CREATING EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION ORGANIZATIONS:
LESSONS FROM PANAMA, BOSNIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2008

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**Report Title:**
Creating Effective Post-Conflict Transition Organizations: Lessons from Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq

**Authors:**
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**Summary:**
The contemporary operational environment includes a host of variables that make the management of post-conflict transitions a challenge. Constructing the optimal management organization is a key component of successful post-conflict transition. This thesis examined four organizations: the Military Support Group-Panama which was established following the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, the Office of the High Representative which was at the center of the peace operation in Bosnia from 1995 to the present, the post-conflict transition in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The Military Support Group-Panama illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of a purely military organization and how it worked in the unique situation of Panama. However, the Bosnia situation called for broader international involvement and the Office of the High Representative served as the focal point for a complex organization. The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq offered a comparison of vastly different organizations operating in the contemporary operating environment. The four case studies showed that post-conflict transition and reconstruction and stabilization operations can benefit from a tailored management organization that emphasizes simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency to achieve maximum success.

**Subject Terms:**
Post-conflict transition, Panama, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Reconstruction, Stabilization
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Thesis Title: CREATING EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM PANAMA, BOSNIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The contemporary operational environment includes a host of variables that make the management of post-conflict transitions a challenge. Constructing the optimal management organization is a key component of successful post-conflict transition. This thesis examined four organizations: the Military Support Group-Panama which was established following the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, the Office of the High Representative which was at the center of the peace operation in Bosnia from 1995 to the present, the post-conflict transition in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The Military Support Group-Panama illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of a purely military organization and how it worked in the unique situation of Panama. However, the Bosnia situation called for broader international involvement and the Office of the High Representative served as the focal point for a complex organization. The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq offered a comparison of vastly different organizations operating in the contemporary operating environment. The four case studies showed that post-conflict transition and reconstruction and stabilization operations can benefit from a tailored management organization that emphasizes simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency to achieve maximum success.
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL(P)</td>
<td>Colonel (Promotable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCMOTF</td>
<td>Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>A summarized term for the instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETM</td>
<td>Essential Task Matrix</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accounting Office</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Iraqi Governing Council</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>Interagency Management System</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMB</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Body</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>Multinational Corps – Iraq</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Military Support Group</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government, United States</td>
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<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Policy Action Group</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Panamanian Defense Forces</td>
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<td>PFLD</td>
<td>Public Force Liaison Division</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Management</td>
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<td>NATO Senior Civilian Representative</td>
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<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.\(^1\)

B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*

In May 2003, President George W. Bush announced, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended….And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”\(^2\) The coalition’s military forces had accomplished its objectives and Saddam Hussein’s regime was no longer in power. The newly formed Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under control of DOS, began working to establish an autonomous and stable Iraqi government. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the new leadership of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, rapidly replaced ORHA. Nearly five years later, the organization overseeing reconstruction and stabilization efforts has morphed into the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) which now manages these operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has contributed over $45 billion to reconstruction and stabilization efforts which the U.S. and coalition military forces predominantly conduct while simultaneously attempting to improve and sustain security.\(^3\)

However, a heavy dependence on military forces to conduct post-conflict activities potentially sets a dangerous precedent. With American armed forces admittedly stretched thin to support military operations worldwide, relying on them to conduct the preponderance of reconstruction and stabilization operations places an additional burden on the force and diminishes its capability to undertake and sustain future combat operations. Consequently, the improvement of the post-conflict transition process would
directly improve the long-term effectiveness of the United States’ military instrument of national power.

The successful outcome of future armed conflicts requires not only thorough planning for reconstruction and stabilization, but also an effective management organization that optimizes the use of available resources. Improving future post-conflict transitions mandates a thorough analysis of how the U.S. Government manages the transfer of control from military leaders to civilian authorities. This research will identify certain characteristics of the organizational structure and/or procedures the U.S. Government should implement to better operationalize the post-conflict transition process. To determine a recommendation, it is necessary to answer the following secondary questions: What are the essential tasks or activities in a post-conflict environment? What are the current organizations or procedures involved in executing post-conflict transitions? What organizational characteristics should be sustained, improved, deleted, or added? Finally, post-conflict transitions are not a new requirement. Throughout its history, the U.S. military has repeatedly occupied and then withdrawn from foreign countries. However, the methods by which it has conducted these transitions have varied widely. This study will examine organizational models the United States has used in past transitions to answer the following tertiary questions: How were past transition organizations structured, trained, manned, etc? How well did past transition organizations accomplish the essential tasks to reconstruction and stabilization?

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 provides the most recent guidance for the execution of post-conflict transition. This directive designated DOS as the lead agency for coordinating and planning reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
Specifically, it directed DOS to “develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts…which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.” Following the publication of NSPD-44 in December 2005, DOS established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) which was “given a mandate by the National Security Council Principals to be the focal point for the U.S. Government on stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.” S/CRS subsequently published an Essential Task Matrix (ETM) that provides a framework for contingency reconstruction planning. Although the ETM captures the fundamentals of reconstruction and stabilization, it is a theoretical framework for planning and does not address execution of a specific plan. Furthermore, S/CRS is not currently resourced to implement its plans and its efforts have not been fully tested in a real world post-conflict situation. As of October 2007, the S/CRS staff is composed of 76 individuals only three of whom represent the Department of Defense. Of those three, one is a White House Fellow, one is a Department of the Army Civilian, and the final one is the sole uniformed representative from the military. He serves as the Senior Military Advisor to the Coordinator. Developing a management organization model that more robustly incorporates interagency representation is a critical factor in furthering the United States’ efforts to improve post-conflict transition.

In addition, post-conflict transition organizations must be effectively tailored to the unique circumstances of the post-conflict environment. While there is no template for creating such an organization, it is useful to identify the general characteristics that make post-conflict management organizations successful. To reach a conclusion, this study will examine various organizational structures that have historically been implemented
during post-conflict transitions. Specifically, it will explain the organizational models used in Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Through an exploration and comparison of five characteristics – simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency – these historical case studies will provide broad lessons learned for building an organization to accomplish the essential tasks of reconstruction and stabilization.

This research is limited in scoped and premised on several assumptions. First, it will assume that future post-conflict transitions will occur between U.S.-led military control and U.S.-led (or advised) civilian control. It will also assume that the civilian component of these transitions requires an interagency effort and that DOS will retain lead agency authority for reconstruction and stabilization operations. Finally, because this is an exploratory study aimed at recommending improvements to the post-conflict transition process, it will not consider resource availability although recommendations will be limited to those that are deemed feasible. All sources used in this research are unclassified. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq mature, additional source material may become available in the future as it is declassified. Further, because Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing operations, their level of long-term success is unknown. This study will incorporate a relative assessment of current levels of success in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This research is also limited in scope due to time available for research and writing. The four selected case studies offer a range for comparison but do not provide a complete study of historical American management of post-conflict transition. They also do not include potentially useful lessons from studies of alternative models for reconstruction and stabilization such as the use of military governments. This thesis also does not delve into the geopolitical or environmental conditions necessary to
transition from military to civilian authority. Finally, this study does not include an in-depth analysis of resource availability; however, recommendations for future post-conflict organizations are limited to those deemed feasible.

It is imperative to define the following key terms which are essential to the study of post-conflict transition management: interagency, post-conflict operations, stability operations, stabilization phase of operations.

Interagency – “United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.”

Post-Conflict Operations – A broad term encompassing all activities occurring after the conclusion of sustained combat operations. The commencement of post-conflict operations follows the strategic culmination of the enemy and implies that the preponderance of the force is no longer involved in armed conflict.

Stability Operations – Stability operations are a subset of post-conflict operations. They are “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside of the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Note that the Department of State continues to refer to these activities as “reconstruction and stabilization operations.” For continuity within the text, this study will refer to these efforts as “reconstruction and stabilization” regardless of the agency involved.

Stabilization Phase of Operations – As Phase IV in the Joint Operational Phasing Model, the stabilize phase “is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat
operations to stability operations.” It is “required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present.”

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the process of post-conflict transition. It discusses the need to improve the U.S. Government’s ability to transfer local authority from the Department of Defense (DOD) to DOS following an armed conflict. Chapter 2 reviews the available literature pertaining to current U.S. government organizations with mandates that require their involvement in the post-conflict transition process. It also reviews literature specific to the four case studies and other potential case studies. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and explains the use and selection of the case studies. Chapter 4 begins with a description of current organizational structures and the organizations employed in each of the case studies. It then provides a comparison and analysis of the case studies. Chapter 5 concludes the research and includes recommendations for areas of further study.


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is organized in five sections based on topics of emphasis. The first section explores joint and interagency doctrine, policy, and other official guidance regarding the management of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The final four sections address pertinent literature references for each of the four case studies: Panama (Military Support Group), Bosnia (Office of the High Representative), ongoing operations in Afghanistan (ISAF/OEF/UNAMA), and ongoing operations in Iraq (ORHA/CPA/IRMO).

Post-Conflict Transition Organizations in Doctrine and Policy

Attention to the management of post-conflict transition and the growing importance of interagency operations has only recently gained momentum and there are few comprehensive publications currently available that address how to organize interagency operations in a post-conflict environment. Key government documents such as the National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (December 2005) provide context and official guidance for what a future organization must accomplish, but do not offer specifics regarding its necessary characteristics or composition. NSPD-44 assigns the Department of State (DOS) as the lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization operations, a key component of post-conflict transition, but DOS has subsequently issued few publications addressing its role in managing such operations. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),
established as a result of NSPD-44, published a matrix of “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” but it prefaces the matrix as a working document and has only recently begun to address the means of task execution through the development of the Interagency Management System (IMS). Overall, DOS publications generally emphasize planning over implementation and focus on broad concepts for management. They do not currently include a study of how to tailor a post-conflict transition organization so that it possesses the necessary characteristics to manage reconstruction and stabilization operations and related activities in a post-conflict environment.

Similarly, many recent Department of Defense (DOD) publications have emphasized the need to expand the culture of joint operations to include other government agencies and organizations. An example of recent joint doctrine is Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, which was published in March 2006 and provides a brief and generalized overview of interagency organization mainly regarding domestic operations and crisis response overseas. It does not, however, specify guidelines for organizing post-conflict transition organizations. Joint doctrine tends to focus on the phase of operations in which DOD is the lead agency and does not address how to organize a command and control structure so that it can transition to DOS-led reconstruction and stabilization activities. While contemporary DOD publications often underscore the necessity of incorporating other government agencies into DOD operations, they neglect to address how to manage such expanded operations.

DOD, mainly through the Joint Warfighting Center, has also recently published numerous pamphlets and handbooks regarding the Joint Interagency Coordination Group.
The *Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* (March 2007), and the pamphlet titled *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)* (June 2004), address the theoretical role of the JIACG as the primary interagency liaison during military operations. However, these publications do not specifically address the JIACG’s roles and responsibilities in the management of post-conflict transitions and, because the JIACGs are regionally aligned with the geographic combatant commands, they inevitably reflect a strong DOD influence and their related doctrine does not address how to form an organization that successfully implements NSPD-44. While DOD typically has vastly greater resources and experience in managing large organizations with complex missions, its current doctrine fails to adequately address post-conflict management organizations at an operational level.

Academia provides the final body of work available regarding the interagency in theory. The U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, other academic institutions, and scholarly journals have published numerous articles and studies advocating the institutionalization of interagency processes or relationships. They variously urge a requirement to train leaders in the interagency process, emphasize the need for new doctrine, or stress the necessity to better operationalize interagency actions. However, current literature does not adequately address how to construct an organization that can manage reconstruction and stabilization operations. Past case studies of post-conflict transitions tend to focus on broad planning themes or necessary force capabilities. They often neglect the importance of constructing the optimal command and control or management organization to oversee post-conflict activities. This research will focus on four case studies, Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, which provide
contrasting approaches to managing reconstruction and stabilization in the contemporary operating environment. The case studies will focus on the effectiveness of the post-conflict management organization created in support of each operation.

Panama- Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY and the USMSG-PM

The U.S. intervention in Panama was one of the shortest in history, lasting just over two weeks. The limited amount of academic study devoted to Operation JUST CAUSE is commensurate to its duration. Much of the related writings are a study of the motivations and execution of the invasion itself. Many books, articles, and other publications provide a thorough historical documentation of the events preceding the invasion and the execution of the operation to include the role of air power, airborne operations, special operations forces, and civil affairs units. A similar amount of material is available reference the invasion in the context of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Yet, because the plan that encompassed post-conflict transition activities was developed separately and essentially was not integrated into JUST CAUSE’s plan, the planning and execution of stability operations in Panama under Operation PROMOTE JUSTICE has received limited study. Very few publications even mention the U.S. Military Support Group – Panama (USMSG-PM). One monograph offers Panama as a model for command and control during stability operations, but its analysis is outdated given current doctrine and government organization. Other writings such as Richard H. Shultz’s In the Aftermath of War focus on broad lessons learned. John T. Fishel’s comprehensive study, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama is a key source in the study of planning for the operations in Panama; however, while it acknowledges the need for tailored post-conflict management organizations, it
does not identify the general characteristics that such an organization must exhibit to succeed. The invasion of Panama inspired a subsequent period of intense study of low-intensity conflict, stability operations, and rapid deployment units. The available literature regarding Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY also provides insight into a uniquely planned and executed post-conflict operation.

**Bosnia – Office of the High Representative**

As a protracted operation with broad international involvement, the intervention in Bosnia has resulted in a large body of literature. A large portion of the written material related to the most recent conflict in Bosnia focuses on its instigating factors such as ethnic and religious tension to include numerous histories of conflict in the Balkans. There is also a body of material addressing international intervention as an inherent moral responsibility and related writings regarding the shaping of U.S. foreign policy and the mandates of international organizations such as the United Nations. More pointed literature focuses on the roles and actions of the various organizations involved in the intervention and subsequent reconstruction and stabilization operations in Bosnia. This body of writing includes historical accounts of events in places such as Srebrenica, as well as personal accounts of the experiences of individuals such as diplomats, volunteers working for non-governmental or international organizations, and military members. Other studies critique the involvement of specific organizations such as the World Bank. U.S. Government reports provide detailed information on the ongoing progress of reconstruction and stabilization in Bosnia; yet they offer little critical analysis.

While the international community deems the transition in Bosnia to civil authority somewhat successful, the conflict has receded from the attention of the media
and there has been little critical study of its long-term reconstruction and stabilization operations or, more importantly, how the international community has effectively managed these operations over a period of more than a decade.

**Afghanistan – ISAF/OEF/UNAMA**

As an ongoing operation, there is little literature available that provides a critical analysis of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts that the ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA organizations collectively oversee. Numerous books and media reports have meticulously captured the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks in America, as well as the events in the weeks immediately following. Similar sources, including after action reports, have thoroughly recorded key events of the initial entry into Afghanistan and the toppling of the Taliban regime. The press continues to provide much of the information for current reports, but Afghanistan has increasingly received less public attention than the concurrent operation in Iraq. Raw data and general trends in progress are available from government reports and international organizations and think tanks such as the U.S. Institute for Peace and the International Crisis Group publish some literature focused on the organizations involved in managing post-conflict activities in Afghanistan. The material currently available that addresses the effectiveness of reconstruction and stabilization in Afghanistan tends to focus on the means of executing these efforts such as the construct, training, and activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams rather than on their overall management. Further, because offensive operations are occurring simultaneously with reconstruction and stabilization, some reports and information that may provide insight into the efficiency of the involved organizations is currently classified and not available for inclusion in this study. Finally, as with all ongoing
transitions, the endstate in Afghanistan remains unknown, but the ability of the ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA to manage reconstruction and stabilization efforts to date provides indicators as to the shaping of the post-conflict environment in Afghanistan.

