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NATIONAL GUARD PRE-MOBILIZATION TRAINING CERTIFICATION:
54 WAYS TO SKIN A CAT

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
On January 19, 2007 the Secretary of Defense announced significant changes to the mobilization of reserve component (RC) forces in support of the Global War on Terror. Most notably, RC forces would only serve 12 months of active duty for each mobilization. This would be accomplished by conducting a substantial portion of their pre-deployment certification training prior to mobilization, reducing the required post-mobilization training time to approximately 2 months leaving the remaining 10 months for active employment in the theater of operations.

The current conduct of pre-mobilization training certification (PMTC) is duplicative, confused, and nonstandardized and this paper will outline ways to remedy these shortcomings. This paper will analyze three different states that recently completed the process of establishing teams to conduct the PMTC. The research will focus on how the teams are structured and manned, their specific roles and responsibilities and how they are funded and resourced. The research will also look at the methods and procedures employed to certify training.
NATIONAL GUARD PRE-MOBILIZATION TRAINING CERTIFICATION:  
54 WAYS TO SKIN A CAT

The trained American possesses qualities that are almost unique. ...his initiative and resourcefulness, his adaptability to change and his readiness to resort to the expedient, he becomes, when he has attained a proficiency in all the normal techniques of battle, a formidable soldier.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

On January 19, 2007 the Secretary of Defense announced significant changes to the mobilization of reserve component (RC) forces in support of the Global War on Terror. One of the major changes was the shifting of all individual tasks to be trained and certified prior to mobilization. This is a monumental undertaking for the National Guard (NG). They are fully capable of accomplishing this requirement, but they are executing it from a running start. That means each state must build, train, and equip a team capable of certifying the pre-mobilization training concurrently as units are conducting the training. Certification entails ensuring that the training was conducted to standard. There is no halt in the mobilization process.

As there are 54 different states and territories – often said 54 different Armies – there could be 54 different ways to execute this requirement. Current policies and procedures are not standardized among the 54 states and territories. The current conduct of pre-mobilization training certification (PMTC) is duplicative, confused, and nonstandardized and this paper will outline ways to remedy these shortcomings.

This paper will examine the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) plan and guidance for the conduct of PMTC and its coordination with First Army. It will also examine three states that have completed the process of establishing teams to conduct the PMTC for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in each of their states. The focus will be on
how the teams were structured and manned, their specific roles and responsibilities, the methods and procedures used to certify training and how they were funded and resourced. Recommendations are provided on how to best organize and man a Pre-Mobilization Training and Assistance Element (PTAE) and conduct the PMTC for mobilizing NG units. Concluding thoughts are also provided to consider future utilization of this new capability.

Background Information

The concept of pre-mobilization training for RC forces is not new. It has been part of the planned method of RC mobilization since the end of the Viet Nam war – mobilize, train, and deploy. Every company size RC unit is required to maintain a mobilization binder that contains the commander’s pre-mobilization training plan for a specified number of days, based on the unit’s level of readiness and the latest arrival date to the theater. At the conclusion of the pre-mobilization period the unit would be mobilized, complete home station processing and then travel to the mobilization station, usually for an extended period of time to complete the required training and validate their readiness for deployment to a theater of operation.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm only one NG infantry brigade was able to meet the Army’s validation standard for deployment to Iraq. The 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, was retained at the National Training Center at Ft Irwin, CA completing one iteration after another until they finally achieved the standard for validation. Prior to 2007, the average length of time for post-mobilization training for NG combat brigades deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was 5 months. Then they deployed to theater for a minimum of 12 months “boots on the
ground” (BOG)\textsuperscript{5} followed by redeployment, through their mobilization station, for out
processing. These NG units spent an average of 18 months mobilized and away from
their families and jobs.

This strategy was sound during the cold war, when the Army was made up of 18
divisions and the RC forces were considered the strategic reserve. There was ample
time to get RC forces trained and validated prior to the time when they would be
required for deployment into battle. But when Secretary Robert Gates shifted the RC
forces from a strategic reserve force to an operational force the requirements changed
significantly. The plan of mobilize, train and deploy was no longer sufficient. A new plan
was designed to reduce the required post-mobilization training time by accomplishing all
individual tasks prior to mobilization.

In December 2006 the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker received a
status of forces briefing that listed the entire active component and RC forces currently
deployed or recently deployed. It also listed which units were going through
transformation\textsuperscript{6} and when they would be available for deployment. The summary of the
briefing was “we’re out of Schlitz.” The Department of the Army (DA) was facing a
problem of how to continue providing forces to sustain the current operations.

