

**STABILIZING US-PAKISTAN
RELATIONS: A WAY FORWARD**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Following 9/11, the US sought (and secured) a new relationship with Pakistan. The new relationship was essential if Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors were to be driven from Afghanistan. Forgotten immediately was that Pakistan was under multiple US sanctions for its nuclear weapons program and Musharraf's coup. Unspoken also in forging the new relationship was that a deep bitterness over perceived past misdeeds characterized each side's view of the other. But 9/11 overwhelmed the need for introspection or deep dialogue, and Pakistan once again became a major US ally. The new relationship, however, is fraught with the legacy of past interactions—all of which ended in bitter "divorces." It comes as no surprise, then, that the latest installment, in which the US has invested \$11 billion, is not playing out as hoped. This has made manifest by a threatening Taliban-Al Qaeda resurgence radiating from Pakistan's tribal areas—a consequence of the Pakistan military's inability (or unwillingness) to act decisively. As a result, US policy is now in need of serious revision. This paper addresses the nature of US-Pakistan relations and offers some recommendations on how cooperation can be better structured to achieve mutual long-term interests.

STABILIZING US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A WAY FORWARD

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US has pumped over \$11 billion in aid into Pakistan, with much of that money going to its military, the country's dominant institution, and its rulers from 1999 to 2007.¹ The decision to seek a new relationship with Pakistan, which, prior to 9/11, was isolated under US sanctions, was necessary if vital Global War on Terror (GWOT) objectives were to be achieved.² The US military simply could not remove the Taliban-Al Qaeda regime in land-locked Afghanistan without moving troops, aircraft, and logistics through and over Pakistan.³ As such, the United States asked for Pakistan's help in prosecuting the GWOT, and President Pervez Musharraf agreed, junking with that pledge of support, his government's long-standing support for the Taliban. With that decision, Pakistan was once again enlisted as a key US security partner.⁴

The decision to side with the US against its long-term proxies in Afghanistan was controversial in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis, notably Pashtuns, supported the Taliban, but Musharraf defended his actions to his people by stating that he had done so to "save Pakistan."⁵

Since that decision, US military and economic assistance has poured into Pakistan. Moreover, US sanctions imposed following the nuclear tests of 1998 and Musharraf's 1999 coup were waived so that the Taliban leadership and their Al Qaeda guests could be driven from Kabul. Simultaneously, US-Pakistan intelligence cooperation mushroomed, and led to the killing or capture of numerous Al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. At US prodding, Pakistan has also dramatically scaled back its support for militant groups operating in Indian-occupied

Kashmir—a policy that had repeatedly pushed India and Pakistan to near war. But to great dismay, stability in Afghanistan and the destruction of Al Qaeda and Taliban networks in the region have not been achieved by renewed US-Pakistan cooperation. Worse, the two groups have regrouped in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands and increasingly work together. Boosted by funds earned from record opium crops, they are now threatening the fragile gains made by the US-led effort in Afghanistan.⁶ Much of this can be attributed to Pakistan's failure since 9/11 to aggressively assert control over its territory and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries.⁷

Seven years on and \$11 billion (US tax dollars) later, senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders remain at large and are waging an increasingly dangerous insurgency in Afghanistan that threatens the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) forces fighting there.⁸ This situation has occurred because the Taliban and its affiliates have been able to reorganize inside Pakistan's remote and rugged Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Not only has Pakistan failed to stop the terrorists, but many observers openly question Musharraf's commitment to the GWOT given the emphasis Pakistan placed early-on in hunting Al Qaeda (foreign fighters) as opposed to the Taliban.⁹ Such a difference was clearly noted in frequent press reports of Taliban leaders openly moving about in parts of western Pakistan, and by the limited number of arrests or killings of their leaders.¹⁰ With US-NATO efforts increasingly at risk as a result of a regrouped Taliban—and with that failure now starting to threaten Pakistan's stability as well—it is clear that the latest US-Pakistan relationship is not achieving desired US ends. Moreover, a string of senior security official visits to Pakistan since October 2007 is evidence of growing US concern over the expanding terrorist threat.¹¹

Not surprisingly, doubts are rising (again) in Washington about the post-9/11 relationship with Pakistan and its reliability as a security partner. Much distrust, however, lingers on both sides resulting from the last period of strategic cooperation (1980-1988) when the US and Pakistan armed the Afghan *mujahideen* to fight the Soviet occupation. That cooperation, which resulted in a Soviet defeat, was marred by US-Pakistan disagreement over how to govern post-Soviet Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war. Relations then bottomed after the imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program. Throughout the 1990's, relations remained cool with limited interaction until 9/11 forced the two together again. This time, the evolving stakes in US-Pakistan cooperation are higher than ever, as the establishment of a secure terrorist safe haven in the FATA poses a direct threat to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and potentially, the US homeland. The new post-9/11 relationship was constructed to secure vital US security interests, but now, as common threats have expanded, offers both sides another chance to solidify a more normal and enduring relationship. The nature of the growing threat requires more than a one dimensional approach. US policy, while evolving, has been slow to realize this fact.

This paper will posit that the mixed results achieved since 9/11 in the latest US-Pakistan (security) relationship were predictable, and are unlikely to improve (and could worsen) short of a radical restructuring of the entire relationship. This is due foremost to a long history of accumulated distrust between the two countries stemming from repeated breakups over policy differences.¹² The mutual distrust, which is structural in nature, is not well understood beyond serious observers of US-Pakistan relations. It is also a byproduct of two very different, almost alien, strategic cultures that have evolved

from their unique national histories. What adds tension to the relationship is that these starkly different strategic cultures have produced national interests that are not adequately aligned (or reconciled), and are initially suppressed by both sides when the exigencies of the day compel the states to work together.¹³ Later, as the relationship matures, the differences emerge, usually expressed by sharp disagreements over desired ends, or the perceived responsibilities of the other to adhere to promises. These irreconcilable differences then precipitate the breakup.¹⁴ The breakup then leads to a period of mutual estrangement, only to be followed by a major geopolitical event that brings the two together. Then, the cycle starts anew. But as events force the two sides together, accumulated misgivings about the other side's reliability as a partner accompany the new partnership.¹⁵ The result is manifested in subsequent policy failures as each side employs hedging strategies to match its misgivings about the other side.

