The Department of Defense acknowledged the importance of language and cultural expertise with the approval and dissemination of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in February 2005 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 in November 2005. Both documents fall short of establishing an all-encompassing and prescriptive approach for harnessing the power of comprehensive regional expertise. Nevertheless, this recognition sets the conditions for establishing a military force that can proactively influence people, gain trust and confidence, and facilitate peace and stability while maintaining the ability to conduct war. It is vital for today’s United States Army professional to develop, train and maintain language and cultural expertise analogous with other fundamental soldier skills. As the United States continues to compete with multiple state, non-state, regional and internal stakeholders to secure positive influence over people and finite resources, and to prevent instability around the globe, it is imperative that the United States Army develop, integrate and maintain comprehensive regional, linguistic and cultural expertise.
Title of Monograph: Comprehensive Regional Expertise in the United States Army

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Abstract

COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL EXPERTISE IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY by LTC Gregory C. Meyer, U.S. Army, 47 pages.

The Department of Defense acknowledged the importance of language and cultural expertise with the approval and dissemination of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in February 2005 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 in November 2005. Both documents fall short of establishing an all-encompassing and prescriptive approach for harnessing the power of comprehensive regional expertise. Nevertheless, this recognition sets the conditions for establishing a military force that can proactively influence people, gain trust and confidence, and facilitate peace and stability while maintaining the ability to conduct war. It is vital for today’s United States Army professional to develop, train and maintain language and cultural expertise analogous with other fundamental soldier skills. As the United States continues to compete with multiple state, non-state, regional and internal stakeholders to secure positive influence over people and finite resources, and to prevent instability around the globe, it is imperative that the United States Army develop, integrate and maintain comprehensive regional, linguistic and cultural expertise.
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INTRODUCTION

Considerable debate among today’s military leaders and political policy makers concerning the military’s participation in nation building or stability and reconstruction operations provokes intense feelings about the way ahead. Should the military conduct these types of operations or should it win in combat, quickly depart the battlefield and consent to other organizations executing stability and reconstruction operations? What is the name of that force? Who is responsible for it? History firmly answers these questions because no other organization can effectively do it alone and the United States military has always played a key, if not the lead, role in stability and reconstruction operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005, defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions;” and Military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) as “Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans from stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interest.”1  SSTR operations are nothing new to the U.S. military and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 clearly states that SSTR operations are a core mission for the military.2

From the Frontier Regulars who cultivated the American frontier in the 19th century until the present day volunteer soldiers who work toward stability around the world, the United States Army has participated in numerous operations across the spectrum from peace to high intensity conflict. Most of these conflicts included stability, and reconstruction operations. Since the

2 Ibid, 2.
Second World War, the United States Army has relied on a small group of military professionals, Foreign Area Officers, Special Forces and Intelligence Organizations, to provide institutionalized linguistic and cultural expertise. This economy of force approach allowed the majority of regionally trained soldiers to focus on the Soviet sphere of influence and the threat of high intensity conflict, but proved inadequate when dealing with the cultural complexities of the more frequently occurring SSTR operations. It is impossible to predict the next conflict or area of instability with precision and the U.S. Army must always stand ready to react on a moment’s notice. However, a linguistically and culturally trained regionalized force potentially provides a proactive capability that can prevent instability or more effectively bring about stability after hostilities, while always ready to apply force when necessary.

The Department of Defense acknowledged the importance of language and cultural expertise with the approval and dissemination of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in February 2005 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 in November 2005. Both documents fall short of establishing an all-encompassing and prescriptive approach for harnessing the power of comprehensive regional expertise. Nevertheless, this recognition sets the conditions for establishing a military force that can proactively influence people, gain trust and confidence, and facilitate peace and stability while maintaining the ability to conduct war. It is vital for today’s United States Army professional to develop, train and maintain language and cultural expertise analogous with other fundamental soldier skills. As the United States continues to compete with multiple state, non-state, regional and internal stakeholders to secure positive influence over people and finite resources, and to prevent instability around the globe, it is imperative that the United States Army develop, integrate and maintain comprehensive regional, linguistic and cultural expertise.
CHAPTER ONE

AN ARMY LEGACY OF STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

The Early Years Close to Home: 19th Century Army SSTR Operations

Throughout its history, the U.S. military has conducted and participated in more SSTR operations than mid-to high-intensity conflicts. As Max Boot points out in his book *The Savage Wars of Peace*, the U.S. Marines participated in at least 180 foreign incursions between 1800 and 1934, and the majority of these included SSTR operations. The U.S. Army ventured little from the North American continent during the 19th Century because the U.S. Government principally employed it against Native American tribes while expanding America’s frontier. This expansion also included continuous and demanding SSTR operations, giving the U.S. Army considerable experience campaigning in foreign and culturally diverse North American regions.

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The Mexican War in 1846 was the U.S. Army’s first relatively large-scale conflict on foreign soil. In addition to a short-lived SSTR operation in Mexico City, the United States reaped considerable territories from Mexico including formal recognition of the Rio Grande as the official border between the U.S. and Mexico, and the territories of New Mexico and California. These new territories required substantial attention and the U.S. Army became fully engaged in exploring, developing and stabilizing them before and after the American Civil War. The new acquisitions also became catalysts for continued conflict with Native Americans as settlers moved west, and for internal strife as politicians passionately debated whether New Mexico and California would be free or slave territories.

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The aftermath of the American Civil War proved to be a massive SSTR effort for the Union Army. From 1865 to 1877, the reestablished U.S. Army played an integral role in rebuilding and reintegrating the Confederate States into the United States. It is important to note that the post-Civil War reconstruction experience did present subtle cultural challenges between the occupiers and the occupied; however, in this example, the lack of language and cultural expertise were not a barrier to gaining the trust and confidence of the people of the former Confederate States. On the other hand, the Mexican War and its aftermath encompassed foreign SSTR experience for most U.S. Army regulars and the dynamics of culture played an influential role in the campaign. Spanish was the language of Mexico and the culture was a conglomeration of the dominant Mexican Roman Catholic Church and the left over tribal cultures of the original Native Americans, while English was the spoken language of the U.S. Army and Protestant denominations were the principal religions. These differences and the U.S. Army’s inability to effectively bridge the cultural gap played a role in an incomplete SSTR operation, but it was a momentous experience for the first generation of professional U.S. Army leaders. Regardless of the Mexican War experience, only half of the U.S. Army’s general officers posted to serve in the post-Civil War occupation army had any SSTR experience. In addition, none of the senior level correspondence from the War Department to the southern occupation commanders referred to any lessons learned from the Mexican War. The failed opportunity to apply lessons learned from the Mexican War experience during post-Civil War occupation revealed an early U.S. Army cultural tendency for forgetting and resulted in a considerably long period of instability in the southern States.

