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In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macro-insecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994–2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004–2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997–1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that short-term success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.

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COERCIVE DISARMAMENT DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR): CAN IT BE SUCCESSFUL?

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
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ABSTRACT

In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macro-insecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994–2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004–2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997–1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that short-term success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the strategy known as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), an applied strategy that is used for executing successful peacekeeping operations, especially by the United Nations. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is critical to the post-conflict reconstruction environment: it “aims to remove the means of violence, such as small arms, from a society and aims to reintegrate ex-combatants into functioning communities.” After success in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia and failures in Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, the United Nations concluded that “without the implementation of the concept of DDR armed conflict is likely to again break out.”

One of the first and most important steps in achieving the goals of sustainable peace and stability in a post-conflict environment is an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. DDR is not a program that should only be implemented in the first or second phase of reconstruction, but rather is part of the entire process. The programs are difficult to execute. In Haiti between 1994 and 1997, a US-led DDR program established in the reconstruction process failed, and the current


3 Hitchcock, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 36.

approach is not experiencing much success. Unlike most conflicts of the 1990s, Haiti was not an intrastate conflict settled via a peace agreement among warring factions. Instead, the international community imposed peace. Cases like Haiti that are without a peace agreement present special challenges when implementing DDR.

Traditionally, practitioners and scholars have focused overwhelmingly on examples of cooperative DDR, that is, on situations where there is a peace treaty and where combatants, not criminals, are the disarmament target. This leaves out the cases that are likely to become increasingly relevant for the international community: those where no peace treaty exists and where common criminals are the greatest threat to a state. The use of coercive DDR in cases where there was no peace agreement has not been limited to Somalia where it was a disaster. It was used in Haiti between 1995 and 1997 and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a coercive approach to DDR is not a thing of the past. As preemptive measures become a more common practice, the successful implementation of coercive DDR will become increasingly important. This thesis will explore the conditions under which coercive DDR can be implemented successfully and how DDR can be effective against armed groups other than combatants in a post-conflict environment.

Given the importance of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program to the reconstruction process, the international community must know how to implement DDR successfully in various post-conflict environments, such as, for example, that of Haiti. Unlike many post-conflict nations, in Haiti, there is no civil war, peace agreement, defeated enemy, damaging stalemate, faction wanting to secede, or


insurgency. Haiti is a weak state with rampant gang violence. And as intra-state conflicts decline, situations like Haiti may emerge as the new trend and challenge for the international community.

B. IMPORTANCE

Many writers, including Krasner and others, argue that in today’s world, weak and failed states pose a tremendous risk to both the United States and global security. States are most vulnerable to failure after a conflict, and states that are at a high risk of failure cannot be ignored. And, as the events of 9/11 demonstrated, the problems created by failed state are not confined within their borders. A failed state like Afghanistan, if ignored, can be used by nonstate actors to launch an attack against a nation thousands of miles away. The international community must therefore be actively involved in restoring stability and preventing state failure. And because state failure is most likely after a conflict, post-conflict reconstruction becomes extremely important. Successful rebuilding prevents further suffering; reduces the chaos that permits terrorists, drug trafficking, and organized crime to flourish; and significantly contributes to global security and stability.

But for post-conflict reconstruction to be successful, it is absolutely necessary that there be an effective DDR program. In 2000, the UN secretary general concluded that “a

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process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation.” 11 Scholars also agree that an effective DDR process contributes significantly to a fragile peace and reconstruction by facilitating reconciliation and trust building between former combatants and noncombatants; and by laying the foundation for elections, security sector reform, and economic development for the state to move forward. 12 A strategy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is therefore critical to the reconstruction process, stability, and security.

Concerning Haiti, there is an additional factor to consider: its status as a weak state and its location pose a potential threat to the United States. The post-conflict reconstruction effort that began there in September 1994 is still ongoing today. According to the latest report by the International Crisis Group in July 2007, the Haitian state was assessed as “very weak, in need of continued military, police, political, financial, and technical support.” 13 Haiti currently ranks as the eleventh out of 177 states on the Failed State Index as the most likely state to fail. 14 Given this estimation, how can the United Nations, which has led the reconstruction effort in Haiti since 2004, and the United States, Haiti’s largest bilateral donor, significantly contribute to Haiti’s becoming a stronger state with sustainable peace and stability? 15 The goal there is to create a viable and stable state that does not require direct assistance from the international community. In 2004, the Bush administration designated the Caribbean as the United States’ third


border and stressed that “events in the region have a direct impact on homeland security.”16 It is therefore imperative that the international community understand how to implement an effective DDR program in Haiti.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars and practitioners have devoted a significant amount of attention to improving an applied strategy of cooperative DDR. Over the years scholars and practitioners recognized that a failed reintegration program could undermine the entire DDR process. As a result, an integrated approach was developed to address the failures of the cooperative approach to adequately address micro-insecurities by failing to reintegrate former combatants back into their communities. In the process, however, they have generally assumed that DDR would always be conducted in a cooperative environment and that the targets would always be former combatants. But this is not always the case. DDR programs are being conducted also in hostile environments where there is no peace treaty and the targets are sometimes common criminals: environments that require coercive DDR.

The following literature review will begin with a discussion of the three main approaches to an applied strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration – coercive, cooperative, and integrated – and identify their short comings. This will be followed by an examination of the five factors identified by Joanna Spear (in the chapter Disarmament and Demobilization in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens17) as necessary to improve the chances of success when implementing DDR. The literature review will also show that there needs to be more focus on identifying ways to make coercive DDR a success and to reintegrate groups other than former combatants.


In a prototypical scenario of an internal state conflict, the post-conflict status is initiated by a peace treaty signed by the warring parties. From reconstruction programs conducted in that kind of environment during the 1990s, the international community accumulated a wealth of knowledge and lessons-learned. According to the International Peace Research Institute, however, such intrastate conflicts are on the decline.\(^{18}\) Instead of a post-conflict intervention to broker and enforce a peace treaty, it is more likely now that the United States (and perhaps the international community) will have to intervene in either a preventive or a preemptive fashion.

1. **Preventive and Preemptive Measures**

After the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration identified failed states as a threat to U.S. national security and endorsed preemptive action as a viable means to counter threats: thus, the intervention in both Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^{19}\) Afghanistan was a weak state accused of supporting terrorists; Iraq was a strong state accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction.\(^{20}\) In both cases, after a military invasion, reconstruction began not as the result of a peace accord but as a project initiated by the victors in the ensuing conflict.

Some members of the international community now also recognize the importance of intervening early in conflicts and thus may become increasingly involved in preventive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration measures.\(^{21}\) To prepare for similar instances in the future, reconstruction experts need to look at the cases that do not


necessarily fit the existing categories of post-conflict reconstruction. Haiti, for reasons mentioned earlier, is a good example, and unlike with Afghanistan and Iraq, enough time has passed to allow an assessment of the Haitian policies implemented and to learn from those reconstruction endeavors.

2. Dealing with Former Combatants

Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants into society is one of the main components of post-conflict reconstruction. The goal is that they become productive and stabilizing forces, not spoilers of the peace. In approaching this task, reconstruction teams have generally used one of three main approaches: coercive, cooperative, and integrative.

a. Coercive DDR

A coercive approach is one in which the warring factions are forced to disarm by either a local or an intervening armed force. Coercive measures are necessary because, in the absence of a mutual agreement to stop hostilities and disarm, the environment is usually hostile. Military force is required to either capture combatants or get them to turn over their weapons. The coercive approach, which is only practical when there is a clear victor or intervention by a superior force, is the least used of the three approaches because historically it has often failed. 22 The United States, for example, used coercive DDR in Somalia in 1993 and in Iraq in 2003. In Somalia, though the U.S. forces captured many weapons, the overall mission was a failure because the United States proved unable to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations. 23 In Iraq, according to most military experts, the early demobilization of the Iraqi Army led to the current violent insurgency. 24

22 Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 142.
b. Cooperative DDR

Of the three approaches to disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants, cooperative DDR is the one most often used. In the cooperative approach, the warring parties voluntarily end the hostilities and lay down their arms. This approach is most successful in situations where there is no clear victor and where the details of DDR are outlined and agreed upon in a mutual peace agreement. Usually, the international community is then called upon to act as a neutral party to ensure equal compliance and to provide necessary resources. At the macro-level, use of a cooperative approach was considered a success in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In each of these cases the use of a cooperative approach to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants helped end an armed challenge to the state. At the micro-level, however, the DDR programs failed because of the high level of crime and violence committed by ex-combatants.25

In their responses to those micro-level failures, practitioners and scholars then began to point out how important it is to recognize that disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants into society is a long process with a combination of short-, medium-, and long-term effects. And long-term reintegration must be given as much attention as the short-term goals of disarmament and demobilization. For DDR to be successful, all three phases require an enormous amount of resources which must be available at the appropriate times. Each phase requires various agencies to work together to accomplish the overall goals of DDR.26 As Kazuhide Kurado of the World Bank

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accurately pointed out in 2005, every implementation of “DDR has political, security, and economic dimensions and no single entity has capacities to handle all.”

c. Integrative DDR

To address those DDR inefficiencies, in 2000 the UN introduced a new form of DDR, called the “integrated approach,” and in August 2006 published complete standards for its implementation. The integrated approach was designed to synchronize the efforts of various agencies both international and local and to ensure that the short-, medium-, and long-term goals are adequately addressed. In this way, it sought to remedy a major flaw of the cooperative approach: the failure of reintegration programs to prevent ex-combatants from turning to destabilizing crime and violence.

The integrated approach, however, does not address the shortcomings of the coercive approaches. How can DDR be successful in situations where peace is imposed by a superior external force, where there is no peace agreement, and/or where armed gang members who are not ex-combatants create insecurity at the micro-level? The integrated approach assumes that any micro-level insecurity will come from former combatants who are not successfully reintegrated back into society. But this is not the case in an increasing number of countries, including Haiti, where it is criminals that pose the greatest threat to society. A survey of murders committed in Port-au-Prince in 2004 revealed that former combatants were responsible for only 13 percent, while armed gangs

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30 Muggah, “Great Expectations: (dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti,” 2-4. Muggah points out that Haiti is not the typical DDR case. It has no peace agreement and the state is threatened by common criminals and not former combatants.
and criminals were responsible for over 80 percent.\textsuperscript{31} No wonder both the Haitian government and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) consider gangs and criminals as the greatest threat to Haiti’s peace and security.\textsuperscript{32}

The main problem is that an approach designed to disarm former combatants is unlikely to work against gang members. Socially and economically motivated armed groups usually do not have either a strict command structure or grievances that are subject to negotiation. Thus armed gangs present a different kind of challenge. They have no grievances that they want settled and no ideology to combat. Instead, gangs generally form as a means to provide security and a source of income when the state is unable to provide either order or jobs.\textsuperscript{33} The bargaining space is extremely small because there are no quick fixes for the root causes of people joining gangs. The situation in Haiti, for example, is like most nations in a post-conflict phase of development. While the various arms of the government are being developed, the police will continue to be unable to provide adequate security and the economic conditions are not likely to improve any time soon. Even if a gang leader agreed to end the violence, there is no guaranty that gang members would comply. It is essential therefore that whatever program is implemented to get gangs to disarm appeal to individual members.\textsuperscript{34} Each member must be convinced that he or she will be safe and that there will be legitimate economic opportunities to make a decent living.

The UN shift in its DDR approach reflects a consensus in the related literature. Writers have long stressed the need to redesign DDR programs so that reintegration is given as much attention as disarmament and demobilization and is undertaken in concert


with those efforts rather than as an afterthought.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, the literature focuses on factors that shape whether or not the \textit{implementation} of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategies will be successful. Joanna Spear, for instance, conducted a study of DDR programs in fifteen countries that identifies the importance of five factors necessary to achieve success: a peace agreement that clearly defines the terms of DDR, support from the national government, the cooperation of a wide range of agencies, the satisfaction of the warring parties with the terms of DDR, and a verification process that ensures the program is achieving its goals and discouraging cheating.\textsuperscript{36}

3. Five Factors for Success

First, Spear emphasizes that a peace agreement is the most important factor of the five. Spear argues that the peace agreement should clearly define the DDR process, and the terms of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration must be worked out and clearly understood by all parties. Doing these things will give the process legitimacy and avoid confusion during its implementation.\textsuperscript{37} Other post-conflict scholars agree that a peace agreement that includes DDR increases its likelihood for success.\textsuperscript{38}

Second, the implementation environment must have the support of both local governments and international agencies. Without the support of the indigenous governments DDR is likely to fail.