This is where the US finds itself today: needing Pakistan, but unsure of Pakistan's commitment. Pakistan, meanwhile, appreciates the renewed US attention and especially the largesse, but questions US staying power and whether it will be abandoned (again) to cope with the aftermath once the US departs or discards it. As such, Pakistan's willingness to fully cooperate in achieving US goals is conditioned by doubt that the US will remain to help Pakistan deal with the consequences of pursuing policies that may not be in its own best interests in terms of ensuring internal stability and security against external threats. US Senator Joseph Biden refers to this historical pattern of US-Pakistan relations as being "transactional", in that the relationship is based on US payment for services rendered, and nothing more. A relationship structured in such a manner, he argues, is not the norm for states with which the US

seeks to have warm and enduring ties—and, he adds, the Pakistanis know it and perform accordingly.¹⁶

That US-Pakistan relations have alternated between close cooperation and estrangement, all the while failing (or feigning) to deeply examine underlying differences in contrasting interests and objectives comes as no surprise to senior Pakistan watcher Dennis Kux. In his sweeping book on the history of US-Pakistan relations, *Disenchanted Allies: The United States And Pakistan, 1947-2000*, Kux observes that both sides have always been more concerned with the attainment of specific, short-term security objectives, and using the other to achieve those ends.¹⁷ More permanent interests, such as Pakistan's legitimate concerns about its security vis-à-vis India, or the US goal of helping new states mature into stable democracies were ignored. But it is those interests that must be addressed if the US is to establish a relationship with Pakistan that will deliver success in the GWOT and bring sustainable stability to the region. In support of that notion, Smith states that trust in the other side must be reestablished; otherwise nothing of significance can be achieved.¹⁸ Furthermore, until the US can demonstrate its concern for Pakistan's long-term health, and the Pakistanis come to believe in the resiliency and honesty of such a commitment, relations are likely to disappoint—with potentially dire consequences. The paper closes with some recommendations US policymakers might consider in restructuring, what Kux calls a “profoundly unstable relationship,” before it is too late.¹⁹

Mixed Results Since 9/11

US assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 in dollar figures has exceeded all previous comparable periods.²⁰ But, of the \$11 billion dollars that has poured into Pakistan,

almost \$10 billion has gone to the military, Pakistan's most effective institution, and its ultimate decider on security matters. In return, Pakistan has cooperated in the capture of numerous Al Qaeda leaders, and allowed extensive use of its airspace, roads, ports, and airbases—all vital to Afghanistan. Musharraf also renounced Pakistan's support for the Taliban and outlawed Pakistan-based militant groups that operated in Indian-held Kashmir.²¹ The Pakistan Army has deployed over 80,000 soldiers along the Afghan border to cut the flow of arms and manpower into Afghanistan, and has taken over 1,000 casualties. The Army has also killed a large, but unknown number, of its own citizens while attacking suspected terrorist hideouts.²² Former Pakistan Army Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Jehangir Karamat recently noted that operations in the FATA are deeply unpopular, and that President Musharraf has had to walk a fine line between supporting US goals and not further alienating his own people. Too little appreciation of this precarious balancing act, according to Karamat, is understood in the US.²³

Despite successes against Al Qaeda, the military effort in the FATA has failed to destroy the Taliban-Al Qaeda hub, or stem the flow of fighters into Afghanistan. During a talk at the Brookings Institution, Karamat acknowledged that failure, stating that the Army since 2001 had successively tried large-scale operations, surgical strikes, cease-fire negotiations, and a mix of the above, but thus far had failed to bring the FATA under control.²⁴ This failure has been especially disappointing to the US, not only because it constitutes a growing sanctuary for the insurgency renewing itself in Afghanistan, but because the Pakistan Army has received more than \$ five billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to pay for its operations along the Afghan border.²⁵ So long as the Army was making progress against the terrorists, using CSF to reimburse it made sense, and

was supported in Washington. But now that strategy is coming under increased scrutiny as security in Afghanistan (and now) Pakistan deteriorates, along with growing incidents of suicide bombings.²⁶

The security threat from the FATA is now worrisome enough to warrant open discussion in Washington about intervening directly with US troops, something Pakistan openly rejects. Musharraf has even stated that uninvited US troops would be seen as an "invasion."²⁷ But another large attack on the US homeland, if linked back to the FATA, would place enormous pressure on the President to take direct action.

An alternative (and sobering) explanation to the situation in the FATA is that Pakistan's security forces lack the military capability to secure the territory and defeat the militants. The explanation also begs whether the Pakistan Army is willing to risk a campaign against the Taliban and its supporters, or employ the force necessary over fears it might destabilizing the country and weaken its status.²⁸ If true, then a certain amount of cautiousness is understandable, albeit difficult from the US perspective to support when \$60-80 million a month in CSF flows to Pakistan. Talk of sending a large, semi-permanent US military training team to Pakistan suggests this explanation may be the case, and that the Army needs better skills and some stiffening of its will.

In non-military arenas, Pakistan has received over \$1.5 billion dollars in budget assistance and debt relief from the Treasury Department.²⁹ The financial support has stabilized Pakistan's current accounts and helped its economy register annual growth rates (GDP) at seven percent since 2002.³⁰ State Department funding streams, to include Development Assistance (DA) as part of a multi-year aid package the Bush Administration assembled in 2003, has matched military-specific Foreign Military

Financing (FMF) at nearly \$300 million per year.³¹ Those funds have supported a myriad of programs to improve women and children's health, broaden public education, and build law enforcement capacity. Spread over five years, the assistance represents a serious US commitment to improving the lives of Pakistan's people.

FMF, at \$300 million annually, however, has gone almost exclusively to enhancing conventional military capabilities and not counterinsurgency capabilities. The rationale for that huge sum was to build trust with Pakistan's military by enabling it to buy weapons it desired to maintain a credible conventional deterrent against India. Little discussion was raised during this period (2003-2007) about the military's continued role in governing Pakistan, or Musharraf's steady consolidation of power. The objective was to temporarily win over the military, the institution that mattered if GWOT objectives were to be achieved.³²

But as the realization dawned on Washington in 2007 that Al Qaeda and the Taliban had regrouped, and the Pakistan Army's efforts to fight them had failed, the policy of backing Musharraf and the Army began to look narrow and short-sighted. Such thinking was reinforced by opinion polls in 2007 that showed a steep decline in Musharraf's popularity due to recent events, such as his sacking of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, his jailing of constitutional lawyers and press critics, and his questionable re-election in October. Pakistanis also registered strong disapproval of its Army (with whom most hold in deep respect) fighting fellow Muslims on America's behalf.³³ In keeping with that sentiment, accounts were numerous that the Frontier Corps, the Army's lead force in the FATA, was standing aside as Taliban militants

moved across the Afghan border.³⁴ As a result, the year ended with renewed talk in Congress about imposing new conditions on US assistance to Pakistan.

As evidence of growing frustration, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, stated that the US considered direct intervention in the FATA a viable policy option if the situation worsened. (Gates later softened his remarks by saying that the US was prepared to “partner with Pakistan.”³⁵) Shortly thereafter, senior intelligence officials traveled to Islamabad to offer US assistance in counterinsurgency training, as well as permission to deploy US forces in a direct role. The offers were rebuffed, at least openly.³⁶

In response to mounting US criticism, senior Pakistan officials claim that the US has not supplied them with the proper equipment, spare parts, and other items required to effectively fight the well-armed militants, many of whom are foreigners and seasoned fighters.³⁷ Pakistani senior officials also argue that the US has failed to make good on the timely delivery of promised equipment, such as night-vision goggles (NVGs), usable attack helicopters (with sufficient spares), and aerial drones to enhance intelligence collection and targeting. Pakistani defense officials also criticize stringent US requirements to periodically inventory sensitive items, such as NVGs, which they claim denotes a lack of trust to properly use them.³⁸ The militants, Pakistani officials argue, are well-armed and mobile, and have the advantage of moving in familiar terrain among a supportive, neglected, and uneducated populace that has been bred to resist the government.³⁹ The FATA, Pakistani generals also note, has never been incorporated into the state structure, and to properly do so will take years and considerable sensitivity. They warn that frequent casualty-producing operations could destabilize the

FATA (and Pakistan by extension), and that fighting should be advanced as a component of an overall strategy that leans primarily on development and rebuilding the traditional tribal structure the Taliban have disrupted.⁴⁰

One obstacle, however, to pursuing a military solution in the FATA has been Musharraf's growing unpopularity and his tenuous hold on power. This stems from the public perception that he has been carrying out US security priorities at the expense of Pakistan's own interests. Recent polling demonstrated just that fact: Pakistanis, by large majorities, disapprove of US policies and motives with respect to Muslims.⁴¹ Pakistanis also told pollsters they wanted democracy, better schools, electricity and other basic services, and not a conflict with Muslims they did not regard as major threats. Polls also showed that Pakistanis were strongly against military operations in their own country and viewed the GWOT as "America's War." Not surprising, the polls also presented a very negative view of Musharraf.⁴² (Such sentiments were recently validated when Musharraf's party was trounced at the polls in February.)