The general consensus in December 2006 regarding the deployment of RC forces
under the partial mobilization, Title 10 USC 12302\textsuperscript{7} was that it was limited to 24
cumulative months of duty in support of an operation (under Executive Order). The RC
forces were nearly out of available “mob time” under this interpretation. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) saw it differently, as the partial mobilization was limited to
24 months consecutive months of duty in support of an operation. RC units could be subsequently mobilized for additional periods not to exceed 24 months.

On January 19, 2007 the Secretary of Defense changed the mobilization guidance making a significant impact to the mobilization of RC forces in support of the Global War on Terror. Most notably, RC forces would only serve 12 months of active duty for each mobilization. It established a goal for RC units of 5 years between deployments, referred to as the dwell time, but units could be recalled at any time. If the dwell time goal was broken the RC members would be due additional incentives and or compensation. This change also added a provision to allow non-qualified Soldiers to be mobilized to attend training yet that time would not count toward their limit of 12 months of total mobilization time.

The new mobilization policy acknowledged that the 12-month BOG time for RC units was no longer attainable because it was dependent on the amount of post-mobilization training a unit required. Therefore, RC BOG time could be maximized by conducting a substantial portion of the pre-deployment certification training prior to mobilization. The goal was to reduce the required post-mobilization training time to approximately 2 months, leaving 10 months BOG in the theater of operation.

All of these changes were significant, but one of the biggest was the change that limited Stop Loss to only 90 days prior to mobilization. If a unit was not stabilized until 90 days prior to mobilization it would continue to require individual replacements up until that time. It was not feasible to accomplish all of the required PMTC for individual replacements in 90 days prior to mobilization. It is certainly not the ideal situation for the development of a cohesive unit.
First Army

The concept of Reduced Post Mobilization Training (RPMT) started in a draft operation order from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in November 2006 and the final plan was approved by General Charles Campbell, FORSCOM Commander in February 2007. When asked about this subject Major General Stewart Rodeheaver, Deputy Commanding General for First Army, said the Army National Guard must build a higher level of readiness prior to mobilization, including medical readiness and the completion of required new equipment training (NET). This is essential in order to minimize the post-mobilization training time required to validate RC units for deployment, maximizing their BOG time and then ultimately redeployed, all within a 12 month window.

MG Rodeheaver discussed the problem with converting post-mobilization days to pre-mobilization days. The general rule First Army used was 1 post-mobilization day (16 hours) equaled 1 Inactive Duty Training (IDT) weekend commonly referred to as a drill weekend. By First Army’s calculations a RC unit that commits all available training time after receiving an alert 18 months prior to mobilization can reduce the post-mobilization training time by 42 days (18 weekend and 2 x 12 available training-days of Annual Training).

MG Rodeheaver emphasized the importance of ensuring every Soldier gets the required training to be fully prepared for deployment and the importance of maintaining accurate records that document all the training received by every Soldier. First Army has received numerous congressional inquiries to examine the training records of RC Soldiers whose families claim they were not properly trained for combat operations. With a significant amount of the required training conducted prior to mobilization each
state’s Adjutant General will now have to answer these types of inquiries regarding the training they certified (although First Army ultimately has the responsibility of validating RC units for deployment into a theater of operation).

National Guard Bureau

Lieutenant Colonel Phil Torrence, the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) lead for PMTC, explained that the goal is to ensure all training is conducted to standard and properly documented giving the Adjutants General (TAGs) the tools they need to certify their units’ training.\textsuperscript{12}

The NGB is executing this Pre-Mobilization Training Certification and Validation operation in two phases.\textsuperscript{13} The transition phase began when the Secretary of Defense issued the change to the mobilization policy (January 19, 2007) and ends on September 30, 2008. This phase involves establishing the PTAE, training the personnel, documenting training, and certifying pre-mobilization training. The objective phase begins on October 1, 2008 and continues through completion of current operations. This phase is characterized by a fully manned and trained PTAE and units alerted for mobilization 2 years (730 days) in advance.

The PTAE command and control cell for each state consists of 3 personnel, one lieutenant colonel, one major and a senior noncommissioned officer (master sergeant or sergeant major). They provide the leadership and direction for the Training Assistance (TA) teams and are responsible for the final recommendation to the TAG on a unit’s training certification. The TA personnel are the members of the PTAE that actually observe and assist (when required) the pre-mobilization training at the unit level.
The TA personnel ensure the mobilizing unit’s training is conducted to standard and properly documented. They also communicate updates as training requirements change and provide the latest training, techniques and procedures (TTPs). They provide the independent unbiased assessment for TAGs to evaluate and certify the pre-mobilization training of their alerted units.

