THE LONG WAR AND AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MILITARY

BY

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THE LONG WAR AND AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MILITARY

by

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The unique characteristics of the “Global War on Terrorism” have implications for the relationship society has with its military, and therefore, for military effectiveness in achieving political ends. Using an “institutional presence” theoretical foundation, four factors of the “GWOT” are described: the length of the conflict; its prosecution through an All-Volunteer Force; the fact that it is directed at non-states actors; and the nature of the enemies’ methods. The author discovers that each factor does close, create or widen the gap between the military and society. However, this is not necessarily problematic given the nature of this struggle, particularly if one focuses on effective formulation and execution of strategy. Finally, recommendations for managing the gap are included.
THE LONG WAR AND AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MILITARY

People are going about their daily lives, working and shopping and playing, worshiping at churches and synagogues and mosques, going to movies and to baseball games…..that is the ultimate repudiation of terrorism.

—George W. Bush

Contrast this quote with the public rationing of gasoline in World War II or the draft to man the force in Vietnam. Examine its fundamental meaning against the Trinitarian concept of the much studied Carl Von Clausewitz. Is it possible that we have embarked on an enduring endeavor, the very nature of which demands an overtly modest or at least significantly different use of means - means being the military and the society on which the military depends for support - to accomplish a vital or important end?

In this paper I will attempt to convince the reader that the unique characteristics of what the Administration has called the “Global War on Terrorism” has implications for the relationship society has with its military, and therefore for military effectiveness in achieving political ends.

First, I will review the relevant literature from the vast body of civil-military relations theory to lay out the aspects of society from which the military can judge its level of integration. I will then describe the factors that make the struggle against terrorism unique, and in doing so, will discuss the potential each factor has to close, create or widen a gap between the military and society. Finally, I will discuss whether that gap is a cause for concern in this struggle, focusing on the effective formulation and execution of strategy and concluding with recommendations for managing the gap.
There are many factors at play today that affect the current and future state of the civil-military relationship, and in fact much has been written on the interaction of the military leadership with civilian authorities in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, this essay will go beyond the war in Iraq and examine only those factors unique to the “long war.”

Definitions

This field is fraught with debate over definition and the rhetoric is indeed important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assert definitional correctness. Instead, I will define the terms critical to understanding my argument in a way that represents a common view.

Civil-Military Relationship. While the term can be defined many ways, this paper will examine the relationship between the military and the civilian society it serves. Civil-military relationship can also mean the specifics of the military’s subordinate posture in regard to its civilian masters and in this area the focus has primarily been on civilian control of the military. Additionally, the civil-military relations is sometimes thought of as the interaction between military men and women and non-governmental organizations in an area of operations; this is more precisely referred to as civil-military operations or CMO. Finally, the working relationship between DoD and other institutions in the government such as the Department of State is also referred to as civil-military relations. This essay examines the sociological approach - the public perceptions of the military that must support the institutional political-military posture, as well as the status of the profession.
Terrorism. There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism despite repeated attempts by the United Nations to develop one. However, the “consensus definition” of terrorism was developed in the early 1980s and probably accepted by about 75% of the experts in the field.

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims become targets of violence. Through the previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of a group are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). The victimization of the target is considered extra-normal by most observers, which in turn creates an audience beyond the target of terror. The purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demand or targets of attention.

Global War on Terrorism. This paper will attempt to avoid the term “GWOT.” Where it is cited, quoted or otherwise used, it is done so as the expressed title of a United States’ campaign and otherwise means the struggle against violent extremism in which the United States is currently engaged. In fact, the “struggle against violent extremism” was proposed as an alternative to the lighting rod term, “Global War on Terrorism” in July 2005. The main opposition to the use of “GWOT” is that it implies a military action against an ill-defined method, thereby inferring that the military instrument is the most appropriate among many other instruments of national power, and that we are combating a means instead of the threat itself.

Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the GWOT. Regardless of whether one believes that Operation Iraqi Freedom was prompted by a rational and strategic approach to countering global terrorism or rather, served only to exacerbate the problem, there is little disagreement that the repercussions of victory or defeat will significantly affect the struggle against violent extremism. Therefore, it is included as
one phase or chapter of the American-defined larger campaign that is likely to shape public opinion about the military for years to come.

Civil-Military Relations Theory

Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are considered the founders of the field and have at the core of their theoretical work the basic paradox of the civil-military relationship: the institution created to apply violence against enemies of the state can threaten the state it was created to protect. It therefore follows that, “in a democracy, those who govern have power by the virtue of a popular vote of their country’s citizens. While not similarly elected, the military also holds power. Consequently, effective civil-military relations…are vital to those seeking to create a government that is ultimately responsible to the people who elected it.”

