A STRATEGIC CULTURE ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE

by

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This study examines the transatlantic security divide through the strategic culture lens, taking a comparative case study approach. It analyzes the emergent EU strategic culture by looking at the European Security Strategy, European security elite speeches, and ESDP operations. It examines the same evidence to determine the predominant trends in American strategic culture during Operation Iraqi Freedom and finds the greatest divide in the ideational foundation of operations, particularly as concerns perceptions of legitimacy. In the area of multilateralism, there is a greater similarity than is usually argued as concerns ad hoc coalitions of the willing: the EU forms coalitions with non-EU partners, allows individual members to decide whether to contribute troops and thus carry financial obligations or not, and now opens up the possibility for ‘structured enhanced cooperation’ in ESDP, despite the legitimacy derived from institutionalized cooperation stressed in public. The use of force only as a last resort is upheld by both in public diplomacy; however, in reality both keep all options open of when to act, even though the EU does stress less the use of force and more crisis prevention and non-military tools, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq was instrumentally declared as a last resort.
ABSTRACT

This study examines the transatlantic security divide through the strategic culture lens, taking a comparative case study approach. It analyzes the emergent EU strategic culture by looking at the European Security Strategy, European security elite speeches, and ESDP operations. It examines the same evidence to determine the predominant trends in American strategic culture during Operation Iraqi Freedom and finds the greatest divide in the ideational foundation of operations, particularly as concerns perceptions of legitimacy. In the area of multilateralism, there is a greater similarity than is usually argued as concerns ad hoc coalitions of the willing: the EU forms coalitions with non-EU partners, allows individual members to decide whether to contribute troops and thus carry financial obligations or not, and now opens up the possibility for ‘structured enhanced cooperation’ in ESDP, despite the legitimacy derived from institutionalized cooperation stressed in public. The use of force only as a last resort is upheld by both in public diplomacy; however, in reality both keep all options open of when to act, even though the EU does stress less the use of force and more crisis prevention and non-military tools, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq was instrumentally declared as a last resort.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The analysis and assessment of differences of policy and strategy across the Atlantic have a prominent place in security studies since the foundation of NATO in 1949.¹ The maintenance of consensus among statesmen, parliamentarians and generals and internal crisis management in instances of sharp division kept this divide from becoming too large, despite constant fear by all concerned of the collapse of the alliance. Such policy helped win the Cold War and transformed the world from a bi-polar structure to the U.S. predominance of the recent past. Realist theory predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union would fatally wound NATO, due to the loss of its *raison d'être*.² The outbreak of peace would in turn widen the divide between each side of the Atlantic. Despite the most dim scenarios painted by theorists, pundits, and political wags, NATO has not passed away since 1989, but has instead seen its first peace support operations, including combat, to say nothing of its enlargements in 1999 and 2004. What has taken place since 1989, however, is a widening of the divide between the two sides of the Atlantic – especially since the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. In particular, the United States’ post 9/11 doctrine of preemption is the polar opposite of the European propensity for extensive diplomacy, multilateralism and a policy of prevention.


During the 1990s, the European Union (EU) gave birth to its own security policy and structures that enable it to act without the United States assistance or approval.\(^3\) The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and associated European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provide the guidance and capacity to gather forces, allowing Europeans to forum shop between NATO and the EU when conducting security-related operations. If identical ideas, policies, and methods drove Europeans and Americans to achieve similar objectives, conflicts between the two institutions should be minimal. However, the proponents of U.S. unilateralism in conflict with the proponents of a policy of an EU third path in world politics, as well as painfully familiar conflicts of spheres of influence between the powers over the Middle East have meant that a number of areas of new, virulent contention have emerged.\(^4\) The outstanding example of this divide has been former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s referral in early 2003 to ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe in an obvious attempt to shift the divide so that it was not between the U.S. and Europe, but instead between the European countries --- one group of which was perceived to be closer to the U.S.\(^5\) While he was temporarily successful in garnering a few allies to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis of the “mission defines the coalition”, the divide between the U.S. and some continental European powers worsened surely for a couple of years and with little tangible benefit to anyone save the enemies of the U.S. and Europe. Now that Rumsfeld, Schroeder and Chirac have exited the scene, a certain Atlantic rapprochement has occurred (notably


\(^5\) Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 128.
with the example of Sarkozy’s France), but one still must wonder whether a new phase of unexpected crisis as in 2002 and 2003 could not sunder relations once more.

This study’s primary purpose is to assess the current state of the transatlantic security divide without resort to the pointless finger pointing and name calling that suffocated the era 2002-2005. Specifically, this work attempts to uncover the different dispositions of Americans and Europeans as to the use of force, highlighted in the debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq. What are the ideational driving forces behind EU-led missions, based on member-state consensus, and how do these motivational forces differ, if at all, from the American ones driving the invasion of Iraq? It is easy to say that different sides of the Atlantic are motivated by different preferences, but this study pursues the more rigorous objective of framing these differences in the context of the corpus of social science theory.

A. INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC CULTURE

In order to assess these differences, this study will look at transatlantic relations through the social constructivist’s lens of strategic culture. There are multiple definitions of strategic culture, but this study will use Christopher Meyer’s definition as a way to measure both the ideational roots of political behavior, as well as the behavior itself. He defines strategic culture as “the socially-transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a
community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.” In his work assessing the convergence of national European strategic cultures, he focuses on four European countries and finds there to be a measurable degree of convergence between some areas of their respective strategic cultures. This study will build on his findings, but concentrate on a different level of analysis. It will compare the collectively shared corpus of norms, ideas and behavior of the emerging transnational European strategic culture as reflected in ESDP activities to the United States’ national strategic culture as reflected in the invasion of Iraq through a focused, comparative case study.

While these two different levels of analysis – one a composite institutional actor, one a state actor – may at first seem incongruent to the task, the difference between the two levels hold less meaning to this study because of its focus on peace operations. In the current world of international security operations, the United States and the European Union are arguably two of the most important actors. That one of them is a state and the other is a conglomeration of states does not preclude an analysis focused on the ideational factors leading up to their policy declarations and behavioral decisions. The U.S. behavior is observable through unilateral or coalition operations and is comparable to collective European behavior visible through collectively authorized EU operations. By understanding the different ideational roots guiding decision-making on security operations on either side of the Atlantic, one can better understand the current state of the divergence between U.S. and European military action. And from such a better understanding one can draw more

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appropriate policy recommendations aimed at reducing the divide should the United States wish to benefit from future cooperation with the European Union.

In the past, any intra-Alliance dissent of how to react to world events was overshadowed by the Soviet threat, which provided strong incentives for the alliance to minimize internal conflict. Within this context, Western Europe was utterly dependent on the U.S. for ultimate protection from an attack by the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet threat was the glue that held the transatlantic alliance together regardless of internal differences. Now that this glue is gone, the security environment has fundamentally changed, and a new security institution has arisen, one must seek qualitatively to understand the impact of this phenomenon on transatlantic relations. The focus here, however, is not on an institution, even though institutions and their accompanying theories provide valuable insight into EU culture. Instead, the focus lies on the ideas guiding national and institutional behavior and their presence in the here and now of policy. Such an effort has the signal virtue of allowing some rational assessment of means and ends without the regrettable tendency to suffocate in rhetoric and posturing.

**B. IMPORTANCE**

For the sake of the U.S. national interest, to say nothing of the wider interest and purposes which U.S. policy hopes to fulfill, U.S. policy-makers must understand the emerging European strategic culture, its implications for U.S. and NATO policy and the specter of possible future conflict about ends and means that it evokes. The political implications of the transatlantic rift further widening or, vice versa, narrowing again are far-ranging. A rift that begins with disagreement over security-related operations could easily spill over to other areas of cooperation and world affairs, given the importance of these two partners. U.S. cooperation with world partners is one of the most important
factors enabling the success of U.S. foreign policy endeavors.⁷ A U.S. and Europe who are united in their strategy would have a much greater chance of wielding influence in international affairs while a Europe opposed to U.S. policy could have substantial negative impact on U.S. achievement of its objectives. By understanding more accurately the difference between these strategic cultures, decision-makers in the United States can modify policy decisions in order to maintain leadership vis-a-vis an increasingly independent European security apparatus. U.S. policy makers can also understand how to align the ideational motives behind security operations in order to increase the chance of European cooperation. The consideration of this divide is also important in the United States’ decision regarding the level of influence it wishes to yield over its European allies. If it indeed wishes to prevent the European pillar from becoming a completely independent arm of security policy (something actually sought to some degree in the wake of founding the transatlantic security alliance in 1948/49⁸), then it will need to lessen the divide, assuming the future continues to hold no looming threat.

Academically, this study intends to contribute to a further understanding of the limitations and benefits of using an ideational lens to analyze policy decisions regarding security operations. The transatlantic security rift rarely is studied through a security culture lens. My thesis builds on previous work that analyzed national strategic cultures, and transfers some of these insights to the emerging collective European level of strategic culture. It diverges from those works and others, though, by including a behavioral dimension, military operations, trying to assess the transatlantic security divide by comparing U.S. and EU operations since 2003. The earliest of the ESDP operations (in Macedonia and Congo in 2003) demonstrated an increasing EU willingness to launch its own operations.

⁷ Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 20.
By including actual behavior, complemented by guiding documents and elite rhetoric, this thesis hopes to shed new light on the transatlantic security divide.

C. METHODOLOGY

Based on Farrell’s finding that a study of the causal relationship between ideational factors and policy behavior can produce fruitful results,9 this study will attempt a “structured, focused comparison”10 between the strategic cultures of the United States and the European Union in order to investigate more accurately the state of the current divide. Similar to Meyer’s previously mentioned study on convergence, this analysis will study the state of divergence by comparing strategic cultures on either side of the Atlantic. This work will also build on one of Meyer’s “surprise findings” that domestic political views were influential in shaping strategic culture and security decisions.11 Since the states under this study’s microscope are liberal western democracies whose governing elites can change from one election to the next, this study assumes that a given political party, when elected into office, may raise certain elements within a heterogeneous strategic culture to the forefront and downplay others.

This study does not aspire to undertake the difficult task of discovering the causal pathway linking ideas and behavior, but instead focuses on how different motivations can be revealed through a controlled examination of guiding documents, elite speeches and behavioral choices, allowing cumulative findings derived from multiple sources. Originally intended to explain why the Soviet nuclear strategy was different from U.S. nuclear strategy, first attempts at strategic culture analysis are today considered overly deterministic by some constructivists.12 However, this study borrows heavily from Colin Gray’s counter

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11 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 12.
12 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 37.
to this critique: strategic culture is most valuable when used as an intervening variable that provides context and thereby helps understand behavior. In his words: “above all else, strategic culture should be approached as the context that can provide understanding of what behavior means.”\(^\text{13}\) This study follows his advice and uses his critique of the constructivist approach as the lens through which to understand the different strategic cultures and provide a valuable assessment of their differences.

Even with the afore-mentioned critiques of strategic culture, there still exists room within the theory to study and “observe the unobservable.”\(^\text{14}\) The ‘unobservables’ in this context are the very attributes of strategic culture, which shape the policy decisions and behavioral choices of both nations and international organizations. The challenge then lies in how one defines the strategic culture embodied by a state, which itself is a composite actor with many subcultures, or a conglomeration of states. In its effort to base strategic culture on specific pieces of evidence, the focus here will be on guiding security strategy documents, elite speeches, and actual behavioral choices. Behavioral choices in this context are the actual military operations undertaken by the U.S. and the European Union within the bounded timeframe. In a departure from first and second generational studies of strategic culture which assumed a long historical context was a necessary determinant of strategic culture, this study borrows on Lantis’ argument that a significant event has the potential to set strategic cultures on a different path.\(^\text{15}\) It is supposed here that the system shock of 9/11, followed by the invasion of Iraq, was such an event for U.S. strategic culture. The initial ESDP operational choices provide an opportunity to look at the ideational differences guiding operational choices at this unique moment in time. This is not meant to assert that operations are only understandable by analyzing the

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 68.
\(^\text{15}\) Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Strategic Insights IV, no. 10 (October 2005): 8.
strategic cultures guiding them. Strategic culture is used in this study as a way to compare the rationales guiding United States’ and European military operations.

After a conceptual chapter on security culture, the empirical part of this study will focus on ESDP operations since 2003, and a comparable study of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. To date there have been more than 17 completed or ongoing operations under the authority of the EU. This study will look specifically at the EU operations conducted so far; they are not just military, but also include police and civilian interventions and will be referred to as activities, operations, or interventions. It will look at these operations in the aggregate, thus trying to filter those overarching characteristics all of them share, in order to compare them afterwards with the invasion of Iraq. Each of these pieces of evidence will be examined for specific indications of strategic culture in order to assess the current state of the ideational divide across the Atlantic. Borrowing from Meyer’s rigorous assessment of the convergence of European national strategic cultures, this study will ask the following four questions in each of the case studies:

1) What was the professed reason for intervention in another country?

2) How much did the actors stress a need for international legitimacy, including UN Security Council authorization, before an operation was initiated?

