COMBATING WMD: IS IT REALLY A PRIORITY?

BY

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**Combating WMD Is it Really a Priority?**

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The National Strategies of the United States all address the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to our national security. National and military strategies have been developed to focus extensively on combating weapons of mass destruction. However, reaching consensus throughout the government on what the WMD threat entails remains elusive. While various strategies/policy mandate our need to improve our ability to respond and mitigate the effects of WMD, actual implementation is not a high priority for the Department of Defense (DoD). The U.S. Army should serve DoD as the Executive Agent for implementing critical aspects of our strategy. Never has there been more relevance for the mission of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, however, the paradigm of how the Chemical Corps is structured and utilized creates capability gaps that inhibit response to the WMD threat to the homeland and abroad. Some improvements have been initiated; however, additional focus is required. Currently an imbalance exists in the consequence management capabilities of the active and reserve components. This paper examines the Combating WMD Strategy and the current DoD capabilities to support national strategy. Capability gaps are identified and recommendations are included.
COMBATING WMD: IS IT REALLY A PRIORITY?

Since the terrorist strikes of 9-11, a great deal of emphasis, at least in words, has been given to combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which, depending on what definition you read, includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Our National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, all address the threat of WMD and the need to effectively counter this threat. As a supporting document to these strategies, we now have a National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and a National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. On the surface it would seem that our strategies to combat WMD is very explicit, however, how the strategy is being implemented leaves the impression that it is implicit in nature; suggested and not directed. Richard B. Doyle, an associate professor with the Naval Post Graduate School asks the question of whether or not our published strategies really have substance and can what is written actually succeed? Do we practice what we preach? Doyle notes, “For the most part, they (our published strategies) tell the world what a government intends to do, strategically. Whether it consistently acts on these principles is another matter—a question of implicit strategy.”

The threat of WMD is nothing new, but the significance of 9-11 has raised public consciousness to a level that demands our government to continuously address the threat, even though throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) the emphasis and resources required to implement a successful strategy remain a lower-tiered priority. This is not to say that no progress is being made; in fact many advances have been made in regards to consequence management in support of a domestic WMD terrorist
strike. However, upon close examination it appears that many of the actions implemented are merely modest attempts to check the block for doing something rather than implementing a strategy that addresses the threat of WMD holistically. Too many capability gaps exist. Why is this? For the most part it is due to a general lack of senior leader emphasis that for years has plagued CBRN defense. Within DoD, the conclusions of a March, 1996 General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO), “Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems,” continue eleven years later to be very valid. ²

The Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for CBRN defense, must be the champion for implementing and supporting the Combating WMD Strategy in a manner that is realistic and credible. The Army, through the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, has the greatest number of specialists and the expertise to strategically address the threat of WMD, particularly if the term WMD is primarily applicable to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive threats. The term “WMD” further complicates strategy due to its ambiguity. This paper examines the definition of WMD, the threat and strategy to counter the threat, and the role of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps in combating this threat. Capability gaps are identified and recommendations are provided to better execute our national and military strategies.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is Implied?

The definition for Weapons of Mass Destruction as listed in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is ambiguous and left open to interpretation. The definition is stated as, “Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in a manner so as to destroy large numbers of people.
Weapons of mass destruction can be nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude means of delivery of weapons where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." What exactly constitutes a “large number of people”? Is it in the hundreds or thousands? WMD “can be” CBRN weapons, but the “can be” implies that there are certainly other types of weapons that can fall into the category of WMD. Is a dump truck driven by a terrorist into a large, crowded market resulting in the deaths of thirty or fifty people a weapon of mass destruction? What if the truck is purposely driven into an ammonia tank farm and detonated resulting in the release of a large ammonia cloud and the deaths of several hundred or a thousand people downwind? How do you distinguish between weapon effects when some conventional weapons such as the Air Force Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, are now approaching the explosive yield range of tactical nuclear weapons, yet are not considered WMD? “Similarly, equating WMD to solely NBC weapons is no longer logical, given that other capabilities, such as directed-energy weapons, nanotechnologies, and high-yield explosives, can cause mass casualties in a single event.”

