TRANSATLANTIC TRANSFORMATION: BUILDING A NATO-EU SECURITY PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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### Transatlantic Transformation Building a NATO-EU Security Partnership for the 21st Century

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**Report Date:** 15 MAR 2008

**Report Type:** Strategy Research Project

**Dates Covered:** 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008

**Distribution/Availability Statement:**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Subject Terms:**

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**Limitation of Abstract:** Same as Report (SAR)

**Number of Pages:** 38

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**Notes:**
See attached
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U.S. Army War College
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The strategic partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has never been more critical than it is today. Closer cooperation between these two major institutions is vital to ensuring the fundamental long term international security interests and strategic stability of its member countries. The uncertain realities of the 21st century security environment demand new comprehensive and cooperative approaches to collective security, in which diverse civil and military efforts are employed together in a coordinated way. This paper examines the fundamental importance of transforming the NATO-EU relationship into an effective Euro-Atlantic security partnership given the challenges of the 21st century security environment. It evaluates the specific security responsibilities, missions, and current operations of NATO and the European Union. It analyzes the status of NATO-EU relations concerning security and defense issues, identifies areas of potential NATO-EU security cooperation, and provides some considerations for further transforming the existing transatlantic security relationship. Finally, it explores U.S. perspectives
regarding strengthening the transatlantic commitment between the United States, NATO and the European Union.
Events of this century have taught us that we cannot achieve peace independently. The world has grown too small. The oceans to our east and west no longer protect us from the reach of brutality and aggression.

—U.S. President Harry S. Truman¹

President Truman’s words following the signing of the Washington Treaty which launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 are just as relevant today as they were almost sixty years ago. The policies introduced at the time ensured European integration, promoted peace, safeguarded common democratic values and strengthened international stability by creating a strong transatlantic partnership that has persisted throughout the 20th century to present day.

Both NATO and the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU) were born out of post-World War II efforts to stabilize and restore Western Europe. NATO’s original purpose was to provide for the collective defense of its member countries through a mutual security guarantee to deter potential threats such as that posed by the Soviet Union. The European Union’s original purpose was to provide political and economic cooperation and social progress to its members by preserving democracy and free markets. U.S. policy through the years has asserted strong support for both NATO and the European Union maintaining that a stable and secure Europe is a vital U.S. interest. The evolution of NATO and the European Union following the end of the Cold War, the Balkan conflicts, 9/11 attacks, Iraq and Afghanistan wars has resulted in some friction between the United States and several European allies regarding security responsibilities and missions of the two organizations.
The *strategic partnership* between NATO and the European Union has never been more critical than it is today.² Closer cooperation between these two major institutions is vital to ensuring the fundamental long term international security interests and strategic stability of its member countries. The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has remarked that “…the roles of the European Union and NATO have become more and more intertwined,” and that the “…two organizations have come to rely on each other, both to build security on this continent and to project security beyond it.”³ He has further remarked that there must be a “complementarily” that permanently exists between the two organizations.⁴ Despite an existing commitment to NATO-EU mutual dependency and cooperation as reflected in major European strategic policy documents, the NATO Secretary General also admits that “Despite many attempts to bring the two institutions closer together, there is still a remarkable distance between them.”⁵ The reality is the institutional adjustments that have been made by NATO and the European Union have failed to result in a transatlantic security partnership that can adequately counter the emergence of new security threats since the end of the Cold War.

The uncertain realities of the 21st century security environment demand new comprehensive and cooperative approaches to collective security, in which diverse civil and military efforts are employed together in a coordinated way. The transatlantic community is now faced with the same global security challenges—most pressingly those of terrorism, failed states, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), pandemics, and energy security—unconfined by geography, often exceedingly complex and dangerous, and offering only limited short term solutions.
NATO and the European Union must develop a new Euro-Atlantic Strategic Partnership Agreement regarding future security cooperation engagement that looks beyond the current “Berlin Plus” arrangement (which governs European access to NATO assets), whereby NATO is supported by civil resources and capabilities of the European Union, and the European Union is able to leverage NATO’s military capabilities. This new agreement must be capable of safeguarding security interests within transatlantic borders while also addressing the globalized nature of today’s diverse security threats. Commitment to the development and adoption of this new coherent strategic concept, including an agreement regarding the capabilities to give it efficacy will be a significant step in the process of reasserting the allies’ interest in renewing post-Cold War, post-9/11, post-Iraq and Afghanistan consensus.  

This paper examines the fundamental importance of transforming the NATO-EU relationship into an effective Euro-Atlantic security partnership given the challenges of the 21st century security environment. It evaluates the specific security responsibilities, missions, and current operations of NATO and the European Union. It analyzes the status of NATO-EU relations concerning security and defense issues, identifies areas of potential NATO-EU security cooperation, and provides some considerations for further transforming the existing transatlantic security relationship. Finally, it explores U.S. perspectives regarding strengthening the transatlantic commitment between the United States, NATO and the European Union.

