MARITIME SECURITY AND THE STRAIT OF MALACCA:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia is one of the world's most important waterways. Piracy, terrorism, and instability within the region have prompted representatives of global commerce to consider this strait dangerous to shipping. Any major incident could restrict navigation in these waters and have a negative impact on global trade and economy, in particular the economies of Pacific nations. National, regional, and international agreements and initiatives have attempted to address this situation with varying degrees of success. The US, through the US Pacific Command, while participating in many of these agreements, proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to provide a clear set of requirements and capabilities that address maritime security within the region. The RMSI framework correctly identifies the four critical elements necessary for maritime security within the strait. National and international dynamics impact the ability for any and all of these initiatives to achieve success.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most important waterways. Piracy, terrorism, and instability within the region have prompted representatives of global commerce to consider this strait dangerous to shipping. Any major incident could restrict navigation in these waters and have a negative impact on global trade and economy, in particular the economies of Pacific nations. National, regional, and international agreements and initiatives have attempted to address this situation with varying degrees of success.

The US, through the US Pacific Command, while participating in many of these agreements, proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to provide a clear set of requirements and capabilities that address maritime security within the region. The RMSI framework correctly identifies the four critical elements necessary for maritime security within the strait. National and international dynamics impact the ability for any and all of these initiatives to achieve success.
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<td>Air Defence Council</td>
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<td>AMDA</td>
<td>Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Economic Cooperative – (Includes: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, China; Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam.)</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum – (Includes: Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Malaysia as well as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Russia, Papua New Guinea, and the European Union.)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations (Includes: Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Malaysia)</td>
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<td>BN</td>
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<td>CSCAP</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
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<td>Essential Task Matrix</td>
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<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>FLIR</td>
<td>Forward-looking Infrared Imaging Radar</td>
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<td>Five Power Defense Arrangements (Includes: Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.)</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
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<td>IADS</td>
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<td>ISAR/SAR</td>
<td>Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar/Synthetic Aperture Radar</td>
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<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Combating Terrorism</td>
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ReCAAP  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy
RMSC  Regional Maritime Security Cooperation Initiative
RMSI  Regional Maritime Security Initiative
RSAF  Republic of Singapore Air Force
RSN  Republic of Singapore Navy
SAF  Singapore Armed Forces
SAP  Security Assistance Plan
SC  Security Cooperation
S/CRS  Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
STAR  Secure Trade in the APEC Region
TSCP  Theater Security Cooperation Plan
TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
TD  Total Defense
UK  United Kingdom
UMNO  United Malays National Organization
USAID  US Agency for International Development
USPACOM  US Pacific Command
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPNS  Western Pacific Naval Symposium
ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with US law, treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect US interests in the Maritime Domain.

President George W. Bush, Presidential Directive
Maritime Security Policy, 21 December 2004

The tasks of the 21st century . . . cannot be accomplished by a single nation alone.

President George W. Bush, 1 December 2004

Introduction

The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most important waterways. The global importance of this waterway is such that its closure, or even restriction, would severely impact world economies. The strait stretches from Singapore to the Aceh region of Indonesia (see figure 1) and handles over 25 percent of the world’s commerce and over one half of the world’s oil shipping.\(^1\) It is second only to the Strait of Hormuz in the amount of oil alone that passes through its waters, 11.7 million barrels per day in 2004.\(^2\) Other raw materials, such as ore and textile materials destined for factories, as well as the finished goods from those factories, are moved constantly through the strait, impacting the United States’ and other Pacific nations’ economies. The Lloyds Market Association, advisors to the Lloyds of London insurance underwriters, has recently declared the Strait a “war risk zone” based on piracy and terrorism concerns.\(^3\) This declaration may be a bellwether of conditions in the strait and the countries that surround it.
There are over 200 straits and canals throughout the world. Only a few are considered strategic chokepoints for the movement of raw and finished goods. Fewer still are controlled by multiple nations. The confined waters of a strait make the ships that transit them vulnerable to piracy and terrorism. The ability to secure these straits while allowing for innocent passage is exceedingly more difficult in areas where straits are controlled by multiple nations. Straits controlled by a single nation, such as the Bosporous Strait controlled by Turkey, do not require bilateral or multilateral agreements in order to delineate security procedures or security responsibilities. Straits controlled by multiple nations present sovereignty and enforcement issues make security agreements that establish security and enforcement procedures imperative.

According to reporting by the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO), the areas most affected by piracy are the straits controlled by multiple nations in the South East Asian region. In 2004 there were sixty piracy related incidents reported in the Strait of Malacca alone. Reporting for 2005 shows a significant decrease. While there have been cooperative exercises and patrols to address the issue of piracy in the Strait of Malacca, this decrease may be attributable more to the effects of the tsunami disaster in December 2004 as much as to a renewed effort by multinational authorities. During the latter part of 2005 attacks off Indonesian waters actually increased.

An uncooperative political and social environment is the primary impediment to ensuring the freedom of navigation within these waters. The security assets of the nations surrounding the Strait of Malacca are under pressure to combat separatist movements, internal strife, and traditional security missions in addition to the strait’s security, and
have been taxed to their limits. In acknowledgment to the limits of resources, a concerted and cooperative effort is necessary to adequately cover the ungoverned spaces that prove a haven for terrorists whether political terrorist or the industrial terrorists, also known as pirates. Even then, existing resources and protocols may be insufficient to provide the surveillance, reporting, interdiction, and enforcement capabilities required for such an undertaking. In addition to ungoverned spaces, there are areas where sovereign limits are extremely tight and these limits are exploited by these same terrorists. Recognizing every nation’s sovereign rights, legal issues, and security interests, and developing a cooperative effort that respects these, are of vital importance to the region. In 1999 the IMO stated that coastal states should establish the infrastructure and operational arrangements to suppress and prevent piracy. This same document went further to say that the operational agreements and infrastructure established for these purposes should also accommodate the prevention and suppression of other acts of lawlessness, such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism.

An assertion underpinning this study is that legitimate commerce, criminals and pirates, and international terrorist organizations, all use the maritime environment for the movement of goods, people, and money. The United States has an obvious interest in protecting freedom of movement for the first group of users, prosecuting the second, and defeating the third. The first two groups gain only from the unrestricted use of the waterways and would suffer in any incident that restricts movement. The terrorist organizations, however, gain utility from either scenario. However, cooperation in the surveillance and interdiction of lawless actors in the strait addresses both piracy and terrorism.
A significant level of international cooperation has been seen in addressing the financing activities of terrorist organizations. This effort includes leveraging many multinational cooperative agreements in the freezing of terrorist assets, regulatory scrutiny, and capacity building in cooperating nations. Among the organizations engaged in this effort are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperative (APEC) and the Manila Framework Group (MFG). Additionally, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption was adopted in December 2003 to target these same elements. As a balance to the efforts to address the financial and smuggling aspects of terrorist and pirate activity in the region, cooperative security engagement is necessary to ensure the physical safety of the ships using the strait and their ability to do so.

The sheer number of cooperative agreements for combined patrols and cooperative engagement within this region obviate that one more will add nothing. With so many agreements already made, a mechanism designed to leverage all of these established agreements is required in order to provide the robust effort needed to ensure a stable environment. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), also known as the Regional Maritime Security Cooperation (RMSC) initiative, promulgated by the US Pacific Command, is an attempt to forge a framework for combined efforts of the nations affected by lawlessness in these seas.

While the RMSI covers other areas, this study will examine the Strait of Malacca and the nations that form its littoral. The three nations, in particular, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have different scale economies and significant differences in political-economic stability. While security may mean different things to each nation, the impact of the Strait is significant to the furtherance of development within each nation.
The nations that form the littoral of the Strait of Malacca represent a myriad cultural system that make for a virtual minefield of cultural missteps, as well as opportunities. In order to effectively manage the dynamics of differences, it must be understood how historic distrust affects current interactions, realizing that one might misjudge others’ actions based on learned expectations. These states are extremely diverse and, despite sensitivity to sovereignty issues, are amenable to trans-national cooperation. Of the regional areas around the globe, only Africa rivals Southeast Asia in its diversity of political and ethnic makeup.

Each one of these three states has a distinct outlook on its identity, future, goals, and perception of the cultures that surround it. These nations have embraced regionalism rather than regionalization as the preferred method of intraregional cooperation. This construct of regionalism allows these nations to maintain separate identities and sovereignty while allowing for greater cooperation and representation as a group without the homogenization that regionalization promotes. In order to appeal to these divergent elements, the US must exercise a delicate but effective engagement strategy to improve stability for the region and ensure that US, as well as global, interests of freedom of movement conditions remain protected.
The United States’ interest in the region is high. The importance of the strait, or the strait’s region, is illuminated in at least five national-level strategic documents including the US National Security Strategy and the US National Strategy for Maritime Security. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is charged with ensuring strategic goals are met within this region. A large portion of the effort will come from the uniformed services. Competent strategy and execution of influencing capabilities require a thorough understanding of what does and does not wield influence. Evidence demonstrates that what is considered a well thought out strategy can be undone with just one cultural faux pax or even a perceived faux pax. Conversely, a culturally conversant commander has more room for improvisation and a greater chance for successfully influencing targeted audiences. At the strategic level, an understanding of the center or
centers of gravity, and of who has the best opportunity to influence them, is imperative to achieving the US’s regional stability goals.