**Iraq – ORHA and the CPA**

The ongoing operations in Iraq present similar results to the review of literature pertinent to Afghanistan. There are extensive publications and media reports available, particularly from embedded journalists, regarding the military invasion and subsequent operations in Iraq. As the presence of embedded reporters in Iraq waned following the initial invasion, the press’ ability to provide analysis based on first-hand reporting has also diminished. While government reports and other independent sources continue to provide raw data and information, much of the current writing on reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq is editorial in nature and often conveys an inflammatory, accusatory, or otherwise biased tone which is not useful for academic research. Many key individuals have published personal accounts of the initial phase of the war in Iraq which provide a comparison of events as seen from varying perspectives. There is also a smaller body of literature from think tanks and academic institutions that attempt to codify lessons learned so far in Iraq. These writings are useful in evaluating the overall command and control and management organizations in Iraq. The limited objective literature pertaining to the evolution of the organizations overseeing reconstruction and stabilization efforts provides timelines, the effects of personalities involved, as well as limited analysis of the various organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. As in Afghanistan, the ultimate extent of the success or failure in managing the reconstruction and stabilization effort in Iraq is unclear at this time.
Summary

A review of available literature regarding post-conflict transitions and reconstruction and stabilization operations reveals several trends. Most current doctrine and writings are overly focused on planning and seldom address implementation. Additionally, although contemporary literature recognizes the importance of a holistic government effort in optimizing reconstruction and stabilization, neither the U.S. defense establishment, nor its diplomatic organizations, have adequately addressed how to operationalize this concept.

Chapter 3 will explain how a study of various past post-conflict transitions can yield an organizational model that, when applied within the constraints of official guidance and doctrine, provides a basis for tailoring a management organization that successfully operationalizes future post-conflict transitions.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Method

This thesis is an exploratory study of managing post-conflict transition. It will first explain the essential tasks that any organization responsible for executing stabilization operations must complete. According to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), these tasks are security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. It will then outline and explain the current U.S. Government organizations that contribute to the management of stability operations. This study will also compare four case studies of historical or ongoing transitions from failed states to stable governments. Finally, based on the case study comparison, this thesis will conclude with recommendations for post-conflict transition procedures and an organizational model that best supports the projected needs of the U.S. Government.

The cases selected for study are: Panama (Military Support Group-Panama), Bosnia (Office of the High Representative), ongoing operations in Afghanistan (ISAF/UNAMA/OEF), and ongoing operations in Iraq (ORHA/CPA/IRMO). These cases were selected based on their implementation of a separate organization dedicated to reconstruction and stabilization efforts following the removal or failure of an existing regime. These cases also involved U.S. military forces as well as other U.S. governmental agencies and research material for each case is readily available. The situations in Panama and Bosnia introduce potential variables to include more limited U.S. geopolitical objectives and the involvement of international organizations such as
the UN and NATO. The transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq differed from one another due to varying circumstances and they provide a comparison in the contemporary operating environment. The analysis of these four cases in Chapter 4 results in a comprehensive understanding of organizations that the U.S. Government has used to execute recent post-conflict transitions. Incorporating the best practices of these four case studies provides an organizational model that the U.S. Government can tailor for future conflicts.

**Framework for Analysis**

The framework for comparing the four case studies is based on assessments of the following criteria: simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency. *Simplicity* describes an organization’s relative degree of bureaucracy. Although the assessment of this criterion could also include the organization’s requirement for resources, it will be focused instead on its ability to achieve unity of command and unity of effort across the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. An enduring principle of military operations, unity of command and effort is also critical to a successful post-conflict transition. The organization conducting this transition must be structured in a way that supports such unity. While simplicity helps guarantee unity of effort, a post-conflict transition organization must also be prepared to support all future military operations. *Responsiveness* is an evaluation of an organization’s ability to quickly integrate into operational planning efforts whether they involve contingency or non-contingency plans. William Flavin’s simple statement in his article in *Parameters* in 2003 supports this necessity: “Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible.”² A proposed organization that
cannot feasibly participate in planning or that demands so many resources up-front that it is not a functioning organization before the post-conflict transition begins is not a viable long-term solution. Likewise, an organization that does not have the ability to quickly and adequately adjust to changes is not a suitable model. *Flexibility* measures an organization’s adaptability to post-conflict environment variables such as the security situation, political conditions, cultural issues, and coalition partner involvement. Many of these variables influence the length of time a transition organization must conduct operations. Because this amount of time has historically varied widely, *sustainability* assesses an organization’s demand for resources such as manning requirements, facilities, and funding. If any of these demands are excessive or unreasonable over the long-term, the organizational model is not a feasible solution. Finally, analysis of the cases will compare and contrast the *efficiency*, or level of success, achieved in each of the identified essential tasks. Because Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing transitions, this study will submit a relative assessment of these cases based on scholarly opinion and the personal assessments of DOD and DOS personnel working in each transition organization. Analysis of these five criteria provide a broad means of analyzing previously executed and ongoing transitions as well as proposed organizations or procedures.

**Case Study Selection**

The case studies considered for this research were limited to U.S. military operations after 1945. Because this thesis aims to optimize the organization and procedures used during post-conflict transition between DOD and DOS, older cases would likely include organizational models or procedures that are neither relevant nor feasible in the current U.S. government bureaucracy. Since 1945, the U.S. has
participated in over 100 military operations worldwide. The majority of these operations do not support this research because they did not involve a failed state or a U.S.-led or advised post-conflict transition. This study excludes these types of operations such as non-combatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance, or foreign internal defense.

In chronological order, the U.S. occupations in Europe and the Pacific theaters following the end of combat operations in World War II provided the first opportunity for research. In Europe, the U.S. and its allies conducted a military occupation of Germany, Italy, and Austria. Specifically in Germany, although General Dwight Eisenhower encouraged a transition from military to civilian control, efforts to civilianize the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) were slow to materialize. The contributing reasons for these difficulties were partially related to circumstances unlikely to reoccur in modern-day conflicts. For example, a program to convert commissioned officers to civilian status following the end of combat operations is unrealistic under today’s civil service system. While the military occupation of Germany contains many historical lessons, it is not well-suited to support the ends of this study. Similarly, although the Japanese government did not collapse, General Douglas MacArthur served as the Military Governor of Japan rather than leading a transition from military to DOS authority. Therefore, Japan was also excluded from this research.

The Vietnam War offered the next potential opportunity for research. Although the Vietnamese government did not collapse it was certainly weak and corrupt. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) teams employed in Vietnam were, according to General William Westmoreland, an “unprecedented grafting of a civilian/military hybrid onto his command.” CORDS was largely successful
because its organizational structure ensured unity of effort among civilian agencies and the military. While many lessons can come from a study of the CORDS model, it is not suited for research of this particular thesis because it did not support a post-conflict transfer of authority from DOD to DOS, but rather an ongoing pacification effort in conjunction with continuing combat operations.

The next group of military operations considered for study included the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama. These cases represent Cold War-era conflicts in which the U.S. manipulated the failure of a regime and installed a new government more sympathetic to America. The typical aim of these operations was to prevent new Communist footholds in the vicinity of the U.S. rather than to promote the development of stable democracies. However, the invasion of Panama occurred, notably, after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Military Support Group model used in Panama provides a good historical example of how to manage post-conflict transition and therefore is included in this study.

Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military participated in numerous operations throughout the 1990s. As governments suddenly collapsed, such as in Somalia and Haiti, the U.S. contributed military and humanitarian assistance, but did not typically remain in-country following the conclusion of operations. Instead, the United Nations was often the lead agency and had varied levels of success at reconstruction and stabilization efforts. In the Balkans, however, the U.S. had an increased role as NATO led military actions to achieve peace and stability in the region. Bosnia, in particular provides an organizational model that includes NATO military forces as well as OSCE
and the UN. The relative success in the Bosnian transition supports its inclusion in this research.

Finally, the U.S. entered yet another chapter in its military history with the initiation of the Global War on Terror in 2001. While military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were initially successful, transition to civilian control has achieved differing levels of success in each country. Because these conflicts are ongoing, accurate assessments of their success are difficult to ascertain. However, each transition incorporated a different organization and they consequently lend themselves to comparison and contrast. Both Afghanistan and Iraq are included as case studies because they provide insight into the U.S. Government’s most recent approaches to managing post-conflict transition.

The following chapter, Chapter 4, consists of sections dedicated to each of the case studies. Each section analyzes the case study using the evaluation criteria of simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency. Each analysis concludes with a discussion of factors unique to that case study and lessons learned. Chapter 5 discusses recommendations and overall conclusions.


CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Panama

As one of the first major U.S. military operations conceived and executed after the passage of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the invasion and subsequent reconstruction and stabilization of Panama in 1989-1990 provided numerous lessons learned for future post-conflict transitions. The crisis in Panama had a lengthy evolution that began to escalate in June 1987 when Manuel Noriega’s reprehensible actions first gained public notice. The lengthy planning window preceding the U.S. intervention resulted in extremely successful combat operations, but post-conflict operations did not achieve the same level of accomplishment. The U.S. experience in Panama provides several enduring lessons for future post-conflict transitions that include the requirement to integrate the organization planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations into the overall operational planning effort, the fundamental importance of incorporating key interagency organizations into the transition organization’s structure, the need for national as well as military leaders to prioritize and streamline resources for post-conflict operations, the significance of selecting the right leaders for post-conflict transition organizations, and the absolute necessity for the post-conflict transition organization to be able to quickly raise and institute an effective police force.

Development of the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM)

On 20 December 1989, the United States invaded Panama after nearly two years of planning. The contingency plan, originally known as ELABORATE MAZE and later
called BLUE SPOON, had evolved from the JCS Planning Order of 28 February 1988 which ordered a plan for “the possibility of U.S. forces being committed against the [Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)].”¹ As the situation in Panama deteriorated throughout 1989, the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps became the executive agent for BLUE SPOON and ultimately executed the operation which was renamed Operation JUST CAUSE.² Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was the sister operation to Operation JUST CAUSE. Based on the contingency plan known as BLIND LOGIC (formerly KRYSTAL BALL), PROMOTE LIBERTY addressed civil-military operations and had an initial mission of establishing “stable democratic and economic institutions in Panama.”³ Conceived as an operation independent of BLUE SPOON, BLIND LOGIC was a wide-ranging plan that U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) civil affairs (CA) planners developed concurrently, but separately, from BLUE SPOON. Although most planners considered BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC as sequential operations, the circumstances in Panama resulted in them actually being executed nearly simultaneously. Far from historically unique, this concurrent execution of combat and stability operations challenged the military’s command and control abilities.

BLIND LOGIC assigned responsibility for all CMO activities in Panama to the Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF) and predicated its efforts on the assumption that Army Reserve civil affairs units, whose members possessed key skill sets, would deploy in support of the operation. The term COMCMOTF was also used to refer to PROMOTE LIBERTY’s civil-military operations headquarters. Due to inadequate prior coordination, USSOUTHCOM J5 assumed the COMCMOTF role at the last minute although BLIND LOGIC called for U.S. Army
South (USARSO) to fill that role. The organization chart for COMCMOTF (see figure 1) clearly illustrates the inherent separation of combat operations from CMO. The advantage to this organization was that the dual-hatted USSOUTHCOM J5 had a direct link to the USSOUTHCOM Commander and could directly communicate the political-military situation which was frequently tenuous following the invasion. A dual-hatted CMO commander also had its downside since he ultimately had to continue to perform his J5 duties. In the weeks immediately following the invasion, COMCMOTF attempted to fulfill the requirements laid out in BLIND LOGIC. However, the sheer geography and breadth of CMO activities that PROMOTE LIBERTY was addressing quickly outgrew the plan and, more importantly, the command and control capabilities of COMCMOTF. Less than a month after the invasion, the roles and responsibilities of the COMCMOTF were absorbed into a new organization dubbed the U.S. Military Support Group – Panama (USMSG-PM or MSG).
The origins of the USMSG-PM lay in the Security Assistance Force associated with a U.S. Embassy’s Country Team which combines typical efforts of CA, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Special Operations Forces (SOF) under one command and control authority. These functions were made subordinate to the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the USMSG-PM organization. Although planners initially considered a model similar to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS) used in Vietnam, senior U.S. Army commanders balked at such an interagency approach and mandated an entirely military organization with “a more doctrinal structure.”

The SOUTHCOM J3, BG William Hartzog, settled on the
name, Military Support Group, because it reflected what he saw as the group’s main function: support. COL(P) Jim Steele, the SOUTHCOM J5 and the USMSG-PM’s first commander, wanted the organization to be jointly manned, but the Army was the only service that ever dedicated resources toward staffing the MSG.5

The MSG’s final organizational structure (see figure 2), placed both the MSG and ground forces under the command and control of the JTF-Panama Commander. Furthermore, the MSG Commander had command and control of CA, PSYOP, and SOF elements for the purpose of rebuilding democratic institutions in Panama and further improving public services. It was exactly what COL(P) Steele and senior Army commanders had wanted.
An implication of USMSG-PM being a purely military organization was that its staff was fully integrated in the operational planning and execution of JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY. However, the MSG was not even established until January 1990. Further, the planners for each operation were compartmentalized and only a few senior level officers were aware of the details of both plans prior to the invasion. The very agencies that the military would depend on to wage key efforts in support of PROMOTE LIBERTY were alienated from operational planning: “[N]one of the agencies that would have to participate in the restoration of Panama was permitted to know of the existence of

Figure 2. USMSG-PM Organization

Source: Fishel, 96.
BLIND LOGIC. It was classified, compartmented, and held exclusively within DOD channels.” The disjointed planning prior to JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY had lasting ramifications as the USMSG-PM strove to achieve unity of effort in rebuilding Panama.

Simplicity

The USMSG-PM’s organization seemingly supported unity of command and unity of effort for ongoing civil-military and nation building operations in Panama. However, the actual results of the MSG’s yearlong execution of PROMOTE LIBERTY were not uniformly successful in this area. The MSG continued to suffer the consequences of poorly integrated planning. Although the individuals leading the MSG overcame many barriers to accomplish PROMOTE LIBERTY’s objectives, it was more a result of personality than one of solid planning and organization. The varied levels of unity of effort in improving each of the instruments of Panamanian national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, the “DIME” – illustrated the ongoing difficulties the MSG experienced.