3) How important was multilateralism for the actors? And how did they understand multilateralism, specifically with regard to international organizations?

4) How much did the actors rely on diplomacy before engaging with military forces?

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17 Adapted from Meyer’s findings in Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, as well as Gray’s description that capturing strategic culture is about capturing the ideas and the behaviors that result from strategy decisions in Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context.”
Each of these questions has its own intricacies. Applicable to three of them are the questions of whether or not the need for legitimacy, multilateralism, or exhausted diplomatic activity was considered an absolute prerequisite to the undertaken operations. Is there evidence that those three factors were sought, but that the operations would have proceeded even if there was no progress in attaining those attributes? Or, does the evidence support that the operation was in jeopardy of not proceeding based on the lack of one of those three preconditions? The questions are also not binary, but instead offer a spectrum on which the answer may lie. There may be cases where an attempt was made in terms of rhetoric, but in the end the operation proceeded without attaining the stated objective. In the most favorable of circumstances, there will be a clear need for a certain precondition, without which the operation would have been cancelled. However, since this study is limited to operations that have been undertaken, that evidence will only be visible in the rhetoric or debate prior to the operation. Also, by limiting the study to operations that have been undertaken or are ongoing, this study looks at only the most important and universally accepted ideas to which actors are committed, by virtue of the fact that these operations receive a portion of the limited resources available to each entity.

In measuring the divide, it is not enough to say that there is or is not a discernible divide. Instead, this study seeks to characterize the divide based on each of the factors mentioned in the questions above. The first comparison will concentrate on ideas as reflected in the security strategies. Content analysis is crucial here, looking at both similarities and differences. This same information will be obtained from the speeches of the primary representatives, President Bush and EU High Representative Solana, as well as those others speaking for the respective entities. Lastly, after analyzing the completed and ongoing operations, the conclusion will aim at determining which areas reveal the most agreement and which the most disagreement. I will finish by offering some specific policy recommendation on how to bridge those gaps.
D. EXPECTATIONS

This thesis expects to find that the current neo-conservative ideational foundation of U.S. security operations is considerably diverging from the Kantian ideals expressed in NATO's charter and, even more so, in the European security strategy. It expects to find that the enlargement and diversity of the European Union has held it to operations that embody the ideal of highly legitimized, multilateral use of force as an act of last resort after extensive diplomatic effort. If correct, this is indicative of very different strategic cultures on either side of the Atlantic that would pose significant barriers to future security cooperation. Without a significant shift in strategic culture on either side of the Atlantic, this would allow only joint operations in future based on those areas where both still overlap. However, with the knowledge expected to be gained from this study, specific policy choices on the part of the EU or the U.S. could lead to a narrowing of the perceived divide and an increase in future cooperation.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The following discussion intends to lay the theoretical foundation for how strategic culture is to be used in this analysis. The first section explains why strategic culture was chosen as the analytical lens for this study. By focusing on one elucidating debate, it explains why neither realism, nor institutional liberalism are appropriate to the task at hand. The main section explores what has previously been written about strategic culture and some examples of how it has been used in earlier studies. Specifically, it will detail what are considered to be the three generations of thought on strategic culture, including how strategic culture theorists argue is the best way for obtaining information about the strategic culture of a certain entity. This section also acknowledges the theoretical limitations of strategic culture and how this study narrows its focus in order to minimize those challenges. The concluding section re-captures the methodology of how to utilize the strategic culture approach in the ensuing case study comparisons.

B. WHY THE USE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE?

In a study published in 2004, Thomas Mowle asked a similar research question: “Why, despite their professed similarity of goals, do the policy preferences of the European Union (EU) and United States diverge on so many multilateral issues?” His answer, after a study of twenty different case studies ranging between environmental, arms control, human rights, and military cooperation issues resulted in a finding that American preferences are predicted better by realist theories, while European positions are “often consistent with

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18 Thomas S. Mowle, Allies at Odds?: The United States and the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1 (italics used by original author).
liberal institutional expectations, European behavior in the end also tends to be consistent with realist expectations.”

These results beg the question of why, then, does this analysis use a comparative cultural approach when a previous comparison of U.S. and EU behavior found these actors’ behavior most aligned with realism’s expectations. This study is fundamentally different by focusing on the simpler task of trying to flush out the ideational differences between these two actors, as opposed to involving itself in a causality argument. Mowle’s analysis focused on which theory fit better to a wide range of topics between the U.S. and EU as the principle actors. Another minor difference is the scope of this study. It intends to study EU operations that mostly occurred after Mowle’s study was completed.

In 1999, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik wrote a compelling article asking if anyone was still a realist. This single article elucidates many of the reasons why these other theories were not chosen for this study. In that article, they pointed out realism’s three fundamental tenets: the primary actors are unitary states in an anarchical system; those states have competing interests, and ‘material capabilities’ are what matter most in pursuing those interests. Legro and Moravcsik went on to recommend that for realist theory to maintain its theoretical soundness, its “claims should therefore be limited to circumstances in which states are motivated by strong and symmetrical underlying conflicts in preferences… or situations where the cost of coercion is so low that its cost-effective use is feasible.” This analysis chose not to use realism because of its lack of focus on ideas and motivations, as explained by this article.

In the same article, Legro and Moravcsik argue that institutionalist theory “contains theories and explanations that stress the role of international

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19 Mowle, Allies at Odds?: The United States and the European Union, 147.
20 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 5-55.
21 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist," 16-17.
22 Ibid., 49.
institutions, norms, and information,”23 which would be helpful to this analysis if it were a comparison of two institutions such as NATO and the EU. Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander’s “brand of institutionalism relies heavily on contractual theories in economics and on the rationality assumption,”24 which also looks more at the interaction of institutions and how that interaction affects institutional behavior. Similarly, Thomas Risse-Kappen presents liberal institutionalism as a Kant-inspired “pacific federation,” or what he refers to, by borrowing from Karl Deutsch, as a “pluralistic security community.”25 Even though the present study is centrally focused on the EU as an institution, it is not focused specifically, as these three authors point out, on the insight provided by institutionalist theories as to the bargaining outcomes and processes specific to institutions. Instead, this study’s focus is narrowly confined to a comparative analysis of why these two agencies (one a state and the other an international organization) are embarking on specific security-related operations, and so again, it focuses on strategic culture as the context used to understanding the differences between the ideas guiding the two respective entities.

C. STRATEGIC CULTURE

The concept of strategic culture traces its roots to the Cold War, and is generally broken down into three ‘generations’ of thought on the subject.26 First generation strategic culture literature, centering around Jack Snyder, generally focused its effort on explaining how Soviet culture caused the Soviet leadership to perceive information differently than the West, and how that different perception caused them to make strategic nuclear calculations that did not

25 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 29-34.
necessarily conform to rational (and Western) realist expectations. Surveyors of the second generation of strategic culture, which is situated in the late 1980s around Colin Gray, agree less about that generation’s trends. According to Johnston, these authors argued that decision-makers primarily use strategic culture arguments instrumentally to legitimate their policies. Lantis, however, singles out reference to historical foundations as the common theme among second generation theorists of strategic culture. What is common across both generations is the search for understanding the impact of ideational factors upon strategic decisions, as opposed to the more common realist considerations of the time, focusing on material capabilities, power, or threat.

There were multiple critiques of first and second-generation research of strategic culture, which helped form the ‘third generation’ of constructivist origin. These critiques are salient to the theoretical constructs of this analysis. Johnston argued that first generation analysts were over-deterministic and because culture explained everything, it explained nothing. Following Gray’s response to this critique, that strategic culture is not easily confined to a falsifiable theory, this study does not adhere to Johnston’s more stringent requirement that strategic culture has to be falsifiable in order for it to be a viable social science theory. This study uses, as his title recommends, strategic culture as an intervening variable that provides context and thereby increases the understanding of


32 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 49.
observed behavior. This analysis turns to strategic culture because it can provide the ideational context about policy choices and behavior that are conducive to a comparative analysis.

The analysis now turns to some of the problems associated with the use of strategic culture as a theoretical basis. One of the more important debates in the realm of strategic culture is the linkage between ideas and behavior. In contrast to Gray’s assertion of the inclusion of both behavior and ideas within the conceptualization of strategic culture, Johnston says they must be separated by in order to use strategic culture as an independent variable that influences the dependent variable of behavior.33 Johnston says that strategic culture is “a system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”34 Another scholar who separates culture from behavior is John Duffield who says that behavior is influenced by culture, but not a part of it.35 Like Johnston, he asserts that culture helps “define the basic goals,” “shapes perception of the external environment,” affects the potential behaviors and responses to events, and “strongly influences the evaluation of the seemingly available options and thus the choices that are made among them.”36 The problem with completely separating ideas from behavior is that ideas are unobservable. Unless the researcher has a detailed survey from all of the elites of a given community, revealing their ‘attitudes and ideas’ that lead to certain security-related decisions,

33 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 44, see footnote 25.
36 Ibid., 771-772.
there is no way to capture these “unobservables.” Without the ability to conclusively identify the ideas embedded in the strategic culture that produce specific behaviors, it is very difficult to prove causality by posing ideas as the independent variable.

This analysis attempts to overcome this difficulty by taking two structural decisions. First, it does not set out to accomplish the more rigorous task of proving causality. As mentioned before, it uses strategic culture as an intervening variable that helps frame an understanding, in order to allow for a valid comparison, without tackling the more daunting task of posing an independent variable that causes the behavioral choices under review. Second, by incorporating behavior as a piece of evidence, in addition to the guiding documents and rhetoric, the comparative study becomes more robust than a comparison that limits its evidence to only the discussion of ideas. In addition to behavior, Farrel also cites “public statements and confidential papers of policy and political policy elites”, and public opinion polls, as a way to find tangible evidence of strategic culture. Johnstone says that evidence of strategic culture could include “the writings, debates, thoughts and words of culture-bearing units such as strategists, military leaders and national security elites; weapons designs and deployments; war plans; images of war and peace portrayed in various media; military ceremonies; even war literature.” Meyer argues that “speeches, statements, and documents may well be expressions of strategic culture, but they should be analyzed systematically and ideally juxtaposed to other evidence such as public opinion polls, newspaper articles, oral evidence, or elite surveys.” These authors argue that strategic culture is a valid independent variable that can affect a dependent variable of policy choices. It is not that this study disagrees with this argument, but instead has chosen a different way to

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38 Ibid., 60.
39 Johnstone, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 49.
40 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, 4.
use strategic culture. This study includes behavior, as Gray recommends, within its conception of strategic culture as a pragmatic way to develop a richer account of the context surrounding each political entity’s behavioral choices. Given these recommendations, this analysis has settled on the use of governing documents, elite speeches, and specific operations as the evidence to be used in order to provide an indication of the two strategic cultures for comparative purposes. By taking a snapshot in time, this study also brings to light the complex question of whether or not strategic culture is be considered a malleable or permanent construct.

In addition to the debate about the inclusion of behavior into the definition of strategic culture, there is also a debate about a strategic culture’s permanence. Johnson unequivocally argues that for an idea or norm to be considered a part of its strategic culture, then that construct must enjoy a degree of permanence. One must remember, however, that Johnston sets out to prove causality by marking strategic culture as an independent variable, and in order to strengthen the case for causality, he argues that strategic culture must be found over a long period of time in order for it to have a direct impact on behavior. In this comparative analysis, which uses strategic culture as an intervening variable, this analysis side more with the authors who argue that strategic culture can change over short periods of time, given certain circumstances. Jeffrey Lantis argues that “external shocks” may cause a significant change to strategic culture. In addition, he argues that certain norms within a community’s strategic culture coming into conflict with one another can also result in behavior that is not previously within the confines of a community’s strategic culture. Even though the majority of scholars regard culture as persistent, changing though incrementally over time, sharp changes in

42 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 52.
strategic culture seem to be possible, given circumstances, such as the catalytic event on September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the formation of a new transnational actor such as the EU’s CFSP and ESDP.

In addition to the debate about the inclusion of behavior into the definition of strategic culture, there is also this debate about a strategic culture’s permanence. Johnson unequivocally argues that for an idea or norm to be considered a part of its strategic culture, that construct must enjoy a degree of permanence. One must remember, however, that Johnston sets out to prove causality by marking strategic culture as an independent variable, and in order to strengthen the case for causality, he argues that strategic culture must be found over a long period of time in order for it to have a direct impact on behavior. In this comparative analysis, which uses strategic culture as an intervening variable, and as a tool to provide a richer comparative analysis, it is accepted that system shocks can also change a strategic culture in a shorter period of time just as other changes take place over a longer period of time. Jeffrey Lantis is one such advocate who argues that “external shocks” may cause a significant change to strategic culture. In addition, he argues that a conflict among norms can also result in behavior that is not previously within the confines of a community’s strategic culture. Even though the majority of scholars regard culture as persistent, changing though incrementally over time, sharp changes in strategic culture seem to be possible, given circumstances, such as the catalytic event on September 11, 2001. By accepting this event as a critical juncture that greatly affected the strategic culture of the U.S., this study focuses on the predominant trends of the strategic culture that emerged after this event. Speaking of the elements of a strategic culture that ‘rise to be the most visible’ brings to light the

45 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 52.
fact that one political entity’s strategic culture may contain many diverse elements: the challenge of heterogeneity.