In the case of the United States, equating inappropriate civil-military relations to a coup is outside the scope of responsible analysis. Therefore, “control” of the military is perhaps not the most useful way to frame discussion of civil-military relations. A better analytical touchstone is “effectiveness.” Sub-optimal civil-military relations demonstrated by a reluctance of the military to provide military options, budget requests that reflect a preferred capability and a myriad other acts of lesser-than-coup commission and omission can result in bad policy, and/or ineffective execution. Poor informational inputs can contribute to poor policy decisions and national treasure of all types can be wasted when policy and operations are not integrated; this is the heart of the civil-military debate in America.

To start with a brief explanation of Samuel Huntington’s theory is appropriate as all other theories of civil-military relations draw on one or more aspects of his work. His
causal logic goes as follows: the liberal ideology of the American society in conjunction with the external security environment drive the elected body to offer the military an autonomous sphere (objective control). The autonomous sphere is maintained through the professionalism of the officer corps and therefore, the civilian entity and the military entity are distinct from each other.\textsuperscript{10} This separateness is a good thing, but in the long run, American anti-military, liberal society must adopt some of the military's conservative realism if military effectiveness is to be achieved.\textsuperscript{11}

Morris Janowitz' work, while based on Huntington's concept of professionalism, offers an alternative approach. He found a way around Huntington's problem of a conservative military in a liberal society, writing that the military can also be controlled not just by professionalism but by effective integration into society. He and his followers of a sociological approach to civil-military relations did not believe in the distinctness of the military from society and its civilian authority figures. The officer corps was becoming increasingly pragmatic and less absolute-warrior in the character of its professionalism, driven by a need for the politically savvy officer to recognize the strategic and tactical dimensions of a full spectrum of military operations. He believed that the political system was geared toward an active role for the military in policymaking.\textsuperscript{12} On the societal level, Janowitz said about the soldier:

He is amenable to civilian control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force. He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its values.\textsuperscript{13}

Neither theory has been consistently upheld by empirical evidence, but Huntington and Janowitz identified the major building blocks to be considered in the study of civil-military relations: society and its values, the existing threat,
professionalism of the armed forces, and military distinctiveness. Both authors were concerned with effective policy and its implementation, but their arguments centered on the appropriate interaction between elected civilian authorities and the military in a liberal democracy. Their focal point, and that of most others scholars who have followed, was control versus effectiveness.

American history has effectively demonstrated that while the limits of military insubordination are not fixed, they do not vary widely or to the point at which policy makers have ever feared that the military will refuse to act. Both civilian failure to listen to the military and military recalcitrance with regard to civilian direction can have serious implications for the development and execution of strategy and therefore serious implications for effectiveness in foreign policy endeavors. Indeed, many scholars and journalists have recently questioned, as Huntington and Janowitz did, whether there is such a difference between the military and the rest of society that it may cause a working relationship to be less than effective.

A better lens through which to view the military’s relationship with society is perhaps the one posited by James Burk. While his work does not offer an if-then theoretical construct, it does suggest that analysts look at the military in society using a construct called “institutional presence.” This presence, and hence the so-call “gap” have varied over time largely due to the threat posed to the United States.¹⁴

Institutional presence has two dimensions, material presence and moral presence. Material presence, meaning the extent to which the military has to be taken into account in society for functional reasons, is measured by its claim on societal resources. Moral presence is the degree to which the military contributes to a “good
society.” This is measured by how well the military meets the expectations of society, expectations that have been shaped by societal norms and values. Burk says that high material and high moral presence equates to a central role of the military in society, while a low material and moral presence equates to a military alienated from society. 

See chart below:

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<th>MI= Moral Integration</th>
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<td>MS= Material Salience</td>
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Table 1.

The scale of resources drawn from society can be measured by looking at defense spending and size of the force. For the purposes of this paper, there are two areas conducive to judging the efficacy of the military in meeting societal normative expectations: how well the military does in treating citizens inside and outside the institution with fairness and decency; and the changing norms regarding the use of force. Both the material and moral yardsticks that Burk suggests offer an appropriate framework for examining changes in the gap between the military and society in this new threat environment.

This Unique Conflict: Is it Widening the Gap?

Determining the military’s institutional presence in the context of the “GWOT” cannot be conclusive as the United States is only seven and a half years into the struggle; trends are emerging, however. Acknowledging that there are similarities
between this conflict and those of the past, specifically Vietnam and the Cold War, this “war” on terrorism is unique in at least four ways.