One of COL(P) Steele’s first major decisions had far-reaching effects on the MSG’s ability to achieve unity of effort. By selecting Fort Amador, with its many former PDF buildings available to house the MSG’s various subordinate functions, Steele forced interaction between offices comprised of personnel from disparate parts of the Army. However, interagency coordination and interaction were woefully insufficient. As LTG Carmen Cavezza, Commander, 7th Infantry Division during Operation JUST CAUSE, confirmed in an interview in 1992, “Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, many agencies were excluded from DOD planning, and the Embassy was severely
understaffed.” Defining the endstate for Panamanian democracy was complicated and the lack of DOS integration into the daily operations of the MSG exacerbated these difficulties. Although the MSG oversaw a wide breadth of activities within Panama, the diplomatic efforts to stabilize the Panamanian government and instill the spirit of democracy into its governmental institutions were paramount to the long-term success of PROMOTE LIBERTY. Despite the fact that USSOUTHCOM had placed the USMSG-PM under the operational control of the American Charge d’Affaires to the new Panamanian government, John Bushnell, the MSG leaders experienced ongoing difficulties formulating a coherent national strategy for Panama. Diplomatically, unity of effort was never fully achieved during the USMSG-PM’s tenure in Panama.

The USMSG-PM’s organization did not overtly convey a consideration for using information operations as a means of implementing a strategy to rebuild Panama. The mere act of removing Noriega during JUST CAUSE resulted in the restoration of privately-owned media in Panama. Although public media outlets had supposedly been restored in the treaties of 1978, Noriega quickly eliminated any sense of open reporting as a democracy such as America enjoys. According to a DOS Dispatch issued on 4 February 1991, all electronic and print media outlets had returned to private ownership and oversight in the year following JUST CAUSE. Unfortunately, the MSG’s lack of a cell dedicated to information operations meant that they missed a key opportunity to shape the Panamanian public’s perception of how the U.S. was reconstructing their country. The U.S. military did not emphasize information operations or strategic communications during the Cold War and its conduct of stability operations in Panama
reflected its understandable tendency to revert to the military to conduct all stability operations.

The rebuilding of Panama specifically did not include manning, equipping, and training an army. Instead, PROMOTE LIBERTY planned for a new civilian police force to reestablish and maintain security as quickly as possible. The U.S. Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) originally took on this mission. The MSG later absorbed the USFLG and redesignated it the Public Force Liaison Division (PFLD). The same interagency disharmony that affected diplomatic efforts also undermined efforts to rapidly build a stable civilian police force under both the USFLG and the PFLD. While the MSG had the appropriate command and control and readily supplied available resources such as office space and personnel, its disconnect with parallel interagency efforts made success nearly impossible. Compounding the lack of coordination between the MSG and other agencies was the decision to build the new police force around what remained of the formerly corrupt and unstable PDF. That decision became one of PROMOTE LIBERTY’s most enduring controversies. Although the MSG may not have made immediate progress in this area, its ability to influence the development of the new police force was at least partially successful and its work with the police force set the conditions for future stability in Panama. Nearly two decades later Panama’s constitution still forbids the raising of an army and the police force successfully provides internal security.

Another critical factor in Panama’s long-term stability was the mobilization of the Panamanian economy. The action with possibly the greatest effect on Panama’s long-term economic viability actually had little to do with the MSG. Following the capture of Noriega, President George H.W. Bush lifted the economic sanctions that had so
devastated the average Panamanian’s quality of life. The President’s additional pledge of $1 billion to repair the damage resulting from the invasion and restore infrastructure beyond its previous levels went a long way toward mobilizing the Panamanian economy although the actual amount of U.S. dollars that eventually flowed into Panama was arguably less than this initial promise. With unemployment rates at a staggering 20-30% in the months following JUST CAUSE, the MSG stood to influence the lives of hundreds of thousand Panamanian citizens. However, as a purely military organization, the MSG had little internal subject matter expertise on economic policy and initiatives. The MSG’s inherent inability to coordinate efforts with other agencies better equipped to oversee economic issues slowed the rebuilding of Panama’s economy. Other agencies and organizations contributed to the limited initial economic progress, but their efforts were not coordinated with those of the MSG. Furthermore, the influx of funding was not prioritized nor did it support a cohesive economic development plan. Instead, U.S. funding was politically motivated and aimed more at ensuring the new Panamanian government did not collapse, lest the first major American post-Cold War military action seem pointless. Ultimately, the MSG had little influence over the establishment of a stable economy in post-invasion Panama because it did not include subordinate organizations capable of influencing economic policy or actions.

Responsiveness

Because the military created the MSG following combat operations, its ability to integrate into operational planning efforts was not actually tested. However, had BLIND LOGIC planners envisioned the true scope of CMO activities that Panama required almost immediately after the invasion, they may have realized that the COMCMOTF was
insufficient in organizational breadth and depth to handle the mission. The MSG, as a subordinate to JTF-Panama, was better organized to address the many challenges in Panama’s post-conflict environment. Although the MSG’s lack of interagency involvement and parochial perspective were weaknesses, development of the MSG prior to the invasion and inclusion of its members in operational planning may have amplified the success it actually achieved. Unfortunately, there is not empirical evidence to support this conjecture since BLIND LOGIC neither included an adequate CMO organization nor were its plans coordinated with those for combat operations in Panama.

Flexibility

The USMSG-PM’s organizational structure limited its flexibility because it did not adequately incorporate the efforts of other agencies and organizations operating in the post-conflict environment in Panama. Lack of interagency coordination caused friction within the emerging civilian police force and slowed both the maturity of the police force as well as its ability to respond to security issues. The internal uprising within the police force nearly a year after its creation exemplified the potential for instability that endured in Panama. The ineffective coordination of diplomatic and political efforts did nothing to improve the already tenuous political conditions within the new Panamanian government. That this fragile government did not collapse in the year following the invasion is likely more a testament to the personalities involved than to the MSG’s ability as an organization to adapt and respond to changing conditions. Finally, the MSG suffered from the inherent weakness of being not only a purely military organization, but a purely American one as well. The U.S. had unilaterally taken offensive action against Noriega’s regime and therefore shouldered the sole responsibility for post-conflict activities.
President George H.W. Bush’s massive effort to build an international coalition on the eve of Operation DESERT STORM not even two years after JUST CAUSE, contrasts starkly with the almost covert planning of the invasion of Panama. Although the circumstances surrounding these two military operations vary greatly, the lack of coalition partner involvement is a unique feature of the MSG that requires consideration when examining its organizational structure as a possible framework for future post-conflict transitions. Although not ideally structured to adapt to changes in the post-conflict environment, this limited flexibility ultimately did not have a significant impact on the MSG’s overall influence because of the unique situation in Panama. The continued functioning of the government throughout the crisis and the post-conflict period negated the need for the MSG to also oversee the establishment of basic government functions. While far from perfect, the Panamanian government’s mere existence greatly reduced the burden on the MSG.

Sustainability

Throughout its approximately one-year existence, the primary challenge to sustaining USMSG-PM was personnel turnover. Disjointed planning and the acceptance of poor planning assumptions had lasting ramifications on both COMCMOTF and the MSG’s operations. BLIND LOGIC planners had consistently based CMO planning on the assumption that Army Reserve civil affairs units would provide needed expertise in the post-conflict environment. When these units were not activated, the result was the implementation of a system of augmentees on extremely short 31-day tours. This system created obvious turbulence and a state of constant transition within the MSG. Further, the augmentees were not necessarily from units oriented on Latin America and did not
always possess the basic skill sets required to conduct the MSG’s mission. Additionally, COL(P) Steele himself contributed to the personnel problem by requiring the MSG to be a joint organization even though the Army was the only service openly committed to ensuring PROMOTE LIBERTY’s success. The Department of the Army had finally authorized Directed Military Overstrength positions that would be filled with personnel on one year tours, but Steele’s insistence resulted in many positions designated to be filled by other services to remain unmanned. “Were it not for the relatively dynamic quality of its leadership in several critical areas and the good working relationships among most of the players, the MSG would have had great difficulty in accomplishing its mission.”12 COL(P) Steele’s selection of the complex of buildings at Fort Amador provided facilities that housed the MSG’s varied functions in relative geographic proximity. However, the MSG’s lack of command and control over other important agencies and organizations meant that Steele could not mandate their occupancy of nearby offices. Although a seemingly insignificant matter, the geographic separation of offices working on similar stability issues directly impacted the lack of unity of effort in post-invasion Panama. It is an unfortunate lesson learned from PROMOTE LIBERTY since adequate facilities were available, but were not properly utilized. What was available was money. The extent of U.S. aid and funding for reconstruction received widespread criticism from Panamanians and funding was subject to typical bureaucratic wrangling within the American political system. However, these arguments were at the national and international level and did not significantly impact the MSG’s ability to execute its mission. A better plan for staffing the MSG with appropriate personnel and
more reasonable tour durations would undoubtedly have elevated the organization’s success in reconstructing and stabilizing post-invasion Panama.

**Efficiency**

Throughout its one year existence, the USMSG-PM, despite its weaknesses, had striven to make progress in each of the five essential tasks of reconstruction and stability operations. A new civilian police force, although immature and plagued with internal strife, maintained some degree of security. It continued to struggle with carving out an identity independent from the much-despised and corrupt PDF mainly because many of its members were former PDF whose old habits quickly returned in the months following the invasion. As regime change resulted in a period of increased crime, looting, and unemployment, the continued presence of the U.S. military in Panama most likely contributed more to the stability of the security situation in Panama than did the new police force.

The new government remained in power, but was constantly at risk for coup attempts and internal corruption. Yet, as Panama’s first serious attempt at democracy in decades, its progress in the short time of the MSG’s existence was relatively successful. The extent of the MSG’s influence on this success was negligible since BLIND LOGIC had not thoroughly addressed the plans for achieving democracy in Panama. Furthermore, “[t]he Panama strategy which was submitted to the U.S. Embassy by the Military Support Group took some major steps toward a remedy but still fell short of clearly describing the desired democratic end-state.”

The Panamanian government’s growing pains had a mixed impact on its citizens. On one hand, basic services were restored and in many areas improved beyond those of
the Noriega years. On the other hand, rising crime and unemployment and the lack of a functioning medical system made the lives of the average Panamanian citizen difficult. One poll taken in the year following the invasion showed that “only 37 percent thought the invasion brought more benefits than problems.”\textsuperscript{14} The difficulties with mobilizing and stabilizing the economy and improving or rebuilding key infrastructure also had direct impacts on the Panamanian people. The MSG, with its lack of ties to DOS and other key organizations influencing economic policy, faced a nearly insurmountable task in this area. It also had to continually prioritize rebuilding efforts, without the benefit of a master reconstruction plan, due to the lack of qualified personnel: “[T]here were not enough civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort, which seems to be a common occurrence in U.S. transition operations.”\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, the citizens of Panama had lived under Noriega’s rule and had experienced the end results of economic sanctions and, ultimately, foreign invasion. Creating a sense of justice in the country was paramount to the MSG’s overall success. The Judicial Liaison Group (JLG) was created prior to the formation of the MSG to advise and assist Panamanians on legal and judicial matters and it ultimately fell, at least officially, under the MSG’s control. In reality, however, the JLG “were never fully independent of the USARSO SJA” and the MSG “never really comprehended how important its role could be.”\textsuperscript{16} With varying levels of influence over the achievement of each of the five essential tasks, the MSG had neither failed, nor had it been a runaway success. It had, however, set a precedent on which future post-conflict organizations could build and improve.
Other Factors

Numerous factors influence the success of any post-conflict transition organization. In Panama, the willingness and ability of its citizens’ leaders to establish a functioning government was one of the major factors in the success achieved in stabilizing post-invasion Panama. Conversely, the MSG was a typically American organization with a typically American problem: it lacked bilingual personnel who could interact directly with key Panamanian leaders. The U.S. experience in Panama serves as just one example of the challenge of conducting stability operations in a non-English speaking country. The tendency for American citizens to not speak multiple languages continues to impede daily civil-military operations. Finally, the rapid establishment of a new civilian police force was only partially successful in Panama since it was cobbled together using many former PDF members. A more effective police force would have contributed to a more effective transition period in Panama.

Lessons Learned from the USMSG-PM

The USMSG-PM as a post-conflict transition organization provided numerous lessons, both negative and positive, for future similar organizations. The U.S. Army created the MSG almost as an afterthought. Neither its members nor those of its predecessor organization, the COMCMOTF, had been integrated into or informed of operational planning. In addition, the scope of the post-conflict mission to reconstruct and stabilize Panama had been woefully underestimated by those who were involved in the pre-invasion planning. As the situation in Panama developed and the opportunity arose to create a new organization to oversee stability operations, there was an almost blatant disregard for including other agencies and organizations into what became the
MSG. The resulting lack of interagency coordination was the MSG’s most significant downfall. Finally, the MSG was never adequately manned although the U.S. military had sufficient resources to do so. The personnel issues served to underscore the lack of priority given to the post-conflict mission as the haphazard planning and disregard for a holistic strategy had already highlighted.

On the positive side, the MSG benefitted from the decision to place it under the command and control of the JTF-Panama. This made it a peer organization to that which oversaw offensive operations and gave the MSG Commander a direct means of communicating issues regarding stability operations. Selecting the best candidate for the commander’s position was also a key to the MSG’s success. COL(P) Steele had experience in the region, important established personal relationships in Panama, and a willingness to overcome the MSG’s many obstacles and rebuild Panama. His selection of the facilities at Fort Amador was also a lesson because it allowed all of the major functions and offices to be co-located (although some important offices chose not to). The MSG organization was sustainable over the long-term. Had the Army ultimately resolved its personnel issues, the MSG – as it was organized in the year following JUST CAUSE - could have remained as an influential organization long after it was officially deactivated in January 1991. The last lesson from the USMSG-PM is one that is applicable in every post-conflict environment. The establishment of a police force that uniformly enforces the law of the land is paramount to the success of further stability operations. Although Panama had a history of relative government stability, it had never sustained functioning democratic government institutions until after the U.S. invasion and the USMSG-PM’s work. The post-conflict experience in Panama held
many key lessons for future endeavors. However, these lessons faded quickly from the military’s institutional memory after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and interest turned to the impending Gulf War.

**Bosnia**

The Dayton Peace Accords, or the Dayton Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995, set a new precedent for international involvement in post-conflict transitions. Not only did it call for international military forces to provide security in the post-conflict environment, but numerous international institutions would simultaneously assist the new Bosnian government with developing solutions for their range of political, economic and social issues. Coming in the wake of the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces’ rapid success in Operation DESERT STORM, and its interventions in Haiti and Somalia, the success in Bosnia represented both a new era in U.S. military intervention as well as a new era for NATO.

The essence of the conflict in Bosnia was enormously complicated and built upon centuries of internal strife. At the heart of these issues lies the complex dynamic of three diverse ethnic groups: Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims – or Bosniaks. Beyond their obvious religious and social tensions, the groups had, and some would contend still maintain, fundamentally different outlooks for the endstate in Bosnia. While Bosnian Serbs and Croats wanted independent states, Bosniaks were more in favor of a unified Bosnia. By mid-1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared its independence but the region remained in turmoil. Over the next three years, Bill Clinton was elected President of the United States, the North Atlantic Council approved NATO air strikes in Bosnia, the Partnership for Peace program was created as a means of enlarging NATO’s
alliance, and Bosnian Serb attacks escalated to include mass attacks on civilians such as in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Leading the international community, but with no significant national interest at stake, the United States was reluctant to deploy troops to Bosnia. American leaders finally agreed to a ground force intervention mainly because they feared that “the UN would withdraw, raising the prospect that U.S. ground forces would be drawn into the conflict under the worst conditions possible.” The rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation further compelled the decision to intervene. Within a week of the signing of the Dayton Agreement, NATO forces assumed command of operations in Bosnia and the complex organization that would implement the Agreement began to emerge.