The final problem this study’s approach must overcome is the widely held assumption of a “homogeneity of a society’s culture across time.” How much heterogeneity does a strategic culture allow to still speak of one culture? When this issue is raised to the level of an international organization, such as the EU, more diversity leads to an even more difficult assessment of what can be defined as strategic culture. Even in the assessment of one state, there are many components and trends within a strategic culture because any state is a composite actor with many subcultures. Here is one other area where the inclusion of behavior in the definition of strategic culture helps elucidate which subculture has become predominant in certain phases. In order to surmount these difficulties, this study confines its focus to minimize the problem’s relevance. As to the American culture, this study is narrowly confined to the currently dominant U.S. strategic culture as reflected in the administration’s policy choice to affect regime change in Iraq. While this case study does exclude other elements of American strategic culture, it serves as a marker from which to analyze this study’s limited purpose: an analysis of the state of the transatlantic security divide at one of its most critical moments. In order to solve the heterogeneity problem encountered with an analysis of the strategic culture embodied by ESDP operations, this article employs a small meshed filter. By only using evidence that was authorized by all EU member states, this study focuses only on the ideas and norms that are mutually agreeable to EU member

\[47\] Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 38; see also Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 58; Glenn, Howlett, and Poore, Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture; and Frank Reimers, Security Cultures in Times of War: How did the Balkan War affect the Security Cultures in Germany and the United States? (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007): 19 for a further discussions of the problem of heterogeneity in strategic culture.

\[48\] This point is one of the fundamental arguments about a European Strategic Culture. It is discussed thoroughly in the next chapter on the substance of European Strategic Culture. See especially Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), chapter 6.
nations and therefore part of its collective strategic culture, despite the considerable differences between the national strategic cultures still persisting throughout Europe.49

The final element of this study to discuss are the boundaries of European strategic culture. As concerns content, I will restrict myself mainly to military operations; thus, the term strategic culture is here preferred over the more encompassing term security culture (put Howorth then in footnote). Jolyon Howorth mentions that he prefers the term “security culture” to “this cocktail that theoreticians and political scientists have called ‘strategic culture,” because he “thinks it is more neutral politically and because I believe it is more appropriate for whatever collective mindset is in fact taking shape in the EU.” 50 As concerns spatial boundaries, cultures always have cores and peripheries, where cultures fray out. Thus, boundaries are fluid and fuzzy. And why not? Theory can well take account of such a state of affairs and retain its validity and practicality. This study focuses on the EU and the culture emerging within it. Such refers specifically to the transnational strategic culture that has emerged thus far within the confines of the EU, limiting its focus on the operations that have been conducted under the auspices of ESDP. The study leaves open in how far other European countries outside the EU realm share the norms and ideas of the EU core. Instead, it concentrates on the norms and ideas that are reflected within the architecture of ESDP. Each country that has a vote within the confines of ESDP contributes to this transnational strategic culture (or what shall also be referred to as EU security culture within this paper) by approving certain activities or disapproving others. These debates and actions have launched a new collective actor into the field of security policy.

49 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; and Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union.
50 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 178.
III. EUROPEAN CASE STUDY

A. THE STATE OF CURRENT RESEARCH

Against the backdrop of what exactly constitutes the broader topic of strategic culture in general are arguments about the specific current makeup of European and American strategic cultures. This study sides with those who argue that a European strategic culture is indeed in the making and attempts to characterize what has emerged thus far. Christopher Meyer, while not specifically talking about the transnational EU strategic culture, found convergence among national European strategic cultures on the legitimacy to use force for humanitarian purposes and the “acceptance of the EU as an appropriate framework for security and defense policy.”51 However, in contrast to his findings of convergence, he still finds areas of disagreement among European countries concerning alignment with United States, which is viewed as more likely to use “force to advance political and economic interests, or to use force abroad in high risk situations.”52 In conclusion, Meyer argues that a specific European strategic culture has emerged and exists based on a “relatively narrow basis in terms of norms and social cohesion, but supporting a model of a cautious Humanitarian Power Europe.”53

Ian Manners agrees that although there is disagreement about the exact nature of the European strategic culture, it has emerged and is embodied in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS).54 Adrian Hyde-Price finds many differences in the national strategic cultures of Europeans based on different experiences during the same formative period. He argues that although the

51 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, 11 (see n. 5).
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
experiences that were incorporated into each nation’s strategic culture were different, they all stem from the same formative events: World War II and the first years of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{55} Because of the shared formative period, he argues that the only commonality between national strategic cultures is based on the tenets that “war should be avoided at any cost,” and that armed forces should primarily be used for “deterrence and territorial defense.”\textsuperscript{56}

Cornish and Edwards disagree slightly with the notion that European Union strategic culture is quite so reluctant to use force and instead cite “preventive engagement”\textsuperscript{57} as a more appropriate way to define the strategic culture embodied in the European Security Strategy. By ‘preventive engagement,’ they are not referring exclusively to the use of force, but also to the European Security Strategy’s emphasis on diplomacy and other tools at its disposal that can prevent humanitarian crises, especially in failed or failing states.\textsuperscript{58}

Each of these views of European strategic culture finds that a degree of strategic culture does exist at the collective level, distinct from the different national cultures. Dissenters disagree that a strong European strategic culture can exist because of the inherent differences in national strategic cultures.\textsuperscript{59} In one such view, Sten Rynning argues that the European national strategic cultures are too diverse, and at best, can only produce coalitions of willing partners who happen to agree on individual security operations.\textsuperscript{60} Jolyon Howorth also points out that many realists “take it for granted that the EU, as an entity of 27 nation-states with different strategic cultures, has no chance


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 494.
whatsoever of gradually forging a coherent and consensual strategic culture of its own.”61 This realist argument, though, slightly contradicts his statement that a European Union strategic culture has not yet emerged, but is in the process of emerging.62 Ultimately, this controversy is about the amount of homogeneity versus heterogeneity needed to talk of one culture, with a threshold almost impossible to set. The starting point of this study is that a collective European strategic culture has indeed emerged and is visible in the norms articulated by the European Security Strategy and ESDP operations, thus sharing the assumption that is increasingly gaining ground in studies on transnational European strategic culture.

Jolyon Howorth cites Christopher Meyer and Bastian Giegerich as having produced the two most important arguments about European strategic culture. Both works’ findings bear elaboration to this study.63 After developing his definition of strategic culture that includes both ideas and behavior, Meyer surveys vast amounts of data in order to measure “normative change in different national settings as well as over time.”64 He chose to study the UK, France, Germany, and Poland. He selected the first three because of their extensive economic resources and military capability and Poland because “it is the most outspoken of the newly acceded member states from Central and Eastern Europe.”65 He found that the national European strategic cultures were, in fact, converging, but not in every aspect regarding the use of force.66 He also found areas where convergence does not take place: in the level of cooperation with the U.S., “use of force to advance economic and political interests, or to use force abroad in high-risk situations.”67 He also cites as a “surprising finding” “the

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 179.
65 Ibid., 7.
66 Ibid., 11.
67 Ibid.
extent to which attitudes to the use of force can vary within national societies across political affiliation, age, and between elites and the general public,“\textsuperscript{68} which is simply an elaboration on the problem of heterogeneity within a given entity’s strategic culture. Bastian Giegerich’s study, on the other hand, looks at the pressures of adaptation to national strategic cultures. He finds that the “adaptation of those national cultures to an emerging European strategic culture was ‘gradual and limited but driven by constant interaction and the emergence of collective norms.”\textsuperscript{69} Also of relevance is his finding that “medium adaptation pressures” produce the most convergence with a European strategic culture. On the other hand, when the European strategic culture differs greatly from the national strategic culture, the reaction is to revert to national strategic culture and “disengage from that element of European strategic culture.”\textsuperscript{70}

B. FORMATION OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

In order to capture the essence of a transnational European strategic culture, I will now first give a very brief historical background of how the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) came into being.\textsuperscript{71} ESDP was borne from the St. Malo declaration formulated by the UK and France in December, 1998. This declaration signified, among its most important attributes, the elimination of a long-held British resistance to a military force separate from NATO. This had been one of the most significant barriers to the EU as a security actor for the previous decade,\textsuperscript{72} even though the French and British sought

\textsuperscript{68} Meyer, \textit{The Quest for a European Strategic Culture}, 12.


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 189.

\textsuperscript{71} For a more complete description, see Jolyon Howorth, \textit{Security and Defence Policy in the European Union}; Andrew Cottey, “The European Dimension of Defense Reform: From the WEU to the EU’s New Defense Role,” in \textit{Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States}, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (New York: Brassey’s, 2002): 19-35. See also David Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, which also provides insight into US-EU relations in NATO that also affected the formation of ESDP.

\textsuperscript{72} David Yost, personal interview, Naval Postgraduate School (January 29, 2008).
ESDP for different reasons. During this time, France had pushed for the EU to gain a security apparatus as a way to exert its own autonomy while lessening the importance of the U.S. in security affairs, while the British sought a capable European security apparatus as a way to maintain the Atlantic alliance. Once the British agreed that the EU needed “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises,” ESDP was born. Howorth cites four reasons for the development of the ESDP that help frame an understanding of the European Security Strategy. He cites “the lessening strategic importance of Europe for the U.S.,” which motivated the British to increase the European capability as a way to maintain the transatlantic ties through more European burden-sharing. The second and third reason Howorth articulates are closely related: the growing international willingness to intervene “in the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights and right humanitarian wrongs” and the ensuing need to do so as demonstrated by the Kosovo tragedy. Lastly, Howorth argues that ESDP resulted from the EU’s internal motivation to be more than an economic actor. These same reasons eventually helped spawn the generation of a European Security Strategy.

C. EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was signed on December 12, 2003. Its opening statement speaks to a Europe that “has never been so

76 Ibid., 54-55.
77 Ibid., 56.
The timing is important to note. The ESS was released in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and after the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 had been released. After a comparison of these two documents, Berenskoetter concludes that the U.S. NSS is “more driven by idealistic or utopian thinking than its European counterpart,” which he argues is “a more ‘realistic’ approach to international security.” It is also important to note that the document was not drafted by the member states, but by Javier Solana at the direction of the European Union Council of Ministers, highlighting its transnational character.

In addition to these comments, a comparative analysis by Simon Duke brings out additional salients, especially about the difference between the ESS draft and the final version. The first version had a reference to pre-emptive action, which was politically unpalatable after the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq and the NSS reliance on pre-emption. The final version also had a less definitive statement about the link between failed states and WMD compared to the earlier ESS draft, which Asle Toje claims was due to the U.S. inability to find WMD in Iraq. Toje also makes several critiques of the document elucidating what it is not. He assesses that it is “primarily a tool to deepen European integration,” rather than “delivering an actual basis for EU security policy.”

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78 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, December 12, 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, last accessed March 2008. This document is referred to extensively throughout this study and will subsequently be referred to as ESS.


80 Ibid, 89.


84 Toje, 132.
most strident criticism, however, is that it is “a recipe for ‘masterly inactivity’ where the EU seeks the moral high ground, aloof from international politics beyond speeches and majority decisions.” 85 Despite these criticisms, the document is a rich piece of evidence for trends in European strategic culture.

After an introduction, the document is broken down into three sections that cover “challenges and threats,” “strategic objectives,” and “policy implications.” 86 Speaking directly to a proposed European strategic culture in section three is the statement, “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.” 87 This single statement, however, does not make a strategic culture; it evolves over years of experience and changes over time. The entire document can be analyzed with regard to the four specific questions asked by this analysis in order to discover the strategic culture that has emerged within the framework of ESDP.

As to the official arguments for EU intervention in other countries, the ESS argues that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” 88 The second section of the ESS, which focuses on the perceived threats to European security, has only one specific sentence referring to European action when it says that “concerted European action is indispensable” to combating terrorism. Other perceived threats besides terrorism that are envisioned as reasons for intervention are globalization, development, scarcity of natural resources, energy dependence, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. 89 The ESS also devotes significant effort to an explanation of how each of these threats is interrelated and how mitigating one threat can help reduce another threat. The ESS also stresses that it is in the interest of

85 Asle Toje, 132.
86 ESS.
87 Ibid., 11.
88 Ibid., 1.
89 ESS, section 2.
European security that regions such as the Balkans, Middle East, and the Mediterranean are also secure. The ESS suggests here that there are important geographical considerations factored into decision to intervene as well the threats previously mentioned.

With regard to perceptions of legitimacy and authorization, especially by the UN Security Council, the ESS is quite specific. It stresses the importance of “upholding international law” based on the “fundamental framework” of the United Nations Charter. It also stresses the fact that the United Nations Security Council “has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”  

This is in congruence with the most commonly accepted notions for the legitimate use of force: “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (article 51), and the UN Security Council’s authority to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security’ (article 42).”  