The ambiguity is further amplified due to the wide spread use of the term “WMD” with differing definitions. W. Seth Carus, who identifies over 40 various definitions of WMD in his paper, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, notes, “There are numerous definitions of WMD with some official or semi-official standing…Even DOD has adopted alternative and fundamentally inconsistent definitions, including some different from the one used by the White House in its strategy and policy documents.” The White House equates WMD to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Within
the DoD strategy, WMD is defined as CBRN. Homeland security and law enforcement agencies have adopted CBRNE as the definition for WMD. This may all seem like a problem of semantics, but words do mean something. Even though the definitions appear to vary slightly, depending on which definition you chose, the scope of the combating WMD mission changes significantly.

With any discussion of WMD, the reference to CBRN weapons is always clear and present, although the effects of each can vary greatly. For example, a chemical, biological, or radiological release does not always guarantee or result in mass casualties, and certainly not a high order of destruction. Depending on the intended target and the type of weapon chosen, actual employment of such weapons can be for much smaller effects than what is proposed in the term WMD. On the other hand, there is no doubt as to the consequences of a nuclear weapon. Author Albert J. Mauroni argues, “the term WMD is a relic of the Cold War and needs to go…Using the terms “WMD” and “NBC weapons” allows some people to make the incorrect assessment that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should be treated the same because they each have the potential to cause mass casualties.”⁶ If the strategic concern is focused only on high order destruction and the death of large numbers of people, then as Al Mauroni points out, nuclear weapons are the one and only WMD.⁷ Mauroni’s assessment of WMD as a misleading term is correct. He further contends that it has become convenient at the strategic level to lump special weapons under the term WMD regardless of the different effects. The collective grouping of these distinctly different weapons under WMD exemplifies an overall lack of understanding of these weapons by our senior political and military leaders. Mauroni notes, “Political and military leaders
often widely overstate the potential employment and effectiveness of CB weapons by including them in discussions regarding nuclear weapons employment.” Mauroni’s contention of a lack of understanding of these weapons by our senior leadership has some validity; however, the use of the term “WMD” is borne more of political reasons than it is for correctly defining the threat.

The phrase “weapons of mass destruction”...is an amorphous one, changing meaning according to the whims of the speaker. Raising the specter of WMD is more a way by which politicians assign blame or take a stand on seemingly objective moral standards than a way by which they assess a particular weapons system.9

WMD is a catch-all term that captures the imagination by conjuring an image of unimaginable death and destruction. Playing on public fear, the intent is to induce support for any policy or action against any adversary we identify as either possessing WMD or attempting to acquire WMD according to our terms, regardless of the specific weapon or weapons and their effects in question. Do we truly have an effective strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction or does the acronym WMD really stand for “words of mass distraction”.10

The term “WMD” has propagated into everyday language and is a major focus for DoD and the Department of Homeland Security contingency planning. Because the WMD threat includes both traditional state and non-state actors, the actual threat becomes more blurred when we try to discern between what had previously been referred to as the potential battlefield NBC threat and the terrorist CBRN threat. Further complicating a feasible military strategy is the number of players with oversight. U.S. Strategic Command is the lead combatant command for integrating and synchronizing DoD in combating WMD.11 At the same time U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Special Operations Command have distinct WMD responsibilities with their respective
homeland security and counterterrorism responsibilities. Trying to deconflict these responsibilities involving a common threat will prove difficult. Combatant commands are now producing Combating WMD contingency plans for their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).