The Dayton Agreement upheld the creation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and created a uniquely structured peace operation. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was comprised of the Bosnia Serb Republic, or Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia which was jointly controlled by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. However, history predicted that enforcing boundaries, settling disputes, and facilitating a lasting peace amongst these entities would require a tailored and sustained effort. The peace operation that grew out of the Agreement had both military and civilian components (see figure 3). The military operation created NATO’s first peacekeeping (or peace enforcement) force known first as the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later as the Stabilization Force (SFOR). These international military forces “had the authority to use force to separate and control the three militaries in Bosnia to ensure that they maintain[ed] the cease-fire.” The civilian component established the Office of the High Representative.
Representative (OHR) “to assist the parties in implementing the agreement and to coordinate international assistance efforts.” Furthermore, the peace operation also involved the United Nations’ International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) whose mandate included post-conflict reconstruction. The specificity of the Dayton Agreement in its division of responsibility amongst these various organizations directly impacted the international community’s subsequent achievements in Bosnia.
Figure 3. OHR Organizational Structure


Simplicity

By clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the various organizations involved in implementing peace, the Dayton Agreement set the conditions for unity of effort and long-term success in Bosnia. At first glance, the parallel organization of the peace operation appears to assign disparate functions to vastly different organizations, each operating under their own umbrella of bureaucracy. However, in accordance with
Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement, the High Representative was truly the focal point for “the implementation of the civilian aspects of the settlement.”²⁴ It coordinated the overall civilian efforts of the OSCE, the UN and other involved organizations. The OHR also coordinated with NATO military leaders to strive for unity. To that end, in a press conference in April 1996, U.S. Army General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that military operations in Bosnia had been successful “because IFOR [and subsequently SFOR] had a very clear mission, very well spelled out in the military annex of the Dayton Agreement” and that “IFOR [and SFOR were] provided with sufficient well-trained and well-equipped forces, and finally, because there has not been any micromanagement of the operation.”²⁵ The peace operation organization in Bosnia clearly separated military operations from civilian operations. Yet, the coordination between SFOR and key civilian organizations resulted in unity of effort.

The area in which the OHR struggled to achieve maximum results was in economic reconstruction and the management and distribution of funds from many different sources. Although efforts to coalesce economic support eventually improved, the OHR’s initial difficulties reflected a common issue for post-conflict transition organizations: “A fatal flaw in all ‘post-conflict’ economic policy is the prior need of a functioning government and functioning proper financial and legal institutions – to absorb the aid delivered, adopt the necessary policies, and implement those decisions.”²⁶ With national economic institutions predicated upon the existence of functioning political institutions, the OHR needed an economic equivalent of the OSCE and UN missions in Bosnia to manage economic reconstruction. Ultimately, the World Bank’s flexibility and
Responsiveness

The Dayton Agreement was essentially the final step in a lengthy international effort to end the fighting in Bosnia. Although the human toll was deplorable, the fact that it was such a long time in the making meant that key organizations had been involved in the peace effort for years. What each organization was able and willing to contribute to the peace operation was known and integrated into the Agreement. The regional presence of key organizations prior to the signing of the Agreement resulted in rapid responses following its approval. Further, the coordinated military and civilian efforts ensured that as the situation developed and the peace operation expanded that each agency was able to respond quickly and sufficiently. Intervention in Bosnia came as no surprise to the international community. However, the OHR’s oversight of the peace operation organization sustained its synchronization with ongoing planning efforts.

Flexibility

The primary challenge facing the OHR and its companion organizations in the peace operation were the unknowns of the post-conflict (or in this case “post-Agreement”) environment. The security situation was tenuous at best. NATO troops were initially focused on keeping the various military groups separated and in compliance with the Dayton Agreement, but they soon faced a growing problem with civil disturbances, protests, and riots. In response, NATO created the Multinational Specialized Unit within SFOR to serve as a pseudo constabulary force. However, by
September 1998, “only part of the specialized unit was operational because countries had not yet committed sufficient resources to the unit.”27 Political conditions hampered other efforts to establish a permanent and effective police force. “[P]olitical leaders of all three ethnic groups continue[d] to use Bosnia’s police forces as a means of furthering their political aims” and the police “remained the primary violator of human rights, often failing to provide security for people of other ethnic groups.”28 Clearly, the roots of the conflict persisted despite the efforts to attain peace in Bosnia.

Cultural issues also plagued other areas of stabilization and reconstruction. Although the Dayton Agreement guaranteed Bosnian refugees the right to return home and reclaim their property (or receive adequate compensation if property could not be restored), “obstruction by Bosnia’s political leaders, particularly Bosnian Serbs and Croats, resulted in most of the 180,000 returnees in 1997 locating in areas where their ethnic group represents a majority of the population” rather than returning to their prewar homes.29 The OHR and its partner organizations’ efforts were significantly slowed due to such issues, but their widespread presence throughout Bosnia gave them flexibility in addressing them.

The slowing of reconstruction efforts ran counter to the international community’s original premise that implementation of the Dayton Agreement would be relatively quick. Instead, as SFOR’s involvement extended and OHR offices became permanent fixtures in the major cities, the overall operation faced potentially significant consequences of a withdrawal of international support. However, the creation of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) ensured the long term involvement (and financial support) of 55 countries
and international organizations. The OHR was under the PIC’s direct authority so each
council member had an overt means of input to the OHR’s policies and actions.

The final example of OHR and the peace operation in Bosnia’s flexibility was its
ability to extend and expand military operations as the regional situation changed. An
October 1998 report from the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that in April/May
1998, SFOR increased its operations on Bosnia’s border with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia as tensions in the Serbian province of Kosovo rose. The report stated that
“the specific tasks being conducted by SFOR are designed to create a climate that does
not allow Serb and Muslim extremists to inflame passions inside Bosnia.”30 A post-
conflict transition organization will almost always face the possibility of shifting the
preponderance of its effort from stability operations back to offensive operations. OHR’s
constant coordination with SFOR and the compartmentalized structure of the peace
operation made such a shift feasible.

Sustainability

In addition to maintaining flexibility, the Bosnia peace operation, centered on the
OHR, faced a daunting and likely time-intensive task of creating a lasting peace in the
newly independent country. While the international community’s commitment was
imperative to the long-term success of the operation, its ability to provide adequate
resources was almost equally critical. That the operation endures over a decade later
provides the best evidence of its sustainability. Since January 2008, the OHR has
employed 38 individuals from various PIC members. In addition, for nearly six years,
the OHR has encouraged Bosnian citizens to apply for open positions in the OHR and
officially given them preference during the hiring process. According to the OHR
website, “This policy reflects the International Community’s effort to streamline its operations and normalise the ratio of foreign and national staff in international organisations.”31 The OSCE similarly continues to actively man its offices with both international and Bosnian citizens. Although the United States led the negotiations and development of the Dayton Agreement, the inclusion of the OSCE throughout the implementation process has naturally made the sustainment of resources, such as personnel, a regional burden.

Personnel requirements have been significantly reduced since the initial implementation process began over ten years ago. However, the divisive nature of the conflict mandated a widespread OHR and OSCE presence throughout Bosnia. Consequently, the large number of offices required more facilities which thus required more people, more funding, and more security. The OHR Headquarters was established in Sarajevo in January 1996. Within a year, regional offices were stood up in Banja Luka (Republika Srpska), Mostar (OHR-South), and Brcko (OHR-North). Regional offices were structured to “resemble that of Sarajevo so that there are corresponding departments that work together, ensuring that the policies are at all times developed in cooperation with the regional offices and carried out on the ground.”32 OSCE also has its headquarters in Sarajevo with fourteen field offices throughout Bosnia and Regional Centers in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Tuzla. The OHR sub-office in Tuzla is co-located with OSCE. “The regional centers co-ordinate field activities to ensure that the Mission’s policies and programmes are implemented consistently throughout [Bosnia].”33 Sufficient manning, and the dedication of those who worked to unify their efforts, was essential to making the complex organization that OHR oversaw work.
Personnel are only one aspect of critical resources in a post-conflict transition organization. Financial resources, particularly as the crisis in Bosnia yielded to reconstruction activities, were also critical. The ground force intervention in Bosnia curtailed the humanitarian crisis that had prompted international interest and, hence, financial support. Many agencies and international aid donors quickly began to attach political caveats to their promises of economic assistance. However, enforcing the creation of the mandated political conditions required additional oversight and resources that often were not available. According to a U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, “in October 1997 and February 1998, officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development [said] they did not have the resources to monitor whether recipients were fully complying with political conditions attached to the agency’s assistance.”

A coordinated effort between various involved organizations and agencies helped overcome instances such as this one where underfunding had a direct impact on the peace mission. Similarly, although the refugee situation in Bosnia drew international attention early on, as recently as 2003, Udo Janz, the head of the UNHCR mission in Bosnia, said that Bosnia still lacks adequate funding to reconstruct nearly 40,000 homes still damaged nearly a decade after the war. Despite these failings, the PIC, a Dayton Agreement creation, continues to successfully support and directly fund the OHR’s efforts. As of 2006, the budget breakdown from major contributors was: EU-53%, US-22%, Japan-10%, Russia-4%, Canada-3%. The breadth of the peace operation likely caused some of the funding flow problems within the organization, but the availability of adequate financial resources to support over a decade’s worth of effort and the OHR’s
ability to coordinate and prioritize resource placement with OSCE and the UN has undoubtedly contributed to the overall success of the peace operation in Bosnia.

Efficiency

For more than ten years, the OHR has coordinated a successful effort in each of the five essential tasks for reconstruction and stabilization. Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated “one of the relatively few international interventions that we can point to as successful was the one in Bosnia.” Since 1995, there have been major improvements in security, governance, humanitarian assistance, economic conditions, and justice.

Previous attempts to negotiate peace or at least “stop the fighting” had been “generally unsuccessful” until faction representatives signed the cease-fire agreement in October 1995 and the subsequent Dayton Agreement in December 1995. The Agreement created a NATO military force and the OHR’s willingness to allow the peace enforcement operation vast freedom in executing its mandate was fundamental to the overall operation’s initial success. According to a 1998 GAO report, “SFOR’s general security presence…ensured that fighting among the three militaries in Bosnia [did not resume].” While tensions understandably persisted between the formerly warring entities, they were forced to manifest themselves through the political process rather than through violence. By compelling this change of perspective, the peace operation established a foundation for the vast reconstruction and rehabilitation effort needed in Bosnia. At a press conference in April 1996, U.S. Army General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “Implementation forces can make a major contribution to reconstruction efforts by spreading the climate of overall security
necessary to hold successful elections, enable refugees to return and allow humanitarian organizations to do their job. Security predicated all other efforts in Bosnia and the successful IFOR and SFOR operations, as a coordinated effort of the overall peace operation organization, set the conditions for lasting peace. As Paddy Ashdown concluded in 2007, “Peace has returned to Bosnia.”

A vital element of that peace was the creation of a new government and political processes that unified Bosnia and democratically represented its multiethnic citizenry. Success in governance in Bosnia has had more mixed results and reviews than its security situation. Closely coordinating with military operations, the OSCE mission in Bosnia eagerly accepted its mandate under the Dayton Agreement to promote the development of democratic institutions at all levels of government. The OHR was charged with coordinating the political efforts of OSCE with its own efforts as well as those of the UN and SFOR. Although the OHR faced an organizational structure that was far from streamlined, the difficulties that plagued progress in establishing governance in Bosnia resulted more from other aspects of the Dayton Agreement and the basic strain between the three ethnic groups. The Agreement tied the military forces’ duties directly to holding “free and fair elections.” By implying that elections were “the precondition” for withdrawal of SFOR forces, “the Dayton negotiators determined that all aspects of the implementation process in the first year would be dominated, and in some ways distorted, by the electoral motives of the three political parties.” Further compounding efforts to solidify Bosnia’s political system was the Agreement’s central premise that its government would reflect a balance of power amongst the three ethnic groups at all levels. In 2007, U.S. Ambassador Donald Hays, former Deputy High Representative,
called “the Dayton legacy of balancing power…hopelessly dysfunctional.”

Despite his positive outlook on Bosnia’s security situation, Paddy Ashdown concurred with Ambassador Hays just a few months later when he wrote in the International Herald Tribune, “Below the level of state institutions, the bureaucratic monster created by the Dayton Agreement…[remains] a dysfunctional muddle of interlocking bureaucracies.”

While the OHR did not necessarily create this bureaucracy of its own accord, the complex organization of the peace operation did little to help prevent the current political situation in Bosnia. The tangled web of offices, directorates, and agencies that conduct Bosnia’s daily business of governance reflects the bureaucracy of the organizations that helped create it. While not a failure, government reform is not only likely but now necessary for further progress in Bosnia. The OHR can facilitate this process only if it retains a presence in Bosnia and a willingness to adapt.

The OHR has overseen a much more successful effort in the area of humanitarian assistance and social well-being. “It helped to avert starvation, provided emergency health and medical care, and supported civilian living conditions. As UNHCR officials have often remarked, no one starved during the war in Bosnia.” Benefiting from an international focus on the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and the efforts of relief organizations prior to its creation, the OHR’s greatest challenges were in forming and sustaining social programs and systems and, most significantly, in facilitating the return of the 1.3 million refugees and 1 million internally displaced people to their prewar homes as stipulated in the Dayton Agreement. Progress of returning refugees “was initially slow” mainly because the public feared a resumption of fighting and because the formerly warring factions were engaged in low-level “turf wars” in spite of the cease-fire
agreement. However, by the end of 2003, nearly one million Bosnians displaced during the war had returned to the country. According to Udo Janz, then the head of the local mission of the UNHCR, these numbers represented, “without any doubt, that enormous progress has been achieved.” Many of those who had chosen not to return had already sought residence in other countries. With basic human rights restored and social services improving at a far greater pace than the political system, Bosnia’s humanitarian crisis was over. Whether the OHR and the construct of the peace operation organization contributed to this success is unknown, but certainly the OHR’s encouragement of coordination and desire to achieve unity of effort on the ground played some part in ending the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people.

As Bosnians returned to their pre-war homes or established new homes, they needed ways to provide for their families and invest in their future. In the years immediately following the Dayton Agreement, economic outlook in Bosnia generally improved. “In 1997, Bosnia’s economy grew by an estimated 35 percent, according to World Bank data. However, growth in Republika Srpska during 1997 still lagged behind growth in the Federation because donors continued to withhold assistance for much of the year due to hard-line Bosnian Serb noncompliance with the Dayton Agreement.” The OHR’s ongoing diplomatic efforts and coordinated efforts in other areas slowly began to influence the economic growth in the Republic of Serbia, but the perceived discrepancies had their own second and third order effects in the political arena. Finally, in June 1997, the Bosnian Parliament passed the first set of what came to be known as the “Quick Start Package,” a set of economic laws that established or restored Bosnia’s key financial institutions such as the central bank. These laws, supported and to some extent crafted by
World Bank representatives, were the first step to placing the onus for economic success on the Bosnians themselves rather than on the international community. The newly created institutions gave the Bosnian government a means of controlling a currency and levying taxes from its citizens. While the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund exerted, and continue to exert, influence over Bosnia’s economic development, this portion of its reconstruction was initially the most distinct and separate from the OHR’s other efforts. As the situation in Bosnia has evolved, however, the OHR more overtly coordinated economic efforts through its Economic Implementation Unit. In 2006, the majority of economic responsibilities were transferred to the Economic Transition Unit staffed mostly with Bosnia citizens. Considering the country was devoid of a working economy just over a decade ago and suffered from vast black market operations, economic progress under the OHR’s oversight has been tremendous.