First, this is likely to be a long, “warm” war. During the Cold War, the military was in a state of prolonged peacetime mobilization to contain and deter a superpower with staying power.¹⁶ Wars of proxy were fought in Latin America and U.S. forces engaged on the margins in Korea and Vietnam. Americans preferred the application of overwhelming military power and were prepared to throw whatever resources are required at an enemy threatening the vital national interest.¹⁷ Even in Vietnam where there were definite policy limits placed on military action, between 1964 and 1973 2,594,000 military members served and resourcing the war was not the constraining issue.¹⁸ Lack of results drove public opinion to determine that the stated end was no longer worth the means requested by policy makers.

In 2004, Henry Kissinger said that the new President’s task was most analogous to the one inherited by Harry Truman at the end of World War II. The security challenge marked by the smoke of the World Trade Center and Pentagon, had become terrorism and scientific technological advances that would enable proliferation.¹⁹ Analysts from important allies and potential peer competitors such as Russia have somewhat grudgingly agreed that while the attacks of September 11th did not usher in a completely new era in international relations, the revealed scope of the security threat from terrorism was enough to shift almost all political trends among nations.²⁰ Operational level leaders have repeatedly said that we have just begun to cross the long plateau of struggle with terrorism and extremist ideology.²¹ The military certainly considers itself to be serving a “Nation at war,” stating that this campaign will not be short and plans for
the future as such. Many believe that this struggle is the “work of decades” and “closer to the beginning than to the end.” These analysts, practitioners and observers are all referring to a continual struggle with a robust role for the U.S. military.

Regardless of the controlling party in Congress or the person occupying the White House, confrontation with radical ideology and prevention of terrorist acts will continue to absorb a considerable amount of resources; no Administration will fail to make it clear to the American people that security of the homeland is his or her number one priority. Outside the borders of the United States, action will be required in territories in which a significant portion of the population is dissatisfied with their socio-economic status, thereby allowing religious or other ideology to turn radical. Such action will probably not involve protracted conventional battle, yet the United State will be unable to disinterestedly watch while states that are susceptible to an infusion of radical ideology fall apart. At the high end of this spectrum another Iraq-type conflict is not unthinkable; at the low end, operations such as the humanitarian activities in the Horn of Africa are expected.

With regard to the temporal aspect of this “warm war”, it is commonly believed that the American people have little patience for the twists and turns and mistakes that time will bring and that the omni-present media will display, and little stomach for the price exacted to do so. As discussed previously, they will expect precision, limited casualties, agility and a quick victory. However, there are some indicators that the public may think differently about what they have been told is a “long war” and may have more tolerance for it than in previous eras.
The American people remember the pain caused by the terrorist attacks but no longer feel it. They horror has faded, not to be re-lived until another such attack happens. This is evidenced by the fact that just two months after September 11, 2001, only 40% of the American people said that they were very or somewhat worried about terrorism. But there is a difference between being “worried” about terrorism and thinking that combating it is an important national endeavor.

In a recent poll on political surveys, the war in Iraq topped the list of “most important problems facing the country,” terrorism in general was a 10th with all issues in between related to domestic or economic concerns. However, when asked to rate “defending the country from future terrorist attacks” among the priorities for President Bush and the Congress for this year, 74% of those polled said that it was a top priority and 22% said “important but lower” than top, second only to strengthening the nation’s economy.

This leads to a discussion of material salience. The percentage of U.S. GDP for this war is less than any other war in American history. The Korean War cost 11.7% of the GDP, Vietnam 8.9%, the Cold War 6.9%, the first Gulf War 4.6%, and this “war” approaching 4.5%. Yet as the struggle has progressed over the last seven plus years, spending for it has gone up remarkably. In 2001, the GWOT bill was $14 billion, in 2003 it was $88 billion, and in 2007 it was $163 billion. In relative terms, the means applied to achieve the ends is minimal. In absolute terms, material growth has been significant.

This increase in indicators of material presence may have something to do with effectiveness, as well. Multiple public opinion polls and media reporting indicate that the public is more optimistic about the prospects for the war in Iraq this early 2008. By
extension, it is more hopeful about the “GWOT” than this time last year. In January 2007, 44% of the American people felt that the U.S. government was doing “not too well” or “not well at all” in reducing the threat of terrorism. This year, the percentage answering the question the same was 31%. The people may be more likely to abstain from protest over budget increases if the resources provided are accomplishing the mission. And in fact, they do. The annual Gallup Mood of the Nation Poll shows a five percentage point increase from 2001 in the country’s satisfaction with military strength and preparedness.