Strategic communication within the region need to be bolstered in order to ensure the nations involved are comfortable with the US commitment across all of the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure (PMESII) elements. Strategic communication in this sense is the coordinated communications effort of the primary US government strategic information disciplines throughout all national level departments. The primary element for impact from the US armed forces is certainly the military element. However, the US armed forces require competency in areas removed from legacy tasks of influence through kinetic power, and are consistently working in the cultural, informational, and social environments to meet US strategic goals and objectives. This is particularly demonstrated in policy that has brought the US armed forces into nonmilitary roles working with other agencies of the US government in stability and reconstruction operations.

The requirement for interagency cooperation is further highlighted by the US National Strategy for Maritime Security: International Outreach and Coordination Strategy promulgated by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in November 2005. These changes have been precipitated largely because of realities faced by regional military commanders in recent US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to secure stability or victory, the commander must go beyond exercising pure kinetic power and ensure US interests are protected on all fronts. The RMSI is USPACOM’s stated strategy for highlighting the regional dynamics and leveraging elements of US national power to effectively promote stability and security within this area.
Subtlety is not normally associated with the US armed forces, but its requirement for influence in the region and how it effects the employment of US elements of national power cannot be overstated. A key to subtlety is the influence dynamics of second and third-order effects in government-to-government engagement. How the US interacts with government $A$ may lessen its engagement opportunities with government $B$. This may require the US to engage government $C$ in order to engage and affect government $B$. A primary enabler for this is strategic communication. Strategic communication in the exercising of influence dynamics can be applied across the full spectrum of operations in peace and in war.

USPACOM has the responsibility to provide a coherent strategy for the US armed forces in the region that supports and secures US interests. In USPACOM’s attempt at this, RMSI includes four implementing elements required to provide adequate security within an area such as the Strait of Malacca. These elements are: increased situational awareness and information sharing; responsive decision-making architectures, enhanced maritime interception capacity; and agency, ministerial, and international cooperation.

This thesis will be focused to answer the primary question: Does the RMSI framework of implementing elements adequately address the maritime security issues of the Strait of Malacca? In order to answer this question, the following also require answering: What are the interrelational dynamics that promote or impede cooperation among the three nations and the United States? Is the current cooperation among the three nations that comprise the littoral of the Strait of Malacca enough to ensure security and freedom of navigation? Do these three nations have the military capacity to adequately secure the Strait of Malacca? What agreements and initiatives are in place to achieve the
identified RMSI elements? How does US national strategy impact US involvement in the region? What are options for the region that support the security of US interests in the Strait of Malacca?

Methodology

Chapter 1 has laid down the background information as it pertains to the nations that constitute the Strait of Malacca, as well as issues that affect it, in order to provide the basis for US actions in a coordinated security strategy. Chapter 2 will examine national and international outlooks and issues of the three littoral nations as they pertain to the three subject nations and the US, China, and India. Chapter 3 will examine capabilities the three nations have to adequately fulfill the security requirement for the strait. In order to address the regional security opportunities for the region this study will examine the RMSI, other current initiatives, long-standing agreements, outstanding required agreements, and alternatives offered by other states. These will be addressed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will analyze successes, obstacles, and leveraging the opportunities for success. This will include security agreements where cooperation has been significant and outside of maritime security concerns. This study will conclude with a framework leveraging feasible opportunities for success.

Limitations

While there are many nations that are geographically significant or otherwise influence the strait, this study will be limited to the US, the three states that form the littoral, and some discussion about the impact of India and China. However, Australia’s influence on the region cannot be neglected. As a stalwart partner in the development of
the region, they have had mainly a cooperative relationship with all three nations and have been a dialogue partner with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over twenty years. Sensitivity to sovereignty issues caused a setback in relations when, in 2004, Australia announced that it reserved the right to exercise preemptive counterterrorist operations in the region. Both Indonesia and Malaysia took exception to the challenge. An additional hurdle that Australia has endeavored to overcome is the strained relationship with Indonesia created by Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis of the late 1990s.

Counterterrorism has provided a platform for closer cooperation. Indonesia and Australia cohosted a Conference on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in December of 2002 building on a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two countries in February of that year. Australia’s influence on the region is significant, but its inclusion is beyond the scope of this thesis. The discussion will be limited to the three nations and the US, plus a limited discussion of China and India.

Other deep-water straits exist within the area. The Sunda and Lombok Straits can support international shipping. However, these straits are controlled solely by Indonesia and security operations do not require de-confliction of sovereignty issues. Additionally, while these other straits could support global shipping, their use, instead of the Strait of Malacca, would likely force a marginalizing of Singapore and Malaysia by forcing a bypass (see figure 2). The effects of such a marginalization would be devastating to the economies of both of those nations, the Asia-Pacific region, and the global economy. For these reasons this study will be limited to the most significant strait in the region, the
Strait of Malacca. The research and discussion will be limited to unclassified topics to accommodate distribution and discussion.

![Map of Sunda and Lombok Straits](http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2003/00155/images/053.jpg)

**Figure 2. Sunda and Lombok Straits**


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CHAPTER 2
NATIONAL DYNAMICS

It is important that individually and jointly we should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of Southeast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with our own ideals and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny.

Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, August 1967

In this century, countries benefit from healthy, prosperous, confident partners. Weak and troubled nations export their ills--problems like economic instability and illegal immigration and crime and terrorism. America and others . . . understand that healthy and prosperous nations export and import goods and services that help to stabilize regions and add security to every nation.

President George W. Bush, 20 November 2004

In order to effect sound multilateral cooperation called for in the RMSI to promote security of the Strait of Malacca the requirement for cooperation among the three states that form its littoral is imperative. There is ample evidence of cooperation among the three nations, as well as points of competition and conflict. The tumultuous history that surrounds establishment of statehood and the early years of these nations set the conditions for cooperation in security matters with each other, as well as with the US, India, and China. While this history has created an environment for cooperation, competition, and conflict, developments within each nation, both economically and politically, give cooperative efforts among the three a much better prognosis for success.
An examination of the dynamics among the three nations of the Strait of Malacca demonstrates that varying degrees of political and economic growth is present in the Strait of Malacca; the confident and well-established Singapore, the growing and maturing Malaysia, and the emerging power of Indonesia. All three have a stake in each other’s success.

Singapore, with its stable governmental structure and economic strength, is eager for multinational engagement in order to ensure stability within its seaborne economic lifelines. Malaysia, with its recent pragmatic shift in its government, is eager to demonstrate its readiness to more fully integrate into the global economy. And Indonesia, in its economic and political reforms, is positioned to capitalize on its newfound transparency to begin to realize its economic potential. The political evolution within these nations notwithstanding, the varying degrees of growth and stability, when combined with the history, are instrumental in national perceptions of security and in determining each nation’s interests.

The varying levels of economic development are also instrumental in recognizing the diversity in the national interests of each nation. Singapore’s established, global-based economy relies on stability within the region to ensure freedom of navigation within important sea lines of communication, particularly in the Strait of Malacca. Malaysia’s growth toward a globalized economy also requires similar freedom of movement for goods as Singapore. Indonesia, in order to support its economic maturation, will also require stability within the strait. However, more important to Indonesia at the present is internal stability. Achieving internal stability could have the second-order effect of stabilization within the strait. A stable and secure shipping
environment in the strait is imperative to achieving and maintaining economic success for these three nations.

Singapore

Singapore is the most developed of the three and is ranked number one with regard to “Global Integration” by Foreign Policy magazine with an economy rivaling the nations of Western Europe. It is also the smallest geographically. An island city-state at the southern-most entrance to the Strait of Malacca, it covers an area of only 240 square miles, which includes approximately fifty smaller islands. Singapore’s population of approximately 4 million is approximately 70 per cent Chinese but also includes significant Malay and Indian populations. Its major religions are Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Singapore is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral legislature. Even though opposition parties exist, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has been in power since independence from Britain, and subsequently Malaysia, in the early 1960s, and currently holds 82 of 84 parliamentary seats. This monopoly on power is counter to the western idea as a requirement for a prosperous free-market economy. However, it is consistent with the philosophy of Singapore’s longest serving prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.

Lee Kuan Yew, who served as prime minister from independence in August 1965 to November 1990, is widely viewed as the architect of Singapore’s ascendancy to global economic status. Lee Kuan Yew rejected “the notion that all men yearned for democratic freedoms, prizing free speech and the vote over other needs such as economic development. Asian societies,” Lee contended, “were different having evolved separately from the West over the centuries.” Lee also argued, “Notions of absolute rights to
freedom for individuals would sometimes have to be compromised in order to help maintain public order and security.” And finally, “[Singapore] may need representative government . . . to reconcile conflicting group interests in society and maintain social order and stability. Representative government is also one way for a people to forge a new consensus, a social compact, on how a society settles the trade-off between further rapid economic growth and individual freedoms.”

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew, took over in August 2004 from Goh Chok Tong, previously the senior minister to the elder Lee, vowing to increase government transparency. Though no significant changes have occurred in the Singaporean government, internal stability is not an issue as evidenced by its ranking among the 20 most stable nations in the Failed States Index for 2006.

Singapore’s economy has outpaced all other regional economies since separation from Malaysia in 1965, and it has assumed a place of relative envy within the region. A charter member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore joined for the same reasons as Indonesia and Malaysia in 1967. Not only did these states want to deter outside interference as they structured their new nations, but as newly independent states they lacked the political clout to effectively engage the international community economically and sought the collective power of association. Since achieving such phenomenal economic success, Singapore has assumed a more international role independent of ASEAN. However, it has maintained a strong and close relationship with its ASEAN partners.

