JOINT RECRUITING…IS THE TIME RIGHT?

BY

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JOINT RECRUITING…IS THE TIME RIGHT?

by

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During the late 1990’s, joint recruiting was touted by Congress and many in the
Department of Defense as a cost effective solution for filling the military ranks. Since
that time, the initiatives, studies, and media attention have died down. With inevitable
changes in our government administration and rumors of decreased supplemental and
defense authorization bills, the pressures for joint recruiting may return in full force. In
an environment characterized by political turmoil and fiscal uncertainty it is incumbent
upon the Department of Defense to be both effective and efficient at attracting new
Service Members. This paper examines three possible joint recruiting options;
combining administrative functions only, combining support functions only, or combining
all functions down to the recruiter level. The preponderance of the research data and
this paper conclude, that while money might be saved in the long term by implementing
full joint recruiting, combining administrative and support functions is a better option for
the armed forces and the nation.
JOINT RECRUITING…IS THE TIME RIGHT?

We have the finest military on Earth because we have the finest people on
Earth, because we recruit and we retain the best that America has to offer.

—William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

Introduction

During the late 1990’s, joint recruiting was touted by Congress and many in the
Department of Defense as a cost effective solution for filling the all voluntary force.
Many Congressional requests asked for feasibility assessments on recruiting force
structure changes (e.g. merging the Services’ recruiting organization into one
command, merging the support functions, etc.). Since that time, the initiatives, studies,
and media attention have died down. With inevitable changes in our government
administration and rumors of decreased supplemental and defense authorization bills,
the pressures for merged recruiting may return in full force. Additionally, in this
environment characterized by political turmoil and fiscal uncertainty it is incumbent upon
the DOD to be both as effective and as efficient as possible at attracting new service
members. This paper examines whether a merger of the four Services, most commonly
called joint recruiting, would increase mission accomplishment at a lower cost. The
three possible joint recruiting options; combining administrative functions only,
combining support functions only, or combining all functions down to the recruiter level
will be examined. The preponderance of the research data and this paper conclude,
that while money might be saved in the long run by implementing full joint recruiting,
combining administrative and support functions is a better option for the armed forces
and the nation.
Background

All Volunteer Force

To understand why the United States government spends billions of dollars each year recruiting young men and women into the Armed forces, it is essential to appreciate the origins of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). There were several reasons for the push to end conscription. First, Americans distrusted standing militaries with the first formal conscription not even introduced until the Civil War. ¹ Second, the number of young men needed in the military in the 1960's was much smaller than the draft eligible population. Thus, many more men were being deferred than drafted, creating a perception problem. The draft was viewed as unfair and consequently lost legitimacy and support among the majority of the American people. Third, as the Vietnam War escalated and draft calls increased, conscription became ever more unpopular and seen as “inconsistent with a free society.”² The Republican candidate for President, Richard Nixon, promised, if elected, to move the country to an AVF. He recognized that it would cost a great deal more to move to a voluntary system, but unless that cost proved to be prohibitive, it would be worth it.³ Fourth, as discipline problems rose, the Army lost confidence in the conscripts and Army leadership was ready for a change. Finally, one historian noted, “there was a rational, intellectual basis for the volunteer force that told young men that they did not have a moral obligation to serve.”⁴

Two months after his election, President Nixon appointed a commission to study eliminating conscription. On February 20, 1970, The Gates Commission recommended an AVF be established; yet remain supported by a standby draft system.⁵ This idea was controversial and disliked by Congress, the military and a majority of the media.
even though there was growing public unrest over Vietnam. President Nixon, however, concurred with the commission’s recommendation and committed the country to an AVF by 1973.

A critical aspect of moving to the AVF, not related to emotions over the draft, was how to find the financing. Many believed an AVF would never be a reality in the U.S. due to cost. Alexander Haig, a military assistant to the National Security Advisor, backed the main stream Army, which stood against the AVF. He wasn’t worried by the Gates commission no matter the outcome, “…a Republican budget could not sustain the simple economics of such a (all volunteer) force…” Since conscription had been used to provide manpower for several decades, the pay of men entering the service had been kept very low. It was then about sixty percent of comparable civilian wages. The Gates commission identified this problem and stated wages this low would not sustain an AVF of the desired quality. Until pay concerns were fixed, the commission concluded that an AVF would be impossible. The commission estimated DOD’s annual spending on personnel would necessarily increase by $2B, or by about 8%, in order to attract enough volunteers to keep the size of the military at 2.5M personnel. In the process of implementing of the AVF, DOD and Congress opted to increase pay and allowances within the existing military pay structure, versus acting on the commission’s recommendations and revamping the pay system to provide more cash benefits versus in-kind benefits (retirement, health care, etc). Enlistment bonuses were authorized to aid in recruiting efforts.