Nineteenth Century military operations created a dilemma for the U.S. Army. From its experiences during the Mexican War and the early part of the American Civil War, the U.S. Army established General Order 100 on 24 April 1863, which was essentially a detailed law of war document. General Order 100 encompassed 157 Articles that included guidance on martial law, public and private property, protection of persons, punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries, deserters, prisoners of war and partisans. In unison with the principles of international law, the foundations of this order directed that “an occupier had a moral obligation to protect the people under its control from undue hardship and to provide them with basic governmental services.”

International law went further to discourage changes to local laws and customs unless vital to the conduct of military operations. In spite of these inherent and stated values, the U.S. Army seemed to forget the lessons of previous SSTR operations, and let the experiences against the Native American tribes before and after the Civil War instill a different lesson than that conveyed in General Order 100.

As early as 1814, President Jackson officially told Native Americans that white settlers would co-exist with them and not take their lands, while directing civilian and military authorities to deceive and lie to get Native Americans off sought-after lands. When this tactic did not work, force was the only sanctioned alternative. Considered by some contemporary historians as the ‘American Genocide’, the U.S. Army played the lead role in systematically killing those who would not voluntarily move as directed by the U.S. Government, and forcing the remaining Native Americans onto reservations that encompassed less desirable lands and were far from

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9 Millett, 142.
tribal territories. There is no question that international law and General Order 100 had little application for the Frontier Regulars while operating against Native American tribes and, in the end, destruction of Native American cultures was preferred over co-existence. The marginalization of the Native American tribes reinforced the U.S. Army’s inclination for forgetting and preference for the application of force instead of fostering trust and confidence to work towards a win-win scenario. It also fostered a general lack of concern for regional or cultural expertise that would characterize SSTR operations into the 20th century.

The Emerging Superpower: 20th Century Army SSTR Operations

While in any long campaign there are soldiers who strive to become regional experts, the U.S. military did not have a comprehensive formal training program to prepare personnel for foreign deployments. As a result, the mainstream U.S. Army culture continued to dismiss the value of cultural and language expertise and its experience in the Philippines starting in 1898 was rife with the application of excessive force and the lack of concern for the local populace. At the dawn of the 20th century, force, torture and coercion were still the order of the day for U.S. Army SSTR operations, and full spectrum operations encompassed force at every part of the spectrum. For example, whether or not Filipino villagers supported the insurgents, U.S. forces burned villages to the ground when total cooperation was not immediate. This should come as no surprise because the senior leaders of the U.S. Army in the Philippines were experienced Indian fighters and had first hand experience applying coercive methods. Twenty-six of the thirty general officers that served in the Philippines had experience fighting against Native

11 Boot, 122.
12 Ibid, 127.
Americans. The Philippine counterinsurgency was extremely successful in the short-term, but it did not extinguish the insurgency, since gaining the trust and confidence of the Filipino people was secondary to exterminating the insurgents.

The two World Wars and the Cold War dominate the 20th Century military history landscape. Both World Wars encompassed carnage on a grand scale and required considerable post-conflict SSTR operations. After the First World War, the U.S. Army officially participated in the occupation of Germany, Austria and Italy until January 1923, when the last one thousand U.S. occupation soldiers departed. This effort paled in comparison to the stability and reconstruction efforts the U.S. Army facilitated in post-Second World War Germany and Japan. In the German occupation alone, where it was part of a robust coalition, the U.S. Army had over one and a half million troops. While each theater of occupation presented distinctly different challenges, the U.S. Army was instrumental in rebuilding and stabilizing Germany and Japan. Similar to past experiences, the U.S. Army gained considerable experience during the two World Wars in SSTR operations. However, consistent success in SSTR operations would continue to elude the U.S. Army, as it did not readily apply lessons learned in its training and doctrine.

In the shadow of the Cold War, two Asian wars, Korea and Vietnam, would characterize the good and the bad for American SSTR operations. In 1945, the Korean peninsula had been under the yoke of Japanese imperialism for over 35 years. Divided by the victorious allies, Korea became the first war by proxy in 1950 between the communist and democratic powers. Following the reduction of hostilities in 1953, the United States became the guardian and provider of the ravaged southern Republic of Korea. Through its army, the United States successfully built and stabilized a country that today is an economic world power.
Vietnam was also a casualty of the Cold War and wars by proxy between the communist and democratic spheres of influence. After the French debacle from 1945 to 1954, the United States steadily became more involved in supporting South Vietnam against communist North Vietnam. SSTR operations were a reality for U.S. Army forces throughout its presence in South Vietnam. The first concerted interagency effort at SSTR in South Vietnam was the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) pacification program. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and the State Department initiated the program in 1967, but there were serious concerns about the effectiveness of the program. As a result, Brigadier General Donnelly Bolton led a fact-finding team in South Vietnam to identify problem areas. His team identified numerous problems concerning military support to the program and arguably, the most important finding was that military personnel did not view advisor jobs with the South Vietnamese as career enhancing. Most officers sought out conventional Army key operational and staff positions and Colonel (later Major General) Stan McClellan pointed out that this ensured the most capable leaders did not pursue advisor positions.13

Another limitation was the amount of training invested in the advisors. Each attended a six-week advisors course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and eight weeks of Vietnamese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California.14 Through pressure from Secretary Laird and General Abrams, Commander MACV, the service secretaries directed that the most qualified service members serve as advisors. Coupled with the reality that most personnel selected did not want to serve as advisors, and lacked the proper and applicable training and experience, it was late 1970 by the time ‘the right’ personnel were infused into the program

13 Brian M. DeToy, Turning Victory Into Success (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2004), 150.
14 Ibid, 151.
15 Ibid, 151-152.
and by then President Nixon was more focused on Vietnamization and drastic troop reductions to ultimately disengage U.S. forces from South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{15} Regardless of its failure, CORDS serves as a great interagency model for SSTR operations. These past experiences reinforce the imperative for the U.S. Army to comprehensively organize and educate its personnel within a regional framework to act as a combat multiplier instead of a hindrance, as, among others, it did in Vietnam.

Central America also emerged as a battleground between east and west during the Cold War. United States involvement in the region was not novel, as the U.S. Military conducted extensive SSTR operations in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. The key differences in Central America during the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century were communist ideology and money to fuel discontent, and to help establish a larger communist sphere of influence close to the west’s center of gravity, the United States. The lucrative drug trade also evolved as a catalyst for United States’ involvement in Central and South America. Special Forces and interagency operators dominated SSTR operations in Central and South America and these personnel possessed the training and regional expertise to operate successfully in long-term campaigns characterized by SSTR operations. Unfortunately, the mainstream U.S. Army continued to focus almost solely on mid- to high-intensity operations.