At the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi WMD capabilities were identified as an Operational level center of gravity. Specifically, the concern with Iraq was with its chemical and biological warfare program. In essence when we talk WMD, the real national security concern is CBRN in general, and actual weapons effects are of little significance. Why not simply state our policy and strategies as such? If we include high-yield explosives, which we should, why not have a “National Strategy to Combat Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE)? This would serve to clear up confusion, clarify requirements, and focus efforts and priorities where it needs to be. Trying to reach consensus on a definition of WMD is too problematic. An argument has been made that the inclusion of high-yield explosives could be applied to most weapons used by the military thereby placing limits on DoD and hindering future disarmament negotiations. Precedence for categorizing high-yield explosives as WMD has already been made with the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the case of Richard Reid’s attempt at using a shoe bomb to destroy an aircraft. While Reid pled guilty to a charge of attempting to use WMD, some would argue that the explosive power of a shoe bomb hardly constitutes a WMD or high-yield explosive. Certainly high-yield explosives are of grave concern, particularly in the homeland defense sector. However, parameters need to be used in defining high-yield explosives within the context of what we want to
combat or defend against. For example, a useful definition might read, “high-yield explosives in the context of CBRNE are weapons that are employed in a non-conventional manner that have been created, modified, or improvised with the intent of inflicting high order destruction and mass casualties”. This clarification could help resolve DoD concerns. If the strategic concern is focused only on high order destruction and the death of large numbers of people, then as Al Mauroni points out, nuclear weapons are the one and only WMD.15

The Strategy: What are the Priorities?

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies three principal pillars, or in essence the ways to achieve the ends: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. While not stated, it is apparent that the order in which the pillars are listed is also the priority. What is lacking due to the ambiguity of WMD is a priority within the context of each pillar. CBRN is addressed with each pillar, but without regard to weapons effects. High yield explosives are not even addressed. Additionally, within DoD, the strategy lends itself to confusion over jurisdiction between the antiterrorism/force protection and the CBRN defense communities when CBRN or CBRNE is addressed as a terrorist weapon of choice.16

The strategic concept of the three pillars is also flawed from a feasibility, acceptability, and suitability standpoint. Counterproliferation involves all activities to defeat or deter WMD employment against the United States. While the concept of counterproliferation is sound, its focus is too broad, covering a very large range of activities and efforts to combat proliferation. These activities include: defense, deterrence, defusing, and destruction. This wide range of options creates difficulty from a resourcing and priority
standpoint. With the pillar of nonproliferation, the ability to achieve meaningful results may be limited to select nation state actors. An argument can be made that with the definition of WMD, any strategy incorporating nonproliferation of WMD is pointless, save for specific types of WMD such as nuclear weapons. Given the globalization and ready access to large amounts of explosives, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial material, and radiation generating equipment throughout the world, nearly every nation has a WMD capability now and the resources are readily available to non state actors (terrorist). How can you impose or garner meaningful nonproliferation support for something that has already proliferated?

Of the three pillars, consequence management is the one aspect of the strategy that we can make a quantifiable difference. In some respects, consequence management, which is the ability to effectively respond and mitigate the effects of WMD, can also serve as a deterrent. Over and over we continually hear from top analyst and politicians that “the question of WMD employment against the U.S. is not a question of if, but when”. Recognizing that use of these weapons against the U.S. is only a matter of time, defensive measures and response capabilities to mitigate damage and save lives should be our top priority. To date, very little has been done to better posture the active component to conduct consequence management support at home or abroad. Perhaps a better stated policy or set of ways to achieve our national objectives in regards to combating WMD would be to deter, contain, and engage. This type of policy has been proposed as a strategy for dealing with the nuclear ambitions of Iran. Under this construct, deterrence would include passive and active defensive measures to include consequence management and response capabilities. An effective deterrence
strategy results in discouraging or denying a nation state or non state actor in possession of what we define as WMD, from using these weapons out of fear of retaliation or from knowledge that no gains can be made due to the U.S. ability to defend, respond, and mitigate the effects of such weapons. Preemptive strike or the threat of preemption also serves as a deterrent. A containment strategy denies the possessor of WMD the ability to use such weapons as a means to intimidate, influence, or coerce the U.S. or its allies. An engagement strategy does not imply that we should seek to negotiate with terrorist, but rather, through meaningful global engagement, we foster better relations and cooperation to defeat terrorism. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, a Senior Political Scientist with the Rand Corporation, advocates engagement and building partner capabilities to combat WMD. Moroney notes. “A coordinated effort to enhance all partners’ border security, WMD detection, and interdiction capabilities are needed to address the global nature of the threat…DoD can contribute most directly through its security cooperation activities…”

