STRATEGICALLY FLAWED: WHY AREN’T ARMY RESERVE INTELLIGENCE ASSETS PROPERLY FUNDED

BY

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STRATEGICALLY FLAWED: WHY AREN'T ARMY RESERVE INTELLIGENCE ASSETS PROPERLY FUNDED?

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Commands and agencies within the Department of Defense have always had more intelligence requirements than assets to meet them. As such, since the mid-1990’s, strides to better leverage Army Reserve (AR) Military Intelligence (MI) forces into support roles have been made. However, strategic support for and by the Army has lagged behind agencies and joint commands. The Army provides only 10% of total AR MI support and known requirements remain underdeveloped. Further, though Army intelligence budgets have received significant increases and supplements since 9/11, funding to the AR MI force continues to experience reductions. If trends persist, support from AR MI will decline and direct intelligence funding to the AR will end in fiscal year (FY) 2009 (FY09). Conversely, AR MI strategic tasks, intelligence center workloads, and structure continue to grow. Logic indicates a need for additional intelligence support and training resources, not less. This paper will explore and review historical data, current support, available resources, joint command and agency successes, and make recommendations applicable to this issue.
It is not a new phenomenon for commands and agencies within the Department of Defense (DoD) to have more intelligence requirements than intelligence assets with which to meet them. As such, available Department of the Army (DA) and Department of Defense (DoD) assets should be resourced in the most effective and efficient means possible. Integrating reserve component (RC) and Army Reserve (AR) intelligence assets, in many instances, could provide the capability to reinforce or close gaps in Army intelligence responsibilities and requirements.

Since the mid-1990’s, there have been various efforts to strategically engage the AR Military Intelligence (MI) force to augment and fill gaps in Army and intelligence community (IC) requirements. Though there have been successes, there are also clear shortcomings and weaknesses. Ironically, commands and agencies outside of the Army have done far more in planning and budgeting resources for AR MI support than the Army. Though IC budgets have received significant increases and supplements since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), direct and indirect intelligence funding to the AR MI force has consistently decreased over the same period of time and could terminate at the end of FY09. While AR MI structures have increased to support all levels of command and meet new mission areas, corresponding AR MI budgets have declined. If trends continue, direct intelligence funding to the AR could, in fact, end in FY09. This paper will analyze the worsening situation and will include a review of applicable history, available funding to engage AR MI, RC funding from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), non-Army funding for AR MI support,
capabilities in the AR, the promise and risk of a new program known as Foundry, and make recommendations for improvement.

**Historical Background**

A capability for non-mobilized intelligence support has been an element of Army and Army Reserve planning since the National Defense Act of 1920. Effective on August 4, 1921, the Act added intelligence as a function of the new Officers Reserve Corps. Further, in 1930, the newly formed Signal Intelligence Section added extension courses for reserve officers. These efforts, however, did not mature or meet expectations. Ultimately, they proved of limited value for the World War II years.

In the late 1940’s, another initiative to integrate AR MI assets began with the formation of approximately 50 MI Detachments (MIDs). These MIDs, though restructured many times, still exist. The mission of the MIDs was to provide focused intelligence support utilizing expertise from specific universities, professions, and various specialized groups. In 1952, pre-dating an active component (AC) intelligence command, Army Intelligence and Security Branches were formed for reserve officers. These branches were later used to assist in establishing the Military Intelligence Branch in 1967.

A 1990 Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) report found that almost all RC intelligence units were under-funded and could not fulfill wartime requirements. Partly as a result of that report as well as the downsizing of both AC and RC intelligence forces, the Defense Intelligence Reserve Program (DIRP) was launched in 1993 to provide funding to “integrate all multi-Service RC intelligence assets and resources in support of national agency, unified command, and Service intelligence
requirements.” The name of the program was later changed from DIRP to the Army RC Intelligence Program (ARCIP). With a consistent record of poor Army budget support, ARCIP resources generally decreased since the late 1990’s. Department of the Army (DA), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2 and INSCOM staff planning, in fact, terminated ARCIP as a part of their planning to initiate a new program called Project Foundry. Unfortunately, ARCIP was the only dedicated Army resource for intelligence support from the AR MI force. Project Foundry is described below in greater detail.