The PTAE is currently being funded from Title 32 funds on Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS).\textsuperscript{14} The NGB has submitted a request to the Department of the Army for 162 additional authorizations (3 for each state and territory) on their master Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)\textsuperscript{15} to permanently fill this 3 person command and control (C2) cell requirement for all 54 states and territories.

The current funding model for the PTAE is 1:60 for all units within 730 days of mobilization. For example, a state with an IBCT is authorized and funded for 57 PTAE personnel. The NGB will soon be moving to a new funding model that is 1:30, but only for units within 365 days of mobilization.\textsuperscript{16} It is a requirement that all PTAE personnel are combat veterans and recommended that they have recent experience in the same theater of operation as the mobilizing unit. TA team personnel are preferably Captains and Staff Sergeants that are not from the mobilizing unit. First Army will conduct Observer Controller/Trainer courses for all of the TA team personnel to attend. They should also attend the Total Army Instructor Trainer Course and Small Group Instructor Course.

All PTAE personnel are traditional guardsmen that recently returned from a deployment and volunteer to remain on active duty for up to two years. In most cases they will work away from their homes, moved to their new duty location at the state
headquarters or near the state’s major training installation. There is currently no additional structure provided to the state headquarters to man the PTAE, so Soldiers are detailed from their current unit to support this mission. They can drill and attend annual training with their home units, if they can find the time, because they are already working at least two weekends each month. They cannot receive any additional funds for performing duty with their unit because they are already on active duty and cannot get paid anything extra for drill. The NGB is exploring the possibility of utilizing a temporary TDA authorization that could move between states as required to assign TA personnel in support of the PMTC for a BCT or other large formation.  

The NGB is examining the issue of what to do with the PTAE after a state has completed the task of certifying their BCT for mobilization. The NGB encourages states to support each other with their PTAEs and is considering the possibility of developing regional support teams that can be used to support PMTC for a variety of mobilizing units in a specified geographic region. Additionally, NGB encourages states to send their TA personnel to support TSBs at mobilization stations after they have completed the in-state pre-mobilization training. 

Lieutenant Colonel Torrence recommends that states build their pre-mobilization training plan around a quality Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), ensuring that Soldiers are fully deployable or deficiencies are identified early to allow plenty of time to take corrective actions required. This supports the concept of building the unit and then stabilizing it during the pre-mob training and on through the deployment. 

The NGB has produced over half of the individual mobilization tasks as distance learning (DL) products available to Soldiers online. The NGB encourages states to pay
Soldiers for completing this type of required mobilization training online. This is an efficient way of conducting required training and it is easy to certify.

**Arkansas Army National Guard (39 IBCT)**

Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bridges is the Officer in Charge of the Arkansas Army National Guard (AR ARNG) PTAE. This PTAE is aligned under the Regional Training Institute (RTI) that is under the oversight of the Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) Director of Operations (G3), Colonel Ross. Lieutenant Colonel Bridges is currently assigned as the Operations Officer for the RTI, on their TDA. The PTAE is further placed under direct control of the JFHQ G3. This task organization was effective, meeting the requirements of the PTAE and enabling a quality command and control relationship.

The PTAE C2 cell is organized similar to a battalion headquarters staff with an administrative and personnel, operations and logistics sections under the direction of an executive officer. The PTAE is organized into battalion specific TA teams to support individual mobilizing units. TA teams consist of 3-5 personnel. The AR ARNG PTAE currently has 44 personnel assigned after losing over 30 TA team personnel that returned to their units in November 2007 to deploy with the 39 IBCT.

The AR ARNG PTAE went through an extremely detailed process to fully qualify their PTAE members. They successfully utilized the state headquarters’ human resource office (HRO) to process the numerous applications they received. This also gave the HRO complete visibility of the Soldiers entering on active duty and they assisted with the in processing. The PTAE needed quality Soldiers with recent combat experience, but not expected to deploy with the 39 IBCT. They sent all of these Soldiers
through a series of schools, including Observer Controller/Trainer (OC/T) Course, Total Army Instructor Trainer Course and Small Group Instructor Course, in order to be fully qualified.