Under US pressure stemming from sharply declining poll numbers and over fears of a political uprising, Musharraf retired from the Army in December 2007, and now governs as a civilian president. But the legality of his October 2007 election to a new five-year term is hotly debated, and will be a subject of considerable debate given his party's trouncing on 18 February. The election, which handed a parliamentary majority to opposition parties, was a strong repudiation of Musharraf's policies, as well as an indication that the Pakistani people want a voice in policies that affect them—notably how the fight against extremism is waged. Asif Ali Zardari, the widow of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and now leader of the Pakistan People's Party, the largest

vote-getter in the election, said as much recently, when he stated that “Pakistan is fighting its own war on terror, rather than the American war on terror.”⁴³ For now, Musharraf remains in office. But with a coalition government that may seek his removal soon to take power, he is likely to find his energies devoted to his political survival, and not threats to regional stability. By any measure, his power will be diminished.

In sum, the political situation in early 2008 was not what US policy intended when it forged a new relationship: a region marked by growing terrorist threats with Pakistan governed by an unelected and unpopular president, somewhat willing to cooperate, but further constrained by a lack of legitimacy to do so. On the bright side, the Pakistani people have voted for change and will get it, but whether a new government will improve the fight against terrorism remains unclear. *Newsweek* analyst Fareed Zakaria believes the recent election may be positive as the struggle in the tribal areas really is “Pakistan’s war” and that only the Pakistanis can fight it.⁴⁴ Furthermore, an elected government will have what Musharraf never had: popular support to fight it, albeit under terms the US may not fully desire.

It can thus be strongly argued that seven years after 9/11 forced the US and Pakistan back together, the new relationship has failed to secure desired US objectives or enhance overall stability in South Asia. Successes, though notable, have been limited and tactical in scope. As a result, post-9/11 security goals of defeating Al Qaeda, throwing out the Taliban, and rebuilding Afghanistan are now in jeopardy. And should stability in Pakistan unravel, the new US strategic relationship with India—a major jewel of the second Bush Administration—will also suffer.

Strategy and First Questions

If a US vision for Pakistan's future was scripted, it might read: the development of a peaceful, prosperous, free-market, stable, semi-democratic, moderate Muslim state that adheres to the rule of law, protects the basic human rights of its citizens, and exerts control over its territory. It is a state that lives in harmony with its neighbors, and does not export (or nurture) religious extremism, *jihadist* groups, or nuclear know-how.⁴⁵ Such a Pakistan can be considered a necessary precondition if lasting stability is to be achieved in Afghanistan and the region. A longer-term concern is stemming the growth of a *jihadist* network increasingly centered on Pakistan that has the potential to dramatically expand linkages between Pakistani-based militant groups and globally-oriented Al Qaeda sympathizers. The key to advance this vision of a future Pakistan, if one is even possible given Pakistan's enormous structural problems, is the provision of immense international assistance and time. This may require, as Husain Haqqani, and former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert Neumann state, an annual commitment to Pakistan's development at current levels of almost \$ one billion, or higher, for the foreseeable future. Much the same will be required for Afghanistan.⁴⁶

Pakistan, as Haqqani notes, has been a quintessential *rentier* state throughout its existence.⁴⁷ That circumstance, by which Pakistan derives income from patron states based on its geo-strategic usefulness has now reasserted itself, this time as a frontline state in the GWOT. The key question, then, is whether successive US Presidents and the Congress will be willing to invest the resources necessary—and for the long term—to help Pakistan stabilize itself and move beyond its *rentier* status. A second consideration is whether such a commitment, if offered, will be enough to convince Pakistan's rulers that the US plans to stay engaged for the long haul, and not simply

until GWOT objectives are achieved or abandoned. For Pakistan's cautious rulers, who remain well-versed in the history of US-Pakistan relations, such an offer will initially be met with profound skepticism.⁴⁸

Whether Pakistan matters to the US in the long-run is a question only senior US officials and lawmakers can decide given other US domestic and international priorities. Situated halfway around the globe, overpopulated, and undemocratic for more than half its history, culturally alien, and lacking in natural resources, Pakistan has little to offer US voters. Worse, Pakistan rarely offers up good news. With each new global terrorist attack, writes UK reporter Christina Lamb, "the path leads back to Pakistan."⁴⁹ To most US citizens, the image of Pakistan is a poor, unstable Muslim (which means alien) country, with uncertain control of its nuclear weapons. Moreover, its most well-known citizen, Benazir Bhutto, was recently killed by a suicide bomber.⁵⁰

Pakistan also compares poorly in the US mindset to neighboring India, a billion-strong nation with whom the US has declared a "strategic partnership." Unlike India, however, Pakistan lacks the economic attractiveness of a huge market, a stable democracy, a large and literate English-speaking middle class, and the support of US business to push for increased bilateral trade. Pakistan also retains unsettling close ties to China and Saudi Arabia, and has previously cooperated with North Korea and Libya on nuclear matters. Pakistan leverages those ties out of its own need for multiple strategic allies, but much of what comes with those relationships—weapons know-how, port access, fuel subsidies and conservative religious influences—runs counter to US interests of promoting a more moderate and democratic Pakistan.⁵¹ Worse, the legacy of Pakistan's still largely undefined nuclear proliferation interaction with Iran, North

Korea, and Libya (regimes of concern to US policymakers), contrasts sharply with India's nuclear cautiousness and its military firmly under civilian control.⁵²

When viewed through a Washington-centric political lens, Pakistan has repeatedly misbehaved and has little commonality with US values to inspire the voting public. But from a security perspective, Pakistan, though a troubled state, is a former ally and a linchpin (again) in US global security strategy. The US needs Pakistan if Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists are to be denied safe haven, control of states, or potential access to nuclear materials. For all of those reasons, Pakistan's cooperation with the US will be required, and for that, an arrangement that goes beyond the immediate security needs of today is required. Only then is it likely that Pakistan's rulers—military or future civilians—will make the necessary hard choices to fully partner with the US and mutually work to eliminate the terrorist threats that confront us all. As Pakistani diplomat Touqir Hussain rightly observes:

US interests go well beyond the war on terrorism. By expending all of its political leverage in securing Pakistan's cooperation in that war, the US risks diminishing its leverage with Pakistan, and neglecting other important strategic goals, such as promoting democracy in Pakistan and the Muslim world and containing nuclear proliferation....fulfilling conflicting objectives without sacrificing any of them is a central policy dilemma for the United States.⁵³

More Resources and Stay Engaged

The Bush Administration's five-year assistance package that provides over \$600 million annually expires in 2009. Additional assistance from the Treasury Department and DoD reimbursement (CSF) puts the annual amount close to \$ one billion. But none of these funds are assured into the future, especially given the pressure on future US budgets. As a whole, the assistance has produced tangible but incomplete benefits.