This lack of Army support, with which to integrate reserve intelligence forces, was contradicted by DA G2 level analysis during the same time frame. The Army Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Target Acquisition Master Plan (AIMP), was also formed in the early 1990’s to reevaluate MI’s role in a post Cold War world. Following the 1990 Gulf War, AIMP recommended an emphasis on providing common and complete pictures of the battlefield via new interacting systems that would allow for a smaller active MI force. Further, although reserve intelligence forces would also face reductions, reliance on those reserve forces would increase.

Though many times larger in scope and size than the ARCIP, a Department of Defense (DOD) level program known as the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) would revolutionize support from Soldiers and units aligned to joint commands and national agencies.

**Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP)**

The creation of JRIP may be By far the most significant improvement of reserve intelligence support since the National Defense Act of 1920. This program was initiated
in 1994 when the Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum entitled the “Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements (PURCIE).” Though it required two years of coordination, the program’s memorandum mandated a “comprehensive implementation plan for the integration of the reserve military intelligence forces from all components into the AC, joint, and DoD intelligence systems.” The plan was based on three principles. The first was that peacetime engagement would enhance wartime readiness of reserve intelligence forces. Secondly, it called for reserve intelligence forces to fill intelligence shortfalls. Lastly, the reserve intelligence forces would become more visible, more accessible, and demonstrate greater utility as a force.

The JRIP was formally established on February 29, 2000, with DoD Directive 3305.7, which officially replaced PURCIE with JRIP as the acronym for this initiative. DoD Directive 3305.7 defined the program as one that “supports wartime readiness and peacetime requirements for intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination by fully utilizing the intelligence elements of the Reserve components (RC).” In doing so, the JRIP engages RC intelligence assets during periods of active and inactive duty to support validated DoD intelligence requirements across the entire engagement spectrum from peacetime through full mobilization, coincident with wartime readiness training. Management and administrative instructions were later published in DoD Instruction 3305.8 on April 11, 2001.

DoD 3305.7 was made obsolete when on March 27, 2007 DoD Directive 3305.07 was published and provided a more mature and updated policy for the JRIP. A key function of JRIP is its provision of funding to reimburse the RC for expenses in pay and allowance incurred by reservists who participate in tours of duty that support active
component intelligence requirements at any level. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) described this provision by stating that Congress inserted language into the Defense appropriations bill granting authority to “to utilize Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for reimbursement of pay, allowances, and other expenses when members of the RC provide intelligence support.”

Today’s JRIP is a program that “details overall responsibilities; increases efficiencies through joint organizations, functional management structures, and flexible drills; [and] improves relations among drilling Reservists, their units, and defense intelligence elements.” The program also “addresses appropriations for pay and allowances provided to Reserve intelligence personnel.” Further, since its inception, the JRIP has striven to provide intelligence connectivity and information architectures to RC intelligence facilities so that reserve assets could more readily be utilized and trained. Today, this sub-program of the JRIP monitors and maintains Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs).

The JRIC concept is a key and additional mission set for pre-existing RC intelligence facilities. JRIC affiliation to those sites means routine first class connectivity and systems for support and training at nearly 30 RC intelligence facilities across the continental United States. From these sites, RC intelligence personnel provide virtual support to nearly all combatant commands, national agencies within the IC, and other joint organizations.

Though the Army has provided little of this connectivity and associated hardware, it does reap some secondary training and support benefits. Ten years ago (in 1998) a House of Representatives report stated, “The committee is favorably impressed by the
intelligence production mission load the JRIP has been able to accommodate in support of the active forces. This has been particularly true of the JRIP support to the European Joint Analysis Center (JAC) from the Fort Sheridan, Illinois.” The committee report also noted that JRIP’s world-wide missions included personnel on temporary duty assignments at active component (AC) command and agency sites and from reservists working virtually connected from remote geographic locations. Further, JRIP assistance provided the AC with increased intelligence capabilities in the areas of collection operations, better response times, targeting data, and various reports and studies. It was also noted that this increase was achieved without having to use limited mobilization authorities.