The aspect of time and constant low-level fighting is marginally relevant to moral integration. This campaign is one of prevention and deterrence for the long term and is just as the term “campaign” implies – a series of operations and engagements that will keep the armed forces busy. If the conflict is prolonged, if it is important, and if it becomes part of day-to-day America, is it not natural that the people will come to expect the government and the military to take care of the threat quietly, as long as there is minimal impact on freedom of movement, individual liberties and the pursuit of economic prosperity? However, time does present the opportunity for revelation of more incidents that may demonstrate that the military does not always treat people with decency, such as the torture at Abu Graib, the perception that the death of Pat Tillman was covered up, and the neglect of wounded soldiers at Walter Reed. As the incidents accumulate, one could expect that the public will look with greater distrust at the military. In this regard the results are mixed. The latest Gallup poll found that 69% of the public had on confidence in the military as an institution, down from 83% in 2003. However, recent polls suggest that society trusts this All-Volunteer Force three times a
much as they trust the president and five times as much as they trust the Congress.

Relative to other government institutions, the military is doing well. Absolutely, the trend is downward.

With regard to the length of this conflict, it seems that society recognizes the important position of the military, yet will not write a blank check for a threat it does not actually feel. With regard to moral integration, time could very well exacerbate the suspicion with which the people like at military men and women. Overall, the gap might be widening slightly.

The second factor speaks to another unique aspect of the current campaign – the continuous use of an All-Volunteer Force. Since 2001, almost 600,000 service members have deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and the Horn of Africa. This is the first extended conflict since the Revolutionary War which the United States has fought with an All-Volunteer Force. For all other conflicts of the 20th Century the force was manned through a draft, thereby involving a larger segment of society. However, only during World War II were both a draft and a full mobilization of the reserve component used; Vietnam saw very limited use of the Reserve Component only beginning in 1968.

Currently, less than 1% of the American population serves in the well-used military. During Vietnam 4% served and during World War II 12% served. For this campaign, the Administration has compensated for the absence of a draft by Partial Mobilization of the Reserve Component. This means that 1,000,000 reservists may serve for no longer than 24 months. These service members are also all volunteers. In this way, the United States has managed to man the force with only volunteers, yet stay
true in part to the doctrine conceived by General Creighton Abrams after Vietnam. About 450,000 reservists have deployed as part of the “GWOT.” At any one time, between 75,000 and 120,000 are mobilized. At the current rate of mobilization and deployment, the United States is not in danger of running out of Reservists and Guardsmen under Partial Mobilization while at the same time keeping the American people involved at an acceptable level.

To rely on volunteers versus the draft or a higher stage of mobilization of the Reserve Component, could indicate a potential for the public to become disassociated with the war effort and the military as an institution. Is this the case? Has there been a decrease in either material or moral presence of the military in society as a result of the extended use of the All-Volunteer Force, as many instinctively believe? As demonstrated before, public willingness to fund the war has not subsided and the public has committed to paying for a larger force. For FY 2008, the Congress authorized the Army to grow its endstrength by 36,000 to 525,400 and the Marine Corps to grow 9,000 to 189,000. It further authorized the Army to grow up to an additional 22,000 and the Marine Corps an additional 13,000 for both FY 2009 and FY 2010. The bill for FY 2009 alone is $20.5 billion.

But it remains to be seen whether Congress will be willing to appropriate the requested dollars for the program lines the Army leadership has said is the most pressing in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force – the welfare of the military family. Over half of this All-Volunteer Force is married and there are more than 700,000 military children. If the Congress cannot be convinced to inject additional resources into family programs, from higher cost programs like the $50 million for impact aid for public
schools experiencing a surge in military child enrollment, to an authorization for military
spouses to ship professional items in a household move\textsuperscript{37}, the challenge of “recruiting
the Soldiers and retaining the family” very well may become insurmountable.\textsuperscript{38} This
would be an indicator of a growing disconnect.

On the other hand, while the threat of terrorism tops the list of very important
topics in the minds of the American people, there is very little support for reinstating the
draft. Just 18\% of Americans, recognizing that the military is stretched thin, support a
return to the draft. This is down from the 2003 figure of 27\%. Further evidence of
America’s rejection of such an initiative is the 402-2 overwhelming defeat of the Charlie
Rangel-proposed legislation that would have reinstated the draft.\textsuperscript{39} Americans have not
always rejected the idea of compulsory military service; in 1980 when President Jimmy
Carter considered the question, a majority of the people supported the option. The
reason for the recent public rejection is unclear; perhaps it is because of a lack of
support for the war in Iraq or perhaps it is because in the collective American mind, the
forecast of an impending crisis does equal a crisis.