**CBRN Readiness: Emphasis Lacking**

Success at the strategic level in combating CBRN entails a high degree of readiness at the operational and tactical levels. DoD and specifically the Army is a critical instrument in achieving this success. However, when one examines the history of low priority given to the CBRN mission across DoD, one can wonder if it will take a disaster of monumental proportions before CBRN readiness and preparedness will ever be adequately addressed. The GAO has reported extensively over the years that chemical and biological defense lacks emphasis, and that unit training readiness is substandard. While the focus of the GAO reports have been on U.S. Military readiness
to fight and survive on the tactical nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield, the repeated findings beg the question of “If not ready at the operational and tactical levels, how can we successfully implement a strategy that can realistically support national policy”? Despite the GAO reporting, little has been done to remedy the shortfalls. As seen with Desert Storm and with OIF, NBC or now what we are referring to as CBRN training, gets plenty of attention upon realization of potential deployment and operations against a foe with CBRN capabilities. As soon as the conflict ends, training and readiness against the CBRN threat takes a sharp nose dive. Some have argued that if Saddam Hussein had employed chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces, emphasis and training readiness would no longer be an issue. This proposes an interesting view that since such weapons were not employed, it only serves to reinforce the mindset of our senior leaders that the potential for an adversary to actually use these weapons against U.S. forces is remote and therefore emphasis and training is a low priority. It is unfortunate that with our military it always takes the hard lesson learned before change can occur.

Realistic CBRN training is rarely conducted in a combined arms setting. “Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions that approximate actual combat. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and some units receive little or none at all.” Major simulation exercises conducted at the Joint level are also notably void of CBRN play. Within the Army and the Marine Corps, maneuver commanders, particularly at division level, dictate training priorities based on
their Mission Essential Task List (METL). Often due to limited resources and high operations tempo, maneuver commanders have a tendency to always focus on conventional maneuver and CBRN training and readiness will always be an accepted risk. These same Division and Brigade commanders move up and take over senior leadership positions within DoD, the respective service departments, and the joint staff. At the highest levels, our senior leaders are again beset with competing programs, priorities, and demands. For most, the mindset of CBRN being a low priority does not change.

Within the Army, chemical personnel are assigned to maneuver units from company through brigade. While assigned to serve as the commander’s primary advisor for all matters concerning CBRN defense and training, most are consumed with additional duties not related to their technical specialty. As with most technical skills, the skills are perishable and without training and practice, the skills are lost. The lack of emphasis, and to a degree respect, is reflected in our manning authorizations throughout DoD. Combatant Commands are only authorized a Lieutenant Colonel chemical officer. The Army recently reduced the COL Corps Chemical Officer to a Lieutenant Colonel. The Army stood up the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) in October, 2004 with a focus on WMD elimination and exploitation missions. The first two commanders of this organization have been Combat Arms officers. Albert J. Mauroni notes, “The Army leadership, failing to appreciate CBRN defense, has reduced the number of general officers in the Chemical Corps to one—the commandant of the Chemical School.” Even this position is not an authorized Brigadier General position.
While DoD generally has concurred with GAO findings and recommendations, little action has been taken to implement major changes to close the gap between preparedness and stated national priorities. Mauroni points out that the failure to resolve identified CBRN shortcomings has been an often repeated cycle. DOD has had the habit of waiting until an incident occurs or the threat is imminent to boldly proclaim, “We need to fix our shortfalls.” However, years go by and nothing happens. “The cycle repeats itself. NBC weapons events and CBRN incidents are the black swan of military combat operations. They don’t happen often enough for anyone to actively support the development of a long-term comprehensive defense program.”

