

A Force of No Choice: The Role of the Military in Interagency Operations

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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This paper examines how the nature of the contemporary conflict environment shapes the military contribution to interagency operations. Modern conflict is increasingly centered on a changed manifestation of war from a contest between state based massed armies to also include a range of non state actors in dynamic tension, within a complex operational environment. The nature of conflict remains essentially political, resting on a contest of wills to shape and influence popular perceptions, but has been made increasingly difficult through the four interrelated trends of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality. Within this arena, control of populations and perceptions is the decisive and central event, with battle being a means to an end. Battlefields are now more often social structures than terrain, with ideas as weapons, human minds the targets and the will of the people the prize. Success in this new contest of wills requires more than application of conventional military force alone, but rather a comprehensive interagency approach to operations.

However, this paper finds that in reality the United States will continue to depend on the military to shoulder the operational burden normally carried by other agencies. Whilst recognizing the desire to involve other agencies in seeking to resolve contemporary conflict, institutional circumstances and operational imperatives offer little other choice. These essential actions by the military reflect the broader interpretation of contemporary security and the need to provide such assistance quickly in the absence of other agencies. To not do so reduces the initial degree of influence able to be established by occupying forces over indigenous populations. In an era of globalised communications and continuous media coverage, these gaps of influence are able to be readily exploited by adversaries, with the attendant risk of prolonged conflict and unfavorable outcomes, as evident in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters.

The transformation from the Cold War continues. The United States government institutions and frameworks for security have not kept pace with the changes evident in the new security environment and world disorder. Until these institutions and processes change, or the nature of the operational and global security environments reverts to a world for which those institutions and processes were designed, the military must remain prepared to be the force of choice in interagency operations. Indeed, as this paper concludes, the military must remain the force of *no* choice.

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The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

-Carl von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTION

The protracted war in Iraq and the ill defined nature of the wider global war on terror suggest that conflict is becoming increasingly complex. The United States Department of Defense 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges that despite continued superiority of the United States military in traditional forms of warfare, it is more likely that the United States will confront non-traditional threats from both state and non-state actors.¹ These new threats, collectively grouped as irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, may be manifested in such varied forms as terrorism, insurgency, criminal activity, possession or use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue or non-states, pandemics, or the use of new technologies to disrupt or negate military capabilities.² As stated in the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment of February 2007, ‘America confronts a greater diversity of threats and challenges than ever before.’³ This view was reinforced in a recent hearing of the United States Congressional Armed Services Committee on Global Security, when the security environment was described as ‘complex, diverse and evolving’, made even more so through evidence

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report February 6, 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 19.

² President, *National Security Strategy 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 43.

³ U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee 2007, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 110th Cong., February 27, 2.

suggesting an increasing level of interaction between potentially hostile states and non state actors.⁴

Yet in introducing and describing the need for transformational changes to meet new threats, these documents also acknowledge the fundamental need to sustain those existing capabilities needed to deter and defeat traditional challenges posed by states employing conventional military forces. Coupled with the continued high operational tempo in Iraq and the likely increasing level of activity in Afghanistan, along with the need to reset and grow the force for future operations, the necessary transformation of the United States military and other security organizations is likely to add pressure to already heavily engaged security forces. In an address at the National Press Club on 14 August 2007, the United States Army Chief of Staff General Casey described how the demands of the current operational commitments have ‘stretched and stressed the all volunteer force’, and directed a strategy to re-balance the Army for complex warfighting environments in an era of ‘persistent conflict.’⁵

Amongst this growing appreciation of the complexity of contemporary conflict, and the commensurate strains upon the traditional state security system, Clausewitz reminds us that war is essentially a human endeavor and a contest of wills. As he states, ‘War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.⁶ His observations that policy - or the contest of ideas and

⁴ U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee 2007, *Global Security Assessment*, 110th Cong., July 11, 3.

⁵ General G. Casey, Chief of Army Staff (address to National Press Club, Washington, DC, August 14, 2007). Available from https://courses.leavenworth.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab=courses&url=/bin/common/course.pl?course_id=982_1 (accessed February 10, 2008). General Casey’s four prong strategy to rebalance the force focuses on: preparing the force for the current conflict; reset the force for future contingencies; transform the force to meet 21st century demands; and sustainment of soldiers, families and civilians.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

values - will always permeate military operations; and that the 'passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people', suggest the continued centrality of humans and the contest of human wills in the conduct of war.⁷

The human dimension of conflict supports Clausewitz's notion that war is a free creative human activity, inextricably linked to human will, emotion and psychology. At its basic elements, war is pursued through both violent and non-violent means, between multiple actors and influences, competing for at least partial control over resources and the perceptions, behaviors and allegiances of societies. The outcome of future conflict is therefore unlikely to be decided through combat operations alone or even on a conventional battlefield, but rather in the minds of people and within social structures. An integrated and comprehensive interagency approach fusing the elements of state national power is required to address not just the conduct of operations within conflict, but also conflict's causes and consequences, in order to more effectively counter the adversaries' influence over populations and resources.⁸

Governments are slowly recognizing the need for an integrated approach to conflict resolution. The 2006 National Security Strategy describes the substantial transformation required of not only the Department of Defense, but of all institutions of United States national security, to meet the new range of asymmetric threats described above.⁹ This transformation will likely require significant organizational and cultural changes to long standing national security

⁷ Ibid, 87-89.

⁸ Much of the analysis here is drawn from 'Adaptive Campaigning' an Australian Army concept document overseen by the monograph author and approved by the CDF Chief of Staff Committee in December 2006. It describes the Land Force conceptual response to the 21st century conflict environment, articulated in the Australian Army's Future Land Operational Concept entitled 'Complex Warfighting', a product of the Future Land Warfare Staff at the Australian Army HQ Canberra in 2004/05.

⁹ President, *National Security Strategy 2006*, 43-46.

institutions and processes, all at a time when these same institutions are heavily engaged in the current war on terror and facing increasing domestic political pressure to bring the current operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan to a satisfactory conclusion. Louis Fisher's recent analysis of the tensions publically evident from Presidential assertions on war powers, and the decisions of Congress since 11 September 2001, highlights the range and depth of Constitutional reforms that may be necessary to reshape government institutions and legal processes to deal effectively with future conflict.¹⁰

However the combative and violent nature of conflict is such that the United States military is likely to remain the force of choice for the lead of or support to interagency operations. This is due to the military's capacity for rapid and sustained deployment in an increasingly lethal and unpredictable environment, its relatively high budget and its integral force protection measures.¹¹ Despite being heavily committed to combat operations to defeat insurgents and provide physical security to populations, the Department of Defense has also had a growing involvement as a direct provider of non-traditional security assistance. These essential actions reflect the broader interpretation of contemporary security and the operational imperative to provide such assistance in the absence of other agencies. To not do so reduces the initial degree of influence able to be established by occupying forces over indigenous populations. In an era of globalised communications and near real time continuous media coverage, these gaps of

¹⁰ Louis Fisher, "Judicial Review of the War Power," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (September 2005): 492-495.

¹¹ During a visit by the Fellows of the School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth to the USAID office in Washington in July 2007, a senior USAID official expressed a sense of exasperation in discussing relative federal funding for the US DOD and USAID, in stating that the rounding errors in the DOD budget could fund USAID annual operations.

influence are able to be readily exploited by adversaries, with the attendant risk of prolonged conflict and unfavorable outcomes, as evident in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters.

Therefore, although all agencies have a role to play in the resolution of conflict, military forces will continue to need to be prepared to lead interagency operations, or at least provide essential enabling support. This paper seeks to examine how the nature of the contemporary conflict environment shapes the military contribution to interagency operations. Part 1 of this paper reviews the changed international security landscape and the underlying drivers and trends that are shaping the contemporary conflict environment, concluding that a comprehensive and integrated whole-of-government approach to the conduct of operations is fundamental to achieve success in a period of persistent conflict amongst the people.¹² Part 2 draws upon insights from the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan in validating this interagency approach, and concludes that both institutional circumstances and operational imperatives dictate that the military will remain the force of choice for the conduct of interagency operations for the near future.

PART 1 - THE CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

A New World Disorder

The events of 11 September 2001 fundamentally altered the United States outlook on national security, and by default, that of its allies and partners in the newly announced 'war on terror'. The terrible spectacle of the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings, crashed

airliners and severe damage to the Pentagon, with appalling loss of innocent and unsuspecting civilian life, heralded a harsh new reality of weakened personal and collective security of nations and people everywhere. The 2002 National Security Strategy issued a year later described an urgent need to transform the United States national security institutions formed under a Cold War era to address the newly emerged threat from radicals and terrorists, in particular to build American military strength and capacity for defense ‘beyond challenge.’¹³ But as subsequent National Security Strategy documents and Department of Defense quadrennial reviews highlighted, the new challenges emerging in the war on terror do not negate the need to be prepared against more traditional threats by states employing conventional defense forces. Rather, a shift in balance of capabilities is required to better address the variety of challenges expected to be confronted. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) illustrates the intended shift or rebalancing as shown in figure 1 below.

¹² The phrase ‘war amongst the people’ was coined by General Rupert Smith in describing the changed nature of the modern operational environment in his book, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 2007), 19.

