A SUSTAINABLE NATO/EU PARTNERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE

BY

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A SUSTAINABLE NATO/EU PARTNERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE

by

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A major question dealing with future security challenges of the United States and Europe will be about the relationship between both, especially through two major organizations, NATO and the European Union (EU). Most political declarations stress the will and the need for cooperation and mutual support. At the same time, disagreements occurred in many cases and may develop in future potential crises. This could bring NATO into a position of reduced influence or non-relevance for the U.S. and some European countries. On the other hand, NATO, and the U.S., needs a strong Europe. A transatlantic ‘indifference’ or ‘separation’ would lead to a major security vacuum and to significantly reduced influence of both Europe and the U.S.

The SRP analyzes NATO and the EU, security challenges for Europe and the U.S., and existing security strategies of NATO, the EU and the U.S. It develops principles for a sustainable NATO/EU partnership. After an analysis of the Turkish issue and of the UK-German-French triangle, it proposes a complementary NATO/EU relationship based on a geographic work-share as the only promising approach for a sustainable future partnership beyond the existing ‘Berlin-plus’ agreements. The SRP develops concrete measures for different levels and initiatives to be taken.
A SUSTAINABLE NATO/EU PARTNERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assured freedom and peace in and for Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as during the transition phase of the former Warsaw Pact and its member states over almost half a century. By first promoting economic and later political integration, the European Union (EU) developed from a small organization covering essentially Western European countries to an ‘all-Europe’ union with 27 member states and more than 450 million inhabitants, representing a quarter of the world’s economic power and having worldwide economic interests. However, NATO remained the only organization able to deal with major European security issues. It is still the cornerstone for its security, at least for many of its countries.

NATO and the European Union in Transition

The construction of a strong European pillar inside NATO has been an issue long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new developing security environment showed in the early 1990s that Europe needed to assume greater responsibility for its security, at least on the European continent. The shock that the EU experienced during the crises in the former Yugoslavia, in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo, led it to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and both political and military means and capabilities to manage crisis. These EU ambitions were only partially oriented to strengthen the ‘European Pillar’ of NATO. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) developing inside the Alliance never attained a substantial capability. The perceptions on ESDI were also different between NATO members: For the U.S., ESDI was essential to keep the American and European partners together inside NATO, while
France seemed to use ESDI essentially to placate the U.S. while focusing on a European agenda. These factors, the missing clear orientation of the ESDP\textsuperscript{6}, a Europe centered agenda of some EU member states and of some influential parts of the security community – especially in France\textsuperscript{7}, and the fear of the U.S. that NATO as the “crown jewel of American foreign policy” could be damaged and that the U.S. could lose influence on the European continent\textsuperscript{8}, led to a permanent mutual mistrust between the U.S. and Europe. In addition the tendency of many European states to primarily deal with security problems with nonmilitary means, the request for a ‘peace dividend’, the perspective that the maintenance and projection of armed forces has little to do with security,\textsuperscript{9} and the U.S. frustration about the missing European will to end civil wars on the European continent with European capabilities, helped to open a gap both between Europe and the U.S. and inside NATO.

Other factors complicated the situation: First, the new quality of threats needing a different kind of military emphasis, combining combat missions with elements of humanitarian relief and nation building. NATO, whose mission was focused on classic, high-intensity warfare in Europe, had to develop – or transform – if the organization should remain relevant. On the other hand the civil-oriented European Union discovered that civil capabilities alone were not adapted to all types of conflict management leading in its culmination in the agreement on the Helsinki Headline Goal\textsuperscript{10} in December 1999.

Secondly, several member countries had different perceptions concerning the future role of NATO and the European Union in external security issues.\textsuperscript{11} Third, Turkey, which played a crucial role for NATO in the Cold War and which had political tensions with Greece over Cyprus made unsuccessful attempts to join the EU.
Cyprus – or better the Greek speaking part of the island - succeeded in joining the European Union in 2004. For Turkey it was unacceptable that the EU could deal with security issues impacting Turkish interests without being a member of the Union or – at least – without being fully consulted. This Turkish exclusion was also disliked by the U.S.¹²

Fourth, some European countries tried hard to define their new role and their interests in the changed security environment and to envisage the use of military force for purposes other than collective defense. Germany as a key player in NATO and the EU was particularly challenged by those questions.¹³

With the engagement of European forces in Kosovo, the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreements¹⁴ and the taking over of the nation building mission in Bosnia by the EU, the problem was solved, at least on the surface. Both seemed to be achieved: The acceptance of the fundamental request by the U.S. that an ESDP should never weaken NATO¹⁵ and the ambitions of the EU to build a capability for autonomous military operations.

However, successful crisis management in Afghanistan, the Balkans and in Africa by common NATO/EU approaches or by engagements of NATO, the EU, or its member states was only achieved by much pain, after hard and often contradictory discussions and with a permanent threat to the cohesion of both NATO and the EU. Even if both organizations often had the same basic interests, at the very least a problem of coordination or worse a concurrency was inherent.¹⁶ Events like the Iraq crisis and the outcome of the French-German-Belgian-Luxemburg summit on 29 April 2003¹⁷ showed
a large gap between political declarations stressing the will and the need for cooperation and the existing reality.