\textbf{The Complex Future: Post Cold War and the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Army SSTR Operations}

Following the Cold War and Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the early 1990s, the U.S. Army embarked on multiple SSTR operations including the former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Haiti with varying results. The United States was unprepared for complex
developing tensions in the immediate post-Cold War environment, especially the former
Yugoslavia, because there were very few regional, language or cultural experts in the Department
of Defense or State Department. In addition to Special Forces, these simultaneous campaigns
required the deployment of conventional U.S. forces. However, only those conventional units
preparing for deployment conducted specialized SSTR training and that training did not provide
the time to effectively incorporate effective language and cultural training. Those units not
preparing for SSTR deployments continued to focus their training on fighting mid-to high-
intensity conflicts.

Presently, the United States Army stands fully engaged with two SSTR operations,
Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. military utilized a large Special Operations force augmented with
conventional forces in Afghanistan, and a large conventional force in Iraq. Special Forces
continue to hold regional expertise and training in high regard while conventional forces have
little to no regional expertise. While there are numerous examples of success and failure in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, two powerful examples reveal the consequence of regional expertise or the
lack thereof. Firstly, U.S. Special Forces operating with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan
displayed the positive power of applying regional expertise on the battlefield. Through this
capability, the Northern Alliance played a key role with the United States in defeating the
Taliban.16 The most glaring example of failure was when the U.S. military failed to recognize the
window of opportunity to stabilize Iraqi society immediately following the seizure of Baghdad.
With very few translators and little regional expertise, the large majority of soldiers had no idea

16 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books,
2006), 308.
what was happening nor could they communicate with local Iraqis to find out.\textsuperscript{17} It is possible that regionally expert soldiers could have constantly communicated with the local populace, and recognized and prevented the impending chaos.

**Thoughts and Challenges**

The key lesson taken away from studying U.S. Army SSTR operations is the Army’s inability, by coincidence or intent, to effectively build on experience. SSTR operations have been so common and chronologically close together that most generations of U.S. Army leaders in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries experienced SSTR operations as junior leaders only to serve as senior leaders in similar operations ten to twenty years later. This forgetting syndrome and the inaction to develop doctrine and train on the appropriate skills, prevented senior leaders from building the fundamental skills necessary for the successful conduct of the more common SSTR operations.

Beyond its apparent aversion to SSTR operations, there is a common theme when studying the history of U.S. Army involvement in full-spectrum operations: a lack of regional expertise. There is no question that multiple factors affect the outcome of any operation, and minimizing those factors should be a priority for civilian and military leaders. Fundamental to everything human beings do is the ability to communicate with each other, which should make regional expertise a priority on every decision maker’s agenda. The inability to effectively communicate with indigenous peoples shapes operations in a negative, unsuccessful direction. This regional skill set will always play a major role across the spectrum of military operations and is the cornerstone for success in all types of operations. The United States does not have an enduring winning record when it comes to SSTR operations and even though mid- to high-

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 493.
intensity operations may not require comprehensive regional expertise, indications are that SSTR operations will continue to dominate the contemporary and near future operating environment.

CHAPTER TWO

CULTURAL EXPERTISE AND INFLUENCING OTHERS

Defining Culture

Fundamentally, individuals and groups base social relationships on trust and confidence. To effectively establish relationships built on these precepts, individuals must possess effective communication skills, cultural knowledge and cultural sensitivity. Furthermore, for those who strive to operate successfully on a global scale, culture and language become requisite skills. Intimately understanding the values, beliefs and attitudes that shape the cultural perceptions of trust and confidence will only facilitate effective communication. In order to realize the significance of cultural and language expertise for the U.S. Army across the spectrum of military operations, it is necessary to define and discuss culture, language and communication, social trust and social capital, and influence.

Culture “refers to the learned set of ideas and behaviors that are acquired by people as members of society.”18 Another aspect of culture is “an individual’s characteristic way of perceiving the man-made part of one’s environment. It involves the perception of rules, norms, roles and values, is influenced by various levels of culture such as language, gender, race, religion, places of residence, and occupation, and it influences interpersonal behavior.”19

Culture Matters, Mariano Grondona identifies twenty contrasting cultural factors: religion, individual trust, the moral imperative, concept of wealth, view of competition, notion of justice, the value of work, the role of heresy, to educate is not to brainwash, the importance of utility, the lesser virtues, time focus, rationality, authority, worldview, life view, salvation from or in the world, view of utopia, the nature of optimism, and the vision of democracy.20 These definitions and contrasting factors emphasize the importance of understanding culture at both the individual and the group level. Family bonds, religion, ethnicity, social status, geography, climate, politics and history all play roles in developing cultural identities and institutions, and illuminating the lens for individual interpretation and interaction. Each of these dynamics has different levels of impact and importance within different cultures. Some cultures will revere family or tribal ties over national ties while others will forge powerful nationalistic bonds and put nation ahead of traditional affiliations. Knowing the relevance of these factors, their priority within the cultural context and the ability to communicate in the local language are critical institutional skills for effectively operating on a global scale.

In order to access all levels of society and achieve a reasonable level of situational awareness in a cultural environment, the ability to communicate is necessary. As previously discussed, multiple factors influence perspective, and the commonly accepted values and beliefs that shape the way people interact. Individuals are the gateway to understanding and influencing groups, institutions, organizations and nations. These relationships provide insight into important societal aspects; for example, formal and informal power distribution, economic and social

stratum, and the priority of allegiances.\textsuperscript{21} The globalization of communications and business markets, and the ability of people to quickly travel just about anywhere in a short amount of time, indicates that the world has minimized its geographic obstacles. As a result, globalization now confronts cultural identity on a grand scale. Some embrace the new order while others defiantly object in defense of their cultural status quo. Nevertheless, change is imminent and it will be the culturally competent individuals and organizations that can successfully neutralize and overcome those barriers.\textsuperscript{22} Cultural identities will continue to exist, but increasing globalization continues to obscure existing cultural norms and compel both wanted and unwanted change. For the regional expert in the globalizing world, it is crucial to maintain frequent contact with their specified cultural environment to stay attuned to changes.

To better understand the impact of globalization on cultures, multi-national organizations can offer valuable insight on the positive and negative dynamics of cultural diversity and interaction. The organizational merging of values and beliefs forms a distinct ad hoc social culture made up of the individuals and their cultural norms, the national culture of the organization’s location, political influence, and the cultural origins of the organization’s leadership.\textsuperscript{23} This diverse environment and merging of cultural perspectives will present new cross-cultural ideas, beliefs and values that may or may not be acceptable to the cultural mainstream. Studying successful multi-national organizations illustrates the potential for diverse cultural groups to work and function together successfully. These organizations also provide

\textsuperscript{22} Richard Bucher and Patricia Bucher, \textit{Diversity Consciousness: Opening our minds to people, cultures and opportunities} (NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2004), 222.  
\textsuperscript{23} Griffith, 89.
examples of the pioneering, flexible and culturally savvy leaders capable of operating productively in culturally diverse environments.