While problematic, the black market was far from the worst criminal operation in Bosnia at the time of the cease-fire. Horrendous crimes against humanity and other war crimes necessitated swift and public indictments and prosecutions. “Bringing to justice indictees – particularly Radovan Karadzic, a major alleged war criminal – [was] viewed by many participants in the operation as critically important to the peace process in Bosnia.”52 With Bosnia’s political and justice system in a shambles, these criminals were mostly brought to justice under the auspices of the World Court; but not Karadzic who remains at large. Bosnia’s judicial system, reconstructed to reflect its new national organization, but based on its prior system under communism is almost implausibly complicated with limited national courts and separate entity court systems. Since its inception, the OHR has managed significant international oversight of the Bosnian
judicial system. While the system in no way mirrors that of “American democracy” it continues to evolve and the OHR continues to facilitate its growth. Without a lasting post-conflict transition organization such as the OHR, the courts would undeniably have been susceptible to unstoppable corruption that would have likely undermined all other reconstruction efforts. The OHR and its partner organizations have faced an ongoing challenge in Bosnia since 1995. Its successes in sustaining security and helping Bosnians recover from their humanitarian crisis have been offset by lesser progress in establishing self-sufficient political and justice systems and by mediocre economic advancement.

Given the particular context of the conflict in Bosnia and that its post-conflict transition is now entering its thirteenth year, the OHR and the organization it manages has proven itself well-suited to the task.

Other Factors

As with any post-conflict transition, the local culture has a notable impact on the ease with which change is implemented. Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its history rich in religious and ethnic strife was certainly no exception. The country is certainly in better form today than it was in the early 1990s, but as David Chandler wrote in his book, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*, “The Bosnian people, or Bosnia ‘culture’ itself, are perceived to be the barrier to international community attempts to bring democracy to the new state.” The effects of cultural differences and the perceived unwillingness of the three main Bosnian ethnic groups to set aside these differences and work toward unity has resulted in a growing sense of skepticism amongst those who have devoted much time and effort to their development. Shortly after leaving his position as Deputy High Representative, Ambassador Hays concurred with Chandler when he wrote, “After 11
years of intensive international effort, it is time to face up to the sad reality. Bosnia’s Serbs, Croats and Muslims simply do not share a common vision for the country.”\(^{54}\) No post-conflict transition organization can achieve success by imposing uncommon values or overly ambitious expectations on a people who recently emerged from what was likely a devastating national experience.

The extensive use of landmines in Bosnia exemplified just one part of the national horror that had permeated Bosnian society during the war. The landmines not only served as a reminder of the human suffering, but also slowed initial reconstruction. “The pace of clearing landmines [was] an area of critical importance to economic reconstruction and refugee returns.”\(^{55}\) By 1997, although land mine clearance was accelerating, “the three parties were still reluctant to remove landmines from strategically important areas because they continued to view the current situation in Bosnia as a temporary cessation of hostilities.”\(^{56}\) Again, the factions of the peace operation in Bosnia inherently assumed that Bosnians universally embraced the cease-fire and land mine clearance was conceived as a forthright military operation. The specific situation, however, added a layer of complexity not only to this operation, but to nearly every other OHR endeavor in Bosnia.

Finally, the post-conflict transition organization in Bosnia understandably functioned in the context of international relations. Tensions between the European Union, the United States, and the other involved organizations, the UN’s perceived failure to stop the war, and the United States’ domination of the peace process while having no demonstrable national interest in peace in Bosnia made the OHR’s influence across the organization all the more tenuous. Most likely, the personalities involved in
establishing the organization had more to do with its sustained success than did the organizational structure itself.

Lessons Learned from the Bosnia Peace Operation and the OHR

Compared to the U.S. invasion of Panama, the American involvement in Bosnia was much more complex both in origin and in execution. Rather than a swift, military operation, Bosnia was a long-lead intervention with robust involvement of the international community. Based on the General Framework for Peace outlined in the Dayton Agreement, the peace operation had a more holistic political, diplomatic, and military effort from the outset. The creation of an organization to implement the peace that encompassed all of these lines of effort as well as embraced the potential contributions of various prominent international organizations was no small undertaking. The OHR coordinated an organization created out of necessity in the context of the Bosnian conflict. It was tailored and sufficiently resourced to provide management oversight of this unprecedented endeavor. Most importantly, the OHR has demonstrated over the past thirteen years that it is flexible enough to respond to changing conditions and continue to fulfill its mandate. Although its work is far from done and success has been fleeting in some areas, the OHR construct, in the context of the Bosnia peace operation, represents how an international coalition can unite and maximize its resources to transition a nation from war to lasting peace.

Afghanistan

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 left the historically weak state without a strong central government. The next few years were turbulent as varying
factions gained and lost control of the country’s capital, Kabul. When the Taliban, an
Islamic fundamentalist group, seized power in 1996, they maintained autocratic control
through harsh enforcement of Sharia law. Afghanistan quickly became a haven for non-
state actors and served as a known sanctuary for Al Qaeda whose leader, Osama bin
Laden, essentially paid the Taliban for the use of Afghan land. Following Al Qaeda’s
attacks on 11 September 2001, the Taliban refused to extradite bin Laden and the United
States consequently invaded Afghanistan with a goal of ousting the regime and searching
for Al Qaeda supporters. Working with the Northern Alliance, a group of Tajiks,
Uzbeks, Hazaras, and some Pashtuns who had increasingly resisted the Taliban’s rule, the
Americans swiftly deposed the Taliban and installed Hamid Karzai as the leader of the
new interim government in Kabul.

Development of Transition Organizations in Afghanistan

By the end of 2001, Afghanistan was in a state of transition under the framework
Officially called “The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending
the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” the Bonn Agreement
provided Karzai and his interim administration broad guidance and authority as a
foundation for a new Afghan government. It also requested that the UN deploy an
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which it quickly did under the authority
of UNSCR 1386. The new government of Afghanistan and its many international
supporters faced the daunting task of rebuilding a vast nation in which the damage of
over 20 years of fighting was compounded by the effects of longstanding cultural tension,
a faltering economy, and a general preference of tribalism to central government.
The remainder of this section will provide an analysis of the transition organizations currently operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan using the criteria of simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, and efficiency. It will also discuss other factors in Afghanistan that mitigated or amplified the transition organizations’ effectiveness as well as lessons that the post-conflict experience in Afghanistan offers.

Simplicity

There is no overarching organization that unifies the ongoing reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. NATO, the United States, and the UN each lead separate missions with independent supporting organizations: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (see figure 4), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (see figure 5), and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (see figure 6), respectively. As the figures below illustrate, each of the three organizations, “maintains liaison with the others, but each has a separate chain of command and there is no unified command structure.” Policy decisions are routinely made via these liaison relationships which are inherently dependent on the personalities of those involved and their ability to effectively and continually communicate. As the mission in Afghanistan has matured, the involved organizations have made numerous changes and have consistently striven to reach a common endstate of a stable and democratic Afghanistan.
Figure 4. ISAF Organization Chart
Figure 5. OEF Organization Chart
Source: Peace Operations Monitor, “OEF Organization Chart”
(http://pom/peacebuild.ca/AfghanistanGovernance.html).

Figure 6. UNAMA Organization Chart
Source: Peace Operations Monitor, “UNAMA Organization Chart”
(http://pom/peacebuild.ca/AfghanistanGovernance.html).
Maintaining unity of effort in Afghanistan without a clear chain of command or organizational hierarchy has been a challenge. Although the Afghan government officially leads the reconstruction and stabilization efforts, it has minimal operational influence and does not provide coordination of the separate mandates that shape each organization’s operations. ISAF is oriented on security and stabilization while OEF focuses more on the U.S. counterterrorism efforts and training the Afghan military. The UN mission is centered on political assistance and government transition.\(^5^8\) Inevitably, these distinct efforts overlap and have great disruptive potential without extensive policy coordination. Upon its assumption of the ISAF mission in August 2003, NATO deployed a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to Afghanistan who “is responsible for coordination between ISAF, the Afghan government, and civilian agencies, like UNAMA, operating in Afghanistan.”\(^5^9\) Further, the transfer of a large contingent of U.S. forces to the NATO command in 2006 resulted in greater integration and specifically improved the effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ efforts. Overall, unity of effort in Afghanistan remains tenuous because it rests upon informal, personality dependent arrangements that could easily unravel.

In recent years, efforts to formalize coordination in Afghanistan have greatly helped to streamline operations. The creation of the Policy Action Group (PAG) in June 2006 provides a good example of such efforts. The PAG is a task force headed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai that addresses intelligence, security, strategic communication, and reconstruction and development. Although its work is currently focused on southern Afghanistan, the PAG exemplifies one way to make a disparate international effort work. The weekly PAG meetings include the Afghan Ministers of
Defense, Internal Communications, and Education, leaders of ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA, as well as the ambassadors from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2007, GEN (Ret.) James L. Jones stated that, “the Policy Action Group has a good chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced cohesion and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of international relief.”

A willingness to cooperate and continual efforts to improve coordination are the cornerstone to the combined success that the organizations in post-invasion Afghanistan have seen.

High level policy coordination in Afghanistan must also include international aid donors who tend to “set their own priorities” under the auspices of the Lead Donor system. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Body (JCMB), also instituted in 2006, meets quarterly and provides a forum for the six largest donors (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, European Union, and India), three neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan, and China), and other leaders in the international community to coordinate with Afghan officials, NATO, coalition forces, and international organizations such as the World Bank. As NATO’s civilian spokesman, Mark Laity, discussed during his Kabul Podcast on 18 August 2006, coordinating bodies such as the PAG and the JCMB have created “more effective streamlined decision-making” which allows policy implementation to happen “more quickly than before.” Giving all participants, especially those funding reconstruction and stabilization activities, a means of coordinating their individual priorities helps prevent bureaucratic stagnation in the post-conflict environment.
Effective coordination in lieu of a unifying organization has also helped reduce duplication of effort and leveraged the instruments of national power to a greater extent in Afghanistan. In April 2008, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and head of the UNAMA, Mr. Kai Eide, announced efforts to further improve Afghanistan’s ability to coordinate with other nations through diplomatic channels. “‘We have to get away from a situation where an Afghan administration which is still in need of capacity-building is faced with a too fragmented international community,’ Mr. Eide stated. ‘And we have to make sure that the agenda that we pursue is the Afghan agenda and not a number of national agendas.’” The involvement of international organizations such as the UN and NATO has provided existing communications channels for bilateral and multilateral diplomatic discussions which have helped alleviate public dissent that would have otherwise hindered the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

International organizations have also provided a much needed means of publicly disseminating information through their spokesmen and the international media. Widespread information operations are a challenge in Afghanistan where there are few televisions and radios, a literacy rate of approximately 31%, and internet usage by less than 2% of the population. Those who are exposed to international media sources spread the information they receive via word of mouth, which remains a primary source of information for most Afghan people. Improvements are underway under the oversight of the Afghan Minister of Communication and Information Technology whose goal is to make Afghanistan “part of the global information society.” Still, the coalition of international organizations working to rebuild Afghanistan face the challenge of not only
The apparent Taliban resurgence in mid-2006 also forced the international community to reconsider its military efforts toward security in Afghanistan. Although NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer restated NATO’s position that “there is no military solution to the conflict and that greater development needs to occur;” in November 2006, “the lead donors [as well as NATO, the UN, the World Bank, and the European Union] discussed unifying their strategy for the first time.” ISAF, now under NATO command, assumed sole responsibility for security and OEF’s mandate became counterterrorism. Immediately, it became clear, however, that these missions overlapped considerably because it is difficult at an operational and tactical level to distinguish the Taliban from Al Qaeda. As a result, unifying the military efforts in Afghanistan also depends greatly on extensive coordination: “[T]he two missions operate in tandem with a large degree of synchronization of efforts.” The additional consideration of various national caveats on ISAF units further complicates operational planning and execution and elevates the need for coordination at all levels.

Many countries and organizations that are hesitant to provide military support to Afghanistan are willing to contribute economic aid. Afghanistan’s fledgling economy is
frail and the effects of decades of war offer seemingly endless opportunities for economic aid and investment. Although the international community has pledged approximately $30 billion for reconstruction, Afghanistan has received less than half of that amount. Further, the Afghan government has managed only about $3.8 billion of the funds dispersed thus far. Donors who do not flow their aid through the Afghan government compromise unity of effort and the government’s overall strategy for reconstruction and stabilization. Recently, pledge fulfillment appears on the rise and in an effort to encourage funneling contributions through them, “the Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and effectively.” As with other areas of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the participants’ recognition of issues within the system and actions to remedy them are helping to improve unity of effort in Afghanistan.

Responsiveness

Given the short period of time between the September 11th attacks and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan less than one month later, along with the swiftness with which the Taliban were toppled, the international community’s ability to respond to the need for a massive reconstruction and stabilization effort in Afghanistan underscores the necessity and the potential effectiveness of standing international organizations such as the UN. Martin Hoffman, the former Executive Director of the Department of Defense Afghanistan Reachback Office, emphasized in 2005 that “the Golden Hour is a very real phenomenon and the speed of implementation counts. Thus, not only must planners match authority and capacity in post-conflict settings, they must be able to implement policies quickly to ensure rapid impact.” The “Golden Hour” refers to the first hour of
treatment in emergency medicine which, if conducted swiftly and adequately, has shown to greatly improve patient survivability. The power vacuum left in Afghanistan following the Soviets’ withdrawal had set the conditions for the rise of the Taliban. Without a rapid response to establish democratic government institutions, Afghanistan’s chances for a stable future were at risk.

The international community’s extensive involvement in stabilizing the fledgling post-Taliban government in Afghanistan helped overcome the effects of hastily planning the invasion. The U.S. government in particular was still dealing with the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th and was plagued by a lapsed Presidential Directive for contingency operation planning. Consequently, “the interagency process was not as detailed in its preparation for OEF as it was for prior operations in the Balkans and elsewhere.” Intense international diplomatic involvement and the UN’s experience with crisis interventions helped fill the void that the U.S. government bureaucracy could not.

**Flexibility**

The interim government and the organizations overseeing reconstruction and stabilization efforts faced many immediate challenges in post-invasion Afghanistan. The sheer vastness and geography of Afghanistan presented a test in administering post-conflict transition. With security an imperative for further development, the coalition’s strategy was multi-layered from the beginning. Military security efforts have included ISAF and OEF operations, the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. In the four years following their fall from power, the Taliban mounted only low levels of
violence. However, in 2006, coalition partners increased troop levels in response to a resurgence of Taliban activity. The “upsurge in violence…took some U.S. commanders by surprise.” However, the various reconstruction and stabilization organizations swiftly and successfully responded to bolster security efforts which included the reorganization of mission sets, the transfer of some U.S. forces to ISAF, and NATO’s assumption of the ISAF mission. As commanders and their troops have become more familiar with the land and its people, their ability to operate more effectively has also contributed to advancing security.