Though the JRIP has had positive effects on those AR MI elements aligned to joint commands and national agencies, it doesn’t address Army intelligence requirements at any level. There is additional capacity in JRIP connectivity and in AR intelligence facilities for greater Army participation; however, the necessary funding to bring AR MI Soldiers to an active duty status to augment Army intelligence efforts from JRIC sites or at Army locations is not provided for by JRIP. In that regard, Army requirements remain Army responsibilities.

**On-Going Operational Intelligence Support (OOIS)**

OOIS is a new term coined by the Commander of the AR’s MI Readiness Command (MIRC). Prior to its initial usage (in 2005), the phrase “intelligence contributory support” (ICS) was considered the normal expression for the same concept. Generally, both OOIS and ICS refer to real-world participation by AR MI Soldiers in an AC organization’s intelligence mission. In the process of providing
assistance, a continuing relationship is fostered—one that is mutually beneficial with respect to training and improved readiness. The concept is based on the reality that most intelligence training cannot be simulated and that quality training is not feasible if conducted within normal AR facilities or with routine AR resources.

A document prepared by the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) describes this type of cooperative effort as a necessary and interdependent process with expanded training opportunities and enhanced mission support as the goal. OOIS and ICS projects “are driven by the intelligence requirements of AC commands and national-level agencies.” Emphasis is equally on the mission of aligned AC intelligence organizations as well as on the training and experience gained by participating AR units and individual Soldiers.

Resources that enable this relationship are derived from a wide variety of sources. These sources are discussed below.

**Army Funding for AR MI**

The Army is reasonably effective in providing “routine” training and readiness funding to AR MI. AR funding, like AC funding is rooted in Title 10 U.S. Code. Title 10, USC Sec. 10102, states that the “purpose of reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency.” The onus, therefore, is on the AR to satisfy baseline training and readiness requirements. Priority for those tasks is applied to all resources currently provided to the AR in order to enable the AR to conduct “routine” training for reclassification, professional development, refresher, and collective training. The need for this is obvious and automatically incorporated within the Army’s Planning,
PPBE training funds are well established in the program objective memorandum (POM) process. These funds are provided to the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), and subsequently passed to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). The bottom line is that the AR budget does not include dedicated resources or funds for OOIS or other forms of operational support.

It is important to note that Title 10 also states that the purpose of the reserve component is used “at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” Therefore, a very limited amount of the money from “routine” PPBE funds can and does finance a very small amount of intelligence support. Ever since intelligence assets have existed in the AR, the AR has been able to use a small portion of its own “routine” funds to place Soldiers in AC augmentation roles, if training on related skills is not feasible within AR systems and resources. However, regulations and guidance prioritize these funds so that usage first ensures AR Soldiers are able to attend “routine,” prescribed and required training events and attain minimal readiness requirements. Utilization is also limited by the DA defined prioritization and usage in current programs from the PPBE process.

Title 10 directs the Army to train and ready the AR in preparation for potential mobilization to active duty. The purpose and overriding emphasis on training and readiness was further strengthened by the AR’s rotational methodology for mobilization and deployment, known as Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREPs).
Therefore, training requirements, limited resources, and priorities, (both individual and collective), are all directed toward basic readiness for mobilization and deployment.\textsuperscript{24}

Differences in an AR Soldier’s duty status are also important parts of this discussion. The most common forms of AR duty statuses include annual training (AT), inactive duty for training (IDT), active duty for training (ADT), and active duty for special training (ADSW).\textsuperscript{25} Less common duty status forms include temporary tours of active duty (TTAD), and extended active duty (EAD).\textsuperscript{26} It is not uncommon for TTAD and EAD to be preceded with the letters “CO” for contingency, such as CO-TTAD and CO-EAD; thus associating those tours with some on-going contingency or deployment. Mobilization is, of course, another form of active duty. It is also important to know that TTAD, EAD, and mobilization statuses are controlled and funded by the AC and not the AR. The duty statuses of ADT, ADSW, TTAD, EAD, and mobilization provide an active duty status; but even these are bound by specific regulatory definitions of those types of active duty.