With regard to the moral presence of the military affected by the All-Volunteer
Force, there is no evidence to suggest that this character of the force is causing a wider
gap. In fact, and without empirical data, society seems to have respect and even
admiration for the service members engaged in the struggle against terrorism. Certainly
there is the appearance of the occasional article like the ones published in \textit{The Nation}
and the \textit{New Republic} this past year, but anecdotal evidence abounds that the
American people “support the troops.” They seem to recognize a selfless patriotism in
military men and women, as well as the fact that policy makers make the decisions
about being in or out of Iraq and Afghanistan, not the military. Additionally, the American people want to think of their institutions as being open, fair-minded and democratic. There is no government institution that is less elitist and more diverse than the military. Overall, the emotional or normative connection that the public feels to the individual members of the All-Volunteer Force is greater than it has been since World War II.

In sum with regard to the affect the All Volunteer Force, one could argue that while the public is content with relegating military service to a very small segment of the population, it is listening to the requirements expressed by the military and is supportive up to the point of a draft. Again relative to other times in U.S. history, the material presence of the military is less and the gap wider. But in absolute terms, it is manageable. The morale presence of the military as an All Volunteer Force is high.

Third, this long war is unique in that it is almost exclusively directed against actors who do not represent a government or a state. They will be radical ideologues of trans-national character or ethnic or tribal groups inside state boundaries. Combating and managing these actors will demand the use of non-traditional instruments of national power and non-traditional military tactics, and require unprecedented levels of civil-military cooperation. These operations, along the length of the spectrum of potential actions mentioned previously, are likely to involve the Interagency, as well as public-private partnerships.

The character of the almost fifteen year old debate that began in the peace operations decade of the 1990s has changed slightly with the struggle against ideological extremism. The UK’s International Development Secretary Hilary Benn
stated, “we do not use the phrase ‘war on terror’ because we can’t win by military means alone ….” 41 It is more flavored by police, non-defense intelligence, and civilian stability and development missions, but it still goes largely like this: the military is a blunt instrument for accomplishing tasks not directly related to engaging and destroying the enemy, but is the only agency in the U.S. federal government with access to sufficient manpower and other resources to address many of the tasks required to achieve the desired political endstate.

The core mission of the military is to fight and win our nation’s wars, to protect the homeland, yet this “war” does not lend itself naturally to first or exclusive use of the military – unless the military is all the state has. The solution goes beyond changing the name of the struggle. The debate to define who should do what when, particularly in pre- and post-conflict situations, is draining as practical changes have been few and far between. Only in the past year has the Interagency gained some momentum.

The most robust and widely-accepted plan has been the one to create a three-tiered system to move civilians, both federal and non into an operation quickly. It has been developed and overseen by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.42 As the Council on Foreign Relations report “In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities” states, State and USAID are at the core of providing the crucial civilian capabilities, but further expertise and manpower contributions must also come from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Health and Human Services. The concept is to deploy the appropriate civilian teams down to the brigade level.43
Despite the recent incorporation of stability operations into the core mission of the military, as well as the recent development of doctrine and better training practices in counter-insurgency, the military remains most comfortable operating at the high end of the conflict spectrum. Chief of Staff of the Army, George Casey, as well as most Army leaders, describe the coming decades as ones of persistent conflict centered in the developing world. Yet, they claim we cannot accept risk when it comes to emerging peer competitors and must continue to train and modernize for operations beyond counter-insurgency. While this is certainly prudent, the volume of the recent talk implies that the Army is already trying to curtail the counter-insurgency and stability operations swing of the probable-military-operations pendulum. Additionally, DoD has also gone so far as to transfer $200 million dollars of its budget to State for the execution of missions that the military would otherwise have to perform.

Others say that winning wars means winning the peace and the United States cannot wait for other government agencies to become better resourced. To date, that argument is winning as evidenced by the material support for DoD versus other government agencies. For example, the FY2007 budget for DoD was $429.6 billion, versus Department of State at $28.7 billion, and the Department of Justice at $20.2 billion. And despite the fact the President’s Budget for FY2008 requested an 11% increase for the State Department programs (excluding the GWOT requests), Congress approved a mere .81% increase. Other federal agency requests and actual appropriations are similar. This may mean that the Congress and the American people see the fight against terrorism as one primarily belonging to the military and continue to place the armed forces in a central position with regard to the vital interest of
maintaining the security of the United States. How society wants to use its military and the military’s response to those demands indicates its level of moral integration. In general, it appears that this gap remains wide.