The budgetary cost of personnel did increase significantly in the early years of the AVF. Military pay, for first term members, was increased to attract volunteers and make
it comparable to the civilian sector. Manpower expenditures averaged $97B a year in 1974 and 1975 compared to $68B a year for 1959 – 1963 (costs in 2006 dollars). The AVF added about $3B per year, in 1974 dollars, to the military’s expenditures ($10B in 2006 dollars); which accounted for 11% of DOD’s 1974 manpower budget.\textsuperscript{11}

Although the AVF is more expensive on a dollar per dollar basis than a conscription force, today Congress, DOD, and the public accept that the military will be all volunteer.\textsuperscript{12} It is also accepted that an AVF is never going to be cheap. In order to compete with the civilian marketplace, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines have to be fairly compensated. The strongest counterpoint to the cost issue remains that the quality of the force the nation receives in return is the best the nation has ever had.\textsuperscript{13}

Service Organizational Structures

The DOD is the largest employer in the U.S.\textsuperscript{14} with more than 1.4 million men and women on active duty and another 1.2 million in the National Guard and reserves.\textsuperscript{15} Compared to the largest civilian employers, Wal-mart at 1.3M employees, McDonalds at 395,000, or United Parcel Service at 370,000 employees, it is easy to see why military recruiting is big business.\textsuperscript{16} Before discussing possible effectiveness and efficiency changes to the current structures and business practices of military recruiting, the reader must recognize the similarities and differences between the services’ organizational structures. A brief description of each service structure is provided below, along with the components recruited, and other relevant facts. Table 1 consolidates the information for all four services for easier comparison.

"The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) recruits Soldiers, both officers and enlisted, to meet the needs of an expeditionary Army."\textsuperscript{17} USAREC recruits
worldwide for regular and reserve officers and enlisted personnel, and health professionals such as doctors, nurses, and dentists. USAREC is composed of a headquarters, 5 brigades, 41 battalions (decreasing to 38 battalions as of 3rd quarter Fiscal Year (FY) 08), 247 companies, 3 detachments, 1661 stations, 6,279 on-production recruiters and 1,774 on-production Army reserve recruiters. The USAREC commander is a Major General (O-8) and the number of people a field supervisor controls (span-of-control) averages between 6 and 8.

USAREC Headquarters, located at Fort Knox, KY, provides command, control, and staff support for the field recruiting force. The headquarters staff develops strategic plans, determines policies, manages operations, and the national marketing and advertising campaigns. Additionally, officer, enlisted, and civilian staff provide support in the areas of personnel, administration, resource management, safety, market research and analysis, public relations, and recruiting operations. The command also has its own inspector general, staff judge advocate, and headquarters company.

All lower level organizational elements support field recruiting activities. Brigades are the liaison between the headquarters and the battalions. Brigades perform managerial, administrative, operational, budgetary, marketing, advertising, and logistical functions to support the battalions. Battalions are the command elements that actively support recruiting efforts through the companies and stations assigned under them. The battalions perform brigade like functions (managerial, administrative, operational, budgetary, etc) to support the companies and stations. Companies execute the recruiting mission and contact the stations and recruiters on a daily basis. The stations
are located in communities throughout all fifty states, several U.S. territories, and three foreign countries. Each station averages four recruiters to accomplish the mission.

The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) seeks the “Best and Brightest” young men and women to succeed in the Navy’s high-tech environment. NRC recruits individuals for both the active and reserve components, officer and enlisted personnel, including health professionals. To do this better, the Navy downsized the recruiting command structure over the last thirteen years, gaining effectiveness and efficiency. The 1994 structure had a headquarters, 5 area headquarters, 31 districts, 195 zones, and 1428 recruiting stations. In this structure, the Navy areas and districts carried out the same type of tasks, except the districts focused more narrowly on their region. The current structure has a headquarters, 2 regions, 26 districts, 210 zones, and 1302 stations. The NRC is commanded by a Rear Admiral (O-8) and the average span-of-control is between 6 and 13.

NRC headquarters located at Millington, Tennessee, functions as the policy and guidance developer, and oversees all administrative, marketing, public affairs, and resource distribution for the command. The regions coordinate public affairs, provide guidance, training, allocate resources, and assist the districts with issues as necessary. The districts are the link between the zones and the regions. They provide administrative support, training, guidance, and assist with issues directly related to the recruiting mission. Zones are where the career recruiting personnel sit and the mission to recruit is put into action. Stations, located throughout the U.S. and the world, are where the recruiters meet with applicants. Each station averages three recruiters.
The Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) was established 1 January, 1994 and is responsible for the selection of the few, but proud, Marines recruited each year. The MCRC recruits officers and enlisted personnel, for both active and reserve Marine forces. The Marines do not recruit health care professionals. The MCRC is headquartered at Quantico, Virginia, and has 2 regions, 6 districts, 48 stations, and 1337 substations. The MCRC is commanded by a Major General (O-8) and the span of control over all levels averages 2.3 through 2.8. Each station typically has two Marine recruiters.

The duties associated with each level of the organization are very similar to the ones described for both the Army and Navy, with one major exception. The commanders at the regions are dual-hatted; reporting to the MCRC for all recruiting matters and the commander of the Training and Education Command for all recruit training issues.

The Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) matches the right skills, at the right time, to the right person while encouraging young men and women to “Do Something Amazing” with their lives and enter the Air Force (AF). The AF is the only service that recruits active and reserve components with two separate headquarters. AFRS, located in San Antonio, TX, recruits active duty officer and enlisted personnel, and health professionals. As of Oct 2007, AFRS had 4 groups, 27 squadrons, 185 flights, and 1285 stations. Commensurate with the ongoing drawdown in AF end strength, by Oct 2009, AFRS will reduce to 3 groups and 24 squadrons, 185 flights, and 1100 stations. AFRS is commanded by a Brigadier General (O-7) and the span of control pre-structure
change was 7 across the command. AFRS typically has one recruiter per station. All levels across the structure have responsibilities consistent with the Army and Navy.