Singapore’s meteoric rise has been attributed to its heavy investment in the global economic infrastructure and high-end technical and intellectual capital. Considered a
trading post since its beginning, Singapore achieved strategic importance in the early twentieth century and global prominence in the latter part of the century. Its significance to global commerce is comparable to that of New York, London, Hong Kong, and Tokyo and contributes to the Singaporean government’s feelings that it is a prime target for fundamentalist terrorist organizations. With an economy of global prominence, Singapore relies on global access. With that in mind, anything that impedes global access is a threat to national interests.

Singapore has a mixed relationship with Malaysia, one shaped by its shared history prior to 1965, demographic representation issues, and the two nations’ competition for resources. Singapore enjoys a robust economic relationship with Malaysia, as well as significant formal multilateral military ties. However, some distrust exists that is rooted in each nation’s perception of the other’s strategic intentions that inhibits bilateral military collaboration. Central to this is the historical leadership of both nations. The senior Lee, being Singapore’s Prime Minister and prime representative during the unified period, carried with him the issues of racial tensions that inhibited successful unification. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman, and his next three successors were all politically involved in Malaysia in some representative capacity during the establishment of the federation and the inclusion and subsequent exclusion of Singapore.

The “Malaysian Malaya” effort put forth by Rahman’s PAP underpinned the racial and political differences, highlighted by the 1964 race riots between Malays and Chinese populations in Singapore, which led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. While they were able to table many of the reasons for separation, including
constitutional issues, racial inequity and representation, and even personal rivalries,\textsuperscript{17} these were always present in their relationship.

While racial tensions remain a constant underlying theme in Singapore-Malaysian relations, the significant modern issues that affect the relationship between these two nations are natural resources and national boundary disputes. Singapore relies on Malaysia for its fresh water supplies as well as fresh fruits and vegetables. This part of the bilateral relationship became more strained when Malaysia unilaterally called for a renegotiation of the water treaty based on what it argues are unfair terms. This call for renegotiation caused a renewal of acrimony surrounding sovereignty issues in the Johor Straits and Malayan Railways access to Singapore.\textsuperscript{18}

Singapore enjoys formal military ties with Malaysia in the multilateral Five Power Defense Arrangements and the two are proceeding on a multilateral relationship that includes Indonesia and Thailand in the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative mentioned later. However, the two nations do not enjoy the bilateral military relationships that Singapore enjoys with Indonesia.

Singapore views Indonesia as a large and restless giant to its south. Indonesia’s \textit{Konfrontasi} policy with Malaysia (then including Singapore) in the 1960s caused Singapore to view Indonesia with a wary eye. Even though Indonesia rescinded this policy over thirty years ago, the relative political instability within Indonesia, as well as Singapore’s perception that Indonesia is a haven for terrorist organizations, has sustained Singapore’s wariness. Singapore has sought good relations with Indonesia and made significant progress in establishing a working relationship with the former Indonesian President Soeharto during the latter part of his presidency. Since Soeharto’s resignation,
ties have been tenuous with Singapore even bypassing the Indonesian central government and engaging provinces directly in 2001.  

While relationships with the successive Indonesian governments have been strained, the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in August 2004 has breathed new life into cross-strait ties and a better relationship is emerging. Economic aid from Singapore to Indonesia, in order to bolster economic stability and in reaction to the tsunami disaster of December 2004, is the most publicized aspect of this relationship. Bilateral military exercises are not uncommon between Singapore and Indonesia. However, Indonesia’s economic situation has caused a narrowing of focus in the military relationship. These and political relationships exist between the two but are much more discreet and focused on Strait of Malacca security.

Singapore’s relationship with the two regional powers, China and India, has been one of primarily economic balance. With India, Singapore has strengthened its trade relationship over the last two years and recently signed a Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA) encompassing free trade, bilateral investment, double taxation avoidance, and air services agreements. The two did not ignore security as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty was also signed that will assist in prosecuting terrorist organizations and their financiers.

With regard to China, Singapore has worked very hard since independence to ensure it did not become known as the “third China” relative to Mainland China and Taiwan and continues to do so. While engaging China economically in order to capitalize on China’s booming economy, Singapore keeps China at arm’s length when considering security arrangements. China’s adventurism in the region, namely toward the potentially
oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and China’s military buildup, have caused Singapore to view the Chinese with caution, although it is careful not to classify China as a “threat.”

Singapore’s relationship with the United States is close, owing to a multitude of mutual interests. Historically these ties have been primarily economic. The US is Singapore’s second largest trading partner (Malaysia is its largest) and a bilateral free trade agreement that eliminates tariffs between the two was signed in 2003. Upon the closure of US naval facilities in the Philippines, defense ties between the US and Singapore strengthened. The US Navy’s need for a regional partner for the replenishment and maintenance of its ships and Singapore’s desire for a strong US presence in the region led to the building of Singapore’s Changi Naval base on the Johor Straits. This base can accommodate all classes of US warships and allows the US to maintain its forward forces and to house a 600-person naval facility. Singapore has also been a proactive participant in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and has recently signed a cooperative agreement with the US against terrorism and weapons proliferation. With its global economic influence, relatively small size, and nervous outlook on Chinese expansion, it has sought a special relationship with the US to ensure its place in the global framework of nations and as a balance against regional powers.

Malaysia

Malaysia consists of two primary regions: Peninsular Malaysia, which includes the northern littoral of the Strait of Malacca, and western Borneo across the South China Sea in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. During the 1980s and 1990s Malaysia shifted from a primarily agricultural and raw materials based economy to one that also has a
large industrial sector that, while ranking in the middle of global economies, is on an impressive economic growth track.

Post World War II Malaysia was tumultuous, with several political factions jockeying for power while Great Britain strived to reestablish a stable environment conducive to organization of a framework for Malaysian independence that maintained a close relationship with Britain. The predominately Chinese Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was the biggest threat to achieving this goal. Britain set about waging a counterinsurgency operation against the CPM that eventually proved successful. Initial elections were held in 1955, independence granted in 1957, and the Federation of Malaysia came into being in 1959. Malaysia adopted the British form of government with a constitutional monarchy and a bicameral federal parliament.

From the beginning the three primary parties have been the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). These parties are reflective of the ethnic makeup of Malaysia. Roughly one-half of the population is Malay, and 33 and 9 percent of inhabitants are Chinese and Indian, respectively. In order to solidify a government that could preside over such a disparate ethnic background an alliance was required. A formalization of the alliance of these three parties came to being in 1974 and is known as the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front.23 This alliance was able to consolidate power and quiet tensions among its 25 million inhabitants. These tensions have been primarily ethnic in nature between the Chinese and Malays, while the Indian population remains the weakest and poorest group.24 This tension between the Malay and Chinese communities exploded on 13 May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur following the general elections
of 10 May. Poor showings in the election for the status-quo Malayan-dominated political scene resulted in Chinese “victory” celebrations that degenerated into Sino-Malay rioting. Rioting was quelled by declaring a state of emergency and Malaysia was ruled by a National Operations Council for two years.

Upon resumption of Parliament Tun Abdul Razak was installed as Prime Minister replacing Rahman. Peninsular Malaysia remains the power base for Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak under-represented politically. This has been a constant since the start of the Federation. Among the states’ population, ethnic Islamic Malays were keen to join the Federation. However, ethnic Chinese and indigenous Sabah and Sarawak peoples held little affinity for Peninsular Malaya.

The most influential Prime Minister in Malaysia’s 40-plus year history was Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed. Mahatir came to power in 1981 upon the resignation of Malaysia’s third head of government, Prime Minister Hussein Onn. Political turmoil in the federal government was significant during the first six years of Mahatir’s tenure, reaching a boiling point in 1987. After narrowly retaining his seat in 1987, Prime Minister Mahatir set about consolidating his hold on the government. In 1988 he removed the judiciary obstacles by firing or suspending six Supreme Court judges and suppressing opposition media. After consolidating power in the late 1980s, Mahatir provided Malaysia with relatively benign authoritative rule. During the 1980s Mahatir pushed entrepreneurship, primarily in the Malay community. Though politically under-represented, the Chinese always controlled wealth within Malaysia and were a significant portion of the merchant class.
Political unrest reemerged with the Asian economic collapse in the late 1990s. This crisis, coupled with the well-received popular view of Indonesia’s *reformasi* movement, set the conditions for upheaval in Mahatir’s government. Mahatir’s deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, positioned himself to be the champion of reform in anticipation of succeeding Mahatir. The Prime Minister had him jailed and appointed Abdullah Bedawi as Deputy and potential successor.  

During his reign, Mahatir was outspoken and often more nationalistic and less pragmatic in dealing with outside influences. Prime Minister Bedawi, who succeeded Mahatir in 2003, has started his tenure on a more reserved note with a decidedly more pragmatic approach.

Malaysia is also a charter member of ASEAN. As a founding member of ASEAN, Malaysia’s interest in its founding was similar to the others: a new state that was trying to gain its own identity free from outside influence while simultaneously gaining a voice in the international community. Under Mahatir’s leadership Malaysia demonstrated aggressive nationalist tendencies that were manifested in a competitive relationship with Indonesia with regard to leadership within ASEAN and was a consistent source of friction within the association and with its neighbors. An example of this was the surprise proposal by Mahatir of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in late 1990 as an Asian answer to the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and a counterfoil to the Asia-Pacific Economic Committee (APEC) that was perceived as Western dominated. Because no prior discussion with the other ASEAN members occurred, it effectively guaranteed that it would be slowed, if not stopped altogether. This proposal eventually became the ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN plus China,
Japan, and South Korea) forum that was formalized in 1999. Prime Minister Bedawi’s pragmatic leadership, in its pragmatic approach, may well lessen that friction.