Mutual trust is still lacking as evident by the continued existence of the terrorist sanctuary and the Pakistani hesitation to deal decisively with it. As an initial show of US commitment, existing assistance levels must be continued, perhaps committed to public law for a decade. Efforts to bolster Pakistan's economy and increase trade opportunities where possible should also be expanded, as an expanded economy opportunity provides powerful alternatives for Pakistan's poor not to join militant groups. A better economy, one that provides expanded opportunity, writes Fareed Zakaria, also bolsters the creation of a wider middle class—a necessary condition to sustain democratic government and its institutions.⁵⁴

US military assistance must be continued at current (or higher) levels, but tailored to weapons and training directly useful to counterinsurgency, and not conventional war with India. And with that, the US should make clear it has no interest in supporting additional conventional weapons transfers, as domestic politics will not support it. In its place, the US should seriously consider offering a security guarantee or treaty to Pakistan as a means to ease security fears of India and an unfriendly Afghan or Iranian government.⁵⁵ While difficult to envision, an arrangement that could tie the US to helping manage Pakistan's security paranoia could pay big benefits in getting Pakistan to halt some of its worst behaviors, such as suspected linkages with the Taliban, materiel support to Kashmiri militant groups, or again engaging in nuclear proliferation-related activities. The arrangement would also clearly made void US help if the kinds of aggressive policy actions the Pakistanis have conducted in the past, such as supporting militants in Kashmir, were to restart.

The US should also realize that Pakistan's military will remain a major decision-maker in the country's foreseeable future, and that strong links to that institution must be maintained, regardless of whether its actions periodically upset us. The key benchmarks must be that the military works with us more than against us, and withdraws from politics. On the future of President Musharraf, the US should state (and demonstrate) that it supports the people of Pakistan and not specific individuals.⁵⁶

State Department-led Foreign Assistance programs should expand on initiatives already underway to assist and develop institutions essential to a functioning democracy, such as an independent judiciary, better police, and for more democracy within political parties. Efforts to build a better press corps and train civil society organizations that monitor the government should also be continued, and expanded where possible. Expanding the capacity of democratic forces is also essential so that the military gains confidence in civilian governance.⁵⁷ In this area, the US must strenuously demand the immediate release of detained judges and lawyers, and the removal of limits on press freedoms Musharraf enacted to curtail opposition to his continued rule in 2007. (The new government will likely do so regardless, but it makes good US policy to say so.)

Equally important, the US should continue to stress the need for improved governance as a core component of its non-military assistance. A government that starts to perform in the delivery of services will fill a political void of popular unhappiness that the Army has traditionally exploited to intervene—as well as decrease the political space religious political parties have used to criticize the government and attract

supporters. Urging Pakistan to expand political and economic freedom will also give the Pakistani people inspiration that the US shares their desire for a life with opportunities.

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) \$750 million plan for infrastructure development that will build roads, health clinics, support girls education, and create a variety of micro and small credit enterprises in the FATA should be implemented as soon as possible.⁵⁸ Development is a key component of bringing the FATA under control, and by providing all but none-existent services to that remote area, support for the government can be expanded and recruitment of future terrorists reduced. In that vein, it is important to reiterate that opinion polls in Pakistan consistently rank the economy and the provision of basic services as far higher priorities than prosecuting the GWOT. And while support for Musharraf fades, support for Al Qaeda, its leader Osama bin Laden, and increased violence against the government is also fading.⁵⁹ The US must leverage these facts to support infrastructure development by expanding our interaction beyond security interests and a fixation on the military to partnering with capable political, civic, and social-humanitarian organizations to improve the lives of ordinary citizens by building local capacity. Such an approach already has precedent (and paid dividends), as nothing the US has done since 9/11 generated significant goodwill like the US military's humanitarian relief operations following the devastating 2005 earthquakes that killed 80,000 people.⁶⁰ In the face of polls that show little approval for US policies, we should strive to find creative ways of reaching directly to the Pakistani people and empower them to live a better life. Conducting more military medical missions into Pakistan with Afghanistan-based assets, security permitting, might be a start, as might sending the hospital ship *Mercy* offshore of Karachi annually

to provide operations to those in dire need. While ideal in scope, US resources in the region are not robust enough to do so at present and would require augmentation.

US military policy must also shift, as stated earlier, from a focus on enhancing conventional war fighting capabilities to building counterinsurgency capacity. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted in a 2004 report, the US initially narrowed its engagement to allowing the bulk of FMF to go toward equipping the Pakistan military for conventional war. This was done to secure the loyalty of the Pakistan Army so that military operations could continue unimpeded in Afghanistan. It is now time to reorient military assistance to the immediate needs of helping the Pakistan military build robust counterinsurgency capabilities.⁶¹

This needed reorientation comes amid rising concerns as to how Pakistan has been spending CSF given the growing strength of the militants in the FATA and the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. CSIS correctly recommends that reimbursement under CSF be continued but better monitored—and that imposing conditions on its use may be required. Such a provision may not sit well with the Pakistan Army, as it calls into question the issue of trust, but domestic politics is already moving toward demanding better accountability of US tax dollars. One way to overcome Pakistani resistance to performance metrics, and stem domestic opposition to cutting off CSF might be by adding to the monthly amount if the Pakistan Army can show progress in achieving mutually-agreed benchmarks. Attaching incentives, as well as penalties, might provide one means to generate a better return on CSF.⁶²

Adjusting US policy will also require better enabling the Pakistanis to take the lead in conducting counterinsurgency operations in the FATA. Such an adjustment will

require a commensurate amount of trust and patience on the US side, but is imperative if a sufficient level of popular support is to be maintained in Pakistan to back operations on its territory. President Musharraf has already made it clear that US forces are not welcome on Pakistani soil. General Karamat echoed that sentiment at Brookings, stating that US combat troops in Pakistan could serve as a rallying point for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, both of whom enjoy sympathy in Pakistan.⁶³ He added that US troops would also worsen the fragile political situation in the FATA, in which secular, pro-Pakistan tribal elders—which the government backs and is working to strengthen through its own development plans—are locked in a power struggle with Taliban upstarts. Instead, Karamat recommends the US let Pakistan take the lead in taming the FATA, and that the US assist by providing robust training, materiel, and intelligence support.⁶⁴ The US should accept the new Pakistan desire to take the lead, but firmly state that it will not tolerate the consolidation of a safe haven and will reserve the right to intervene if sufficient progress is not made, or if evidence of plans to attack the US or its allies emerge.