The 39 IBCT was officially alerted on April 6, 2007 to provide 28 security force companies along with the subordinate battalions and brigade headquarters performing other missions (approximately 3,000 Soldiers) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They spent the time from alert through the end of September 2007 organizing the units to meet the mission requirements, conducting initial SRP, NET and getting started on the required individual tasks referred to as Theater Specific Individual Readiness Tasks (TSIRT). The 39 IBCT then put the entire mobilizing force on duty from October 10 through the mobilization date, December 21, 2007. They trained at Camp Robinson, Fort Chaffee and home station, using this time to complete the required PMTC and issuing the sized Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI),\textsuperscript{21} items. They reported to the mobilization station, Camp Shelby, MS in early January, 2008.

The PTAE did very little training or training support, as the IBCT had enough qualified instructors and a good plan to accomplish the required training. The PTAE had worked with the IBCT ensuring their leaders and trainers were well aware of the training requirements, the standards and documentation methods.

The AR ARNG PTAE is the only team in the National Guard currently utilizing Common Access Cards (CAC) cards – commonly known as Military ID cards – to document Soldiers participation in a PMTC event. They purchased 50 bar scanners at a cost of $110,000 for that purpose. The PTAE dissected the required tasks, identified all the subtasks, and then created a bar code for each one. This included all the TSIRT,
Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills. Then for every PMTC event a member from the PTAE would scan their card and the card of the primary instructor, the unit commander or his designated representative and every Soldier that participated in the training. This provided a time and date record of everyone that participated in that training event. That information is then sent electronically to the state headquarters for loading into the master data base.

A task is not complete until all the sub-tasks are complete. Often a unit is not able to complete all the sub-tasks of a given task during an IDT weekend and is forced to finish the remaining sub-tasks during the next IDT weekend. The tracking of who has completed what tasks and sub-tasks is a true challenge. Lieutenant Colonel Bridges of the AR ARNG PTAE claims that using the CAC card scanners to track the PMCT is a great way to have an accurate and automated record of who has completed what training. However, First Army currently requires hand written signatures as the standard for supporting documentation of the training conducted. The Training Support Brigade (TSB) at Camp Shelby, MS accepted all the PMT conducted by the 39 IBCT. They said “if a state says it was trained and certified, then they have no questions.”

When asked about keys to success, Lieutenant Colonel Bridges said it would not have been possible to track the training for a brigade sized unit without the use of some type of automation. The first group that his PTAE team certified was a small 30-man mayoral cell and they did it all manually, by hand written signatures, but he felt it would have been much more difficult accomplishing that requirement for all 3,000 Soldiers of the BCT. The data base information gave wide visibility and provided transparency on every Soldier.
Once the 39 IBCT completed the training and the last files were uploaded into the database the PTAE C2 cell prepared a presentation for the G3. They demonstrated the process used to ensure that every Soldier had been properly trained and that training was properly documented. Each major staff section at the Joint Forces Headquarters, including the Inspector General, also presented a certification memorandum that explained what had taken place in their area of support to prepare and ensure the 39 IBCT was ready for deployment. All of these certification letters, along with a disc containing the training documentation was presented to the Adjutant General with a final certification letter for his signature. This packet was forwarded through the Army National Guard Training Branch Chief for Pre-Mobilization Training Certification for final signature and validation by the Director of the Army National Guard.

Indiana Army National Guard (76 IBCT)

Lieutenant Colonel Rodney Babb is the Officer-in-Charge of the Indiana Army National Guard (IN ARNG) PTAE and the guidance that their PTAE operated under limited their role and responsibility to only training certification and not training assistance or support. In Indiana the leadership felt strongly that units train units. Their team was only manned by 32 personnel, but Lieutenant Colonel Babb projects a growth to 45 personnel in training year 2009 based on additional guidance from the IN ARNG G3. The NGB model (1:60) would have authorized them 72 personnel. Because of the limited manning of the IN PTAE they were only able to observe approximately half of the training tasks conducted. They had to rely on unit commanders and quality audits to ensure the balance of the training was completed for certification.
The IN ARNG was officially alerted on April 6, 2007 that the 76 IBCT would mobilize 3,400 Soldiers to perform security force operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 76 IBCT would mobilize in late December 2007 and report to their mobilization station at Fort Stewart, GA.

The 76 IBCT did most of their own training, forcing them to closely manage their trainers to ensure they also got all of the required training accomplished. The 76 IBCT effectively used the 205 Infantry Battalion, First Army’s training support battalion, based at Camp Atterbury, IN to assist with their PMT. These units had a long working relationship and this relationship fostered an effective method of conducting PMTC.