Third, the implementers which consist of numerous agencies and organizations, must all work together for DDR to succeed. No one person or group can accomplish DDR.


\textsuperscript{36} Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 148.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

Fourth, if the warring parties are satisfied with the political terms and the new balance of military power, DDR is likely to succeed. It is also helpful if the warring parties are able to assist in the DDR process.

Finally, the verification process is critical to success. It is important that all parties involved are reassured that the process is achieving the goals that they agreed on. Verification also builds trust and contributes to the peace process.39

Judging from their research and experience, most scholars and practitioners agree that Spear’s five factors are essential for the successful implementation of a DDR strategy. Although there is some disagreement about how to rank the five in terms of importance, most also agree that a peace agreement is crucial and, like Spear, they focus on the demobilization of former combatants.40

**a. The Five Factors and Coercive DDR**

Two of Spear’s five factors are not applicable to the coercive approach. First, a peace agreement does not apply because if a peace agreement exists, then by definition the DDR is not coercive: the parties have agreed to demobilize. Second, verification is not applicable because without a peace agreement no goals have been agreed to by the warring parties and the targeted group must be forced to disarm. It is highly unlikely that any uncooperative personnel will verify whether or not they are being effectively disarmed.

Spear’s other three factors could be applied, however, to improve the success of coercive DDR. Two of the factors address implementation elements – the

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The fourth factor – the need for warring factions to agree to the political and military balance of power resulting from the DDR program – implies a level of agreement that is alien to a coercive approach. But as a counterfactual reading of the Haiti case will show, one could imagine the demobilizing parties agreeing to a balance of power without a peace treaty being in place.

In sum, the integrated approach stresses the importance of reintegrating former combatants, and Spear and others stress the importance of a peace agreement during implementation. However, two major questions have yet to be addressed. How can a DDR program be successful without a peace agreement? And can a successful DDR program be designed that targets criminals and gangs motivated by poverty and other social causes in a post-conflict environment? These two questions will be addressed in this thesis by examining three case studies: the two DDR programs conducted in Haiti and one in Albania.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

In its attempt to conduct a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Haiti, where no peace agreement had been reached between the warring parties, the international community was forced to take a coercive approach, the least preferred and most likely to fail. Another challenge it faced was implementing a DDR program that was designed for former combatants, not criminal gangs. In this regard, the question this thesis asks is, Are there any conditions under which a coercive approach could be successful? This question can be broken down into two sub-questions: Under what conditions can a coercive approach address macro-insecurities? And, under what conditions can a coercive approach address micro-insecurities, particularly those posed by individuals and groups who were not formerly combatants?41

41 Collier, Paul, “Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition From War to Peace,” *Journal of International Development* 6, no. 3 (1994): 343. Collier defined macro-insecurities as “the fear the state will be overthrown by insurrection” and micro-insecurities as “the fear that the individual will be the victim of crime.”
We address these questions examining both successful and unsuccessful cases of coercive DDR. We studied Haiti as a (mostly) unsuccessful case of DDR, divided into two case studies. The case study that will be discussed first is Aristide’s Haiti (1994–2004), followed by a case study of DDR in post-Aristide Haiti, 2004 to 2007.

President Aristide was removed from the presidency in 1991 by the military led by General Raoul Cedras. In 1994 he was reinstated as President by the international community led by the United States. Following President Aristide’s unilateral decision to disband the Haitian military, the United States scrambled to implement a coercive DDR program to ensure that former military members would not pose a threat to international forces and the Haitian state. The program achieved short-term success but failed in 2004 as armed former military members forced Aristide out of office.

In this case, how did the coercive approach achieve short-term success? Why did the military, given its structured chain of command, not engage in a coordinated resistance? Did the United States fail to do something that then caused the DDR program to have only short-term success? Our tentative answers to these questions are as follows: the presence of a superior force that prevented any resistance resulted in the DDR’s short-term success. More long-term success could not be achieved, however, because the reintegration phase of the program was a failure.

In the second case study, post-Aristide Haiti, the U.S. Marines deployed to Haiti after President Aristide was forced to leave the country in 2004 were later replaced by a UN peacekeeping force that continues to this day. During this time, the Haitian government carried out a cooperative DDR program that successfully reduced the threat posed by ex-military members. And the international community launched an integrated DDR program to combat the micro-insecurities posed by armed gangs. The program coordinated and synchronize the efforts of numerous agencies to deliver economic and developmental projects to communities in the form of job creation and infrastructure improvements. It also required the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Haitian National Police (HNP) forces to conduct raids and set up checkpoints to disarm gangs by force.
Both planks of the program have been a failure, a situation that leaves many questions unanswered. Why have the raids not resulted in the disarming of gangs? Why did the integrated approach fail to reintegrate gang members and reduce the threat they posed to society? The tentative answers to these questions are that poor security and economic conditions in Haiti made gang members unwilling to give up their weapons: both their security blanket and their bread winner. There is also the problem that the integrated approach was designed to conduct DDR on combatants as a group, and Haiti’s challenge is how to force individuals to disarm. The integrated approach in Haiti is also failing because the efforts of the various agencies involved were neither coordinated nor synchronized.

To better illustrate why and how Haiti’s DDR process failed, the thesis will compare it to Albania’s more successful program. The Albanian case is widely accepted as an example of a successful implementation of coercive disarmament only, not of a full-fledged DDR program. Those disarmed were ordinary citizens with no affiliation with an organized group; thus no demobilization or reintegration program was required. What the Albanian case study provides is invaluable insights on how to successfully get individuals to disarm in the absence of a peace agreement, a challenge that Haiti also faces.

In February 1998, the Albanian government invited the international community to help it implement the coercive disarmament of civilians who had armed themselves a year earlier by looting 1,300 armories and weapons factories. By January 1999 the disarmament program was fully operational; it was completed in August 1999.

As noted above, unlike in most post-conflict situations, the Albanian program was not aimed at combatants. The international community designed an unconventional disarmament program that was successful in disarming the citizens of Albania and thereby eliminated the micro-insecurity they posed. But what lessons can the international community learn from the Albanian experience that could be applied to cases like Haiti? How did those involved in the program convince Albanian citizens to

disarm? A preliminary examination of the case suggests that the local community’s support and a disarmament program tied to community development programs were the main factors in the program’s success.

In respect to the major question driving this thesis – Under what conditions can a coercive DDR approach be successful – it is widely argued that a coercive approach always leads to failure. But the Albanian case demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. Nonetheless, the mischaracterization of coercive DDR has led both scholars and practitioners to virtually ignore it and to concentrate instead on finding ways to improve the cooperative approach. While this effort led to the development of an integrated approach, a decided improvement, it failed to address the problem of how to successfully implement DDR in the absence of a peace agreement. We examine both why coercive DDR worked in Albania but not in Aristide’s Haiti and why it worked in post-Aristide Haiti but not over the longer term. This examination proves useful because it illuminates critical aspects of coercive DDR that suggest that it may prove more widely implementable in certain types of post-conflict environment that are common today.

The thesis will also draw on one of the Haitian case studies to address a shortcoming of an integrated approach, which ignores the fact that a coercive DDR program implemented in 1994 was considered a success for nearly a decade. Over 16,000 weapons were recovered and no armed faction actively resisted the process. Nevertheless, by 2004 Haiti’s DDR program was an apparent failure, as armed former combatants forced President Aristide from office. These circumstances make the Haitian case relevant to practitioners who question whether Haiti’s short-term success with coercive DDR could be replicated and, if so, how its long-term failure might be avoided.

What is clear is that even absent a peace agreement, Haiti experienced short-term success with coercive DDR: Aristide disbanded the army with little short-term resistance.

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44 Ibid., 9.
What the thesis asks is why this happened, contrary to similar cases of coercive DDR such as Somalia where the process was actively resisted. Perhaps more important, the thesis will examine the failure of the coercive approach in the long run, when in 2004 ex-military members cooperated with armed groups to force Aristide from office. Could the international community have forged a workable agreement about the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in a situation without a peace treaty and conditions that were not ripe for a coordinated approach?

To supplement these discussions, the thesis explores ways in which DDR could be used to address widespread crime and violence, major sources of micro-insecurity, as in Haiti post-2004. We question both the source of crime as well as possible solutions. For example, Is the crime in Haiti caused by a failed DDR program or are most criminals noncombatants who are forced into a life of crime by the poor economic conditions and the availability of weapons? If the majority of criminals are disgruntled civilians, do they pose a different set of challenges than if the criminals were ex-combatants? Should DDR programs be part of the solution to the violence carried out by criminal gangs in Haiti? If so, is a cooperative approach based on negotiations with the “warring parties” feasible or would a coercive approach be necessary? If so, how could the coercive approach be modified to avoid failure as in the past?

E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on a comparative study of three cases: Haiti 1994–2004, Haiti 2004–present, and Albania 1997–1999. Our analysis of each case study will use the five factors identified by Spear offered to demonstrate the likelihood of success or failure of implementing DDR. Although two of the factors are not applicable to coercive DDR, all five offer great assistance, to varying degrees depending on the circumstances, in identifying elements that contribute to DDR programs’ success or failure. But since all five factors are not applicable to the case studies, additional elements will be introduced to assist our determination of what contributes to success or failure. The Haiti 1994–2004 case demonstrates how short-term success can be achieved using coercive DDR, showing that a coercive approach does not have to be a complete failure. There are important
lessons to be learned here that could be applied to improve the chances of coercive 
approach being successful. However, in 2004 an armed rebellion led by former 
combatants showed that coercive DDR in Haiti failed to have long-term effects. Lessons 
could be learned here also that might show in turn how to ensure that in the future such 
DDR programs would have longer-term success.

In the case study of Haiti 2004–present the local government and the international 
community confronted the micro-insecurity posed by criminal gangs. So far, an 
integrated DDR program launched in August 2006 has failed to disarm the gangs of 
Haiti. An examination of this case should reveal the faults involved in implementing a 
DDR program designed for former combatants to target criminal groups in the hope that 
individual members will disarm.

The third and final case is Albania 1997–1999. This case, a success story, will 
offer significant insights on how to effectively force individuals to disarm.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II will explore the failed DDR program in Aristide’s Haiti (1994–2004), 
its consequences, and the challenges that were encountered. Chapter III will explore 
Haiti’s current DDR program and identify obstacles to its success. Since the two Haitian 
cases have largely failed and offer primarily negative lessons for policy makers, the thesis 
will examine a case of successful disarmament in a country in which where conflict did 
not end with a peace treaty. In 1998, Albania asked for international help to combat 
armed civilians and violence and implemented a successful disarmament program. 
Chapter IV examines that successful disarmament of individuals and identifies elements 
that contributed to the Albanian success. Chapter V concludes the thesis with lessons 
learned and recommendations for the international community to use when conducting 
reconstruction in post-conflict scenarios that are not settled via a peace treaty. The overall 
aim of this thesis is to add to the literature the special challenges that these largely 
ignored post-conflict scenarios present and how to resolve them.
II. DDR IN HAITI: 1994–2004

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1994, three years after the military ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power, the United States reinstated him as the rightful leader of Haiti. President Aristide, without reaching an agreement with the military and without consulting the United States, decided to disband the Haitian armed forces. Most military members opposed demobilization. Consequently, the United States was forced into implementing coercive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the approach that is considered to have the highest probability of failure. Unlike its previous use of coercive DDR programs, however, in this case, the United States was able to achieve short-term success with very little resistance. Nevertheless, over the longer term, it was an obvious failure, as in 2,004 former soldiers led armed rebels in an attempt to overthrow the government. That ultimate failure raises two main questions: Why was the short-term success unsustainable? What went wrong?