The 'Berlin Plus' agreements were able to conceal the need for deeper change. However, any further major dissension could reduce NATO's credibility or make it even less relevant than today for the U.S. and some European countries. Even if the U.S. cannot essentially focus today on the transatlantic and European security, it continues to need a strong and reliable transatlantic link and a stable and secure Europe. The U.S. and NATO need a strong European Union to face future security challenges and the EU needs a capable NATO for its security and prosperity. A transatlantic 'indifference' or 'separation' would lead to a major security vacuum with global consequences and to significantly reduced influence of both Europe and the U.S., usable by other actors to the detriment of both the U.S. and Europe.

**Challenges for Europe’s and the U.S. Security**

The Cold War era challenged European and U.S. security in a very clear manner with permanent threat from the Soviet Union and the possibility of a destructive war if deterrence would have failed.

The current threats in conjunction with globalization, which also has a large influence on security issues, do not have clear borders or limits. It is unlikely that current and future security challenges will lead to large scale high intensity wars and only then if the geo-strategic environment will significantly change. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts spreading to other parts of the globe, failing and failed states, and organized crime are more likely to further develop. Europe and the U.S will have to face these threats and the corresponding risks in a
permanently volatile, uncertain and accelerated changing environment. The competition for the access to natural resources, the growing gap between wealthy and poor regions, migration problems due to growing economic imbalances and effects of global warming, and the permanent existence of both stable and unstable regions will challenge the U.S., NATO and the EU.\textsuperscript{18}

These complex threats and risks need complex answers and flexible structures far beyond purely military approaches. Politics in all its facets and diplomacy are certainly on the front row. But power is a necessary condition for enduring and sustainable foreign policy success,\textsuperscript{19} and the security and well-being for the U.S. and for Europe. Security organizations and military capabilities as part of power have to be suitable to deal with missions from low intensity conflict management to regional high intensity wars and they have to be qualified to do both in parallel, fighting a dangerous war and winning a lasting peace. In addition, crisis and conflicts need to be confronted at their sources to limit the negative impact as far away as possible from the countries and people in Europe\textsuperscript{20} and the U.S.\textsuperscript{21} The will to engage rapidly with military and civil means in almost every part of the ‘global village’ and the capacity to project significant troops and civil personnel for long distances are prerequisites which have to be fulfilled. In addition, external and internal security will be more linked than in the past. The existing imminent threat even for people living inside peaceful regions became more clear than ever on 9/11.\textsuperscript{22}

**Strategies to Meet the Challenges**

NATO, the EU and the U.S. have valid strategies to deal with the challenges for European and the U.S. security: The NATO Strategic Concept adopted in April 1999 by
the North Atlantic Council in Washington, the European Union Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the EU-Council in December 2003 and the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of March 2006. Even if NATO’s Strategic Concept is a pre-9/11 paper, it deals with complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability which are in principle the same mentioned in the ESS and the NSS.\(^\text{23}\) The NATO concept has been subject of permanent adjustments. E.g. the Riga Summit Declaration points out that the Alliance is confronted with complex, sometimes inter-related threats like terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.\(^\text{24}\) The Riga Summit Political Guidance underlines that approach\(^\text{25}\) and acknowledges a growing role of the EU in support of international stability.\(^\text{26}\) The character of the strategic environment and the key threats are defined in an almost common manner in the ESS and the NSS: regional and ethnic conflicts, poverty and economic distress, failing states and collapse of political order, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.\(^\text{27}\)

However, the strategies, as well as the organizations and the states involved are different in character. The differences concern the importance and the will placed on using military means to resolve conflicts, regional ambitions, and the intensity of conflicts within the mission spectrum of each player. While military strength has been a cornerstone of U.S. security policy since World War II, especially after the 9/11 attacks happening on U.S. soil, the NSS is a strongly pro-active strategy focused on the war on terror and the active promotion of democracy as an important measure to combat terrorism, instability and to prevent crisis. In the U.S. strategy the use of force to achieve these objectives plays a prominent role. NATO and the EU are not in a state of war. Their strategies have a more re-active character. They are threat and risk oriented,
mention a larger spectrum of possible answers, and they have a stronger focus on multilateral aspects, in particular on the importance of a strong transatlantic relationship. In addition the ESS emphasizes that all political resources must be used to attain security and to solve crisis and conflicts. Military power only plays a secondary role. However, preventive engagement that could shape problems before they become more serious as well as robust intervention must be possible for the EU, if required. Thus, the ESS is a more soft-power oriented strategy. This might have consequences for the will of the EU to engage in high intensity military operations and in preemptive strikes which NATO envisages against terrorist threats, as described in the NSS of 2006. Nevertheless, the NSS is in certain contrast with the NATO character of multilateralism and consensus and with NATO’s balancing of preemptive military action against the degree of threat. Furthermore, the NATO Strategic Concept and the ESS stress the role of the United Nations for international peace and security while the UN is only marginalized as an instrument in need of repair in the NSS.