At the operational level, military resistance to civilian operational control is not uncommon. The disparity in resourcing makes it difficult for the military to gracefully work for the State Department or any other civilian agency. This normal tension between government agencies does not imply a crisis in civil-military relations as defined in the academic literature. It can, however, contribute to an inappropriate feeling of the military that, in work ethic, values and capabilities, the military is superior to civilians and that civil society would benefit if it adopted military mores.\(^50\) This is not a new phenomenon, and heretofore in the “long war” there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that it is approaching the level of WWII when an attempt was made to ensure civil-military cooperation in re-building post-Nazi Germany.\(^51\)

Additionally, because this struggle is likely to take place against non-state, transnational actors, the international community, particularly the U.S., has been re-defining the rules of the game in terms of protection of individual rights, preservation of American values, and appropriate intelligence gathering. Where the military is involved, such as at detention facilities, in the debate on torture, and in the issuing of thousands of national security letters to gather domestic records, the public is watchful and wary.\(^52\)

To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even preemptive war. These are evils because each strays from national and international law and because they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process. They can be justified only because they prevent the greater evil. The question is not whether we should be trafficking in lesser evils but whether we can keep lesser evils under the control of free institutions.\(^53\)
Indeed, the American people have been consistently clear that there are certain limits on the way the United States may fight terrorism. Answers to questions on the willingness to assassinate other heads of state or government leaders, to torture, and to use nuclear weapons all indicate less than 40% of Americans support such things, clearly indicating that certain activities are outside the bounds of American values and culture. This particular characterization of the issue is not universally accepted, but the debate goes on and to the extent that the military becomes embroiled in it, the relationship of the military to society will likely be affected.

In sum, with regard to this third factor, it appears that there is no evidence for a civil-military material gap. Society provides resources to the military for the accomplishment of all types of missions. However, the moral presence of the military in society may be decreasing in this regard; note the preference society has for the types of military employment, the military’s involvement in the infringement of civil liberties, and a sense that the military potentially feels itself superior to the civilians.

The fourth factor is the hardest to grapple with. The United States is prosecuting a campaign against enemies whose major tactic – terrorism – has the short term objective of reminding innocents of their cause through the disruption of day-to-day life. The enemies who may most threaten the security of the United States have no immediate expectation or objective of toppling the U.S. government or any other democratic regime. Their aim is to cause turmoil, pain and even consistent inconvenience over an extended period of time, in order to achieve graduated goals in their own regions. As the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism says, “Extremists use terrorism – the purposeful targeting of ordinary people – to produce fear
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious or ideological goals.”

The uniqueness of terrorism is that terrorists achieve their goals not through the acts themselves but through the response to the acts. The consequences of the violence are merely the first steps toward more remote objectives and are aimed at psychological result. The methods of the enemy demand a very different calculation of ends, ways and means.

For example, it is fairly well known that Al Q’aida wants the United States out of the Middle East and wants to establish Islamic states in that region. It is also well accepted that its general strategy is to provoke the United States into committing a level of ground forces into the region that will exhaust the public’s will to stay in the fight – and in the region. The Administration is well aware of this and must walk a very fine line so as not to actually assist the enemy in prosecuting its strategy.

Terrorists can claim victory when their chosen adversary responds to their tactics meant to instill fear. Terrorists rarely seek change from those they target; rather, they want those watching to change policy, change the fundamental character of opposing societies, or otherwise concede to more immediate demands. In other words, to make the tactic ineffective, policy makers have to convince the public not to pay attention. If Al Q’aida can make life uncomfortable enough for the average American citizen, they may be able to obtain capitulation from the American government on certain policies. Therefore, it stands to reason that “the GWOT is a war to preserve ordinary peoples’ ability to live as they choose, and to protect the tolerance and moderation of free and open societies.”
In this struggle, is it really both impractical and immoral to tell the American people to live life as usual while asking the military to bear the burden of deadly overseas ventures alone? Among many, Senator Lieberman says yes and has called for shared sacrifice, saying, “…our military went to war but our nation did not go to war. And as long as that is true, we are not going to have the success and the victory we need.” Is he right?

The public cannot be accused of not wanting to sacrifice; it is merely doing what the President, the Commander in Chief asked of it. And maybe he is correct. Who has not had the passing thought that for each pair of shoes removed at the airport security screen, Al Q’aida has scored a small victory? Is it not possible that every dollar spent on the so-called GWOT is a dollar not spent on under-developed nations, arguably a necessary context within which trans-national terrorist organizations operate?