¹³ President, *National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2002), 29.




Figure 1 – Department of Defense Shifting of Portfolio of Capabilities ¹⁴

This rebalancing reflects the diverse and unpredictable nature of contemporary and future conflicts, and the need for states to hedge against a range of circumstances in the development of capabilities deemed appropriate in an uncertain global environment. This dilemma is reflected in the 2006 QDR which states:

The War on Terrorism – a war of long duration – differs from the kind of conflict for which the department traditionally prepared. Our focus is increasingly on the search for small cells of terrorists and on building the capacity of our partners. However we must also retain the capability to conduct sustained conventional combat operations and to protect the homeland. ¹⁵

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report February 6, 2006*, 19.

This assessment of the complexity of the security environment and the need to rebalance defense priorities is reflected in the strategic analysis of key allies to the United States in the war on terror. The Australian Defence Update 2007 notes that although Australia ‘does not face any conventional threat to our territory, nor is this likely in the foreseeable future...Defence must plan for a full range of possibilities.’ The report also describes ‘terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and the risks arising from fragile states as being immediate threats to Australian interests’ and that ‘these factors have created a more complex strategic environment for Australia.’¹⁶ The United Kingdom ‘Joint Discussion Note: The Comprehensive Approach’, broadens the historical view of security from that of ‘traditional geographical defence based security’ to one which accommodates contemporary issues such as ‘climate change, ideology, greed, ethnic animosity, residual territorial claims, religious fanaticism and competition for resources.’ The document predicts that ‘terrorist actions, communal violence, endemic criminality and ethnic disturbance will continue to complicate international relations.’¹⁷

Thus the changed international environment has caused a fundamental rethink of the nature and types of security threats other than from traditional state based conventional forces, and the balance of capabilities needed to respond appropriately. Joseph Nye’s review of international conflict post Cold War, in particular his rebuttal of the opposing and perhaps oversimplified views of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ and Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, highlights the impact of globalization, ethno-national conflicts and transnational

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report February 6, 2006*, A-7.

¹⁶ Australian Department of Defence, *Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2007* (Canberra: Commonwealth Printing Service, 2007), 13.

¹⁷ United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, *Joint Discussion Note 4/05: The Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham Wiltshire: DSDC(L), 2005), 1-3 – 1-4.

actors in the international security environment. His description of the evolution of a ‘hybrid world order’ through international power becoming more multidimensional, structures more complex, and states themselves more permeable underline his conclusion that the complex new world order ‘must rest upon more than the traditional military balance of power alone.’¹⁸ Nye would however find agreement in Huntington’s assessment of states becoming ‘increasingly permeable’, following a global trend in devolving power and influence to ‘sub-state, regional, provincial, and local political entities’ through the effects and actions of international institutions on individuals. Huntington also observes that state governments are having increasing difficulty in controlling the flow of ideas, technologies, goods services and people. He foreshadows the end of the ‘hard billiard ball state, in place since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648’, and the emergence of a ‘varied, complex, multi-layered international order.’¹⁹ *Disorder* rather than order therefore appears to better describe the changed international landscape, with significant implications for states in the interpretations of security, its determinants and suitable responses.

In order to understand the nature of the contemporary operational environment within this new world disorder, it is necessary to examine the drivers and trends that are shaping this environment and how modern governments and institutions approach the resolution of conflict. The first section of this part of the paper will examine these drivers and trends, determining the impact these have on determining an appropriate approach to contemporary conflict.

¹⁸ Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Pearson Longman, 6th Ed, 2007), 266-279.

¹⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Simon & Schuster, 1997), 35.

Key Drivers of the Operational Environment

Over the course of 2004 to 2005 the staff at the Future Land Warfare Branch of the Australian Army HQ conducted a detailed analysis of the nature of the 21st century conflict environment from the perspective of the land force. Led by Lieutenant Colonel (Dr) David Kilcullen, the writing team published a document entitled 'Complex Warfighting: The Future Land Operational Concept', representing the Australian Army's best thinking on the nature of modern conflict and its underlying drivers and trends. It confirmed the two key drivers of the operational environment as globalization; and the dominance of the United States military capabilities.²⁰ These two drivers and their interrelationships will now be examined.

Globalization

In the absence of an official ADF definition but based on a range of academic and analytical sources, the document defines globalization as 'a process of increasing connectivity, where ideas, capital, goods, services, information and people are transferred in near-real time across national borders.'²¹ The paper describes the 'winners and losers' created by mutual but unequal distribution of benefits of globalization, at the same time empowering those opposed to or maligned by its effects with unprecedented tools by which to carry their fight to their enemies. Key targets of this animosity are those perceived by the underprivileged to be most advantaged by globalization, in particular developed western nations like the United States. For citizens of developing nations deeply affected by poverty, disease and inequality, globalization can easily be seen as favoring more developed nations. Globalised media, communications, travel and the

²⁰ Australian Army, *Complex Warfighting: The Future Land Operational Concept* (Canberra, 2006), 2-3.

internet offer a ready means of pursuing their opposition to the perceived unfairness of the new interconnected world, and drawing others to their cause. Complex Warfighting also observes that the multi-national organizations, businesses and non-government actors have grown to act as proxy governing bodies within states, bypassing government institutions and policies, and adding to the sense of mistrust and lack of control amongst disaffected parties. Finally, the paper notes the globalized nature of security, as the security of a nation states no longer equates to its borders. A nation's economic, political, technological, and industrial interdependence with the world means that its national interests can be threatened without an actual incursion or attack on its sovereignty.

This analysis finds common ground in academic writings. In his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman defines globalization as 'the dispersion and democratization of technology, information and finance.' He argues that globalization is not just a phenomenon nor a passing trend, but rather the international system that replaced the Cold War system. He highlights the anti-United States sentiments of envy and resentment that have risen through a perception amongst others that America is somehow controlling or influencing the system, evidenced by rising United States living standards and the predominance of 'American icons, markets and military might.'²² He suggests that what bothers other peoples most about the combination of 'Americanization' and globalization is the world pervasiveness of United States culture, values, economics, technologies and lifestyles – whether invited or not – thereby seen as a threat to traditional cultures, beliefs and values and giving rise to fears of United States cultural

²¹ Australian Army, *Complex Warfighting: The Future Land Operational Concept*, 2-3.

²² Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999), 310-312.

imperialism. Friedman posits that Americanization-globalization therefore not only gives the world's angry men adversely affected by globalization an incentive to hate America, but it also super-empowers those men to act against America, through the rapid flow of information and ideas, the miniaturization of very destructive weapon systems and remote access to network based communications systems. In a prescient manner, Friedman cites the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre by Ramsi Yousef's as the actions of a 'Super-Empowered Angry Man' and representative of the gravest and immediate threat to the security of the United States. Globalization at once provides the motivation, logic and means to these men to attack the United States or her allies, without authority or involvement of their parent governments. Friedman's most telling conclusion from his analysis of globalization is that the threat from Super-Empowered Angry Men is most pressing because so many people can readily become a 'Ramsi Yousef', and increasingly have the desire to be so.²³

An example of the information revolution arising as a result of globalized modern communications empowering non state actors is the extensive and proficient use of the internet and email by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The 9/11 Commission Report indicates that the 2001 attack on the United States was planned and synchronized with coded email and internet messages between Al Qaeda operatives and their commanders.²⁴ Media reports indicate western intelligence sources reports that the process of radicalization - the drawing of disenchanted or disaffected youth to radical ideologies such as those of Al Qaeda - is occurring largely unchallenged on the internet. This is evidenced by Osama bin Laden's latest video message being

²³ Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 326-329.

²⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: Norton, 2004), 157.

one of ‘broad motivational value to followers rather than a specific strategic directive.’²⁵ By contrast, in presenting a Landon Lecture at Kansas State University on 26 November 2007, the United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lamented the fact that ‘public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals’. He went to state that ‘Al Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America.’²⁶ His sentiments were echoed by the Secretary of the United States Army Pete Geren, when he addressed the United States Army Command and General Staff College on 6 February 2008, stating that ‘Al Qaeda has a reach around the world that dwarfs major networks of only a few years ago.’ He highlighted the importance attached to this capacity by terrorist groups by observing that Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in command, wrote to Zarqawi in 2005: “Al Qaeda is in a battle, and more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our *umma* [nation].”²⁷

This asymmetric advantage offered by globalized communications is not only exploited by non state actors such as terrorist groups, but also by weak state actors. The recent heavy media coverage of a clash between a number of Iranian gunboats and United States warships on patrol in the Straits of Hormuz indicate how a relatively small and weak military force can maximize its political impact with adroit use of media coverage, utilizing the western news media networks

²⁵ Leigh Sales, National Security Correspondent, “Experts Say Online Radicalisation Now Driving Terrorism,” *Australian Broadcasting Commission Online News Service*, September 19, 2007. Available from <http://abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/19/2038099.htm> (accessed September 19, 2007).

²⁶ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007, “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” *Military Review*, (January-February 2008): 7.