Language and Communication

The individual and group definitions of culture imply that communicating in diverse and complex cultural environments depend not only on a firm understanding of the culture, but on functional language skills. Effective human interaction is dependent on the participants’ abilities to communicate. Communication depends on a common understanding, which can include, but is not limited to, language, beliefs, behaviors, religion, economics, politics, and geography; the better the understanding, the greater the potential for effective communication. As described previously, these are all parts of culture and while language is paramount because it is the keystone to providing genuine access and awareness to all other aspects of a culture, the two are indivisible.

Cultural anthropologist Robert Lavenda defines language as “a system of arbitrary vocal symbols that human beings use to encode their experience of the world and to communicate with one another.”

Lavenda also points out the regularity of non-verbal means of communication and the importance of mastering more than just grammatical language skills. In addition to verbal and non-verbal communications, social and cultural nuances can play a substantial role in interpersonal communications. For example, in many Asian cultures, social, age and family status define how you communicate with one another and the words used to address each other are different based on status and position in the conversation. Another cultural anthropologist

24 Lavenda, 34.
25 Lavenda, 41.
points out that “we can ‘hear’ culture only by ‘listening’ to language in a certain way.”

Fundamentally, social interaction and understanding are dependent on the ability to communicate primarily through language.

There are numerous barriers to effective communication and Richard Bucher, a university professor and expert in race and ethnic relations, highlights five key barriers: cultural biases, lack of awareness of cultural differences, language differences, ethnocentrism and inactive listening. Bucher’s barriers highlight a lack of understanding and a tendency for universalism. From another perspective, business professor David Griffith identifies four factors that define the quality of an intercultural relationship: cultural understanding, communication competence, cultural interaction, and communication interaction. These factors are important regardless of who the communicators are, and the type of interaction: broadcast one way communication or one-on-one two way communication. Not speaking a common language only exacerbates the challenges to effective communication and emphasizes the significance of cultural and language skills. When genuine cultural and language proficiency exists, the matter of influencing to gain trust and confidence becomes a realistic possibility.

A pioneer in modern sociology and political economics, Max Weber, provided considerable insight into the dynamics of social relationships. He considered the reciprocal interaction between individuals who base their behavior on commonly accepted norms and values as the cornerstone of sociology. He also explained dynamics that shape social relationships

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27 Bucher, 164.
28 Griffith, 91.
including struggle, communalization, aggregation and corporate groups. Weber correctly proposed that the underlying and unifying dynamic for social relationships is understanding. One’s intended actions may not translate with another individual if the norms and values are not commonly accepted, i.e. cross-cultural communications.\(^{30}\) Even when people speak the same language and come from the same culture, there can be considerable friction when building and maintaining relationships. Weber’s presentation of these social concepts underpins the critical component of ‘understanding’ in a culturally diverse world. Essentially, culture influences everything in society from politics to economics, and individuals that do not understand the cultural dynamics or do not speak the language will struggle to gain social trust and build social capital.

**Social Trust and Capital**

Staff writer for the Harvard International Review Jordan Boslego defines social trust as “the ongoing motivation or impetus for social relations that form a basis for interaction.”\(^{31}\) He points out critical perceptions including integrity, objectivity, consistency, competence and fairness that can influence the establishment and maintenance of social trust. These perceptions encompass the qualities that build and maintain relationships among individuals; however, Samuel Huntington believes that it is difficult to achieve social trust between individuals and groups that embrace different values and come from different cultures.\(^{32}\) This perspective implies the usefulness of cultural proficiency because without it, chances for success in any cross cultural interpersonal endeavor are low. Therefore, one must strive to develop social trust at all levels of

\(^{30}\) Ibid, 15.  
\(^{32}\) Ibid, 29.  
\(^{33}\) Ibid, 31.
society. From the individuals through the society to the cultural/political/economic institutions, it is imperative to understand the history, relationships, values, biases and norms that influence and shape both individual and group human interaction. While it may be difficult to achieve cross cultural social trust, Boslego hints that if achieved, widespread social trust may set the conditions for freedom, democratization and modernization. This point further emphasizes the importance of cultural skills to bridge differences, build lasting social trust, affording the opportunity to influence and bring about positive change.

Another concept important to any discussion about cultural communication is Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital, which states that people value social networks. Social capital can also be defined as the “the sum of current and potential resources incorporated in, available in, and derived from the network of relations possessed by an individual or social unity.” These potential “resources” facilitate collective action. Putnam identifies two major dimensions of social capital: bonding and bridging. These dimensions can either complement or contradict depending on the beliefs and values that characterize bonding and the level of trust and confidence that characterize bridging. Bonding refers to the social interaction between people with some level of social commonality like membership in an organization or club. Bonding can also include more defining characteristics like family ties, ethnicity or religion. Individuals will likely have multiple bonds and the bonds will normally vary in importance; for example, family

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34 Ibid, 28.
38 Putnam, 22-23.
bonds taking precedence over membership in an organization. On the other hand, bridging refers to the social interaction between and among people without social commonality; for instance, people who are members of different organizations or from different countries who speak different languages.38

Bonds are the strongest form of social capital and identifying as many existing or common bonds as possible may afford, although limited, some level of instant credibility. The fewer bonds there are, the greater the need for interaction to bridge social capital. Bridging is much more difficult, requiring good communication skills and cultural understanding. The inability to communicate both verbally and non-verbally reduces the likelihood of developing any substantial social capital. In the global environment, bonding and bridging play powerful roles in building social capital and language and cultural skills are absolutely necessary for both. The Cold War and post-Cold War periods provide a great example of bonding and bridging social capital.

During the Cold War, the bonding social capital for the West was shared defense against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. U.S. forces serving abroad in bases characterized as “Little Americas’ did little institutionally; for example, study and immersion in culture and language to bridge existing differences. However, the real threat of Armageddon created a powerful bond that overshadowed the lack of bridging. After the Cold War, that shadow and the bond diminished, bringing the neglected bridges to light. Free from the threat of annihilation, nations and states around the world reassessed their relationship with the United States and the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. There is little doubt that U.S. military personnel abroad influenced the process of host-nation reassessment. Even today, other than the
foreign area officers, military trained linguists or service members with ties to the region, few soldiers strive to achieve a high level of cultural and language competence.

While cultural and language competence are critical, the Cold War example reveals that interaction is absolutely necessary to establish the relationships that facilitate gaining the trust and confidence of the local people.\textsuperscript{39} Individuals bridge cultural differences through the ability to communicate, leading to social trust and social capital, which presents the opportunity to share information and influence others. This currently flies in the face of security when operating in a non-permissive environment and when few personnel have the skills to communicate directly with the local populace. Comprehensive culture and language skills in the force will build confidence and provide the opportunity to interact regardless of the environment. In addition, the ability for every soldier to communicate within cultural contexts will significantly improve situational awareness and facilitate proactive instead of reactive operations.