Finally, the long-term nature of the security challenge to the region must be fully appreciated in Washington, as no quick fixes are likely. The region must be seen as an integrated whole, and with that a new policy must emerge that views success in Afghanistan and Pakistan as intertwined and independently unachievable. To be successful in securing long-term political support in Washington, the new approach should forge a Cold War-like bond between the executive and legislative branches to sustain funding levels comparative to the allotments given annually to Israel and Egypt.

US policymakers must understand that they will have to pay the full price for peace and stability if they want it in South Asia.⁶⁵

Senior US officials must also understand that the Pakistanis, allied and dysfunctional, yet simultaneously clever and dangerous, have us cornered by virtue of their own miscalculated failures to defeat the terrorists on their soil before they regrouped. Promoting greater political and economic freedoms are essential, but in seeking a new relationship that leads to a stable, more responsible, terrorist-free Pakistan, the US must pay to play—and must do so with the cold understanding that immediate objectives may not be achieved. Moreover, Pakistan's pervasive culture of corruption may siphon or misdirect a fair share of assistance funds, or its leaders may unilaterally decide that the cost of US cooperation is not worth the cost. That decision, which Pakistan could make at any time, could lead it to choose other, less-demanding partners, such as Saudi Arabia or China, to meet its needs—or it could choose to play multiple sides in a way that limits the influence of US largesse.

What seems clear, however, is that staying the present course or disengaging is no longer possible in a post-9/11 world. Not only will NATO fail in Afghanistan if a terrorist sanctuary strengthens in the FATA, but Pakistan's own capacity to manufacture security problems—a trait manifested throughout its short turbulent history by repeated wars with India, support for *jihadist* groups, and nuclear proliferation activities all attest—will only continue. Just who, for example, is today receiving military training in the many unobserved camps spread along the Afghan border?⁶⁶ Add to that concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and one shudders at the consequences of an unstable, or unfriendly Pakistan.

Conclusion

It was the United States that brought the Cold War into South Asia when it allied itself with Pakistan, writes historian Robert McMahon.⁶⁷ McMahon continues that Jawaharal Nehru, India's first leader, strongly protested the US involvement as he believed it would distort the region's newly independent states struggle to consolidate democratic institutions. Whether the US partnering with Pakistan to expand containment eventually pushed India toward the Soviet Union is debatable, but the early US military build-up of Pakistan certainly helped short-circuit the development of a healthy democratic culture—which was already under stress from the beginning given Pakistan's tumultuous start. Subsequent periods of US-Pakistan interaction did not help, Husain Haqqani notes, as all were largely security-based relationships.⁶⁸ Taken as a whole, Haqqani believes that US interaction compounded Pakistan's already formidable challenge in establishing a stable democratic culture by continuously elevating the status of the military (who benefited from US largesse) over civilian politicians. And he argues that the US has done this again post-9/11 with so much of its assistance going to the military. In the immediate days following 9/11, the policy made sense. But it no longer does, as opinion polls in Pakistan all clearly indicate that Pakistanis want a democratically-elected government that delivers services, works to improve the economy, and rejects extremism. As a result, US policies should adjust to these trends, as they represent the best way forward to stabilize Pakistan and roll-back extremism.

The road to a better future also requires undoing much of what the US-Pakistan military-to-military relationship has unintentionally perpetuated: a poor, unevenly developed, undemocratic rentier state whose strategic culture and internal politics its military has shaped and dominated. Pakistan's deficient strategic culture is one largely

shaped by its military that has for much of its 60-year existence: (1) used religion as the sole organizing principle of national identity (instead of engaging in the harder work of creating a wider, more ethnically and regionally-inclusive democratic system); (2) perpetuated hatred of India (instead of pursuing peaceful co-existence and trade) as justification for a large military that dominates the state's budget (despite appalling social needs); and (3) that dreams of playing an assertive political role in the Islamic world the country lacks the resources to realize, short of peddling its nuclear know-how and exporting its *jihadist* infrastructure, which, many observers believe, has already grown beyond the government's control.⁶⁹

Changing Pakistan's deficient strategic culture and putting it on the road to normalcy will require immense resources, patience, and steady US political support. Today's troubled Pakistan, which now faces the specter of suicide bombings and further political fragmentation, is a product of its founding dysfunction, spilling out almost by mistake from British India, and the hardening over time of a political culture distorted by a dominant military that saw threats everywhere to Pakistan survival and did not trust its politicians to lead and safeguard the state's interests. But just as Pakistan's maturation into a global problem state took decades, so to might corrective measures. Major US investment, if sustained over time and targeted at the right areas, could be sufficient to boost the prospects of Pakistan developing a more moderate and democratic political culture—and with that dampen the appeal to religious extremism as a corrective.

Having brought the geopolitics of the Cold War into South Asia (perhaps unadvisedly in hindsight), and having continued to engage episodically with Pakistan when security interests coincided, the US should consider itself in part obligated help

correct the cumulative build-up of Pakistan's dysfunction, which now manifests itself in a solidifying safe haven for Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies in the FATA, as well as a myriad of former government-supported *jihadist* groups (who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets and later against India rule in Kashmir), all of whom, should they coalesce, will pose a grave challenge to the survival of the Pakistani state. But the more pressing reason, of course, is US national security, as these same terrorists threaten us.⁷⁰

In the decade prior to 9/11, it was easily argued that Pakistan's problems constituted a significant hindrance to stability solely in South Asia. Pakistan's dysfunction did not overly concern US policymakers, though a nuclear exchange with India over Kashmir was a serious policy concern to prevent. The US willingness to repeatedly sanction and abandon engagement with Pakistan, however, makes the point that Pakistan and its legitimate security interests were never major priorities in Washington. But the US disengagement from Pakistan following the Afghan-Soviet war has had significant consequences and changed that calculus: foremost being a renewed Afghan civil war which led to the subsequent rise of the Taliban and the coming of Al Qaeda to South Asia.⁷¹ What followed a decade later, orchestrated by those same individuals, were the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the Afghan-Soviet war deeply altered Pakistan as a violent culture of guns, drug-addiction, and large-scale opium smuggling mixed with religious radicalism took root.⁷² And Pakistan continues to reel from those profound social changes today.

To stabilize the Pakistani state, only the US has the combination of resources and historical ties that resonant from 60 years of interaction. The Chinese and the Saudis

will naturally compete for influence, and could win out, but for the foreseeable future, the US still has the lead role in shaping Pakistan's future. The oft-used, colloquial phrase of *Allah, Army, and America* remains unmodified, and is used, only half-jokingly, to describe who and what decides matters in Pakistan.⁷³ The phrase demonstrates that the US remains the dominant influencer or external consideration for policy decisions.

A long-term commitment to helping Pakistan develop into a normal state that transcends the current US focus on the GWOT (and the military aid that distorts the creation of a freer, more democratic society) represents the best hope for containing the spread of extremist violence that threatens stability in South Asia and beyond. There remains, despite opinion polls to the contrary, a deep repository of mutual goodwill and affection between the two countries, notably between the two militaries.⁷⁴ Moreover, even if past history suggests that the current round of US-Pakistan relations is headed for an inevitable break-up due to a diverging interests, such as a Pakistani unwillingness to tackle the FATA or US congressional reluctance to sustain high assistance levels, the future has yet to be written. Past histories can fall away, and 9/11 was likely an altering event. If so, then a new commitment to developing Pakistan that the US can resource over time could do much to change Pakistan's conception of its real national interests, reduce distrust, and strengthen its efforts to fight terrorism.