This chapter will address those questions. It examines the coercive DDR program carried out by the United States between 1995 and 1997 and explains why it was successful in the short run but a failure in the long run, ultimately undermining the entire reconstruction process. The chapter will present evidence that coercive DDR can be successful, at least in the short run. The chapter will also argue that long-term success was also achievable, at least in theory. If Aristide had not been so opposed to the military taking jobs in the public sector, he could have unilaterally crafted a DDR program which terms would have been accepted, if grudgingly, by the target group. Aristide did not do that, however, and once the United States and other international forces departed, mid-level commanders of the disbanded military were able to mobilize disgruntled rank-and-file soldiers against the state.

B. THE ORIGINS OF THE DDR PROGRAM

The Haitian military has long been a key player in the country’s politics. Since Haiti’s independence in 1804, the military has helped determine who would be the
president and for how long. This arrangement was altered in 1957 when Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier won Haiti’s presidential election. Papa Doc was very aware of the role that the armed forces played in politics, so he decided to neutralize the military by replacing the current officers with officers loyal to him. He then acted to reduce any potential threat the military could pose to his government by establishing a paramilitary as a counterweight, “the notorious Volontaires pour la Securite Nationale, commonly known as the tonton macoutes.” Aided by the military’s support and influence, Papa Doc ruled Haiti until his death in 1971.

His son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, then took over and ruled until 1986 when street protests and military maneuvering led to his forced exile. After Baby Doc’s departure Haiti fell under military rule until 1990 when the United States pressured the military into creating an interim civilian government that would organize an election for a permanent elected government.

In Haiti’s first free and fair elections, held in December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won 67 percent of the vote, but he did not remain long in power. He lacked the support of the military and just eight months after his inauguration was ousted from power by a military coup. In 1993, an attempt to return Aristide to power under the so-called Governor’s Island Accord failed. The United Nations then passed Security Council Resolution 940 authorizing the use of all necessary means, including force, to replace the military government of Haiti and restore the democratic government to power. A UN mandate authorized the creation of both a Multinational Force (MNF), which was predominantly U.S.-manned, to intervene and a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to replace the MNF once a safe and secured environment was established. However, when the head of the Haitian military government, General Raoul


Cedras, realized that a forced intervention was pending he signed an agreement to allow Aristide to return to power. The arrangement stipulated that General Cedras and his officials would resign and provided for legislative amnesty for the military. A planned force entry became a permissive one and on October 15, 1994, Aristide was reinstated as the president of Haiti.

The intervention plan had called for an international force to work with the Haitian Army to provide security while the Haitian National Police (HNP) was being established. It soon became clear that Haitian troops were not able to provide public security in accordance with international norms. For example, it was not uncommon for unarmed citizens to be beaten by members of the Haitian military. One of these incidents, televised in the United States, showed an unarmed man being beaten by uniformed Haitian personnel while U.S. soldiers watched. The resulting outcry led to U.S. forces taking a more active role in patrolling the streets.

The Haitian forces continued to disrupt the peace process, exchanging gun fire with U.S. forces in Cap Haitien that left ten people dead, and attacking a peaceful protest in Port-au-Prince that left five dead. These incidents and Aristide’s awareness of the threat the military posed to his tenure led to his decision on December 23, 1994, to disband the military. He did not consult with either the United States or Haitian military leaders before making his decision. But a month later, after soldiers were allowed to take their weapons home, he reluctantly gave the United States permission to conduct a DDR program in Haiti. The UN, which had had prior experience with administering such programs in Latin America and Africa, was unable to assist because the program was not included in their mandate.

50 Scott, “Order in the Court: Judicial Stability and Democratic Success in Haiti,” 3.
C. THE DDR PROGRAM’S SHORT-TERM SUCCESS

The DDR program in Haiti was divided into two parts which were conducted independently of each other. The U.S. Army was responsible for disarmament. The Office of Transition Initiative (OTI), which fell under the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID), was responsible for the demobilization and reintegration program. The agency also financed the International Organization of Migration (IOM) to help with implementation of the program, known as the Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP). The DRP had three objectives: (1) “short-term neutralization” to decrease the threat ex-military members posed to US forces; (2) the creation of “breathing space” to keep former soldiers engaged and allow post-conflict development and transition to the UN; and (3) long-term reintegration to lay the foundation for former Haitian soldiers to be reintegrated economically, socially, and politically into Haitian society.

The next section will discuss the DDR program’s success in the short-term neutralization of the military and the creation of breathing space for UN operations. Programs for long-term reintegration, however, would face more problems. Their ultimate failure is discussed in a subsequent section.

1. U.S. Disarmament Measures

The U.S. Army was able to achieve a degree of success in disarmament by actively searching for weapons stockpiles across the country and from former soldiers. Special Forces units conducted search missions to locate and secure the Haitian Army’s secret weapon caches. U.S. soldiers were also posted at Demobilization and Reintegration sites to search former soldiers when they showed up. As a result U.S. forces were able to secure over 16,000 Haitian military weapons. But due to the poor record-keeping of the Haitian military, it is difficult to know what percentage of total weapons this constitutes. Most analysts agree that 16,000 was far short of the number of weapons available to the Haitian military prior to the U.S. intervention. 54

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2. **U.S. Demobilization and Reintegration Measures**

When Aristide abolished the military, USAID was able to get approximately 3,550 former soldiers integrated into the Interim Public Security Forces (IPSF). Another estimated 3,440 voluntarily demobilized during the winter of 1995. Of the 3,440 that demobilized, only about 390 refused to participate in the reintegration program. In June 1995, when the Haitian National Police began to assume responsibility for providing security for Haiti and the IPSF began to release ex-military members, the demobilization and reintegration teams processed another wave of former soldiers.55

The demobilization process had two parts: registration and orientation. Registration was easy, with registration sites located all over the country, five in Port-au-Prince and six in the other provinces. Eighty-two percent of those who registered did so in Port-au-Prince, indicating that most military members lived in and around the largest city. At the registration sites the MNF searched registrants for weapons; government officials confirmed their status as former military members, gave them a pay check, and offered them the reintegration program; and their military identification cards were replaced with those issued by USAID.56

The second part, the orientation process, lasted four or five days: two days for general information, two days for explaining the vocational training program, and one day reserved for general questions and answers. The orientation process had several goals: (1) explain the Demobilization and Reintegration Program, (2) give former soldiers a chance to voice their concerns, (3) advise them on Haiti’s economic and employment conditions, (4) prepare them to function in a democratic society, (5) prepare them for the challenges of returning to school, and (6) advise them on the challenges they would face as they transitioned to civilian life.57 After demobilization was complete the next step for those who registered was reintegration.

The reintegration program had three components: vocational training, stipends, and the Opportunity and Referral Service (ORS). The vocational training lasted six

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56 Ibid., 16-17.
57 Ibid., 17-18.
months, with courses being offered in twenty-three different schools, most of which were located in Port-au-Prince. Participants could choose to attend any of the following ten courses: auto mechanics, electricity, computers, welding, carpentry, plumbing, general mechanics, masonry, electronics, and refrigeration. Most participants chose to be auto mechanics.58

Stipends, which equaled the pay soldiers had received in the military, allowed them to attend vocational training full time. However, the payment process was did not go smoothly. Though the Haitian government had agreed to pay the stipends, they later decided not to. Finally, in June 1995, the government decided it would pay the stipend out of a foreign donor fund.59

After graduation, students had a difficult time finding a job, leading the U.S. International Development Agency to create the Opportunity and Referral Service, which gave seminars on writing a resume and how to conduct job searches and interviews. The ORS also became a forum for former soldiers to air their grievances and get counseling. After listening to graduates, the OR service realized that a diploma verifying their skills and a tool kit would help them in finding jobs. USAID then started issuing diplomas, and by the end of the program 97 percent of graduates had received a tool kit.60

In sum, the DDR program in Haiti was able to secure over 16,000 weapons. More than 6,000 former soldiers of an estimated force size of 7,000 registered for demobilization. Over 80 percent (5,204) of registered soldiers participated in the reintegration program, with only a six-percent drop-out rate. While over 4,800 graduated, only six percent were able to get a job. Nonetheless, when the international forces left Haiti in November 1997, they believed the DDR program was a success. It appeared to have broken the power of the Haitian military and its allies and eliminated any potential of armed resistance.61 More important, the coercive approach had worked despite the

59 Ibid., 19.
60 Ibid., 20.
lack of a peace agreement. The military had not agreed to be demobilized either in peace talks or any other accord, but it did not resist. How can this be explained?

a. **Explaining the Apparent Success**

Once the formal order to disband the Haitian military was given, the United States expected clashes with former soldiers, but none occurred. A key reason for this was the presence of a superior force providing security, which discouraged retaliation by former soldiers. There were more than 20,000 international troops in Haiti while the Haitian Army, even at full strength, did not exceed 7,000. Another reason was the Haitian military’s lack of leadership. On September 19, 1994, when the multinational forces arrived, many of the Haitian military leaders went into exile, some into hiding just over the Dominican Republic’s border. Within this context, the demobilization and reintegration program was able to keep the rank-and-file soldiers sufficiently occupied that they did not pose a threat to the state. The International Development Agency was able to outmaneuver President Aristide, incorporating 3,500 former soldiers into the Interim Public Security Forces while others attended a six-month vocational training program. Since only one officer was participating in the DDR program, this helped break the chain of command.

In sum, the DDR program was very successful in the short-run. The presence of a superior force deterred any large-scale, organized retaliation by former soldiers. International forces were able to establish a safe environment and transfer responsibilities to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, allowing it to operate safely until they departed Haiti in November 1997. However, the DDR program teams had failed to reintegrate former soldiers, a factor that was to have long-term ramifications.

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64 Ibid., 7.
D. THE DDR PROGRAM’S LONG-TERM FAILURE

In 2000, Aristide won the election and returned to the presidency, but during his second term the economic situation in Haiti grew worse. The police were increasingly accused of engaging in extra-judicial killings and of harassing supporters of Rene Preval, the previous president who had once been an ally of Aristide but was now a bitter rival. In addition, Aristide began to arm the paramilitary groups that supported him. One group, the Cannibal Army, was well known for its plundering and burning of the homes and offices of opposition members. Finally, under pressure from the international community, Aristide was forced to arrest the Cannibal Army leader, Amiot Metayer, who then became a fierce Aristide opponent. Metayer was accused of many political murders including those of opposition party members that occurred after the December 2001 attacks on the presidential palace. Metayer did not stay in jail long. His followers used a bulldozer to break into the jail, and he and more than 150 other prisoners escaped. This marked the beginning of the Metayer gang’s reign of terror in the countryside.65

Around this same time, former soldiers also began mobilizing. A number of former mid-level commanders including Guy Phillippe, Louis Jodel Chamberlain, Antoine Izmery, Jean Pierre Baptiste, and an ex-army colonel, Remissainthe Ravix, were angered by the military demobilization and being shut out of government jobs. They began mobilizing former rank-and-file soldiers who were largely disgruntled over the lack of jobs along the Dominican Republic’s border. In 2002, they launched a number of attacks, killing civilians and harassing the police. But their terrorist acts were not just limited to civilians and police; they also killed government officials, including, on July 25, 2003, four members of the Ministry of Interior.66

As Metayer’s Cannibal Army’s reign of terror became more destabilizing, the former soldiers joined forces with him to exploit the confusion in the North. On February 5, 2004, they seized Gonaives, the fourth-largest city in Haiti, and took control of the police station. The police relinquished control of the north, and as the rebels began to


march on the capital, President Aristide was forced to abdicate his office. If the U.S. Marines had not quickly deployed, the combined forces of the rebels would have taken control of the country.67

Clearly, the international community’s belief that the Haitian disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program had eliminated macro-insecurity – the threat to the state posed by former soldiers – was mistaken. Nonetheless, the program had been successful in the short run: the former soldiers had not resisted the DDR process and, until 2004, did not threaten the state.

1. Reasons for the Eventual Failure of DDR

According to Spear, the factor most critical for success in a post-conflict situation is a peace agreement by which the parties agree to be demobilized and a political and military balance of power is created that is acceptable to all parties. In Haiti, this did not happen: the military did not agree beforehand to demobilization, thus creating a situation that called for a coercive form of DDR. But even without a peace treaty, it is conceivable that a DDR package could have been crafted that would have satisfied the military. However, while the terms of the package may have been acceptable to the United States, a major stakeholder in the DDR process, it would not have been acceptable to President Aristide.