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report states that DoD must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas. This statement implies that we must have military capabilities to conduct the traditional warfighting CBRN defense mission as well as a homeland defense mission. Taking into account the poor track record of DoD’s warfighting CBRN defense readiness, the ability to perform the homeland defense mission is doubtful. In event of a terrorist CBRN release in the U.S., DoD must be prepared to provide domestic support to civil authorities (DSCA). The “be prepared to” mission is support to consequence management efforts under the purview of a Lead Federal Agency. However, when you examine the majority of the active component military and the capabilities to operate in a CBRN environment, it is obvious that the warfighting CBRN environment that the force has been equipped for, does not equate to the domestic environment we may be tasked to operate in. For one, the personal protective equipment (PPE) to include the M40 series protective mask and the protective over garments are designed for the tactical
environment. Neither is designed for prolonged exposure to high concentrations of chemical agent, rather they are designed to keep soldiers alive until they can evacuate to a clear area, decontaminate if necessary and reduce their protective posture. Because WMD was used as the primary reason for OIF, DoD, recognizing the need to conduct sensitive site exploitation in its search for Saddam’s WMD, deployed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and protective ensembles designed to meet higher standards for personal protection. Within the active component, only the Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the Army’s Technical Escort Units had been trained and were authorized the OSHA/NIOSH approved equipment. Select soldiers fell in on the equipment and received training while in theater.

The establishment of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (CST), now numbering 55 teams authorized to ensure that each state and territory has at least one CST, are recognized as DoDs homeland CBRNE event first responders. These teams consist of “22 high-skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air Force national Guard who are federally resourced, trained, and certified, and operate under the command and control of a State governor (Title 32, U.S. Code).” CST teams possess OSHA/NIOSH approved PPE. Currently Civil Support Teams are restricted by law to support of the homeland and are non-deployable outside the United States or its territories. This poses a problem if the military were tasked to support the State Department with foreign consequence management. With both foreign and homeland consequence management contingencies, the potential exists to have active duty soldiers operating in
PPE that provides a lower level of skin and respiratory protection along side civilian and specialized military first responders provided higher levels of protection. The level of training and skills possessed by the CST far surpass that of the active component CBRN specialist. While the role of the CST in the overall consequence management mission is only one small aspect of the mission as a whole, what is evident is that the active component requires these same skill sets. The skill sets of the CST would prove invaluable in supporting WMD elimination operations, to include sensitive site exploitation.

Because of a lack of emphasis and unwillingness to apply resources where needed and to provide long term solutions, the Army has implemented some ad hoc solutions in an attempt to offset capability gaps. An example is with the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) which is a tailored joint task force built around a maneuver brigade headquarters. The CCMRFs are to be capable of responding to a wide range of CBRNE attacks with a wide range of services, including: decontamination; security; search and rescue; medical triage; treatment and care; and transportation and logistical support. This is an ambitious effort but falls short from a common sense perspective. An unnamed General Officer recently alluded that the concept of tasking a maneuver brigade for this type of mission for which they were ill prepared was a great disservice. The requirement for the CCMRF entails fencing identified units for a period of one year, essentially making the identified units nondeployable for warfighting operations and dedicated to the homeland defense mission. A certification exercise is required for the identified units. Warfighting skills will
erode during this one year period, requiring six months to a year of training after being relieved of CCMRF responsibilities in order to be prepared for deployment.