The character of the struggle because of the tactics used by the enemy, have demanded a military material presence much lower than many analysts instinctively and logically, believe it should be. We have only statements from the Administration as evidence that refusing a higher stage of mobilization, higher taxes, or greater spending as part of the GDP, is a matter of deliberate calculation, not a matter of an ignorant mismatch of ends, ways and means. The public has met the demands that the president has asked for as evidenced above. The fact that the public wants the military out of Iraq does not speak to its commitment to the larger campaign.

The public regularly reads terrorist plots were foiled. Yet it does not live in fear of another attack. A sense of fear or urgency might well cause the people to willingly provide whatever resources are required to eliminate a threat. This is not known. As it
is, the public will not wring its hands overmuch even about the expenditure of the most
precious of resources – American lives – if a convincing argument is made that the end
is worth the cost. In a recent survey, only 28% of adults were able to say that about
4,000 Americans have died in Iraq. Unlike in Vietnam, the reason for the “GWOT” is
not obscure and the price that the public is willing to pay has not yet risen above the
value of the ends. The fact that we do not know what price the public would be willing
to pay may be a matter of Administration policy. The Administration has been accused
of fear-mongering on one hand, and not doing enough on the other. It must maintain a
state of equilibrium between not disrupting the economy and state of moral well-being of
the public and trying to ensure the safety of the state.

In sum, looking at the four factors that are unique to this struggle, we see a
material presence in society that is not as great as in conflicts past. We see a moral
presence that is not significantly more removed from society than in times past, but is
worth keeping an eye on. Evidence does suggest a widening gap in terms of what
society is providing, relative to other times. It does not currently suggest a great divide
with regard to the ability of the military to contribute to a good society. On Burk’s chart,
the military today would likely fall somewhere between central and Peripheral, certainly
not predatory or alienated.

So There is a Gap…

What does this relative gap mean? Is it necessarily a problem? The difficulty in
aligning ends, ways and means in this current struggle is exemplified by the recent poll
that indicated that 44% of the American people - a record high since regular polling on
this subject begin in 2001–felt that the U.S. military was not strong enough. However,
an equal percent felt that the U.S. spent too much on defense. This reflects a belief that
the government must secure the homeland against terrorist attacks, but at the same
time not negatively affect quality of day to day life.

Changes in ways and means described above must be linked to the political end. One can assume that the unspoken political objective of the fight against violent extremism is to minimize the damage that terrorists can inflict on America and her allies; it would be futile to develop policy with the goal of eliminating the tactic of terrorism or even ideological extremism. This being the case, the ways and means used to achieve this goal must be tailored in ways that are unprecedented. How is the merit of this calculation determined? It is possible that the Clausewitzian concept of optimality may offer the answer. He said that the ideal strategy will accomplish the political objective at the lowest possible cost. It will manage the ways and means of a campaign to suit the political end, applying neither too little nor too much.\textsuperscript{64} It follows then that the attempt to apply effort when it is counter to achieving the political objective is illogical. Demanding of the American people increased taxes, rationing, military draft and/or other forms of sacrifice, could potentially exhaust their will to fight this battle at all.

The ideal end of a balanced civil-military relationship is the protection of the American way of life. The common expression of the national ethos is “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” meaning that American citizens should have freedom of movement, protection of their individual liberties, and the right to pursue economic prosperity. How the U.S. government, and by extension, the U.S. military, has ensured these things has fluctuated over time. It may be that support for the political end of a military operation is not best obtained through a direct and personal stake of the
American people, particularly when a certain pre-conceived stake is not necessary to achieve the ends.

It seems that the “GWOT” does in fact have the ability to cause a greater distance between that of the military and that of society in both material and moral terms. But it is not nearly as much as some would have observers think and more importantly, it will not necessarily amount to a decrease in effectiveness. Nothing contained herein should necessarily point the reader at an impending crisis in civil-military relations. The boundaries within which the military relates to civilian authorities are likely to remain quite narrow – and mostly appropriate. What this study does point to is a potential need to re-look the near-universally accepted construct by which military operation (ways), the resources used by the military to execute policy (means) and the political objective (ends) are joined. Moreover, it could provide the opportunity for greater effectiveness in the struggle against violent extremism.

**Recommendations and Conclusion**

First, policymakers should attempt to develop a grand strategy for addressing the threat environment of the 21st Century. Terrorism, energy security and non-proliferation are the largest threats. A strategy that matches means to ways to ends will help to rationalize what seems to be a mismatch in the “GWOT.” Context and a coherent approach will help the United States to avoid using confusing rhetoric. Words matter and positing that violent extremists pose an “existential threat” to America and Americans cannot help but to arouse some bewilderment.65 If our very existence is threatened, the public will expect to make a sacrifice. Our existence is not threatened at this time, but the potential for extreme harm in the future is something the U.S. must
combat indefinitely, particularly with regard to the nexus of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The fact that our existence is not threatened does not mean that military men and women will not be asked to give their lives in pursuit of viable policy. That policy should be clear.