This section obviously stresses the importance of UN approval, but it is important to note that the ESS does not indicate that UN approval is necessary before the EU may undertake a specific operation, even though this may be a matter of semantics.

“Effective multilateralism” is the leitmotif of GASP and ESDP and is referred to extensively throughout the document. It is difficult to quantitatively measure ‘importance’, but the fact that multilateralism is mentioned six times and in almost every section suggests that this norm is considered significant within the emerging European strategic culture. The importance is also highlighted by the statement in the ESS that says the the EU needs “to work with others” if it is to “make a contribution that matches its potential.”  

This emphasis and importance should come as no surprise since the EU is an international organization. In one of the many analyses of the ESS, Whitman states that

90 ESS, 9.
92 ESS, 11.
Effective multilateralism has become an overwhelming objective of the ESS. It is the EU's equivalent of the U.S. Cold War notion of containment as the key objective of the EU internationally.93

As one of three major strategic objectives, the ESS sees multilateralism as a foundation for security in a globalized world. The centerpiece of this section on multilateralism is the reference to the United Nations charter and the United Nations Security Council, both of which are mentioned in reference to international legitimacy. The ESS also expresses high regard for international institutions of varying types, as key components of a multilateral world that derives stability from the rule of law. These pieces of evidence, taken together, show that the ESS understands multilateralism in terms of close cooperation with other international organizations.

There are some more detailed explanations of the ESS’s view of multilateralism that are not unpacked in the ESS, but this does not lessen the importance of this norm. The ESS in summary stresses multilateral action as a fundamental tenet of its objectives and policies, but does so in vague terms without defining exactly what it means and without stipulating multilateral requirements that must be met before it acts.

To what degree is the use of force a last resort? The ESS does not touch on this topic specifically because of its emphasis on a comprehensive approach that encompasses all of the tools within the EU kit. Its discussion of intervention refers not to the use of force, but to the use of diplomatic, civilian, and military intervention, as seen in its single sentence on strategic culture. In this comment, the ESS states that it must develop a strategic culture that “fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”94 While it talks about early intervention when necessary, this does not imply the early use of force, but the early intervention of the EU in a potential crisis with all of its available tools.

94 ESS, 11.
Lastly, the ESS speaks of “preventive engagement” as a way to “avoid more serious problems in the future.” As mentioned earlier, this was in contrast to the 2002 U.S. NSS and highlighted the EU strategic intent for trying to prevent problems with early intervention, but not an early use of force.

D. SECURITY ELITE SPEECHES

As many scholars of strategic culture have pointed out, a political entity’s elite speeches are a valuable tool in an attempt to capture and articulate the ‘unobservable’ ideas associated with that entity’s strategic culture. The most visible elite associated with ESDP operations is Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO who is now the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary- General of the Council of the European Union,. In the former role, HR Solana “assists the Council in foreign policy matters, through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European policy decisions,” a role he is adeptly suited for with his reputation for promoting consensus, both as a figure in the Spanish opposition to Franco, the democratic consolidation of said country and later in Brussels at HQ NATO. He acts on behalf of the European Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties.” In addition to a multitude of speeches by

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95 ESS, 11. It is also interesting to note that the first version of the ESS dated June, 2003 originally had the words “pre-emptive engagement,” which were later substituted by “preventive engagement.” Whitman, “Road Map for a Route March?” adds that “the latter was thought to be [a] more realistic appraisal of Europe’s power and demonstrated somewhat more humility than has been characteristic of the neo-cons,” (8).


Javier Solana, there are a lesser number of speeches by the EU CFSP Commissioners for External Relations\textsuperscript{98} from which to gather indications of the nascent European strategic culture.

This study uses the evidence of these speeches since 2003 that speak directly to the research questions at hand. The most helpful to this study are the remarks or summaries from meetings between high-level diplomats, remarks at the commencement or conclusion of specific operations, and reports to meetings of the EU defense ministers. Not only do these speeches report to people who have control over national participation in ESDP activities, but these are also venues Solana or other figures can use to introduce new ideas. The following sections make no attempt to capture every quote that pertains to each research question, but instead are an attempt to ascertain the broad themes that appear throughout the speeches and which help further the understanding of a transnational European strategic culture.\textsuperscript{99} Overall, the speeches by security elites affiliated with the European Union are extremely congruent, not only with each other, but also with the ESS, signaling a remarkable degree of homogeneity within the nascent European strategic culture.

There are many indicators as to the ideational foundations for ESDP interventions strewn throughout EU security elites’ speeches. One of the first trends to note is how these speeches are very closely aligned with the ESS’s reasons for intervention and how strong the normative tone is within these speeches. The EU is frequently mentioned as a “force for good”\textsuperscript{100} in addition to

\textsuperscript{98} Other individuals cited include the Right Honorable Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations from January 2000 – November 2004; Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission from 1999 – 2004, and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations from November 2004 – Present.

\textsuperscript{99} The European Union Website has an entire section dedicated to Javier Solana. It has also archived his speeches, remarks, and summaries of his statements since the fall of 1999, available at EU website archives, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=246&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN, last accessed March 2008. This study has used every Solana speech archived since 2003 as its research data, focusing on those pieces of rhetoric which are dedicated to EU foreign policy or ESDP operations.

\textsuperscript{100} ESS, 13.
the general goals of intervention on behalf of “security and stability.” In a speech about the first civilian EU operation, the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Solana mentioned implementing the rule of law as a goal second only to a “peaceful and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Later that year at a similar EU police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), Solana again mentions that EUPOL PROXIMA is “aimed at strengthening the rule of law.” In an additional example of his normative tone in 2005, Solana uses words like a “vector of peace and democracy,” and the “promoter of stability and security,” Also of note, in terms of congruence with the ESS is how Solana says the EU will intervene as it combats terrorism. Focusing on the causes of terrorism, he notes that the EU needs “to tackle the underlying causes such as political alienation and radicalization.”

In addition to the reiteration of the strategic objectives that were mentioned in the ESS, there are a few examples of reasons for intervention introduced by security elites that are not found in the ESS. Javier Solana’s rhetoric deviates slightly from previous patterns by mentioning “the notion of human security - which puts the security of individuals front and centre.” He mentions this security dimension as a potential area for future EU involvement as

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101 ESS, 11.
105 Javier Solana, speech entitled “Europe’s International Role” (November 9, 2005, Bratislava).
106 Ibid.
107 Javier Solana, speech entitled “Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy” (January 24, 2005, Brussels). In reference to the concept of “human security,” Des Gasper summarizes human security as a “discourse” that is “broader than a single concept. It synthesizes concerns from basic needs, human development, and human rights,” whose elements also include a “normative focus on individual persons’ lives and an insistence on basic rights for all; and an explanatory agenda that stresses the nexus between freedom from want and indignity and freedom from fear.” Des Gasper, “Human Rights, Human Needs, and Human Security: relationships between four international ‘human’ discourses,” Institute of Social Studies Working paper no. 445 (July 2007): 21.
globalization fosters a sense of “frustration and injustice.”108 In another notable deviation from the ESS, Aldo Ajello, the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, mentions deterrence as “the real contribution” of the ESDP force that had been committed with the EUFOR mission in Congo.109 In a January 9 presentation to the United Nations Security Council, Javier Solana also referred to the ESDP’s ability to deter forces during its mission in Congo. Deterrence is not mentioned in the ESS as an ideational reason behind the commitment of EU forces and Solana is not referring to deterrence as a reason to commit forces, but he and EUSR Ajello point out a valuable, proven capability that EU forces have demonstrated, and by doing so, avail deterrence as a tool available to the EU. Both human security and deterrence were not in the ESS, but have been mentioned by EU security elites.

There are other EU representatives, whose speeches also reflect the leitmotifs of Solana’s speeches. The head of the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission, Pieter Feith, specifically mentions that his monitoring mission was successful because it deployed a “broad range of instruments” in its “crisis management” mission and because the mission did “proactive monitoring”.110 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, makes the same point twice during 2005 that the EU is a force for good, but highlights that regional interests are also at play by asserting that the EU must pay special attention to its own neighborhood.111 She thus emphasized a key point in the ESS – that the EU is especially interested in its own neighborhood.

108 Javier Solana, speech entitled “Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy” (January 24, 2005, Brussels).

109 Aldo Ajello, “Press briefing on the occasion of the end of the EU military operation EUFOR RD Congo” (December 18, 2006, Brussels).


111 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Remarks to the joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the European Parliament and of National Parliaments” (Brussels, October 5, 2005), and “Non-proliferation and disarmament; what role for the EU?” (Brussels, December 8, 2005).
Lastly, there are speeches that indicate a slightly more militaristic approach. In a March, 2006 speech, Solana remarks that “of course we must be ready to conduct ‘pure’ military operations.”¹¹² In a speech at the beginning of the following year, he alerts his listeners to his perceived future expectations that the EU will be called upon to perform “more missions and in more difficult situations.”¹¹³ While not a direct reference to a more militaristic intervention, his comments are an allusion to intervention in areas that would potentially be more violent and that would require a more military oriented intervention. These comments about possible future ESDP activities point to potential scenarios where intervention would be more than what would be expected of a ‘Civilian power Europe.’

ESDP rhetoric has consistently stressed the same factors when it mentions international legitimacy. Solana emphasizes legitimacy as a bedrock of ESDP activity, but stops short of mentioning UN Security Council authorization as a necessary requirement prior to EU intervention. The forms of legitimacy mentioned throughout ESDP rhetoric are UN Security Council mandates and requests for EU intervention from either a specific country or a regional security organization.

Examples of how the EU stresses the importance of international legitimacy can be found throughout any number of the many speeches given by Javier Solana. A great example is a speech of Solana in July, 2003 when he mentioned the power international legitimacy lends to interventions.¹¹⁴ Even asserting that a legitimate action is destined for success. He also argued that legitimacy is important because it creates “a lasting effect”¹¹⁵ when combined

¹¹² Javier Solana, “Summary of remarks at the informal meeting of Defense Ministers” (March 6, 2006, Innsbruck).
¹¹⁵ Javier Solana, “Mars and Venus Reconciled.”
with the use of force, whereas the use of force without perceived legitimacy entails “a wholesale return to the politics of the caveman, where the guy with the biggest stick carries the argument (until he turns the next corner)?”

This evidence indicates that within ESDP, legitimate intervention is seen as a key to achieve long-lasting success.

Solana mentions UN mandates for many ESDP operations, but also indicates that an invitation is another way to underscore an intervention’s legitimacy. That invitation can come from the UN or a regional organization. Thus, the reason the EU sent a police force to Bosnia and Herzegovina was a request from the UN. During opening remarks of the EU police mission in FYRoM, Solana again stressed that the EU was there at the request of the Macedonian government. Another example is a speech on June 22, where Solana stressed that the EU was undertaking the Rule of Law mission in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government. Each of these remarks underscores the legitimacy that is perceived to be derived from the request of an outside agent. None of the EU missions so far has taken place without an explicit invitation by the country concerned.

Despite this great respect for legitimacy, Solana refrains from describing a UN mandate or an invitation as an absolute requirement. One example of coming close to this definitive restriction is in reference to the need for a UN force to follow the EU ARTEMIS mission in Congo. Of this need he cites a chapter VII UN charter mandate as an enabler for “robust rules of engagement,” but not as a requirement for legitimacy. Another example where Solana was willing to

116 Javier Solana, “Mars and Venus Reconciled.”
117 Javier Solana, Address to the Institute of European Affairs (Dublin, May 21, 2003).
118 Javier Solana, Remarks at the opening ceremony of EUPOL PROXIMA (Skopje, December 15, 2003).
use the Dayton agreement as a source of legitimacy without stipulating that a UN mandate was necessary was his referral to EUFOR military action in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would “exercise Dayton authority.”121 A UN mandate was expected, and received, prior to the EUFOR deployment,122 but this speech shows the willingness to point to sources of legitimacy other than the UN.

The evidence above suggests that legitimacy is considered extremely important because of the power that it lends to an intervention. That legitimacy can come from a UN mandate, and / or in the form an invitation to the EU to provide some form of assistance. Even though it is considered extremely important, the evidence found in ESDP rhetoric does not support that a mandate from the UN or an invitation by the country concerned is absolutely necessary prior to intervention by the EU.

An examination of the references to multilateralism in the elite speeches of the ESDP representative reveals two important areas of discussion that are pertinent to this study. The first area focuses on the importance of multilateralism in ESDP operations, which includes references to why multilateralism is considered so important and how it is considered one of the foundations of ESDP activity. The second area within the rhetoric helps frame how this important norm of multilateralism is put into action during ESDP operations. Taken together, these two areas show that the principle of multilateralism is a fundamental component of European strategic culture.