National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) is another ad hoc attempt at filling a void. The CERFP is to provide assistance to local, State, and Federal authorities in CBRNE consequence management. Specific tasks include: casualty search and extraction; medical triage; casualty decontamination; and emergency medical treatment.27 As with the CCMRF, Guard units tasked with this additional duty have a primary warfighting mission. Further complicating readiness is the fact that the soldiers and airmen performing these duties are not full-time guardsmen. Training time is precious and now they are forced to divide their limited training time on their go to war tasks and their homeland defense mission. DoD needs to step back and reevaluate its priorities. To be truly viable, units with the required mission capabilities need to be formed in an active status. Numbers, size and composition of our response forces needs to be commensurate with the threat.

Strengthening CBRN (E) Defense

Change is required in order to effectively support our National Strategy and protect the homeland as well as our forces and interests abroad from the affects of CBRNE weapons. As mentioned, the first step is to get rid of the term WMD and state our strategy explicitly as Combating CBRNE. The Army, with the largest number of technical specialist for matters relating to CBRNE defense, must take the lead. As such, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps with a total authorized Corps strength in excess of 22,000 officer and enlisted CBRN specialist should be the focal point.28
Corps and Chemical School must be recognized respectively as the foundation and the Center of Excellence for the Combating CBRNE mission.

Recently the Chief of Chemical, Brigadier General Thomas Spoehr, announced, “All courses at the U.S. Army Chemical School and position titles within the Corps have been renamed from “Chemical” to “CBRN” to more accurately reflect the skills and capabilities we bring to the fight.”\(^{29}\) This is a great initiative, but all that is needed to better support national security and current policy is simply to add the “E” to CBRN. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal technical specialty, which has for far too long been misaligned under the maintenance and logistics focused Ordnance Branch, should be absorbed and embedded within a new branch of the Army entitled the CBRNE branch. Already, new modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for our major warfighting unit staffs have began embedding EOD officers and NCOs with the CBRN staffs to form CBRNE sections. The 20\(^{th}\) Support Command (CBRNE) exercises command and control over three EOD Groups and a Chemical (now CBRN) Brigade. Consolidating the assets that perform the basic CBRNE response functions under one branch of expertise gives a greater sense of legitimacy and jurisdiction to the Army’s critical role in combating CBRNE. Colonel Robert D. Walk, former Deputy Assistant Commandant for the US Army Reserve, US army Chemical School, proposed this concept in 2006, but going one step further by adding Functional Area 52 (Nuclear research and Operations) to the consolidation efforts.\(^{30}\) Colonel Walk notes, “FA 52 officers, located at higher-level Army staffs, provide technical expertise on nuclear operations…With the removal of the Army’s nuclear mission and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Army has adjusted the FA 52 mission to include other WMDs.”\(^{31}\)
Because FA 52 officers were originally focused on Army offensive nuclear capabilities, a capability which no longer exists, they are now being utilized to offset shortages of chemical officers in higher level billets. There is no reason why the functional area should be abolished and the FA 52 officer absorbed by the new CBRNE Corps. From a doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis, this reorganization effort appears to have merit.\textsuperscript{32}

The new CBRNE Corps needs to look hard at current force structure and be an advocate for change that best supports National Security objectives as well as Army transformation and modularity efforts. A top priority must be in the area of personnel and specifically on the career paths of Chemical Officers and NCOs. The assignment of Chemical Officers and NCOs’ to maneuver brigades and battalions are a waste of manpower. The Chemical School has initiated a request to implement a Warrant Officer program in the Chemical Corps. The intent of this program is to replace brigade and battalion chemical officers with warrant officers. Based on history, this will likewise be a waste. What is needed is to remove these officers and NCOs and place them into Chemical Units or CBRNE staff sections where their focus is on CBRNE issues and where they can hone and develop their individual and collective technical skills. A CBRNE team consisting of an officer and NCO can be earmarked for maneuver brigades and battalions for major training events and contingency deployments. Today’s threat dictates that we have a professionally trained and ready Corps of experts. The skills of our company grade officers and NCOs are being eroded through their assignments with maneuver units that do not value their specialties, but rather see them as warm bodies to perform a litany of administrative additional duties. At the same
time, maneuver commanders need to be held accountable for the CBRN readiness of their formations, namely the proficiency in the CBRN related common skills that all Soldiers are required to master.