NATO Today

As long as threats remain to the security of Europe and North America, NATO will be the primary institution through which its members provide for their common defense.

Responding to New Threats—From Common Defense to Common Security

What is NATO? Why does it exist? What does it do? There seems to be a perplexing void in the general public’s knowledge and understanding of what NATO is in the 21st century or even why it still exists. According to the *NATO Handbook*, NATO is an intergovernmental organization in which member countries retain their sovereignty and independence. The organization provides a forum in which member countries consult together on common political and military matters affecting their security and take joint action to address them. Although accurate in its characterization, this definition does not explain what NATO is today. NATO today remains the dominant institution for safeguarding the security of its member countries, although the significance of this activity has changed considerably in the post-Cold War security environment.

Similarly, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, outlining his conception of the EU Security Strategy in 2003, was optimistic but realistic regarding the potential for the European Security and Defense Policy. “NATO,” he argued, “is and will remain key to safeguarding our security: not as a competitor, but as a strategic partner.”

NATO experienced remarkable success during the 20th century as it deterred the robust conventional and military threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, protected the territorial integrity of Western Europe, and provided for transatlantic common defense. Throughout this period, there was little doubt among policy makers or the general public concerning the Alliance’s essential and enduring purpose. Following the 1990s, during which NATO embarked on operations in the Balkans based more on humanitarian and moral imperative than on a calculated, strategic decision—NATO
began an ambitious transformational process of modernizing its military capabilities into a flexible and expeditionary force to contend with the demands of an evolving security environment.

During the Cold War, NATO—even as a regional security organization focused on territorial defense—was a key component in the overall process of maintaining global strategic security. Following this period, NATO’s partnership and enlargement policies provided the framework for assisting new democracies in Central and Eastern European in their political, economic and military transition. Today, as it continues to transform its capabilities and conducts operations throughout the world, NATO remains a critical institution for building and maintaining 21st century strategic security.

In order to further codify NATO’s continuing role in providing strategic security in today’s globalized environment member countries must reaffirm NATO’s emerging role in the 21st century, which is to safeguard and promote transatlantic security and to preserve global strategic stability. This reaffirmation moves NATO beyond its previous raison d’être, the common defense of its members, to a new strategic concept of common security. The SACEUR, in his 2007 Posture Statement to Congress acknowledged NATO’s new global scope in the following manner:

NATO remains an Alliance committed to the common defense of its member states. It increasingly recognizes the concept of common security, a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world where the threats are non-traditional and more global in nature. In a strategic environment marked by terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, common security is an absolutely essential factor in achieving individual national security.

This new concept of common security demands a broadened and more comprehensive security perspective than the traditional common defense of the Euro-
Atlantic area. In today’s globalized world, the contemporary goal of common security will enhance NATO’s ability to further provide for the common defense of its members. The acceptance of this new role of common security will require NATO to further increase its military transformation efforts and expand its global partnership network with other countries and international organizations like the European Union in order to enhance certain capabilities. A key component of such an effort would be clearly articulating NATO’s new *raison d’être* to member nations’ populations. There is an opportunity during the next NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania in April 2008 to expand NATO’s strategic concept that would secure the Alliance’s direction for the foreseeable future.

Enhancing Capabilities to Fulfill Common Security Objectives

As NATO moves toward the sixtieth anniversary of the Washington Treaty, in April 2009, and more than a decade and a half following the end of the Cold War, a reorganized NATO is still in business, but transformation within the Alliance is still very much an incomplete process that requires continued effort and emphasis among its members. Transformation within NATO is certainly not a new concept and has largely been an ongoing endeavor in varying degrees since 1990, when NATO pursued transformation to cope with the changed strategic concept created by the end of the Cold War. To achieve complete transformation and meet its 21st century goals of actively projecting power, stability, and purpose at strategic distances, NATO must transform beyond just the military component. Arguably, NATO in the future will assume even greater significance in international affairs as the Alliance strives to confront new threats that not only endanger member countries, but more than likely global strategic stability. To this end NATO must further transform its culture, scope and strategic
concept, its expeditionary military capabilities, its global partnerships, and its political business practices.\textsuperscript{15}

NATO’s experience in helping to stabilize the Balkans, leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, establishing a training mission in Iraq, and providing logistical support to the African Union in Sudan has led to several practical improvements.\textsuperscript{16} The 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) resulted in NATO streamlining and reorganizing its operational command structure along functional rather than previous geographic lines, reflecting the new missions and priorities of the Alliance. Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) were reorganized into Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACO represents a strategic command for all NATO operations headquartered in Belgium and ACT, based in Virginia and co-located with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is responsible for overseeing transformation of NATO’s military capabilities, doctrine development and allied interoperability.