Other major differences exist in missions and ambitions. The NSS has a global approach and focuses on the proactive promotion of freedom and democracy to achieve a growing community of democracies as one major prerequisite to confront the current security challenges. It is a strategy of the current single super power in the world which does not and will not hesitate to use force to achieve its political goals and to support its interests, if appropriate. Even if NATO’s strategic concept is more reactive than the NSS and only wants to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area the organization has to look beyond this area to meet its ambitions. The Riga Summit Declaration takes those aspects into account while acknowledging that the
threats to be confronted by the Alliance are increasingly global in scale.\textsuperscript{39} The capacity of NATO forces must therefore be adapted to enable it to conduct joint military expeditionary operations for long distances.\textsuperscript{40}

One major issue of the NATO Strategic Concept is the emphasis of the organization’s collective defense mission.\textsuperscript{41} This ambition and task give NATO an incomparable weight and influence as the major security organization in existence. This is the reality even when non-Article 5 operations represent the current situation. NATO thus needs military capabilities and forces able to meet the requirements for the full range of its missions:\textsuperscript{42} the ability to conduct effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations,\textsuperscript{43} to fight high intensity wars with joint and combined forces, and to accomplish stabilization missions of medium intensity, which could be as demanding as collective defense missions.\textsuperscript{44}

The main strength of NATO is its character as a defensive alliance and its strong concentration on military power, even when the Alliance’s first political goal is to seek peaceful solutions to disputes.\textsuperscript{45} The strength of the EU and its security strategy is the collective availability of civil capabilities for crisis prevention and management, which can be complemented by military operations within a NATO framework or autonomous if NATO does not want to be involved.\textsuperscript{46} The ESS fully reflects this character and limits the reach of the EU’s ambitions on the build up of security in the European region by promoting a ring of well governed countries in that region, favoring multilateral approaches and the balancing of extreme economic disparities.\textsuperscript{47} In order to achieve these goals, the EU wants to use the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and it wants to be able to conduct robust intervention, when necessary. The EU can add
particular value by developing operations using military and civil capabilities. But military power is only a small part of the effort for the EU and not an end in itself and its ambitions concerning military action are only focused on the Petersberg-Tasks. These tasks will lead the EU essentially to military missions at the lower end of military operations in the sense of Chapter VI of the UN charter.

**Principles for a sustainable future NATO/EU Partnership**

A sustainable future NATO/EU partnership must be based on comprehensive political, strategic and military approaches. Only administrative procedures might not address the issues confronting 21st century global security policy and a limitation of a future partnership on military aspects would be highly questionable. A fundamental debate about the core of the future transatlantic relationship has not taken place and cannot be postponed any longer. NATO must find a new balance between its Euro-centric missions and its global challenges and must accept that the EU needs a credible military capability to realize its responsibilities in crisis prevention and crisis management, at least inside Europe and within its areas of interest. Taking the security strategies and the areas of interests of both organizations into account, NATO could represent a kind of large geographic ellipse, and the EU a smaller ellipse inside the larger NATO surface covering essentially the European continent and its neighbors. Inside the overlapping surface, both organizations must be completely complementary. Beyond the overlap, reinforcement of NATO by EU means must be possible.

For further discussions a precise identification of transatlantic common and congruent interests and of areas of interest is mandatory. In addition, an honest and respectful understanding of both organizations’ differences especially in their more
military or civil orientation is a must. NATO and, in particular its leading power, the U.S., need to recognize that EU security interests and EU responsibilities do not end on its borders. The EU itself needs to arrive at a consensus about its ambitions in security and defense issues and about a common political will of its member states to engage military forces in dangerous missions under the flag of the EU, even if no member state or parts of the Union are directly threatened. However, under current conditions the EU will realistically not be able to achieve more than a partial autonomy in military security issues and a use of force beyond the Petersberg tasks. The participation in high intensity operations outside Europe would be politically difficult for many if not most EU countries. In the eyes of many Europeans the engagement of significant military forces ‘out of EU’ is only legitimate if the core interests of a state or the European region are threatened. In case of collective defense in Europe it is the overall consensus that only NATO could be in charge. Thus the EU has to limit itself on the attainment of its goals depicted in its ESS and other existing concepts, in particular the Headline Goal 2010, and on the accomplishment of the Petersberg tasks.

A sustainable NATO/EU future complementary partnership could be realized by two basically different approaches: Complementary through integration or complementary by work-share. However, a work-share may never lead to a transatlantic separation because the security situation affects Europe and the U.S. in the same way. A key factor for the approach to be taken is the need to achieve a unanimous decision of the member states in both organizations. One clue is to find a solution which is acceptable for Turkey. The other is to achieve a common position in the EU with regard to France and the UK.
The Turkish Issue

In the Cold War period Turkey was the foremost outpost of NATO, held a relatively strong status as an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) and is today a bridge to the Middle East. With the quasi closure of the WEU in 2000, associated members, like Turkey, were marginalized. Turkey which started its relations with the European Economic Community in 1959 and applied for full membership in the European Community (EC) in 1987 was particularly affected by this development or, at least, perceived that it was. The accession of Greece to the EC in 1981, the Greek speaking part of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and the delayed beginning of the membership talks with the EU in October 2005 were wounds to a proud country which possesses the largest conventional military forces in Europe. Turkey believes it is a regional power.