²⁷ Pete Geren, Address to Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 6, 2008.

and preference for dramatic footage to advantage. Although the provocative action of the Iranian was of limited significance tactically, its strategic and political impact especially to a receptive domestic Iranian and sympathetic Middle Eastern audience, was greatly increased through the attention of globalized media networks, at a time when the President of the United States was scheduled to visit the Middle East to rally regional support against Iran.²⁸

The United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfare Center published a compilation of insights and best practices of various United States Joint Headquarters in September 2006. This document, edited by Senior Mentor General (Retired) Gary Luck and entitled ‘Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science’, offers a succinct summary of the nature of globalization and its ramifications for state security:

This globalization has security ramifications. The world is much more interdependent; it is more vulnerable to regional issues, things like world oil flow, terrorism, and population displacements. This is reality; we’re there and we can’t back away from it. Security in this global environment can no longer be guaranteed by traditional, military means alone. It has shifted from a military defense focus to that of using all elements of National Power.²⁹

United States Military Dominance

The other driver of the contemporary conflict environment identified by the Australian Army ‘Complex Warfighting’ concept document is the dominance of the United States military. It has already been noted from the United States Department of Defense 2006 QDR that the

²⁸ Robin Wright, “President Calls Action of Iranian Boats Provocative: Peril Posed by Tehran a Theme of His Mideast Trip, Bush Says,” *Washington Post*, January 9, 2008. Available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/earlybird/Jan2008/e20080109572155.html> (accessed January 9, 2008). To demonstrate how media coverage and public perceptions of this incident were manipulated by Iran, see also: “Iran Shows Own Video of US Ship Incident,” *Australian Broadcasting Commission Online News Service*, January 10, 2008. Available from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/10/2136107.htm> (accessed January 10, 2008).

United States military maintains considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare.³⁰ Recognized as the world's only superpower and enjoying a period of general hegemony the United States has secured an unprecedented place in world history. In his paper 'Square Pegs for Round Holes', Michael Krause describes several reasons for this dominance. The first of these is there has never been a single superpower with concurrent global interests and the means to pursue those interests quickly and in a sustainable manner. Secondly, this global reach and military capability is achieved with conventional capability, rather than solely nuclear means, that so exceeds its potential opponents that such a contest can be regarded as largely one sided. Thirdly, the United States has achieved this unsurpassed position without economic or industrial exhaustion. Lastly, the economic power underwritten by other instruments of national power enables it to significantly shape the world institutions that manage world affairs, thereby strengthening its relative position to likely competitors.³¹

The dominance of the United States Military is unlikely to be challenged for some time, as military expenditure is taken as a measure of commitment of that nation to its traditional defense capabilities. In Financial Year 2008 the United States is slated to spend more on its military than the next 42 highest spending countries combined, accounting for more than 47% of the world's total military spending.³² The relative global distribution of military expenditure is illustrated in Figure 2.

²⁹ US Joint Forces Command, *Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science Best Practices* (Norfolk, Va: Joint Warfighting Center, September 2006), 4.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report February 6, 2006*, 19.

³¹ Michael Krause, *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt* (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 132, June 2007), 10.

³² Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "National Defense Spending," Available at <http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/> (accessed January 25, 2008).




Figure 2 – Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2005.³³

To place this relative expenditure in context, the United States military spending is almost seven times larger than the Chinese budget, the second largest spender. The combined budgets of the six countries regarded as ‘rogue’ (Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria) and that of potential state competitors China and Russia, is still only 30% of the United States military budget for 2005. This comparison does not include the additional funding

requested to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, an additional US\$141.7 billion on top of the 2008 non-war budget of US\$481.4 billion.³⁴ The relative defense expenditures by the top ten spending nations, based upon known figures for 2005, is given in Figure 3 below.³⁵

<u>Country</u>	<u>Dollars (billions)</u>	<u>% of total</u>	<u>Rank</u>
United States	420.7	43%	1
China *	62.5	6%	2
Russia *	61.9	6%	3
United Kingdom	51.1	5%	4
Japan	44.7	4%	5
France	41.6	4%	6
Germany	30.2	3%	7
India	22	2%	8
Saudi Arabia	21.3	2%	9
South Korea	20.7	2%	10

Figure 3 – Relative Defense Expenditure of Top Ten Spending Nations 2005

³³ Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2005,” Available at <http://www.globalissues.org/Gepolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending/asp?p=1> (accessed January 25, 2008).

³⁴ Ibid. See also William Matthews, “The GDP argument,” *Armed Forces Journal* (March 2007) available at <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/03/2545232> (accessed January 25, 2008).

³⁵ Ibid.

On 20 February 2008, in an impressive display of military capability outside conventional means, the United States Navy successfully struck an errant spy satellite 130 miles above the Pacific Ocean with a ship launched missile. Apart from meeting the technical challenge of striking such a high speed target at such an altitude, the most notable aspect of this event was that it was demonstrated an ability to shoot down satellites with little modification to existing systems, and from a platform as strategically agile and maneuverable as a United States warship. As the *New York Times* reported, such a capability ‘has to cause any adversary to pause.’³⁶

A relatively enormous investment in demonstrated military capabilities, especially in weapons and systems designed for open warfare between massed concentrations of troops as envisioned in a Cold War, has placed the United States in a position of dominance in conventional military power. This has been amplified by the United States economic, technological and industrial strength, and its capacity to exploit the beneficial effects of globalization, with resulting flow on effects to its military industries and capabilities. The twin drivers of globalization and United States military dominance have given rise to an increased interaction of three enduring trends of warfare and a change in the characteristics of the conflict environment, which will be discussed in the next section.

Enduring Trends of Warfare

There are three interconnected and enduring trends in warfare which underpin this analysis of contemporary conflict environment and the growing need to balance defense priorities against conventional and newly emerged asymmetric threats. These trends are evolving lethality,

³⁶ Thomas Shanker, “An Errant Satellite is Gone, But Questions Linger,” *New York Times*, February 22, 2008. Available at <https://www.us.army.mil/earlybird/Feb2008/e20080222582040.html> (accessed February 22, 2008).

emptying of the battlespace and a retreat into complex terrain. Although these trends have evolved over many years of conflict, the effects of globalization and the peerless capabilities which the United States and her allies have established and maintained since the end of the Cold War have given rise to an increased degree of interplay between these trends.

The capacity of man to cause destruction and injury to his fellow man has evolved exponentially over time. In particular the advent of modern surveillance methods and precision munitions delivery systems, along with advances in more conventional artillery and direct fire means has made the historical contest for terrain and space in the battlefield an increasingly lethal undertaking. Adding to the variety of conventional weapons are systems incorporating new technologies such as blinding lasers, acoustic devices, plastic mines, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, cyber systems and directed energy attacks. In addition, this unprecedented level of lethality is now available to small teams and individuals rather than massed armies of nation states of the industrial era. These technologies and weapons can be obtained, deployed and operated by individuals with very small and temporary detection windows, owing to miniaturization of components and very low tactical signature when actually fired. Intelligence assessments of most governments confirm the most pressing lethal threat remains the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist organizations or hostile states.³⁷ At the other end of the spectrum the rapid adaption of commonly available technologies in the form of household chemicals, abandoned ordnance and remote trigger devices are routinely put to lethal effect by small groups of insurgents and terrorists in the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The crashing of airliners into major city structures is yet another example of

³⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2008, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence*. 110th Cong., February 5, 4-7.

lethality being recast in unfamiliar terms. The consequence of this evolved lethality is that land forces can expect to encounter individuals with very lethal potential with little warning or early detection regardless of the type of operation. The opportunity for strategic defeat of a larger force through a minor tactical engagement by a lesser force can be realized at any point. As stated in the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force recent White Paper, 'perhaps for the first time in history of warfare, the ability to inflict damage and cause strategic dislocation is no longer directly proportional to capital investment, superior motivation and training, or technological prowess.'³⁸

Driven by this increasing lethality and improved means of detection and command and control methods, concentration of combat forces in the conventional battlefield has been reduced in density. Land force elements have been compelled to maneuver in smaller groups to seek shelter within available terrain and avoid detection, whilst still retaining reachback to offensive and massed fires through more capable communication systems. The concept of battlespace itself is becoming refined as combatants seek to blend within population groups in complex mostly urbanized terrain, giving rise to a series of intense battles within a disaggregated battlespace lacking any identifiable framework. This complex terrain comprises non-combatants and the myriad of infrastructure that supports societies at all levels, thereby offering little scope for detection of or direct attack against fleeting targets moving amongst population groups without significant risk of unintended consequences.

³⁸ General Michael Moseley, CSAF White Paper, *The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force*, December 29, 2007, 5. Available at <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf> (accessed February 19, 2008).

These three trends give rise to four characteristics of the contemporary operational environment of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality.³⁹ It is complex in terms of physical terrain comprising populated and urbanized features, density of human involvement with varying allegiances and perceptions, and a multitude of informational flows and nodes. It is diverse in terms of the blending of conventional and irregular capabilities spread across various belligerents and interested parties, presenting an unpredictable spectrum of threats based on differing motivations and capabilities. It is diffuse in terms of traditional conceptual frameworks of operations being rendered less useful, such as the blurring of the levels of war, state and non-state actors, conventional and Special Forces, military and interagency elements and combatant and non-combatants. Finally it is lethal in terms of individual or small teams of adversaries causing potentially strategic defeat to conventional western forces through small tactical actions with highly lethal effects, exploiting globalized communications and the media to maximize information goals.