The Air Force Reserve Command Recruiting Service (AFRCRS) is responsible for recruiting all AF reserve officers, enlisted personnel, and health professionals. AFRCRS is comprised of a headquarters, and three squadrons covering Western, Eastern, and Central regions. The AFRCRS is a small organization, authorized only 398 slots within the total recruiting structure (from headquarters through recruiters). The headquarters is commanded by a Colonel (O-6), the squadron commander is a Lieutenant Colonel or Major and has a much larger span of control of 18 senior recruiters typically at the rank of Chief Master Sergeant (E-9) or Senior Master Sergeant (E-8). 34

Table 1 shows a comparison of the information discussed above, to include the services recruiting structures, rank structures, and span of control. 35

Cost of Recruiting

Now that the structures of the services’ recruiting organizations are laid out, it is crucial to address the cost to recruit the AVF under the current structures. Since 1993, the DOD has spent approximately $4B per year. 36 This funding includes enlistment bonuses, advertising, support functions, and associated manpower costs at all organizational levels.
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Table 1. Comparison of service recruiting structures, missions and span of control

Span of Control example: 41 Battalions / 5 Brigades = 8.2

As the recruiting environment becomes tougher (i.e. during times of war or low unemployment), the cost of the mission also increases. For example, in 1999 the Army spent more than $11,000 to recruit every new Soldier. Since 1999, the cost of doing business has gone up considerably, due in part to the necessity of offering enlistment bonuses. In Oct 2006, about two-thirds of Army recruits qualified for a bonus to enter the service at an average amount of $10,000. The ten thousand dollars was just the amount of the bonus. In 2006, the active Army spent $166M in enlistment bonuses but that amount was as high as $200M in 2002. Meanwhile, the Army Reserve went from $18.7M in 2000 to $61M in 2005. The other services also offer enlistment bonuses to entice individuals to join their ranks. On average, over the last six years, the active
Marines have offered $7.3M in bonuses, the reserve Marines $1.3M, the active Navy $84.8M, the reserve Navy $4.8M, the active AF $79.3M*, and the reserve AF $5.4M.\textsuperscript{41} Despite on-going force reductions, the Navy and AF continue to offer bonuses to encourage individuals to enter undermanned or hard-to-fill specialties.

Advertising provides funds for local, regional, national and corporate marketing to increase public awareness and describe employment opportunities. Reaching prospective recruits with a ‘join the services message’ does not come cheap either. By 2003, the DOD was spending $1900 on advertising per recruit, nearly tripling in the five year period from 1998-2003.\textsuperscript{42} The DOD programmed$1.65B for recruiting support and advertising alone in the FY 2008 budget (i.e. no manpower costs).\textsuperscript{43} The services project to spend $669M in advertising for FY 2008. The media mix includes television, radio, magazines, newspapers, internet, videos, direct mail campaigns, recruiting booklets, pamphlets, and posters. The active Army has the largest share of the advertising budget at $287M, followed by the Navy and Army National Guard at $84.6M and $84.4M respectively.\textsuperscript{44}

The remaining portion of the recruiting budget provides support. In the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget estimate, support is classified under two areas, recruiting and examining. The two together for FY 2008 total $985.7M. The recruiting funds provide support to the commands and stations, including meals, lodging and travel for the applicants to process for entrance into the military, recruiter expenses, civilian pay, vehicle operation and maintenance, lease of office space, and other incidental expenses. The examining funds provide support for the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) who administers the Armed Service
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test. These funds also provide for the physical examination of applicants to determine their medical qualification for enlistment in the Armed Forces.45

A close examination of recruiting budgets overtime reveals several factors. First, funding the AVF is expensive. Second, as one or more services struggle to meet end strength numbers, the costs increase. Finally, as programmed service end strength numbers increase, so do recruiting budgets. It takes an array of resources from enlistment bonuses, advertising, and support, not just manpower, to man the force. Therefore, as pressure builds on the services’ budgets, other options to increase effectiveness and efficiencies, while still accomplishing the mission, must be examined.

Perhaps the most controversial approach, combining all services into Joint operations, poses the most potential. Jointness, however, comes in multiple varieties, that will now be discussed in three option packages. One caveat must be addressed up front for all the options, actual numbers will not be proposed during this research project due to time and space constraints. Likewise, not all possible pros and cons can be addressed in detail. This paper will, however, examine several pros and cons for each option discussed. The three options include one that combines only the administrative functions (i.e. Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, etc). The second option combines support functions into a new command but leaves the operations functions for the services. The final option combines all functions under a new combatant commander for recruiting.
Option 1

The first Joint option proposes only combining the administrative functions of the recruiting commands. These functions include activities performed by administrative staffs for the commanding Generals, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, and Congressional response and Public Affairs staffs. This option would establish a new combined headquarters, but leave all the support and operations functions run by the individual services.

Several items need to be considered to make this option a practical alternative to the current system. First, this option requires the consolidation of the four service headquarters into one location for a manpower savings realization. Significant money savings could be realized if space were available at one of the current headquarters' locations to save relocating one headquarters. However, just because space is available doesn’t make it the most effective or efficient answer. A manpower and environmental impact study would be necessary to best locate the headquarters building based on multiple factors.

The second major discussion under this option is “who is in charge?”, “what is the commander’s rank?”, and “who would the commander report to?” After combining the headquarters staff, a new chain of command and organizational structure would have to be devised. Let’s look at each of these questions. First, “who is in charge?” and “who would the commander report to?”