**Influencing Others in the Global Environment**

In the midst of multiple SSTR operations, the Department of Defense has recognized the importance of cultural and language expertise, as revealed in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. Services are striving to develop programs to implement the policies; however, their limited efforts have generally been voluntary. Considering historical and current land operations, it is vital for the world’s preeminent land force, the U.S. Army, to institutionalize comprehensive regional expertise. This will set conditions for the successful execution of the more prevalent SSTR operations conducted in diverse cultural environments around the world.

\textsuperscript{39} Griffith, 87.
The first step for the U.S. Army in establishing a regionally expert force is changing its own culture. Beyond the historical trend for disregarding lessons learned from previous engagements and SSTR operations around the world, the U.S. Army must look beyond its universalism perspective. American values and beliefs do not apply to the rest of the world and when the U.S. attempts to force its own values and beliefs on other people, the common response is often resistance and resentment. Local people interpret ignorance of local values and beliefs as a personal affront, and it always plays into the hands of our adversary, and works counter to gaining trust and confidence.

There are many qualities that characterize individual regional expertise and the ability to influence others. Basic communication skills, cultural knowledge and foreign language proficiency are an important few that create favorable first impressions and early credibility, cultivating trust and confidence. These abilities promote the building of both individual personal and professional relationships and ultimately present the opportunity to positively influence others. Individual relationships also offer insight into intra- and inter-group, organization and state dynamics, providing a better understanding of the role family bonds, religion, ethnicity, social status, geography, climate, politics and history play in developing cultural identities and institutions. These insights help define allegiances and relationships, and which ones are more important.

When the U.S. Army deploys around the world, it is attempting to influence a situation in support of U.S. strategic objectives. Sometimes this involves the application of force and coercion; however, current trends indicate the prevalence of SSTR operations where credibility and the ability to influence at every level of society becomes the means to the desired end of long term stability. SSTR operations demand regional expertise that includes cultural knowledge and language skills. Without the regional knowledge and skills, the U.S. Army will only continue to struggle to gain the social trust essential to influencing others. To meet the demands of regional
SSTR operations, the U.S. Army must build language and culture training into the current Officer and Enlisted Professional Military Education (PME) and regionally align its forces.

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCING CULTURE AND LANGUAGE TRAINING INTO THE ARMY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION MODEL

The Current Professional Military Education Model
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**Annex A to Appendix A to Enclosure A**

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE A

CJCSI 1800.01C
22 December 2005

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ICAF, NWC, and JAWS offer single phase JPME
The Officer and Enlisted PME Policies mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions 1800.01C dated 22 December 2005 and 1805.01 dated 28 October 2005 provide the policies, procedures, objectives and responsibilities for the professional development of all uniformed service personnel. The CJCS primarily emphasizes the importance of joint war fighting and the training necessary to build joint proficiency within the different branches of service for both enlisted and officer personnel.41 In the following description of the PME instructions, it quickly becomes apparent that these documents do not provide any direct guidance on incorporating or developing regional expertise throughout an individual’s professional military education. Fortunately, the Department of Defense drafted and disseminated the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in January of 2005, which could be a starting point for regional expertise in the U.S. Army.

The PME Continuum for officers focuses on five military education levels: precommissioning, primary, intermediate, senior and general/flag.42 The precommissioning level of education is concerned with the service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs and officer candidate schools. There is a heavy emphasis on the tactical level of war, an introduction to the services’ missions, and an introduction to joint warfare for the future officers of the military. For the U.S. Army, the primary education level includes the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) for all newly commissioned lieutenants, branch specific basic course schooling and the Captains Career Course, which continues to emphasize the tactical level of war and how the officer’s specific branch supports it. BOLC is a new branch immaterial training concept designed to develop platoon leaders for the contemporary operating

41 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (Dec 2005): 1-2.
42 Ibid, 22.
environment; with an emphasis on field craft and leadership.\textsuperscript{43} The intermediate level of education, which includes the service staff colleges, is the first opportunity for officers to formally study the operational level of war and begin their formal joint military professional education. However, tactics continue to form a large part of the curriculum. The senior level of education, which includes the senior staff colleges, focuses heavily on the operational and strategic levels of war, and joint and coalition operations. General Officer education continues with the same focus as the senior level of education.\textsuperscript{44}

The PME Continuum for enlisted personnel also focuses on five military education levels, but with slightly different categories: introductory, primary, intermediate, senior and executive.\textsuperscript{45} The introductory level of education includes initial entry training and branch specific advanced individual training. The focus at this level is almost solely tactical with an introduction to national military capabilities. Enlisted primary level of education continues to focus on the tactical level of war and emphasizes small unit leadership skills and training. While the majority of the curriculum continues to focus on tactics, the intermediate level of education introduces the operational level of war and joint operations. The senior level of education introduces the strategic level of war and provides a more in-depth study of joint, interagency, and multi-national operations, and the executive level of education continues with the same focus as the senior level of education.\textsuperscript{46}

The U.S. Army translated the CJCS’s guidance into the Army Modernization Plan for 2006, which prolifically mentions the importance of joint operations and how critical it is to

\textsuperscript{43} Department of the Army, \textit{2006 Army Modernization Plan} (March 2006): C-9-10.
\textsuperscript{44} CJCSI 1800.01C, Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{45} CJCSI 1805.01, Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, Appendix A.
understand the complex battlespace in the contemporary operating environment. It identifies the U.S. Army’s core competencies as “train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commander as part of the joint team.” Even though war fighting remains the U.S. Army’s primary mission, it recognizes the prevalence of SSTR operations, but doesn’t realistically address the need to develop doctrine and to train the necessary skills. The ten enduring imperatives (“implement transformation initiatives,  

47 Department of the Army, 2006 Army Modernization Plan, C-1.
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<tr>
<th>GRADES</th>
<th>E-1 TO E-3</th>
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<td>-Senior EJPFME Course</td>
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<td>-Foundations of Joint Operations</td>
<td>-National Strategic Overview</td>
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improve capabilities for homeland defense, improve proficiencies against irregular challenges, improve capabilities for stability operations, achieve Army force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain, improve Army capabilities for strategic responsiveness, improve global force posture, improve capabilities for battle command, improve joint fires capability and improve capabilities for joint logistics\textsuperscript{49}) imply the critical value of regional expertise well beyond the mere “understanding of the effects of cultural awareness on military operations.”\textsuperscript{50} However, as previously stated, there are not any specific language or cultural training requirements articulated in either of the CJCS Instruction documents, or in the 2006 Army Modernization Plan Annex C: Training and Leader Development. The emphasis is principally on combat and not conducting the other aspects of full spectrum operations where language and cultural skill are absolutely necessary. When the document does mention culture, it is cultural awareness, not regional expertise that serves as the theme in the 2006 Army Modernization Plan.