If the US commits itself to the long-term development of a more normal Pakistan, and demonstrates the will to resource that vision, then a new relationship and a new Pakistan are possible. Abandonment or gradual disengagement, while policy options, are likely to hasten less than desirable outcomes, such as a Pakistan more aligned with Saudi Arabian religious sentiments or beholden to China. In either case, the US would

confront a more uncooperative Pakistan less likely to assist the US in pursuing terrorists. Nor could US policymakers, under such conditions, work closely with Pakistan to ensure the long term security of its nuclear weapons, or prevent further proliferation. What is clear, however, is that less US investment in building a comprehensive relationship—or a general retreat—will result in less US influence on Pakistan's future, and with that the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes in the FATA, Afghanistan, and beyond.

Should the US fail to take the long view and resource it accordingly, the Pakistanis will do likewise by reverting to behaviors that run contrary to wider US interests. History makes that clear. In that alternative future, the next likely US-Pakistan interaction could involve military action on Pakistani soil—with decidedly uncertain outcomes. The US should do everything it can to prevent that.

Calling for a new and enduring relationship based on broad parameters should start soon after a government is formed in Islamabad following the February 2008 elections. Announcing an intention by the US to deepen relations could be made at that time, both to offer a new US commitment to Pakistan, and to reward a free and fair vote. The US has the next move.

At present, Pakistan's cooperation in the GWOT is less than desirable, and must be improved if the terrorists in the FATA and elsewhere are to be neutralized. An embattled President Musharraf, should he survive as president, does not have the legitimacy or domestic support to be a full US partner, and his successors may prove no better. For the US, the fate of the GWOT, NATO in Afghanistan, and whether Pakistan's growing *jihadist* manpower pool chooses religiously-inspired violence or job-training

depends heavily on whether the US restructures (and upgrades) its relationship. With violence inside Afghanistan and Pakistan on the rise, and with concerns being raised by senior US officials over potential attacks on the US homeland being planned from the FATA, the time to act is now. As a final call to action, a January 2008 cover of the *Economist* magazine depicted a hand grenade imposed on the Pakistani flag with the caption: *Pakistan, The World's Most Dangerous Place*. Better US policy could make it far less so.

Endnotes

¹ Spencer Ackerman, "US AID to Musharraf Is Largely Untraceable Cash," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 November 2007 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://latimes.com>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2007. See also David Sanger and David Roche, "US Is Likely to Continue Aid to Pakistan," *New York Times*, 5 November 2007; sec 1A. p. 1. The figure does not include covert assistance.

² Sanctions in place included Section 508 (coup) sanctions and others stemming from Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. Few countries in the world had as many US prohibitions on them as did Pakistan prior to 9/11.

³ COL(R) David O. Smith, Pakistan Desk Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense, interview by author, 3 December 2007, Washington D.C. Smith noted that the main logistics route into Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and that 80% of all military supplies—basically everything that is not airlifted—comes into Afghanistan by road from the port of Karachi. The loss of that supply route would be crippling, something NATO and Pakistan know well. It is also interesting that, despite the spike in Taliban attacks in 2007 and growing complaints that Pakistan is not doing enough along the Afghan border, attacks on supply convoys moving through Baluchistan have been extremely limited.

⁴ Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was dispatched to Islamabad shortly after 9/11 to notify President Musharraf that he could agree to a series of US demands, which included unlimited overflight, use of Karachi, Pakistan's main commercial sea port, for offloading supplies, and use of airbases, or face possible military action. Musharraf immediately agreed to the terms, telling senior army commanders Pakistan had no choice. The US painted his decision, which included abandoning Pakistan's staunch support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as "courageous," but Musharraf had few options. Armitage in 2006 denied every uttering the threatening remark that "Pakistan would be bombed into the Stone Age if it refused, "but President Musharraf stands by the threat. In either case, the US message after 9/11 was a stern one. See "Armitage Refutes Musharraf's Claims," 22 September 2006; available from <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/99/22/terror/main2035622.shtml>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2008. A video of Musharraf's comments from a CBS News interview on 60 Minutes broadcasted on 17 September 2006 can also be viewed at that site. See also "Pakistani Leader

Claims US Threat After 9/11," *New York Times* [newspaper online]; available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/pakistan.html?n=Top/reference/Times%20Topics/People/A./Armitage,%20Richard%20L;> Internet; accessed 11 February 2008.

⁵ Ibid. For the complete text of Musharraf's statement to the Pakistani people go to: <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/pakistanpresident.htm>.

⁶ Jerry Seper, "Afghan Poppy Production Grew to Record in 2007," *Washington Times*, 1 March 2008, p. 3. See also, Sara Carter, "Al Qaeda Role Seen in Directing Groups," *Washington Times*, 27 February 2007, p. 4.

⁷ Elaine Sciolino, "Terror Threat from Pakistan Said to Expand," *New York Times*, 10 February 2008, sec. 1A, p. 1. See also "Al Qaeda Still a Threat to U.S., Intelligence Chief Says," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 February 2008, p. 8., and "Pakistan Army Failures Put West In Peril," *London Daily Telegraph*, 11 February 2008, p.1.

⁸ Craig Whitlock, "U.S. Presses Allies for More Afghan Troops," *Washington Post*, 11 February 2008, p. 10. US Defense Secretary Gates, among others, has been pressing NATO that its members must provide more troops or the situation in Afghanistan will worsen. See also Jason Straziuso, "Afghan War Took Bad Turns in 2007," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1 January 2008, p. 1.

⁹ Senior US military and intelligence officials have long expressed frustration over what appears to be two Pakistan standards regarding the killing or capturing Al Qaeda versus Taliban militants. The former, US officials believe are pursued with vigor while the latter are not. See Ron Moreau, "Where the Jihad Lives Now," *Newsweek*, 29 October 2007, 23. See also Carlotta Gall and David Roche, "Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say," *New York Times*, 15 January, 2008, sec. 1A, p. 1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Since October 2007, Admiral William Fallon, Commander, Central Command and Admiral Michael Mullin, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have visited Pakistan. Admiral (R) Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, and General Michael Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency visited in January 2008. All sought to stress US concerns about a growing terrorist threat residing from Pakistan and asked for permission to expand US military cooperation. The Commander of US Special Operations Command also visited during this period.

¹² David O. Smith, *Facing Up to the Trust Deficit: The Key to an Enhanced US-Pakistan Defense Relationship*, (Written Report for the Defense Intelligence Agency, BCP International Ltd, Washington D.C., 1 July 2007). Smith, a former two-time US Army Attache to Pakistan, believes that a lack of trust by both sides in security matters is the key impediment to improving overall relations.