Since the premise of this paper is that the four services are merging recruiting functions at some level, by default, this new organization would be joint. The commander would most likely be a Major General (O-8). This command billet would rotate between the services. The selecting authority would be the Secretary of Defense
who could delegate authority down to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy.

As far as the chain of command is concerned, it could be fashioned after the USMEPCOM model. USMEPCOM, activated on 1 July 1976,\textsuperscript{46} is a joint command responsible for “ensuring the quality of military accessions during peacetime and mobilization in accordance with established standards.”\textsuperscript{47} The USMEPCOM commander’s first three supervisors are the Deputy Under Secretary for Military Personnel Policy, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and then the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness respectively.\textsuperscript{48} The Services are not in the chain of command and the United States Army Accessions Command is the Executive Agent for USMEPCOM.\textsuperscript{49} This high level of attention and supervision is necessary if recruiting is truly to become joint in nature.

The first pro of admin only consolidation is the manpower savings. Efficiency gained by combining staffs is money saved to spend in areas where it can be better used. The second pro is the possible synergy attained by the USMEPCOM commander and the new joint recruiting commander, United States Recruiting Staff Command (USRSTFCOM), having the same chain of command. When disconnects happen between the two commands, solutions should be easier to coordinate and implement.

Nevertheless, the cons of this first option outweigh the pros. The expected manpower savings is small for this option.\textsuperscript{50} Some reductions in administrative staff will result, but it won’t be on a scale of 4:1 or 75% reduction. A manpower study would have to be completed, but past experience has shown that 30% would be a more realistic reduction number.\textsuperscript{51} Although this joint headquarters would take the repetitive,
non-recruiting administrative tasks from the services, the headquarters would still require supporting data from the service recruiting commands. For example, Congressional inquiries on recruiter misconduct could be handled at this level, but the data (and ultimately the paperwork and staff package) would have to work its way through the service headquarters to answer the questions. It is quite possible that “mission creep” over time would just add another layer to the process.

However, the greatest obstacle I see to this option is the lack of solid results for lots of initial effort and costs. Setting up USRSTFCOM would be a huge undertaking that could take millions, if not billions of dollars, that only buys a combined headquarters function. In essence, this new organization pulls the top support structures from the old organizations and makes them slimmer, but it does little to improve any processes. In fact, it could make all four organizations weaker if the different cultures of the four services aren’t addressed. Even at the headquarters level this is vitally important. For example, if a Navy JAG is giving an Army Commander a recommendation on an Article 15, the Navy JAG, must understand the consequences to the individual’s career in the Army’s system, not in the Navy’s system. If the Service representatives are not educated on all four services’ cultures on this smaller, leaner joint staff, then the joint headquarters is no longer mission effective.

Option 2

Consequently, there might be a better structure to squeeze additional effectiveness and efficiency from the cost and difficulties of setting up a new command. A second option combines not only the administrative functions, but also the support functions. Marketing, advertising, training, logistics, real estate, personnel, finance,
programming, budgeting, and market research and analysis would all be combined.

Figure 1 is an example of a notional organizational structure. The headquarters would be set up as described in option one with one exception. With the additional manpower, resources, and responsibilities, the commander’s billet would become a Lieutenant General’s billet (O-9). The rating chain would also move one level up to include the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Each lower level organization could be modeled after this structure as well.

![Organizational Chart](chart.png)

Figure 1. Notional organizational chart for the United States Recruiting Support Command, USRSPTCOM.

This option looks very much like any joint functional combatant command today; therefore, the implementation could be aided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s recent lessons learned. The J-1 directorate would manage personnel, training, safety, education, etc. The J-4 directorate would manage all logistics including the General
Services Administration (GSA) cars and vans, overseeing the Corps of Engineers real estate program for recruiting stations, maintaining phones, faxes, desks, etc. The Plans and Policy directorate, J-5, would be responsible for generating all support policies and plans, and providing market research and analysis for all services on recruiting trends. The J-6 would be responsible for integrating all the information management systems and managing all information technology programs. The J-8 directorate would program and budget for the USRSPTCOM and resource as appropriate by interacting with the services. USRSPTCOM, being a joint command, would receive a majority of their financing through the service budgets. 52

The main question under this option is how far down are support functions merged? Do they merge down to the headquarters, brigade, battalion, or company levels? And what impact does it have on the organization, and more importantly, the mission as the “merge” continues further down the tiers? If the merger is transparent to the field, or improves service, then this option could be considered successful. So, let’s examine each tier to determine the appropriate level for merging the support functions.

The easiest level to begin with is the lowest, or company level. Table 2 lists all functions performed at the company level. 53 Since the Army is the only service to have any support functions at this level, there is no reason to combine functions. Each service would operate at this tier, and below, as they do now.
### Table 2. Tier 3 (Company) level functions

The next tier up, battalion, has the potential for combining support functions.

Three of the four services have considerable support staffs at this level and a merger could save manpower as well as consolidate infrastructure, information support systems, training, etc. Table 3 lists the functions for tier 2 by service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 2</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squadrons</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC Recruiting Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>* A blank means the Service does not have that function at this level</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Public affairs, marketing and advertising are all combined in one person/office for the Marines at the USMC Recruiting Station level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 2</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Support</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Response Teams</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarter Company (i.e. AF Element at a Joint HQs)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing/Advertising</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance/Programming/Budgeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Research/Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Tier 2 (Battalion) level functions
The principal obstacle for merging at this level would be service buy-in. For example, at the AF squadron level, there are two trainers. If the USRSPTCOM declared all trainer positions joint, one of those two positions would become a non-AF billet. That means for AF field recruiters, they would have weekly, if not daily, contact with a trainer from another service. While definitely possible, since recruiting is a sales based skill, all four services would require a single sales program to develop the recruiting force. The headquarters would also need an effective train-the-trainer program to educate the trainers on the unique cultural aspects of the four services so the trainers could effectively coach all service recruiters, not just their own branch.