The people and their divergent cultures have also challenged governance and the establishment of political institutions in Afghanistan. As in Bosnia, balanced ethnic group representation throughout the government has been difficult to achieve and has served as a source of tension since the creation of the interim government in late 2001 and the first loya jirga, or legislative body, in 2002. While the Bonn Agreement “created a government that represented the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan [and] was designed to help reduce intergroup tension,” Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, initially filled his cabinet with a disproportionate number of his Northern Alliance compatriots. Karzai has since successfully created a more representative group under the guidance of UNAMA advisors although longstanding ethnic tensions – particularly between the Pashtuns and Tajiks – endure. Overall, the UNAMA, following the example of other successful UN missions, has proven well-suited to adapt to the challenges of implementing its political mandate. The latest Report of the Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan makes no mention of ethnic tension within the government, but instead emphasizes the current priority of
improving the linkage between the provincial and central governments as well as lower level governance where loyalty to village or tribal elders over political representatives has stalled political progress.

A final challenge of the post-conflict environment in Afghanistan revolves around the composition of the international coalition. Regionally, the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan is mostly viewed as a stabilizing incident. However, despite signing a non-interference pact, the Kabul Declaration, in December 2002, the true motivations of several neighboring countries remain unclear. Pakistan’s actions, specifically, have repeatedly undermined regional trust. Having previously recognized the Taliban as a legitimate government (joined internationally only by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), “Pakistan has been at best a most grudging ally.” With a porous border that effectively undermines all efforts to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan, the coalition relationship with Pakistan is strained. This relationship affects the operations of each of the organizations involved in the rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and requires them to continually reevaluate policy and actions.

Having three separate organizations with different mandates and limitations may actually have been a benefit in providing greater flexibility in addressing the changing post-conflict environment. Where one organization was not suited to respond, another organization could. As in Bosnia, such international cooperation ultimately can achieve greater success than a more streamlined effort.

Sustainability

According to the recent Afghanistan Study Group report, “The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few
military forces and insufficient economic aid.” The war in Iraq has greatly impacted the military forces available to support the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan. In December 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen confirmed that, in Iraq, “the United States does what it must, while in Afghanistan, the United States does what it can.” Although the coalition is capable of sustaining its current force structure in Afghanistan, its ability to surge or flex military power is limited. ISAF also particularly suffer from a lack of skilled trainers for Afghan security forces and are currently relying on regular forces, such as U.S. Marines, to fill the approximate 3,200 man shortage in training personnel. The UNAMA also suffers from limited personnel resources as the UN has increased its number of missions worldwide in recent years. In Afghanistan, it particularly suffers from a lack of skilled military and police advisors who are critical in the “development of synergies between UNAMA, security forces and the Government.” Notwithstanding, the UN Secretary-General’s request for another 12 month extension of the UNAMA’s mandate in March 2008 indicates the UN’s determination to sustain its efforts in Afghanistan. Similarly, since 2005, the United States and NATO have worked with the Afghan government to formalize use of facilities both in and near Afghanistan. While Afghan government officials have supported “an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security,” they have not consented to permanent U.S. bases, but have given U.S. forces “access to Afghan military facilities” in support of the global war on terror. Although the international community continually strove to minimize its footprint in Afghanistan, its presence appears to be a long term endeavor.
The international community also appears committed to sustaining aid contribution and funding for the reconstruction and stabilization. Mainly because the United States preferred not to lead funding for efforts it perceived as “nation building,” a lead donor system for the security sector was arranged at the Tokyo Donor Conference in 2002 (see table 1). Although the United States has honored its pledges, not every country has fully donated as promised, which has exacerbated the challenges inherent in a lead nation arrangement such as “poor coordination…, the inadequate capacity of some donors to establish sufficient programs, disputes between donors on appropriate strategies, and importantly the lack of Afghan leadership in the process.” In addition, the lead donor system incorporates the G8 countries and relieves pressure on other potential “non-lead” donors to contribute the efforts in Afghanistan. This system also not only encourages lead donors to influence strategy and priorities in their area of responsibility, but in turn reduces the level of responsibility of the Afghan government to ensure supporting programs succeed. Finally, this system encompasses only the areas of security sector reform. Aid for other important tasks, particularly in the area of governance, has been “modest…as compared to the amounts made available to Bosnia and Kosovo.” Yet, even as Afghanistan continues to compete with other worldwide crises for resources, it remains a significant priority for the international community and will likely continue to receive substantial support for reconstruction and stabilization.
### Lead Donor Responsibilities in Security Sector Reform

Table 1. Lead Donor Responsibilities in Security Sector Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Donor</th>
<th>Area of SSR Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Training the Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Training Officer Corps of ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU / Germany*</td>
<td>Training Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Judicial Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Counternarcotics</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*The EU assumed responsibility for the training of Afghan police, though Germany is in command of the mission. Prior to June 2007, Germany served as the sole lead nation for police reform.


### Efficiency

The organizations in Afghanistan faced immense challenges in each of the essential areas for reconstruction and stabilization: security, governance, humanitarian assistance and well-being, economic and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.

Although the 2001 invasion removed the Taliban from power, their destabilizing influence remained in the country in addition to the inherent instability that generations of tribal discord had produced. Initially, the security situation seemed to improve, but as the Taliban regrouped and other internal and external factors began to influence the situation, security in Afghanistan – especially outside of the cities – became more tenuous. The war in Iraq required coalition members’ attention and resources and regional tension, mainly with Pakistan and Iran, placed the Afghan government in difficult diplomatic positions between its neighbors and key coalition members such as the United States. Internally, ISAF and OEF were slow to consolidate efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan in areas outside of the major cities where a general state of lawlessness existed. Civil affairs teams and special operations forces’ limited resources were slowly augmented with PRTs, but their command and control channels were often blurred and, as a result, the implementation strategy for PRTs was unclear. Ultimately, ISAF took control of all PRTs which improved their effectiveness. Yet, while the use of PRTs in Afghanistan has helped link security and reconstruction, their establishment took years and they remain undermanned and insufficient.81

The security situation in Afghanistan remains unresolved. Many critics, such as the International Crisis Group, blame a lack of resources for recent setbacks in the wake of the Taliban resurgence of 2006: “The intervention in Afghanistan has been done on the cheap. Compared even to many recent post-conflict situations (Bosnia, Kosovo) it was given proportionately many fewer peacekeepers and less resources – and Afghanistan has never been a post-conflict situation.”82 Unfortunately, national caveats imposed on many forces committed to peace operations also reduce their effectiveness. A recent study by the U.S. Atlantic Council summarizes concerns about the current trend in security in Afghanistan by concisely warning, “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.”83

The UN’s political mission in Afghanistan has also seen limited success in the crucial area of governance. No country achieves a functioning democratic government overnight and the international community has filled a vital role in Afghanistan in its mentorship, oversight, and funding efforts. The UNAMA has had to balance the realities of building an unfamiliar type of government with the international pressure for measurable political success. “Democracy has not failed but representative institutions
have not been given a chance to function.”\textsuperscript{84} Afghanistan, like many young democracies, faces many simultaneous challenges in addition to building its government, but it is improving. According to a 2007 DOS report on Afghanistan, elections held in 2005 “did not fully meet international standards for free and fair elections, but citizens perceived the outcomes as acceptable.”\textsuperscript{85} Thus, the nation and its new democratic system have a foundation upon which to improve. The task of governance has been trending upward, but time is still required to build a functioning Afghan government at all levels.

The tasks of humanitarian assistance and social well-being are overtly tied to the task of governance. Prior to the U.S-led invasion of Afghanistan, its people lived in some of the poorest and direst conditions in the world. Human rights, particularly those of women, had been stifled since the Taliban seized power in 1996 and aid organizations had difficulty penetrating the Taliban’s control over the population. Members of the international community also could not directly send aid through a government which many did not even formally recognize. The removal of the Taliban changed the conditions to allow humanitarian assistance to pour into the country. Although distribution has been a continual challenge due to the geography and lack of infrastructure, it is improving. The human rights situation although legally remedied has remained a challenge as the insurgency, drug trafficking, and the legacy of decades of fighting continue to grip much of Afghanistan. The Afghan government has made some progress in the major population centers, but the Taliban’s control of some outlying areas has given sanctuary to those whose actions run contrary to improving the social well-being of all Afghan citizens. Continued coordination amongst ISAF, OEF, UNAMA and other important organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red
Crescent is vital to increased humanitarian assistance and social well-being in Afghanistan.

Other essential tasks, such as improving economics and infrastructure, also affect security and quality of life in Afghanistan. Sustained security depends partly on the improvement of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The November 2006 International Crisis Group report recommended increased attention to the causes of low ANA retention rates to include “improving the welfare of soldiers’ family members.” Many families live with minimal or inconsistent access to electricity and water and unemployment remains a challenge as legitimate job opportunities are still scarce. In addition, the country’s dire lack of modern infrastructure makes travel and the movement of supplies and goods painstaking. With no other option, many ANA soldiers must take extensive absences just to travel to their homes and deliver their pay. Improved physical and information technology infrastructure would alleviate this and many other problems. However, considering that Afghanistan’s reconstruction began in 2002 when there was “no stable national currency” and “weak or nonexistent” economic institutions, its progress has been notable.

The lack of infrastructure has also hampered the ability to conduct criminal investigations. With no constabulary or robust police force, local militias often are the sole source of justice in Afghanistan, but they tend more toward inciting fear than providing security in many areas. A shortage of trained police and the consequent inability to consistently enforce justice has impacted both security and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. According to Rick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “[T]he Afghan National Police continue to require a great deal more training and
an increase in pay to ensure success and sustainability.”88 The consequences of not improving this ability are greater than continued violence. In particular, it is crucial to bring insurgents adequately to justice to demonstrate that “this is a conflict between a legitimate authority and rebels and show the population that no one is above the law.”89

As with other efforts in Afghanistan, there has been criticism of the availability of adequate resources to support justice and reconciliation activities. In November 2006, the International Crisis Group reported, “The police and judiciary have been woefully neglected in reconstruction efforts.”90 The UNAMA has received outside assistance from other organizations, such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, who are focused on improving judicial policy and systems in Afghanistan. While additional organizations provide more manpower and resources, they also require even more coordination to maintain coherent strategy and policy in building a functioning and legitimate judicial system in Afghanistan.

The essential tasks for reconstruction and stabilization in any post-conflict environment are mutually reinforcing. Afghanistan presents an even greater challenge with an ongoing insurgency and other factors that impede its progress toward stable democracy. Its history and lack of traditional institutions exacerbate these challenges. Having achieved limited success to date, the organizations in Afghanistan, to include important non-governmental organizations, must continue to work closely together and maintain open channels of communication to optimize future progress in Afghanistan.

Other Factors

Numerous enduring and evolving factors in Afghanistan have great potential to hinder reconstruction and stabilization efforts. As in many countries, Afghanistan’s
culture has a profound impact as its government attempts to create democratic institutions while preserving its national heritage and traditions. These traditions of tribalism, ethnic tension, and general lawlessness have had a profound effect on the populace’s willingness to support the establishment of a functioning central government, especially outside of the capital and provincial centers. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, also influence its rebuilding efforts. Regional issues and varied national interests with regard to these countries have strained internal coalition relations and directly affected the operations of ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA. The imposition of national caveats, particularly on some of the NATO forces that comprise ISAF, has had a real operational effect which translates into a perception amongst the troops, and subsequently their governments, that the burden of the security mission is disproportionately spread. Conversely, some coalition members have criticized the United States for what they see as unwillingness to participate more in non-military tasks and believe that it has taken on only the high profile missions while other nations bear the burden of difficult, and resource intensive, tasks such as rebuilding the justice system. Finally, the rapidly growing drug trade in Afghanistan has impeded nearly every reconstruction and stabilization effort. It is “both a symptom and a source of instability and corruption.”91 The drug trade has erupted in the absence of uniform security, strong governance, a viable economy, and an effective judicial system. Continued and steady progress in each of the essential tasks for reconstruction and stabilization will likely help stifle the narcotics business in Afghanistan and help it mature as a stable and democratic nation.
Lessons Learned from ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA

Afghanistan provides a unique example of a contemporary reconstruction and stabilization operation. The efforts of ISAF, OEF, and UNAMA are disparate, yet interdependent and reliant on mostly informal coordination relationships. One inherent weakness in a post-conflict effort comprised of separately managed organizations is a lack of accountability. According to the Peace Operations Monitor, “Currently it is not clear which international actors can ultimately be held accountable for the success or failure of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Only the Afghan government is being held accountable for the success or failure of these efforts, though significant media and public attention is being given to the mission in western countries.”

In Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) served as a central coordinating office for the efforts of various international organizations, but there is currently no analogous office in Afghanistan. NATO’s SCR plays an important role in synchronizing activities and the Policy Action Group has made inroads in coordinating regional strategy. However, the SCR is not nearly as high profile and wields much less authority than the OHR to whom the Dayton Accords gave extensive power and responsibility. The PAG provides a good example that the coalition could officially implement in a more widespread fashion at the national and provincial levels. Placing the onus for long-term success on the Afghan government simultaneously makes it accountable for its own future, but also reduces the pressure on the international community to maintain its commitment. However, that commitment is vital to sustaining progress in Afghanistan. The initial investment in Afghanistan helped it quickly get on the path toward democracy. In fact, some claim that “the speed with which we
introduce[d] private enterprise and economic development [was] fundamental to our success. ’’ \(^{93}\) Now, the international community must continue to work together to maintain momentum in rebuilding Afghanistan.

While the unique military and civilian organizational structures and relationships in Afghanistan are an improvement over some past post-conflict transitions, they do not reflect all of the lessons learned from recent interventions. According to a 2003 RAND report, “the overall results achieved to date in Afghanistan are better than those in Somalia, not yet better than those in Haiti, and not as good as those in Bosnia or Kosovo. However, the operation in Afghanistan is a good deal less expensive.’’ \(^ {94}\) Nearly five years after that report, the organizations in Afghanistan continue to demonstrate a willingness to change and improve as the reconstruction and stabilization requirements evolve.

**Iraq**

After the 1991 Gulf War, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 mandated the end of all Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and long range missile programs. The resolution also ordered the destruction of any existing weapons and subjected Iraq to an inspections program to ensure compliance. After years of wrangling over the conduct and results of these inspections and with global terrorism at the forefront of its national security concerns, the United States led a multinational coalition in an invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. Coalition forces swiftly defeated the Iraqi military and on April 9, Baghdad abruptly fell. Iraq’s totalitarian leader, Saddam Hussein, fled into hiding and widespread disorder erupted in the wake of his regime’s collapse. By the end of the month, the invasion was effectively over, but the process of rebuilding Iraq
had just begun. Although the management of reconstruction and stabilization efforts has morphed through various organizations, starting with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), this case study will focus on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) period of oversight during the year following the invasion.