¹³ The idea of how different strategic cultures and interests have inhibited the development of a normal bilateral relationship is the theme of Dennis Kux's masterful book on the history of US-Pakistan relations, and why that relationship has repeatedly failed to produce satisfactory outcomes. Though written before 9/11, Kux's theme is that there is simply too little in common culturally for the US and Pakistan to ever have a truly productive relationship. See Dennis Kux,

Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

¹⁴ Smith refers to these repeated breakups as “divorces.” Kux also cites the pattern of repeated break-ups in his work. Smith examines each of the previous divorces in his paper: the 1965 Indo-Pak War when Pakistan used US-provided weapons against India in a war it started and then lost because, it claimed, the US failed to come to its aid; again in 1971 when Pakistan was cut in half after the Indian intervention crushed its forces and liberated Bangladesh—a war Pakistan also started; the break-up after the Afghan-Soviet war in 1990 (along with nuclear sanctions as discussed earlier); followed by the imposition of additional sanctions in 1998 and 1999. Each period, Smith notes, created further doubt about the worthiness of the other as a reliable partner.

¹⁵ Senator Joseph Biden has written on this pattern in US-Pakistan relations and says the US must move beyond what has historically been a “transactional relationship,” in which the US buys Pakistan’s support for the sole purpose of achieving short-term security goals. This policy, Biden observes, is well-understood by the Pakistanis, who are only too willing to use the US for their own ends. As a result, frustration builds on both sides and new problems emerge. See Joseph Biden, “A New Course on Pakistan,” *Baltimore Sun*, 12 November 2007, 36.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Kux, 360.

¹⁸ Smith believes reestablishing mutual trust is paramount to improving relations. He is generally optimistic on the future of the relationship. Kux, who focuses on the lack of common culture and what he believes are irreconcilable strategic interests, is pessimistic that any enduring relationship can be created. But, Kux’s book was written prior to 9/11, and his views may be outdated. Time will tell.

¹⁹ Kux, 366-368.

²⁰ The next nearest figure was \$ seven billion, which the US pumped into Pakistan during the 1980s to support the *mujahideen* fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

²¹ Many of those militant groups have reorganized under new names and are sitting out the current warm period in US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan, unsure of the US commitment to its long-term security, seems to be hedging on the future utility of these groups, and could easily encourage their revival should the US disengage from Afghanistan and the Indians categorically refuse to discuss resolving the Kashmir dispute. See Ralph Joseph, “Banned Terror Groups Back with New IDs,” *Washington Times*, 7 February 2008, 15. See also Josh Meyer, “Extremist Group Operates Openly in Pakistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, 18 December 2007, p. 1.

²² General Jehangir Karamat (retired), Pakistan Army Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 1997-1999, “The Future of US-Pakistan Relations,” panel discussion, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 6 February 2008. Cited with permission.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid. Karamat also noted that success can be achieved, but that it will take time (perhaps a decade) and considerable resources.

²⁵ Sanger and Roche, sec. 1A, p. 1. See also Ackerman (Internet version).

²⁶ Recent suicide attacks inside Pakistan are targeted at the security forces and secular political leaders, such as the December 27, 2007 attack that killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Pakistani officials claim that terrorists based in the tribal areas are behind the attacks.

²⁷ Eric Schmidt, "Musharraf Warns US Not to Attack within Pakistan," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 January 2008; available from <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/12/asia/pakistan.php>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2008. See also, "Suggestion of Covert US Mission Stirs Anger," *Washington Times*, 7 January 2008, p. 9.

²⁸ General (retired) Anthony Zinni, former Commander, US Central Command, "The Future of US-Pakistan Relations," panel discussion, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 6 February 2008. Cited with permission. Zinni, a strong supporter of the Pakistan Army, stated that any army would face huge challenges operating in the FATA and openly asked whether we [US] have given Pakistan the necessary equipment and training to effectively operate in those areas? Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, also present, agreed with Zinni, and added that the US should be quieter in terms of how it communicates with the Pakistani leadership, especially with regard to criticisms. Armitage's remarks were made in reference to a question about recent comments from unnamed White House officials that the US might consider unilateral action in the FATA if the situation worsens. Such public remarks, he said, "were unhelpful."

²⁹ Sanger and Roche, sec. 1A, p. 1. See also Ackerman (Internet version).

³⁰ Anne Patterson, "Overcoming Extremism in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities." *The Ambassador's Review*, Fall 2007. See also Colum Murphy, "Pakistan's Last Bid for Democracy," *Far East Economic Review*, November 2007, 17-22. Both sources note that sustained economic growth is the underreported success story in Pakistan since 9/11. Economic growth has helped expand an emerging middle class, and a mass-felt desire for political stability. The challenge for Pakistan's leaders is to broaden the benefits of recent economic gains to reach more of the country's 160 million people.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Greg Miller, "US Aid to Pakistan Misses AQ Targets," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 November 2007, p. 1. See also Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, "As Concerns Rise, US Is Reviewing Afghan Mission," *New York Times*, 1 December 2007, sec. 1A, p. 1.

³³ Polling in Pakistan shows a steep drop in support for Musharraf and for US policies, which are broadly perceived as anti-Muslim. See "Poll Finds Pakistanis Democracy," *Boston Globe*, 7 January 2008. The US Institute of Peace conducted the poll. For a percentage breakout of what Pakistanis want (basic services and expanded economic opportunity) see "Democratosis," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 10 October 2007, p. 5.

³⁴ The Frontier Corps is the Army's auxiliary force whose mission is to maintain order in the FATA. Its troops are raised entirely from the tribal areas, which enables the Army to use their knowledge of local terrain, dialects, and customs. But complaints abound from knowledgeable US security officials that the force is untrained and unequipped and to actually fight the militants in the FATA. See Miller, p. 1, and Isambard Wilkinson, "Pakistan Army Failures Put the West in Peril," *London Daily Telegraph*, 11 February 2008 [newspaper online]; available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02/11/wpak111/xml>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2008.

³⁵ Anwar Iqbal, "US Ready to Partner with Pakistan Troops in FATA," *Karachi Dawn*, [newspaper online]; available from <http://www.dawn.com/2008/01/26/top5htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2008.

³⁶ Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, "Musharraf Rebuffs Secret US Plea for CIA Buildup," *New York Times*, 26 January 2008, sec. 1A, p. 1.

³⁷ Pakistani officials report that many of the fighters in the FATA are Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs. All are veteran fighters and have the benefit of fighting on terrain they know better than the Pakistan Army. General Zinni, speaking at Brookings, agreed, stating that even the US Army would be challenged to operate in the tribal areas, given the rugged terrain, limited roads, and the local inhabitants, who tend to exhibit a general hostility to outsiders.

³⁸ The Pakistani claim is only half-right as serious observers all recall the leaky pipeline of the 1980's, particularly regarding accountability on Stinger ground-to-air missiles. The US has a right to demand accountability on sensitive equipment. That said, better mechanisms could be adopted to do inventories when the equipment is being used in combat situations.

³⁹ Joby Warrick, "US and Pakistan: A Frayed Alliance," *Washington Post*, 31 October 2008, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Karamat and Patterson. For a detailed explanation of how the Taliban have disrupted the established tribal system, see Shaukat Qadir, "Defusing Pakistan's Tribal Rebellion," *Far East Economic Review*, November 2007, 10-16.

⁴¹ Andrew Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World," 27 February 2003, available from <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=63>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2008.

⁴² Ibid. Many Pakistanis refer to President Musharraf as "Busharraf," an unkind swipe at US policy and a popular perception that he exists to execute it over the objections of his own people.