The 76 IBCT started conducting PMT 2-3 months prior to the IN ARNG PTAE becoming fully operational in July 2007. Once the PTAE started reviewing the training records and documentation they found problems with standardization, creating some accounting problems. The problems were resolved by the PTAE and ensured what was entered into the First Army Commander’s Training Tool (CTT) for certification was correct and supported with documentation. They ensured that every sub-task under a Warrior Task or Battle Drill was accounted for and completed prior to a Soldier getting credit for completion of the task.

The IN ARNG JFHQ started conducting the SRP for the 76 IBCT after they received their alert and continued it every month until completion in November 2007. As Soldiers were determined unfit for mobilization they had to be replaced. This was a problem because the units were not actually solidified until every Soldier had cleared the SRP.
The 76 IBCT conducted a 3-week pre-mobilization training event at Camp Atterbury, IN for the entire IBCT in August 2007 called PMT 7.0. This training focused on completing the required NET, Warrior Task Training (WTT), and individual and crew served weapons qualification. The NET involved well over half the 76 IBCT and took up about half the available training time. The 76 IBCT enlisted the support of the 205 Infantry Battalion for some of the training and used another outside unit to conduct their weapons qualification ranges, but most of the training was conducted internally by each company. The 76 IBCT conducted a 2-week make-up training event in September 2007, called PMT 7.2 for units and Soldiers that were added to the unit after the initial training.

The 76 IBCT conducted a final brigade-wide 3-week PMT event called PMT 8.0. This training event required the use of four different locations (Ft Campbell and Ft Knox, KY, Camp Atterbury, IN and Camp Grayling, MI) and selections were based on geographic proximity to the different units. The training took place from mid-October to mid-November and included 1-week at home station to complete the issuing of the sized RFI items. The main focus of the training was the completion of the TSIRT and all the weapons qualification tasks that must be completed within 6 months of arrival to the theater of operations. The 76 IBCT also conducted training on gun truck certification, but not many units were able to achieve certification due to significant crew turbulence. The units still felt it was valuable training and exposed their Soldiers to the standards of the task and provided them with experience and confidence that will enable them to perform the task better during post-mobilization training certification.

The 76 IBCT conducted a 2-week make-up PMT event, referred to as PMT 8.2. This actually was two 1-week training events repeated consecutively for any Soldiers
that needed to complete the required PMTC tasks. They trained 600-700 Soldiers at Camp Atterbury, IN using the 205 Infantry Battalion as the primary trainers for most events. At the conclusion of the PMT the 76 IBCT achieved 90-95% completion on all individual tasks.

The PTAE maintained close coordination with the companies and battalions under the 76 IBCT as they input the results of their training into the First Army CTT. They conducted a 10% audit of each company to ensure the required documentation was present for all the tasks annotated as complete. They were satisfied with the results of their audit and recommended to the G3 that the Adjutant General certify the 76 IBCT pre-mobilization training.

The 76 IBCT mobilized on December 10, 2007 at Camp Atterbury, IN where they completed final administrative actions and training prior to moving to their mobilization station at Ft Stewart, GA on January 2, 2008. The PTAE is still unsure how much post-mobilization training time will be required for the 76 IBCT. Their goal is 60 days, but not more than 90 days. They have received limited feedback from the TSB that will ultimately be responsible for validating the 76 IBCT for their deployment.

Lieutenant Colonel Babb said that the First Army CTT provided good visibility on the status of training of each unit and individual Soldier. He also said the IN ARNG authorizes Soldiers to conduct on-line training for required courses such as Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) training on their own time and receive credit and pay for performing a drill period. This flexible training allowed the 76 IBCT to accomplish some of the special training required and provided Soldiers the opportunity to complete the training on their own schedule.
Some of the things Lieutenant Colonel Babb said he would do differently would be to conduct an initial coordination meeting with the TSB that would be responsible for training the 76 IBCT at the mobilization station to clarify requirements and establish correct expectations. The TSB started contacting units to request information and it became a burden for units to respond to multiple entities. Another change would be to conduct a quality SRP at the beginning of the training cycle. For example, there must be a dental screening to identify Soldiers with problems and allow them the opportunity to get the issues resolved on their own if possible or other arrangements made with ample time to recover outside of training.