Development of the Coalition Provisional Authority

Two major issues crippled the planning for post-conflict transition in Iraq. First, the United States sought to solidify an international coalition, but ultimately “the deadlock at the UN and opposition from key allies reinforced [its] desire to retain control of both military operations and post-conflict planning.” The U.S. Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS) planned separately for reconstruction and stabilization activities and neither plan was adequately integrated into the overall operational plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom nor did they consider potential international efforts. At the combatant command level, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had originally prepared a plan “for a Phase IV (after combat action) operation that would last twelve to eighteen months,” but that plan was never executed. Similarly, although DOS had compiled a lengthy and in-depth study of Iraq’s reconstruction requirements called The Future of Iraq Project, “[d]uring its prewar planning for the occupation, the administration almost wholly ignored the project’s observations and recommendations.” These disjointed planning efforts greatly contributed to the initial difficulties in post-conflict transition execution in Iraq.

The second planning issue, though somewhat related, had a lasting and distinct impact on reconstruction and stabilization efforts. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), issued in 2005, identified DOS as the lead agency for all
reconstruction and stabilization operations. However, in 2003, no such directive existed. As a result, not only was there a significant interagency disconnect in the first year of transition in Iraq, but there also was a lack of accountability for reconstruction and stabilization planning and execution. At the time, the recent experience in transition in Afghanistan further exacerbated tensions between DOD and DOS in planning for Iraq’s reconstruction. Fueled by the “hubris [that] emanated from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,” DOD “ensured that [it] would be in charge of stabilization and reconstruction even though [it] had no viable plan for and no experience at either.”\textsuperscript{98} DOD created ORHA as a temporary organization to initiate reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq as major combat operations were ending.

By many accounts, LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner assumed responsibility for a mission doomed to failure before it even started. Asked to lead ORHA barely two months prior to the invasion, Garner inherited DOD’s small team to lead Iraq’s post-conflict transition.\textsuperscript{99} Not only was “he prevented from cooperating with Central Command planners,” but DOD also worked to “minimize [his] cooperation with the State Department” in their efforts to “maintain complete control” over reconstruction.\textsuperscript{100} Despite Garner’s best intentions, political and interagency infighting undermined most of ORHA’s initial efforts in Iraq. Within weeks, the CPA, headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, replaced ORHA and remained in control of Iraq’s post-conflict transition until mid-2004 when the new Iraqi government technically assumed this responsibility.

Simplicity

The CPA’s authorities and reporting chain were mired in confusion from its creation. The Secretary of Defense officially appointed Ambassador Bremer as the CPA
Administrator on 13 May 2003 and a White House press release the week prior had indicated that Bremer reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, over the next year, Bremer would often report to the President as well. Although he had served as a career diplomat, this assignment left DOS out of his chain-of-command completely. The overall CPA organization seemed well-constructed on paper, but there was never unity of command or effort in post-invasion Iraq during its tenure (see figure 7). More importantly, regardless of criticisms of Bremer’s personality and management style, his position as special envoy and civil administrator of Iraq was never empowered to fulfill its responsibilities.
Even before the declaration on 1 May 2003 that “major combat operations in Iraq [had] ended,” the disconnects in the chain-of-command became obvious hindrances to unified post-conflict operations. The military, having focused planning on the invasion, began indicating its intent to withdraw troops almost immediately. As CENTCOM and the Combined Forces Land Component Command prepared to depart Iraq, newly promoted LTG Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of the remaining coalition land forces under the umbrella of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7).
Sanchez officially reported to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid, but, like Bremer, Sanchez was soon receiving guidance and orders directly from the Secretary of Defense. Although Bremer and Sanchez seemingly attempted to coordinate their efforts, even agreeing to co-locate their offices, they lacked the personal connection that would have facilitated true cooperation. According to Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, “if they didn’t hate each other, they could barely tolerate each other.”

Despite leading potentially capable organizations, Bremer and Sanchez exemplified how personalities can sometimes bridge a gap in an organization’s structure, but they can also serve as impediments to progress.

The lack of unity of command in Iraq greatly influenced the coalition’s inability to leverage any of the instruments of national power over the course of the next year. Diplomatically, Bremer served as the President’s special envoy to Iraq, but the struggle to establish an effective interim Iraqi government gave him few opportunities to engage in the type of formal diplomacy with which he was accustomed. Also, in spite of its initially streamlined organizational structure and acknowledged understaffing, the CPA swiftly became a vast bureaucracy. This trait had significant impacts on its ability to interact not only with the military and Iraqi leaders, but with the international media as well. The CPA failed to develop or implement a coherent strategic communications campaign during its year in Iraq. The prevailing attitude in its press office was reactionary and it “seemed to see itself more as a monitor of the media than as a provider of information.”

With media outlets still funding scores of embedded reporters and journalists, the opportunities to project a unified message were rife during the initial phase of the occupation.
As CJTF-7’s mission rapidly grew and as the worsening post-conflict situation in Iraq developed, Sanchez also faced an increasingly complex military problem. With the CPA focusing its limited resources on its core mission of executing large-scale reconstruction projects and with no functioning Iraqi government, CJTF-7 absorbed many unforeseen tasks such as detainee operations. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal would eventually underscore the lack of accountability in Iraq for many aspects of the post-conflict environment. Military commanders never reported directly to the CPA and unity of command never existed in the first year of the occupation. Not until almost a year after CPA’s inception did DOD address the inadequacy of CJTF-7 by creating Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). Activated in May 2004, MNC-I subsumed CJTF-7 and expanded its capabilities. However, the divergent strategies of the CPA and CJTF-7 had already had a widespread impact on transition efforts throughout Iraq. In October 2003, the CPA representative in Al Anbar reported to Bremer that he perceived a “refusal by these two parties [CPA and CJTF-7] to join in a common effort.” This perception soon permeated the ranks of both organizations and left an indelible impression on many coalition members and Iraqi citizens.

Economically, the CPA had dedicated offices for economic development as well as for integrating international and nongovernmental aid. However, Bremer tightly controlled these financial resources partly because they were initially so limited and partly because he literally “didn’t have the people in the field” to spend them.\textsuperscript{105} The growing perception that the area surrounding the CPA’s headquarters, the “Green Zone,” provided a disproportionately high level of quality of life also helped fuel mounting frustrations of both Iraqi citizens and coalition military forces with the pace of
reconstruction and the availability of funds for validated requisitions. Ultimately, the CPA’s increasing dysfunction, internally and with the military, as well as the lack of a clear chain-of-command made it nearly impossible to develop a cohesive reconstruction and stabilization strategy in post-invasion Iraq.

Responsiveness

The CPA, having not existed prior to the invasion of Iraq, was never integrated into operational planning which was extensive, but focused almost solely on the invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein. CENTCOM’s Joint Task Force IV, which was created soon after the headquarters received a Joint Staff directive to develop Iraq’s post-conflict plan in July 2002, never produced “a real plan for postwar Iraq that could be implemented by commanders and soldiers on the ground.”\textsuperscript{106} Bremer accepted his position having had even less exposure to the pre-invasion planning than Garner, and, except for an initial Foreign Service posting in Afghanistan, he had no experience operating in the region. The CPA’s initial structure did, however, incorporate all of the essential tasks for reconstruction operations. It had the potential to successfully manage Iraq’s post-conflict transition, but it was developed and implemented far after the operational planning phase.

Flexibility

Unfortunately, the CPA’s anticipated reconstruction efforts were predicated on faulty assumptions such as the Iraqi government retaining some semblance of its former organization and the establishment and maintenance of security throughout Iraq. The CPA’s greatest challenges came after the successful invasion and dissolution of the
Hussein regime. With the rise of an insurgency, the military had to continually refine its planning and conduct of simultaneous counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although the CPA had military liaisons and communication lines with the U.S.-led joint task force on the ground, military staff planners were routinely excluded from CPA planning. As military commanders increasingly criticized CPA policies and plans such as de-Ba’athification and economic privatization, the friction between the two organizations intensified. The CPA was under persistent pressure from Washington to make visible reconstruction progress, but at the same time, security was rapidly disintegrating in many parts of Iraq. Under these changing conditions, the poorly defined relationship between the CPA and the military eventually created confusion at all levels and thwarted both the CPA and the military’s attempts to integrate their planning efforts.

The CPA’s limited autonomy over its budget also hampered flexibility as conditions changed in the operating environment. Complex and uncoordinated large-scale contracts as well as Congressional supplemental appropriations that funded specific projects made changes to the reconstruction plan nearly impossible. Although funds may have appeared available, they often were already obligated by law for future use. The funding pipeline’s inability to support the rapidly changing requirements in Iraq left many coalition members “deeply frustrated with CPA and the difficulty of responding to events on the ground.” The growing schism between the CPA and CJTF-7 hampered long-term planning, but the organizational structure’s lack of responsiveness also severely handicapped the coalition’s ability to adapt in a cohesive manner to changes in the post-conflict environment.
Sustainability

Although resources almost always seem constrained during post-conflict transitions, the CPA dealt with some limitations that were exceedingly severe. Both the CPA and the military were understaffed throughout the first year of occupation in Iraq. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan sapped already limited personnel resources, particularly from the DOS: “Neither State nor USAID were able to rapidly mobilize experienced officers in anything near the numbers required, and the military and DOD were forced to fill the vacuum.”\textsuperscript{109} The military, however, had left less than 200,000 troops on the ground to secure a vast country in the throes of a developing insurgency.\textsuperscript{110} The CJTF-7 staff, in particular, was never sufficiently manned to handle its rapidly expanding mission set. In fact, “the Pentagon calculated that [Sanchez] needed a headquarters staff of 1,400 but during 2003 he was given a fraction of that, at one point hitting a low of just 495.”\textsuperscript{111} Across both organizations, staffers were either experienced and overworked or so inexperienced that they had little impact other than to contribute to the problem of high personnel turnover.

While military units fanned out across Iraq and established a growing network of forward operating bases, the CPA consolidated its headquarters around lavish residences and the Republican Palace in Baghdad. The Green Zone was initially designed to provide security for the mostly civilian organization, but the quality of life inside the zone was soon “in sharp contrast to the rest of Iraq, where conditions generally were deteriorating.”\textsuperscript{112} The CPA had difficulty staffing and maintaining offices outside of the Green Zone, particularly as force protection grew more difficult. Although USAID established regional offices that were making effective progress in managing
reconstruction, they proved too expensive as the security situation declined.\textsuperscript{113} Eventually, only five DOS regional offices endured beyond the CPA’s tenure.

Despite relatively consolidated facilities, the high rate of personnel turnover and lack of regional oversight soon diminished the CPA’s ability to account for its expenditures. Millions of dollars in property such as cars, generators, trailers, and other equipment were literally lost in Iraq. “It soon became apparent the CPA had no idea what it owned or where it had put it.”\textsuperscript{114} While some confusion is understandable given the rapidly changing environment, the extent of the loss of property accountability exemplifies the CPA’s incoherent management processes. The establishment of a permanent, more robust U.S. Embassy in Baghdad soon became crucial to sustaining reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Efficiency

The occupation and reconstruction of Iraq was a task that eclipsed any recent similar undertaking in breadth and depth. Although Iraq posed similar challenges as Bosnia or even Panama, its geographical size and location made stability far more difficult to achieve. In addition, the divisions within the international community ran far deeper regarding the invasion of Iraq than they had prior to intervention in the Balkans. These fundamental differences have made progress in each of the essential tasks for reconstruction and stabilization arduous, and sometimes fleeting, thus far in Iraq.

The crux of the CPA’s problematic tenure was that “in Iraq, stabilization was never achieved, but we nonetheless embarked on reconstruction.”\textsuperscript{115} Although security is a basic condition for nation-building, the CPA was immediately focused on reconstruction projects. With limited coalition military forces on the ground, the post-
invasion environment in Iraq became increasingly less stable and “Iraq quickly
disintegrated into a virulent insurgency.”116 However, by the nature of their divided
organizations, the CPA had no direct authority over the military forces that inevitably had
the task of improving the security situation. The first common point in their chains-of-
command was the Secretary of Defense who was seven thousand miles away and unable
to track daily developments in any detail.

Numerous other factors also contributed to the deteriorating security situation
during the year following the fall of Baghdad. First, CPA Orders Number 1 and Number
2 isolated former Ba’ath Party Members and disbanded the remnants of the Iraqi
Army.117 Whether these orders were prudent requires subjective analysis, but the lack of
a subsequent effort to “entice, cajole, or even coerce Iraqi soldiers back to their own
barracks” opened them up to alternatives such as “joining the insurgency, organize crime,
or militias.”118 While the CPA’s Director of Security Affairs oversaw the initial program
of creating a new Iraqi Army, the ambitions for this program far exceeded the reality of
the situation and an effective training and equipping program that produced functioning
Iraqi Army units remained years away and would require vastly more resources than the
CPA possessed. The CPA was not internally empowered to directly address the security
situation, but it failed to effectively address misleading guidance from national leaders
although Bremer certainly had opportunities to do so. The establishment of an
overarching organization that encompassed the functions of both the CPA and the
occupation troops would have unified communication with the national command
authority. Instead, disjointed decision-making and policy implementation in the crucial

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first few months after the invasion set the stage for a deteriorating security situation that the coalition continues to struggle to restore.

As with stabilization efforts, the utter collapse of the Iraqi government structure following Saddam Hussein’s departure overwhelmed the CPA’s resources. The widely reported post-invasion looting in Baghdad had practical implications in that a large percentage of the government’s property, from office supplies to significant items of equipment, was stolen and many files “had been destroyed, stolen, or acquired for other nefarious purposes." Many newly installed government officials had to completely rebuild their ministries and offices.

In an attempt to form a foundation for a new government of Iraq, the United States initially installed Ahmed Chalabi as its internal leader. However, unlike Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, Chalabi’s lack of charisma, unfamiliarity, and consequent lack of loyalty “made it impossible to simply hand the reins of power” to him. Although many DOS and military officials had already begun establishing effective local level governing councils, the Bush administration “insist[ed] on a change…rather than allowing the bottom-up process the time it needed to succeed.” The CPA subsequently appointed twenty-five prominent Iraqi citizens to the first Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and empowered them, under Bremer’s supervision, with broad oversight and control of reconstruction efforts. With other people in place, this initial attempt at governance may have been more successful. Instead, “many of the IGC leaders were horribly corrupt” and they “used their positions on the IGC to engineer their own further political and military (and financial) aggrandizement.” By virtue of the CPA’s organization, the onus for this effort falls on Bremer. However, the lack of interagency cooperation and
the Bush administration’s unwillingness to accept help from international organizations such as the UN left a wealth of experience in governance untapped. Unfortunately, the initial experience under the IGC created a damaging legacy in the new Iraqi political system that continues to plague its development.

As ORHA’s name implied, planners anticipated that reconstruction and humanitarian assistance would comprise the major missions in post-conflict Iraq. While the humanitarian situation actually was “better than expected,” the breadth of the reconstruction effort exceeded what planners had anticipated. In reality, however, Iraqis had lived through decades of war and economic sanctions. It was, ironically, the coalition’s public message that began to mold their expectations for improvement. As the fledgling Iraqi government faltered and international contractors were slow to mobilize, there was little apparent progress to the average citizen. Soon, perceived disparities in aid between ethnic and religious sects developed and the security situation simultaneously began to deteriorate. As the year progressed, “the drumbeat of Iraqi dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reconstruction was constant, and it fueled the worsening insurgency.” Although the coalition had removed a totalitarian regime and its abusive leader, the destabilization of post-invasion Iraq threatened the sustainability of improvements to living conditions. Further, the CPA lacked the necessary authority and capacity to counter the effects of the security situation on the overall social well-being of its citizens.