The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap’s Strategic Planning Guidance has established four primary language transformation goals, which are “create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components, create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities, establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (reading/listening/speaking ability), and establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers”\textsuperscript{51} The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap desired outcomes are “the Department has

\begin{itemize}
  \item [49] Ibid, C-1.
  \item [50] Ibid, C-10.
  \item [51] Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (Jan 2005), 1.
\end{itemize}
personnel with language skills capable of responding as needed for peacetime and wartime operations with the correct levels of proficiency, the total force understands and values the tactical, operational and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language, and regional area education is incorporated into Professional Military Education and Development.\textsuperscript{52} So the desired end state directly endorses the value and need for regional expertise across the spectrum of military operations. These goals are in the right direction of regional expertise; however, like the previously mentioned documents, it is not comprehensive.

**Training the United States Army's Regional Experts**

Because both the Enlisted and Officer Professional Military Education (PME) Policies inadequately address cultural and foreign language studies, it is imperative for the U.S. Army to proactively develop a robust language and cultural program that complements and is an integral part of the current PME. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army have taken the first step by recognizing the importance of these skills in the contemporary operating environment and have implemented token training opportunities. For example, in early 2006 the U.S. Army purchased licenses for the language training software Rosetta Stone in multiple languages and made it available to all U.S. Army personnel through its internet web portal, Army Knowledge Online. Its use is encouraged, but not mandatory. Another example, the Command and General Staff College Class of 2006 required officers assigned to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) upon completion of the course to take an elective course in language studies. The elective period was approximately 30 hours of classroom time; which is not sufficient to even learn several languages’ alphabets. These examples reveal the

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 4.
U.S. Army’s recognition of the desired capability, but do not realistically provide the means to achieve a level of proficiency necessary for current and future SSTR operations. In order to achieve regional expertise the PME programs must include three primary areas of emphasis: cultural training, language training and communications training in the form of classroom instruction and scenario based training. It is important to note that these are the author’s recommended additions to the PME programs and not drastic changes to the existing education program.

There is no question that numerous culturally diverse groups populate the world, making the prospect of training and maintaining a regionally expert force daunting. However, a training approach that focuses on the modal qualities of similar cultural groups would provide a viable training baseline. Modal qualities are the distinctive social and psychological characteristics of a culture and social anthropologist Roy D’Andrade refers to six widely held modal characteristics: reliability, consistency, normality, education, intelligence and experience. He points out that the modal characteristics are the “most generally and widely accessible common meanings,”53 and an understanding of these will provide soldiers serving around the world a distinct advantage and starting point when working with people in different regions. Developing expertise in the areas outlined by D’Andrade leads to a fundamental level of regional expertise; however, it is important for regional experts to invest time immersed in the cultural environment. D’Andrade supports this premise and readily points out that it is imperative to communicate with members of the culture to develop true expertise.54

54 Ibid, 195-6.
Throughout its history of multiple SSTR type operations, the U.S. Marine Corps has had the opportunity to develop and value a unique level of cultural awareness. Although it appears to have moved away from this legacy in the second half of the 20th Century, the U.S. Marine Corps also realizes the value of developing cultural expertise. A U.S. Marine working group identified four major conclusions: “Culture is simply another element of terrain, all Marines must have a basic understanding of culture, cultural training and the study of cultural terrain are tasks that all Marines, not only intelligence Marines, must undertake and perform as part of their professional development, and cultural training is not sensitivity training.”55 These conclusions present the need for a comprehensive approach to training and who needs the cultural skill set; however, without language, operational cultural expertise is not achievable.

As previously discussed, the foundation of every culture in the world is the means to communicate. Language is the gateway to communication, and to true cultural understanding and regional expertise. To truly build a relevant and ready force in the 21st Century, the U.S. Army must invest in a comprehensive language and cultural training approach. The current enlisted and officer PME programs provide tried and tested roadmaps for the professional development of U.S. Army personnel, and they address the importance of every level of war at the appropriate rank and the importance of joint war fighting. Incorporating language and culture training will only result in increased operational capabilities across the spectrum of military operations and the following outlines a recommended way ahead for the U.S. Army to develop comprehensive regional expertise.

55 James L. Higgins, Michelle L. Trusso and Alfred B. Connable, “Marine Corps Intelligence,” Marine Corps Gazette (December 1, 2005), 23.
In order to effectively apply the language and cultural skills, soldiers must establish proficient interpersonal and cross-cultural communication skills. Communications consultants Sue Dewhurst and Liam Fitzpatrick identify five basic elements for an effective communicator: personal skills, information, ability, network and learning. Soldiers operating in a culturally different environment must possess these elements to effectively conduct full spectrum operations. Through the ability to communicate across cultures and truly understand the environment, soldiers become powerful and capable sensors; leading to unprecedented situational awareness. During formal schooling, the trainers can coach communication skills through scenario lane training based on current operational challenges and environments.

Figure 3: Proposed Additions to Officer Professional Military Education Continuum
The basic culture and language training begins at the pre-commissioning level of education. For United States Military Academy and ROTC cadets that are on scholarship, the U.S. Army allocates regional study and language quotas to the Academy and ROTC commands. This facilitates basic proficiencies in target regions prior to becoming commissioned officers. Not all universities provide the same regional study programs, so different universities will provide different opportunities for ROTC cadets. Because a comprehensive program trains enlisted soldiers in language and culture as part of their initial entry training, officer candidate school graduates will already possess the necessary training prior to BOLC and Officer Basic Course (OBC) attendance.

Upon university graduation and before formal commissioning as second lieutenants, all cadets will be assigned a regional affiliation and attend 6-12 months of language, culture and communications training. Once completed, the cadets are commissioned and will attend BOLC and their branch specific OBC. During BOLC and OBC, officers will continue their regional studies and in order to facilitate training, language courses will be chronologically staggered to ensure like regional officer groups will serve in the same training platoons for both courses. The schools organize the students into RCC companies and language specific platoons. This also facilitates the inclusion of language and cultural aspects in lane and scenario training exercises. When officers are serving in units, they are required to maintain their regional skills through post language facilities and mandatory unit training programs. Military Intelligence and Special Forces organizations provide a working model of how to effectively do this, and the Army’s language training regulations provide guidance on the weekly, monthly and annual language training requirements.