Given a broad strategy and context, military leaders must talk to the force. They may have to explain to Soldiers, Airmen, Marines and Sailors that selfless service really is just that. The involvement of society may not pre-determined or required in military operations, even when lives are being lost. What may be required is merely interest, even detached interest. Interest may well be enough to secure the resources the military needs.

Second, with regard to the changing roles and missions of the military, partially driven by the dominance of non-state actors in this fight as well as the need to participate in the tasks of other members of the Interagency, the military must attempt to clarify what the profession of arms is and is not. The need for and required restraints on the military’s sense of self-awareness pervades almost all writing on civil-military relations. In this time of continuing tension among agencies over who should do what, the military must continue to grapple with self-awareness - which core missions, what expert knowledge, what does it mean to be effective, and how to maintain the trust of the American people. On one hand, the failure to deliver victory after the initial combat operations in Iraq, was a blow to the professional ethos. On the other hand, the military is not quite ready to incorporate the winning-the-peace aspects of war into a commonly accepted description of the profession of arms. A professional military, all agree, is foundational to effective civil-military relations.
Third, given the lack of experience in Congress (only 119 of 435 Representatives have a military service record, down from 140 just four years ago\textsuperscript{67} and the potential continued detachment of the American public, it may be time to review the limits of appropriate military engagement in policy formulation. As a rule, military leaders are educated national security officials, the military is well resourced, and the need for interagency collaboration is high. Should the military have been more engaged in policy making leading up to Iraq? Would the policy outcome have been better?\textsuperscript{68} As the chief operator and the one inevitably responsible for success or failure of the mission by acting as de-facto coordinator for all instruments of national power, it may be time to inject the internal military maxim into policy decisions: argue until the point a decision is made, at which time salute and move out smartly. Adopting this behavior would in no way over-step Constitutional bounds.

Fifth, the U.S. Administration and the Congress should work together to better develop a national sense of conscious and service, much as it did in the Cold War. John F. Kennedy began the Peace Corps in 1960 in order to demonstrate American good will around the globe and to encourage national service.\textsuperscript{69} Perhaps it is time to relook the idea of compulsory national service. Traditionally, military conscription has worked when “the cause was just, the stakes high and the burden equitable.”\textsuperscript{70} The cause is just, the stakes are high enough, and the burden could be made more equitable. But the burden need not be military, especially given the nature of this long war. Compulsory national service, military or otherwise, could very well strengthen the fabric of American society, conveying a social consciousness that would have the
opposite effect of that intended by Al Q’aida. It may be time to conduct a thorough analysis that examines all facets of the debate.

Additionally, George Kennan and others drove the establishment off myriad cultural exchange programs that involved the American people in fighting the ideology of communism. Multi-national cultural awareness and exchange programs could make the next generation of Americans more able to draw in the rest of the world, better enabling action against those who wage effective information campaigns against the United States and other democracies.

The warnings conveyed by the preeminent theorists in the field when looking at the unique factors of this war may hold to the extent that they are causing a wider gap between the military and society and the military and policymakers. Given the nature of this war, the disconnect may be unavoidable. But this gap does not necessarily mean that policy and foreign endeavors will fail. It does mean that the gap must be bridged by dialogue, education and examination of old issues in new ways.

Endnotes


2 See article such as Michael Desch’s Foreign Affairs piece, “Bush and the Generals” and the United States Military Academy’s 2007 Senior Conference Report on “Civil Military Relations Fifty Years after The Soldier and the State.”


10 Ibid., 5.


13 Ibid., 440.

14 Burk, 252.

15 Ibid., 251.

16 Betts, 4.


21 General Peter Schoomaker, Testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, December 2006.


23 There are numerous reference to the projected length of the U.S. fight against terrorism. The two here are from speeches by President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

the United States has had in small wars, the new American way of war “eschews the bloody slogging matches of old (to) seek a quick victory with minimal casualties on both sides.” He writes that the old way and the new way combine to make attrition warfare no longer acceptable, while demanding measured, controlled methods.


27 Ibid.


58 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12.


61 Despite the fact that Congress requires and annual report from the Department of State on the GWOT, statistics on actual numbers of incidents of prevented attacks are not available from DoS or the National Counterterrorism Center public sources. Rather, these agencies and others provide examples. See Us Department of State “9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges,” 2006, p.5.


65 Koppel, 3.