Malaysia’s relationship with Indonesia has been difficult with numerous confrontational episodes punctuated with many successful agreements. Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy, declared at the start of the Malaysian Federation’s existence, denied the legitimacy of the Federation and set the tone for early cross-strait diplomacy. The “Confrontation” ended in 1966 after considerable international pressure was placed on Indonesia and the change in leadership from Sukarno to Soeharto. Since then, the two nations have cooperated on the political and economic level.

Border disputes and illegal immigration issues are the primary contentious issues in bilateral relations. Border disputes along numerous areas have been a constant source of friction between the two. Tensions flared in the spring of 2005 off the contested Sipadan and Ligitan islands when Malaysian and Indonesian warships faced off resulting in a collision at sea. Illegal immigration by Indonesian workers into Malaysia is an even more confrontational issue. Of the 1.2 million Indonesian workers, between 650,000 and 850,000 are reported to be illegal. Intermittent expulsions and detentions by Malaysia of these illegal immigrants caused a rise in tension that will likely remain for the foreseeable future. In contrast to their rocky bilateral relationship, Malaysia and Indonesia have a good track record of cooperation in multi-lateral agreements.

Malaysia has had progressively improving relations with India over the past 10 years with only an occasional setback. A deepening economic relationship is especially evident in transportation and information infrastructure. There are no security agreements between Malaysia and India. Like the Federation’s relationship with India,
China is becoming a stronger economic partner as Malaysia tries to position itself to benefit from China’s economic expansion. However, standing disagreements about the Spratly Islands impede any thoughts of security cooperation.

From a security cooperation standpoint, Malaysia has maintained focus on its top priority, Malaysian sovereignty, and voiced the opinion that no non-ASEAN nation has a right to employ security forces in the Strait of Malacca. This assertion has had differing levels of intensity and does not impede intelligence sharing or capacity building. The constant theme is not to do anything that may compromise sovereignty. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tan put it succinctly in 2004; “What is important to remember is that all of these efforts must take into account the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral states. So, we will not do anything which will infringe on this sovereignty.”35

Overall Malaysian-US relations have been good since the birth of the Federation despite frequent anti-Western rhetoric. Malaysia has a robust economic relationship with the US, consistently finding itself on the favorable side of bilateral trade figures, almost tripling over the last ten years.36 Diplomatically, relations had been strained as a consequence of the sour US view of irregular political developments within Malaysia and in particular Prime Minister Mahatir, during the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The events of September 2001, however, caused a shift in US priorities. Full diplomatic cooperation was restored by 2002. These relations were strained again based on disagreements about the US led operation in Iraq. However, the pragmatic Prime Minister Badawi has managed to separate this issue from the overall US-Malaysia relationship and the two nations still enjoy good ties based on mutual interest. Malaysia intends to keep a
strong security relationship with the US that is primarily geared toward antiterrorism, drug trafficking, and training.  

**Indonesia**

Indonesia is the largest and most populous of the three nations. Despite being the least economically developed of the three nations, its size and population ensure that the Indonesians have a major influence on regional politics. Major political reforms, under the concept of *Reformasi*, within the Indonesian government, precipitated by the region’s economic problems of the late 1990s are ongoing and provide a superb opportunity for fostering growth. *Reformasi* has manifested itself in the lessening of restrictions on the press, instituting democratic reforms, lessening of military influence on political institutions, and free-market reforms. However, internal stability issues remain, especially in areas outside the central island of Java.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation and the fourth most populous overall with over 241 million people. It is made up of approximately 17,000 islands but primarily consists of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. The island of Sumatra makes up the southwestern littoral of the Strait of Malacca and internal security issues on the island, and especially the criminal activity in the Riau area of eastern Sumatra along the Strait of Malacca (see figure 3) cause it to be considered a primary source for the piracy threat to the Strait.  

Indonesia’s ethnicity is extremely diverse and is represented by over 300 hundred different languages. The Javanese are the primary power holders within the nation. As stated previously, Islam is the major religion and is practiced by approximately 90 percent of the population. However, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism are also
practiced. The government is democratic and headed by an executive branch with democratic policies reinstituted in 1998 as a result of the *Reformasi* movement. The president of Indonesia is Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who entered office in 2004 on the heels of a hotly contested national election. A primary reason behind his popularity is the “Clean Government” platform on which he campaigned. He has demonstrated he is a champion of “*Reformasi*” and has proved open to improved US-Indonesian cooperation.39

![Figure 3. Sumatra’s Riau Region](source: USACGSC Curriculum A340)

Indonesia’s ascendency to regional prominence occurred during the 1970s within the ASEAN framework. Indonesia first demonstrated leadership in ASEAN in its infancy due to the significant population and military power Indonesia represented. Through the ASEAN framework, Indonesia has been able to broker additional trade and defense agreements in order to further enhance its influence. Indonesia’s ability to consolidate successes impacted the nation in two ways: First, industrialization and participation in the...
modern global economy require a transparent government to encourage investment from outside actors. Second, it makes the nation more susceptible to extra-national economic downturns, such as the collapse of the Thai Baht that precipitated the Asian economic crises of 1997.

The lack of transparency started to impact Indonesia during the late 1980s and was highlighted by a comment from then US Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz about the need for “openness.” This openness, as well as security, is required to attract foreign investment that would help reduce Indonesia’s large unemployment problem. The major economic development seen in Indonesia today is attributable to the transition from authoritarian-rule to a more mature political system that is more inclusive and participatory.

While progress was made in “reformasi” following the resignation of long-time ruler Soeharto in 1998, the political challenges that faced the next two successive governments were compounded by the peaceful transition of power that kept in place the primary governmental infrastructure that existed in the autocratic Soeharto regime. The current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, inherited most of this infrastructure from the intervening presidents. Challenges still ahead for President Susilo lie in the reformation of institutions that were created and manipulated by the Soeharto government and remain in place. To realize full reformation, there remains the need for significant change within the government as a whole. The Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) has been a centerpiece in “reformasi.” Integral to the process of democratic reform is a lessening of the TNI’s influence in political affairs. A major effort has already
occurred and is still ongoing to reevaluate the political portion of the dual-function policies of the TNI and at what level, if any, are these policies still required.42

Relations between Indonesia and the US have historically been good throughout the existence of Indonesia but were strained when the US Congress, in response to Indonesian policy and tactics employed in the formerly Indonesian province of Timor, imposed sanctions on military cooperation with Indonesia. Based upon the progress made in Indonesia’s “reformasi” and the desire to improve relations with Islamic nations, the US began reexamining its policies toward Indonesia. In 2003 the US Congress began the process of removing sanctions and in November of 2005 the State Department lifted the last impediments to military cooperation.43 The major reformation and desire to achieve transparency have been motivators for Indonesia to actively engage in international anti-corruption efforts.

India and China have expended tremendous effort and have made great strides in broadening engagement with Indonesia. India has made significant inroads with regard to defense cooperation with Indonesia since signing a defense cooperation pact in November 2005 and has conducted joint patrols with the Indonesian navy. Economic cooperation between India and Indonesia has been strengthened by trade agreements and Indian investment in Indonesia.44

China has used its strengthening global influence to restore diplomatic ties with Indonesia and is pursuing economic agreements to better its rocky relationship. Since relations with China were re-established in 1990, cooperative trade between Indonesia and China has steadily increased and cooperative oil field ventures have occurred. However, the Spratly Islands have been an issue for ASEAN and China. Indonesia had
played a major role in keeping resolution at a diplomatic level. China attempted to impact that by trying to make Indonesia part of the overall problem. China redrew its territorial limits to include the Indonesian island of Natuna making Indonesia a principal in the Spratly-South China Sea issue. Indonesia responded by holding its largest military exercise since 1996 in the Natuna area. China has since become less vocal regarding claims to the region.

The elements of cooperation, competition, and conflict have permeated the relationships among the three littoral nations since decolonialization. However, there is ample evidence that the multilateral cooperation, consistent with the implementing elements of RMSI, required to provide security within the strait is present. Singapore enjoys a formal cooperative relationship with Malaysia in the FPDA, conflict in the issues surrounding resources and boundaries, and competition when viewed against Malaysia’s growing global economy. While wary of instability issues affecting Indonesia, Singapore is in a primarily cooperative relationship with its southern neighbor on military relationships and with regard to economic aid to assist Indonesia’s internal development. Malaysia has maintained a defiant stance within the region. In addition to the previously stated issues with Singapore, the memories of Konfrontasi combined with immigration and border issues have made Malaysian bilateral relations with Indonesia difficult however multi-lateral relationships inclusive of both countries thrive. And finally, Indonesia’s primary focus is on its internal reformation issues. With these factors in mind, Singapore is in a position to heavily influence relationships within the three, especially with the pragmatism displayed by Malaysia’s Bedawi in furthering Malaysian interests and Indonesia’s desires to move beyond its current situation.


15 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City, The Armed Forces of Singapore (St Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), introduction.


17 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 6.


22 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia.

23 Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford Press, 2001), 273.


27 Ibid., 273-283.

28 *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia*.

29 Ibid.


31 *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia*.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.


38 *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia*. 