The limited influence of this non-EU member country on ESDP issues was determined to be an exclusion from the decision making processes in the EU about security issues which could directly affect Turkey while Greece and Cyprus were sitting at the table. Since the EU Council in Nice in 2000, Turkey has attempted to establish a link between its will to cooperate within NATO and the EU in ESDP issues and its goal to achieve full membership in the EU. Even while the EU tried to find ways to integrate Turkey into EU decision making and planning processes to compensate Turkish non-membership in the PSC and its non-existing rights in the EU Council, Turkey blocked decisions inside NATO over NATO-EU arrangements. Only the decisions of the EU’s Copenhagen Council on 12-13 December 2002 on the timing of Turkish accession negotiations and the declaration that ESDP will not be used against an ally, opened the way for a detailed development of the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements and allowed the timely
takeover of the NATO operation in Bosnia by the EU.\textsuperscript{69} Even after the EU began membership talks with Turkey in October 2005, it used the ESDP issue again to block NATO’s decision making processes, e.g. in the summer of 2007 over NATO/EU cooperation in Kosovo, more out of frustration than political rationale.\textsuperscript{70}

Two factors will complicate the situation or, at least, keep it unchanged: First, Turkey will continue to use the ESDP issue to create political pressure if it continues to believe it appropriate to achieve national political goals. Secondly, a full Turkish membership in the EU is not imaginable in the current political landscape. Too many European countries reject a full Turkish membership in the Union and will maintain that position, even under greater pressure by the U.S. who promotes it. The new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has clearly expressed that political position.\textsuperscript{71} Turkey itself seems unwilling to accept a compromise like a ‘privileged partnership’.

This leads to conclusions that will have a major influence on the approaches towards a sustainable NATO/EU partnership for the future:

First, the status quo would not resolve any problem.\textsuperscript{72} Neither the political coordination nor the military cooperation would be enhanced, nor would the Turkish issue be solved. Second, in case of a “Complementary through Integration” of ESDP assets into NATO structures, Turkey will have, and will use if it deems appropriate, the possibility to block decisions dealing with ESDP issues or with EU military operations inside NATO, at least until the country becomes a full member of the EU. A fully integrative approach could also lead to European ambitions to achieve a stronger influence inside the NATO command structure\textsuperscript{73} which would create an additional problem with Turkey.
Third, the Turkish EU membership negotiations are on track, but are assessed as long and difficult and requiring at least 10 – 15 years. However, the future security challenges for Europe and the U.S. will not allow delay for the design of a future NATO/EU partnership architecture until the solution of the Turkish EU membership problem. A way out could begin with an acceptance of a privileged partnership with the EU by Turkey with a simultaneous full integration of Turkey into the ESDP structures. This could also be an approach in EU security and defense issues towards other countries, e.g. Norway. However, a Turkish acceptance of such an option in the short term is not likely.

Hence, NATO and the EU must seek a solution which does not separate both organizations but which does allow them to overcome the difficult Turkish positions inside NATO, will allow the EU to act autonomously within certain limits, orients NATO towards a global organization, does assure the availability of forces for NATO and the EU, provides possibilities of a mutual reinforcement, takes into account that not all member states are integrated in both organizations, and guarantees the common defense in Europe and on its borders in case of a major conflict. These conclusions lead to an approach seeking a sustainable partnership built on a ‘Complementary by work-share’.

Important ESDP Triangle: United Kingdom, Germany and France

The United Kingdom’s first choice for its security is and will remain NATO. Even if the British government agreed on 4 December 1988 in Saint-Malo that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged and that the EU must be given appropriate structures the UK’s focus was
essentially oriented towards the strengthening of European military capabilities and by
that the strengthening of NATO. One major British principle is to avoid any duplication of
NATO operational structures. 77 Thus, it is logical that the UK countered the build up of a
European operational headquarters at Tervuren 78 and promoted the European Headline
Goal 2010 and the EU Battlegroup concept. 79 The UK will only promote European
approaches strengthening European and NATO military capabilities, i.e. it will support
ESDP within certain limits. A functional work-share between NATO and the EU, leaving
all tasks on the higher end of military missions’ to NATO, corresponds with British
interests.

For Germany, NATO and ESDP are the two sides of the same coin. NATO will
continue to be the cornerstone of Germany’s security and defense policy and the EU
represents an indispensable area of stability. 80 The improvement of the NATO/EU
relationship and a closer and more efficient cooperation of both organizations is a major
goal of German security and defense policy. 81 Even if Germany participates in
international crisis management with military forces 82 and is transforming the
Bundeswehr into a more expeditionary force, German security policy focuses on a
harmonization of civil and military instruments 83 and is cautious concerning an
engagement of military forces in military crisis management operations of higher
intensity. The reasons are essentially not financial: First, German politics was not used
to actively promote security policy goals by using troops outside its own country for the
previous five decades. Secondly, a military leadership role for Germany after the fall of
the Berlin Wall was neither acceptable to its partners, nor to the German domestic
populace. 84 Third, while the German population views international engagements of the
Bundeswehr in a very positive manner, it demonstrates a clear preference for peace and humanitarian operations.\textsuperscript{85}