The 76 IBCT suffered from a lack of mission essential equipment like optics for weapons that negatively impacted their ability to complete some of the required training. These types of equipment shortages must be identified early and elevated for appropriate action. The 76 IBCT lost several Soldiers that had to attend special schools. Soldiers requiring special training should attend courses early in the training cycle or ensure they are scheduled around other major training events to ensure they complete the required training with their unit. Another option is to schedule a mobile training team to conduct a course on-site specifically for the mobilizing Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The Deployment Manning Document (DMD) remained incomplete, impacting many different areas. The early SRP will help solidify the DMD, but the current stop loss policy does not allow units to stabilize until 90 days prior to mobilization.

Oklahoma Army National Guard (45 IBCT)

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fuller is the Officer in Charge of PTAE for the Oklahoma Army National Guard (OK ARNG). He was mobilized to deploy with the 45
IBCT after a few key personnel at the mobilization station were categorized as non-deployable.

The OK ARNG PTAE was authorized to hire 60 personnel to support their team. They had difficulty manning the team, only hiring about 20 personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Fuller sent TA personnel to the units to certify training. They reported back that there was a sense of disbelief from the units and the leadership that any of the pre-mobilization training they conducted would be accepted by the TSB. There was an institutional paradigm that no matter what they did during pre-mobilization they would have to repeat it at the mobilization station.

The OK ARNG was officially alerted on April 6, 2007 that the 45 IBCT would mobilize approximately 2,500 Soldiers to fill 22 Security Force companies in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The battalion headquarters would serve as Rear Area Operation Centers (RAOC) and the IBCT headquarters would serve as an Area Support Group (ASG) headquarters. They would report to their mobilization station, Ft Bliss, TX in November 2007.

The 45 IBCT conducted two major PMT events during the summer of 2007. The first event was 30 days long (July 7 – August 4) at Ft Chaffee, AR and Camp Gruber, OK. The primary focus of this training event was the completion of drivers training (40 hour requirement) and the Combat Life Saver Course (40 hour requirement). Unit integrity was broken and Soldiers were sent to these different courses. Units did conduct other training but it was not done to standard or properly documented and therefore could not be entered into the First Army CTT. The PTAE was still getting established and completing their own training requirements during this time. Once
available the TA personnel worked with the IBCT and subordinate units to explain the documentation standards and the importance of properly using the First Army CTT to document the training completed. The TA personnel were extremely valuable in advising commanders and unit trainers on how to effectively plan and accomplish the required PMTC.

The second PMT event was conducted for 3-weeks in September 2007 and was planned similar to the way training is executed at a mobilization station. The training was conducted by company as they rotated to different training events and the unit stayed together. They completed individual and crew served weapons qualification, RFI issue and SRP.

The 45 IBCT did very well in certain areas and not as well in others. When they reported to their mobilization station they had accomplished 85% weapons qualification and 86% security clearances, but only 27% had completed the required briefings and 9% completed the required individual tasks.\(^\text{25}\) Lieutenant Colonel Fuller explained this is not as bad as it appears, because these numbers only reflect the percentage of Soldiers that are 100% complete. There are many more Soldiers in the 90% range.

**Recommendations**

The creation of additional **TDA authorizations for the PTAE C2 cell** is a good start toward a real commitment to support this requirement. The Arkansas PTAE C2 cell is organized similar to a battalion staff with a Commander, Command Sergeant Major, XO, S1, S3 and S4. The Commander/OIC, XO and Command Sergeant Major positions should be permanent TDA positions and the other positions filled by volunteer Soldiers that are attached to the PTAE (for a 1-year assignment) from other nondeploying units.
Putting the most senior members of the PTAE in the TDA positions will ensure their focus is on the mission of training certification and not distracted by competing demands from their actual unit of assignment. Additionally, it removes them from a situation that could possibly keep them from providing the TAG the true and unbiased assessment of the training.

The **PTAE should be assigned to the RTI.** Each state has a senior leader with a different opinion regarding whether the PTAE should be assigned to the G/J-3 at the JFHQ or under the RTI. These concerns originate from the personalities and relationships of the leaders in those positions. That is not a solid foundation on which to make this type of decision. The PTAEs need resources, higher headquarters support and clear direction and guidance to facilitate their ability to execute the mission. The RTI has a core competency for training certification and is a TDA organization capable of absorbing this additional structure.

The NGB should continue to pursue the concept of **regional PTAEs** to help fill the gaps created as they move to a 365 day model for funding PMT. The ebb and flow of mobilizing units from one year to the next will create a constant turnover of TA personnel compounding the challenge of manning and training the PTAE. This will create a gap for states between the time a unit is alerted (730 days prior to mobilization) and the time they can hire the personnel to fill the PTAE (365 days prior to mobilization).