These four characteristics of the operational environment, underpinned by globalization and United States military dominance, are now interacting in a mutually reinforcing fashion in shaping the contemporary conflict environment. The net result is that any direct confrontation by state or non-state actors with the United States military or like capable force in a conventional battlespace is certain to result in defeat, as evidenced by the rapidity and success of the tactical maneuver phases of United States led coalition forces in both Gulf wars in 1991 and 2003, and in Afghanistan in 2002. As United States and allied conventional detection and targeting capabilities

³⁹ For a full description of these four characteristics of the conflict environment and their increasing degree of unpredictable interaction, see Australian Army, *Complex Warfighting: The Future Land Operational Concept*. (Canberra, 2006), in particular pages 4-12.

have become increasingly advanced and lethal to exposed enemy forces, potential adversaries have therefore been forced to operate in less and less dense groups, predominantly in urbanized and built up areas. In this way they can negate the superior conventional capabilities of United States and her allies and remain below the detection and discrimination threshold, whilst continuing to pursue their military, ideological and political goals by operating within and amongst the people.

A key outcome of the asymmetric behavior of these adversaries in operating below the detection and discrimination threshold is that gathering of information, either for targeting or development of intelligence purposes will require intimate interaction with the populations and groups within which the enemy is resident. In the complex and dynamic operational environment, information will flow from physical interaction with the problem rather than by remote analysis alone. Until such time as the complex urban environment is completely transparent to surveillance systems, a stand off approach to engagement with the environment and threat is likely to result in poor information, inaccurate intelligence and planning or at worst, engagement of friendly or civilian groups with highly adverse effects to the campaign's informational objectives, and alienation of the local populace. Land forces will, therefore, need to fight for, and not necessarily with, information and develop a situational awareness and understanding through physical interaction with the environment and its occupants – the population who inhabit the space. The land-centric approach required of the 21st century must be based upon a baseline requirement to operate in close proximity to population groups to win their support and shape their perceptions and allegiances, whilst retaining the capacity for close lethal combat at any point in the operational environment.

Complex Conflict among the People

This need to operate within population groups is supported by a shift away from the manifestation of war as historical state on state conflict leading to decisive defeat of armed forces,

with the recognition and acceptance of defeat by a rational actor. The defeat of organized armed forces was the central and pivotal action in this pre-modern era. As described above, in the complex operational environment contemporary enemies are more likely to adopt an asymmetric approach in confronting the West through indirect population centric means. Rather than challenge their opponents in direct military action alone, they will seek to shape the environment to their favor through close interactions with the population, to win their support and render the operational environment even more lethal and ambiguous to forces better prepared for conventional operations. Clausewitz's maxim, that 'war is merely the continuation of policy by other means' reminds us that war as a form of armed politics is about influencing and controlling people and perceptions.⁴⁰ A current manifestation of war could therefore be described as 'violent and non-violent means, between multiple diverse actors and influences, competing for control over the perceptions, behavior and allegiances of human societies.'⁴¹ This philosophy sees war as 'fundamentally a human, societal activity, rather than a technical or engineering problem', and places the control of population and perceptions as the 'central and decisive activity' and battle as an enabling activity, if required.⁴² Further, this also introduces the notion that the application of military force is but one of a number of instruments of national power applicable in the conflict environment, as the objective of winning control of populations and perceptions will not be able to be achieved through traditional military means alone, if at all.

The complexity and human centricity of modern conflict is supported by the United States Agency for International Development 'Conflict Assessment Framework', in its

⁴⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

⁴¹ Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (Canberra: Australian Government Printing, 2008), 9.

description of the causes of modern conflict as essentially human and political in nature, requiring a human centric approach addressing a range of needs:

Conflict is extremely complex...It happens when causes found at multiple levels come together and reinforce each other. It is ultimately the product of deep grievance, political and economic competition, irresponsible political leadership, weak and unaccountable institutions, and global and regional forces. Effective interventions cannot therefore be based on activities that focus on a single dimension of conflict, such as ethnic tension or political exclusion.⁴³

In his anthology 'Conflict after the Cold War', Richard Betts offers that the causes of conflict rising to fill the vacuum of superpower competition post Cold War are likely to include enduring issues such as religion and ideology, but also new sources such as 'competition for resources, damage to the natural environment or the effects of population displacements.'⁴⁴ This reinforces the idea of people and their perceptions as the central theme of modern conflict. Colin Gray stresses the fundamental political nature of war, and as such the centrality of the control of ideas and perceptions in conflict, when he posits that 'the political context is the breeding ground of war and hence warfare' and 'if there is no political context, there can be no war', concluding that 'warfare is all about human behavior, ours and theirs.'⁴⁵

⁴² Australian Army, *Complex Warfighting: The Future Land Operational Concept*, 13.

⁴³ United States Agency for International Development, *Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development, April 2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 37.

⁴⁴ Richard Betts, *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace* (New York: Longman, 2002), 464.

⁴⁵ Colin Gray, "Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context," Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006, 17 and 28. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB640.pdf> (accessed February 11, 2008).

In his book 'The Utility of Force' General Rupert Smith describes how war has moved from state on state conflict to war amongst the people. He lists six major trends in this type of war he has observed during his forty years of military service:

The ends for which we fight are changing from hard objectives of interstate industrial wars to unclear objectives related to non state actors; We fight amongst the people in both a physical sense and in a virtual sense owing to the pervasiveness of modern media; Our conflicts tend to be timeless based on achieving conditions leading to agreement of several belligerents; We fight so as not to lose the force rather than achieving the aim at any cost; On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons giving rise to rapid adoption of equipments designed for conventional battlefields; and the sides are mostly non-state in that they are made up of coalitions or non-state actors.⁴⁶

General Smith posits that these trends reflect the constant intermingling of political and military activities rather than a decisive military event leading to a conclusive political outcome.

Samuel Huntington's argument that 'conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict' may have yet to be proven, yet his description of the necessity for the West to better understand other people and their perceptions and interests as their economic and military strength relative to the West increases is correct when he states that:

'This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also however require the west to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations.'⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 2007), 19-20.

⁴⁷ Samuel Huntington et al., *The Clash of Civilisations? The Debate* (New York: Foreign Affairs Reader, Summer 1993), 49.

Summary of Analysis of Conflict Environment

From this analysis the evidence suggests that modern conflict is increasingly centered on a changed manifestation of war from a contest between state based massed armies to also include a range of non state actors in dynamic tension, within a complex operational environment. The nature of conflict remains essentially political, resting on a contest of wills to shape and influence popular perceptions, but has been made increasingly difficult through the four interrelated trends of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality. Combat operations alone are insufficient to address the range of issues and views of the population within which the enemy will operate and seek to dominate. Within this arena, control of populations and perceptions is the decisive and central event, with battle being a means to an end. Battlefields are now 'more often social structures than terrain, with ideas as weapons, human minds the targets and the will of the people the prize'.⁴⁸ Success in this new contest of wills requires more than application of conventional military force alone. A comprehensive and integrated whole-of-government approach to the conduct of operations, bringing together the range of national instruments of power, is necessary to achieve success in an era of persistent conflict amongst the people. Part 2 of this paper will now examine these 'interagency operations', drawing upon insights from counterinsurgency theory and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in validating this integrated approach and the military's role within it.

⁴⁸ Taken from a series of presentations by the author to Army students at the Grade 2 Staff Officer courses at the Australian Army Land Warfare Centre July 2006-2007. This quote represents a distillation of works from a number of other authors and ideas formulated in writing 'Adaptive Campaigning' in 2006.

PART 2 - INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

The Need for an Comprehensive and Integrated Approach

The nature of the operational environment, the centrality of human ideas and perceptions and the need for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution is being increasingly recognized and accepted by governments, particularly in light of the experiences gained by those nations involved in the Global War on Terror. During the presentation of his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University on 26 November 2007, the United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that he expected that asymmetric warfare would be ‘the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time’, positing that ‘conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power’.⁴⁹ He also made the astute observation that success will be hinged upon an enhanced capacity to shape behavior of all groups and stakeholders in modern conflict – including adversaries, allies, indigenous populations, undecided neutrals and the citizens of those countries with deployed forces. In advocating an increased emphasis on capacity for soft power rather than hard power alone, Secretary Gates described how ‘the threats and challenges we face ... will extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency.’⁵⁰ He emphasized the importance of being able to build partnerships with nations afflicted or threatened with conflict, to enable them to be able to defend and govern themselves. The raising and development of indigenous army and police forces, once regarded as a role of Special Forces, has become a key mission for the military as whole. He concluded that

⁴⁹ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

combined with new threats, this requires the various elements of governments to work collectively in a much more ‘unified, agile and creative manner, requiring considerably more resources devoted to America’s non-military instruments of power’.⁵¹

Supporting these comments in addressing the Command and General Staff College on 1 February 2008, and underlining the need to address non-military aspects of conflict, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren posited that 21st century wars could not be won through defeat of the enemy on the battlefield, even if a uniformed and recognizable enemy were to present himself. Rather, contemporary wars could only be won ‘when the conditions that spawned armed conflict have been changed’.⁵² In an article in the *Washington Post*, General (Retired) Wesley Clark cautions against the simple and sole application of military force to contemporary conflict issues, advising ‘never go to war unless you can describe and create a more desirable end state...and doing so requires a whole lot more than just the use of force’. He concludes ‘Americans must understand that the goal of war is achieve a specific purpose for the nation. In this respect the military is simply a tool of statecraft, one that must work in tandem with diplomacy, economic suasion, intelligence and other instruments of United States power’.⁵³

Similarly, the Canadian Land Forces concept for employment of land forces recognizes the requirement for an integrated interagency approach in complex contemporary operations. It describes how ‘military power alone will not fully achieve national objectives. In a world where

⁵¹ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” 6.