⁴³ Zahid Hussain, "Coalition Doesn't Have Votes For Musharraf Impeachment," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 February 2008, p. A2.

⁴⁴ Fareed Zakaria, "This Is Pakistan's War," *Newsweek*, 3 March 2008, p. 33.

⁴⁵ The endstate formulation is the author's own, but borrows from the phraseology used in Nepal by US Ambassador James Moriarty regarding US policy goals in Nepal. The author served as Defense Attache in Nepal from 2005-2007.

⁴⁶ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 311. See also Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan and the Islamists," *Current History*, April 2007, 147. Ronald Neumann, "Borderline Insanity: Thinking Big About Afghanistan," *The American Interest*, November-December 2007, 52. Both argue forcefully that only a sustained US (financial) commitment to the region can correct the mounting problems—as well as undo misguided policies advanced by prior US and Pakistani governments.

⁴⁷ Haqqani, 149.

⁴⁸ This sense of distrust with the staying power of the US is reflected throughout David Smith's report by retired and active serving Pakistan Army generals. See note 10. See also Haqqani, *Between Mosque and Military*, 86, 197. Haqqani cites two historical examples in which the military governments headed by Generals Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq, agreed internally that they could never trust the Americans, but would cooperate and use them accordingly to pursue Pakistan's best interests.

⁴⁹ Christina Lamb, "Just Whose Side Is Pakistan On?" *The Times of London*, 13 August 2007, p. 15.

⁵⁰ When the author, an Army South Asian Foreign Area Officer, informs fellow citizens of his long-term connection to Pakistan, most register little more than a passing knowledge that "a pretty woman" was the leader there once—which itself was an anomaly given the belief that women are treated horribly in Muslim countries. Those who know more, know of poverty, nuclear weapons, and home-grown "terrorists" who seem to be showing up in Europe and elsewhere. In all, the author's assessment is that Pakistan's image in the minds of most Americans is non-existent to deeply negative.

⁵¹ The Chinese and Saudi connections are disturbing. From the Saudis the Pakistanis get oil at reduced prices and job opportunities for workers whose remittances help sustain the Pakistan economy. The Saudis also invest heavily in spreading conservative *Wahabist* Islam, which is largely alien to Pakistan. The Chinese connection extends into the military and economic domains. The most recent development is the Chinese \$200 million investment in building the Port of Gwalor, a facility which could provide porting to the Chinese Navy. See Robert Kaplan, "Lost at Sea," *New York Times* [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/opinion/21kaplan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&ref=opinion; Internet; accessed 24 September 2007.

⁵² Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, "Pakistan's Dr. Doom," *Los Angeles Times*, [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-op-frantz2dec02,0,1189267_story?coll=la-sunday-commentary; Internet; accessed 22 December 2008.

⁵³ Hussain Touquir, "US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond," *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 145*, August 2005, 15.

⁵⁴ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company), 2003. Zakaria observes that UN studies suggest that democracy is unsustainable in states where per capita incomes fall below the \$ 3,000-7,000 range. Pakistan, at \$925, according to US Ambassador Patterson, has a long road ahead and plenty of room for improvement

⁵⁵ Smith, 16. The idea has merit, but any proposed arrangement would face significant opposition.

⁵⁶ At Brookings, General Zinni argued that maintaining military ties is key, while former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage emphasized the need for US policy to support democracy and stability, and not personalities. The two are not mutually exclusive but should advance in parallel, so long as the military retreats from overly interfering in politics.

⁵⁷ For an excellent review of ongoing and future State Department-led initiatives for Pakistan, see Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, *Fortifying Pakistan, The Role of US Internal Security Assistance* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 2006.

⁵⁸ "US, Pakistan Sign New \$750 Million Agreement for FATA Development," 30 September 2007, linked from US Embassy, Islamabad website; available at <http://islamabad.usembassy.gov>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2007.

⁵⁹ Stephen Graham, "Bin Laden Backing Plummet," *Washington Times*, 11 February 2008, p. 14.

⁶⁰ Waleed Ziad, "In Pakistan, Islam Needs Democracy," *New York Times*, [newspaper online]; available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/opinion/16ziad/html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin\\$page](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/opinion/16ziad/html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin$page); Internet, accessed 16 February 2008. Ziad notes that Pakistanis devastated by the quakes referred to US aid helicopters as "Angels of Mercy" and that respect for America soared after the relief operation.

⁶¹ Teresita Schaffer, *Pakistan's Future US Policy Options*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

⁶² The idea to attach conditions to CSF has been raised by numerous Washington D.C.-based think tanks, Congressional staffers, and analysts within DoD. The author agrees the idea has merit.

⁶³ Karamat.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ The author draws on the writings of former US Ambassador Robert Neumann and Colonel (retired) David Smith in making this recommendation. No major, security-related challenge in the region is discreet, and solutions must involve the active involvement of multiple governments. In the author's view, only the US has the capacity and the standing to assist on the level required.

⁶⁶ For example, according to Christine Lamb, 400,000 British citizens visited Pakistan in 2004. The average stay was 41 days. At Brookings, General Karamat claimed he knew of 80 schools in the FATA that were providing military training to students. Recent reports have also hinted that US citizens may be receiving training at such schools. See Peter Grief, "Al Qaeda Still a Threat to US, Intelligence Chiefs Say," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 February 2008, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 340-344. Written well before 9/11, the book is a

superb account of how the US interaction influenced South Asia since 1947. Overall, the author believes US involvement in South Asia has been more negative than positive. He recommends a more detached view, and the avoidance involvement in regional disputes, particularly those between India and Pakistan, or in supporting individuals over institutions. But, again, his approach was made pre-9/11.

⁶⁸ Haqqani, *Pakistan, Between Mosque and Military*, 311-312.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 326. Haqqani's concluding chapter is a must read for those interested in understanding the accumulated dysfunction of 60 years of US-Pakistan relations.

⁷⁰ The author is not suggesting that the US is responsible for Pakistan's inability to consolidate democracy or build a stable polity. However, only the US, working closely with Pakistan for an extended period, is the most likely way Pakistan will be able to overcome its mounting instability and began to build a more enduring, inclusive, and stable democratic structure. This is a view shared by Pakistan experts, Husain Haqqani and Zaheed Husein, among others.

⁷¹ For an excellent account of what happened in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure, see Steven Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004). Coll traces the rise of the Taliban and the coming of Al Qaeda to Afghanistan to a breakdown in Afghanistan resulting from the US walking away after the Soviet departure. See also Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

⁷² The claim that the US departed and left Pakistan to manage the fallout from the Afghan War, (what is now termed the "blowback") is a frequent criticism leveled against the US Government by senior Pakistani officials, as well as many US scholars. The author has heard the critique in harsh terms on many occasions, mostly from Pakistanis who remain bitter about the war's aftermath, but many senior US officials concur with the assessment.

⁷³ The author first heard the phrase used while serving as an exchange student at the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in 1995. The origin of the phrase is unknown, but the author has heard it uttered by senior US and Pakistan government officials on numerous occasions. Pakistanis refer to the "the three A's" as the only powers capable of saving the country.

⁷⁴ General Zinni, for example, speaks repeatedly about how military ties, built-up over decades, have sustained a level of contact and affection between the two militaries independent of the politics of the day.

