Cultural Audit, accountability, and expanding the mentoring program to everyone.

• The Commandant’s Diversity Advisory Council (DAC) was established.

• Coast Guard Diversity Summits I and II, which included senior leadership.

The following is an excerpt from the Commandant’s Diversity Policy Statement:

Diversity is not a program or a policy—it is a state of being. Diversity sparks innovation and incorporates fresh approaches. It provides well-rounded perspectives in problem solving that let us identify better ways of performing the duties entrusted to us by our government and fellow citizens.
The Coast Guard has had a sustained leadership commitment, as shown through the milestones mentioned above in addition to the Coast Guard’s association with affinity groups and recruitment outreach programs. The Coast Guard monitors this commitment to diversity through workforce forecasting and analysis; Organizational Assessment Surveys, which were developed by OPM and are given every two years; Command Climate Surveys; Equal Opportunity Reviews; and periodic service studies, such as the Officer Succession Management Plan study and the Sexist Behavior Focus Group study.

Challenges that the Coast Guard still faces include minority and female retention and representation in leadership positions, command and community climate concerns, competing internal demands, and organizations competing for the same talent pool.

Panel 4 Q&A and Discussion

Dobbin’s study concluded that training is not effective for diversity in the private sector; however, an attendee points out that the military has to do a great deal of mandatory training so it might not have such a negative effect. Dobbin points out that there is a lot of mandatory training in the private sector as well. The reality is probably closer to Dobbin’s findings.

Training in the military is not integrated or relevant. People do the Microsoft PowerPoint training and check the box and then, three days later, the person who completed the training cannot give a definition that was taught. Training cannot be “death by PowerPoint.” It has to be made relevant, related to mission-effectiveness, and something the trainees can relate to. In terms of training, when people confuse EEOC and diversity, both concepts are hurt.

It is pointed out that, while Dobbin’s study concluded that performance appraisals were useless, the GAO reported that they were beneficial. The GAO study gives a sum total of “success”—people acting on the basis of faith rather than quantitative analysis.
Closing Session

Most of what has been presented at this summit has been heard before. Now DoD needs to focus on what to do to execute and move to the next level. Unless DoD does something different, everything will stay the same for the next 10 years (except maybe for a slight increase in women).

It is a concern that everyone (all of the Services and the Fourth Estate Agencies) has a different definition of diversity. There needs to be a standard definition. The issue of the disabled also needs to be incorporated into the definition. Title 5, Section 7201, of the U.S. Code is the law that addresses the issue of representation. DoD has to look at this law, and the definition must address this law.

There has been a lot of discussion about “numbers diversity” (representation) versus “diversity of ideas.” DoD is not where they want to be with numbers (representation), so they cannot lose sight of that. The problem cannot be redefined to get away from the numbers problem.

EO (applied to the military) is not the same as EEO (applied to civilians). What works for EO might not work for EEO. One is chain of command and one is a whole set of regulations.

Whatever best practices DoD decides on, they have to ensure that the practices will work on both sides of the equation. For example, tying diversity goals to the salaries and bonuses of senior leaders needs to be examined for all DoD components, not just piecemeal.

DoD needs to focus on accountability and look at holding leaders accountable for diversity. SES has diversity goals related to bonuses and salaries.

There needs to be a focus on the marketing of DoD as an employer of choice. DoD does not market itself well on the civilian side. When people hear “defense,” they think military only. College students are not thinking about DoD; they are thinking about NASA, National Science Foundation, etc. These kids need to be told about the opportunities at DoD.

There are 160 retired military who have gone to SES, and they are almost all white males. DoD needs an SES-development program to make sure the applicant pool is rich enough.
DoD needs to try to have diverse disabled recruits, since there are fewer legal restrictions with this group. The Workforce Recruitment Program (WRP) is being expanded.

**Panel 2 Summary**

Lim’s main points:

- Whatever analysis strategy you use, it is only as clear as the definition of your goals.
- Whatever the definition or vision dictates, define the dimensions of that vision that can be tracked so that you will have metrics and data. All stages—recruiting through retention—need data.
- You need rigorous analysis. Comparing percentages that are apples and oranges is not useful—you are chasing your own tail.

During the summit, recruitment was mentioned 100 times more than retention. DoD needs to focus more on retention. Leadership is all about retention because it takes so long to grow people.