The importance attached to multilateralism in Javier Solana’s speeches cannot be over-emphasized. In reference to multilateralism, Solana uses words such as “our best weapon against threats,”123 “essential to our success in these

121 Javier Solana, “Summary of remarks at the NATO Istanbul Summit” (June 28, 2004).
122 Ibid, “Background: EU-led mission, including a military component, in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (June 2004): 1.
areas,” 124 and “sovereignty shared is sovereignty magnified.” 125 In a slightly different context, again highlighting the importance of multilateralism by emphasizing its effectiveness, Solana states “threats are never more dangerous than when the international community is divided.” 126 In 2007 further supports the reliance on multilateralism by stating that “it is often easier for us to act together than alone.” 127

In addition to the attributes of importance and effectiveness that are given to multilateral efforts, these elite speeches also indicate the type of multilateralism to which ESDP operations are connected. These speeches regard multilateralism as a form of policy coordination through formal institutions requiring consent and approval of all the member states. Solana says that achieving the EU’s foreign policy goals is only possible “with the active support of all member-states.” 128 Also with respect to EU foreign policy, Solana says that “unanimity remains the rule.” 129

Besides unanimous consent, these speeches also view multilateralism as an inclusive concept whereby other non-EU countries can join in ESDP operations in order to strengthen those operations. The multilateralism associated with the EU’s police mission in Bosnia was referred to as “voluntary and open.” 130 In reference to the EU mission in Kosovo, Solana stated that “We are looking forward to the participation of non-EU NATO member states in the

124 Javier Solana, “Summary of Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting” (Jakarta, July 2, 2004).
127 Javier Solana, “From Cologne to Berlin and beyond.”
128 Javier Solana, “Europe’s International Role,” speech at Primacial Palace (Bratislava, November 9, 2005).
130 Javier Solana, Address to the Institute for European Affairs (Dublin, May 21, 2003).
The inclusive aspect of the EU consideration of multilateralism was also evident at the press conference announcing the end of the EU-led ACEH monitoring mission when the head of that mission, Pieter Feith, mentioned that “working closely together in an integrated mission with the ASEAN countries” was one of the highlights to be taken away from that EU mission.

The evidence within ESDP elite speeches appears to suggest certain trends associated with how the ESDP frames the concept of multilateralism. When multilateralism is mentioned, it is always mentioned as one of the most important concepts because it is perceived to increase the efficacy of ESDP activity. Multilateralism is always directed towards international organizations or regimes, not perceived as an ad hoc mechanism of policy coordination. In the context of the CFSP, multilateralism is based on unanimous EU member state approval of the activity, not just approval of the most supportive countries – even though not all countries need to actively participate in those activities. And lastly, the rhetoric stresses that ESDP multilateralism is open and inclusive because the contribution of other international organizations or non-EU states is perceived to strengthen ESDP activities. We do not, however, find any arguments criticizing the unilateralism of others or debating the drawbacks of multilateral endeavors.

Answering the question of how exhausted diplomatic activity must become before the EU resorts to force is difficult given so few purely military operations. However, the EU strongly stresses conflict prevention, stressing a comprehensive approach employing all the tools at the EU’s disposal before a conflict turns into a crisis. In light of this, Javier Solana iterates again and again that the EU must act early, but this does not mean by military force. The intervention (whatever the kind) must be preventive and early to keep the crisis from exploding.

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131 Javier Solana, “Summary of remarks at the informal meeting of EU defense ministers” (Wiesbaden, March 1, 2007).
Examples abound of Solana speeches that proclaim proactive intervention better than reactive intervention. In a 2003 speech addressing the transatlantic rift, he recommends that the U.S. and the EU “tackle causes and not just symptoms,” implying that coordinated, early intervention is a way to help mend the rift and also preclude the need to deal with a larger conflict. Also, in 2003, Solana points out that the EU “must be ready to act before a crisis occurs,” again suggesting that early diplomatic action will prevent the EU from becoming a bystander to the world’s conflicts.

Two years later, more examples of ESDP rhetoric stress the same type of early response to a crisis as one of the key objectives of the EU. At the beginning of 2005, Solana presented EU action as a stark contrast from previous world perceptions of EU behavior. “There was a time when the EU’s foreign policy was criticized for being all talk and no action,” he admits, adding that “Europe needs to be more active and more capable – and that is exactly what we have become.” Later that year, in a speech in Paris, Solana reiterated his call for “rapid reaction and effective action.” In both of the commencement speeches for EU operations in Congo and Indonesia at the end of 2006, the capability for rapid reaction was mentioned as a key virtue by the respective ESDP leaders who touted the EU’s ability to intervene quickly and effectively, but not by force as a last resort.
There is also some indication in the rhetoric that the EU would not refrain from a rapid military intervention if required. This is not at the expense of diplomatic activity, but in addition to more diplomatic activity. In early 2007, Solana argued that the EU’s “battlegroups capacity is at the heart of the EU’s ability to act quickly and robustly where needed.”\textsuperscript{138} In a similar vain, later that year, Solana reiterated that rapid reaction is an EU capability, but again added that that capability is available when the situation calls for rapid reaction. In reference to potential Balkan instability, Solana reaffirms that the EU “will remain capable of responding immediately and robustly if required to intervene.”\textsuperscript{139} In these examples, Solana’s use of the word ‘robust’ reaffirms the EU commitment for a comprehensive approach that includes all the tools of intervention at the EU’s disposal, but the argument is not made that diplomatic activity must be exhausted before a military intervention may commence.

E. ESDP OPERATIONS

The most thorough and recent account of ESDP operations thus far comes from Howorth and this study makes great use of his work as the best secondary piece of evidence used to supplement the primary evidence available directly from ESDP sources.\textsuperscript{140} Howorth summarizes previous studies of ESDP operations by first pointing out the different theories under which they have been analyzed. He also points out the different ways these operations can be grouped, which obviously depends on the theoretical approach that was chosen. The realist school, he points out, seeks to understand ESDP operations “holistically in the same way as a nation-state.”\textsuperscript{141} A second framework for

\textsuperscript{138} Javier Solana, “From Cologne to Berlin and beyond” (Berlin, January 29, 2007).

\textsuperscript{139} Javier Solana, Summary of the speech to the plenary of the European Parliament on the current international situation and the role of the EU (Brussels, March 29, 2007).


\textsuperscript{141} Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 208.
analysis separates EU activities into the types of foreign policy intervention (diplomatic, police, military, etc.), while a third school of thought focuses on institutional processes. Howorth summarizes these methods of categorizing ESDP activity based on objectives, geography (as done by the EU website), or his personal choice, functionality. The focus here is not recounting every detail of every operation, a task well beyond the scope of this text. In this analysis, the narrow focus is on answering the four research questions about ideational foundation, legitimacy, multilateralism, and the use of force as a last resort. Given the narrow focus, a brief summary of the operations is still required.

All previous, current and projected ESDP operations are summarized in Table 1, which borrows heavily from Howorth’s own tabular depiction. In addition to the data from Howorth’s table, this study adds the ESDP activities that have taken place since his book was published in 2007. The table first separates each ESDP activity between civilian and military types of operations. The second column, operation category, details the type of mission that was accomplished. The third column shows the names of the specific operations. The fourth column lists the duration of the operation by showing the beginning and ending date, or ‘present’ if the operation is still ongoing. The fifth and sixth columns show where the operation took place and the number of personnel assigned to each operation.


144 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 210-211.
Table 1. ESDP Operations.145

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Operation Category</th>
<th>Operation Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>EUPM PROXIMA</td>
<td>1/03-12/06</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>12/05-6/06</td>
<td>FYRoM</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa</td>
<td>4/05-6/07</td>
<td>FYRoM</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COPPS</td>
<td>1/06-6/07</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>11/05-11/05</td>
<td>Palestine/Israel/Egypt</td>
<td>55-75</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military or</td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>6/05-7/05-12/07</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>4/06-2/08</td>
<td>Sudan/Darfur</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU Planning Team</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU Security Sector Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Monitoring/</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring</td>
<td>9/05-12/06</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU – Just – Lex</td>
<td>7/05-7/04-7/05</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU – Just Thémis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Administration</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>2/08-</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military Missions</td>
<td>Concordia Artemis</td>
<td>3/03-12/03</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>6/03-9/03</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>12/04-6/07</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR TChad/RCA</td>
<td>1/08-</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chad/Central</td>
<td>3700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>African Republic</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The most striking fact about “EU Operations”146 is the unexpected disparity between military and civilian operations. There are 16 civilian activities

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145 Howorth, 211-212 provides the basis of this table, although this has been updated to include the operations that have commenced since the 2007 publication of his book.

146 This is how The Council of the European Union refers to activities governed by ESDP on its website.
compared to only five military operations. This contrasts with the amount of personnel devoted to each type of operation which has been decidedly more weighted to the military operations, with one exception that will be noted later. The plurality of civilian activities are police operations, of which there have been six, which is more than the total number of military operations. These operations take the form of “monitoring, mentoring, advising and training.”

Both of the border control missions were at the request of the local authorities and were intended to raise the border control standards to a more professional level at each location. The four missions that Howorth considers as military or technical assistance missions were more varied in their nature. They ranged from security sector reform in the Congo (human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law) to a combined military and civilian mission aiding the African Union’s AMIS II mission in Darfur. The civilian missions characterized by Howorth as peace monitoring or judicial training were just that. The EU-Just missions are rule-of-law training missions, a technical term the EU uses to describe training given to those who work in the judicial system, while the Aceh mission in Indonesia was “designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)” The final civilian mission is

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147 These words or a combination of these words can be found on the EU’s website about each of the six police operations. See Council of European Union website, EU Operations, http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g, and select any of the police operations; last accessed March 2008.


149 Council of European Union website, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=956&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed March 2008. The military portion is aiding African Union forces, especially with transportation and equipment, while the civilian portion is a police training mission.

also the second most recent, but possibly the most controversial. By far the most robust civilian mission in terms of personnel, EULEX Kosovo is in the build-up phase during the writing of this report. The controversial nature of this mission will be dealt with in the subsequent answers to the research questions.

The four military missions mentioned by Howorth and the most recent military mission (EUFOR TChad/RCA) have less diversity in their missions than the multitude of varied civilian missions. The most significant operation in terms of financial and personnel resources is EUFOR Althea, a Berlin-plus\textsuperscript{151} military mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina that took over NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) duties. The only other military mission within the Europe’s geographical area was the first military mission, Concordia. It was essentially the first test of ESDP’s military force and the first test of the Berlin-plus arrangement and it turned into a police mission once crime was determined to be the main threat.\textsuperscript{152} Both of these military operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia) were operations that the EU took over from NATO. The other three military missions have been in Africa and have demonstrated the EU’s willingness to increasingly engage militarily outside of Europe, even far away from the geographical boundaries of Europe. Africa has become a focus of these operations. Those three missions are all considered ‘autonomous’ due to the fact that they did not use any of NATO’s assets. EUFOR ARTEMIS (2003) in Congo, EUFOR RD Congo (2007), and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (2008) were or are related to humanitarian relief and crisis response. ARTEMIS, the first EU mission deployed beyond Europe and without NATO’s help, had the limited objective of preventing civilian massacres in a single sub-state region (Bunia in the Ituri province of Congo).\textsuperscript{153} EUFOR RD

\textsuperscript{151} Berlin-plus, in the most simple explanation is an agreement where the EU may be granted access to NATO resources. For an excellent history and description of ‘Berlin-plus’ operations, see David Yost, \textit{NATO and International Organizations} (NATO Defense College Forum Paper: Rome, 2007) Chapter 3.


\textsuperscript{153} Howorth, 233.
Congo, similar to ARTEMIS, was designed to temporarily assist a UN force during the Congolese elections last year. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the most recent of EU military actions, has specific objectives that include “protecting civilians,” facilitating “the delivery of humanitarian aid,” and the protection of UN personnel and material.154

Given the multitude of operations, the difficulty in finding a concise way of identifying the ideational foundation of so many different types of operations is significant. A characteristic that is relevant throughout each of the civilian operations is the intent to motivate good governance, whether in the areas of police, judicial, border control, or the security sector. That intent, however, is what those operations do, but not necessarily the reason behind what is done. This is usually accomplished through advisory functions. Raising the level of governance certainly aligns EU activity with the rhetoric and the ESS as a ‘force for good,’ even though there is an admitted vagueness to that term and it would be hard to imagine an intervention that was not viewed by its proponents as a ‘good’ intervention.

Both EU military operations in the Balkans took over from NATO forces. CONCORDIA’s aim was to “contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement,”155 which “deals with the political aspects of inter-ethnic relations in the country.”156 ALTHEA, the other mission in the Balkans, continued the work of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR), whose ideational foundation is to help build “a

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secure, self-sustaining and democratic country.”157 This operation, as the other
three military operations conducted in Africa, are under UN Chapter VII, “action
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.”158 Those three missions were directly in support of UN missions
and contain aspects of humanitarian assistance spelled out in the documents
available from the EU.

Lastly, the EULEX mission to Kosovo is entirely new. It is the most robust
civilian mission in a country that has recently declared independence,
accompanied by much international controversy. The EU’s stated goal in this
recent operation is to “support, mentor, monitor, and advise the local authorities”
in the Kosovar efforts to “build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law
system.”159 What the website does not mention as it uses its technical term for a
judicial training mission is that it will de facto take over from the UN mission
(UNMIK) that is administering all of the civil administration of a country which is
still considered by some to be a sovereign part of Serbia. UNMIK has been
winding down since the last year, following the Ahtisaari Plan which the UN
Secretary-General forwarded last year to the UNSC.