When officers attend the Captain’s Career Course, they will attend formal language and cultural classes and study the political, economic and institutional aspects for their specific region. Like the lieutenants, it is imperative that officers from like regions serve in the same
Figure 4: Proposed Additions to Enlisted Professional Military Education Continuum
RCC companies and language platoons to maximize training. When officers are promoted to major and attend their intermediate level of education, most likely at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the school will organize them into regional staff groups and provide formal language training throughout the course of the academic school year. The intermediate level education will emphasize the political, economic and institutional aspects of a region, as well as the formal and informal relationships of countries in the specified regions. The Army War College will provide formal language training in its curriculum for senior field grade officers and also more in-depth regional studies at the operational, strategic and national levels.

After their Initial Entry Training, soldiers will attend their initial 6-12 month language and culture training. Upon completion, they will proceed to their branch specific Advanced Individual Training, where formal culture and language instruction will continue; in addition to scenario lane training to develop interpersonal and cross-cultural communication skills. Like the officer schools, language courses will be chronologically staggered and enlisted schools will organize soldiers into RCC companies and language platoons to facilitate training. The same unit regional studies requirements discussed for officers apply to enlisted personnel. Like the officer model, the Enlisted PME program will incorporate formal language, culture and communication instruction at every level of education.

This is a very optimistic addition to the PME and regardless of the quality of training; there will be officers and enlisted personnel that intellectually cannot develop strong language proficiencies. This does not eliminate the need to train them; however, the proposed regionally affiliated U.S. Army task organization in Chapter 4, and the personnel assignment process address this potential shortfall. Currently, the officer and enlisted personnel life cycles do not support a regionalized force, as individuals may never serve in the same region throughout their career. In order to maintain regional expertise, assignments must include regional consideration. For example, the U.S. Army will only assign an officer who learns Mandarin Chinese and
Chinese culture within Pacific Command or the Continental United States. For those previously mentioned personnel who realistically cannot attain any level of language proficiency, they will primarily serve in CONUS based, non-regionally affiliated units. However, they will have a regional affiliation and still be required to train in regional studies.

If the U.S. Army is serious about skillfully conducting full spectrum operations, then comprehensive language and cultural expertise are a must. Incorporation of robust regional studies into the officer and enlisted PMEs will only better prepare the U.S. Army for current and future full spectrum operations. As regionally focused units spend time deploying and training in their regions, they will develop strong relationships, build trust and confidence for the U.S. around the world, and provide an unprecedented intelligence sensor capability that allows the U.S. to proactively prevent conflict instead of reacting to it. Regardless of this positive capability, SSTR operations will continue to dominate the contemporary operating environment due to events including natural disasters, political coups and catastrophic terrorist attacks. As a result, the U.S. Army must consider in the end state cost analysis; the benefits of a regionally trained force outweigh the cost in time and resources. In addition to comprehensive regional training, the U.S. Army must consider affiliating part of the modularized force along regional lines with the regionally affiliated Army Service Component Commands.

CHAPTER FOUR

A PROPOSED REGIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION TO MAXIMIZE COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL EXPERTISE

Current Army Organization

The U.S. Army is currently undergoing an extensive transformation that spans both the tactical and operational echelons. Central to this transformation is the development of more responsive organizations capable of operating in joint and combined environments across the spectrum of military operations. While transformation continues in the midst of major troop
deployments, primarily in the Middle East, it is important to present the planned transformation force structure objectives before providing a recommended transformed force that incorporates comprehensive regional expertise. The following discussion focuses on the five regional combatant commands, the Army’s active component Armies and its assigned units, active and National Guard component Divisions and its assigned units, and active, reserve and National Guard component Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and Support Brigades.

Figure 5: Current RCCs and ASCCs (excluding NORTHCOM)

Currently there are five unified Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs): Northern Command, European Command, Southern Command, Central Command and Pacific Command, and one sub-unified RCC: United States Forces Korea. In addition, the President of the U.S. approved the establishment of a sixth unified RCC in February 2006, Africa Command. This discussion excludes Northern Command because of its Homeland Defense mission, unique requirements and limitations under the Posse Comitatus Act, and the insignificance of regional expertise within Northern Command. The RCCs are responsible for synchronizing joint and combined full spectrum operations within their defined regions. In order to do this effectively, a service component command represents each service. To facilitate U.S. Army support for the
RCC Commander, the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Third Army/U.S. Army Central Command, U.S. Army Southern Command, Seventh Army/U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Pacific and Eighth Army in the Republic of Korea, serve as the U.S. Army’s service component commands for the RCC Commander as depicted in Figure 5. With this organizational approach, the new Africa RCC will also require an ASCC.

**Figure 6: Current ASCC Assigned Units**

During peacetime, the Army headquarters are responsible for administrative control of all Army forces operating in the RCC’s area of responsibility. ASCCs also conduct the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of Army forces in support of joint forces, interagency elements and multinational forces as directed by the RCC. During operations, the army headquarters is also capable of serving as the Joint Forces Land Component Command or Joint Task Force Headquarters. As shown in Figure 6, there are five subordinate units assigned to each ASCC: the Medical Support Command, the Theater Intelligence Brigade, the Theater Sustainment Command, the Theater Network Command (formerly the Theater Signal Brigade)

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57 Command and General Staff College, *ST100-3 Battle Book* (1 July 2005), 2-2.
and a Civil Affairs Brigade. As a result of their regional affiliations, these units have developed an unmeasured level of regional expertise. However, because the U.S. Army does not have a regional approach to personnel career life cycles, this expertise is not consistent nor will the organizations ever achieve a high level of regional expertise. As corps and division headquarters and brigade combat teams flow into the region, they are attached or under the operational control of the Army headquarters.58

![Figure 7: Current Division Headquarters with No Regional Affiliations](image)

The U.S. Army currently has four corps headquarters, I Corps, III Corps, V Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps, with plans to reduce the number to three, as V Corps merges with United States Army Europe to form a more robust Seventh Army in Europe. While the U.S. Army retains both the corps and division headquarters, Army leaders still consider the divisions to be the primary operational-level headquarters. Both headquarters are capable of establishing a joint

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58 Ibid, 2-2.
task force headquarters or serving as the joint force land component command, which reveals a continued redundancy between the corps and division headquarters.\(^{59}\)

**Current Corps and Division Assigned Units**

![Figure 8: Current Corps and Division Assigned Units](image)

Figures 7 and 8 depict the ten active component and eight National Guard Army division headquarters, and six types of multi-functional support brigades that can support either a corps or division headquarters: maneuver enhancement brigade, battlefield surveillance brigade, combat aviation brigade, fires brigade and sustainment brigade. These support brigades are self-contained organizations that can operate independently or plug into any corps or division headquarters when necessary. Division headquarters can command and control the assigned support brigades and up to six maneuver brigade combat teams in mid- to high-intensity combat operations.\(^{60}\)

The U.S. Army is currently transforming maneuver brigade combat teams into three types of modular brigades: infantry or light, Stryker and heavy. The transformation objective for maneuver brigade combat teams is 48 active component and 28 National Guard brigade combat

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\(^{59}\) Department of the Army, *2006 Army Modernization Plan*, B-8.