France plays a crucial but also difficult role. Despite the withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structures France always remained a reliable partner within the Atlantic alliance and for the U.S. In the framework of the crises in the Balkans and in Afghanistan it did not hesitate to engage its military forces under the flag of NATO. However, France always promoted approaches seeking a European autonomy from NATO and thus from the U.S. In its Defense White Paper of 1994 and in its Military Procurement Law 2003-2008, it clearly points out its will to construct a capable Europe, including defense, to promote a European autonomy and to develop the necessary European military capabilities.\textsuperscript{86} The new French President Sarkozy will not basically change this policy. By a decree of July 30 2007 he established a very personally balanced commission\textsuperscript{87} for a new Defense White Paper. This might lead to a more balanced French position concerning the weights of NATO and ESDP. On the other hand, President Sarkozy prioritized the European defense in his speech to the commission on 23 August 2007 and in his letter to its chairman.\textsuperscript{88} In the letter he also points out that the financial constraints of the French Republic with a defense budget of about 2\% of the GDP must be respected by the commission,\textsuperscript{89} despite the absolute importance of the money devoted to support of French nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{90} These aspects lead to two major conclusions: First, France will not accept a functional work-share between NATO and the EU, like it did already in the past 15 years. Second, France will not increase its conventional military capabilities.
Thus, a geographic work-share is currently the only feasible approach for sustainable NATO/EU cooperation beyond ‘Berlin-Plus.’

**Promising Approach and Consequence Measures**

A work-share solution needs to achieve some essential prerequisites. First, collective defense in Europe and on its peripheries must remain a NATO mission only. Second, a work-share between NATO and the EU must never lead to a decoupling of the U.S. and the Europe over security, should never create unnecessary double structures and must avoid a discrimination of partners as far as possible. Third, the transatlantic cohesion must also be reinforced through a closer security partnership between the U.S. and the EU without weakening NATO. Fourth, NATO, with the U.S., and the EU, need to agree on a basic common understanding of the use of containment, deterrence, prevention and preemption while facing existing and future security problems.\(^9\) Fifth, the realization of a complementary by work-share needs comprehensive measures on the political, strategic and operational level.

**Political Prerequisite: A New North Atlantic Charter**

The first steps have to be made on the political level. The North Atlantic Charter has to be reviewed. In the framework of such a process NATO should propose itself as a privileged partner of the United Nations, like the EU already did in its ESS.\(^9\) In addition for its mission of collective defense, a revised Charter should allow NATO crisis management operations within the full intensity spectrum outside the European theater even when no member state has been attacked or directly threatened.\(^9\) A new Charter should include a ‘Constructive Abstention’ as foreseen in the former Draft for a European Constitution.\(^9\) For crisis management inside Europe, but exclusively Turkey,
and in Africa, NATO should identify the EU in a new Charter as first choice for military crisis response operations. The EU would have to acknowledge NATO’s primacy in all areas except Europe and Africa. On the one hand this would create pressure on the European states to increase their military crisis management capabilities and their readiness to accomplish missions on the high end of the use of force. On the other hand it would also give to the EU and its member states a certain time to further mature in this direction.

Such a geographic work-share between NATO and the EU would allow NATO to act in the full range of its missions and concentrate essentially on military aspects. The EU could use its strength by engaging political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities, concentrate its efforts on the European continent and support the U.N. in one of its major regions of concern, Africa. The probability of high intensity wars in Europe and in Africa is – at least – for the near future rather small. The EU will thus, in general, be challenged to execute military operations in the low or medium intensity spectrum, which is acceptable for its member states.

A new NATO charter and additional documents have to contain a coherent consultation mechanism in case of substantial differences between the EU and NATO, respectively the U.S., about the use of military force in the framework of crisis management in the ‘European Area of Responsibility’. However, NATO and the U.S. will have to accept that Europe must keep the final decision about the whole spectrum of crisis management measures to be taken inside its geographic work-share portion.
Coordination, Command and Forces

Complementary by work-share requires closer and more visible coordination at the NATO/EU political level. The cooperation between the NATO Secretary General (SG) and the EU HR must work well as an essential part, perhaps the most important, of daily NATO/EU coordination. However, to develop the necessary political weight and to prevent a conflict of interests or a blocking by one of the member states of each organization, regular meetings at the high political level should be institutionalized. A meeting in the format of ‘US President–NATO SG–EU HR–EU Council President’ could be integrated in the regular US-EU summit. The NATO SG should attend the meetings of the EU foreign ministers and defense ministers, and the EU HR to attend similar meetings on the NATO side. The NATO SG or his representative should attend the meetings of the EU Political and Security Policy Committee and vice versa for the EU HR or his representative at the North Atlantic Council meetings. Both should be allowed to speak in the name of their respective organization. For the military committees, the same procedures should be adopted.

A key factor for the implementation of a NATO/EU complementary by work-share is the build-up of an adequate command structure on the EU side. The EU already possesses all necessary structures on the political and military-policy level, as well as command elements at the operational and tactical levels. However, the EU would need a permanent strategic planning staff, certainly limited in size but fully operational. Such a headquarters should integrate planning and command elements for military and civil crisis management tools and should be able to plan, control, and coordinate two simultaneous major EU engagements with up to 10,000 military and civil personnel each, at the same time as some minor EU engagements. The civil-military planning cell
currently integrated in the EUMS could become the core of this EU Supreme Command (EUSC). With respect to the geographic orientation of the EU crisis management missions, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM should dispatch permanent liaison elements to the EUSC and vice versa. The critical factor for the establishment of a EUSC is its full acceptance by the U.S. administration.