Despite these changes, NATO has continued to struggle to prepare for the global threats posed by this new security environment. Additionally, a widening military capabilities gap persists between the United States and Europe that could further threaten allied interoperability if left unchecked; despite shared common threats and strategies on both sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{17} Convincing its allied members to develop appropriate and adequate military capabilities given today’s declining defense budgets and diminishing force levels has been a challenge for the Alliance. General James L. Jones, former SACEUR, in his remarks to Congress in 2006 stated that,
…one cannot fail to emphasize that the political will to do more is as yet not completely accompanied by an equal political will to resource in men, money and material this newfound appetite.\textsuperscript{18}

The 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified a wide range of military capability shortcomings to be addressed, but several years later few had been met. As a result, the DCI was succeeded in 2002 by the PCC, which narrowed the earlier list of capability priority goals, but few observers have noted any real progress.\textsuperscript{19}

Perhaps the most significant step NATO has taken toward developing enhanced military capabilities has been the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and its future is now of central importance for both symbolic and practical reasons.\textsuperscript{20}

Established by the 2002 Prague Summit Declaration, the NRF is intended to fill the capabilities gap by providing joint multinational expeditionary forces readily available for contingencies enabling NATO to better meet global threats to security and stability across the full spectrum of military missions. The NRF reached full operational capability (FOC) in October 2006 with up to 25,000 troops drawn from rotational national forces. Prior to FOC, elements of the NRF were deployed to provide additional security forces in support of the Afghanistan elections, and to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.

In addition to its expeditionary role, the NRF is considered to be NATO’s most visible example of operational transformation and primary means for improving European military capabilities and allied interoperability. The NRF faces many challenges. Force generation efforts to resource previous NRF rotations have failed to produce a complete and balanced force primarily due to 20\textsuperscript{th} century funding mechanisms that require nations to pay all costs associated with the transport and
sustainment of their deployed forces. NATO’s current approach to resourcing operations actually acts as a disincentive for member countries to contribute forces for deployments. These Cold War funding arrangements were appropriate when forces were static and did not deploy outside the European theater of operations but now demand much needed reform. More importantly, given the number of troops that Allies have contributed to NATO current global operations—not only in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, but also in UN sanctioned missions in Lebanon, Africa, and Iraq—it has been difficult to resource the NRF at full strength: It remains under-resourced for effective action. In an era of persistent engagement, balancing critical force requirements for contingencies and expanding common funding for NRF missions to protect the principle of burden-sharing among Allies are essential force generation and economic concerns that must be addressed if the NRF is to succeed.

Even if the NRF overcomes its many challenges and is regarded as successful in the future, the change within NATO is still not enough. Successful strategic evolution must occur in two important areas, if NATO is to remain the preeminent military alliance in the world and assume a greater role in providing transatlantic common security against today’s emerging threats. NATO must enhance its military capabilities and reform its decision-making processes to increase its capacity to provide for common security.

First, NATO must possess the tools required to fulfill its missions and commitments. The widening gap between NATO’s political will and its lack of strategic force projection and sustaining capabilities must be bridged, organizationally within NATO, as well as between its members. Additionally, NATO must effectively integrate stabilization and reconstruction capabilities into future military operations. The
necessity to conduct stability, reconstruction, and civil support activities across the entire spectrum of multinational military operations in post-conflict regions, while interacting with civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations, and dealing with both weak infrastructures and irregular forces has become a growing trend of the post-Cold War security environment. Recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have reinforced the notion that providing secure and just governance and development in crisis regions can significantly contribute to strategic stability and order throughout the world.

Second, NATO must reform its political decision-making process to achieve greater flexibility and responsiveness while performing global security missions in crisis situations. During the Cold War, NATO provided effective deterrence based upon a transatlantic consensus concerning the clear and present threat posed by the Soviet Union. In today’s current security environment, timely and decisive agreement among NATO members may be needed in response to emerging threats or natural disasters requiring swift “out of area” contingency deployment of NATO forces. Unanimity in decision processes could leave the Alliance divided and adversely affect military operations. In order to reform the political consensus mechanisms required to effectively respond to current threats, NATO must take into consideration both the global context in which it now operates and the security role and contributions provided by the European Union.

The EU’s Emerging Role in Strategic Security

Today’s EU brings development aid, human rights standards, anti-corruption programs, police trainers, election monitors, cadre-building skills and most importantly, increasingly, the capacity to bring all these
things together in the right combination to meet the challenges of the moment. 28

Security Institutions within the European Union

What is the European Union’s global security role? What military capabilities does it possess? Do these capabilities and missions complement or compete with NATO efforts? Following the end of the Cold War, the process of European integration reached a stage where it became entirely logical and a strategic imperative, for the European Union to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with credible military means to help boost its weight in world affairs. 29 The CFSP represents an increasingly coordinated approach of the 27 EU member states on a range of foreign policy and security issues, including the threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation, human rights, and HIV/AIDS, as well as strategic relationships with the Middle East, Russia, Africa, Latin America, Asia and many other regions.