⁵² Pete Geren, Address to Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 6, 2008.

⁵³ Wesley Clark, “The Next War,” *Washington Post*, September 16, 2007. Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/14/AR2007091401973.html> (accessed September 18, 2007).

conflict will continue to involve myriad ethnic, religious, ideological and material drivers, an ability to bring to bear all instruments of both national and coalition power and influence on a problem in a coordinated, collaborative fashion will be essential to achieving effective results.’⁵⁴ This doctrine also highlights the critical importance of engaging the views of all interested and neutral parties to the conflict through the population and media as operations progress, supporting the early analysis of this paper. Therefore, as the Canadian concept concludes, ‘outward-focused, integrated and multidisciplinary approaches must be the norm to address the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment.’⁵⁵ The Canadian Land Force Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) approach is represented graphically at Figure 4.

⁵⁴ LTCOL David Buller, Australian Army Senior STANREP DGLCD Kingston Canada, e-mail message to author, January 24, 2008. The e-mail cited an extract from Canadian Land Forces *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*, 25-27.

⁵⁵ Ibid.




Figure 4: Canadian Land Forces JIMP Concept

The United Kingdom outlook to this issue is similar to that of the United States and Canada, with the United Kingdom developing an interest in the need for a comprehensive approach initially arising from their military experience in the Balkans in 1991. As described in the United Kingdom Joint Discussion Note 4/05 and reflective of the analysis of the contemporary operational environment described previously, UK military personnel encountered a ‘complex interplay of civilian, paramilitary and military groups and individuals, international organizations and the mass media’. Confronted with a bewildering diversity of factors and players, it was recognized that ‘the military instrument alone could not deal with complex modern

crises involving and occurring among communities and populations.’⁵⁶ This view was subsequently reinforced in UK operations in the 1990s, resulting in NATO commanders in Kosovo acknowledging that increasing cooperation at the tactical level needed to be elevated to operational level thinking and planning. Eventually in light of more recent experiences in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, it was accepted that true coherence and collaboration would only be achieved by interagency unity at the strategic level, now reflected in emerging UK doctrine. Modern interpretations of security, having morphed to include issues such freedom from persecution, fear, wants and needs, places people as the ‘vital ground’. As such early responses to impending crises although difficult will always require ‘decisions and intervention across a wide range of activity including economic diplomatic, military, developmental and humanitarian.’⁵⁷ The Joint Discussion Note offers a salient conclusion, drawing in the important links to a synchronized development and information effort to address the needs of communities in conflict and their perceptions, and the pre-emptive potential of interagency cooperation:

The realization of national strategic objectives inevitably relies on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customized, agile and sensitive influence and information effort. Seeking to strengthen and hasten for the formation of these partnerships within an institutional framework...it is hoped that the Comprehensive Approach could help encourage, at the earliest opportunity, the forestalling, containment or permanent resolution of crises.⁵⁸

The issue of a synchronized information campaign underscores the need to collaborate across all agencies and organizations involved in the operational environment. In a contest of

⁵⁶ United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, *Joint Discussion Note 4/05: The Comprehensive Approach*, 1-1.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-4.

ideas and perceptions, it is critical that a common theme or message be relayed to the population, adversaries and the undecided neutrals living within both the conflict area and the wider international audience connected via globalized media networks. Whilst informational messages will need to be tailored to meet specific targets or purposes, contradictory or fragmented messages across and within informational flows are likely to quickly be seen as shallow or irrelevant to the circumstances on the ground, and are likely to work against rather than with intentions of deployed commanders and operators. There are two elements arising from this observation: the imperative to coordinate information messages across the increasingly blurred levels of war and across all agencies involved in the conflict area; and the difficulties in relaying and reinforcing these messages in a potentially lethal and highly ambiguous operational environment to an often unreceptive or at least neutral audience.

In a paper presented to a symposium on Adapting Command and Control to the 21st century, Anne-Marie Grisogono an Australian Defence scientist highlighted the need in complex environments for ‘targeted probing actions that generate small information-rich signals, in contrast to a sensor grid that would collect large amounts of information-poor data’.⁵⁹ These small teams as the point of contact with the unpredictably lethal operational environment and its inhabitants must represent more than only combat effects in their two way interaction with the population. A unified message or theme to a population, demonstrated as a most critical element

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1-2.

⁵⁹ Anne-Marie Grisogono, “Adapting to the 21st Century: Operationalising Adaptive Campaigning,” (paper presented to the 2007 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Coronado Ca, May 2007). Available at http://www.dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/html/papers/198.pdf (accessed January 5, 2008).

in a war of ideas, conceptually demands a unified and interagency approach team approach, necessarily manifested at the very small tactical team level in the complex operational domain.

Identification of the need for an interagency approach to conflict has in some respects been foreseen by authors such as Huntington in the 1950s. In his paper from that period ‘National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy’, he refers to the multitude of alternative roles required of a military service which can threaten interpretation of its strategic concept for employment. In particular he notes that even at the time of his writing in the 1950s, ‘a military service may at times...perform functions unrelated to external security, such as internal policing, disaster relief and citizenship training’.⁶⁰ These are regarded however as subordinate duties, not of the nature for which the service primarily exists, and only tasked to the military because it has been already been activated due to a related security issue. Although the context of his argument was to state the case for transoceanic responsibilities of the United States Navy of the day, Huntington’s underlying point remains valid: the strategic context of the period sets the purpose and role of a nation’s military, and with a changed context the concomitant purpose and role of the military must be redefined. In the modern security context, the role of the military has now been extended beyond traditional military functions to encompass all of those non-military roles Huntington outlined and many more, most likely beyond any likelihood of reversion to type. The changed security context, giving rise to a changed operational environment and a redefining of military tasks, necessitates a more unified interagency approach to conflict resolution. In both meeting new operational threats and concurrently addressing the consequences of the threats realization,

⁶⁰ Samuel Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Army CGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Readings in Contemporary Maritime Strategy, A858L2-RA, Lesson 2. Available at https://courses.leavenworth.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab=courses&url=/bin/common/course.pl?course_id= 982_1 (accessed 14 February 2008).

the military is being asked to take on more tasks beyond its historical requirements and likely institutional capacity.

One such task is nation building. Sir Michael Howard, in his foreword to James Corum's book, describes the political and military aversion to this task. This is despite the historical evidence that suggests the more proficient one's own military forces become at the rapid destruction of an enemy's opposing forces, the more likely the prolonged campaign post combat operations, owing to plentiful resources being available to dissident elements instinctively inspired to fight against the occupying foreign forces.⁶¹ This gives rise to the need for the rebuilding of indigenous national infrastructure, institutions and processes, whilst fighting resistance forces of varying ideologies and intent. Without a shift away from a high technology centric approach to conflict by modern militaries, considered unlikely by Howard, the need for military to conduct nation building accompanied by the necessary host of agencies and organizations is very likely to continue. Gregory Cantwell would agree, offering that the United States military has historically often performed post conflict operations to rebuild government capacity after regime change.⁶² As Corum points out, 'side missions [such as nation building] are going to take up a large part of the United States military forces and effort, whether desirable or not. The mission of controlling populations is not going to go away.'⁶³ This implies a continued strong need for interagency operations, especially post conflict, for the foreseeable future.

⁶¹ Sir Michael Howard, in Foreword to James Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2007), 9-10.

⁶² Gregory Cantwell, "Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise", *Parameters United States Army War College Quarterly*, XXXVII, No 3 (Autumn 2007): 56.

⁶³ James Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*, 85.

Western military analysts should not ignore the views of other potential state competitors in their interpretations of the changed security environment and the implications for security services. China is noted in the 2006 QDR as having ‘the greatest potential to compete militarily with United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional United States military advantages.’⁶⁴ The 2006 QDR goes on to express concerns over China’s increasing substantial investment in high end asymmetric military capabilities such as electronic and cyber attack systems, ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, air defense networks and unmanned aerial vehicles. It should also be noted that, according to the ‘Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007’, China has a much more comprehensive view of modern warfare and security than simply by military means, evident in their describing ‘comprehensive national power’ and ‘strategic configuration of power’ as two central concepts in gauging China’s strategic and security position relative to the rest of the world.⁶⁵ The report indicates that Chinese strategists draw from their historical and cultural perspectives to emphasize ‘non-kinetic means of warfare and the increased role of economic, financial, information, legal and psychological instruments in Chinese war planning’. The report also refers to the PLA Academy of Military Strategy text, the Science of Military Strategy (2000), which notes that ‘war is not only a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy and law.’⁶⁶ Therefore in any future engagement with China, whether from a military or other related security viewpoint, Western strategists and planners

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defence Review Report February 6, 2006*, 29.