The CPA faced similar challenges in the related tasks of economic and infrastructure improvement. Prior wars in Iraq and prolonged economic sanctions had left Iraq’s infrastructure in shambles. Saddam Hussein’s regime had also forced many of
Iraq’s most educated citizens to flee and the country’s vital middle class was hollow by
2003. Still, “the Iraqi economy had potential for high economic growth, if its human
capital could be harnessed, its oil sector modernized, and conditions created for
sustained growth.” Although USAID had mobilized a comprehensive economic
growth program in March 2003, Bremer “concluded that the economic governance
portion of the program was not needed.” Economic programs soon became subject
to the convolutions of CPA’s bureaucracy and the emerging web of overlapping
government contracts. Despite these procedures and the growing insurgency, “the Iraqi
economy was initially growing and generating employment, although not in all areas of
Iraq.” Unfortunately, CPA left a legacy of haphazard execution of large-scale projects
that created concerns about lasting economic growth and sustainability. For example,
disjointed planning resulted in the construction of “water treatment plants that had no
distribution system” and questions over whether Iraqi ministries would be able to operate
and maintain the new infrastructure. Again, the CPA’s inability to unify their efforts
reduced the pace of progress and squandered limited resources. Even though
“reconstruction needs were found to be much greater than expected” after the CPA’s
creation, its limited authority and the added bureaucracy of the funding and contracting
systems quickly undermined the best planning efforts for thoughtful reconstruction in
Iraq.

Finally, in the task of establishing justice and reconciliation, the coalition
achieved minimal success under the CPA. Following the capture of Saddam Hussein in
December 2003, both the CPA and the military were quick to tout it as a potential turning
point in the insurgency. However, the coalition failed to capitalize on this unique
opportunity and its symbolic impact quickly diminished as many Iraqis expressed outrage at what they perceived as their former leader’s public humiliation. Rather than stifling the insurgency, the handling of Hussein’s arrest and detention actually fueled it in some areas. The lack of progress in other areas, such as security and economic improvement, simultaneously served to stimulate the black market to the extent that “organized crime and banditry are now deeply rooted” in Iraqi society. Again, the CPA’s failure to unify its policies and the efforts of all organizations involved in Iraq’s post-conflict transition stifled much needed justice and reconciliation.

Other Factors

The CPA struggled to sufficiently understand the ramifications of Iraq’s culture and the extent to which religious and ethnic tensions pervaded its society. Beyond the fundamental differences between its Sunni and Shi’a populations, there was enduring Shi’a resentment against Sunnis in general because they had enjoyed greater privileges under the previous regime. Tribal leaders were quick to highlight perceived inequalities in the CPA’s programs. Seemingly simple issues, such as power outages, quickly became platforms for exacerbating the religious divide. The CPA’s grandiose approach to reconstruction in Iraq did not incorporate means for addressing such small incidents which ultimately snowballed into violent confrontations. Also, by virtue of Iraq’s historical borders, the CPA faced the challenge of incorporating the ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq into its governance plans. The Kurds maintained a great sense of autonomy and maintained their own security via their peshmerga forces. They also were making greater reconstruction progress through independent initiatives than the CPA was creating in the rest of Iraq. Despite OSD’s dismissal of the potential effects of ethnic tensions in
Iraq prior to the invasion, the willingness of the Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds to establish a functioning government together proved to be a real and complex problem for the CPA.133

Lessons Learned from the CPA

The post-invasion experience in Iraq emphasizes several lessons that unfortunately are not new. The CPA inherited an operational environment utterly lacking the vital conditions for successful reconstruction and stabilization. Security is paramount to entering a post-conflict transition. Without first achieving – and maintaining – stability, reconstruction efforts are doomed to mediocrity regardless of the organization overseeing them. Although plans existed for the reconstruction of Iraq, they were predicated upon security and were never integrated with the invasion plan. The U.S. Government disregarded the lessons of Panama in which the reconstruction plan took a distinct back seat to the invasion plan and, as a result, the failures of reconstruction quickly usurped the victory of the invasion forces. Further, despite the availability of immense study of lessons learned from previous conflicts, the plans for Iraq stood on numerous faulty assumptions and contained no executable contingency branch or sequel plans. More detrimental than the shoddy planning, however, was the exceedingly inappropriate involvement of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the relentlessly misguided pressure it placed on those dealing with the daily realities of the operational environment in Iraq. The CPA had the potential for lasting success in post-invasion Iraq. However, the failure to adequately resource, staff, and empower the CPA organization made achieving the vision of a stable and prosperous Iraq unattainable during its tenure.


4 Ibid., 39. Based on Dr. John T. Fishel’s interview with a USSOCOM Senior Staff Officer in April 1991.

5 Ibid., 40.

6 Ibid., viii.


11 Ibid., 258.
12 Fishel, 48.

13 Fishel, vii.

14 Buckley, 259.


16 Fishel, 46.


18 Fishel, 77.

19 Throughout this case study, the term “Bosnians” refers to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Likewise, the term “Bosnia” is used interchangeably with “Bosnia and Herzegovina” or “BiH.”


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 9-10.


34 General Accounting Office, “Pace of Implementing Dayton,” 145.


36 Office of the High Representative, “Status, Staff and Funding.”


38 General Accounting Office, “Pace of Implementing Dayton,” 2.


40 Kozaryn.

41 Ashdown.
42 “Dayton Agreement,” ann. 1A, art. VI.


45 Ashdown.

46 According to the Hays’, et al. article: “Washington has agreed to dismantle the Office of the High Representative next summer.”

47 Burg and Shoup, 399.


49 Dervisbegovic.

50 Ibid.


52 Ibid., 8.


54 Hays, Hitchner, and Joseph.


56 Ibid.


58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

61 Peace Operations Monitor.


65 Peace Operations Monitor.

66 Ibid.


69 Presidential Decision Directive 56, the Clinton administration’s planning document for complex contingency operations, had expired during the transition in administrations and was not renewed.


71 Katzman, 23.

72 Dobbins, et al., 132.


75 Katzman, 24.

Katzman, 26-7.

Peace Operations Monitor.

Dobbins, et al., 131.

Caan.

International Crisis Group, “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency.”

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Peace Operations Monitor.

Caan.

Dobbins, et al., xxiv.

Ibid., 167.


98 Ibid., 38.

99 DOD had assembled approximately 200 personnel, many not of Garner’s choosing, to man ORHA.


103 Ibid., 173.

104 Ibid., 208.

105 Ibid., 205.

106 Ibid., 78-9.

107 Pollack, 6.

108 Stephenson, 45.

109 Ibid., 37.

110 Ricks, 174.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid., 206.

113 Stephenson, 40.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid., xv.

116 Ibid., xiv.

Pollack, 6.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 8.

Ibid.

Dobbins, et al., 181.

Stephenson, 34.

Dobbins, et al., 169.

Ibid., 171.

Stephenson, 157.

Ibid., 138-9.

Ibid., 60 and 140.


Ricks, 264.

Dobbins, et al., 169.

Ricks, 96.
Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the effectiveness of the post-conflict management organizations that were analyzed in each of the case studies and the major lessons learned. The next section concludes what organizational characteristics are necessary for success and which essential tasks the organization must be capable of completing. The third section summarizes recommendations for the creation of future post-conflict management organizations, evaluates current efforts to improve the management of reconstruction and stabilization operations, and recommends areas for further research.

Lessons Learned

The U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia both achieved success in their respective post-conflict transitions. While the USMSG-PM’s tenure was short-lived, the OHR has sustained efforts for over a decade and the post-conflict environment in Bosnia has slowly improved. The long-term effectiveness of post-conflict transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq remains to be seen; however, initial progress was generally much greater in Afghanistan than in Iraq during the CPA’s existence. The analysis of the organizations that oversaw reconstruction and stabilization in Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq revealed five major lessons for the management of post-conflict transition.

The first major lesson involves the direct correlation between planning and effective transition from combat to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Whereas
the Dayton Agreement created a common framework for the way ahead in Bosnia and
clearly defined the authorities and responsibilities of OHR and the military, the other case
studies illustrated the detrimental effects of insufficient planning. In the case of Panama,
the compartmentalized planning process prior to the operation not only prevented the
integration of reconstruction and stabilization into the overall operational plan, but also
resulted in planners giving the preponderance of their attention to the combat operations
plan. While successful combat operations are a necessary precursor to reconstruction and
stabilization, the two phases are always inextricably linked. Similarly disjointed planning
prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 also failed to sufficiently address the requirements
for post-conflict transition and, as in Panama, there was no organization established prior
to the actual transition to implement a reconstruction plan. The acceptance of faulty
planning assumptions and failure to develop contingency plans further hampered the
initiation of reconstruction and stabilization activities in Iraq. Planning for reconstruction
and stabilization must be integrated into the operational plan in advance and must include
comparable detail as planning for combat operations. The creation of a tailored post-
conflict management organization as part of this planning process is central to ensuring a
smooth transition to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Another critical element for post-conflict management organizations is the
inclusion of other government agencies and international organizations in both planning
and execution. While the peace operation in Bosnia embraced interagency and
international efforts, other post-conflict organizations have not been as inclusive.
Planning for Panama was almost exclusively a military staff process even though
reconstruction and stabilization requires tasks for which the military is not trained.
Minimal interagency representation within the USMSG-PM also degraded the organization’s ability to achieve rapid progress. Had the Panamanians themselves been less adept and willing to rebuild their country, the USMSG-PM would likely have attained much less success. In Iraq, the United States again shunned international involvement and created an organization centered on its Department of Defense (DOD). Although the Coalition Provisional Authority was an interagency effort, DOD’s influence annulled any potential interagency synergy. In stark contrast, the ongoing reconstruction and stabilization operations in Afghanistan have an overt international and interagency quality. Other government and international organizations have far greater experience and a depth of talent that is greatly needed in the post-conflict environment. Their inclusion in both planning and execution are instrumental in making swift progress during reconstruction and stabilization.

However, progress in the various areas of reconstruction and stabilization is often incremental and reliant on a master plan. Such a long-term outlook requires a corresponding commitment of resources. The OHR’s organization in Bosnia could never have sustained its operations for over a decade without sufficient personnel and financial resources. Rapid initial investment in Afghanistan set the conditions for reconstruction, but Afghanistan’s post-conflict organizations also required a sustained flow of resources to capitalize on this initial momentum. Once the United States engaged in similar operations in Iraq, demand for the same resources increased which contributed to the CPA’s enduring struggle for experienced personnel and monetary support. Personnel in particular can become a significant hindrance to efficiency. Maintaining personnel continuity, especially during critical phases, reduces turbulence that can impede progress.
As new personnel arrive, they need time to fully understand the post-conflict environment to prevent misguided or uninformed decision-making. Tours of duty supporting reconstruction and stabilization must be sufficiently long to prevent high personnel turnover. The creation of post-conflict management organizations must include thorough feasibility assessments of long-term manning and other resource requirements.

One of the most significant lessons for post-conflict transition organizations is that they are designed inherently to manage reconstruction and stabilization operations only. Although post-conflict environment variables differ, the prerequisite for sustainable security is always paramount. The U.S. Army currently embraces the concept of full-spectrum operations during which it can simultaneously wage various types of operations; yet, if the preponderance of the effort is on security and offensive operations, the management of reconstruction becomes immeasurably more difficult. The CPA’s struggle to synchronize its efforts with those of the coalition military forces as security in Iraq disintegrated illustrates the futility of such a strategy. Security sets the conditions for swift reconstruction and, as in Afghanistan, can help post-conflict transition organizations initially overcome hasty operational planning. What post-conflict organizations must do to fully reap the benefits of initial security is oversee the creation of an effective police force. The study of the USMSG-PM exemplified the critical role that quickly and effectively raising the police force has on subsequent reconstruction and stabilization. Although not entirely effective, the rebuilt Panamanian police force enabled the USMSG-PM to sustain security to a great enough extent that other reconstruction tasks could proceed. While security is a vital requirement for the
transition to reconstruction, an effective police force is necessary for any sustained
reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

The final lesson from the analysis of the four case studies is the necessity of
effective command and control. As each of the case studies revealed, unity of effort can
be elusive in the post-conflict environment. An effective post-conflict management
organization must have a well-defined command and control architecture that supports
unity of command and promotes unity of effort. No single organizational structure is
suited to every reconstruction and stabilization operation. Instead, a post-conflict
management organization must incorporate the concepts of unity of command while
conforming to the particular variables of the operational environment. As the OHR-
centric structure in Bosnia illustrated, a linear hierarchy is not necessarily required
although formal coordination becomes more important without one. More informal
coordination relationships, such as those between the three organizations in Afghanistan,
can also work, but they are more heavily dependent on the personalities of the individuals
involved. The critical component of a non-linear organization is that the central
coordinating office or element must have commensurate power and authority to coalesce
the reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Whereas the OHR had such power and
authority, the CPA never did. The disparity of the initial progress in Bosnia and that in
Iraq emphasizes this difference. Separately managed organizations not only inhibit unity
of effort, but also encourage a lack of accountability because there is no clear delineation
of responsibility. Finally, the CPA’s tenure in Iraq demonstrated the disruptive effects
that high-level government micromanagement has on synchronizing complex
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Only through careful planning, clearly defined
roles and responsibilities, and continual policy coordination can a post-conflict management organization effectively command and control reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

**Common Characteristics**

While there is no set historical model for future post-conflict management organizations, there are common characteristics that any future organization must possess. The five evaluation criteria used to analyze the case studies in Chapter 4 provide a framework for building a new organization. Any organization designed to manage post-conflict transition must be thoughtfully constructed to encourage unity of effort. Optimally, it should be incorporated into operational planning at the earliest stages and it must be constructed in a manner that allows for appropriate expansion or restructuring as the post-conflict environment changes. The organization also must be realistic in its demand for resources which requires a holistic interagency assessment based on the contemporary operating environment. Finally, all post-conflict transition organizations must be capable of managing the five essential tasks for reconstruction and stabilization: security, governance, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economics and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. Lastly, the most effective organizations were comprised of individuals who had the right skills, experience, and personality for the specific challenges of the post-conflict situation. As the contemporary operating environment becomes more complex, the post-conflict environment will also become more complicated. Creating effective organizations and manning them with the finest individuals is crucial to improving global stability.
Recommendations

The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and its concepts for the Interagency Management System (IMS) are both steps in the right direction toward improving future post-conflict transitions. However, S/CRS must receive expanded resources that are more in line with the enormity of its responsibility. More importantly, DOS should continue to strengthen and improve communication lines with other government agencies. DOD should make similar efforts and future military plans should include robust interagency representation at the earliest stages.

Further study of ways to improve international coordination during post-conflict planning and execution is also warranted. There is also the potential for additional study of the activities and supporting organizations that best support progress in each of the essential task areas – particularly those in which the military plays a greater supporting role such as governance and economic improvement. Such research would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of how to optimize interagency resources and experience to develop a tailored approach to reconstruction and stabilization.

Finally, although post-conflict environments are never replicated exactly, the future success of post-conflict transition mandates a professional approach which includes the study of past successes and failures. Proper application of the lessons gleaned from such historical analysis can improve a post-conflict transition organization’s efficiency. A thoughtfully tailored approach to managing post-conflict transition reduces both the monetary and the human costs of war.
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