Since 1999, following U.S. hesitancy to intervene in the 1990s Balkans conflicts which exposed deficiencies in European capabilities, the European Union has sought to develop a defense identity separate from NATO to provide a military backbone for CFSP and to give itself more options for dealing with crises. 30 This project, known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), has led to the development of a 60,000-strong “Headline Goal” rapid reaction defense force for humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management missions, as well as three defense decision-making bodies, and ties to NATO intended to ensure close relations between the two organizations and prevent any duplication of NATO resources or structures. 31 Essential to ESDP has been the development of Civilian Response Team (CRT) capabilities for crisis management intended to address stabilization and reconstruction missions. The
European Union has also emphasized that ESDP is not aimed at usurping NATO’s responsibility for collective defense against outside threats or at weakening the transatlantic alliance.32

In December 2003, the European Union adopted the first European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, affirming the role of a multilateral security actor with a global outlook, and further recognizing that the key threats confronting Europe are the same threats that confront the United States—terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. It emphasized the importance of conflict prevention and multilateral solutions, while underscoring that the security instruments of choice are diplomacy and preventive measures vice military action as a means of achieving their political goals. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the divisions created by the war in Iraq in the spring of 2003, the ESS made it possible for EU Member States to share a common vision of security. The ESS also established a policy framework for ESDP. It properly focused on “The ability to help unstable countries move from conflict to peaceful integration.”33 “This can and should be the primary EU contribution to European security,” posits U.S. Congressman Doug Bereuter. The ESS stated,

> We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations…we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.34

The ESS also expanded the Petersberg Tasks so that military missions deployed by the European Union could now include disarmament operations as well as support for third countries in combating terrorism and reforming their security sectors.35 The revised 2010 Headline Goal calls for the establishment of multinational rapid response
EU Battle Groups (EUBG) committed by EU member states of approximately 1,500 troops, capable of deploying within 10 days of an EU decision to launch the operation.\textsuperscript{36} Initially, thirteen EUBGs were proposed in 2005 with five additional EUBGs contributed by 20 EU member states. Full Operational Capability (FOC) was reached on January 1, 2007, meaning the European Union could undertake two limited duration EUBG-size rapid response operations concurrently, or deploy them nearly simultaneously to locations outside Europe.\textsuperscript{37} The EUBGs rotate every 6 months and are sustainable for 30-day deployments with the possibility of extending up to 120 days with proper resupply. It is also important to highlight that a EUBG could be employed in a crisis management operation in response to a request by the UN or under Chapter VII UN mandate.\textsuperscript{38}

The evolution of CFSP and ESDP has included the creation of some new institutions within the European Union to facilitate direction and implementation of security policy:

- **The High Representative for CFSP (EUHR).** Since 1999, Javier Solana has served as EUHR and Secretary General of the Council of the European Union. In the past few years he has transformed his post into an essential element of European policymaking. In 2003 he and his staff drafted the first-ever ESS and he often acts on behalf of the Council and the EU President in conducting political dialogue with third parties.\textsuperscript{39}

- **The Political and Security Committee (PSC).** The PSC is made up of the political directors of EU member states' foreign ministries. It handles a broad range of issues including military matters and foreign policy discussions
among EU members, contributing to the definition of policies, and monitoring implementation of the Council's decisions. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and may be authorized by the Council to take decisions on the practical management of a crisis.40

- **The EU Military Committee (EUMC).** The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS), represented by their military representatives (Milreps). It is the highest military body within the Council and serves primarily in an advisory role for military consultation and cooperation between the European Union Member States concerning conflict prevention and crisis management.41

- **The EU Military Staff (EUMS).** The EUMS is made up of military experts from EU member States to the Council Secretariat and is the source of the European Union's military expertise. It conducts contingency planning, provides assessments, and makes recommendations regarding the concept of crisis management and general military strategy to the EUMC and the PSC. The EUMS includes a 24-hour situation center and a civilian-military planning cell.42

- **The European Defense Agency (EDA).** The EDA was created in 2004 to assist EU member states develop and coordinate their defense capabilities for crisis-management operations under ESDP and strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base. European Defense
Ministers form the EDA’s Steering Board under the chairmanship of the EUHR.43

- **EU-NATO Cooperation.** In the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in 2002, the two organizations formally established a strategic partnership for coordination of crisis management and security issues, including through the Berlin Plus arrangements.44 In order to further develop ESDP and establish consultation, cooperation and transparency with NATO, the European Union adopted a new agreement on enhancing the EU’s military planning capabilities in 2003. This compromise agreement included:
  - The establishment of an EU planning cell consisting of 20-30 officers at NATO headquarters (SHAPE) to help coordinate Berlin Plus missions (EU missions conducted using NATO assets).
  - The addition of a small operational planning cell to the existing EU Military Staff to conduct possible EU missions without recourse to NATO assets.
  - The exchange of permanent Liaison Officers between the EU Military Staff and SHAPE to help ensure transparency and closer coordination between the two organizations.

Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities

For the United States and Europe, it is important to be able to dominate any form of military conflict from stable peace to general war. The means to accomplish this strategic objective today are best realized through comprehensive full-spectrum security capacity, including both military and civilian capabilities. Recent experiences in the
Balkans and Afghanistan have clearly demonstrated that stability in a crisis region can rarely be achieved through the military instrument of power alone. Preserving transatlantic security in the 21st century requires a full-range of integrated military and non-military capabilities, along with the political will to employ them for sustained periods of time.

Civilian crisis management is a key tool under the ESDP. ESDP planning and implementation is limited to the Petersberg Tasks for both conflict prevention and crisis management, which range from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement in regional conflicts. The European Union, in contrast to NATO, does not envisage engaging in collective defense missions, and are therefore not part of ESDP planning. Furthermore, NATO’s role is limited almost exclusively to the military aspects of crisis management. Dr. Kenneth Payne, a NATO Research Fellow at BBC News Analysis and Research, in his paper, The European Security and Defense Policy and the Future of NATO relates that,

…they [Europeans] will continue to be constrained by two factors: political cohesion and military capabilities. Both factors mean that, for the medium-term at least, the EU security force is likely to develop as a small-scale humanitarian and peace-support force, operating at the civil-military intersection. Any operations at a larger scale are likely to be conducted by ad hoc coalitions, or by NATO.

The strength of the European Union in the area of security policy lies precisely in its ability to provide significant civilian resources and mechanisms, commonly referred to as soft power, required to bring about stabilization and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflicts, while its military capability remains limited. Even though cooperation between EU agencies and member-state governments in the area of security and stability is, to a certain extent challenging, these civilian resources
represent a potentially significant contribution to global crisis management. The ESS has identified unstable situations caused by states emerging from conflict or on the verge of failure as a key threat, and in response the European Union is organizing a range of resources capable of engaging in stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

The European Union is continuing to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas first defined by the Feira European Council in 2000. The first priority area is to have a ready-pool of civilian police available for deployment to crisis situations when requested. A second priority area is to provide assistance in establishing the rule of law and support in rebuilding a failed judicial system. A third priority area is having available experts to carry out essential governmental administrative tasks in order to promote civil society in a post-conflict or failed state environment. Finally, in the area of civil protection, to have rapidly deployable consequence management teams available to assist civilian populations in situations involving natural disasters or emergency crisis. At the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in 2004 EU leaders agreed on a 2008 Civilian Headline Goal of 5,761 personnel in the area of civilian police, 631 for rule of law, 562 for civilian administration, and 4,988 for civil protection to further improve the EU’s civilian management capabilities by enabling the European Union to respond more rapidly to emerging crises. Currently the European Union is engaged in eleven civil ESDP missions in six regions, including Africa, Asia, Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, and the Middle East.

Harnessing these military and civilian crisis management capabilities together in a consistent and coherent force is an ambitious goal that will take considerable time,
effort, and resources to realize under the best circumstances. As these ESDP operations demonstrate, the European Union is capable of launching limited military and civilian operations in relatively permissive environments; however it remains unclear how effective the European Union will be when faced with more complex missions on a larger scale, particularly one requiring extensive strategic air and sea lift, enhanced command and control, and sustained logistical resupply.  

The Future of ESDP

With the adoption of the ESS in December 2003, the European Union, like NATO has taken on the character of a security actor with a global outlook: “In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.” This character is, to some extent, borne out in recent practice through a wide variety of military and civilian ESDP missions, including humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management in Africa, South-eastern Europe, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus. Many EU leaders view ESDP as a way, not only to boost security capacity, but also to further European integration, and will likely seek to enhance ESDP in the future. Ultimately, differing strategic priorities and levels of political support, financial constraints, capabilities, and NATO-EU cooperation will all likely shape the nature of ESDP development.

Recent EU agreement on a new compromise Reform Treaty may serve to accelerate the EU’s internal integration and provide increased support for international political influence, broader security strategy, and defense integration. The Lisbon Treaty, signed in December 2007, aimed at updating and revitalizing the EU’s institutions and replacing its failed constitution, will likely enter into force in 2009 if it is
successfully ratified by all 27 member states this year. This treaty gives the European Union the constitutional form of a state and is a potential major step towards a federal Europe. On security matters, a *solidarity clause* is introduced in the case of terrorist attacks. A member state victimized by a terrorist attack or other disaster will receive assistance from other member states, if requested. However, provisions covering supranational legislative acts are not yet adopted under CFSP and new treaties would be needed to modify this issue.