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 23 May 2007), 6. Available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf> (accessed 31 January 2008).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

would be well advised to consider China's inherently whole of government and interagency approach evidently already deeply entrenched in that nation's strategic outlook.

The evidence reviewed above therefore confirms the blurring of conventional military and non-military aspects of security and the need for interagency operations in contemporary conflict. An approach suitable to the use of military force in this period, as General Rupert Smith suggests, 'must flow from joint analyses as there are no longer purely military or political situations. This is necessary ... because in a war amongst people, information not firepower is the currency upon which it is run.'⁶⁷ He would find a like mind in General Anthony Zinni, Commander of CENTCOM from 1997 to 2000, who confirmed the political and multi-dimensional aspects of modern operations, and its implications for military planners and leaders, when he stated:

For the profession of arms, it's no longer sufficient just to be militarily proficient. You really need to understand dimensions beyond the military dimensions. You need to understand politics and economics. And you need to understand cultures. These aren't pure military operations anymore.'⁶⁸

Insights from Counterinsurgency Theory and Current Operations

In his book 'Fiasco', Thomas Ricks identifies a series of political and military actions during the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that contributed to the creation of an insurgency in the ensuing 12 months. These actions included the decision by the Head of the CPA Paul Bremer to disband the Baath Party and dissolve the former Iraqi Army and Ministry of the Interior. Along with reduced troop numbers deployed compared to that originally envisaged by

⁶⁷ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, 377.

⁶⁸ General Anthony Zinni, quoted in James Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*, 83.

military planners, Ricks asserts that the net effect was to alienate the Iraqi society to the presence of foreign troops in their country, and provide a ready source of insurgents motivated and prepared to resist the occupation.⁶⁹

Ricks also describes how almost any reference to classical works on counterinsurgency reveals how the United States effort in Iraq failed to adhere to well established principles of this type of warfare.⁷⁰ As the Iraq campaign continues to draw an enormous investment in military and other resources from United States and her allies in the Global War on Terror, the question arises how such classical works on counterinsurgency may be applied to the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, and these insights may support the above analysis of the contemporary conflict as complex, people centric and requiring a multiagency approach. This issue will be answered by briefly examining two such classical works on this topic, David Galula's 'Counterinsurgency Warfare' and Frank Kitson's 'Low Intensity Operations'.

In reviewing Galula's work, a common theme emerges as to his view of the underlying nature of both insurgency and the respondent counterinsurgency – the political nature of this type of warfare and its links to the population. He describes the essence of the problem of counterinsurgency as being to 'build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward.'⁷¹ This simple statement establishes the population as the focal point of all counterinsurgency actions, rather than the insurgent or his tactics, enroute to a political goal.

⁶⁹ Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2007). Numerous citations apply but page 165 gives a succinct summary of the cumulative effects of de-Baathification, dissolution of the military and economic upheaval on Iraqi society, thereby creating an insurgency.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁷¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 2005), 136. Note that Galula uses the term 'revolutionary' in defining 'insurgency' in the first chapter of the text.

In defining an insurgency as a ‘protracted struggle ... in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order’, he underlines both the objectives of the insurgent as well as the likely path to counter such a strategy.⁷² He further describes the relationship between politics as an instrument of war and military action, positing that contrary to conventional operations, politics becomes a more active operational instrument. Every military action must be viewed in light of the attendant political effects, and vice versa.⁷³ Thus politics, or the contest of ideas fought out amongst the population, permeates every element of counterinsurgency planning and actions. The objective is the will of the people rather than terrain or space that the people may occupy.

Galula returns to this theme of interconnection between the military and political dimensions of this type of warfare throughout his text, and underpins his analysis and recommendations in developing a strategy for counterinsurgency. He strongly advocates securing and controlling the population as the keys to success in countering the insurgent’s influence. Throughout all phases of this strategy, targeted information operations are aggressively pursued, designed to both defeat the insurgent’s messages and reinforce that of the counterinsurgent. According to Galula, victory in counterinsurgency warfare is achieved when the local population maintains isolation from the insurgent through their own will and resources.⁷⁴

Frank Kitson draws many parallels to Galula in his analysis of what was generically known as low intensity operations. In defining the terms subversion and insurgency, he illustrates the close connections between political and military actions in operations to counter the enemy’s

⁷² David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 4.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

aims, the only distinction between the two terms being the relative use of armed force to achieve a political outcome.⁷⁵ Thus his subsequent analysis and strategy have a common basis to Galula – namely that all military actions must align with the political goal, and that the means of achieving this are through a blend of combined military and non-military actions aimed at controlling the people. As the ultimate goal is political in nature, Kitson asserts that political leadership should take precedence over the military.⁷⁶ This accords with Galula’s claim of political primacy as a matter of principle and practicality, and that military action should always be directed at a political goal. Galula’s suggested formula of a 20% military and 80% political balance of actions highlight the importance of non-military instruments in this type of warfare, and would find agreement with Kitson.⁷⁷

The two authors also find common ground in stressing the importance of information operations synchronized with the broader counterinsurgency strategy. Kitson cites the example of the British Government announcing a timeline to withdraw from Aden in 1968, regardless of defeat of the insurgents, with the resulting loss of local support for the security forces.⁷⁸

The two authors share like conclusions in the fundamentals required for success in counterinsurgency operations. These include an effective intelligence flow driven from the local population, and close cooperation under a single authority between military, civilian and

⁷⁵ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (St Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, c1970), 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁷⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 89.

⁷⁸ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 50.

indigenous authorities.⁷⁹ Classical counterinsurgency theory stresses the primacy of political objectives, the need for close multiagency cooperation under a single authority, and the importance of synchronized information operations. These conclusions are all relevant to the current insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As David Kilcullen notes however, current insurgencies differ from those studied by Galula and Kitson in their complexity and interaction, exacerbated by a globalised propaganda network. Classical theory remains valid but may need re-appraisal to account for a more dynamic and interconnected world. Thus classical theory is ‘necessary but not sufficient for success against today insurgents.’⁸⁰

There is also much evident in the nature of the current operational environment encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States led coalition that supports this paper’s analysis of the contemporary conflict as complex, population centric and requiring a comprehensive approach. Current serving authors such as Cassidy and Kilcullen maintain that counterinsurgency as a strategy provides the best strategic framework for the ill defined Global War on Terror.⁸¹ As an example, the recent surge in Iraq was aimed at clearing space and time for

⁷⁹ Both authors also recognize the need for adaptation of the training and mindset required of military officers in their interactions with the multitude of other actors. Kitson however expresses an expanded and up to date view that an understanding of the interdependence of all military and non-military elements at play may be more important than knowledge of the elements or programs themselves. See Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 51.

⁸⁰ David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” *Small Wars Journal* (2006), under “Conclusion,” <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf>. (accessed January 10, 2007).

⁸¹ See Robert Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the GWOT* (Westport: Preager, 2006), 165; and David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 597-617. The classical tenets of counterinsurgency as described by Kilcullen, ‘displacing the enemy influence from social networks, supplanting insurgent support within the population, and maneuvering to marginalize the enemy and deny them a popular base’, were validated as current operational level counterinsurgent art during recent AOASF visits to CENTCOM and SOCOM.

Iraqi Government political initiatives to take seed, rather than simply destruction of terrorist networks.⁸²

Max Boot predicts that owing to the dominance of Western militaries in conventional warfare and the increased destructive potential of terrorists, ‘the insurgency war currently raging in Iraq is likely to typify the future form of warfare because it is clearly a strategy that works [for the insurgents]’.⁸³ In his description of modern counterinsurgency at a recent seminar hosted by the USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence, Kilcullen summarized counterinsurgency as exhibiting enduring fundamentals including ‘control of populations, resources and terrain; primacy of the political strategy; inherently joint and interagency in nature; centrality of local support based on mobilizing and controlling populations; population centric methods and enabling pillars of information, political, economic and security actions.’⁸⁴ In drawing from his very recent experiences as Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser to General Petraeus, the Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, Kilcullen’s articulation of these enduring elements of counterinsurgency underscores the population focus required in planning and conducting modern operations. It also supports the need to incorporate a broad range of capabilities not normally associated with military forces, but necessary in the battle for ideas

⁸² However, this author also witnessed evidence of a continuing focus on kinetic effects against insurgents, driven by adherence to long standing military culture and convention, suggesting that the Galula’s ratio of 20% military and 80% political balance of actions may be inverted in practice.

⁸³ Max Boot, “Iraq and the Consequence of Failure,” *Australian Army Journal* IV, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 15.

⁸⁴ David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice 2007” (presentation to Counterinsurgency Seminar 2007 at USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence Quantico VA, September 26, 2007). Summary of presentation and slides available at <http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/COIN%20Seminar%20Summary%20Report%20Secure.pdf> (accessed 10 February 2008).

rather than solely tactical terrain or destruction of the enemy. The ongoing conflict in Iraq therefore validates the need for an integrated approach to conflict, both now and in the near term.

The Iraq situation is a good example of the rapid and anticipated defeat of an opponent's standing army by a technologically and tactically superior Western force, only to set the conditions for a prolonged campaign after decisive combat operations as described above by Michael Howard. Initially intended as a military operation to facilitate regime change and removal of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat, five years after the March 2003 invasion by a United States led coalition the Iraq operational theater is now widely recognized as a blend of insurgency, sectarian violence and criminal activities, beset by political struggles with an unclear timeline for resolution.