In 1994, during Haiti’s occupation, there were three main stakeholders operating in the country: the international community led by the United States; the Haitian government led by President Aristide; and the military whose top leaders were in exile.68 Each of the three had its own view of the future role of the Haitian military. The United States believed it could be used to provide security in the short-term and then, after being vetted of personnel guilty of human rights violations, could help establish the Haitian National Police.69 The legislative amnesty that General Cedras had secured for the military and the security the military initially provided during the occupation indicates that the military believed they would have a significant role in Haiti’s security. But

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68 CNN.com, “Haiti: The Past is a Prologue,” CNN.com, 1.
President Aristide, after being ousted by the military, wanted it dissolved.\textsuperscript{70} He not only prevailed in this, he also succeeded in denying employment in the public sector, Haiti’s largest employer, to demobilizing military members.

The Haitian military, on the other hand, was disgruntled with the terms of DDR. They wanted severance pay and/or retirement packages for those who had earned them. Part of the military members’ pay went into a savings account, and they wanted that paid to them. They wanted to be able to get civil servant jobs, and many wanted the military reinstated. In brief, the ex-military members wanted to remain relevant in Haitian society and to have economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{71} Needless to say, they were not satisfied with their new role. But under both President Aristide’s and President Preval’s governments, their grievances were not addressed.

Most of the rank-and-file soldiers were especially frustrated by the lack of jobs. They had no means to provide for their families. And even though the DDR program was coercive, the Haitian government could have made economic opportunities available to former soldiers. If they had work or even believed that they had a chance of getting a job, it is highly unlikely that the lower-ranked soldiers would have been susceptible to recruitment by the mid-level leaders.

Recently, some scholars and practitioners of have criticized DDR programs for ignoring the special needs of mid-level commanders who are crucial to the success of most DDR programs. It is their participation that gives the programs legitimacy, and they can either get their subordinates to comply with DDR measures or to resist.\textsuperscript{72} The fact that only one officer participated in Haiti’s DDR program indicates either that the mid-level leaders were not targeted by the program implementers or that the mid-level

\textsuperscript{70} Jean-Germain Gros, “Haiti’s Flagging Transition,” 96.


commanders did not find the terms of DDR acceptable. Among the many reasons that the former military members were disgruntled was the desire of most mid-level commanders for positions within the government. If the DDR package had addressed their needs and if the administrators had sought their participation in the DDR process, it is unlikely that the mid-level commanders would have led former soldiers in a rebellion against the state.

However, some mid-level commanders could not have been part of the government or been targeted for DDR; they were guilty of gross human rights violations and should be prosecuted. Viscous leaders like Louis Jodel Chamberlain were suspected of numerous heinous crimes against humanity, and arguably, would have tried to launch an attack against the state when and if the opportunity presented itself. But the probability of these wicked individuals being successful in recruiting employed former soldiers to lead a large-scale rebellion against the state would have been greatly reduced.

In sum, if the Haitian government had created a DDR package that was more effective in providing economic opportunities for rank-and-file soldiers and allowed mid-level commanders the public sector jobs they desired, the macro-insecurities posed by former soldiers would have been reduced.

The disarmament part of the DDR program also failed, largely because there was no agreement between the United States and President Aristide. Consequently, Haitian soldiers were initially demobilized without being disarmed. They simply took their weapons home and thus were able to use them while participating in the rebellion of 2004. An agreement between the United States and the Haitian government may have prevented this. It could have provided for the successful disarmament of soldiers in a controlled environment, which would have prevented ex-military members from having access to high-powered, military-style weapons to launch an attack against the state.

Spear argues also that the implementation environment of a DDR program must be conducive for success by having the support of local governments; and implementers must be willing to take on “statelike roles (e.g., protection of citizens and provisions of welfare).” This did not happen in Haiti. President Aristide and his ministers distanced themselves from the DDR program, refusing to pay stipends for soldiers enrolled in vocational training programs. More important, the government failed to communicate to the public the long-term benefits of the program and reconciliation. Many Haitians despised former soldiers, who were viewed as oppressors and potential trouble-makers. They were stigmatized and, as a result, after graduating from vocational training they were unable to find jobs in the private sector. The public sector, the country’s largest employer, offered no relief, since former soldiers were prohibited from holding government jobs. Only six percent of former soldiers were able to secure a legitimate means of income.

Another element of the implementation environment is the need for implementers who are able to perform statelike duties, such as providing welfare relief and security. Providing welfare for former soldiers was an area in which the U.S. Agency of International Development did not believe it would be involved. Also, the government was unwilling to pay former soldiers their stipends for attending the reintegration program. The stipends were almost the same amount that soldiers had been paid when on active duty. Without the stipends soldiers were unable to attend the program full-time. They were busy searching for alternative sources of income. Eventually, USAID was able to secure stipends, which enabled former soldiers to attend vocational training full-time.

For a time, the United States and other international forces provided a safe and secure environment for implementation of DDR and deterred any potential for armed rebellions, but that was only a temporary fix. After the last international security force departed Haiti in November 1997, the newly established Haitian National Police became the sole providers of Haitian security. But the force was poorly equipped, inexperienced,

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76 Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 151.
78 Ibid., 53.
and too small to provide adequate security. A country the size of Haiti with a population of eight million people required a police force of at least 14,000 personnel. The HNP, with just slightly above 5,000 members, was unable to prevent former soldiers and criminal gangs from marching on the capital and threatening the democratic Haitian state.79

In sum, the DDR implementation environment for the most part was not conducive to success, the Haitian government did not support the program, and the indigenous security force established by the program implementers was not sufficiently empowered to provide adequate security. The implementers' main achievement was that they were able to secure funds for former soldiers to attend the program full-time.

A third aspect necessary for DDR to be successful is that the implementers must coordinate with other agencies.80 As the program’s failure in Haiti clearly demonstrated, no one agency can achieve success in and of itself, and in Haiti, the DDR program was conducted unilaterally by USAID. Another agency that might have been of significant help was the UN, which has vast amounts of resources and experience in conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects. Prior to Haiti, the UN conducted DDR in both Latin America and Africa. But, USAID could not coordinate with the UN, and DDR was not part of the UN’s mandate. At the very least, it and other developmental agencies could have assisted USAID in securing jobs for former soldiers outside of the public sector. But its wealth of expertise, knowledge, and resources were not brought to bear in Haiti. USAID might also have used some assistance from the Haitian government in getting former soldiers reintegrated back into their communities.

But ultimately, for DDR to be successful and sustainable, the community must be consulted and engaged.81 In Haiti, the local government officials distanced themselves from the DDR program, and so did the local communities. Consequently, USAID neither consulted nor engaged the local communities. Thus, the reintegration plan was developed and implemented without the community’s input. USAID, in isolation, believed that by

80 Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 154.
giving former soldiers certain skills they would be accepted back into their local neighborhoods, but that did not happen. Instead, they were stigmatized and rejected by their communities, and eventually sought refuge near the Dominican Republic’s border where mid-level commanders were conspiring to attack the state.82

Thus, yet another area of failure was border security. Both the United States and the UN believed that weapons were coming across the Haitian–Dominican Republic border, which neither the United States nor the UN did anything to secure. Both claimed it was not in their mandate. However, weapons were not the only thing coming across: former military leaders crossed the border during the occupation to avoid capture. Louis Jodel Chamblain, for example, a sergeant in the Haitian army, had been tried and found guilty in absentia for killing government officials in 1993.83 He had escaped trial by hiding across the border, then reentered Haiti after the occupation to help plan and lead the armed rebellion of 2004.

As we have said, it is commonly believed that a coercive approach to DDR will invariably end in failure, because a coercive approach is usually only used in the absence of a peace agreement. But, failure in Haiti did not occur because of the lack of a peace treaty. Our research shows that a DDR package might have been developed that would have satisfied the needs of both the former mid-level commanders and the rank-and-file. An agreement outlining the DDR process between the Haitian government and the United States would also have increased the likelihood of success. Instead, as we have shown, there were numerous reasons for the DDR program’s eventual failure in Haiti: a lack of national government and interagency support and coordination; an inadequate indigenous security force; a lack of coordination and engagement with the local communities; and a failure to secure the border. These shortcomings are not inherent to the use of a coercive approach: in the case of Haiti, they were a product of poor planning and implementation.


E. CONCLUSION

In 2004, a rebellion led by former soldiers against the Haitian state made it clear that the DDR program had failed and undone all that had been accomplished during the reconstruction effort in the period from 1994 to 1997. After the rebellion, the international community had to launch yet another reconstruction effort in Haiti. Thus its experience demonstrates how critical it is for DDR programs to be successful in achieving both short-term and long-term effects.

In the short-run, Haiti was successful in defusing the threat that former soldiers posed to the state (i.e., macro-insecurity) and allowing the mission to be accomplished in a safe environment. Thus, Haiti’s case clearly shows that coercive DDR can be at least temporarily successful. In the long-run; however, success was unsustainable, mainly because the terms of the DDR program were unacceptable to ex-military members, there was no agreement between the United States and the Haitian government, and no community engagement in the DDR process. All these contributed significantly to the failure of DDR in Haiti. Though the experience in Haiti was not a complete success, there are many lessons that might be learned from it regarding the elimination of macro-insecurities when using coercive DDR is the only option.
III. DDR IN HAITI: 2004–2007

A. INTRODUCTION

In February 2004, armed gangs and former soldiers joined forces and marched on the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince. On February 29, President Aristide was forced to resign the presidency and once again leave the country.84 That same day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1529 authorizing a three-month Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to restore order in Haiti. The force totaled three thousand personnel, with troops from countries such as Chile, Canada, and France, led by the United States. Largely due to its size and mandate, the MIF, though able to restore order, was unable to undertake any reconstruction projects or to disarm rebel groups.85 The latter task would fall to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which assumed responsibility in Haiti on June 1, 2004. Led by Brazil, the stabilization mission totaled 6,700 military troops and 1,622 civilian police from over a dozen countries: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, France, Guatemala, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, and the United States.86

The UN Stabilization Mission was faced not only with the challenge of disarming former members of the Haitian military, but also with confronting and conducting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of violent gangs, which presented unique and unfamiliar challenges to the international community. This chapter will focus on how and why MINUSTAH, working with the Haitian government, succeeded in demobilizing former soldiers (even in the absence of a peace agreement), but failed to disarm the gang members, which consequently continue to threaten Haiti’s stability.

B. FORMER SOLDIERS AND COOPERATIVE DDR

The former soldiers who had taken up arms against the state, believed to number approximately 5,700, were concentrated in the center of Haiti around Hinche with some influence in the north and Gonaive. They were led by Louis Jodel Chamblain and Guy Philippe. As ex-military members, they were not interested in creating long-term instability and insecurity. They only wanted to cause enough trouble to convince the Haitian public that the military should be reinstated to provide stability and security.\(^87\)

According to a Wayne State University survey of crimes in Haiti conducted between February 2004 and December 2005, former soldiers were accused of committing only 13 percent of the murders and 20 percent of the kidnappings.\(^88\) Unlike the violent gangs, they were not known for committing large-scale murders, kidnappings, sexual and physical assaults, or property crimes.\(^89\) Also unlike gangs, the former soldiers had specific grievances they wanted addressed: reinstatement of the military; ten years of back pay; retirement packages for those who qualified; and eligibility for civil servant jobs.\(^90\)

1. Former Soldiers Disarmed

After President Aristide departed Haiti, an interim government was created to take charge of the state and prepare the country for general elections. The UN Stabilization Mission and the interim government took a cooperative approach to DDR that focused on disarming the former soldiers. Prime Minister Gerard LaTortue of the interim government, who called former soldiers “freed om fighters,” agreed to negotiate with them.\(^91\) In addressing their major issues and concerns, he agreed to look into the possibility of reinstating the military by creating a special board to look into the matter.