European defense budgets also affect the prospect of ESDP development by imposing burden-sharing limits. Since 2001, the United States has increased its defense spending considerably, thus widening the gap with Europe.\(^{54}\) By contrast, defense spending within the European Union has remained generally flat throughout the same period, with a few countries providing marginal increases and others simply cutting their defense spending.\(^{55}\) In 2004, U.S. national defense spending was more than twice the combined EU-25 defense budget, while Europeans possessed less than half the U.S. military capability. Defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) only reinforces this unbalanced view of burden-sharing contributions. Overall, collective EU defense spending as a proportion of GDP has dropped from 2.0 percent in 1997 to 1.7 percent in 2004, while the U.S. figure increased substantially from 3.0 percent of GDP to 4.0 percent.\(^{56}\) Despite pressure from successive U.S. administrations to increase European defense spending there is no expectation among European defense analysts and EU officials of any budgetary increase in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the downward pressures of providing future public benefits to the elderly will likely constrain European defense spending even further over the next 20-30 years.
Moreover, given current budgetary pressures, some countries will not be able to retain the full range of military forces, and will have to reallocate funds and other resources to a limited set of critical assets in order to enhance their capabilities, thus providing capability depth.

The European Union has taken a few positive measures to address capabilities improvement within existing budgetary constraints through two closely related initiatives: European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and European Defense Agency (EDA). ECAP was launched in 2001 to enhance European military capability efforts and remedy identified deficiencies in the Helsinki Headline Goal. In November 2004, the European Union Military Capability Commitment Conference determined that there was widespread agreement regarding the nature of the deficiencies, however there was minimal accomplishment in finding solutions. Established in 2004, the EDA’s mission is to improve the EU’s defense capabilities with a view to the 2010 Headline Goal and rationalize European defense procurement under ESDP. Since 2006, ECAP projects have migrated to EDA in order to bring a review of the deficiencies closer to the defense procurement process.

The most important challenge for ESDP future development originates from the fact that both NATO and ESDP draw on the same national military forces and capabilities for their operations. European leaders must come to a greater political consensus on appropriate roles and missions for European militaries, in order to accurately determine the required priority capabilities given the current demands on these forces to meet today’s shared security challenges. Furthermore, enhancing European defense capabilities is not only in Europe’s interest but also in the
transatlantic interest of the United States. It is also in the U.S.’s interests for Europe to be able to coherently assume a wider spectrum of security missions as a full partner. Michèle A. Flournoy, a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in her report, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities, makes a compelling argument for pursuing a greater degree of European defense integration:

Given the political and budgetary constraints that European capitals face in increasing their defense budgets, the obvious way to enhance European defense capabilities and address existing shortfalls is through a greater degree of defense integration – that is, coordinating the efforts of individual European countries, the European Union and NATO to create an enhanced and more interdependent set of collective defense capabilities to meet Europe’s future defense needs.  

It is this complementary and interdependent set of collective defense capabilities that could make NATO-EU operations increasingly important. However, overcoming the gap between Europe’s security strategy and its capabilities requires a more integrated approach to European defense planning and investment.

Building a NATO-EU Security Partnership for the 21st Century

We have learned that war in the 21st century does not have stark divisions between civilian and military components. It is a continuous scale that slides from combat operations to economic development, governance, and reconstruction – frequently all at the same time. As we noted as far back as 1991, in the real world, security has economic, political, and social dimensions. The European Union and NATO need to find ways to work together better, to share certain roles – neither excluding NATO from civilian operations nor barring the European Union from military missions.  

Cooperation and Complementarity

Since the end of the Cold War, the development of a durable and efficient security partnership between NATO and the European Union is as indispensable as it is
unavoidable. However, in recent years only protracted attempts to consummate an enduring strategic partnership have emerged between the two organizations. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War redefined this strategic partnership. It brought about not only a redefinition of NATO’s security role, but also an enlargement of NATO and the European Union, and the emergence of ESDP. The existing transatlantic security arrangement failed to anticipate an EU determined to create an independent ESDP. Notwithstanding, both NATO and the European Union have critical roles to play in providing transatlantic security in the 21st century, however, the strategic partnership itself must be revised to reflect this new reality. Moreover, forces that were structured to defend Europe from attack have found it difficult to perform the kinds of expeditionary operations that have come to define the post-Cold War global security environment.

Both NATO and the European Union are unified in a number of ways: by strategic concerns and overlapping global interests; by convergence of their membership; by compatible values; by expanding dialogue and growing interdependence on security and defense matters; by vulnerability to common non-traditional security threats; and by acknowledging that both organizations can provide a complementary set of capabilities for responding to these threats. NATO and the European Union are likewise unified by budgetary constraints which can severely limit the means of member governments to maintain two similar, but entirely separate security and defense organizations. The European Union lacks the deployable military power to contend with even a medium-sized crisis, while NATO needs the European Union’s military and civilian crisis management capabilities, as well as its political support to achieve successful
outcomes. The next logical step is to build a new transatlantic security partnership capable of acting together to counter common security threats. The goal of this reformed security partnership is to protect transatlantic interests at home and abroad, while providing the expeditionary capabilities to meet strategic security needs. Staying the current course of NATO-EU cooperation, while relying on limited measures such as Berlin Plus to enable real cooperative action, will only contribute to further dysfunction in a strategic partnership that requires fundamental changes in structure and approach.