In his report to the United States Congress on the situation in Iraq on 10 September 2007, General Petraeus described the nature of the Iraq conflict as 'ethno-sectarian competition for power and resources.' The level of violence within this competition was influenced by 'foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals.' The situation was further exacerbated by 'malign actions by Iran and Syria...lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and various forms of corruption.' General Petraeus' conclusions that 'a [military] mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives', and that 'regional, global and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success', highlight that more than simply military actions are necessary in the resolution of the ongoing Iraq insurgency.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Testimony by General David H. Petraeus Commander Multi-National Force Iraq to Congress, 10-11 September 2007. Available at: <http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:L9m5A3AmF6oJ:www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus->

The revised near-term United States strategy to deal with the insurgency in Iraq was summarized neatly by General Petraeus in his succinct comment that ‘you’re not going to kill your way out of an insurgency’.⁸⁶ Highlighting the imperative to address underlying causes of the insurgency by addressing their needs of the population and also shape their perceptions, Petraeus described the variety of tasks undertaken by the military and other agencies in Iraq, from rebuilding and operating schools, provision of medical support, construction of roads and wells, to organizing of soccer leagues. The raising and training of Iraqi police forces by forces under Petraeus’ command is another example of institution and capacity building, critical in transferring long term responsibility for security to indigenous governments. His maxim ‘some of the best weapons do not shoot’ supports the analysis above that more than military force is required to address the local grievances of the people affected by modern conflict, on the way to establishing wide spread conditions amenable to a long term political solution generated from within the system. This is not to suggest that the need to kinetically target certain terrorists has been diminished – life for these individuals remains ‘nasty, brutish and short’ in Iraq.⁸⁷ Such predominantly military actions are however acknowledged as a shaping activity in support of the main effort of securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists.

[Testimony20070910.pdf+General+Petraeus+testimony&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us](#) (accessed 10 February 2007).

⁸⁶ Arthur Herman, “How to Win in Iraq – and How to Lose,” *Commentary Magazine* (April 2007) under “III,” <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/How-to-Win-in-Iraq-and-How-to-Lose-10856> (accessed August 26, 2007).

⁸⁷ David Kilcullen, comment on “Understanding Current Operations in Iraq,” Small Wars Journal Blog, comment posted June 26, 2007, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/print/understanding-current-operatio/> (accessed August 26, 2007). Original phrase is attributable to Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, 1651. It refers to the life of mankind when in its natural state.

The Joint Forces Command Joint Warfare Center reports the best practice of current operational commanders, interagency and multinational partners as being centered on ‘an atmosphere of inclusiveness...in working together to achieve objectives.’⁸⁸ This inclusiveness describes the collective approach to understanding the complex environment, developing and executing plans and assessments, all based on higher commander’s setting of conditions, access to capabilities not under command or control, and trust and confidence. This sense of inclusiveness is fundamental to the current operational theater, categorized throughout this analysis as complex, population centric and requiring a comprehensive approach. David Cavaleri is correct in concluding in his study of transition from combat to stability operations that ‘Phase III [combat] operations do not achieve the ultimate political end state goal of a sustained peace – they only set the conditions for Phase IV [stability and transition] activities.’ Further, as he cites from the On Point Study, ‘One of the great truths of this [OIF] campaign is that combat operations alone will not attain the desired end state. Operations ongoing now will be decisive, not those that the troops concluded in downtown Baghdad.’⁸⁹

One of the most far reaching outcomes arising from current operations in the broader Global War on Terror is how traditional security mechanisms and alliances developed under now defunct strategic conditions have come under increasing pressure. In calling upon NATO member nations at a recent Munich Conference on Security Policy to provide additional combat troops to the current Afghanistan operations, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has recently warned against

⁸⁸ US Joint Forces Command, *Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science Best Practices*, 2.

⁸⁹ David Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 87-89. See also Greg Fontenot et al, *On Point: The United States Army in OIF*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 433.

NATO becoming ‘a two tiered alliance of those willing to fight and those who are not.’⁹⁰ He also indicated that ‘the Bush Administration had learnt from mistakes made in Iraq, including the need to more closely integrate the civilian led stabilization efforts with the military efforts, and that these lessons must be applied in Afghanistan to assure success.’ In reminding the audience that European security, and that of the world, was linked to the security outcomes in Afghanistan, he added that ‘The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real and it is not going to go away.’ His comments and the resultant tension amongst certain NATO members raise two important issues in the context of this paper: that the issue of interagency extends beyond states to the collective international arena; and that the execution of interagency operations, made exponentially more difficult when conducted in an international context, places an even greater burden on planners and operators if long held security alliances are to retain relevance in the new world disorder.

The Military as Force of Choice in Interagency Operations

In his November 2007 Landon Lecture, Secretary Gates stated that one of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was the absolute requirement for a range of other activities beyond purely military actions essential to long term success. ‘Economic development, institution building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications – along with physical security’ were given as examples of essential assistance to communities under conflict and move the overall situation to

⁹⁰ Robert Gates, “Gates Says NATO At Risk Over Afghan Troop Burden,” *New York Times on the Web*, February 10, 2008 <http://www.us.army.mil/suite/earlybird/Feb2008/e20080210579103.html> (accessed February 10, 2008).

resolution.⁹¹ Evidence of the effectiveness of this comprehensive strategy in action in Iraq is given in the very recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Report by Anthony Cordesman, which indicates major progress in many areas in Iraq through a combination of the effects of troop surge, improved ‘clear, control and retain’ tactics, an uprising against terrorists by local tribesmen in Anbar, and continued adherence to a ceasefire by followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Ethno-sectarian deaths in Baghdad have reduced from a peak of 2200 in the month of December 2006 to around 200 in November 2007, in part attributable to calls for restraint by community leaders and enhanced security measures to protect the population.⁹² The new clear, control and retain tactics have built upon the security provided by military means to target the broader needs of local Iraqi communities, with funds from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program being infused into local economies, businesses, health clinics, schools, governments, courts and infrastructure with beneficial outcomes.

The task of post conflict stability and reconstruction, or nation building, identified previously in this paper as a task likely to continue to consume military resources for the foreseeable future, has grown in importance in the new conflict environment. Bathsheba Crocker from the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project highlights that post conflict operations will be ‘a necessary and unavoidable part of virtually all military operations involving the United

⁹¹ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” 4.

⁹² Anthony Cordesman, ‘*Creating a Stable and Secure “Iraqracy”*: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,’ CSIS Briefing Package, Revised 14 February 2008. Available at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4334/type,1/ (accessed 20 February 2008).

States in the future.’⁹³ She concludes that ‘the United States and its international partners will invest billions – if not hundreds of billions – of dollars in coming years on trying to rebuild failed states and to stabilize war-torn societies. Post conflict reconstruction is here to stay.’⁹⁴

In an important step in seeking to cast the mission of nation building and reconstruction in a truly integrated manner, the United States Government has directed several policy initiatives in this area, in particular creation of the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department in August 2004. Its core mission is ‘to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.’⁹⁵ President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 in December 2005 to give policy direction in the management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. This document appoints the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating efforts amongst the various government agencies:

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.⁹⁶

⁹³ Bathsheba Crocker, John Ewers and Craig Cohen, “Rethinking and Rebuilding the Relationship between War and Policy: Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 361.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 378.

⁹⁵ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Homepage” under “Core Mission” Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/> (accessed 20 February 2008).

⁹⁶ President, Directive, “NSPD 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 7 December 2005,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2.

As Cantwell points out, the responsibility for coordination does not mean that the Department of State has the all the resources or capabilities required to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations. Indeed he suggests that many believe that the Department of Defense holds such responsibilities for such actions associated with combat operations such as in Iraq.⁹⁷ This arises from the Title 10 of the United States Code Chapter 307, which specifically states that the Army ‘shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.’⁹⁸ This statute indicates that the military is required to conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities as a logical consequence of land combat operations. Further to this interpretation, the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of November 2005 outlines stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations as core missions for the military, directing the Department of Defense to include such plans in all military planning:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning...

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.⁹⁹

The interpretation of the Title 10 statute and the Directive 3000.05 give clarity, at least within Defense, to the vital issue as to whether the increasingly important task of reconstruction

⁹⁷ Cantwell, “Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise”, 58.

⁹⁸ Title 10 United States Code, Chapter 307 Section 3062. (b). Available at <http://www.house.gov/hasc/comdocs/reports/Title10UnitedStatesCode.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2008).

⁹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, DoD Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2.

and stabilization as nation building activities should be a core task for the military. Further and most importantly, Directive 3000.05 clarifies any debate as to the leadership of military-civilian teams undertaking these types of tasks and states:

Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations...
Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool.
The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development
of military-civilian teams.¹⁰⁰

In assigning itself the clear responsibility for leadership of military-civilian teams Defense is seeking to remove any opportunity for confusion or misalignment of priorities at the operational and tactical levels in conducting nation building activities. However these internal directives do not of themselves obviate Defense from adhering to NSPD 44 in coordinating their actions with the State Department, nor do they necessary apply to personnel or organizations outside Defense or government authority. Some potential for confusion remains.