To alleviate service concerns, merging at the brigade level might offer the same benefits without the stated difficulties. Table 4 lists the functions performed at the brigade level as discussed in a focus group meeting held at the USAWC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Districts</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congressional Response Teams</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarter Company (i.e. AF Element at a Joint HQs)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing/Advertising</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance/Programming/Budgeting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market Research/Analysis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A blank means the Service does not have that function at this level

Table 4. Tier 1 (Brigade) level functions
Three of the four services have substantial staffs, and the Air Force has representative functions, at the higher headquarters (AFRS). A merger at this level has the potential to save manpower, as well as consolidate infrastructure, information support systems, and training, etc. But a merger here offers the additional benefit of adding the non-joint layer between the brigade and the recruiter, namely the battalion. The battalion would be the “buffer” offering transparency to the field, while enabling the joint command to improve processes. Let’s re-visit the training example. The same AF squadron would now have two AF trainers but the AF Group would be a jointly staffed organization. The two AF trainers at the squadron would be trained by Army, Navy, Marine and AF trainers, but only the AF squadron trainers would interact with the AF recruiters in the field. Let’s look at a second example. Currently, the services have separate contracts with the GSA for car, vans, etc. Under a joint command, an Army logistician would now have the ability to combine all car and van GSA vehicles into one contract; potentially saving millions of dollars every year.

The pros of this option are many, whether the merger happened at the brigade or battalion levels. Manpower and dollars would be saved at each level; while synergy could be gained though joint programs. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that in FY 1992 the DOD would have saved $13M through this option and over $150M through FY 97. DOD also has a proven track record of success in the real estate arena through the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee (JRFC). All real estate (i.e. offices) are leased and maintained by the Corps of Engineers and managed by the JRFC. From 1989 to 1994, the cost of recruiting facilities and the cost to maintain them, due in large part to JRFC oversight, were reduced by $14M through
reduction in space, closing, and co-locating offices as opportunities arose. There is every reason to believe that consolidated oversight committees in other support areas could also be equally successful in the new USRSPTCOM.

Unfortunately, not all service recruiting programs are as integrated. Research suggests that the services need to focus more on joint marketing campaigns versus service specific campaigns. In his 1989 book, *The Effects of Military Advertising: Evidence from the Advertising Mix Test*, James Dertouzos suggests that the services gain enlistments from additional advertising. In 1999, the Defense Department commissioned the National Academies’ National Research Council to study the effectiveness of military advertising campaigns. They found “the services also are competing with each other for youths who are already interested in military service. We suggest an increased focus on advertising military service as a whole.”

This would increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of the recruiting marketing programs. This new command would give structure and oversight to the support functions such as marketing, much as the JRFC did for the real estate community.

No organizational structure is without its drawbacks. The first con is the chain of command. Support and operations have two different bosses. The mission remains with the services under this construct; thus, the recruiting commands would be the supported commanders. USRSPTCOM would be the supporting command. This would take an adjustment period. The remaining personnel in the services organizations would have a lower rank structure and new relationships would be formed. Conflicts between support and operations would now be solved through a different chain of
command. This is not a show stopper, rather an issue to be address during command and control design and implementation.

Second, this new structure would be highly dependent on infrastructure and good information flow. If the organization were too large for a good exchange of information across service lines, the concept of jointness would be lost. The focus must become one of functional areas versus service. However, a complete transition would be difficult because the support is still delivered to a service recruiting mission versus a joint mission as discussed above.

Historically, the four services have not been good at interoperability. This represents what may be the greatest obstacle to success. In Feb 1992, the GAO took issue with the services having four distinct automated recruiting information system development efforts to meet common functional requirements. The services estimated a cost of $82M to develop, operate, maintain, and enhance these systems.\textsuperscript{60} To answer those concerns, the Under Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness introduced the Joint Recruiting Information Support System (JRISS). JRISS, an automated system, was intended to improve business processes and information management while reducing costs for all the services. The system encompassed all functions from initial identification of potential recruits through initial training and assignment.\textsuperscript{61} For various reasons, the project was re-scoped and became the Army Recruiting Information Support System.\textsuperscript{62} The last fifteen years, haven’t shown any improvement either. Currently, each recruiting command has their own system to enter applicant data into their respective personnel systems.\textsuperscript{63} USRSPTCOM would demand a new
JRISS for a successful joint integration of the support functions, no small undertaking in terms of resources and service biases.

**Option 3**

This final option is the panacea often called “purple” recruiting. All four recruiting commands would be merged into one command, the United States Recruiting Command (USRECCOM). The merger would take place down at the recruiter level. Since this paper is at the strategic level, implementation of how recruiters would recruit at the substation level won’t be discussed except to mention three possible broad approaches: the recruiters 1) continue to recruit for their own service, 2) get a combined goal and recruit for all the services or 3) recruit qualified individuals and the service determination would be made at a different level/location.

An organization chart is shown in Figure 2 below and is similar to option 2 with a J-3 added for operations. Due to the scope of responsibilities and personnel assigned, the new organization becomes a functional combatant command, with rank and reporting chains equivalent to other functional combatant commands.