The PTAE must establish **contact with the TSB and the mobilization station** as early as possible to begin coordination on the methods and procedures for the pre- and post-mobilization training certification and validation. The 76 IBCT (IN ARNG) received great support from their local TSB in conducting the PMTC, but they over looked the
importance of making early coordination with the TSB at the mobilization station. This contact must continue throughout the PMT process ensuring unit status updates are provided on a regular schedule.

The **TA personnel should be encouraged to support the TSBs** at the mobilization station. The NGB encourages states to consider sending their TA personnel to support TSBs after the in-state pre-mobilization training is complete. The TA personnel will have to be put on Title 10 active duty orders for the period that they are supporting the TSB at the mobilization station because they are working for First Army and not available to the Governor. The TA personnel will remain engaged in the unit's mobilization and gain valuable experience regarding post-mobilization training that can be transferred to the PTAE, improving their overall effectiveness. This will further develop a positive working relationship between states and TSBs and increase the TSBs availability to provided valuable training support and assistance to units during their pre-mobilization training.

The use of the **CAC card to document Soldiers participation in PMT** should become the accepted standard. PTAEs should be funded to purchase the hand-held portable scanners and replicate the process used by the AR ARNG PTAE. This information is transmitted to a data base that automatically populates a master list of the required tasks and sub-tasks. There is no question of who was at training or what training has been accomplished and it provides instant visibility to all users.

The NGB should continue to **push pre-mobilization training to Distance Learning** (DL) to allow Soldiers the flexibility to conduct these tasks online. This is an effective way to accomplish required PMT and it is easy to prove certification. The 76
IBCT (IN ARNG) capitalized on the NGB policy to allow Soldiers to be paid for completing DL training in lieu of attending drill. Mobilizing units should commit a set number of IDT periods to be conducted in a flexible status to complete specified DL training.

The states should continue to plan and conduct a **consolidated block of makeup PMT** prior to mobilization for the Soldiers and units that do not meet the established pre-mob training goals. All three states examined in this study successfully utilized a consolidated period of makeup PMT. The PTAE must be involved in this process at a predetermined decision point to notify Soldiers and ensure the funds and resources are available to support this training event.

The PTAE should be **training management consultants to unit commanders** from company through brigade. The 45 IBCT (OK ARNG) got results by employing their TA personnel as effective training management advisors to commanders and unit trainers. They are the experts most familiar with all the PMTC requirements and have the knowledge and experience regarding what methods work best. The TA personnel help ensure units are maximizing the available training time and focusing on the appropriate pre-mobilization training required for certification.

**Conclusion**

As long as RC forces remain an operational force and not a strategic reserve there will continue to be a requirement for the PTAE. The current mobilization policy further drives the requirement to validate as much training as possible prior to mobilization to maximize the BOG time.
PTAE and the pre/post mobilization training certification/validation will continue to evolve over the next couple of years. If the current operational tempo continues a very good solution will be developed. Innovation is the child of necessity and states will continue to refine this process finding new, better and more effective ways of meeting this requirement of ensuring no Soldier or unit deploys to a theater of operations untrained. Standardization is essential, but there must be room for some creative innovation to explore new methods in a safe environment.

The NGB has successfully implemented the PMTC from a running start and the states examined in this study demonstrate outstanding professionalism and a strong desire to train Soldiers and do the right thing. Although currently the conduct of PMCT is duplicative, confused and nonstandardized these recommendations provide an opportunity to improve the overall process and work toward achieving better trained and ready units. The NG is scheduled to provide up to six BCTs each year in support of the global war on terrorism. There are many opportunities ahead to continue to improve this extremely important task of PMTC.

Stop loss is an issue that requires further study. Each state interviewed expressed a desire for it to be in effect at least 365 days prior to mobilization if not as soon as the unit was officially notified of a deployment, ideally at 720 days prior to mobilization.

When the operational tempo eventually subsides and the military resumes steady-state, peace-time operations the NGB should retain the authorization for the PTAE C2 cell. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) training model (or something similar) will remain in effect and this cell can shift its focus, but continue to provide quality training oversight and training readiness tracking for all units within the state. It will
remain available to resume the responsibility for conducting PMTC if required in the future.