Though somewhat confusing to those unfamiliar with AR, duty status becomes much more understandable when corresponding resources are understood. AT is derived from its own MDEP and can resource up to 29 days of active duty. IDT also has its own program and funding that finances the 2 days of mandatory and monthly training, commonly referred to as “drills.” TTAD and EAD funds and orders are controlled by AC sources. ADT is a versatile form of active duty that is funded by a large number of programs where duty days can range from days to months. The most common usage of ADT in the AR is to fund professional development and reclassification training.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Source</th>
<th>Routine Purpose of Fund</th>
<th>Dedicated OOIS / ICS Support / Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Drill Weekends (Battle Assemblies)</td>
<td>Refresher / Sustainment for Individual Soldiers</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Training (PRAT)</td>
<td>Annual Collective Training</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Development (TRPD)</td>
<td>Officer and Enlisted Educational Training</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclassification Training (TRIT)</td>
<td>Skills Qualification Training</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW)</td>
<td>AR Unit Readiness and General Purposes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Training (TDLP)</td>
<td>Language Refresher / Sustainment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDTRAIN (GPIR)</td>
<td>Intelligence Training</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCIP (GPIR)</td>
<td>Intelligence Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Applicability of Available Funds to AR MI Support

ADT is also the form of duty status used by the AR MI force for the dwindling Army Intelligence programs. The need to augment the Army’s intelligence efforts with AR Soldiers and units, as a critical part of training, is not as easy to justify as are those that are perceived as the baseline routine requirements. Only clearly written descriptions of purpose which include explicit statements of intent to improve training and readiness hold any traction in the POM process for the AR. Augmentation must be described as another form of training that improves readiness for mobilization. With competing requirements for limited Army funds, operations or training above the “routine” level is more readily left without resources. In short, AR intelligence funding is a low priority vs. AT, professional development and reclassification funds. Still, some intelligence funding is preferable to none. Even grossly under-funded intelligence programs offer far more opportunities than no program at all. Though funding has never provided more than a fraction of requested and validated requirements in existing AR intelligence programs, requirements historically submitted into the PPBE process have garnered some success.

The graph below depicts PPBE programmed intelligence requirements vs. appropriated intelligence funding to AR MI. Resources depicted represent a
combination of funding for the intelligence readiness training (REDTRAIN) program and
the Army Reserve Component Intelligence Program (ARCIP). Over the period of time
covered by the chart, MDEPs have changed titles; but the programs remained the
same. The termination of funds at the end of fiscal year 2009 is based on planning
guidance provided to the AR by DA G2 and INSCOM representatives in the 2005 and
2006 timeframe.  

It is important to remember that these are the only programs in which the AR
receives appropriated intelligence funds for operations and maintenance or Soldier pay.
AR appropriations in these two areas are entitled Operations and Maintenance, Army
Reserve (OMAR) and Reserve Pay and Allowances (RPA).

The graph demonstrates that requested and validated requirements generally
increased, while funding simultaneously decreased. Furthermore, the gap between
requirements vs. funding increases through FY11 and beyond. It is also interesting to
note that DA G2 stated requirements appear somewhat erratic. These inconsistent
patterns may indicate a lack of established historical norms for these programs and / or
that POM methodologies were not well constructed.

According to information from DA G2, all directly appropriated intelligence
funding to AR MI could cease at the end of FY09. The termination of these funds is
due to a shift in the DA G2 staff towards a not yet fully developed program called
Foundry. Foundry, a proposed intelligence training program, will use the MDEP GPIR,
while REDTRAIN and ARCIP are simultaneously eliminated and removed from that
MDEP Foundry, as reported by program representatives in 2005 and 2006, would
eliminate the small amount of direct intelligence funding to the AR in FY09.
Since 9/11, appropriated AR intelligence funds have declined and are programmed for potential elimination, while general IC funding has received large increases. The exact size and composition of the U.S. intelligence budget and supplements is classified; but it has been estimated at $40 Billion for FY06 alone, with approximately 80% of the total budget going to the Department of Defense. The Army’s share of the annual IC budget is also classified; but it too is undoubtedly measured in billions of dollars and has increased since 9/11. With such large increases, it is astonishing that the AR intelligence force has not only been lacking in corresponding assistance but has actually seen its funding sharply reduced and marked for termination.
RC MI Funds at INSCOM

Funding for AR MI support to Army intelligence requirements need not wholly depend on the Army POM process. The U.S. funds its intelligence assets from two distinct sources; the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The NIP provides “integrated intelligence that covers broad aspects of national policy and national security,” while the MIP refers to “programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense’s intelligence and counterintelligence, and related responsibilities as outlined in DoD Directive 5143.01.”