Given the nature of today’s operations and the practical result of overlapping interests between NATO and the European Union it is clear that neither organization can afford to fail, or afford to have others fail as a result of ineffective cooperation. Ongoing operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan serve as a reminder that both organizations have a critical role in ensuring international security interests and strategic stability and that it makes sense to have complementary instruments for seamless coordination. Three key considerations that might serve as a conceptual framework for more intensive transatlantic cooperation and a deepened strategic partnership between the two include:

- **Strategic Policy as a Premise for Future Action.** NATO and the European Union must develop a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Partnership Agreement for the 21st century (harmonized with a new European Security Strategy and a revised NATO Strategic Concept). For Europeans, as well as the United States, NATO constitutes the primary transatlantic forum for cooperation and consensus on security policy, however, the NATO-EU relationship continues to be plagued by strategic incoherence and unhealthy
competition. The international *forum* for this new political agreement should include comprehensive discussions involving all 32 heads of state and government representing NATO and the European Union (including 21 European member states belonging to both organizations). Strategic dialogue needs to expand beyond Afghanistan, Kosovo, and military capabilities. This new agreement should specifically address common or complementary strategic policies for shared purposes, goals, roles, character, and future missions of transatlantic security cooperation. Additionally, strong consideration should also be given to expansion of the current framework for operational collaboration—Berlin Plus, that would allow both organizations to benefit from the flow resources. Without a durable strategic policy to guide future NATO-EU cooperation, the hard and soft, military and civilian assets of each organization can scarcely be exploited to achieve the best possible results.

- **Resource and Capability Planning.** Challenges of the 21st century security environment require new capabilities; resource constraints require an integrated approach to defense and procurement; likewise enhanced European defense capabilities will serve to strengthen the transatlantic partnership. Europe, as a Union has emerged in the post-Cold war era as an important power in the world due to its significant non-military capabilities, its global interests, and its universal influence; but lacking political unity and commitment to increase defense expenditures and improve military capabilities, it is not a world power. For these reasons,
NATO and the EU must build compatible key defense capabilities. Two immediate considerations include:

- Rapid reaction force planning and force commitment deconfliction of the NATO Response Force and EU Battle Group Project. European governments must make the EUBGs effective and compatible with NATO force transformation, while the United States should demonstrate its commitment to the NRF by offering combat forces. These two forces have the potential to become a model of how NATO and the European Union can develop complementary rapid reaction capabilities.

- NATO and the EU must integrate military and civilian capabilities to deal with a full range of tasks, from warfighting to reconstruction. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates has stressed in a recent speech at the Wehrkunde Conference on Security Policy, NATO and the European Union must develop mechanisms that will allow them to better integrate military and civilian assets to address the stabilization and reconstruction tasks that are central to complex security and crisis management operations today.

- Geopolitical Burden-Sharing. The end of the Cold War transformed geopolitical responsibility and transatlantic burden-sharing for security. Today, NATO and the European Union have assumed an increasingly global outlook regarding security roles and missions. In today's global security environment there is little distinction between internal and external
security. As a result, the need for an integrated approach to address such threats, involving both civilian and military components has become increasingly clear. Both geographical and functional accommodations are required as NATO seeks to renew its political authority by broadening its geographical scope and the European Union attempts to address the functional deficiency of its lack of credible military capability. In order to bridge the gap between European security strategy and security capabilities increased emphasis on integrated defense and niche capabilities is required in the military field; while more specialized economic development, governance, and reconstruction capabilities are required in the civilian field. Geopolitical burden-sharing under this strategic concept deemphasizes the requirement for both organizations to assume the same tasks or develop the same capabilities. However, without a durable and robust political-strategic security partnership in place, the achievement of mutual coordination and complementarity between NATO and the European Union is highly unlikely.

Conclusion

One of the enduring themes in the U.S.-European security debate is the relationship between NATO and the European Union. The strategic partnership between the two organizations has undoubtedly reached a critical stage, given the unprecedented NATO mission in Afghanistan and the ongoing European integration in the Balkans. Closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union is vital to ensuring the fundamental long term international security interests and strategic stability of its member countries. Challenges and opportunities of the 21st century security
environment demand new comprehensive and cooperative approaches to collective security, in which diverse civil and military efforts are employed together in a coordinated and complementary way.

This paper focused on the fundamental importance of transforming the NATO-EU relationship into an effective security partnership capable of safeguarding security interests within transatlantic borders while also addressing the globalized nature of today’s diverse security threats through efficient harmonization of traditional military warfighting resources with civilian crisis management capabilities. It provided three key considerations that could serve as a conceptual framework for more intensive transatlantic cooperation and a deepened strategic partnership between the two organizations: strategic policy as a premise for future action, resource and capability planning, and geopolitical burden-sharing.