The investments of most EU member states for military capabilities will not increase on a large scale in the foreseeable future. Even with some significant augmentations and with an enhanced pooling of forces, EU member states will not overcome all current shortfalls or achieve full interoperability with U.S. forces. With a geographic work-share EU member states can clearly orient the structure of their forces. The EU members would have to equip parts of their forces for high intensity network centric operations within NATO requiring full interoperability with U.S. forces. These forces should be earmarked to NATO. Other units could be equipped essentially for stabilization and crisis management operations, oriented towards EU military missions and earmarked to the EU. The current “single set of forces” for NATO and the EU, of which most units are at least double-hated, would be transferred into two clearly defined sub-force-pools, one composed of available forces for high intensity NATO missions and the other of forces for EU crisis management missions. With such an organization of a single force pool mutually coordinated, NATO and EU force planning processes and an agreement for a mutual reinforcement must go along. To avoid a political blocking of mutual reinforcements, respective NATO and EU members should have the right for a ‘Constructive Abstention’.
Conclusion

A sustainable future NATO/EU partnership needs more than only administrative agreements. NATO and the EU have to go beyond ‘Berlin Plus’ and they should have the courage to make a big step. The continuation of a small step policy will only lead to stagnancy. NATO will have problems to innovate and the EU will continue to develop its ambitions and military capabilities in parallel and not necessarily coordinated with the North Atlantic Alliance. As a result, a less credible and less powerful NATO, and a slightly more powerful but not really capable and credible EU would not be able to face the future security challenges for Europe. The transatlantic link would be seriously weakened if not completely disrupted. The U.S. will be able to deal with every challenge to its security by its own means. Thus, the transatlantic bridge would have a strong bearing on its western side, a weak bearing in the east and a corroding structure in between which nobody would use again for a really heavy requirement.

A feasible approach for a sustainable NATO/EU partnership seems to be a complementary by a geographical oriented work-share. This will need two basic preconditions: A review of the NATO charter and structures, and a limitation of the EU’s ambitions. With an adjusted charter and a more flexible structure NATO must be made fit for a larger global responsibility in crisis management while keeping the mission for collective defense in Europe and on its borders. The EU should place the credibility and feasibility of its action in crisis management over goals that are too ambitious and concentrate on missions that are limited, both geographically and militarily.

The U.S. should promote a modernization of NATO beginning with a new charter, and accept the development of an autonomous and coherent but limited EU crisis management capability that is complemented by a geographic work-share for both
organizations. An undermining of this development by the U.S. will strengthen autonomous European approaches rather than weaken them. An active countering of even limited European efforts could lead to a kind of defiance by European nations which could split NATO and the EU.

The U.S. should take the initiative for both: The renewal of NATO and the strengthening of the EU for crisis management. The current political climate seems to be more supportive than ever. The U.S. will win politically by promoting international organizations and multilateral approaches. A stronger orientation of NATO towards global responsibilities will make the organization more attractive to the U.S. and also more usable for it. An EU capability to act autonomously in its given area will allow the U.S. and NATO to focus on global problems while Europe and its neighborhood are kept stable by the Europeans themselves. With the new French President Sarkozy, the UK-France-Germany triangle, which essentially influences ESDP, can retrieve a balanced position between European interests, the perception about NATO and the U.S. and the importance of the transatlantic link. Finally, the U.S. must use all its influence to convince Turkey to share these U.S. political goals, to join the initiatives and to play a constructive role independently of a future EU membership.

Endnotes


2 Driving factors were certainly the full integration of the re-unified Germany in NATO and the attraction of the Alliance for many former Warsaw Pact members, seeking at first a strong insurance against potential aggression by the hegemon they knew for more than four decades.

The base for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP was laid in the Treaty on the European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community to “The European Community”. Title V defines “Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy”. In the so called Maastricht Treaty the EU member states agreed on basic goals for a CFSP. It was the birth for common European approaches outside the Union and beyond economic and social issues. However, in that treaty “The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”. Real defense issues were still felt “far away” for the EU. The “shock of the Balkans” did still not take place. A real need for an ESDP as a logical amendment to the CFSP was not felt. The Treaty on the European Union is available at http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm.


The article *La Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Européenne, Bilan d'Étape*, published by Yves Boyer is only one example showing a strong French tendency to emancipate the European security from NATO, and thus from the U.S. Available on www.diplomatie.fr/cap/ressource/FD001283.pdf


In the framework of the European Summit in Helsinki in December 1999, the European member states set themselves the goal to be able to deploy rapidly a militarily self sustaining force capable of the full range of the so called Petersberg tasks (see endnote 48) up to corps level (50,000-60,000 soldiers) with appropriate air and naval elements within 60 days and with a sustainability of at least one year. The outline of this goal was largely influenced by the military needs to deal with the Kosovo crises and by the ambition of the EU to manage potential similar crisis in Europe by own means. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.)

France, since its divorce from NATO military structures, took a rather critical position towards the organization and focused on ‘European solutions’. Great Britain was traditionally oriented towards a strong NATO and a special relationship with the U.S. while Germany tried to keep a balanced position between the two organizations, both essential for the country.
The Berlin Plus agreement (also used as “Berlin plus”) is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit 1999. The core of the agreement is the assured access to NATO planning capabilities and the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO). In addition it contains arrangements on security aspects, consultation mechanisms between both organizations, and for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements. If the EU makes recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in the framework of a CMO, the Deputy Commander of the Allied Command Operations (DSACEUR) is the strategic coordinator and force commander. The DSACEUR is in the current NATO command structure always a European, respectively British general officer. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.)