The MIP was previously managed as two separate programs known as the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The JMIP was established to account for defense resources that provided joint intelligence support to military operations. Below NIP and JMIP levels, TIARA was resourced and managed directly by the military departments to support tactical military forces. JMIP and TIARA, as well as their various sub-programs, still exist as consolidated programs under the MIP. These broad definitions are presented merely to highlight the critical functions that these funds provide to all levels of the IC to include national, joint, and tactical levels. But with the exception of remaining GPIR, which falls into the MIP category of funds, AR MI receives no direct IC funding.

AR MI and any intelligence requirements it may have are not incorporated into IC budget considerations or resources. AR MI access to IC funding processes is controlled at the DA G2 staff level; and, to date, this access is not inclusive of AR MI requirements. Efforts, since at least 1999, to forward requirements for consideration have not been successful. A formal AR MI brief and request in fiscal year (FY) 2006 to DA G2 for such inclusion, was denied by DA G2 representatives.
Though efforts for direct funding have failed, it is possible for AR MI to receive some indirect and non-appropriated IC O&M from a small O&M budget held at INSCOM and managed by DA G2 representatives on an irregular basis. The total is not very large and ranges in size from only $1-2 million each fiscal year. In theory, requests from the Army RC compete in the DA G2 staff for approval. The DA G2 receives requests, prioritizes the requests, and determines allocations.³⁹ The timeline for this request, review, and approval process varies each fiscal year. Some years, it was not even completed till late 1st quarter or early 2nd quarter. Historically, it has become a confusing task for AR MI, DA G2 and INSCOM to manage and execute. This confusion is easy to understand, as the funds held in this INSCOM “checkbook” are not appropriated for the RC in the Army POM or by the IC. Without clear programmed guidance, uncertainty is a common feature of this source. This uncertainty has further and consistently translated into perpetual unreliability.

It is normal and expected that only a small portion of DA G2 approved allocations will actually reach and satisfy AR requirements.⁴⁰ Throughout most fiscal years the AR must continually press DA G2 and INSCOM for the transmittal of approved resources from the INSCOM “checkbook.”⁴¹ If transmitted at all, it is also normal and expected for these actions to occur at unpredictable times late in the fiscal year. At times, notifications that a release of funds will finally happen comes too late in the FY for efficient execution. Execution requires time and often turns into a race, with the end of the fiscal year as the finish line. As all defense “budgeteers” know, September 30th ends the possibility of executing remaining funds from that fiscal year. Late transmittal, even if by mid-fiscal year, only adds to uncertainty, unpredictability, and confusion.
Non-Army Funding for AR MI Support

Combatant commands and national agencies, aided by JRIP, long ago realized the advantage and value of intelligence support from its aligned RC and AR MI assets. Along with JRIP, these joint organizations provide IC funds to resource AR MI support. While they do not have the reserve pay and allowance (RPA) appropriations required to produce orders on AR MI Soldiers, they do have operations and maintenance (O&M) funds which can be used to reimburse the AR so that the AR can produce the necessary orders. The ability to reimburse the AR MI for intelligence support is specifically established in U.S. Code, Title 10. Under this provision, any AC organization can use any source of O&M, to reimburse the RC and AR MI for intelligence support.