\(^{60}\) Command and General Staff College, *ST100-3 Battle Book*, 2-7.
teams. These brigades are smaller than pre-transformation brigades; however, through improved organic capabilities, they can deploy quicker and sustain operations longer around the world. For example, the transformed and modular infantry brigade combat team has two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition squadron, a fires battalion, a support battalion, a military intelligence company, an engineer company, and a signal company. In the past, these supporting units provided direct support to the brigade, but the units were not assigned to the brigade commander.61

Organizing the United States Army’s Regional Expertise

The establishment of comprehensive regional expertise in the U.S. Army does not counter the current transformation and modularity effort, but instead complements it. In order to effectively provide the RCCs with regionally expert U.S. Army units, it is important to align the task organization along regional lines. However, it is also imperative to maintain the U.S. Army’s ability to fight and win the nations wars. The following recommended task organization retains the war fighting capabilities, while enhancing the U.S. Army’s ability to conduct full spectrum operations with an emphasis on SSTR operations, where the U.S. Army will most likely continue to spend the majority of its effort.

61 Department of the Army, 2006 Army Modernization Plan, B-6.
As shown in Figure 9, there is no need to modify the Army Service Component Command headquarters other than the addition of one for the newly designated Africa Command. Each army headquarters and its subordinate units should continue with their regional focus, and the previously recommended modifications to the professional military education models will build and maintain an unprecedented level of regional expertise.

Figure 9: Proposed RCCs and ASCCs (excluding NORTHCOM)

Figure 10: Proposed ASCC Assigned Units

The proposed ASCC assigned units depicted in Figure 10 include the already existing theater intelligence brigades, theater network commands, theater support commands and medical support
commands, and recommends the addition of a Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) Brigade and a Fires Brigade.

**Proposed Stability and Reconstruction Operations Brigade**

![Proposed Stability and Reconstruction Operations Brigade Diagram]

**Figure 11: Proposed Stability and Reconstruction Operations Brigade**

The addition of a Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) Brigade as shown in Figure 11 will provide the RCC Commander and the ASCC Commander an awesome SSTR capability designed to rapidly meet the needs of regional populations. The proposed structure for the SRO Brigade is a military police battalion, engineer (construction) battalion, sustainment battalion and a civil affairs company. The other change to ASCC assigned units is the addition of a Fires Brigade. This unit will provide additional combat power to the RCC and ASCC Commanders for the rapid response and application of force in regional crises. Because the corps and division headquarters provide redundant capabilities, deactivate the corps headquarters and utilize the manpower to build more robust standing joint force headquarters capabilities within each of the regional ASCC headquarters. This will provide additional command and control capabilities for full spectrum regional contingencies, and improve the RCC Commander’s ability to aggressively conduct multiple contingencies simultaneously.
Proposed Division Headquarters Regional Affiliations

Active Component (Regional Affiliation)

- PACOM: USARPAC 25ID
- CENTCOM: USARCENT 3ID
- SOUTHCOM: USARSO 4ID
- AFCOM: USARAF 101ID
- EUCOM: USAREUR 1ID
- CONUS: 1ACV 1AD 2ID
- USFK 2ID

National Guard Component (Regional Affiliation)

- 4ID 29ID 36ID 42ID 28ID 34ID 35ID

Figure 12: Proposed Division Headquarters Regional Affiliations

In order to effectively employ and maintain regional expert personnel for a tactical level headquarters, assign one division headquarters to each regional Army Service Component Command headquarters, as depicted in Figure 12. The regionally aligned division headquarters provides the RCC and Army Service Component Command a robust command and control capability and an additional army force or joint force land component headquarters for smaller contingencies.62

Proposed Division Assigned Units

XX DIV

- X BFSB Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
- X CAB Combined Aviation Brigade
- X ME Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
- X SUS Sustainment Brigade

*Current Corps structure/manning become Standing Joint Force Headquarters for the ASOCs

62 Command and General Staff College, ST100-3 Battle Book, 2-7.
Each regionally aligned division will have four BCTs, a maneuver enhancement brigade, battlefield surveillance brigade, aviation brigade, fires brigade and sustainment brigade, as shown in Figure 13. These regionally aligned brigades will provide immediate full spectrum operational capability to the RCC commander. The remaining division headquarters and brigades will make up the CONUS based force, whose primary mission is mid- to high-intensity operations. However, in the comprehensive regionally trained force, each brigade and division will have approximately 500-800 personnel representing each region. This provides each unit a cadre of personnel who are expert in every region; who can play a key role in deployment preparation anywhere in the world.

**Figure 13: Proposed Division Assigned Units**

**Objective Regionalized Active Component**

*Each ASCC has this task organization*
Figure 15: Objective Regionalized National Guard and Reserve Component

Figure 14 and 15 show a comprehensive picture of the regionally aligned forces for the Active Component, National Guard and Reserve Component. There are other organizations and units that have not been included in this discussion. Some, like special operations forces are already regionally aligned and others provide specialized support for operations around the world. These regional task organizations coupled with PMEs that train and maintain comprehensive regional expertise across the force provide core regional U.S. Army capabilities for full spectrum operations in support of the RCC commanders. This combination will prove invaluable to the United States in present and future SSTR operations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In the midst of multiple SSTR operations and when considering the historical trends of mid- to high-intensity operations that include SSTR operations, it is apparent that the U.S. Army will continue to conduct full spectrum operations that most often include SSTR operations. The Department of Defense and U.S. Army have taken the first steps by recognizing the importance
of regional expertise, and while limited and voluntary, it is striving to implement programs and policies to foster regional awareness. However, regional awareness will not be enough to meet growing SSTR challenges and if the U.S. Army is serious about skillfully conducting full spectrum operations and maintaining its status as the world’s preeminent land force, then comprehensive language and cultural expertise are necessary.

Investing in a regionally skilled force that is capable of communicating across cultures will provide the U.S. an awesome capability from the tactical to the strategic levels of human interaction. Comprehensive cultural and language proficiencies will set the positive conditions necessary for gaining trust and confidence wherever the U.S. Army operates and potentially prevent the need for the application of force. Without regional skills, the U.S. Army will continue to struggle gaining a strong foundation of social trust while conducting SSTR operations and rely more heavily on influence through coercion.

Through comprehensive regional studies that include culture and language, a personnel assignment system that enforces regionalized assignments and a regional task organization that spends a considerable amount of time in its assigned region, the U.S. Army will set the conditions for the successful execution of full spectrum operations in the 21st Century. It will be capable of proactively gaining the trust and confidence necessary to influence people potentially without the application of force, while maintaining its capability to apply force when absolutely necessary. There is no substitute for regional expertise and the ability to communicate across cultures, and when properly employed, this capability will only enhance United States credibility around the world.
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