The data is fairly clear with regard to the question of legitimacy and ESDP
operations. Up until EULEX Kosovo, there has been little controversy over the
legitimacy of any EU operation. Either a UNSC resolution was deemed
necessary and then issued to cover an operation (especially the military ones), or
in case this was deemed unnecessary (e.g. disaster relief) a UN action was not
deme necessary. All the missions, being non-coercive, followed a specific
invitation of the host government. This pattern has now changed with EULEX

157 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “EU Military Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Operation EUFOR – Althea)” (November 29, 2004),
159 Council of European Union Website, EU Operations, EULEX Kosovo,
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1458&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed
March 2008.
Kosovo. Due to Kosovo’s controversial declaration of independence, considered by some (such as Russia) to be against international law,160 there is less apparent legitimacy for this operation than any previous ESDP activity. Serbia contends that the UN Security Council is the only governing body that can legitimate an international body in Kosovo.161 The EU has chosen to keep the 1999 UNSC Resolution 1244 as the legal basis for its EULEX Kosovo mission, as no new UNSC resolution could be attained due to the Russian veto. This operation has just begun as of the writing of this paper, so further conclusions would be premature, but this operation stands alone as the one ESDP activity with questionable legitimacy.

The multilateral nature of the EU depends on whether one is speaking of internal or external aspects of multilateralism. The EU as a transnational organization is internally multilateral with unanimous decisions required to conduct ESDP operations. The decision-making process for ESDP operations is an example of what Ruggie defines as a “formal international organization” that acts in a multilateral way.162 This is based on his definition that “multilateral is an adjective that modifies the noun institution.”163 Ruggie states that an international organization (as opposed to an international regime) must have formalized “decision-making rules as voting or consensus procedures.”164 ESDP operations are certainly an example of Ruggie’s definitional requirement through the decision-making process, established by the various treaties that govern

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160 Russia and Serbia have most notably come out against this declaration, but other opposition comes from European Union states such as Spain, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia. See Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers, “Kosovo is recognized but rebuked by others,” New York Times, February 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19kosovo.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin, last accessed March 2008.


163 Ibid., 574.

164 Ibid.
ESDP. Other internal areas worth discussion under the guise of this conception of multilateralism are the processes that guide financial and troop contributions for the various ESDP activities.

ESDP decision-making, although a complicated process based on various treaties that modify previously-signed treaties, sheds light on how ESDP activities meet Ruggie’s conception of multilateralism. The most recent Treaty of Lisbon has been signed by all 27 members of the Union, but has yet to be ratified by the parliaments. It is targeted for ratification by all member states so that it may go into effect by January 1, 2009.\textsuperscript{165} The Treaty of Lisbon would modify all previous treaties, the most recent of which was the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on February 1, 2003.\textsuperscript{166} On matters that relate to CFSP, the Treaty of Nice stipulates that unanimous voting is required for ratification.\textsuperscript{167} The Treaty of Lisbon, if ratified and entered into force, retains the unanimity requirement for CFSP actions, but adds “permanent structured cooperation” as an additional avenue for ESDP activities.\textsuperscript{168} Permanent structured cooperation, an idea taken from the non-ratified European Constitution and practiced in other areas of EU activity (such as the Monetary Union or the Schengen Treaty), permits certain EU members who have attained a specific level of military capability to act, specifically to a request from the UN, by qualified majority voting instead of unanimous consent.\textsuperscript{169} Some view this as a way for the European Union to create a defense force where only the most militarily capable actors can commit forces, yet still retain the authority and legitimacy of the larger European


\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
As of now, however, every activity authorized by ESDP has required the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers, even though the financial burden is distributed disproportionately among the member states.

Where military and defense related expenses are concerned, the EU has set up a funding mechanism known as Athena because military and defense-related expenses are not permitted by the current treaties to be taken out of the CFSP budget. Athena contributions are governed by treaty and paid for based on a formula that establishes a certain percentage for each country. The EU factsheet about Athena reveals that a disproportionate share of the financial resources for ESDP operations that are related to defense or military operations are shouldered by just four countries: Germany, France, the UK and Italy. These four countries contribute a collective 70% toward the Gross National Income (GNI) scale that is used to divide ATHENA contributions among EU member states. ATHENA money is used to pay for the administrative or overhead costs of each operation, but other personnel and equipment-related costs are shared on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis, meaning each country is responsible for paying for its troops and the operations of its equipment. This disproportionate share among the members for the financial burden is also prevalent in personnel contributions.

Personnel contributions among EU member states for different ESDP activities are on an ad hoc, state-preference based system. Each state contributes troops on a voluntary basis, which in an unstructured way, creates

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172 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “Financing of ESDP Operations,” Annex. The exception is Denmark, which has opted out of financing defense-related operations.

the same disproportionate burden-sharing outcome as the structured ATHENA system does for sharing the financial burden. This system results in random contributions of troops to each operation based on the desires of the individual nation-states. It also means that the composition of troops over time can change during a single operation.

From an external standpoint, ESDP operations show a strong proclivity to act along with other willing partners such as the UN, African Union, Asean, or NATO under the Berlin-plus arrangement. These coalitions with other willing partners are, in fact, coalitions of willing partners formed *ad hoc* for specific missions.

ESDP strategic culture that has developed thus far reveals a strong desire for both internal and external multilateral activity. However, ESDP activity is not guaranteed to be multilateral in practice because of a lack of multilateral enforcement procedures. The financial mechanisms place a disproportionate share of the resource burden on a few countries, while personnel contributions are on a completely *ad hoc* basis, as are the alignments with other organizations. In addition, if the Treaty of Lisbon goes into force, then ESDP activity will become less multilateral due to the Treaty’s ‘permanent structured cooperation’ clause.

The concept that diplomacy should be exhausted before a political entity resorts to the use of force is not entirely applicable to EU operations.\(^{174}\) The present analysis will only apply this question to the five\(^{175}\) military ESDP operations that have occurred thus far. This contrasts with the earlier applications of this question in which strategy and speeches can speak to this issue in a rhetorical sense, because security elites can easily speak about how the EU’s comprehensive tools should be used before a crisis occurs. They can also speak of the use of force as a last resort when they are speaking of strategy and potential interventions. The question at hand does not fit well with non-

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\(^{174}\) Based on Meyer’s study that found national European convergence on this topic.

\(^{175}\) Includes information available about EUFOR TCHAD/RCA authorized by the EU on January 28, 2008.
military operations that did not involve the use of military force. In each of the five military engagements, diplomacy was used prior to the dispatch of military forces, but only to the extent that the diplomacy resulted in an invitation for EU forces, such as was the case for CONCORDIA in Macedonia and the mission to RD CONGO. Two of the military operations (including the nascent EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) were to support UN forces, and ALTHEA was a follow-up to NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The trend thus far has been that four out of five military operations have been conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indicating that the EU perceives the use of force as a UN-sanctioned response to a threat to peace. ESDP military operations have not been used, as of yet, as an intervention tool where diplomacy was perceived to have failed and the EU needed to resort to force in order to accomplish its objectives.

F. CONCLUSION

A strategic culture has emerged and is still emerging for ESDP activity and is visible in its guiding document, elite speeches, and actual operations, be them civil or military. On reasons for intervention, security, stability, rule of law, and humanitarian assistance are all reasons that are articulated in the ESS, many of Solana’s speeches and in the ESDP activities that have been undertaken. Although terrorism is mentioned in the ESS and frequently mentioned in Solana’s speeches, it has not yet been an articulated reason for an actual EU intervention. The multitude of civilian operations have at their heart better governance, while the military missions tend to be missions covered by Chapter VII of the UN charter. And lastly, a comprehensive civilian and military approach to these interventions has firmly established itself within the strategic culture that has emerged from the EU as the preferred way for the EU to intervene throughout its nearby region and throughout the world.

The need for legitimacy is also firmly rooted within EU strategic culture. Whether that legitimacy stems from a UNSC resolution or mandate or from an invitation to the EU, the EU stresses that it does not act without normative
sources of international legitimacy. That legitimacy has been unquestioned except for the most recent EULEX Kosovo mission. While the rhetoric and ESS stress legitimacy as ultimately important, they do not draw a hard line that puts the EU in an inflexible position that requires rule-based legitimacy. This flexibility is now tested with the mission to Kosovo and it will serve as a distinct data point with regard to EU strategic culture and legitimacy.

ESDP activity, rhetoric, and the ESS have also strongly ingrained the concept of multilateralism within the strategic culture that has emerged in ESDP behavior. Multilateralism is understood both internally and externally. Internally, a unanimous vote is required for action to be taken under ESDP guidelines. However, internal troop or financial contributions are at the discretion of the individual member countries. Externally, the EU favors additional partners who are willing to join with the EU in an ad hoc coalition. The potential for a lesser degree of internal multilateralism is present if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, opening the way for the proposed ‘permanent structured cooperation.’

Lastly, the EU’s strategic culture does not favor the use of force as a last resort. The EU prefers early and proactive intervention across the wide spectrum of EU capabilities. Neither the ESS, Solana’s speeches, nor the actual ESDP interventions indicate that using force as a last resort is something to which the EU aspires.

Each of these areas indicate that a strategic culture has emerged and is visible in ESDP activity. Also, as strategic culture theory suggests, the EU’s foreign policy version is also constantly evolving as it matures as an organization with each organizational experience and worldwide event. This evolution is especially evident with examples like EULEX Kosovo and the proposed Lisbon Treaty which depart from the previous EU experiences in the areas of legitimacy and multilateralism. The evidence also suggests that this evolution will be slow and the changes that have been witnessed thus far conform to Giegerich’s findings that adaptation pressures on national strategic cultures, when applied slowly, can result in strategic culture shift. However, when these adaptation
pressures are applied too quickly or forcefully, they do not result in change, but in rejection of the pressure to change. If this finding remains true to adaptation pressures on the strategic culture of ESDP activity, then students of the EU can expect to see gradual change over time, that could suffer setbacks if the change that is sought by some of its members is too great or too sudden.
IV. AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

A. MAJOR FINDINGS ON AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

American strategic culture is less heterogeneous simply because it is embedded within one nation-state. This fact does not mean complete unanimity, however, as heterogeneity is still found within the debate over policy choices in a single nation just as it is in a transnational organization. Such a variety of views has a long tradition in the U.S., reaching back to the 18th century. Also, whereas the emergence of a European strategic culture is a relatively new topic based on the formation of CFSP and ESDP, American strategic culture has a much longer history from which to draw its composition,\footnote{For excellent readings on this topic, see Colin Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand strategy} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), Emory Upton, \textit{The Military Policy of the United States} (New York: Greenwood, 1968), Christopher Layne, \textit{The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to present} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), or Russel F. Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).} even if one argues that European strategic culture began before the formalization of EU security policies. This study, however, confines its scope of analysis to the fabric of American strategic culture as it is reflected in the decision to invade Iraq.\footnote{For other accounts of this decision, not focused on American strategic culture, see Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, \textit{Globalization and empire: the U.S. invasion of Iraq, free markets, and the twilight of democracy} (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2006), Robert Kagan, \textit{America’s crisis of legitimacy}, \textit{Foreign Affairs} 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 65-87, and Rick Fawn, \textit{The Iraq war: causes and consequences} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).} Based on Lantis’ argument of a system shock that provides the impetus for a possible change in strategic culture, this study argues that the New York City terrorist attacks were such a system shock that brought certain elements already in American strategic culture to the forefront of American strategic culture.

In 1996, Peter Katzenstein argued that “American politics shows a deep division between a Congress committed to unilateralism and an executive
favoring multilateralism.”178 This period saw a Democratic President at the same
time facing a Republican majority in Congress. It demonstrated how American
strategic culture was broken up along party lines. Jeffrey Lantis’ account of
American strategic culture is exceedingly relevant to the study at hand. He
describes it as consisting of three main tenets: “American dominance in
international affairs, with priority consideration of homeland security,” “a doctrine
of preemption that includes a willingness to use military force to achieve security
objectives,” and “a preference for unilateral action to reduce external constraints
on American behavior.”179 Meyer also professes agreement with at least one of
Lantis’ tenets by asserting that a high degree of international legitimacy is not
regarded a fundamental tenet of the present American strategic culture when
compared to European national strategic cultures.180

Another recent evaluation places current U.S. strategic choices firmly
within the historical context of what Colin Dueck calls the two most prevalent
themes in American strategic culture. He argues that “classical liberal
assumptions” and “intense preference for limited liability in strategic affairs” are
“two dominant and persistent features of [American] traditional strategic
culture.”181 He argues that this tendency toward liberalism spawns the “desire to
see democratic values and systems of government spread overseas,” either by
force or by example.182 The other strong component, the “assumption of limited
liability,” he defines “as a culturally shaped preference for avoiding costs and
commitments in grand strategy, to an extent that is actually inconsistent with

178 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in
179 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda,”
180 Christopher Meyer, “Theorizing European Strategic Culture: Between Convergence and
181 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand
182 Ibid., 23.
stated and established international goals.”183 In his argument, he also theorizes cultural change whereby adjustment takes place in reaction to “international conditions,” “the dominant strategic culture of the period,” “domestic politics,” and the current “political leadership,” which all combine to affect America’s “strategic adjustment,” or how its dominant foreign policy changes over time.184 His insight is helpful to understand how American strategic culture has changed based on the system shock of 9/11, and what kind of strategic culture is reflected in the decision to invade Iraq.