Expressed essentially by the “Three Ds” of the formulated by the Clinton administration: No decoupling (of European and NATO decisionmaking), no duplication (of structures and resources), no discrimination (against non-EU/NATO members).


26 Ibid, paragraph 3.


In the NSS NATO is mentioned 4, and the EU 4 times. However, the NSS points out in chapter VIII.C.4. that “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a vital pillar for U.S. foreign policy.” and that “NATO must deepen working relationship between and across institutions, as it is doing with the EU, …”


33 Ibid, 35.


36 Ibid, Foreword: “We seek to shape the world, not merely shaped by it; …” and “Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.”

37 Ibid, chapter I, 1.

38 NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, paragraph 10.


40 Ibid, paragraph 24.

41 NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, paragraph 41-43.

42 Ibid, paragraph 51.

43 Ibid, paragraph 47.

44 Ibid, paragraph 49.


48 Ibid, 11.


50 The term "Petersberg tasks" refers the types of military missions considered to be appropriate for EU intervention. Established by the Western European Union Petersberg declaration of June 1992, these include: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, Peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The Petersberg tasks were incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and are a central element of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The 2003 European Security Strategy put forward the prospect that as European capabilities developed, these missions might also be expanded, possibly including “joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform.” The proposed EU Constitutional Treaty included such an expansion of the Petersberg tasks in its Article III-210 stressing that these missions can contribute to the fight against terrorism. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of
The EU Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, defines the tasks in Article 28 B as follows: “The tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1), in the course of which the Union may use civil and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” With that definition the Petersberg tasks finally became EU law. Source: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties.

51 Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”

52 Bernard von Plate, Die Zukunft des transatlantischen Verhältnisses: Mehr als die NATO, 11.

53 Ibid, 8.


55 Ibid, 93.

56 Bernard von Plate, Die Zukunft des transatlantischen Verhältnisses: Mehr als die NATO, 7.

57 Ibid, 11.

58 Ibid, 14.

59 The commonly known term ‘Petersberg tasks’ is used throughout this paper despite the definition of the EU tasks in Article 28 B of the Lisbon Treaty. The definition in the Lisbon Treaty (see Endnote 50) does not represent a quality change concerning the EU tasks in the framework of its Common Security and Defense Policy.

60 In the framework of its regular opinion survey concerning the attitude of the German population towards the engagement of the German Armed Forces in foreign countries (Bevölkerungsbefragung zu den Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr) the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Studies (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr) conducted a research to compare issue related opinions in Germany, France, the UK and the U.S. The majority of the German, French, British and U.S. populations are in favor of an engagement of military force when the own interests are threatened, when the security situation in a European crisis region must be stabilized (except U.S.) and when humanitarian aspects are concerned. For other purposes, e.g. secure energy supply and prohibition of WMD to countries like Iran, only a majority of the U.S. population is in favor of using military force. Bevölkerungsbefragung des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr 2006, http://www.sowi.bundeswehr.de, 34-35.
Even France as the most NATO critical European country acknowledges that fact. Former French Secretary of Defense, Michelle Alliot-Marie, pointed out in two speeches during her visit in the U.S. in March 2003, that the Atlantic Alliance remains an indispensable link between Europe and the U.S. in case of a major conflict and that the ESDP is a complement to NATO. France even bolstered its orientation towards the U.S. and NATO after the new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, came into office in spring 2007.

The Headline Goal 2010 should reflect the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology. Driving factors are the availability of a real rapid reaction capability, interoperability of European forces and deployability. A central role in the HG 2010 is played by the Battlegroups concept. This concept has its origin in a French-German-UK initiative of February 2004 and constitutes a specific form of rapid response. A EU Battlegroup has a strength of 1,500 personnel and includes a reinforced infantry battalion with additional Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements, capable to begin action in an area of operations at a distance of 6,000 kilometers from Brussels within 10 days after the Council decision to launch an operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would support the Battlegroups. The EU has already achieved the permanent availability of two Battlegroups. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.)

Complementary through integration means a full integration of all European crisis management capabilities into NATO structures as the European pillar of the organization. The EU would only keep ESDP decision making structures on political level. After an EU political decision to conduct a crisis management operation and after consultation within NATO and the agreement of the North Atlantic Council, the EU could use NATO’s European pillar with all its capabilities and additional NATO assets for the EU operation. Complementary by work-share means a clearly defined sharing of missions between NATO and the EU. When a crisis occurs NATO and the EU will decide on the basis of an agreed work-share and after additional consultation who will conduct a crisis management operation. In case of a NATO operation the organization will make the necessary decisions, and plan and conduct the operation using NATO structures, capabilities and NATO earmarked forces. The EU will reinforce NATO capabilities on demand. In case of an EU operation the organization will make the necessary decisions, and plan and conduct the operation using own EU structures, capabilities and EU earmarked forces. NATO will reinforce EU capabilities on demand.

Bernard von Plate, Die Zukunft des transatlantischen Verhältnisses: Mehr als die NATO, 5.