![Diagram](image)  
**Figure 2. Notional organizational chart for the United States Recruiting Command, USRECCOM.**
The main questions under this option are “why do it?”, “could the mission still be accomplished under a joint structure?” and “could it be accomplished more effectively and efficiently?” First, why even do it? In the early 1990’s, DOD estimated the implementation of joint recruiting would save $27M in FY93 and over $240M through FY97.\textsuperscript{64} The report does not indicate whether these savings would come from personnel or other resource savings, however, just like in Options 1 and 2, combining the services would save manpower and reduce duplicate functions. Additional savings, above Option 2, would be expected since the merger would occur throughout the entire organization. Considerable upfront costs would be necessary to create fully interoperable systems. Many of these same systems would have to be combined under Option 2, but all operational systems would require merger under Option 3 (i.e. recruiter point of sales systems, software to build and enter jobs for recruiters to sell, etc). Thus, the driving force behind joint recruiting is financial (and purported process improvement).

Could the mission be accomplished under a joint structure? This is a tough question to answer, since the U.S. has never done joint recruiting. Britain is a nation, much like ours, that does joint recruiting. According to Hew Strachan, from the University of Glasgow, in 1999 the British Army only needed about 11,000 recruits and the British Navy required less than half that number.\textsuperscript{65} Joint recruiting, on such a small scale, might not be a good model to compare to the over 180,000 active and reserve recruits the U.S. requires in FY 2008.\textsuperscript{66} None of the U.S. service recruiting experts
believe joint recruiting is the right way to recruit for the U.S. The GAO disagreed with these assessments, noting that:

Rather than responding with thorough analyses and rebuttals to the management review, the services dismissed the proposal out of their reluctance to alter methods that had succeeded for them in the past. For example, the Army’s response was that “a major, radical change to our way of doing business—combined with the turbulence of personnel reductions while entering an era of uncertainty—will surely disrupt mission accomplishment.” The Navy’s position was that “creating a single recruiting bureaucracy would eventually erode [the] strong identification with service, reduce the recruiter’s emotional involvement, and create an atmosphere where quantity, not quality, is the major objective.”

Since 1993 the services have transformed structures in many areas to become more joint. When the question was posed, “If forced to do joint recruiting, could it be done?” the answer was yes. Admittedly, this was a small sampling size, but professionals in all services would make joint recruiting work if directed by DOD or Congress.

Thus, the real question becomes “could it be accomplished more effectively and efficiently?” If it can’t be done better, then it isn’t worth the effort and cost of standing up a new combatant command. This is the toughest question of all to answer. In an attempt to answer this question, I’ll examine some of the difficulties the command must overcome to be successful.

The first challenge would be establishing a common goaling philosophy. “Goaling” is the process used to establish mission numbers for the field to achieve in order to meet monthly and yearly accession numbers. Each service approaches goaling differently. AFRS uses the exact number they need to make their accessions number and divides it among their groups according to a weighted formula. Any losses at a lower level must be replaced at that level on a one-for-one basis. If three of four
groups reached 100%, and the fourth group was less than 100%, AFRS would fail mission. The Army uses the same weighted approach at lower levels and the one-for-one replacement idea, however, they require the lower levels in the aggregate to exceed the USAREC total goal. Thus, every level below USAREC could miss goal, but USAREC could still make mission. This lowers the risk to the overall Army mission, but tends to reduce morale at the station levels carrying out the daily mission. The Marines follow the Air Force approach at the national level, but don’t receive goaling credit until the individual graduates from basic training. So, all basic training loses must be replaced by field recruiters, in addition to pre-shipping loses. The Marine Corps is convinced that making recruiters responsible all the way through basic training graduation reduces attrition and recruiter malpractice. These different schemes may seem trivial and easy to reconcile, but all recruiting processes and training programs are built around these schemes. Considerable time would be spent selecting one process over the others, in addition to changing the supporting processes behind this fundamental idea.

Another challenge would be personnel equity between the systems. Recruiter duty has different professional results in terms of promotion for each service, at least in terms of perception. Recruiter duty appears to have the best payoff for Marine Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), followed by Army NCOs. It is neutral for Navy and AF enlisted NCOs, as well as officers. The Marine officers also do very well for promotion. The perception among most Army officers is that recruiting duty does not help them, and in fact, can hurt them. If USRECCOM were truly joint, individuals serving the same tour, with the same meritorious service, could have very different career paths.
The Major in the Marines could get promoted and make Colonel, while an Army Major could be passed over and retire at twenty years. These perceived inequalities would make filling Army billets in this new joint command difficult. In order to overcome this, Service headquarters would have to embrace this new joint recruiting command as a full up combatant command, equal with all other combatant commands for promotion and career opportunities.

A third challenge is the wide range of diverse programs. Just because the services combine recruiting does not mean the programs would be combined. It still makes sense that the Army will offer the highest enlistment bonuses and college funds, especially right now, because they need the most people and are having the hardest time recruiting. Thus, joint program costs will not automatically go down. If recruiters recruit for all services, training costs and recruiter irregularities could go up, because they’d have to learn a lot more material. Also, customer service could suffer due to the quantity of material the recruiters would be required to learn, and re-learn given the frequency with which these programs change.