This use of AC O&M for intelligence support is commonly referred to as intelligence funded reimbursable authority (FRA). The purpose of FRA is to authorize any AC organization to reimburse the AR for travel and RPA costs associated with an AR MI Soldier’s intelligence support to that command or agency. AC O&M is not converted to RPA, as they are wholly different appropriations; however, O&M can be exchanged for RPA. In order to accomplish this, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), a part of the Army Pentagon, establishes a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with commands and agencies that desire support from AR intelligence units and Soldiers. Funds are transmitted to the Human Resources Command – St Louis (HRC-St. Louis) where the exchange is conducted and Soldier ADT orders are produced. FRA processes in the AR are managed by the AR’s MI Readiness Command at Fort Belvoir, VA. Though this may appear cumbersome, it has become a very successful process that executes approximately $20-22 million each fiscal year and provides
approximately 200 man-years of intelligence support each fiscal year. Of the FRA based support provided by the AR MI force, 95% is provided to joint commands and national agencies. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) is the only notable beneficiary of FRA support in the Army, as JRIP and joint organizations will recognize and fund a number of NGIC’s joint projects.

USARC base operations (BASOPS) funds can only provide training resources based on the amount and programmed limitations of funds received from DA. Also, such support is simply not within the scope of its mission to provide trained and ready Soldiers for post-mobilization deployment. USARC’s BASOPS resources are provided at levels necessary to pay for routine utilities and building maintenance. The AR does not have the resources to support operational intelligence systems, automation, or connectivity.

The resources necessary to perform real-time intelligence production from ARISC platforms are provided by supported joint and agency sources. It is, therefore, joint and agency support that is accomplished. The Army, to date, has provided very little FRA support or service funding, thus intelligence support for the Army is trivial in comparison (to joint and strategic level support). The result is a gap in support to INSCOM theater brigades and for Army commands everywhere. Given this lack of foresight, very little AR support to intelligence production specific to Army requirements is conducted. There is, however, great capacity at AR intelligence centers and from personnel resources in AR MI units.
What AR MI Provides

AR MI structure is designed to augment the active intelligence force of the Army. It consists of capabilities in virtually every intelligence discipline and is aligned to every level of command, to include tactical, operational / theater, strategic, and national. The graph below depicts existing AR intelligence units and the active levels or organizations to which they are aligned. Unfortunately, insufficient funds are available for use in tapping the resources and assets aligned to the operational and tactical levels.

Not all AR MI capability is embedded in MI units. As in the AC there are intelligence staffs, known as S2 and G2 staffs, at all unit and command levels. There are also AR MI teams, sections, and individuals in augmentation units aligned to all AC Army and joint commands. In fact, it is often the case that most of the personnel within these generic augmentation units are MI.

**Figure 3: Summary of AR MI Units and AC Alignments**

Though S2 and G2 staffs and AC augmentation units hold significant numbers of AR MI Soldiers, the highest concentration of MI capabilities are in AR MI units. In this context, AR MI units operate under MI structure resource codes (SRCs). AR MI units at the tactical and operational levels are often Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MTOE) units; whereas those above the operational level are generally Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units.

Virtually all MI units, known as Troop Program Units (TPUs), are under the direct command and control (C2) of the AR’s MI Readiness Command (MIRC).\textsuperscript{46} With the exception of 2-3 very small MI TDA units under the AR’s 9th Regional Readiness Command (RRC) in Hawaii and the 7th ARCOM in Germany, all AR MI units fall under the MIRC.\textsuperscript{47} The MIRC constructed two small subordinate commands to better organize its ability to conduct day to day C2. The MIRC’s Theater Support Command (TSC) holds the AR’s operational MTOE battalions, while the Combat Support Command (CSC) administers AR MI TDA units. There are also a number of direct reporting units, as not all units fit well into the TSC or CSC. (See diagram #1).

The TSC holds four Battlefield Surveillance Battalions (BfSBs), five Theater Support Battalions (TSBs), a Joint Interrogation Detention Center (JIDC) Battalion, and the Army’s only Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) Battalion. Each TSB is aligned to one of INSCOM’s operational brigades and the TECHINT battalion is aligned to the National Ground Intelligence Command (NGIC). Only the modularized BfSB battalions lack a single aligned AC headquarters (HQs).