The WEU was founded on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. With the creation of NATO it lost its basic importance as a mutual intergovernmental self defense treaty which also promoted economic, cultural and social collaboration. In the EU Masstricht Treaty of 1992 (see footnote 4) and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 the WEU still played an essential role as the EU’s “armed arm” and concerning the Petersberg Tasks (see footnote 46). With the ongoing evolution of the ESDP the WEU tasks were transferred into the EU, initiated in the framework of the Cologne European Council in June 1999 and adopted by European Councils in Helsinki 1999 and Nice in 2000. With the Nice decisions the EU set up the necessary permanent bodies for the implementation of an autonomous ESDP: The Political and Security Policy Committee (PSC), which plays within the EU a role comparable with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the European Military Committee (EUMC) comparable with the NATO Military Committee, and the
European Military Staff (EUMS), which essentially works for the EUMC and which can be seen as equivalent of the NATO International Military Staff (IMS). Some countries, amongst others Germany, decided not to establish an own representative in the EUMC but to “double-hat” its representative in the NATO MC. With the decisions of Nice the WEU lost its “raison d’être” and was put into a dormant status. Only the WEU parliamentary assembly is still working. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.)

66 Ramazan Gözen, Turkey’s delicate Position between NATO and the ESDP, (Atilim University Ankara, March 2003), 76.

67 Ibid, 76.

68 E.g. “deep consultation” in the format “15+15” including all EU and former WEU partners. Additionally non-EU nations contributing assets to EU military operations have the right to be involved in detailed operational planning and are invited join a contributors’ group. (Source: Own documents from assignments in the German Ministry of Defense, e.g. the ESDP section of the Policy and Advisory Staff to the German Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.)


70 International Herald Tribune Europe, Turkey voices frustration at being snubbed by the EU, June 8, 2008. Turkish Daily News, NATO’s chief to convince Turkey not to block NATO-EU ties, June 11, 2007.


72 Gilles Rouby, Franz Pfrengle, OTAN – Union européenne: Partenariat ou concurrence?, paragraph 3.3.2, 19.

73 Ibid, 22.


75 In the research paper OTAN – Union européenne: Partenariat ou concurrence? which I wrote together with French Army Colonel Gilles Rouby at the Center for Higher Military Studies, Paris 2005 (see endnote 13), I argued for a solution towards a renewed relationship NATO/EU by integrating the EU ESDP as “the European Pillar” into NATO. Even, when many aspects of the proposal, in particular concerning policy aspects (paragraph 3.3.1) remain still valid, the approach is currently not feasible. One assumption mentioned in the study (paragraph 3.3.2) is the full NATO membership of all EU countries. Turkey will certainly vote against a full NATO membership of Cyprus. The study also requires a larger responsibility for the EU in the NATO command structure, e.g. by assigning a European general officer as Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the Allied Command Operations. Turkey would certainly block such a measure.


See endnote No. 17.

See endnote No. 61.


Ibid, 12.

Germany has currently deployed 3,215 soldiers in Afghanistan (ISAF), 255 at the horn of Africa (OEF), 2,800 in Kosovo, 210 in Bosnia, 620 in the eastern Mediterranean (UNIFIL), 42 observers in Sudan (UNMIS), 13 observers in Georgia (UNOMIG) and engaged 75 soldiers in the framework of Active Endeavor.


Edwina S. Campbell, From Kosovo to the War on Terror, 40.


The order in the sentence of the speech to the commission “… la France définit sa défense et sa sécurité nationale dans un cadre européen, transatlantique et international.” (Translation: “… France defines its defense and national security in a European, transatlantic and international framework.”) indicates a priority for European approaches. Présidence de la République, Allocution de M. le Président de la République, Commission du Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité nationale, Translation: Speech of the President of the Republic,
In his letter to the chairman of the commission, Jean-Claude Mallet, President Sarkozy is even more clear: "Compte-tenu de la priorité que j’entends donner à l’Europe de la défense, je vous demande …", Translation: "Taking the priority into account which I intend to give to the European defense, I ask you …", Présidence de la République, Lettre de mission de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, adressée à M. Jean-Claude Mallet, Conseiller d’Etat, Translation: Mission letter by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, to M. Jean-Claude Mallet, Counselor of state, Paris 31 July 2007, http://www.elysee.fr.


92 Gilles Rouby, Franz Pfrengle, OTAN – Union européenne: Partenariat ou concurrence?, paragraph 3.3.1, 19.


94 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003, Article III-210: “European decisions referred to in this chapter shall be adopted by the Council of Ministers acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council of Ministers may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the European decision, but shall accept that the latter commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council of Ministers qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States representing at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.”

95 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Article 28 A of the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007 defines that “The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy.” Thus, the HR has responsibilities in his role as an EU HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as Secretary General for the Common Security and Defense Policy. The definition in the Lisbon Treaty replaces the former nomination of the EU HR/GS as the High Representative and Secretary General for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Source:

96 Operations Headquarters which could be partially used for EU operations. These HQs are already operational in Germany (Einsatzführungskommando in Potsdam), France (CPCO Paris), United Kingdom (PJHQ Northwood), Italy (OHQ Rome) and Greece (OHQ Larissa).

97 National EU member states assets.