Endnotes


2 U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), G3 Training Division, FORSCOM Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Operations in Southwest Asia (SWA), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), G3 Training Division, 21 September 2007). Currently pre-mobilization training requirements are covered in the South-West Asia guidance from the commander of Forces Command (FORSCOM). There are over 130 individual Soldier pre-mobilization training tasks.

3 Latest arrival date, commonly referred to as LAD is a planning figure used to ensure forces are flowed into a theater of operation when they are required. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 October 2007), 308; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 December 2007.

4 “48th Infantry Brigade (Enhanced) (Mechanized) “Old Gray Bonnet,”” available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/48in-bde.htm; Internet; accessed 19 December 2007. More than 4,500 members of the 48th enhanced Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard were mobilized in 1990 to participate in Desert Storm. The unit successfully completed the most intensive training ever conducted at the Army’s National Training Center in California, and was the first and only National Guard combat brigade validated as combat ready for the Gulf War. The conflict ended before the brigade was employed in the Persian Gulf.

5 Boots on the Ground or commonly referred to as BOG is the actual time spent in a theater of operations. The Department of the Army (DA) policy was 12 months BOG for all Army units until the changes to the mobilization policy on January 19, 2007. The new DA policy is 15 months with a goal of 12 months for active duty units and RC units BOG is undefined due to the uncertainty of required post-mobilization training. RC units will mobilize for a maximum of 12 months including time required for post-mobilization training. U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) for Contingency Operations in Support of GWOT (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 13 February 2008).

6 Transformation refers to the conversion of Army forces from the legacy force organization to the new modular brigade combat team organization. This transformation was accelerated by the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, taking advantage of the current conflicts to support the required funding required for this action. U.S. Department of the Army, 2003 U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 November 2003).
Title 10 United States Code 12302 provides the authority to the President of the United States to conduct partial mobilization of the reserve component forces for up to 24 months. *Armed Forces*, U.S. Code, Chap. 1209, Sec. 12302 (2006).


Stop Loss is a personnel policy that freezes all movement in a unit that is alerted for a mobilization. Soldiers that are scheduled to leave the unit because they have completed their service contract are involuntarily extended. No transfers out of the unit are approved. This is to stabilize the unit as they prepare for the ensuing mobilization and subsequent deployment. U.S. Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) for Contingency Operations in Support of GWOT* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 13 February 2008).

Major General Stewart Rodeheaver, Deputy Commanding General for First Army, Ft Gillem, GA, telephone interview by author, 15 October 2007. MG Rodeheaver is a NG officer on a title 10 tour. He previously served as the 48 IBCT Commanding General and led that unit in Iraq during OIF (Jun 05-May 06).

The standard annual training period for a National Guard unit is 15 days. This calculation takes into account 2 days of travel and at least 1 day of recovery that are not counted as days available for training. U.S. Department of the Army, *National Guard Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army National Guard Training*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 June 1991), 2-2, c, pg. 8 and based on author’s personal experience.

Lieutenant Colonel Phil Torrence, the NGB lead for Pre-Mob Training Certification, NGB Readiness Center, telephone interview by author, 12 October 2007.


Title 32 funds are provided to each state by the NGB to cover the costs associated with putting NG Soldiers on duty while under the control of the Governor. In the context of this paper it specifically refers to Soldiers on duty in support of a mobilization and is considered Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS). Soldiers in this duty status are funded to conduct training and support in preparation for a mobilization. *Armed Forces*, U.S. Code, Title 32, Chap. 1, Sec. 113 (2006).


Lieutenant Colonel Phil Torrence, the NGB lead for Pre-Mob Training Certification, NGB Readiness Center, telephone interview by author, 8 January 2008.

Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bridges, OIC for the AR ARNG PTAE, telephone interview by author, 2 January 2008. He is also the S3 for the AR ARNG RTI.


The First Army Commander’s Training Tool, commonly referred to as the CTT is an Excel workbook. It has a series of spreadsheets that contain all the required tasks and sample training documentation to support the completed tasks. This is the format that First Army wants units to use for the PMTC documentation.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fuller, OIC for the OK ARNG PTAE, telephone interview by author, 18 December 2007. He was preparing to leave his post and deploy with the 45 IBCT. He would be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Baldridge.

First Army, “First Army Pre and Post Mobilization Training,” brief slides, slide 8, Results of BCT Pre-Mob Trng (Snapshot As of: 27 Nov 07). Slide show provide to author by fellow student.

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units. 2007 Army Posture Statement, Addendum H: Army Force Generation, pg. 23.