32


41 Kingsbury, A Political Profile, 51.


CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

We must ourselves defend Singapore. No one else is responsible for our security. 47

One of the Five Elements of the Singapore National Education Program

Sishankamrata – Universal People’s Defense.

Concept that has shaped Indonesian development and doctrine

The first three elements of RMSI state that a requirement to maintain a secure environment for shipping within the Strait of Malacca is the capability to provide physical security with a credible armed force that possesses adequate enabling capabilities. These capabilities include: first, the ability to conduct surveillance of the affected waters and littoral sanctuaries; second, a cohesive reporting and decision-making mechanism; third, the capability to interdict lawless actors; and fourth, the legal authorities and ability to conduct pursuit in order to enforce national and international law.

The development of defense capabilities is normally in concert with national priorities and perceptions of what each nation considers a threat to its security. The capabilities that each of these three nations possess are consistent with this concept and reflect the national and regional history and each nation’s definition of security.

Singapore

Singapore easily has the most capable armed forces of the nations situated along the Strait of Malacca. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom (UK) and
subsequent de-unification from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has prospered greatly, allowing it the capital to afford a highly technologically capable force. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) originated from the two battalions that were contributed by Singapore as part of overall Malaysian defense. Immediately after Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia these two battalions still participated with Malaysia in exercises and deployments and were even controlled by the 4th Malaysian Infantry Brigade that was headquartered in Singapore. The issue of Malaysian generalship of Singapore’s forces was remedied with the creation of the Ministry of the Interior and Defense (MID) that took over both internal and external defense responsibilities. A program to establish a viable and identifiable defense force was undertaken. However, Singapore did not anticipate providing for its own defense against major external threats. As evidenced by the Five Power Defense Arrangements, Singapore had relied heavily on the UK to maintain its strategic defense. Singapore was surprised in 1971 with the expedited realignment of British defense priorities that pulled the forces of the UK out of distant theaters and closer to home. Singapore subsequently embarked on an ambitious defense plan built on a strategy of diplomacy and deterrence.

The deterrence portion of Singapore’s strategy has matured into the concept of Total Defense (TD). TD has five components aimed at uniting all sectors of society in the defense of Singapore; Psychological Defense, Social Defense, Economic Defense, Civil Defense, and Military Defense. Within the Military Defense component Singapore has built the most technologically capable armed force in the region. Developed to provide a deterrent role, it is not built for sustained long-term operations. The armed forces primarily provide for defense of Singapore from invasion and to provide a significant
operational strike capability designed to bring belligerents back to the diplomatic process.  

Key capabilities applicable to anti-piracy and antiterrorism efforts in the surveillance and reporting mission are found in both the naval and air arms. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) employs four Northrop-Grumman E-2C (Hawkeye) airborne early-warning aircraft that are capable of surface surveillance and the command and control (C2) of intercept units, naval or air, through several data link systems. The RSAF also uses the Fokker 50MPA aircraft for Maritime Patrol duties. The 50MPA is a very capable aircraft for anti-terrorism/anti-piracy duties with Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar/Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR/SAR) and Forward-looking Infrared Imaging (FLIR), as well as C2 data links compatible with E-2C and naval units for intercept control. Additionally, the 121 Squadron of the RSAF has an established relationship with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).  

The RSN is a well-developed naval force employing submarines, stealth frigates, corvettes, and patrol craft, as well as landing and logistics ships. Most suitable for antiterrorism and antipiracy interdiction operations are the eighteen ships of the Lurssen, Victory, and Fearless classes. The RSN is capable of inter-operations with their E-2C and 50MPA aircraft for patrol, intercept, and interdiction of belligerents. However, the Fokker is the only aircraft designated for that role.  

Malaysia  

Malaysia’s Air Force and Navy are small organizations but very capable. Upon gaining independence, the Malaysian armed force’s primary security concern was to complete the counterinsurgency that Britain had successfully brought to a level that the
new nation could handle. Following quickly on the heels of independence was
Indonesia’s confrontation policy that compelled Malaysia to shift its defense focus to its
south and especially east. Both of these threats required a large army, while the navy and
air force were developed as supporting arms. Like Singapore, Malaysia was faced with a
strategic defense gap in 1971 with the British pullback and welcomed the Five Power
Defense Arrangements to alleviate pressure on its new armed forces.\textsuperscript{53}

The Malaysian Air Force is shifting its tactical focus from traditional support for
the Army and Navy to a more central strike and air defense role. The Royal Malaysian
Air Force currently employs the Beech 200TB for maritime patrol duties in support of the
Navy. The Navy may be anticipating taking over this role and securing an organic fixed-
wing maritime reconnaissance capability within the Navy.\textsuperscript{54}

This added capacity could compensate for the lack of an adequate number of hulls
designed for maritime patrol to provide the needed patrol for over 2,000 miles of
coastline. The two distinct missions of maritime security tax the small naval force beyond
its current capabilities. The first being the mission to maintain security for the coastal
areas of peninsular Malaysia, that include the Strait of Malacca. The second is the
forward presence and deterrence mission in eastern Malaysia around northern and
western Borneo and the South China Sea. The Navy is still geared towards its early
threats with a large but antiquated fleet designed to support the Army in an amphibious
assault role and has not yet evolved to assume both of these more modern missions. Only
twelve ships suitable for either of these new missions are less than twenty years old.

Malaysia has commissioned a Maritime Marine Enforcement Agency (MMEA)
that would assume many of the roles the US associates with the Coast Guard. However,
the MMEA currently has more of a command and control function, with surveillance capabilities. No patrol craft have been committed to this new organization that could enforce the nation’s maritime laws, so this part of the mission is given to the Navy and Marine Police in a coordination, vice subordination, role with MMEA. The Marine Police force of Malaysia has a capable inland and coastal waterways fleet of 27 patrol craft and over 120 smaller riverine craft and is charged with law enforcement duties.55 This fleet is also aging and only six of the patrol craft are newer than twenty years.

Indonesia

In Indonesia, the military’s dual function role under Sukarno and Soeharto was instrumental in solidifying the existence of the new state. Even though they had a bellicose period in the early 1960s, the main threat to the state was internal stability. The TNI assumed its “dual function” role to maintaining unity and solidify the nation and its government as one and this required primarily Army forces. This dual function led to a lack of focus against external threats, potential for corruption, and skewed priorities. A significant reform is underway in the armed forces, as in the rest of Indonesian government. The reforms initiated in Indonesia in the late 1990s reached the armed forces in 1999 with the call from the late-Maj Gen Agus Wirihadikusamah, then chief of the strategic reserve, for the TNI to get back to the basics of defending Indonesia.56

These issues, plus the political isolation Indonesia faced because of the East Timor crisis, caused the TNI, especially the naval and air forces, to fall into a state of disrepair. In 2004, naval Chief of Staff Admiral Bernard K. Sondakh testified before parliament that the Navy had approximately 15 percent of the forces necessary to effectively ensure Indonesia’s maritime security.57 While the restoration of military ties
with the US in November 2005 has created the opportunity for Indonesia to have access
to needed parts and expertise, there is much work ahead to bring the Naval and Air fleets
to readiness. While Indonesia possesses the largest armed force of the three principle
nations, because of its lack of material and training readiness, it is the least capable to
carry out adequate maritime security duties in the Strait of Malacca.

There is a marked need to address capabilities shortfalls in order to provide an
adequate physical security environment as defined in the RMSI implementing elements.
Singapore possesses the most capability in surveillance and interdiction mission areas,
but does not have the sovereign right or responsibility to provide security within the strait
itself. However, in its responsibility to protect its national interest it would be consistent
for Singapore to explore all opportunities to maintain this security. Malaysia currently
does not possess the capacity to fulfill its responsibility for strait security while
simultaneously providing adequate security for its extended territories. However,
recognizing this requirement and its applicability to its national interests, Malaysia has
embarked upon a modernization program working within their economic reality that will
provide for the required physical capacity for surveillance and interdiction. Indonesia is
the least capable force for this type of operation. Competing requirements for internal
defense issues still overshadow this mission. However, understanding that continued
economic development relies on the development of this capacity leaves the opportunity
open for other nations and organizations to assist Indonesia in building this capacity.

As a conglomerate, the nations do have the ability to conduct surveillance of the
affected waters and sanctuaries and have the capability to interdict lawless actors. In
addressing the remaining issues of development of a cohesive decision-making
mechanism and establishing the legal authorities and ability to conduct pursuit in order to enforce national and international law these three nations, with Thailand, have established the “Eyes in the Sky Initiative.” This initiative is a ground floor attempt at addressing multilateral standard operating procedures and is explained in chapter four.


48 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 13.

49 Ibid., 24.

50 Ibid., 56-57.


54 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Southeast Asia, Malaysia [database on-line]; available from www8.janes.com/search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/seasu/m; Internet; accessed 18 February 2006.

55 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia.


57 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia
CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The United States will continue to promote development of cooperative mechanisms for coordinating regional measures against maritime threats that span national boundaries and jurisdictions. By reducing the potential for regional conflict, maritime security is enhanced worldwide. The United States will also work closely with other governments and international and regional organizations to enhance the maritime security capabilities of other key nations.

National Maritime Strategy, 20 September 2005

The common goal of RMSI is to develop a partnership of willing nations to enhance capabilities and leverage capacities through unity of effort to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats consistent with existing international and domestic laws.

Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, US Pacific Command, November 2004

The fourth implementing element of RMSI is the agency, ministerial and international cooperation requirement in order to achieve maritime security of the Strait of Malacca. There are numerous international, regional, and multilateral initiatives designed to provide a more secure maritime environment within the Strait of Malacca. While progress was made in agreement within policy and requirements surrounding the security infrastructure of the nations involved, little progress was made in developing a credible and cooperative physical security apparatus. By examining first the RMSI and then the non-governmental conventions followed by international strategic and operational agreements, applicability and opportunity for US engagement can be highlighted.
The central theme of what has become known as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative was first articulated in 2001 in the *Washington Quarterly*. This article, written by Admiral Dennis Blair, then the Commander of USPACOM, and his principal strategic advisor, John Hanley Jr., highlighted the principle central to attaining security in this region. “To develop habits of cooperation,” they wrote, “nations need not be signatories to a treaty alliance. They do not need a common enemy or national threat. They need only shared security interests and the willingness to work together. Nor must all coordination and cooperation involve US participation, and certainly not all will require US leadership, although often nations will desire access to US capabilities.”

USPACOM published the *Strategy for Regional Maritime Security* in November 2004. Implementation of this strategy is led by USPACOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Combating Terrorism (JIACG/CT) in recognition of the need to employ all elements of national power in a concerted effort to ensure US interests in the region are protected. It was incorrectly reported that Admiral Thomas Fargo’s implementation of RMSI meant that US Navy and Marine Corps forces would be deployed to the region to conduct patrols of the Strait of Malacca. One cause for this misperception was Indian and US warships escorting high-value shipping through the Strait of Malacca in 2003. However, without qualification or modification, the primary goal of the RMSI is to build a common, shared regional maritime traffic awareness to secure territorial waters, eliminate safe havens, and create a maritime environment hostile to terrorist activities and other criminal activities. This goal is further defined within the strategy as to develop a cooperative effort of willing nations to identify, monitor, and
As stated previously, there are four implementing elements to the RMSI that would result in operationalizing the effort. They are: Increased situational awareness and information sharing, responsive decision-making architectures, enhanced maritime interception capacity, and finally, agency, ministerial, and international cooperation.

Instrumental to the successful implementation of the RMSI’s four implementing elements is the leveraging of existing agreements and cooperative international organizations. While not limited to these, there were eight specific organizations highlighted: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Security Community (ASC), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

In the nongovernmental arena there is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) that conducts analysis in order to provide governmental leaders with appropriate recommendations. The CSCAP was formally established in Kuala Lumpur in 1993 as a nongovernmental venue to enhance security in the Asia-Pacific region. While representative of the nations and consortiums with interests in or resident in the region, it is considered second tier and not representative of the governments themselves. This allows for flexibility in proposals and discussions without tying any one nation to policy statements. The primary purpose of CSCAP is not to implement actionable programs but to provide intelligent, cooperative, and insightful study in order
to produce security related recommendations to governmental level organizations for consideration.

In December 2004 a reorganization of CSCAP was accomplished and currently there are six active working groups: Capacity-building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Asia Pacific; Future Prospects for Multilateral Security Frameworks in Northeast Asia; Human Trafficking; Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building; and Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region.

Of particular interest to the RMSI is the first working group. Five of the six primary objectives of this working group are consistent with the objectives of RMSI. These objectives are: to refine the notion of capacity in the context of maritime security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; to identify the requirements for effective maritime security cooperation at both the national, subregional and regional levels; to identify weaknesses in the current arrangements for maritime security cooperation and how they might be overcome; to draw on the expertise of CSCAP members in overcoming barriers to effective cooperation and facilitating regional dialogue and awareness; to support links between CSCAP and relevant Track 1 organizations dealing with maritime security, including APEC, the ARF and the IMO. The sixth objective is a consolidated monograph consolidating results of the first five objectives and is due to be published December 2006.62

Also, nongovernmental, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a consortium of those with the economic
interests in the Strait of Malacca. The IMB was established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. Through investigative efforts and associations with other international crime-fighting agencies the IMB recognizes new criminal trends and advises member nations of emerging criminal threats. This has been primarily associated with world customs organizations. However, in 1992 the IMB opened a piracy-reporting center in Kuala Lumpur. The primary goal of this center is to act as central agent in analyzing piracy incidents and working with national governments to reduce their vulnerability. Not a government sponsored agency, 25 sponsors with a vested interest in anti-piracy measures made up of Protection and Indemnity clubs, ship owners, and insurers provide funding for the center.

At the international, governmental, level is the IMO that provides international legitimacy to governmental efforts in securing the waterways. The IMO, conceptualized and established under the United Nations in 1948 and launched in 1958, is designed to "to provide machinery for cooperation among governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships." While engaged in a myriad issues regarding the international maritime environment, the IMO lends international legitimacy to anti-piracy efforts in the Strait of Malacca. Of particular interest is the IMO endorsement of the Japanese initiative, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP). ReCAAP is an Asian-focused agreement involving ASEAN, China, Japan, India, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.
aimed at combating piracy and other crimes against shipping. The focal piece of this effort is the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center used to facilitate shipping related communications between member countries.67

The largest multinational governmental organization for cooperation within the Pacific region is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperative (APEC). APEC was established in 1989 to promote economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region and is primarily geared toward free-trade principles. Recognizing that security is integral to economic growth, a fact underscored by the September 2001 attacks in the US, APEC broadened its agenda to include security. In October 2002 APEC endorsed the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative. STAR represents APEC’s policy related efforts to work within supply chains to ensure they are safe and facilitate the movement of legitimate goods and persons. STAR has grown incrementally since the first STAR conference in February 2003. The first conference concentrated on the secure movement of goods through container security and tracking initiatives. The second conference in Chile in 2004 brought maritime and aviation security to the forefront with regards to the movement of persons. Additionally, the Chilean conference introduced measures to combat terrorist financing. The third STAR conference, held in Korea in February 2005, continued to address maritime and aviation security but also addressed policy implications for any future STAR initiatives.68

ASEAN is the organization with the most at stake in a cooperative security arrangement for the region. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are all three charter members of this organization that came into being as a cooperative economic relationship mechanism. Many of the same reasons for starting ASEAN, to include economic security
and inhibiting extra-ASEAN nations from exercising undue influence on the sovereignty of member nations, also exist when addressing trans-national threats, such as piracy and terrorism. However, ASEAN has historically found its utility in maintaining cooperative relations within its member nations and has primarily been engaged in confidence building activities.\footnote{69}

In recognition of the impact of globalization on the region, in 1994 ASEAN created a spin-off organization, the ARF, in order to broaden ASEAN dialogue within the Asia-Pacific region.\footnote{70} The ARF’s initial aim was to provide a forum for non-ASEAN nations and organizations when working with ASEAN. Like its parent, and exacerbated by the lack of institutional framework, the ARF also provided little more than a forum for meetings and confidence building measures.\footnote{71} Since 2004 there has been a concerted effort to strengthen the ARF through the establishment of a standing organization with a designated chair, manned by ASEAN and member nation officials. This fortified organization has already proven useful in furthering nonproliferation initiatives by both the US and China. The ARF has also been the mechanism that allowed the opportunity for the US to conduct workshops on regional maritime security cosponsored by Malaysia and Indonesia.\footnote{72}

A second proposal born of ASEAN is an August 2005 proposal for the defense ministers of ASEAN to convene a meeting to discuss regional security issues. ASEAN has traditionally avoided the topic of defense alliances and normally stayed within the economic parameters it was based on. Malaysia has initiated this proposal based on the fact that the topic of regional security, especially within the ASEAN area, has been on the agenda at other, broader, regional forums. No alliances or defense pacts appear to be on
the horizon based on this proposed meeting but it will offer a more robust confidence building measure. The Head of the Department of Political Science in the International Islamic University Malaysia, Wahabuddin Ra’ees, contends the importance of such a meeting is that it would enable ASEAN countries to talk to each other on defense and security-related issues in a more transparent way to create better understanding on sensitive issues and problems between them.73

Actionable initiatives originating from APEC, however ASEAN focused, and of specific importance to taking steps in concrete efforts to operationalize security within the strait, are APEC’s initiatives surrounding the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) established in February 2003. The primary responsibility of the CTTF is monitoring and facilitating the implementation of STAR initiatives as well as monitoring other regional initiatives that address terrorist and piracy concerns.

In Busan, South Korea, in 2005, the CTTF of APEC established an aggressive counterterrorism program that provided for joint reporting, cooperative prosecution, and a funding site through the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for capacity building of the underdeveloped Asian nations.74 Integral to the implementation of this program is the Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP) reporting system. Through the CTAP individual nations can monitor their and other nations’ progress in the implementation of agreed counterterrorism measures. APEC, or more specifically CTTF, can also monitor and gauge where a concentrated level of effort is required in order to meet specified goals.

Another viable multilateral governmental organization applicable to security within the region in which Singapore and Malaysia participate is the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA). Though not specifically addressed in the RMSI, the FPDA warrant examination with regard to RMSI. These arrangements came into being as an evolutionary process from the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA), later renamed the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement of 1957. This bilateral agreement recognized that the UK would be the principal provider of security for Malaya and later for the newly independent Malaysian Federation. The AMDA was sufficient, with Commonwealth forces based in Butterworth and Singapore, to provide a balance of power that enabled Malaysia the freedom to solidify their position as a sovereign nation in face of Indonesia’s Konfrantasi policy.