The last challenge I’ll address is the recruiting cultural differences between the services. While these differences are hard to quantify, the Joint Advertising Market Research & Studies (JAMRS) program conducts a recruiter quality of life survey approximately every two years. The results of this survey give an idea of how recruiters inside each service feel about recruiting. It is a way to compare recruiting duty across services and over time. In Figure 3 below, job satisfaction is shown for the years from 1996 through 2005. The Army recruiters are always the most dissatisfied with their jobs, followed by the Navy, Marines and then AF.
Figure 3. Satisfaction with recruiting from 1996 through 2005

The differences between work environment and expectations are also apparent in these surveys. Figure 4 shows the number of recruiters from each service that worked more than 60 hours per week. The Marines work the most, followed closely by the Army. There is a drop of about 10% points in the mid-90’s growing to over 20% for the Navy versus the Army and Marines. But the AF has the greatest difference between the other services. AF recruiters would definitely have a different expectation in terms of work week requirements.

Figure 4 – Percent of recruiters working more than 60 hours per week
This might or might not have a direct correlation to the next question, but AF recruiters were the most likely to stay in recruiting if offered the choice, with Army recruiters the least likely to stay (see Figure 5). While these charts don’t offer conclusions themselves, they do suggest that each service has a unique culture with different expectations built into their recruiting force. A key fact, not discussed yet, is that the majority of recruiters are young enlisted Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines that haven’t been exposed to joint service previously. These differences would have to be addressed, during the merger, to set expectations for the organization that all individuals understood and embraced. The more joint the organization and the lower the organizational merger goes, the more important setting these expectations becomes.

![Figure 5 – Percent of recruiters who would remain in recruiting if given the choice](image)

One final example of an attempt to combine dissimilar recruiting operations took place in the Navy. In 2002, Navy active recruiting combined with Navy reserve recruiting. This merger had fewer apparent challenges. It involved a single service, with one goaling policy, one career path, and one culture. Their primary challenge was
teaching recruiters to sell separate programs. Was the program effective or efficient? From FY 2002 – 2007, the NRC made goal in the active program all six years and reserve goals in 02, 03, 04 and 07. They missed the reserve goal in 2005 and 2006.\textsuperscript{81} I’m not suggesting that this mission failure was strictly due to structure changes; or that this means that joint recruiting will be ineffective and inefficient. Although, it does suggests that combining separate recruiting missions is not as easy as proponents might suggest or wish.

Conclusion

Joint recruiting isn’t the panacea proponents suggested in the late 1990’s. Nor does it assure the certain disintegration of our military traditions that some service hardliners insisted would happen if the service recruiting commands were forced to merge. However, the environment and timing is not yet right for joint recruiting. Over the last decade, the services have approached recruiting in a responsible manner. They downsized organizational structure by leveraging automated information systems and introducing better business processes. Along the way, the services have increased effectiveness and efficiency, and saved money and manpower for reinvestment elsewhere in the military.

That being said, if joint recruiting were mandated, USRSPTCOM is the right bridging organizational structure. A recruiting functional combatant command, like USRECCOM, is one step too far. The support command, USRSPTCOM, should be tested and implemented first. There would be many challenges to overcome with establishing this command, but each service should be able to continue their unique recruiting mission while this command is stood up. This whole process would take at
least three to five years. At the end of this period, USRSPTCOM would have a much better handle on how much and how well the services had integrated. Then, and only then, if the business rules and processes were worked out, should USRECCOM even be considered.

It is important that DOD find opportunities to influence this process in order to best shape the outcome. We must continue to look at joint recruiting and decide when, and if, the time is right. Standing up a USRSPTCOM or USRECCOM would be painful. That is expected with any change. However, it is most important the pain produces worthwhile results on the other side; not only for the recruiters, the military, the DOD, but also for the nation. We are the experts, who need to guide and drive the process, not have the process drive us, because we don’t want to rock the boat and try something new.

As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote, “The men and women in uniform today are, without question, the finest military in the world-probably the finest military the world has ever seen. The concept of an all-volunteer force has been a booming success. It works and it works well.” Yes, it costs a lot of money…that is the price the nation must pay for an AVF that is representative of our free society. It is DOD’s responsibility to ensure we are effectively and efficiently spending those dollars to recruit the best and brightest young men and women into the United States Armed Forces. We must continue to search for the right structure and business practices to spend those precious dollars in the right way, at the right time, to get the most buying power for each dollar spent, because America deserves no less.
Endnotes


3 Ibid., 36.

4 Ibid., 2-4.


7 Rostker, I Want You!, 96.


10 Rostker, I Want You!, 78 – 96.


20 U.S. General Accounting Office, More Innovative Approaches, 57. Note: The number of recruiters in this section does not match the number presented in Table 1. The number shown in Table 1 was the number of recruiters actually recruiting individuals (called “on-production” or “on-the-bag” recruiters) when the table was created. The 6,279 + 1,774 = 8,053 is the number of authorized Army Active and Reserve recruiters.

21 USAREC homepage and USAAC G2, 4.

22 United States Army War College (USAWC) Focus Group with five Lieutenant Colonels, one foreign officer, and one Department of the Army civilian. The Focus group discussion was held 14 January 2008 at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. All seven individuals had previous recruiting experience. The focus group had previous commanders from the Air Force, Army, and Marine recruiting commands along with a civilian from the Department of the Army headquarters level. One Army National Guard officer was also in the meeting initially along with an Italian Army Officer with experience at the headquarters level. The focus group discussion was held to compare levels of command, functions, support, and the practicality of combining recruiting and at what level recruiting could be combined (if practical). The discussion covered strategic, operational, and tactical level issues. The major consensus of the group was that joint recruiting was impractical right now due to the many conflicts in business practices, lack of common systems, and diverse cultures. However, if forced to combined, the best way to approach joint recruiting is by merging administrative and support functions only.