This section seeks to understand the American strategic culture, not over the entire history of the United States (a task that exceeds the limits of this study), but at the moment in time when the decision was made to invade Iraq. By asking the same four questions that were asked in the previous section, this study seeks to garner evidence of U.S. strategic culture from the guiding National Security Strategy, elite speeches, and actual intervention in Iraq so that a focused, structured comparison can be made between the two strategic cultures.

B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 was drafted shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and can be considered the overall guiding document of U.S. strategic behavior when the decision was made to invade Iraq. It has since been replaced by a new version that was signed and released in 2006, but an analysis of the changes between the two documents is beyond the scope of this study which only seeks to understand the cleavage between the European and the American strategic culture in 2003.

Unlike the ESS, which was noted as somewhat of a response to the U.S. NSS of 2002 and which was the first document of its kind, the NSS, as a document, harkens back to George Kennan’s call for a strategy of containment

\[183\] Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand strategy., 26.

\[184\] Ibid., 33-36.
which was contained in his Mr. X article.\textsuperscript{185} Since 1986, each President of the United States has issued his version of a National Security Strategy. Bush’s NSS of 2002 was a proclamation of how the U.S. intended to face the world in the wake of the cataclysmic terrorist attacks the previous fall. Many authors have written extensively about the document\textsuperscript{186} and there exists a consensus that describes the document as almost Wilsonian in its idealist thrust. Dannreuther and Peterson ascribe the term “revolutionary” to both it and the ESS in their attempt to “change the world in essentially their own images.”\textsuperscript{187} Colin Dueck asserts that the document was a collection of “American classical liberal values… described… as ‘nonnegotiable demands.”\textsuperscript{188}

One of the most controversial pieces of this document is its justification of, and intended reliance on, preemptive action. As Dueck points out, “preventive wars are not unknown in American history, but by any standard, to openly embrace the concept of preventive military action as a centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy was a remarkably bold departure.”\textsuperscript{189} While the executive branch’s National Security Council is responsible for the publication of the NSS, it was a matter of domestic politics for Bush to gain support from Congress in order to act upon said document.

Bush made speeches throughout 2002 that introduced the ideas of the forthcoming NSS and painted a threatening picture that if the U.S. did not act, terrorists in conjunction with weapons of mass destruction would continue to threaten the U.S. until it acted to defeat these threats.\textsuperscript{190} The attempt to radically change the foreign policy parameters is reminiscent of a similar period in history.


\textsuperscript{187} Dannreuther and Peterson as cited in Howorth, 200.

\textsuperscript{188} Dueck, 158.

\textsuperscript{189} Dueck, 159.

\textsuperscript{190} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, 158.
After the cataclysmic event of World War I, President Wilson proposed and obtained allied approval for a supranational body after World War I after making significant political concessions of his own. 191 But where Wilson failed in his attempt to attain domestic political support for his League of Nations proposal, Bush was able to gain domestic support for the use of force against Iraq from the U.S. Congress, 192 and thus garner implicit approval for the implementation of the 2002 NSS. Similar to Lantis’ argument of a system shock, Dueck calls this change a “strategic adjustment,” 193 a process whereby U.S. grand strategy did change because “window of opportunity” opened that allowed a specific strategic “subculture” to become the predominant thread in the national strategic culture. 194 It is within this context that U.S. NSS of 2002 is best understood.

The NSS is quite specific about the stakes for which the U.S. intends to intervene. These stakes can be broken down into two categories: the ideals the U.S. aspires to propagate, and the intended areas of this propagation. In the opening prologue, President Bush cites “defending the peace” and working “to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world,” 195 as ideals worth U.S. intervention, even though not necessarily in a military sense. Another ideational foundation for intervention mentioned twice in the document is promoting “a balance of power that favors freedom.” 196 In addition to the ideational reasons for intervention are the specific targets of that intervention. These targets are flushed out into two categories, both of which are also mentioned in the prologue. The NSS envisions intervention against “terrorists and tyrants” and against any enemy that is

193 Dueck, 13.
194 Ibid., 38.
196 US NSS, 1 and 29.
“seeking weapons of mass destruction.” These two perceived enemies are mentioned again in later sections, as tyrants are replaced by “rogue states,” especially those which are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These first pieces of evidence of U.S. strategic culture indicate U.S. intervention based on behalf of liberal ideals of spreading democracy and peace and directed specifically against terrorists or rogue states attempting to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is no mention of United Nations approval in the NSS as an avenue to obtain legitimacy. Instead, the NSS indirectly bases its legitimacy for the use of force on what is known in theoretical terms as just war theory, one of whose major tenets is “just cause.” Just war theory justifies the use of force by an adherence to accepted norms associated with the decision to use force and the method in which that force is used. Some examples of these norms include proportionality, minimized collateral damage, and the unacceptability of civilian casualties, which are also embedded in the law of armed conflict. Moreover, the ethical way to justify the use of force instead of the alternate justification based on international law negates the UN as an assumed or sought-after source of legitimacy for U.S. intervention. In summary, the NSS’s final sentence in the chapter entitled ‘prevent our enemies from threatening us, our Allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction’ neatly articulates how the U.S.

197 US NSS, prologue.
198 Ibid., 14.
199 Ibid., 16.
200 Ibid., 269. There exists significant literature on the origin and selection of the norms which a country chooses to constitute its own definition of just war, all of which is beyond the scope of this study. For more information about Just War Theory, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 1977); for an opinionated article on Just War Theory applied to the US war on terror, see Neta C. Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (2003): 5-25.
202 Ibid.
views the legitimacy of unilateral action by claiming “the reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.”\textsuperscript{203}

The most supportive statement in the U.S. NSS of multilateral activity states that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”\textsuperscript{204} This statement, however, differs from the tone of the remainder of the document, which is more along the lines of an expectation of and attempt to undertake multilateral activities, but not reliance upon multilateralism. For example, in section three, entitled ‘strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends,’ the NSS states that the U.S. “will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists,” and then later that the U.S. “will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism.”\textsuperscript{205} At the end of the section on strengthening alliances comes one of the more deferential statements toward multilateral activity. In it, the U.S. acknowledges that it needs assistance “to defeat terrorism in today’s globalized world.”\textsuperscript{206} Another section that stresses multilateral activity is chapter four entitled “working with others to diffuse regional conflicts.”\textsuperscript{207} This section’s tone is similar to the previous quotes stressing cooperation as an avenue to success in regional conflicts just as the previous section stresses cooperation against terrorism. The next chapter on countering WMD also looks to further U.S. interests by taking “full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries,”\textsuperscript{208} and other examples of multilateral behavior. The underlying tone here is one that recurs throughout the NSS; the U.S. wishes to

\textsuperscript{203} US NSS (2002), 16.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., title of Section IV.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 14.
make use of its friends and allies to increase its leverage in security affairs and acts multilaterally only insofar as partners act in line with U.S. national interests.

In addition to these statements there are references to “mission-based coalitions.” These coalitions are viewed, in the prologue, as a way to “augment... permanent institutions” (referring to international organizations such as the UN, OAS, NATO and WTO). This type of multilateral activity seeks *ad hoc* arrangements in order to achieve emergent U.S. strategic objectives that have been laid out for a specific intervention. In the chapter specifically devoted to “cooperative action,” the opening sentence refers to the U.S. strategy to organize coalitions “of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.” When other states are not willing to assist the U.S. in meeting its strategic objectives, the NSS states that the U.S. “will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require” unilateral action.

Overall multilateralism, as viewed by the U.S. NSS, does not fit well with Ruggie’s analysis defining multilateral as an adjective that describes institutional behavior. Instead it is articulated along a spectrum that ranges from the willingness to act unilaterally, to an admission that unilateral action does not lead to the lasting achievement of intended objectives. Along this spectrum, the pragmatic implication is that *ad hoc* coalitions are acceptable and sometimes preferred to the other end of the spectrum: cooperation through institutions, although this end is stated as the ideal way to attain lasting objectives.

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210 Ibid., prologue.
211 Ibid., Chapter VIII, “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power,” 25.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid., 31.
The U.S. NSS makes extensive reference to the use of diplomacy, but does not stress that diplomacy must be exhausted before military action can be taken. The most relevant piece of evidence in this respect is in the prologue where the President states “the only path to peace and security is the path of action.” This is an ambiguous term, but is taken to ultimately mean military action because of the specific circumstances that have already been discussed in which this document was written. Other references to diplomacy throughout the document simply mention that diplomacy is one of the tools within the arsenal of the U.S. strategic activity. Diplomacy is mentioned to help prevent the spread of WMD, as well as “at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes.” In summary, diplomacy is highlighted as a tool, but it is not stressed that diplomacy should be exhausted before the U.S. commits its military forces.

C. SECURITY ELITE SPEECHES

There are many speeches made by multiple representatives of the U.S. government that explain the intervention in Iraq. This study will focus only on those speeches that give direct evidence about the four research questions posed by this study as they pertain to the intervention in Iraq.

There are many speeches to choose from in order to assess the reasons for U.S. intervention in Iraq and, more importantly, to see the evolution of those reasons over time. In September 2002, during his speech to the UN, the President lists several reasons for Iraq to remain at peace. The first reason mentioned was Iraqi possession of WMD and the second reason was Iraqi

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217 Ibid., 31.
218 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 159 also mentions some of these speeches as especially insightful to the action in Iraq.
support of terrorism. Other reasons were mentioned, but they were of a smaller scale, such as internal Iraqi minority rights. In October 2002, the proclaimed motivation was to deny WMD to Saddam and affect regime change. Later, during the President’s 2003 State of the Union address, the President stated, “if Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him,” again signaling WMD as the primary reason for intervention. And finally, in the speech announcing the commencement of military action, President Bush used similar words, saying that the American military and its coalition partners were in Iraq so as not to “live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass destruction.” Over time, presidential speeches before the invasion outlining the motivation for intervention moved from WMD and support of terrorism to WMD and regime change and then finally to the primary reason of eliminating WMD from Iraqi possession, especially to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists. This finding corresponds with Dueck’s assessment that an essential element of U.S. strategic culture is its liberal thrust. U.S. intervention in Iraq, according to the rhetoric, is based on a desire to safeguard peace through preventive war and the elimination of WMD. Although the articulated reasons for intervention may have changed after WMD were not found in Iraq, this study considers the rhetoric before the intervention as a more valid indication of strategic culture than rhetoric that may have changed in order to save face.

On September 12, 2002, President Bush delivered a speech at the UN calling for the UN to enforce its resolutions and hold Iraq accountable for its

219 George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly” (September 12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html, last accessed March 2008. Each of the following President’s speeches, referenced only by title and date can be found at www.whitehouse.gov under the link “News by Date.”


223 Dueck, 21-26.
actions. This speech is a telling indicator of the way in which the U.S. viewed international legitimacy in the period preceding the intervention in Iraq. This speech makes use of both theoretical principles of international legitimacy, ethical and rule-based, in calling for action against Iraq. The ethical reasons are used to justify U.S. and international intervention based on the assertion that the Iraqi regime presents a danger to the security of the world because, as President Bush said, “the just demands of peace and security will be met.”224 The rule-based legitimacy is asserted in two ways. The President asserted that action must be taken against Iraq because of its continued violation of UN resolutions. He also asserted that Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions weakens the UN’s effectiveness and to prevent this loss of efficacy, the “partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.”225 The test he refers to is the continued Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions and whether the UN would act to enforce its own resolutions. His speech indicated that the U.S. would act and hoped to get UN backing, but the lack of UN backing would be considered to be more of a failure for the UN than a loss of legitimacy to the U.S. operation.226 This speech ultimately indicated that the U.S. constructed ethical and rule-based legitimacy as potentially conflicting, with the former taking priority, the latter being secondary.

Another example of the pursuit of international legitimacy made by the U.S. government is Colin Powell’s speech at the UN Security Council outlining intelligence information on Iraqi activities. At the end of that speech, the case for

225 Ibid.
226 At least one article at the time described this an “ultimatum to the UN” and a test for UN’s legitimacy, not just the pursuit of legitimacy for action against Iraq, which is the type of legitimacy with which this study is concerned. See Howard LaFranchi, “Bush gives UN an Ultimatum,” Christian Science Monitor (September 13, 2002), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0913/p01s01-uspo.html.
legitimacy was rule-based but the emphasis was not that UN resolution 1441\textsuperscript{227} compels action in Iraq. Instead, he emphasized that UN members “have an obligation to this body [UN as an institution] to see that our resolutions are complied with.”\textsuperscript{228} The difference is subtle, but important. He does not emphasize that the resolution legitimizes action as much as he emphasizes that no action erodes UN legitimacy, again emphasizing ethical legitimacy over rule-based legitimacy.