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\(^89\) Ibid.
\(^91\) Ibid., 11.
Former military members who qualified but were denied retirement packages would start receiving them. And former soldiers would be allowed to join the Haitian National Police (HNP). Three hundred former soldiers joined immediately and others were allowed to enter the police academy. 92 While the international community did not approve at first, LaTortue assured them that former soldiers would be subjected to the same vetting process as everyone else. 93 As part of the negotiations, one of the soldiers’ leaders, Louis Jodel Chamblain negotiated for a retrial for crimes he had been convicted of in absentia and was acquitted. Thus, the threat that the former soldiers had posed to the state and population was virtually eliminated. By early 2006, both MINUSTAH and the Haitian government no longer considered ex-military members a threat to Haiti’s stability and security. 94

Armed gangs, however, remained a destabilizing force and spoiler to the reconstruction process. Armed gangs had also participated with the former soldiers in the rebellion against President Aristide and were committing over 80 percent of the crimes in Haiti. Significantly, the DDR program developed by the UN Stabilization Mission and the interim government did not target armed gangs. 95 They were considered a problem to be handled by the local police and justice system.

C. FAILURE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO CONTROL ARMED GANGS

In general, armed gangs are motivated mostly by economic reasons. And, according to the International Crisis Group, extreme poverty and the lack of economic opportunities are the two biggest contributors to the gang culture and violence in Haiti. 96 According to the World Bank, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere: its economic and social indicators are lower even than the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The average life expectancy in Haiti is 52 years, compared to the regional

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average of 71. Infant mortality is 79 per 1,000 live births, more than twice the regional average. Malnutrition affects about half the children under the age of five, and half the Haitian adult population is illiterate. Most of the population lives in abject poverty with 78 percent of Haitians living on less than two dollars per day.  

Armed gangs in Haiti commit murders, rapes, and robberies and engage in extortion and kidnappings. The latter is by far the most lucrative way to make a living, with ransoms for victims ranging from fifty dollars for a street vendor to tens of thousands for professionals. By sharing their earnings with the people within their communities, the gangs also earn the support of the people. They are mainly concentrated in Port-au-Prince, especially in the slums of Cite Soleil. While the gangs are numerous, it is difficult to determine their size: some have as few as twenty members, some as many as eighty.

Haiti’s ineffective police and justice system has failed to resolve gang violence; some even argue that they contribute to the problem. They fail not only to deter criminal activities but also to provide adequate security to discourage citizens from arming themselves for protection. In the aftermath of the insurrection in 2004, the Haitian National Police was reduced to fewer than 3,000 officers, far fewer than the 14,000 officers judged necessary to provide security for a nation of eight million. Many officers fled as rebels approached the police stations in the north; and some are believed to have joined armed gangs. To make matters worse, between March and the end of 2004, the interim government dismissed 350 police officers for corruption, but they were not

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disarmed. Another 25 percent were suspected of being corrupt. It is the corruption and
human rights violations of the HNP that has caused many citizens to identify with gang

Like the police force, the judicial system is known for its widespread corruption. Many judges who were political appointees lack the necessary education and training to carry out their duties. Some are illiterate. They are underpaid, with salaries much lower than those of prosecutors and police officers. But, unlike the police, judges go months at a time without being paid. As a result, judges are susceptible to bribes and corruption; thus, it is a common belief in Haiti that justice can be bought. The executive branch is also known for interfering with the outcome of cases. The police complain that the justice system is broken. They arrest individuals only to have them released later without being punished.\footnote{Ibid., 2-9.} Moreover, the prison system is not much better. Uprisings by prisoners protesting their living conditions are common and prison breaks are frequent.

The gangs were not afraid of either the police or going through the justice system. It was unlikely in the first place that the police would catch them, and if caught and brought before a judge, they would simply buy their freedom. Or failing that and going to prison, they would escape. Thus, there was little incentives to fear or follow the law. The police were ineffective, the justice system was broken, and there were no legitimate opportunities for youths to make a living. The one sure option available was to join a gang and earn a living through illegal and violent means.

In effect, while the gangs were not interested in overthrowing the state, they posed a micro-insecurity threat to the Haitian population. Thus, for the reconstruction effort to be a success, they had to be disarmed and neutralized.
D. THE FAILURE OF COERCIVE DDR TARGETING OF GANGS

Following his inauguration in May 2006, President Preval blamed the interim government and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for not doing enough to reduce gang violence. Viewing negotiations as a better option than raids, which could lead to the loss of many lives, Preval initially decided to negotiate with the gangs. Though President Preval offered economic aid and job training packages in return for disarmament, most of the gang members refused the offer and the violence and kidnappings increased. President Preval took this as an insult and in August 2006 warned the gangs to disarm or face possible death, an announcement that marked the launching of a new DDR program to target the gangs of Haiti.\(^\text{103}\) Since gangs would not disarm voluntarily, they would be disarmed by force.

In implementing the disarmament process, the UN Stabilization Mission, with support from the government, adopted an integrated approach. The plan was to synchronize the efforts of various agencies – the HNP, the justice system, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the newly created National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) by the Haitian government to conduct an effective DDR program. The plan was divided into three phases, beginning with forcible disarmament.

Members of the UN Stabilization Mission joined a special team of trusted HNP officers, prosecutors, and judges to catch and punish gang members. Working together, they set up checkpoints and conducted raids to disarm gang members forcibly. The second phase of this integrated approach was to support the disarmament effort with community development, job creation, and an improved infrastructure, including services such as electricity and potable water. This aspect of the process was important in convincing gang members to join the reintegration program by showing them that legitimate economic opportunities would be available. The implicit message was that a

The gun was not the only means to earn a living. This phase was also meant to combat the perception that the DDR program was benefiting the perpetrators of crime but ignoring its victims. Finally, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration was created to coordinate the various agencies’ efforts and run the reintegration programs. All three phases of the disarmament process were designed to operate interdependently and simultaneously with one another.

According to the plan, gang members were to turn in their weapons at disarmament sites and be subjected to an investigation to determine whether or not they were suspected of any crimes. If they were, they would be prosecuted but would receive leniency. If they were not suspected of any crimes, they could join the reintegration program and receive vocational training. Upon completion, they would be offered job referral and placement services. Simultaneously, communities would receive developmental aid to create jobs and improve their living conditions. Meanwhile, the UN Stabilization Mission and HNP teams conducted raids to increase security by physically disarming and prosecuting gang members. Captured gang members would be prosecuted by the selected team of trusted lawyers and judges. In addition, President Preval made vetting the HNP a priority and promised to increase its size to 14,000 by 2010.

So far, the program has been successful in improving security, which has in turn led to a reduction in crime. But it has not convinced gang members to disarm. The International Crisis Group’s latest report on disarmament in Haiti, July 18, 2007, almost a year since launching of the DDR program, classified the program as a failure. As recently as November 2007, of the 100,000 weapons believed to be in the hands of gang members, only a few thousand old, rusty, and inoperable weapons had been collected, and only 353 members out of thousands of youths had registered to enter the reintegration

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program. Gangs are being forced to disarm but are fighting back. In a raid conducted by MINUSTAH in December 2006, fifteen MINUSTAH soldiers lost their lives and over thirty Haitian civilians were killed. Members of the community, including a popular radio announcer, who were suspected of cooperating with the DDR program were killed by gang members. In short, the DDR program is not disarming the gangs of Haiti.

E. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE

The failure of the government’s effort to negotiate a peace treaty with the gangs does not portend well for the success of DDR. This failure to come to terms on the content of a DDR program suggests that the use of a unilateral, coercive approach is destined to fail because the implementers will inevitably be unable to create a DDR program that is acceptable to gang leaders.

Why did the negotiation attempts fail? First, the implementers were familiar with negotiating with groups that had developed a strict command structure after years of fighting with whom they could negotiate an agreement on DDR. This was not the situation in Haiti. Thus it presented an unfamiliar challenge to the plan implementers. They had to negotiate with gangs that did not have strict command structures. In contrast, the interim government had been able to successfully reach an agreement on DDR with former soldiers because they were more typical combatants with a leadership that could negotiate on behalf of its members. Unlike former soldiers, the criminal gangs were splintered with many leaders. There was no leadership structure to represent them all.

As Ambassador Edmond Mulet, the UN special representative in Haiti, has pointed out, an agreement with gangs was always unlikely. Mulet stressed the idea that gangs are neither an army nor a guerilla group with whom a disarmament plan could be negotiated. They tend to be too splintered with too many leaders. Therefore, any plan to

disarm gangs must take an individual approach, not the group approach taken in previous DDR efforts. It is the individual gang members, not the gang as a whole, who have to be convinced to disarm.\footnote{110}

In addition, in Haiti, the government and the gangs could not agree on the terms of the DDR program. Whereas the gangs wanted total amnesty, both President Preval and representatives of the UN Stabilization Mission refused to consider amnesty as an option. But without amnesty, gang leaders claimed, their members would not disarm. They would surrender weapons, but only those in poor condition, keeping the good ones for future use. Another reason that the gangs refused to agree to the DDR plan was that the government could not guarantee their safety. They feared that if they disarmed and other gangs did not, they could become victims themselves of gang violence. They did not believe the state could protect them if they chose to disarm.

As Spear points out regarding her fifth factor, verification, disarming groups need to be reassured through a verification process that rival groups are also disarming. In Haiti, President Preval could not get all the gangs to agree to disarm and he failed to offer any alternatives to verification, such as protection for demobilizing gangs and individuals. Consequently, the gang leaders refused his disarmament offer. As a result, the implementers took a more coercive approach to the disarmament, only to find that the few weapons being surrendered were inoperable.\footnote{111}

The implementation environment was more conducive to success than ever before because of the local government’s support. The creation of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration demonstrated that the local government both supported and participated in the DDR program. They were not just sitting on the sidelines while an international force disarmed its citizens.

Despite all these efforts, however, the DDR implementers were unable to provide the kind of security and welfare necessary for the program to work. As a direct result of the combined operations of agents of the UN Stabilization Mission and the Haitian police

\footnote{110} Federal News Service, “Roundtable Discussion with Ambassador Edmond Mulet.”
who had been providing security in city slums where crime rates were high, the crime rate was significantly reduced. Today, police officers are able to patrol the streets of Cite Soleil, which they had been unable to do for years. Moreover, kidnappings, gangsters’ favorite means of making money, were down from 130 in December 2006 to 9 in March 2007. The continuation of these combined efforts is laying the foundations for the police to provide adequate security for the Haitian people after the UN Stabilization Mission personnel depart. If successful, Haiti’s security force will not collapse as it did in 2004 when the government faced a large-scale rebellion. As of January 2008, the Haitian police force numbered almost 9,000, an increase of almost 6,000 since 2004. Also, the justice system is being reformed and President Preval is considering the creation of a National Guard unit to help with patrolling duties. Nonetheless, though the implementation environment is more secure, there is still a problem: the gangs are not disarming.

The increase in direct action — patrolling, raids, and setting-up checkpoints — by both UN personnel and the police has created a more secure environment for both the implementers and the Haitian people. The improvement in security is apparently not sufficient to convince gangs to disarm. And the DDR implementers in Haiti cannot be satisfied with just the safety of the general public. In addition to deterring violence and the occurrence of kidnappings, they must increase the risk of joining a gang by aggressively going after gang members. At the same time, they must assure gang members that if they choose to disarm they will be safe. Currently, it is the gangs themselves that are discouraging disarmament and participation in the DDR process, by killing any individual suspected of assisting DDR efforts.

The DDR program have also failed to deliver welfare programs that were promised to communities in the form of economic and developmental aids. Therefore, gang members are being coerced to disarm and join training programs for jobs that do not exist. This is detrimental to the program’s ultimate success because, as history shows, it

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is the job-creation and employment aspects of the reintegration process that guarantee long-term success. Failure here, as occurred with the earlier DDR program between 1995 and 1997, will lead to failure in the entire reconstruction effort. In September 2007, the citizens of Cite Soleil gathered outside the UN headquarters to demonstrate against both the security operations that UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti was conducting in their communities and the lack of jobs and economic development. If the economic packages promised are not delivered, the disarmament program could lose local support.