The transatlantic partnership is indispensable. Both NATO and the European Union have critical roles to play in providing transatlantic security. For these key considerations to take hold, U.S. and European governments must engage in a renewed political commitment based on the same common ideals and unity of purpose established by President Truman nearly sixty years ago—emphasizing the fundamental importance of mastering the past with unprecedented commitments to a shared future. Now is the time to build a new transatlantic security partnership that strengthens both organizations while enhancing strategic coordination. The framework for transatlantic transformation and the future of the NATO-EU security relationship will rely on deepening interdependence and global responsibility between the United States and the European Union.
Endnotes


8 NATO Handbook, 15.


10 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO Today and Tomorrow,” speech by NATO Secretary General, Helsinki, FI, 8 November 2007.

11 Today, nearly 50,000 troops from some 40 allies and partner nations conducting five operations on three continents currently serve under NATO command thousands of miles from traditional European borders; including almost 16,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo and countering an insurgency in Afghanistan (NATO’s most important mission and first ground combat deployment in its history) with 35,000 troops in a military mission where all 26 Allied member countries and 11 additional global partners participate, including the European Union, the United Nations and other international and non-governmental organizations.


16 NATO’s eastern European enlargement, the increasing conduct of “out-of-area” missions, the establishment of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) are all examples of NATO’s political willingness to implement a modernization process to effectively deal with the changing security challenges of the 21st century.


21 Jones.


23 NATO funding processes require member countries to incur all costs associated with the deployment and sustainment of their forces while participating with the NRF for a particular mission (“logistics and support costs lie where they fall”). Current funding mechanisms fail to take into account the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO operations. For this reason, many countries are inclined to oppose NRF deployment. Additionally, limited unity exists within NATO regarding the question of when to deploy the NRF, making it unlikely that this force will be deployed to a crisis region anytime in the near future. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, “The NATO Summit in Bucharest: The Alliance at a Crossroads,” Research Paper, NATO Defense College, no. 33 (November 2007): 3.

24 Serfaty, 7.

25 Burwell, 4.


27 Burwell, 4.

28 Victoria Nuland, “U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nuland Urges EU, NATO to Work Together”, speech by U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO at the Institute of European Studies, Brussels, BE, 16 October 2007.


31 Ibid.

32 Since 1999, U.S. support for ESDP and for the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations has been conditioned along three redlines, known as the three D’s: no “decoupling” of European defense from NATO; no “duplication” of NATO command structures or Alliance-wide resources; and no “discrimination” against European NATO countries that are not EU members. See Archick and Gallis, 15.

33 Bereuter, 22.

34 European Security Strategy, 11.

35 The Petersberg Tasks refer to the types of military missions considered to be appropriate for EU intervention. Originally established by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, they


37 Lindstrom, 14.


44 The Berlin Plus arrangement of 2003 allows the European Union to borrow NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations thus preventing duplication of NATO structures and wasteful expenditures of scarce European defense funds. Berlin Plus gives the European Union “assured access” to NATO operational planning capabilities and “presumed access” to NATO common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led operations “in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.” The European Union has conducted two major military operations under the auspices of Berlin Plus – Operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 and Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004. See Berlin Plus Agreement, SHAPE website; available from http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm; accessed 27 January 2008.

46 Petersberg Tasks.


48 The terms **hard power** and **soft power** are often used to contrast the primarily military force of the United States with the alternative civil capabilities of the European Union. Joseph S. Nye, in his original definition, however, defined **hard power** as all resources and measures used above all to carry out coercive measures/sanctions, whereas he described **soft power** as the ability to influence the agendas of others for one’s own cause by making one’s own culture and ideology attractive. For background on **soft power** see Joseph S. Nye, “The Changing Nature of Power,” Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): 1-32.


51 The European Union launched its first ESDP crisis management operation in January 2003 (EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and, as of December 2007, there are 12 active ESDP missions (three in the Western Balkans; two border missions covering Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; and three in Africa), three more planned (Chad/Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and Kosovo), and 9 completed for a total of 24 missions, including military operations and civilian missions. See Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Operations, Brussels, BE; available from http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008; and Giji Gya, “ESDP and EU mission update,” Institute for Security Studies-Europe, European Security Review, no. 36 (December 2007): 14.

52 Burwell, 8.


54 The U.S. defense budget in 2001 was $308.5 billion compared to the EU-15 combined defense budget of approximately $126.8 billion. In 2004, the spending gap between the United States and the European Union was comparatively large; the U.S. figure was $453.6 billion, while the EU-25 defense budget totaled $186.3 billion. Data is from the Stockholm International


56 See SIPRI data on military expenditure.

57 Burwell, 11.


60 Burwell, 15.

61 Flournoy, 8.


63 ESDP is intended to allow the European Union to act autonomously—indeed independent of the United States. Since the European Union continues to rely on NATO for supporting capacities in larger-scale military operations, and NATO depends on the support of the United States there is certainly inherent potential for further cooperation and complementarity. See Volker Heise, “The ESDP and the Transatlantic Relationship,” *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, Berlin, DE (November 2007): 5.

64 Flournoy, 8.


66 Burwell, 18.

67 Cornish, 9.