The speeches leading up to the Iraqi invasion do not support an institutional definition of multilateralism, but instead support multilateralism as a concept of multiple countries acting together. President Bush utilized the now infamous phrase, “coalition of the willing” to describe how the U.S. viewed multilateralism in the context of the intervention in Iraq.\textsuperscript{229} During his subsequent State of the Union address, President Bush reiterated the U.S. perspective on multilateralism:

> We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.\textsuperscript{230}

Another speech by Secretary Rumsfeld also provides excellent insight as to the reason behind this view of multilateralism. In January 2002 at the National Defense University, in a speech to the U.S. military’s future leaders, Rumsfeld explained that

> Wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure. But they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it

\textsuperscript{227} UN Resolution 1441, adopted November 8, 2002 under UN Chapter VII, para. 13: “Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”

\textsuperscript{228} Colin Powell, “Address to the UN Security Council” (February 5, 2003).

\textsuperscript{229} George W. Bush, Press Conference by President Bush and President Havel of Czech Republic (Prague: November 20, 2002).

does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we can’t afford that.\textsuperscript{231}

Each of these speeches (and too many more to cite) explain the often-analyzed U.S. view of multilateralism during the Iraq intervention as a coalition of countries willing to cooperate on a given mission. Instead of an adjective used to describe institutional behavior, it is viewed in terms of flexible mechanisms established ad hoc to achieve a common, temporary goal.

Speeches in the run-up to the intervention in Iraq indicate an extensive need for diplomacy and the resort to force as an option of last resort, although this view was challenged by other international actors. In President Bush’s November 2002 speech to the UN, Bush places potential intervention in Iraq in the context of UNSC resolutions that date back to 1991.\textsuperscript{232} In the State of the Union speech prior to Iraqi Freedom, Bush reiterates that the context for the use of force is based on twelve years of Iraqi non-compliance with international demands.\textsuperscript{233} At a speech after the UNSC adoption of resolution 1441, Bush again mentioned Iraq’s non-compliance with previous UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{234} Each of these speeches assert that the use of force in Iraq is seen as an intervention at the end of a long attempt at diplomacy covering the previous twelve years.

This rhetoric, however, opened the U.S. up to extensive criticism, which it received from many European countries. Even though Bush portrayed America as exceedingly patient for having waited over a decade before intervening, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, testified that his organization expected “in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough


\textsuperscript{232} George W. Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly” (September 12, 2002).


\textsuperscript{234} George W. Bush, “President pleased with UN vote” (November 8, 2002).
assessment of Iraq’s nuclear-related activities.” 235 So, while some European countries, most notably the United Kingdom agreed with the Bush position that diplomacy had run its course, others led by France and Germany argued that the weapons inspectors already in Iraq should get the time they asked for to finish their job. 236 Thus, the Europeans-American dissent clearly signaled that the Europeans were willing to wait longer than the U.S. before employing military means, although the U.S. portrayed the Iraqi intervention as a last resort to the use of force.

D. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

In many cases, there is little difference between the answers to the research questions about the specific operation in Iraq and the answers to the research questions about the rhetoric prior to the operation in Iraq, which was presented in the previous section. In order to minimize repetition, the answers to the questions in this section will only present significant deviations from the previous section or, when appropriate, acknowledge agreement with the themes previously presented.

The official reason for intervention in Iraq was no different in the night of the beginning of hostilities than it was in the period prior to the military operation. President Bush, in a succinct speech on the night hostilities began, offered that coalition forces were in Iraq because “the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.” 237 Dueck argues that the stated objective (referring to the outlaw regime and implied ensuing spread of democracy) is an example of the “classical liberal ideas in American grand strategy.” 238 This characterization,


237 George W. Bush, “President Bush addresses the Nation” (March 19, 2003).

238 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 147.
however, ignores the other portion of Bush’s stated objective about the threat of WMD, a characterization that Colin Powell “convinced the President, along with the rest of the cabinet” to use as an additional justification, in order to attain “some measure of international legitimacy.”

Dueck’s characterization also ignores the originally stated objective of regime change, which faded to a secondary objective due to Powell’s ambition to increase legitimacy.

The evidence presented thus far illustrates that the U.S. went to extensive lengths to obtain international legitimacy. President Bush’s September 2002 speech and Colin Powell’s February 2003 speech were aimed at convincing the international community to support intervention in Iraq, but they did not stress that international support was necessary before the operation could proceed. The U.S. did seek an additional UN resolution, but was blocked by the potential of a French veto. During these speeches, they stressed that the international community needed to support the operation because of the ethical legitimacy of intervening against an actor who presented a threat to peace through the attainment and proliferation of WMD. They also stressed that inaction would erode the authority of the UN, resigning it to a meaningless organization in the face of continued defiance. However, in the end the Bush administration was willing to override any UN Security Council veto, including calls for moderation by allies such as France and Germany, the former of which was not able to block U.S. intervention with recourse to its Security Council veto power.

The view toward multilateralism also did not change between the speeches previously examined and the actual operation. In terms of multilateral UN action, the case has already been presented that the U.S. administration argued for international support, but was willing to act alone if it deemed necessary. Multilateralism was seen as a tool of providing coalition partners, and not as a prerequisite before the U.S. could proceed with military action.

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239 Ibid., 157.
240 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 157.
The speeches previously presented also provide the same evidence as the actual operation. The U.S. argued that military intervention in Iraq was the final step after over a decade of failed diplomacy. Its also argued that continued unsuccessful diplomacy meant that diplomacy had become irrelevant because of its inability to obtain pivotal national objectives.

E. CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the findings of this study, it is most important to reiterate that the conclusion presented here about American strategic culture are not intended to be all-inclusive. Instead, the intent is to provide a glimpse of the elements of American strategic culture that were most prevalent in the decision to invade Iraq. These elements of strategic culture emerged as guiding principles from the system shock of September 11 and, as Gray argues, provided the cultural context for help in understanding the behavioral decisions.

The ideational foundations for U.S. intervention prevalent in its strategic culture are liberal in nature. Dueck refers to it as elements of American grand strategy, but the intention is stressed in the NSS, elite speeches, and Operation Iraqi Freedom that the U.S. will act forcefully, and if necessary unilaterally, on behalf of maintaining peace in the world and protecting herself and her allies from potential harm from the use or proliferation of WMD. In terms of international legitimacy, the U.S. derives legitimacy more from the ethical basis of fighting a just war than it does from rule-based legitimacy. This did not prevent it, however, from seeking UN authorization for the involvement in Iraq while simultaneously arguing that any action against Iraq was already legitimate. In terms of multilateral behavior, the evidence indicates that the predominant view of multilateralism that governed the invasion of Iraq was one of ad hoc coalition, not multilateral institutional behavior. This did not prevent the U.S. from seeking as many international partners as possible. But theses international partners were portrayed as desirable, not necessary, based on a rhetoric that stressed that the U.S. would act alone if necessary. Finally, the evidence suggests that
the portrayal of the use of force as a last resort was important for the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq and that the events of 9/11 had proven that waiting any longer was an unacceptable risk that the U.S. was not willing to take. These elements of U.S. strategic culture which resulted in the policy decision to invade Iraq are not necessarily the dominant elements of American strategic culture today, but were most dominant during this snapshot in time among the ruling elite.
V. CONCLUDING COMPARISON

This study set out to discover the extent of the transatlantic security divide by comparing the emergent European strategic culture that is prevalent in ESDP activities with the American strategic culture that dominated the decision to invade Iraq. The differences are stark and portray political entities that are sometimes diametrically opposed in their consideration of the topics presented in this study, but there is more commonality in the area of multilateralism than one might first suppose. Before summarizing those differences, it is important to first reiterate the limits of this study and what it does not reveal.

The title of this chapter was specifically chosen to help elucidate the point that this study consciously limited its focus. By studying only four questions, it provides insight into only a portion of each entity’s strategic culture. It also chose only one U.S. operation as a way to focus on what may be considered to be the transatlantic divide at its deepest point in a number of years. Focusing only on what was jointly accomplished, as opposed to what was debated but not realized by ESDP, it focused on what was agreeable among Europeans. Lastly, this study made no attempt to ascertain any devious reasons for intervention, but only focused on the reasons publicly articulated by the respective actors, thus potentially losing some richness of information, but also eliminating some controversy. Even with these shortcomings there is valuable insight to be gained from the material at hand.

In terms of the ideational foundation for action, the strategic culture reflected in ESDP activities is significantly different from the U.S. action in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq revealed a strategic culture that was based on a willingness to preemptively intervene in another country under the auspices of protecting the peace by preventing the spread of WMD. The strategic culture surrounding ESDP activities, on the other hand, tend to largely rely on civilian intervention that promotes good governance, especially as concerns police and rule of law.
ESDP has not yet intervened preventively, and certainly not to affect regime change or prevent the proliferation of WMD. ESDP does focus more on the causes of problems and exhibits a trend of intervening proactively to prevent outbreaks of violence.

There is also a stark contrast in terms of international legitimacy based on two very different perceptions of how that legitimacy is derived. On the one hand, the U.S. strategic culture derives legitimacy from both ethical and rule-based sources. The European Union, on the other hand, is deeply committed to rule-based legitimacy. However, even though the EU presents itself as reliant on the UN for rule-based legitimacy, EU rhetoric leaves open the option of acting without an explicit mandate from the UN. This flexibility is now tested in the EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission that controversially bases its legitimacy on a 1999 UN mandate issued in the wake of Operation Allied Force.

There is more agreement in the area of multilateral behavior than one would potentially expect. EU strategic culture is definitively one of multilateral institutional behavior, but it has certain aspects that are closer to the U.S. willingness to operate unilaterally. Both actors exhibit openness to form temporary coalitions with willing and capable contributors to their operations. ESDP accepts partners from states that wish to join an EU operation (civilian or military), just as the U.S. was open to a coalition of willing partners in its intervention in Iraq, once multilateral UN action was unobtainable. The fact that ESDP operations are only conducted after an unanimous vote also obscures the fact that participation of the EU member states is voluntary. Thus, de facto the members who embark on the actual operation also form a coalition of willing states within the larger institutional process. There is also rhetorical and documentation evidence that the EU is moving toward a less multilateral type of behavior with the potential ratification of the Lisbon treaty which includes ‘permanent structured cooperation.’ This would allow a less than unanimous vote to authorize ESDP activity. Thus, the American and European approach to multilateralism is less diverse than their public rhetoric make us think.
Surprisingly, the strategic cultures of each entity with respect to the use of force as a last resort are opposite of what one might expect, but still very different. The EU strategic culture does not rely on an early resort to force, but on an early resort to action that includes all of the EU’s tools. Its culture considers early intervention as a better way of preventing crises than responding after the crises have already occurred. On the other hand, the element of U.S. strategic culture found in the run-up to Iraq gave indication that it considered the use of force only after diplomacy had proven to be ineffective over the period of the previous twelve years. It would be imprudent to purely accept this rhetoric at face value as there are strong indications of declaratory policy. It can be argued, however, that elements within the U.S. strategic culture acknowledge that diplomacy must appear to be exhausted in order to gain support from the international community for an operation such as Iraq.

The transatlantic rift, exposed in this case study is severe. Especially deep are the different perceptions of legitimacy, reasons for an intervention, and how exhausted diplomacy must be before the use of force is considered. The division between multilateral behavior is less severe, but still notable. There are many promising signs (some that were not mentioned in this study) that the divide is already lessening. The revision of the NSS in 2006 and the EU’s proposed permanent structured cooperation both indicate that the divide may be lessening. The upcoming U.S. election could also potentially narrow the divide, depending on the national security policy of the incoming administration. A follow-on to this study would consider any changes in U.S. policy since the invasion of Iraq and reconsider the EU strategic culture that is continually evolving, especially in light of EULEX Kosovo and the potential ratification and changes contained in the Lisbon Treaty.

The final question after seeing the differences revealed by this structured focused case study is to ask: so what? The answer is that it provides an understanding, or a snapshot, if you will, into elements of the respective strategic cultures at one of their most divisive periods. The timeframe for ESDP analysis
was wider and provides a glimpse into the future of where the European strategic culture could be headed: a smaller, less multilateral force that could be used for more militaristic interventions than previously seen in ESDP. One policy recommendation derived from this analysis is for the U.S. to recognize that cooperation with ESDP forces will be more successful when the mission is aligned with the strongest aspects of European strategic culture: comprehensive intervention in order to maintain the rule of law or stability in an area near Europe. The transatlantic partnership could suffer worse fates than a burden sharing intervention that uses the strengths of U.S. hard power with the strengths of European civilian intervention, especially if these strengths were combined with a high degree of legitimacy. This type of cooperation may be the best opportunity for achieving long-term stability in a perennial trouble spot such as the Balkans.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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