But an attendee points out that minorities stay in more often and longer than majorities so it is not as much of an issue. With the hierarchical structure of the military, you have to focus on recruitment.

Lim points out that there is Air Force research showing retention issues with female officers.

The question when faced with the attrition rate of women in the Navy was, “We must have picked the wrong ones.” There has been no question of “What’s happening to these women in their careers as Naval officers?” The Navy needs to get to the root cause of the attrition of women and look at what types of exit interviews are being conducted with women and minorities to determine why people are leaving.

The Navy reports that SWOs and aviation women are leaving because they want to have a family. They are working on women’s retention through exit interviews, surveys, focus groups, and talking to people who are contemplating leaving.

There are options, such as an on/off career ramp, sabbatical, a stint in the reserves. However, the military is more restricted with options
because things have to be accomplished in a Service career and getting off track makes that difficult.

Dobbin comments that the problem with statistics is that you do not take the differences among groups into account. He says that Lim and Ridgeway’s research shows real promotion rates that you cannot see with the raw numbers. He thinks that the military should get IT people doing these types of calculations. There should not be a small sample size problem because you are weighting the data.

Panel 3 Summary
There is no reason to think that talent is not randomly and normally distributed. DoD currently does not get to people until they are through high school, so they either benefit from what they have or suffer from what they lack.

Diversity is the kind of change that is slow because really the only way to change is to change the hearts of individuals and how we treat people.

The policy change should be a drumbeat of communication. Diversity should be part of evaluation processes and part of the daily routine.

Mentoring and leadership are key.

An attendee raises the question of whether mentoring should be formal or informal and how it should be institutionalized.

The Army says there should be a formal mentoring program in which you have to mentor two or three people who do not look like you. The Army also uses affinity groups for mentoring.

The Marine Corps has a formal mentoring program but thinks you also need an informal program through leveraging affinity groups. The Navy set up a formal mentoring program three years ago.

It is suggested that if a mentoring program is mandated, it takes on a different form. One option would be to encourage mentoring as a part of the performance system.

At the end of the day, what matters is that mentoring, whether formal or informal, takes place because mentored people do better.

Results will not be seen for 20 or more years from the decisions made today. It will take that long for changes in senior leadership since
people have to be grown. Therefore, DoD needs to be proactive. The end results are what matters.

**Panel 4 Summary**

The GAO chart on slide 13 of Theodoropoulos’s presentation is a great summary (leadership commitment, diversity as part of the strategic plan, diversity linked to performance, accountability). Theodoropoulos listed only leadership-related practices, so accession planning, mentoring, and outreach should also be added to the list.

In terms of training, maybe training on communication is needed. Training could be tailored to avoid negative reactions.

A GAO report on organizational change says that it takes 7–9 years for an organization to change.

An attendee points out that, although it has been said that DoD will not see results in senior leadership for 20 years, this is assuming that DoD continues to do business the same way. DoD can find ways to accelerate people through the hierarchy or bring people in at a higher level of the pyramid. In corporations and the outside world, people do not have to wait 20 years to be a superstar. DoD needs to think out of the box; however, DoD cannot accelerate too quickly unless the law is changed. The stakes are high: You cannot fast-track the responsibility for $20 billion in equipment, people’s lives, and the ability to start a nuclear war. The attitude needs to move toward paradigm change, even if with caution.

For all of the issues that have been discussed (focus on recruiting versus retention, in-the-box thinking versus out-of-the-box thinking, etc.), do not look at X versus Y but instead incorporate both sides. Also, there are both short-term and long-term strategies to consider.

DoD needs to be clear what problem they are trying to solve—for instance, whether it is representation or diversity. Diversity is a state of being, a process—it is not an outcome. The process will leverage outcomes.
Final Remarks

The results of this summit need to be collectively turned into DoD policy and should include agreed-on definitions, agreed-on strategies, and agreed-on ways ahead. People in the various chains of command need to be convinced of the importance of the discussion and that DoD is going in the right direction. DoD needs to build the expectation that something is going to happen as the result of these discussions.
### Table A.1  
**DoD Diversity Summit Attendees**

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<thead>
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### Table A.1—Continued

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CBO—see Congressional Budget Office.


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