Indonesia’s confrontation policy with Malaysia was no longer pursued after 1966. However, the United Kingdom had decided to pull out its military forces “east of Suez” by 1967. In order to mitigate the impact of this decision, the AMDA transitioned to the FPDA and this was formalized in 1971. These arrangements were seen as a hedge against any potential “power vacuum” the withdrawal of British forces might create. Because of Singapore and Malaysia’s mutual distrust of each other, Australia became the lead nation in the FPDA effort.

Operationalizing the FPDA occurred in the founding of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The IADS effort of FPDA, under the command of an Australian Air Force Vice-Marshal, matured to include deployment bases in Malaysia at Butterworth as well as in Singapore. This maturation also included mechanisms to ensure compatibility of IADS software and command and control capability. Leadership and management of the FPDA have also evolved. The two governing structures of the FPDA, the Joint Consultative Council (JCC) and the Air Defence Council (ADC), have evolved into the
FPDA Consultative Council (FCC). The FCC’s purpose is to manage the efficiency of the IADS and more importantly to explore ways to expand the scope, level, and efficiency of FPDA exercises.\textsuperscript{80} This has resulted in a much more robust exercise program and significant changes to the structure of the organizations participating entities. Exercises have expanded beyond solely conventional air defense to asymmetric and non-conventional threats such as terrorism and piracy. In order to support this effort participants now include air, naval, and land components. This expansion resulted in changing IADS to be an Integrated \textit{Area} Defense System vice an Integrated \textit{Air} Defense System.\textsuperscript{81} The first exercise to encompass this expansion was \textit{Bersama Lima 04} in September 2004 and included 31 warships from the five nations of the FPDA.\textsuperscript{82}

When viewed from a capability standpoint the FPDA could be a formidable organization to participate in security efforts aimed at securing the Strait of Malacca, and indeed it is participating in an overall security perspective. However, political sensitivities and the relative comfort within its member nations regarding its current construct inhibit major reformations that would expand its membership or charter.\textsuperscript{83}

Finally, most specific to physically securing the strait’s maritime environment with regard to piracy and anti-terrorism, the nations along the Strait established joint patrolling procedures using available assets and entered into a non-codified arrangement that includes Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and added Thailand for joint patrols of the Strait of Malacca. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia commenced joint patrols of the Straits in June 2004. However, no coordinated surveillance mechanism, or more importantly, authorities for pursuit were in place. Coincidently, the Shangri-La dialogue of the third International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Conference,
which included discussion of the RMSI, was the platform to announce the “Eyes in the Sky Initiative.” This proposal was announced by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Najib Tun Razak at the June 2005 conference and included Thailand as a participating nation. While a start was made at cooperative surveillance among the three principal nations and Thailand in the joint tracking center in Batam, Indonesia, a more robust and formalized program was called for.\textsuperscript{84}

The first such patrol under the auspices of “Eyes in the Sky” was conducted in September 2005. The concept of this patrol is the division of the Strait into sectors that the nations involved will patrol no less than twice per week. The Maritime Patrol Aircraft assigned to patrol duties under “Eyes in the Sky” would include observers from all of the nations and would report suspicious contacts to Monitoring and Action Agencies (MAA) located in each country for appropriate action.\textsuperscript{85}

An important aspect to these joint patrols is that Deputy Prime Minister Razak did not discount participation by non-regional nations in realizing security in the Strait. He highlighted the importance of contributions other nations could make in the capacity building of the principal nations.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, Deputy Prime Minister Razak has stated that these patrols are the first of a multi-phased program and could involve the international community at a later stage.\textsuperscript{87}

**US Engagement**

While little attention has been paid to the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), Security Assistance Plan (SAP), and US Embassy Mission Performance Plan pieces of the RMSI, they are likely the most important avenues for progress within the initiative as it attempts to operationalize the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
International cooperative efforts by the US government have traditionally been conducted within the different channels of the departments that sponsor them with only limited cross-planning. There are four programs that are instrumental in international security cooperation. Department of Defense is responsible for Security Cooperation and Joint Training while Department of State is responsible for Mission Performance and Security Assistance plans. Recognizing this impairment to unity of effort, during a workshop to discuss Theater Security Cooperation in November 2004, a specific point was made of the requirement for synchronization of RMSI with the Joint Training Plan, the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the Security Assistance Plan, and the US Embassy Mission Performance Plans.

At the national level, the National Military Strategy (NMS) tasks the US armed forces with engaging in Security Cooperation (SC) in order to establish important military interaction, building trust and confidence between the United States and its multinational partners. Further, SC is to complement other national-level efforts to prevent conflict and promote mutual security interests. Finally, these activities are to encourage nations to develop, modernize, and transform their own capabilities contributing to stability in key regions. While SC is military in the nature of activities, the third strategic principle in the NMS is integration; focusing on fusing and synchronizing military operations among the services, other government agencies, the commercial sector, nongovernmental organizations and those of partners abroad.

Complementing this is Department of State’s strategy that directs that department to leverage its diplomatic resources and influence, while coordinating closely with other components of the US government, to promote and enhance close cooperation among
sovereign nations, international and regional organizations, and the maritime private sector to enhance global maritime security. This strategy is one of eight that complement the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). Two important pieces that drive the strategic actions of the NSMS are that the need for a strong coalition of nations is highlighted by no single nation having control of the maritime domain and the requirement that seamless coordination and employment of all elements of national power consistent with international law is necessary in order to accomplish this security.

The NSMS recognizes the difficulty in interagency coordination needed to implement a coherent and broad national effort in securing the maritime domain and even takes pains to ensure departmental authorities within the US government are not impeded. Imperative to attaining a unity of effort while maintaining delineations within authorities, a planning mechanism is required that addresses the interagency process. In an attempt to reconcile the difficulties of inter-agency coordination, at an authoritative and operational level, the Department of State and the Joint Warfighting Center of the US Joint Forces Command have published the US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation. This work is a planning tool to address interagency coordination for preconflict and postconflict situations and to facilitate decisions on sequencing of US and international activities.

Internationally there are a multitude of initiatives and declarations that demonstrate the importance the international community places on the Strait of Malacca. Some of these initiatives have been more dynamic in their application but all have resulted in higher visibility and commitment. There are conceptual organizations, such as
CSCAP and implementing organizations, such as APEC’s CTTF. International law and sovereignty issues are addressed through the IMO and ASEAN’s ARF. And finally, operational protocols are being initiated through “Eyes in the Sky.” With these, the mechanisms are in place to realize implementation of a coherent security posture for the Strait of Malacca.


59 Sheldon W. Simon, “U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations: Elections, Unrest, and ASEAN Controversies” (Research Paper presented to Arizona State University – circa 1st quarter 2005), 68. Author incorrectly states that RMSI was modified in face of Malaysian and Indonesian objections to direct US patrols.


61 “About CSCAP,” CSCAP [article on-line]; available from http://www.cscap.org/about.htm; Internet; accessed 5 March 2006.

62 “Study Group for Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” CSCAP [article on-line] available from http://www.cscap.org/SG%20MARITIME.htm; Internet; accessed 4 March 2006. The six objectives of the working group are: to refine the notion of capacity in the context of maritime security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; to identify the requirements for effective maritime security cooperation at both the national, sub-regional and regional levels; to identify weaknesses in the current arrangements for maritime security cooperation and how they might be overcome; to draw on the expertise of CSCAP members in overcoming barriers to effective cooperation and facilitating regional dialogue and awareness; to support links between CSCAP and relevant Track 1 organizations dealing with maritime security, including APEC, the ARF and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); and to produce an edited monograph(s) and a report for consideration by the CSCAP Steering Committee that might include a proposed CSCAP memorandum for sending forward to relevant Track 1 organizations.


64 Ibid.


68“Secure Trade in the APEC Region,” APEC, available from http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism/secure_trade_in_the.html; Internet; accessed 3 February 2006.


71Cohen, 49.

72Ibid.


74“Counter Terrorism,” APEC, available from http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism.htm; Internet; accessed 3 February 2006.

75Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 2.


78Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 8.

“Dire Straits,” *Military Technology* 29 no 3 (March 2005): 44.

Dr. Khoo How San, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain’t Broke…,” 1.


George W. Bush, President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2005) 20. While the strategy highlights the need for full alignment with appropriate State and local agencies, it gives the lead to four different departments; the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State.


Ibid., 7.


What appears out of place in context of the document to the author is the following: “This Strategy does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of the department and agency heads, including their authorities to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive information. It does not impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President and Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures.”

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The amount of international attention that has been paid to security within the Strait of Malacca demonstrates the importance of these waters to the global community. Global and regional international organizations, as well as nongovernmental and commercial organizations, have responded to the threats of terrorism and piracy within the strait with a plethora of proclamations, endorsements, research, and observable actions. These have included initiatives aimed at awareness, lessons learned, best practices, and finally, capacity building. Within the realm of capacity building, one of the actions most applicable to RMSI is the reporting mechanism established under APEC’s Counter-Terrorism Task Force CTAP program as well as its parent, CTTF. Singapore has participated fully and has documented its ability to contribute heavily to the physical security of the straits. While Malaysia has not participated to the same extent as Singapore and Indonesia, their participation has highlighted areas of relative importance to Malaysia and their ability to confront certain aspects of security within the strait. Most illuminating is Indonesia’s forthright documentation of progress and outstanding requirements. Their reporting is consistent with statements regarding the need for a more robust law enforcement capability to include training as well as infrastructure. The CTTF has also put into place mechanisms for addressing shortfalls through the ADB.