The Defense intent to fuse and lead the actions all agencies with a role to play in stability and reconstruction is best represented on the ground by the work of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) as fielded initially in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. Secretary Gates referred to the historical origins of these PRT in his Landon Lecture, recalling the very good results of Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program during the Vietnam War, whilst also lamenting the need to re-learn these hard lessons by repetition in the current war. The formation and deployment of these teams have relieved the military, already heavily committed to demanding tasks of providing security to the population, from the 'burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past.' Despite this, the Secretary highlighted the fact that due to pressing operational and security circumstances on the ground,

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, DoD Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005, 3.

uniformed personnel have continued to perform a range of non-military tasks such as ‘building schools and mentoring city councils.’ He noted that these teams have done excellent work, but observed that there is ‘no replacement for the real thing - civilian involvement and expertise’ in ‘the decisive actions of reconstruction, development and governance.’¹⁰¹

The need for the military to continue to lead military-civilian teams has been made clear by recent operational experiences reported by PRT commanders. Mick Ryan, a former commander of an Australian Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan in 2005, states that ‘while some may question the expanded role for military organizations in reconstruction operations...the harsh reality is that in many areas such as Southern Afghanistan and Iraq, tenuous security conditions prevent many aid groups and other government agencies from establishing a presence.’¹⁰² He notes that insurgent groups, recognizing the positive impact that aid groups and other agencies would have on the local populace, deliberately target such groups to prevent them from gaining a presence. Underscoring this paper’s analysis of the characteristics of the contemporary operational environment as complex and lethal, this would suggest therefore that only a military centric or led PRT would have the robustness and survivability to operate with acceptable risks in most conflict situations. The military’s inherent capacity for persistence, pervasiveness and proportionality equip it ideally as the force of choice for the conduct of these decisive operations, demonstrated in this analysis to be the likely mainstay of operations for the foreseeable future.

¹⁰¹ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” 6.

¹⁰² Mick Ryan, “The Military and Reconstruction Operations,” *Parameters United States Army War College Quarterly*, XXXVII, No 4 (Winter 2007-08): 59.

However, there is more to the need to be able to operate in a sustained manner within the lethal and unpredictable operational environment. Ryan concludes ‘By necessity, military led reconstruction operations have spilled over into what was traditionally the domain of NGO. This is not a deliberate attempt to seize additional responsibility by the militaries conducting these operations, but a pragmatic realization that regardless of the security situation, the local population requires rapid humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.’¹⁰³ In the battle of ideas for perceptions and allegiances in the complex human-centric environment, the speed and manner in which assistance can be provided to the local population may be more important than the actual nature of the task itself.

The need for the military to remain the force of choice is not restricted to the reconstruction and stabilization environment. Thomas Ricks reports that even as efforts against certain groups in Baghdad appear to be succeeding and more people are freed from the danger posed by insurgents and ethnic-sectarian violence, new threats continue to emerge to threaten stability and progress. In an interview with the Divisional Commander responsible for security in Baghdad, Ricks describes three separate but related wars in Iraq: against Al Qaeda; the domestic Sunni insurgency; and perhaps the most worrying, against Shiite extremist militias. This latter group believed to be supported by Iran ‘have been especially effective in using explosively formed projectiles (EFP), sophisticated bombs designed to destroy armored vehicles.’¹⁰⁴ Whilst Al Qaeda increases its attacks against local armed groups who are cooperating with United States forces, Shiite extremists continue to target United States troops with lethal weapons such as EFP.

¹⁰³ Mick Ryan, “The Military and Reconstruction Operations,” 68.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Ricks, “In Iraq, Three Wars Engage U.S.,” *Washington Post*, February 3, 2008. Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/02/AR2008020202072_pf.html (accessed 3 February 2008).

This highlights the continuing lethality and complexity of the operational environment despite significant security successes in some locations, and suggests that the military will continue to be required to provide security whilst also shouldering the burden of those tasks normally assumed by other agencies, as predicted by Secretary Gates. Whilst recognizing the desire to involve other agencies in seeking to resolve the conflict, operational and physical security imperatives offer little other choice.

There are other reasons to support the notion that the military is the appropriate force of choice for the conduct of operations in the contemporary operational environment. Principal amongst these is its budget, resources and personnel numbers relative to other government agencies within the United States system. Funding for non-military foreign affairs programs remains disproportionately small compared to the United States Department of Defense budget and to its relative importance. Gates points out ‘the total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is US\$36 billion – less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone.’¹⁰⁵ The enormous disparity in funding between Defense and other United States agencies is only set to grow larger. The Pentagon’s role of direct provider of foreign assistance has surged recently in support of operations. From 2002 to 2005, Defense’s share of United States official development assistance increased from 5.6% to 21.7%. In addition, a proposal by the Bush Administration has been submitted to Congress that would give the Pentagon permanent authorities to provide such non-traditional security assistance. Meanwhile, the funding, staffing, programs and operational

¹⁰⁵ Robert Gates, Address at Landon Lecture Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the non-military Instruments of American Power,” 8. Secretary Gates also placed the relative manning between the Defense and State departments in practical terms by observing that the 6 600 foreign service officers from the Department of State number less than the manning for one aircraft carrier strike group.

capacities of the USAID and State Department have stagnated at a point in history when the diplomatic and developmental outcomes of these agencies have grown greatly in importance.¹⁰⁶

Secretary Geren made several telling comments in answering questions after his presentation to Command and General Staff College in support of the notion of primacy of the military in interagency operations for the near future. He noted that other elements of national power do not have an expeditionary culture or the capability of Defense in the conduct of contemporary operations, adding that the rest of the government agencies were ‘not likely to be able to step up and relieve pressure or burden from the military for some time.’ He also added that there was no compulsion for members of other agencies to deploy to work in potentially lethal areas, other than from a sense of duty or desire to remain in a particular employment stream.¹⁰⁷

Secretaries Gates and Geren’s comments, although likely to cause some concern amongst members of other agencies as to the likely long term policy effects, reflect a true state of current affairs. The United States will continue to depend on the military to shoulder the burden normally carried by other agencies for the time being. This has been driven by the complex, lethal and population-centric situation encountered in the contemporary operational environment, shaped by changed global security conditions. A comprehensive and integrated interagency approach is required in the conduct of operations. In reality however, the transformation from the Cold War continues. As indicated in the National Security Strategy 2006, the United States government institutions and frameworks for security have not kept up with the pace of changes evident in the

¹⁰⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, “Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance,” (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, December 2007), vi.

¹⁰⁷ Pete Geren, in answers to questions following his address to Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 6, 2008.

new security environment and world disorder.¹⁰⁸ Until these institutions and processes change, or the nature of the operational and global security environments reverts to a world for which those institutions and processes were designed, the military must remain prepared to be the force of choice in interagency operations.

CONCLUSION

From this analysis the evidence suggests that modern conflict is increasingly centered on a changed manifestation of war from a contest between state based massed armies to also include a range of non state actors in dynamic tension, within a complex operational environment. The nature of conflict remains essentially political, resting on a contest of wills to shape and influence popular perceptions, but has been made increasingly difficult through the four interrelated trends of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality. Combat operations alone are insufficient to address the range of issues and views of the population within which the enemy will operate and seek to dominate. Within this arena, control of populations and perceptions is the decisive and central event, with battle being a means to an end. Battlefields are now more often social structures than terrain, with ideas as weapons, human minds the targets and the will of the people the prize. Success in this new contest of wills requires more than application of conventional military force alone, but rather a comprehensive interagency approach to operations.

In reality however, for the time being the United States will continue to depend on the military to shoulder the burden normally carried by other agencies. Whilst recognizing the desire to involve other agencies in seeking to resolve contemporary conflict, institutional circumstances and operational imperatives offer little other choice. These essential actions by the military reflect

¹⁰⁸ President, *National Security Strategy 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 43.

the broader interpretation of contemporary security and the need to provide such assistance quickly in the absence of other agencies. To not do so reduces the initial degree of influence able to be established by occupying forces over indigenous populations. In an era of globalised communications and continuous media coverage, these gaps of influence are able to be readily exploited by adversaries, with the attendant risk of prolonged conflict and unfavorable outcomes, as evident in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters.

The transformation from the Cold War continues. The United States government institutions and frameworks for security have not kept pace with the changes evident in the new security environment and world disorder. Until these security institutions and processes change, or the nature of the operational and global security environments reverts to a world for which those institutions and processes were designed, the military must remain prepared to be the force of choice in interagency operations.

As Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski, the Founding Director of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation, summarized in describing the role of the military in the changed security environment:

'As we have witnessed in both Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving political victory is far different from winning on the battlefield. In fact, success on the battlefield is only loosely coupled with achieving political aims. This gap yawns before us. The nation's military force must be an adaptive instrument of national power. It must provide political utility across a much more diverse and difficult range of scenarios and circumstances. This force must act as a flexible instrument of policy engagement, not simply provide a larger sheaf of thunderbolts.'¹⁰⁹

In this complex, population-centric conflict environment, requiring a comprehensive interagency approach to operations, the military is in fact the force of *no* choice.

¹⁰⁹ Arthur K. Cebrowski, in Foreword to Anthony McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), xiii.

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