The CSC consists of six MI Groups (MIGs) aligned to the NGIC and three Strategic Intelligence Groups aligned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It also has three Army Reserve Elements (AREs) aligned to NSA’s Regional Security Operations Commands (RSOCs) and another NSA aligned unit known as the Army Technical Analysis Element (ATCAE). Other CSC units include AREs to the Joint Transformation Command for Intelligence (JTC-I) at Joint Forces Command, as well as
an ARE co-located with the State Department. Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) consist of large AREs to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The MIRC controls a number of specialized units and centers that have specific missions which support all Army components and other elements in the intelligence community. One of these is a small organization known as the MI Augmentation Detachment (MIAD) which provides mechanisms for recruitment and training for Soldiers who reside far from their assigned units.

The MIRC also commands five Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs). ARISCs are key intelligence assets in the AR mission and structure. They also act as intelligence production platforms for various joint commands and national agencies. They have evolved over the last 10-12 years into complex facilities with wide sets of missions, roles, and functions. Today’s ARISCs provide three overlapping functions for the Army and the intelligence community. As stated in their original charters, they are first an Army training platform for training on MI procedures and equipment from the individual Soldier to battalion level. In concert with FORSCOM, USARC, and 1st Army, ARISCs are responsible for the post mobilization and pre-deployment training for mobilized reserve component (RC) MI units. They also provide a powerful real-time production platform open to all RC service intelligence assets. These assets are enabled to conduct intelligence support to all joint commands and national agencies. ARISC assets also enable support to some Army intelligence requirements.
LTG Keith B. Alexander noted that the purpose of Project Foundry is to “place a percentage of our tactical intelligence soldiers into ongoing live environment intelligence operations that provide better technical and regional expertise. Project Foundry will include soldiers from almost every Military Intelligence military occupational specialty.”

Improving readiness through refresher and sustainment training on new technology and procedures at the tactical level is a core feature of Foundry. “Project Foundry will station selected tactical intelligence Soldiers with the Army Intelligence and Security Command and national intelligence organizations, to provide a foundation of regional and subject-matter expertise developed through daily training in a live mission environment.”

The conceptual goal of Foundry is to improve individual Soldier operational intelligence skills and intelligence readiness as well as support to deployments and contingencies. It is designed to help MI personnel sustain and improve war fighting technical, analytical, and foreign language skills required to carry out assigned operational intelligence missions. Commanders and senior intelligence officers (SIOs) are provided with a means to meet their priority intelligence training and certification requirements. Priorities for Foundry resources are: deploying forces, next deploying forces, units that directly or indirectly support the training of tactical forces, training of individual MI Soldiers to augment or supplement tactical forces or support operational missions, and routine MI skills or systems training, in that order.

Headquarters, Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) serves as Army lead and single point of entry for Foundry training opportunities. As such, CG INSCOM appoints a DA Foundry Program Administrator (FPA) and establishes a Foundry Office
to manage Army-wide implementation of this program.\textsuperscript{57} A Foundry Planning Committee (FPC) and a Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (Foundry) Handbook are also established at INSCOM.\textsuperscript{58} The FPA and the Foundry Office establish, maintain, evaluate, and inspect all data requirements, Foundry Status Reports, quarterly Foundry Expenditure Support Reports, Annual Foundry Program Reports, the Foundry Automated Survey System, funding plans, Foundry Portal advertisements, etc.\textsuperscript{59} These new functions and responsibilities at Headquarters, INSCOM imply a requirement for a robust and fully manned Foundry Office. It also implies additional functions and responsibilities at every level of command in the Army to administer the program.

Thus far, Foundry has been funded in the form of AC OMA supplements only; and, at this time, there are no formal Foundry funds in the Army budget for any component of the Army.\textsuperscript{60} DA G2 believes this year’s POM will provide for Foundry FY09 and beyond.\textsuperscript{61} In the meantime, AR MI has been informed that it should use its remaining REDTRAIN and ARCIP coded funds as if they were Foundry funds. Currently, however, there is insufficient data on Foundry processes, ADT order procedures, etc. to execute the program in the AR.