Research shows that a major reason the welfare needs are not being met is that the implementers are not coordinating their actions and work with other agencies. According to the plan developed under the integrated approach, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration was created to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of various agencies functioning within the Haitian operational space. However, the Commission lacks the ability both to compel other agencies to fulfill their roles in the DDR process and to secure funds for developmental projects and the reintegration program. As a result, 150 of the 353 gang members who have registered for the reintegration program are still waiting to be accepted. The program lacks funding because, according to the international donors, they find the vetting process by the National Commission to be suspicious. Communities are still waiting for their promised developmental projects. In addition, there are no incentives for communities to support the disarmament program or for gang members to view disarmament as a viable alternative to gang violence. And thus, overall, critics like Robert Muggah have classified the integrated approach in Haiti as “disintegrated.” He found no synchronization or coordination of efforts occurring in Haiti.

It was also found that inadequate border and port security also contributed to the DDR failure in Haiti. Weapons are coming across the border from the Dominican

115 The Henry L. Stimson Center, “MINUSTAH: Peace Operations Fact Sheet.”
117 Ibid., 3-4.
Republic and by sea from the United States. Indeed, according to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, most illegal weapons leaving southern Florida are bound for Haiti.\textsuperscript{118} To cut off the sources of weapons in an already volatile environment, it is crucial that the ports and the border be secured. Agents of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti agree: the ports and border are a problem and they plan to focus on this area in 2008.\textsuperscript{119}

F. CONCLUSION

The planned integrated approach currently being implemented in Haiti is no more than coercive DDR. But it has not failed because it is coercive. It has failed because the security being implemented neither discourages gang membership nor encourages disarmament. The program also lacks community participation because their safety is at risk when they do participate and implementers do not offer any employment guarantees. Overall, Haiti does not provide legitimate opportunities for its youth to make a living, and the reintegration program offers little more than job training. The poor conditions and lack of jobs make a life of violence for profit very attractive. Like the former soldiers who participated in the 2004 rebellion largely because they were unable to find a job, if Haiti’s youth are not offered economic opportunities they will continue to engage in violent crimes and the current improvement in security will be short-lived, just as it was in the late 1990s and in early 2000s.

In sum, the DDR programs in Haiti that were undertaken without an agreement targeting former soldiers in 1995 and gangs in 2006, have failed to achieve their desired goals. When there was an agreement, as was demonstrated with former soldiers between 2004 and mid-2006, the program was successful. Because of these varying factors, while


the Haitian cases offer few positive lessons, they do provide insight into the aspects that must be improved if coercive DDR programs are to succeed.

Chapter IV will discuss the situation in Albania where, despite the lack of a peace agreement, a program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration directed at noncombatants was successfully implemented. The applicability of lessons identified in the Albanian case for other instances of coercive DDR will also be examined.
IV. DISARMAMENT IN ALBANIA: 1997–1999

A. INTRODUCTION

Today, Haiti is still faced with the problem of disarming gang members. Implementers have attempted to force gang members to disarm but have failed to address the issues of poor economic development — one of the root causes of gang violence. As UN Ambassador Mulet has pointed out, to be effective, a Haitian disarmament plan must be directed at the individual gang member. Thus, Haiti needs a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program that is designed both to address the economic hardships and to persuade individual gang members to lay down their arms. To achieve that design, much can be learned from the successful disarmament program implemented in Albania, which offers insight into how economic development can be joined with improved security to convince gang-members into disarming. Albania’s plan was successful because it addressed the root causes of gang violence and drew on the power of communities to coerce gang members into disarming. These are precisely the areas in which DDR implementers in Haiti have been unsuccessful.

The Albanian program shows that a “coercive” disarmament program (i.e., one undertaken in the absence of a peace treaty) need not rely only on military or police forces to physically disarm individuals. Citizens can be persuaded by alternative means to disarm. In Albania, addressing the root causes that led individuals to arm themselves in the first place and including communities in the disarmament process proved to be far more effective and sustainable than using physical force. But to achieve disarmament, the international community must also be willing to employ unconventional methods when required. Together, the Albanian government and international community pioneered an innovative community-based approach in Gramsh, one of Albania’s thirty-six districts. The Gramsh Pilot Program (GPP) was such a success that it was replicated nationwide.

In this chapter, Spear’s five factors will be used to identify and evaluate the elements that contributed to Albania’s success. The chapter will also look at how the
Albanian program was implemented in a post-conflict environment where there were no peace agreements and where the target of disarmament was the general populace.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Albania’s weapons problem can be traced back to the 1960s when Albania severed its ties with the USSR and aligned itself with China. Fearing a Soviet invasion, the Albanian government began to distribute small arms for militias throughout the country to be used in national defense. After the Cold War ended, the fear of an invasion was replaced by poor economic conditions and insecurity as state-owned industries collapsed and unemployment and emigration rates skyrocketed.

In this environment of insecurity and an emerging free market, a young and vibrant private sector began to generate “an increasing amount of domestic savings.” “In 1995 private savings reached almost 15 percent of GDP, or 350 million (up from practically zero two or three years earlier).” These inexperienced account holders became easy targets for swindlers who launched “pyramid schemes” promising investors anywhere from 10 to 50 percent interest monthly. Many Albanians moved their entire savings from banks to pyramid accounts. In early 1997 the pyramids collapsed, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Albanians losing their life savings. “About a third of the country was waiting to see how their main question would be answered: Who will give them their money back?”

Many Albanians believed that the government should repay the money. It was difficult for Albanians to accept that an investment scheme involving every other Albanian household was not guaranteed by the government. Once it was clear that the


government would not be compensating investors for their losses, the people took to the streets. They raided an estimated 1,300 armories, police stations, and National Intelligence Service sites. It is believed that over 550,000 light weapons, 900 million rounds of ammunition, and six million explosives were stolen and were now in the hands of civilians. This abundance of arms in civilian hands resulted in an upsurge in crime, looting, and violent clashes between the police and armed citizens. The perception that government officials may have profited from the pyramid schemes and the government’s failure to control the violence led to the resignation of Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi and his ministers on March 1, 1997, and the eventual resignation of President Sali Berisha on July 23. Amidst the chaos and violence, the country narrowly escaped a civil war as tensions between the north and south increased.

The fear of a possible civil war in an unstable region led the international community in April 1997 to launch “Operation Alba,” a multinational force led by Italy and supported by the UN Security Council. Operation Alba dispelled any possibility of a civil war. The multinational force’s main objective was to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. The task of disarming civilians was left largely to the Albanian government. It is estimated that between March and September, 1,311 people were killed and another 1,450 wounded. The German ambassador to the UN summarized the situation best when he concluded that “The number of weapons per capita in Albania is extraordinarily high. These weapons delay political and economic progress. They endanger the life of each citizen in Albania, increase criminality rates and further


instability to an already explosive region." In short, the disarmament of Albania was important for national and regional stability.

C. DISARMAMENT IMPLEMENTED

The disarmament of Albania was not going to be an easy task. Many people believed the weapons they looted were compensation for their lost investments. The impact of the riots created “much fear and a lack of confidence in the police, which led some people to hold on to weapons in hope of being able to protect themselves.” The disarmament process would also have to combat the culture of Kanun which gives everyone over the age of 18 the right to own a weapon. The international community and the Albanian government had to restore order and disarm its citizens while combating an economic crisis, inadequate security, and a culture of gun ownership. Disarmament was going to be difficult.

In their attempt to recover the stolen weapons, “the government declared amnesty for anyone who returned the looted weapons.” The amnesty program began in August 1997 and ended in August 2002; it involved police officers visiting homes and forcing individuals to either hand their weapons over “or sign a declaration stating they did not possess any unregistered weapons.” The program did not go well. Only 75,548 weapons were collected, a far cry from the 550,000 estimated to have been stolen.

For a number of reasons, the government’s use of force and the promise of no punishment failed to convince people to disarm. First, the government had effective control only over the capital, Tirana. Second, citizens expected to be compensated for the

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130 Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 4.


132 Ibid.


stolen weapons and the government refused to pay for stolen property.\textsuperscript{135} Third, the long tradition of Kanun discouraged participation in the program.\textsuperscript{136} Finally, people did not believe the government could protect them.\textsuperscript{137} A police presence was absent in many parts of the country. People needed their weapons for protection. The Albanian government soon realized that they could not disarm their citizens on their own. In February 1998 they requested the help of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{138}

1. **Gramsh Pilot Program (GPP)**

Although the Albanian government had initially refused to pay for stolen weapons, it now changed course and requested the UN’s help in establishing a buy-back program. The UN denied the government’s request because such a scheme would be too expensive, could inflate the price of arms, and might encourage trafficking in the region.\textsuperscript{139} Another suggestion was to create a paramilitary force that would carry out house-to-house searches and confiscation. This too was rejected because the local police were already conducting house-to-house searches without much success. When Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (1998–2003) led a fact-finding mission in Albania in mid-June 1998 to decide on a disarmament program, he suggested that a community-based approach would be more appropriate for Albania.\textsuperscript{140} Rather than rewarding individuals for turning in stolen weapons, the community as a whole should be rewarded for weapons surrendered.\textsuperscript{141}

Since this was a new and experimental approach, the UN decided to employ it in only one of Albania’s 36 districts. The district of Gramsh was chosen because it was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{smith2001b} Smith, “Illegal Arms in Albania and European Security,” 15–16.
\bibitem{holtom2001} Holtom et al., “Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania,” 110.
\bibitem{faltas2001b} Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 4.
\bibitem{kopel2001} Kopel, Gallant, and Eisen, “Micro-Disarmament: The Consequences,” 19.
\bibitem{holtom2001b} Holtom et al., “Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania,” 110.
\end{thebibliography}
believed to be saturated with weapons. Gramsh had four military depots and a weapons factory, and observers believed 10,000 weapons could be collected in the district. Gramsh was also identified as the community most in need of security improvements and community developmental projects. The district had a total population of 56,000; it was divided into one municipality (where 40 percent of the population was located), with nine communes, and 91 villages.\(^{142}\)

The basic concept of the program was to have turn-in sites established at the targeted commune. Citizens did not have to fear being penalized for forfeiting looted weapons since the amnesty was still in effect. While weapons were being turned in, there would be a community meeting to discuss and determine the developmental projects the community most needed and the type of projects the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) could afford. After a destruction ceremony, developmental projects would commence.\(^{143}\) The Gramsh Pilot Program (GPP) officially started in December 1998, was fully operational by January 1999, and ended in August of the same year.\(^{144}\)

In 2003, Faltas and Paes, after conducting an analysis of the Albanian situation, concluded that a good part of the 550,000 weapons looted in 1997 were no longer in the hands of the populace. They had been exported, surrendered in the UNDP programs, or confiscated in efforts led by the Albanian police.\(^{145}\) The number of murders also fell, from a high of 1,542 in 1997 to 119 in 2004. And homicide per-capita rates have returned to pre-riot levels of just under six per capita in 2007 from a high in 1997 of forty-six per capita.\(^{146}\) The Gramsh project significantly enhanced economic and social development as well as strengthened the rule of law. “Most strikingly it inspired in the local

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{144}\) Holtom et al., “Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania,” 110.
\(^{145}\) Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 4-5.
D. EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS

The five factors Spear identifies as being critical to DDR success are not as useful in accounting for success in the Albanian situation as they were in explaining Haiti’s failures. Unlike the two previous case studies where implementers’ insufficient address of the five factors resulted in failure, the Albanian case is a success. Although implementers in Albania did not have a peace agreement – with warring parties agreeing to the political terms and the new balance of power and a verification process to prevent cheating – they were still successful. But, two of the five factors were addressed by implementers: the implementation environment and coordination with other agencies.

Spear argues that, for DDR to be a success the implementation environment must have the support of the local government and the implementers must be willing to provide services the state would normally provide, such as security and welfare. The UN Development Programme had local government support. The national government invited the UNDP in and supported the operation. But it was unable to provide security and welfare programs.

The second applicable Spear factor, coordination with other agencies, means that for DDR to be a success implementers and other agencies must work together. The UN Development Programme was designated as the agency in charge of the operation and coordinated the efforts of various international and local agencies. It was able to ensure that all efforts were synchronized and coordinated to achieve the desired results. Unlike the National Commission for DDR program in Haiti, the UN Development Programme in Albania was able to secure funds to accomplish developmental projects and dictate to other agencies where and when their expertise and funds would be needed to accomplish

147 Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 2, 4.
their goals. Having one agency in command of the operational space ensured the program was being executed efficiently and effectively.148

Implementers were able to address only two of the five factors but still managed to have a successful program without a peace agreement. Albania’s success can also be explained by the following factors: (1) all stakeholders agreed to the terms of the DDR package developed; (2) the disarmament program addressed grievances and root causes; and (3) the community was engaged and involved throughout the entire disarmament process.