24 USAAC G2, 4.


26 More Innovative Approaches, 58.

27 USAAC G2, 4.
Ibid.

U.S. Navy Recruiting Command.

More Innovative Approaches, 60, and USAAC G2, 4.

More Innovative Approaches, 60.

USAAC G2, 4.


USAAC G2, 4 and Col Mario Campos, Commander, 372nd Recruiting Group, telephone interview by author, 2 February 2008, and Don Bohn, Head of Legislative and Resource Planning Division, N53, Navy Recruiting Command, interview by author, 27 February 2008 and USAWC Focus Group, 14 January 2008. NOTE: This comparison is not exact. I used the USAAC G2 slide as the starting point but altered the chart based on conversations with the persons listed above. The Navy, Air Force and Marine columns were altered to more accurately reflect the command relationships when compared to Army levels. In the Navy and Air Force cases, the zone and flight levels were moved down one box. For the Marines, the Regions, districts, and stations were moved up and the substations were moved down. The Marine and AF officers in the focus group agreed these changes better matched the intent of the Army structure. For example, the E-7s at the flight level for the AF do not have any command authority, so they should not be compared to the O-3 at the company command level. It should also be noted that the number of recruiters in the chart was updated to show authorized and actual (at the time the chart was created).


39 The National Priorities Project.


41 Ibid., 45, 59, 75. Note: The AF active duty average numbers are impacted by a large decrease in 2004 and 2005 due to force structure cuts. The range of enlistment bonuses is a low in 2005 at $21M and a high in 2001 at $123.8M.

42 DOD Needs to Establish Objectives, npn, and NPP Home Page.


44 Ibid., 129.

45 Ibid., 130.


48 Note: The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is a Code 2 (SES 4 star equivalent), the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is a Code 3 (SES 4 star equivalent) and the Deputy Under Secretary for Military Personnel Policy is a Code 4 (SES 3 star equivalent). Available in a letter from OSD to DOD on order of precedence for protocol available from www.calguard.ca.gov/protocol/Documents/DODorderofprecedence.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 February 2008.


50 Col Mario Campos, Commander, 372nd Recruiting Group and Lt Col Richard Barton, Deputy Commander, 372nd Recruiting Group, 20 December, 2007. Col Mario Campos has also been the Director of Support (RSS) at AFRS Headquarters, Deputy Commander of the 367th Recruiting Group and the 342nd Recruiting Squadron Commander. This phone conversation concentrated on all three options and the structures and resources it would take to implement each option. Col Campos and Lt Col Barton were confident that joint recruiting could work all the way to the recruiter level. Between Col Campos, Lt Col Barton, and the author Lt Col Brown, they have 14 years of active recruiting experience at all levels. Both Col Campos and Lt Col Brown have gone through major restructuring efforts of AFRS at all levels.
The 30% was the author’s personal experience during a reduction in manpower during a previous assignment. However, one data point does not make policy or form correct structure. Thus, the author acknowledges the need for a comprehensive realistic manpower study that doesn’t have a predetermined required reduction number. The study would address the workload and then determine the manpower required to accomplish the required tasks.

USMEPCOM Home Page.

USAWC Focus Group.

Note: Currently the services are not required to use the same sales programs. The Marines and AF use PSS Inc. and the AF Reserve uses IMPACT. The Brooks Group Home Page, available from https://www.brooksgroup.com/about/casestudies/usafr.htm; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008. The other service programs were not available.

USAWC Focus Group.

Col Mario Campos and Lt Col Richard Barton.

Note: The millions figure is an estimate based on the following information…GSA charges $172 / month and $.13 / mile for a Sedan, compact. With no bulk discounts and for recruiters only, that would be over $32M for the cars alone, without mileage. Of course, commanders and other support personnel also get cars and mileage must be paid. A bulk contract for all four services versus just one service; thus, has the potential to save millions of dollars. U.S. General Services Administration Home Page, “Vehicles and Fleet Services,” available from http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSA_BASIC&contentId=17102&noc=T; Internet; accessed 25 January 2008.

More Innovative Approaches, 38.


64 More Innovative Approaches, 38.


66 Note: The FY 2008 goals are 184,767 for the four service active and reserve components only (minus AF Reserve). USAAC G2, 4.

67 More Innovative Approaches, 38.

68 Col Mario Campos and Lt Col Richard Barton.

69 USAWC Focus Group.

70 Col Mario Campos, Lt Col Richard Barton, and personal knowledge. The author worked in that section during a previous assignment. The weight of different values changes over the years but not the concept.


72 USAWC Focus Group.


74 USAAC G2, 31.

75 USAAC G2, 28-29.

76 Note: “These recruiter irregularities range from administrative paperwork errors, to actions such as failing to disclose disqualifying eligibility criteria or instructing applicants not to reveal medical conditions or prior civil litigation, to criminal violations committed by a recruiter who is subsequently prosecuted under articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Criminal violations may include such actions as sexual harassment and falsifying documents.” Recruiter Irregularities, 3.

77 USAAC G2, 32.
USAAC G2, 33. Note: 2005 was an abnormal year due to lower goals and drastic reductions in end strength for the AF.

USAAC G2, 34.


NRC Home Page.