According to the United Nations’ IMO, the three nations that form the littoral of the Strait of Malacca bear the ultimate responsibility for its security. These three nations recognize this responsibility. However, they also recognize the disparate
capabilities and differing security requirements among each other. To normalize this they have developed a credible surveillance, reporting, and patrol regime that has evolved into the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative and has incorporated the capabilities of Thailand, an ASEAN member nation.

In addition to addressing the issue of capabilities to ensure the physical security of the straits, economic and governmental reforms as well as economic aid, particularly in and for Indonesia, will largely contribute to curbing the internal instability that fosters a favorable environment for pirates and terrorists alike. Efforts, such as these, are not restricted to ASEAN member nations and present an opportunity for engagement by nations outside ASEAN. Proactive and coordinated activities in this realm would also set the stage for a more active role by non-ASEAN nations in the physical security aspect as opportunities for that role mature.

These opportunities for nations outside of ASEAN to participate will likely manifest as the three nations, still hypersensitive to perceived sovereignty issues, continue to broaden bilateral relationships without the traditional suspicions generated during their early periods as nation-states. All three nations are entering into second generation and later leadership with influential personalities that were not part of the turbulent early years of statehood. Issues that were contentious during the formative years may well be relegated to history. This is evidenced by the maturing relationships these nations are building with each other. Traditionally, these nations have used multilateral platforms to address issues that are now being addressed bilaterally. Because of this, the multilateral role has been able to mature into cooperative security and economic platforms vice conflict resolution. This maturation has been demonstrated through ARF,
ASEAN+3, and ASEAN Defense ministers meetings, as well as the efforts brought about during the Shangri-La Dialogues.

The United States, because of the interest to its economy, and its role as a world leader, plays a vital role in establishing a secure environment in this region. The US Pacific Command is ultimately responsible to the US government for maintaining security of US interests in this region. USPACOM’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative has been a bold attempt to organize and formalize Admiral Blair’s philosophy for the region. Analyzing progress in relation to the four implementing elements provides insight into the goal of a cooperative security effort.98

Increased situational awareness and information sharing, fused information shared among governments that will facilitate border security and cue effective responses to maritime threats. While not complete, efforts realized under ReCAAP, the IMB, and most importantly the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative have addressed this element. All of the nations involved have an airborne maritime patrol capability with differing degrees of data management and dissemination capabilities. Interoperability within their own forces, much less the forces of the other nations, is an outstanding capability shortfall. The United States contributes to mitigate this shortfall through training and exercises that develop the surveillance techniques required for situational awareness.

Responsive decision-making architectures, that will use standardized procedures to support timely responses and cooperation against emerging threats. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have established a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that allows for pursuit, to include pursuit into national waters. However, interdiction is not included in this SOP. There is no evidence that this SOP has been
tested. However, interdiction and pursuit are not without precedence. In December 2004, Indonesian authorities captured pirates after the pirates had taken a Singapore-registered tug-boat. The interdiction and re-capture of the ship was taken without bloodshed and the vessel was returned to its Singaporean owners.99

The MAAs instituted as part of the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative should play a central role in this element. Surveillance and reporting being done by a multinational crew to reporting centers located in each of the subject nations provides the opportunity for timely decision-making that would facilitate interdiction or even prevention of incidents. This will need regular practice and, more importantly, the capability to adequately perform interdiction.

**Enhanced maritime interception capacity**, that will facilitate each nation taking effective action, as it deems appropriate. Arguably the most identifiable shortfall with regard to maritime security within the strait is the lack of required assets to perform patrol and interdiction. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have an identifiable gap between assets available and assets required in order to adequately patrol their expansive coastal areas while simultaneously providing adequate maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. As mentioned previously, APEC’s CTTF has mechanisms in place to address maritime patrol duties in the areas at risk for piracy and terrorism. US Foreign Military Sales, and Foreign Internal Defense programs provide opportunity for US involvement in capacity building. This element, along with the previous two, would operationalize security cooperation within the Strait of Malacca. This operationalizing of the security apparatus is defined as a degree of cooperation in which policies addressing common threats can be carried out by midlevel officials of the states involved without immediate or direct
supervision from strategic-level authorities. Consultation and information sharing between security ministries are examples of cooperation whereas the data assessment and intelligence briefing by combined teams of analysis would involve operational cooperation. Further, the ability to pursue and interdict/apprehend offenders, irrespective of national boundaries, by a combined task force based upon the Standard Operating Procedures established by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in December 2005 is a significant step in attaining an adequate operational environment for achieving maritime security in the Strait.

Agency, ministerial and international cooperation, under existing international and domestic laws, that is essential to synchronize all elements of regional capability. This element is the most difficult to assess. The sheer magnitude of multinational effort and strategic level attention that has been focused on this region underscores the global community’s desire to attain and maintain stability in this region. International and multinational organizations have been proactive in establishing cooperative efforts at the strategic level and are making progress in developing cooperative instruments that allow for functional progress among nations.

By examining progress in relation to the four implementing elements of the RMSI it is apparent that actions called for are occurring with varying degrees of success. Does this mean RMSI is successful? The answer to that is probably not in its entirety. The initiation of the RMSI may very well have been the catalyst needed to move security efforts in the region beyond the conversation stage into observable and concrete action. However, the intentions that other nations engage under the auspices of RMSI have not been realized. Sensitivity to perceived overt extra-regional presence in the straits, coupled
with the hypersensitivity to sovereignty issues, has caused regional nations to be reluctant in acceptance. Simultaneously, these nations have recognized the utility of the elements of RMSI and are working to address the milestones that it lists.

Does this mean the RMSI is redundant and useless? Absolutely not. The RMSI is a recognizable effort at addressing USPACOM planning for the straits region based on available ways and means and outside the construct required from a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) construct. The JSCP does not adequately take into account the trans-national threat of both piracy and terrorism. Therefore, planning towards these two threats requires innovative planning ideas highlighted by RMSI. Nor does the JSCP account for precrisis operations that are the primary area for countering these two threats.

Operating in a precrisis environment requires coherent interagency cooperation in order to bring to bear all elements of national power to achieve a common goal or end-state. As stated previously, RMSI attempts to envelope this requirement by prescribing a synchronization of interagency programs within the US Government. This prescriptive was ahead of its time. Since publication of the RMSI the US Government has recognized this need for interagency effort, especially in the wake of US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the establishment of State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the subsequent interagency planning document *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation* mentioned previously, there now exists a non-ad hoc framework for interagency planning.

An area for further research is the applicability of this interagency planning tool. This document, together with its Essential Task Matrix (ETM), is intuitively geared for
postconflict interagency cooperation. However, many of the same elements required for postconflict operations are likewise imperative in pre-conflict stabilization. Evolution of RMSI into a planning construct based on this interagency planning document would provide a much more comprehensive effort at attaining stability within the Strait of Malacca region. By translating and expanding the goals of RMSI to equate to Major Mission Elements (MME) in the strategy development level of planning would give opportunity to address security related issues beyond the physical security aspect of surveillance and interdiction. These MMEs generate tasks that would then be addressed by agency led actions. Actions such as “Alternative Income” programs by the Department of State’s US Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Riau (Sumatra)-region inhabitants would contribute to security by lessening the impact of a more stringent physical security posture. These actions would be nested with programs, such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID), through US Embassy country teams and Department of Defense cooperative programs and exercises. Encapsulating activities, such as US counter terrorism training and capacity efforts, which have implications in both counterterror and antipiracy efforts, that were provided to the TNI and the national police, as well the schools initiative announced by President Bush, would be aligned under a central national effort.

Staying true to the concepts put forth by Admiral Blair, and the organizational effort and vision provided by Admiral Fargo, the RMSI is a viable planning and actionable initiative. Through understanding regional impediments to another international security regimen, as well as attempting to tackle US interagency coordination issues, RMSI may finds its future more fitting as a US intranational
cooperation initiative vice an international one. Additionally, RMSI is well suited to evolve as a tracking tool to maintain US Government, vice international, visibility on actions taken by all principals in the region in order to more accurately identify opportunities for engagement by US agencies.

96“Counter-Terrorism Action Plans,” APEC [article on-line]; available from http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter-terrorism/counter_terrorism_action_plans.html; Internet; accessed 8 April 2006.

97Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, MSC/Circ 622/Rev 1.


GLOSSARY

Barisan Nasional. National Front – The moniker for the formalization of the three main political parties of Malaysia in order to form a functioning government.

Dual-Function. Indonesian concept of operation for the Indonesian armed forces that put the armed forces not only in a defense role, but also a political role.

Enforcement. The ability to exercise interdiction and retention of suspected criminal elements within authorities established by national decision makers.

Engagement. A cooperative event between two governments or subordinate agencies.

Interdiction. To stop or arrest an intended unit keeping it from its intended progress.

Konfrantasi. Indonesia’s bellicose policy towards Malaysia that denied the legitimacy of the Malaysian government. This policy was ended in 1966.

Marginalization. To make insignificant.

Operationalize. To move beyond discussion and policy in to performance of measurable actions.

Reformasi. Political movement in Indonesia causing a reformation of the military, opening of the press, and reformation of the government.

Regionalism. Identifying with a particular geographic region

Regionalization. A limited merging of national identities based on shared national cultures and interests.

Reporting. The act of passing on actionable intelligence to appropriate decision makers and interdiction forces.

Surveillance. The ability to monitor and classify units of interest for follow-on reporting and interdiction.

Transparency. The act of operating in an open, non-secretive, environment.


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