All levels of leadership reached an agreement on the DDR process and coordination was done prior to implementation. Unlike Haiti between 1994 and 1997, where the absence of an agreement between the United States and President Aristide resulted in military members taking their weapons home, the UN Development Programme in Albania was coordinated with all levels of government prior to implementing a disarmament program ensuring all stakeholders were involved in the process. After Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala decided on the most appropriate approach to accomplish disarmament, he sent a team in mid-August 1998 to determine the feasibility of a community-based program. The team spoke with national, district, community, and village leaders and individual citizens to determine where and how the program should be implemented. The team was able to arrive at a consensus based on the input of the stakeholders at all levels that a community-based approach would be successful in Albania.

The team also determined that insufficient security and poor economic conditions were the two main reasons why the population was reluctant to turn in their looted firearms. The disarmament program would not be successful unless these two issues were addressed.149 “The civil population has no incentive to turn in their weapons if they see the police cannot guarantee their security.”150 Therefore, enhancing the local police

capabilities became priority number one for the UNDP. To increase the capabilities of the indigenous security apparatus a new police station was built in Gramsh. The police were also equipped with the following basic equipment they had lacked: cars and communication and transportable forensic equipment. Roads were also built to connect villages with the municipality and to increase security by giving the police access to once inaccessible areas. Improvement in the local police capabilities resulted in an increase in security. Crime dropped significantly and the police were visibly active in providing security. Members of the district no longer needed a hand gun for protection.

The second root cause was poor economic conditions. To improve the economic conditions of the targeted area the UNDP invested in labor intensive jobs that would employ as many people as possible. They undertook projects such as road construction to connect the communes and villages to the municipality; improved street lights to benefit security and encourage entrepreneurship; built a new post office, and installed telephone services that were greatly appreciated by the citizens of Gramsh. The services and employment created by the projects in Gramsh were seen by many as compensation.

Community support and involvement were also essential to the successful DDR in Albania. The UNDP was able to get and keep the support of the communities by involving the community in the development and implementation of the program. During the developmental stages of the program the team sent by the Under-Secretary included the community’s input to create the disarmament program. When the UNDP arrived at the targeted community to implement the program a community meeting was held. The meeting was open to everyone. Members of the community, not the UNDP, decided on

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the projects they wanted in exchange for their weapons. The community benefited when it was able to convince its members to surrender illegally obtained firearms and ammunitions.\textsuperscript{154}

Pressure on individuals within a community to disarm did not come just from their neighbors. Support and pressure for disarmament was not sought just from the citizens of Gramsh. The media was also used at various levels to garner support. The European Union and regional, national, and local presses were used to inform the people in the region what was happening in Gramsh. The media blitz resulted in support from all levels and, eventually, Academy Award–winner Michael Douglas visited Albania to encourage disarmament. His visit demonstrated that the whole world was watching Gramsh hoping they would disarm.\textsuperscript{155}

The UNDP was successful in Albania because it planned and coordinated with the local government and people, addressed root causes, and engaged and involved the community throughout the disarmament process. Although it only collected about 6,000 of the 10,000 weapons they expected to find in Gramsh, the program was still considered a success. The district experienced improved economic and security conditions with a significant drop in crime. The experience in Gramsh led to similar programs being implemented nationally and achieving similar success.

Despite the success Albania experienced, however, implementers failed to address border security. The in-and-out flow of arms in the targeted area must be controlled. Unlike Haiti, where the problems of arms are largely isolated with only indirect global implications, the Albanian situation could directly destabilize the entire region and cause worldwide instability. The problems associated with arms control should be isolated to a specific location to prevent the situation from getting worse or arms being sent to unstable parts of the region. Failure to adequately seal off Albania’s border did not result in more arms entering Albania, but weapons were trafficked to Kosovo and Macedonia to support ethnic Albanians in conflict. It is estimated that 150,000 of the weapons stolen in 1997 were trafficked out of Albania during the Kosovo crisis and the unrest in

\textsuperscript{154} International Action Network on Small Arms, “Weapons for Development,” 2–3; Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 2.

\textsuperscript{155} Faltas and Paes, “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door,” 4.
Macedonia. Additional arms in an already unstable situation could have destabilized the entire region which could have made disarmament in Albania a minor issue for the international community. It is imperative that the borders are secured.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that coercive disarmament can be successful and that coercion is not limited to physical force. The UN Development Programme was able to use community and peer pressure to force the members of communities within Gramsh to disarm. Peer pressure came mainly from within the communities with additional pressure from neighboring districts, the region, and the international community. This was proven to be far more effective than police going from door to door. However, for the power of peer pressure to be effective grievances and root causes that led people to arm themselves must be addressed. Albanians were also willing to disarm once they were convinced that the security and economic conditions were improved. Lessons should be learned from the Albanian experience and applied in other post-conflict environments, particularly Haiti, to increase the likelihood of DDR being a success. Finally, DDR must be designed to address the special challenges of each situation.

This raises the question of the extent to which lessons from the Albanian case can be applied to Haiti. Unlike in the Haitian case, implementers in Albania were targeting peaceful people who armed themselves during a crisis. The target group did not engage in criminal and/or gang activities. They did not prey upon or terrorize the communities with violence. In fact, the arming of the Albanian population was supported by the local communities. Many viewed the arms as compensation for lost investment and as a way to protect themselves from rioters. People arming themselves were viewed as justified.

To get the communities to disarm, implementers had to convince the communities that the crisis was over, they would be safe, and they would be compensated with jobs and developmental projects. In Haiti, implementers would have to convince the communities of the same things, plus accepting into their communities murderers, rapists,

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and thieves. That is not an easy task; however, it is still possible, especially for the majority of gang members guilty of lesser crimes. This point will be taken up in additional detail in the next chapter.

Unlike Haiti, the Albanian situation did not call for demobilization and reintegration. Since the mob that raided the armories was not organized by a leadership, there was no chain-of-command to sever by conducting demobilization. The country had not been through a protracted conflict where armed individuals were separated from their communities for an extended period and needed to be reinserted and reintegrated into their communities. The operation in Albania was simply disarmament of the population without an agreement after a brief crisis.

Despite the differences between the Haitian and Albanian cases the disarmament lessons learned from the Albanian case study are relevant to Haiti’s situation. Haiti must disarm gangs that lack a strict command structure and therefore is forced to take an individual approach. Most DDR experiences focus on disarming combatants as a group. Albania is one of the few cases that demonstrate how to effectively disarm individuals and incorporate the communities into the process. The rare insights that the Albanian case offers coupled with other traditional measures in DDR could solve the problem of disarming the gangs in Haiti.
V. CONCLUSION

The three case studies in this thesis offer insights into how to improve the probability of success when implementing a coercive DDR program that targets armed groups other than former combatants. The first case study, DDR in Haiti 1994–2004, demonstrates how coercive DDR can make short-term progress, but fails to have sustainable long-term success if reintegration, especially of mid-level commanders, is neglected. The second case study, DDR in Haiti 2004–2007, demonstrates: (1) how much easier it is to negotiate a settlement with combatants, who have a regimented command structure and specific demands, than with loosely organized armed groups engaged in crime; (2) how security, one of the root causes of armament, can be improved, yet disarmament fails; and (3) that without economic development disarmament is unlikely. The third case study, Disarmament in Albania 1997–1999, showed that contrary to popular belief, coercive disarmament can be successful and sustained in the long-term when the terms of disarmament are acceptable to the targeted individuals, when root causes are addressed, and when the community is involved.

This final chapter will present six lessons-learned from the case studies and will make recommendations for policy-makers to consider when implementing a coercive DDR program, in the absence of a peace agreement, that targets armed groups other than former combatants.

A. SIX LESSONS-LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Lesson #1

The first lesson-learned is that, in a post-conflict situation absent a peace agreement, there must be an agreement and close coordination between the DDR program implementers, the host nation government, and any other major stakeholders. The importance of these factors was demonstrated when President Aristide decided to disband the Haitian military without informing the United States, the DDR implementer. The military was demobilized before the United States could disarm the soldiers, and thus many were able to simply take their weapons home. After their demobilization, it was a
month before the U.S. disarmament program was launched, which made it impossible for implementers to disarm all soldiers and secure all the weapon caches. In addition, a lack of support from and coordination with the Haitian government meant that the local communities did not support the DDR program. The government distanced itself from the program and did not inform the public about its benefits. Instead, the former soldiers were stigmatized and, unable to secure a legitimate means of income, they joined the 2004 rebellion against the state.

However, in the two cases studied here, where there was an agreement with the host nations’ government, the success of a coercive DDR program was much more likely. In the second Haitian case, the UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH), working with the Haitian government either in the lead or in a supportive role, succeeded both in eliminating the threat posed by former soldiers and improved Haiti’s security conditions. In Albania, also, the DDR implementers worked with government leaders all the way down to the community level and were able to achieve success in coercive disarmament despite the lack of a peace agreement. From those successes, we derived one essential lesson-learned. The international community must recognize that in a post-conflict situation, when there is no peace agreement between the warring parties, DDR implementers themselves can and should make an agreement with the national government and all the other stakeholders that clearly outlines the DDR process.

Achieving an agreement with stakeholders – particularly groups or individuals that are targeted for demobilization – in the absence of a peace treaty is difficult, but not impossible. Sometimes, one party can decide unilaterally the acceptable terms for the DDR program implementation, which can then be accepted post hoc by the groups and individuals targeted for demobilization. The short-term success of the first Haitian DDR program shows the potential for success of this tactic, which was not necessarily cancelled out by the program’s eventual failure. If the former military members had been offered some type of economic opportunity, for example, jobs in the public sector, it is unlikely that they would have engaged in an attack against the state.

In general, agreements with combatant groups are easier to reach and enforce than with loosely organized criminals. After years of fighting, combatant groups usually
develop a well-regulated line of command in which members are expected to strictly adhere to their leaders’ decisions. This was demonstrated in the second Haitian case study when the interim government was able to successfully negotiate an agreement to disarm with the leaders of the former soldiers. Once an agreement was made, they were no longer a threat to the Haitian state. In contrast, when President Preval tried to negotiate an agreement with splinter gangs under various leaders, he was unsuccessful. There was no one leader representing the gangs collectively for him to negotiate with in seeking total gang disarmament. Each gang feared that the others would not disarm and thus jeopardize their safety.

2. Lesson # 2

The DDR implementers in Albania faced a somewhat similar problem: disarming individuals, but in this case, with no group ties. They were simply civilians who had spontaneously armed themselves during a time of national crisis, and thus there was no leader with whom the implementers could negotiate. Instead, they had to appeal to the local communities as a whole to force their citizens to disarm. In this case, therefore, implementers of DDR gave compensation for turning in looted weapons to the whole community, not individuals. They also offered the communities developmental projects that benefited everyone. Obviously, it was in the community’s interest to persuade their members to disarm; that’s what made this approach so successful, much more successful than having police go door-to-door disarming civilians. In sum, the second lesson-learned from the case studies is this: when the target of a disarmament project is individual citizens in a post-crisis environment, it is essential that community leaders at every level be involved in the development and implementation of the program.

One argument that could be made against the community-based approach is that it would be ineffective against groups guilty of committing violent crimes against members of the community. The Albanian situation was unique in that the targeted group was otherwise peaceful civilians who had armed themselves during a crisis. It was probably comparatively easy for community members both to convince their armed neighbors to
disarm and to then accept them back into the community. But would the same approach be as effective if the targeted groups were violent gangs known for committing numerous kidnappings, rapes, and murders?