After FY09, there is no known source for man-day orders in the AR. Though there is a mechanism to “convert” AC OMA to RC man-days, it is uncertain if Foundry plans to utilize that mechanism.\textsuperscript{62} In order to ensure Foundry training objectives and goals are met, the AR requires sufficient funds to pay Army Reserve MI Soldiers under an ADT status with an identified RPA funding source and mechanism to access those funds. Operational and maintenance funds are also required to provide sufficient support for supply and equipment requirements.
The vision and concept for Foundry are sound and needed. However, uncertainties concerning funding sources, appropriations, ADT order mechanisms, and potentially heavy program workloads make the program appear unreliable for the AR’s future. There is also seemingly little emphasis or priority for AR MI Soldiers to conduct operational support as a form of training. This fact alone could seriously impact AR MI unit relationships with their aligned AC higher headquarters and further degrade readiness. It requires time to build new programs into the Army POM and more time to adjust or correct those programs. These uncertainties could result in even less AR MI training and support for an extended period of time. Based on requests for support from active Army intelligence units to their aligned AR MI unit, significant requirements may remain unfulfilled and unresourced on a permanent basis.

Conclusion

For many years the AR has highlighted this issue with little to no effect. Currently, as AR MI representatives report, Army intelligence support at the operational level is wholly unfunded and unresourced.63 Previous imaginative and innovative use of internal AR resources has provided limited means to fill a fraction of this operational gap. With the termination of ARCIP, these means are further degraded. Internal resources, such as annual training, are too limited for most support requirements. With the continued demand for intelligence and the need for greater integration of AR aligned battalions to supported AC brigades, this gap can only continue to widen. Perhaps, the complete absence of support will gain the attention this issue deserves--years of warnings did not.
The issue is repairable and the price is far from too high, as total minimal requirements from Army operational sources is estimated at only $5 to $8 million—an amount equivalent to one-tenth of 1 percent of the estimated IC funds that reach the Army. Considering the fact that the AR MI force makes up approximately 15% of the uniformed strength of the Army MI force the estimated $5 to $8 million would seem to be a bargain. Is one-tenth of 1 percent too large a number to enable 15% of the force to close operational and training gaps with Army AC intelligence organizations? In any ends, ways, and means analysis, this investment seems well worth the minimal costs.

Active Army intelligence organizations do not request AR operational support equally. However, known coordination of requirements and requests by the 501st MI Brigade in Korea, the 500th MI Brigade in Hawaii, NGIC, and others demonstrate a requirement that may be even larger than estimates indicate. This is not really surprising, as Commands and agencies have always desired and needed more intelligence production than their assets could meet. Over the last 10+ years, the joint command and national agency levels made significant improvements in filling gaps with aligned AR MI assets; the Army did not.

The mechanics of the Army appear somehow misaligned. Army and AR MI structural requirements have rightfully grown since 9/11, and in some areas this growth was staggeringly large. The Army has also received much higher than pre-9/11 funding from the IC. Yet despite large AR MI mobilizations and deployments, an explosion in structure requirements, and increased ARISC and AR MI workloads, AR MI funding continues to decrease and is threatened with extinction in the near future. This paper did not attempt to explain this apparent illogic; it only attempted to explore applicable
questions, review historical data, discuss current support, list available assets, outline joint command and national agency successes, and make some recommendations applicable to this issue.

**Recommendation**

Despite over six years of irregular war, insufficient resources are forcing the AR MI force to become less engaged in Army support. Efficient and effective integration is beginning to decrease, just as it is needed the most. Active Army Commanders must have the tools to use all available assets with which to operate in all 21st century environments: traditional, catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive. Moreover, AR MI Soldiers and units must have the resources to integrate closely with supported active Army commands. It is likely too late to prevent a short term but notable decrease in AR MI support and losses in associated training. The cyclic nature of Army and DoD resource planning and forecasting requires time to adjust and incorporate changes. It is clear that remaining intelligence appropriations to the AR will decrease through fiscal year 2009 and that AR intelligence appropriations will reach an historical low. The situation can, however, be turned around with appropriate attention. Recommend DA G2, INSCOM, AR, and other key Army intelligence staffs and organizations correct associated issues to provide the small amount of required resources to the AR and fill needed gaps in support in Army levels. Steps need to be taken no later than the end of fiscal year 2009, as time is running out.
Endnotes


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61 Military Intelligence Readiness Command Records.

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66 Military Intelligence Readiness Command Records.