Recent experiences show that the community-based approach has worked in several post-conflict environments in which the targeted groups had terrorized their communities for years. Since such combatants are not isolated outside groups, but actually part of the community, it is critical that the communities be consulted and engage in the DDR process. Community–combatant relations usually combine both solidarity and coercion, giving the local people leverage in dealing with the targeted group. In some cases, the DDR implementers have successfully tapped into the power of the community as it relates to the disarmament and reintegration program. In Sierra Leone, for instance, after more than a decade of bloody conflict, the implementers of the DDR program there have experienced success through the implementation also of a Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) process. In other post-conflict environments such as Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Congo Brazzaville, implementers have experienced success by using a community-based approach in conjunction with other DDR measures against violent groups.157

In these successful cases, combatants were, and were treated as, part of the community. Some of those combatant groups were initially militias formed to protect their communities. In other cases, the combatants were viewed simply as other victims because they had been forced to take up arms against their fellow citizens by vicious warlords. All these cases show clearly that communities are very willing to use their coercive power to get citizens combatants to disarm so they can then welcome them back into the community.158


That was not how it was in Haiti however; it had a much different set of circumstances. Haitian communities were, and still are, terrorized by what can best be described as human predators. The gangs were not victims of an unfortunate situation; they were criminals who took advantage of the poor social conditions. They saw the inadequate security and poor economic conditions as opportunities to prey on the communities for personal gain and group profits. That reality raises a number of questions for the study of coercive DDR programs. Do local communities have any coercive power over gangs operating in their neighborhoods? If a disarmament and reintegration program is implemented, will the communities be willing to take back these criminal gang members? Can the communities be of any help in disarming gang members? These are the kinds of questions that must be answered before implementers can use community assistance in implementing DDR programs in environments like Haiti’s.

Our research found that in a number of typical post-conflict environments, use of a community-based approach proved effective against both individuals within violent groups and the groups themselves that lack a hierarchical command structure. Thus, the international community should not underestimate the power that local communities have to force individuals and groups to disarm. Their capabilities are a force multiplier that DDR implementers should exploit whenever possible.

That said, Haiti is not a good example: the situation there is not a typical post-conflict environment. Before the power of Haitian communities can be used effectively in disarming violent, noncombatant groups, further research is necessary to determine exactly what the communities’ role should be.

One option worth considering is how inner-city law enforcement officials employ communities to dispel gang violence. In Boston, for example, city officials were able to reach a consensus with the local communities in implementing a program that facilitated truces between gangs to combat gang violence. More important, community leaders supported and accepted all the terms of the plan. To ensure that that public support was maintained, some truces were publicized, demonstrating not only the success of the program but also its benefits to the community. The program also benefited the gang
members, who were given a forum that they could use to settle disputes without resorting to violence.\textsuperscript{159} Though the program was not implemented in a post-conflict environment, the techniques are worth examining in terms of their possible applicability in Haiti.

3. Lesson # 3

A third major lesson learned from the thesis case studies is that long-term success can be achieved only if the root causes of the conflict or to arm oneself are addressed, especially in post-conflict environments without a peace treaty. Many scholars argue that for a peace treaty to be successful it must address the root causes and grievances that caused the armed conflict.\textsuperscript{160} This means that when there is no peace treaty the root causes of the conflict often remain unaddressed. However, if a DDR package is to be acceptable to the targeted group, the implementers must first be aware of root causes and must see that the plan developed addresses them.

In our three case studies, the root causes of the groups’ armament were a lack of adequate security and limited economic opportunities. In the failed attempts at DDR in Haiti, the root causes were insufficiently addressed and thus the terms of the DDR program were unacceptable. In Albania, the root causes of the crisis were adequately addressed and the terms of disarmament were acceptable to the local communities. Subsequently, therefore, they contributed to Albania’s success. The first root cause was inadequate security. And while an intervening force can provide temporary security, but long-term security can only be achieved by empowering indigenous forces to provide the kind of security that deters armed rebellion against the state and protects the population from crime and violence. The DDR plan in Albania recognized the lack of adequate security in the implementation environment and took a “security-first” attitude. The local


police were empowered to provide adequate security, which showed community members that the state could protect them; they had no need to arm themselves for protection.

In the Haitian cases, once the international forces departed and the national police force proved too weak to stop armed gangs, groups of ex-soldiers gathered together to launch an attack on the state. In Haiti, in the absence of security, gang violence and a gang culture have flourished, threatening the safety of its populace. Recently, the security situation in Haiti has improved significantly, as the police capabilities and size have increased. But this has not resulted in individuals disarming. So it seems that improving security for DDR implementers and the general public does not necessarily lead to the target groups disarming. Although the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Haitian National Police have improved the security environment for both implementers and the general population, they have failed to get gang members to disarm or to seek legitimate ways of making a living. In theory, implementing security should also have discouraged gang membership by diverting them with aggressive direct actions and at the same time convincing gang members that when they do decide to disarm they will be safe. It is highly unlikely that gang members will disarm if they believe they will then become victims of gang violence. Just as the regular public needs protection, so too do gang members that disarm. Apparently, ensuring the safety of both the general public and DDR implementers is simply not enough. Security is a root cause that must be addressed but how to improve security against criminal gangs in a post-conflict environment is a question that requires further research.

Another reason that DDR programs have failed in Haiti is the lack of livelihood guarantees. The economic development packages and job-creating projects promised to Haitian communities were never delivered. There are no jobs. This makes it difficult to convince gangsters that they do not need weapons as an income provider. But will job creation be enough to convince criminals to disarm? The gangs are already engaged in some type of economic enterprise. Therefore, a significant amount of research is needed to determine what type of economic packages will be effective in persuading gangs to disarm and whether they are feasible.
The conclusion here is that when implementing DDR in environments without a peace agreement, the international community must be aware that the root causes of groups’ armament have probably not been addressed. And any DDR program implemented must address those causes. Furthermore, for the program to be successful, its terms must be acceptable to the targeted group in both the short- and the long-run. But as the case study Haiti 2004–2007 clearly demonstrates, addressing the root causes is simply not enough. The type of security and economic packages implemented must be designed to be effective against the target. In Haiti, the criminal gangs are not responding to an improved security environment as would have been the case in a typical DDR setting. This means that much more research is needed to determine the type of security and economic packages that will be effective against criminals who at present are providing for their own security and economic well-being.

4. **Lesson # 4**

In the case studies Haiti 1994–2004 and Albania 1997–1999, and in most other post-conflict environments, DDR is implemented as a countermeasure to prevent former combatants from posing a threat to the state and the population. If the DDR programs fail then the state and the population will be at risk. But the present situation in Haiti is different from the typical post-conflict environment and thus the fourth lesson-learned. Implementers in the second Haitian case had to target gangs that were already posing a threat to the population by engaging in violent crimes for profit. The DDR programs in places like Haiti and other post-conflict environments, where violent groups that are not necessarily former combatants already pose a threat to the state and the population, must be reactive, not preventive. Unlike the programs that attempt to deter former combatants from posing a threat, the DDR implemented must be able to convince violent gangs into discontinuing their profitable, illegal, and violent activities.

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5. Lesson # 5

Kazuhide Kurado of the World Bank claims that DDR programs in a country cannot be accomplished by any one agency alone, a claim that was validated by the failure of the DDR program in Haiti between 1994 and 1997. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented DDR unilaterally. It might have sought help from other groups such as economic agencies to secure jobs for former soldiers upon graduation of vocational training. In the second Haitian case study, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) was created to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of various agencies. But it lacked the ability to compel the agencies to act and secure funds to accomplish promised projects, and thus was unable to coordinate and synchronize the agencies’ efforts. These failures resulted in developmental projects not being delivered and efforts being uncoordinated.

In comparison, the DDR experience in Albania was a more coordinated and synchronized effort. This is credited to the fact that the UN Development Programme was in charge of the operational space and was able to secure funds and compel other agencies to deliver on developmental aid. This coordinated and synchronized effort significantly helped in the overall success in Albania. Before implementation, the international community needs to establish the agency that will be in charge of the overall DDR operation and its designated agency needs to be empowered to secure funds to accomplish projects undertaken and get other agencies to deliver on aid packages promised.

6. Lesson # 6

Finally, disarmament means little if porous borders provide a means for individuals or groups to rearm. All three cases reviewed here failed to devote attention to border security and instability was the result. In the first Haitian case, both the United States and the UN acknowledged that the border with the Dominican Republic was a source of weapons but were unable to secure the border because it was not in their mandates to do so. In the second Haitian case, UN Stabilization Mission, aware that the
border with the Dominican Republic and the sea ports are sources of weapons, now (2008) plans to do a better job in securing these areas. In Albania, the lack of border security helped fuel instability in both Kosovo and Macedonia. The international community should never deploy forces and implement DDR without border security as a priority in their mandate. The problem of arms control should be isolated to the targeted area and denied the ability to influence instability in other areas.

In sum, the six lessons-learned were: (1) an agreement on DDR between implementers and host-nation governments and/or stakeholders improves the chances of success in the absence of a peace treaty, and an attempt must be made to make the terms of DDR acceptable to the targeted group, especially when DDR is being implemented unilaterally; (2) local community support is absolutely necessary, especially when the program has to target individuals and noncombatants without a hierarchical command structure, but further research is needed to determine how to effectively employ communities in the disarmament of criminal gangs and gang elements; (3) the root causes must be addressed, but research is needed to determine what kind of security and economic packages will be effective against criminals that are providing for their own security and guaranteeing their livelihood through illegal means; (4) DDR implementation in environments similar to Haiti’s will not be to prevent former combatants from posing either a macro- or a micro-threat, Instead, DDR will more than likely be reactionary to stop existing criminal elements from posing macro- and/or micro-insecurities; (5) to achieve coordinated and synchronized efforts, one agency should be empowered to compel other agencies to fulfill their roles in the DDR process and be given the ability to secure funds; and (6) borders should be protected to prevent erosion of the gains from disarmament. These lessons may not only improve the likelihood that coercive DDR programs will succeed success, but also may contribute to improving the five factors introduced by Spear.

This thesis has argued that coercive DDR can be successful. Haiti was successful in eliminating the macro-insecurities posed by former soldiers in the short-term. Although most Haitian military members opposed demobilization, they did not actively resist. Soldiers were engaged in job training and other programs to assist them in
reintegrating back into society. Unfortunately, that progress was unsustainable. Mid-level commanders were excluded from the DDR process, and many former soldiers found the terms of the package unacceptable. They were marginalized economically. Eventually, unemployed soldiers were recruited by their former commanders to launch an attack against the state.

In Haiti during this period, the DDR package, which was developed unilaterally, did not adequately address the concerns of the former soldiers. If it had, the program may have been more successful in the long run. In Albania, the coercive DDR approach was successful because the Albanian government and the DDR implementers agreed about the DDR process, and the local communities accepted the program and were involved throughout its duration. In sum, coercive DDR can be successful both in eliminating a threat to the state posed by ex-combatants and in disarming individual fighters. At this time, it is less clear whether coercive DDR that targets violent criminal groups can be successful in eliminating micro-insecurities.

Today, the issue of micro-insecurities is particularly important; not only in post-conflict situations where there is no peace treaty but also in cases where there is a peace agreement but the DDR program implemented has failed and criminal groups now threaten the citizenry’s security. Such situations are becoming increasingly common. But scholars and practitioners have been slow to realize that DDR programs will not always be implemented in situations where hostilities were ended with a peace treaty. They also continue to view disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a preventive measure and not as a reactionary measure that is implemented in environments that are saturated with weapons and crime.

Evidence from the Albanian situation and case and other community-based DDR programs suggests that communities may be the key to disarming violent criminal groups. And community-based DDR is especially likely to be successful when the target groups are viewed as victims of the situation. But before a community can be effectively employed in the DDR process, the implementers must first determine two things: how the communities view the violent criminal groups and whether they have any leverage they can use to influence them. If they have some leverage, then the implementers must
determine how the state can help increase that leverage power. To gain and maintain the community’s support for the DDR program, implementers must also use the media and other mechanisms to inform the public and gang members of the benefits of the DDR program to both groups.

We believe that DDR programs are critical to the success of post-conflict reconstruction projects, and great strides have been made in eliminating the macro-insecurities in these situations. However, micro-insecurities are still obstacles that interfere with the successful implementation of both cooperative and coercive approaches to DDR and thus hinder the establishment of a sustainable peace, security, and stability. Much more research is needed when implementing these programs if we are to prevent or reduce the impact micro-insecurities have on the peace process.
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