We need to build into our active duty chemical unit force structure some of the same capabilities as possessed by the National Guard WMD CSTs and the CERFPs. This is critical in supporting both homeland and foreign consequence management missions. As discussed earlier, the CSTs are not deployable outside the U.S. and U.S. territories. Additionally, 55 CST teams are overkill and a waste of resources. Politics instead of actual threat have driven the establishment of so many teams. Just because certain states have a CST does not mean that every state and territory requires the same. The Chemical Corps and soon to be CBRN Corps is already engaged in transformation efforts which involve modularizing the majority of chemical units. This primarily involves making most of the chemical company sized formations multi-purpose units, combining decontamination, CBRN reconnaissance, and biological surveillance in the same unit. Some specialized units, such as the two Technical Escort Battalions are being redesigned to make them more capable of worldwide deployment. This is great progress, but in order to truly support the Army’s modularity intent as well as the Joint Staffs force application functional concept for providing a more capable joint force to meet national objectives, the multi-purpose units we are creating need to have enhanced capabilities that are not limited to one or two specialized active component units. The Army and Marine Corps have been approved for growth, however, the preponderance of the soldiers being added to force structure will be used to create more conventional warfare oriented combat brigades. As a result of ongoing
counterinsurgency efforts and emphasis being placed on stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, a growing argument is ensuing over the future focus and design of our Army. Andrew F. Krepinevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, provided testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which advocates the creation of Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) vice focusing the Army’s future growth towards more conventional warfare oriented Brigade Combat Teams. Krepinevich’s assessment of the Army being too focused on conventional forces is correct; however, going one step further, the Army also needs to look at building organizations dedicated to full spectrum DSCA support. These type units would be dedicated to this vital mission and allow combat units to strictly focus on combat missions. These DSCA formations could be tailored to perform multifunctional roles and be able to respond to events raging from wild fires, natural disaster response, to catastrophic WMD events at home and abroad. Some are arguing that the National Guard should have units specifically dedicated to this mission. While the National Guard certainly plays and will continue to play a pivotal role in emergency response, what is required is a full-time active component in a trained and ready status.

In his book “Where Are the WMDs?” Albert J. Mauroni offers a set of long-term strategic goals for improving CBRN defense capabilities. First of his listed goals is the implementation of an aggressive education and outreach campaign to develop a senior leader constituency within the Army, OSD, and Congress. The bottom line is that the Chemical Corps needs more general officer positions at the Department of the Army, and DoD. Additionally, our COMs need CBRN experts in the rank of colonel. Senior CBRNE leadership at the highest levels of DoD would greatly assist in their ability to
educate and influence decision makers in a manner that properly address CBRNE strategic issues and shortfalls.

Conclusion

A bottom-up review is required if the nation and the Department of Defense are serious about combating WMD and in particular CBRNE. First and foremost our strategy needs to be specific as to what we are trying to combat. WMD is an ambiguous cold war term that needs to go. Consensus needs to be achieved throughout the government on the threat. If the threat is actually CBRNE, whether employed against our forces on the battlefield or by a terrorist at home or abroad, then greater emphasis needs to be placed on CBRNE defense, response, and mitigation. A starting point to combat the CBRNE threat is with the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The foundation and expertise required to successfully implement any strategy involving CBRNE weapons resides with the Chemical Corps. While some great initiatives have been implemented toward improving CBRNE defense, response, and mitigation capabilities, greater emphasis should be placed on transforming the Chemical Corps to better support the full range of the combating WMD mission set. This in turn would enhance the ability of DoD to support our nation’s objectives. Additionally, DoD, and in particular the Army, needs to look hard at future transformation initiatives. The world has changed and the conventional threat of years past has decreased significantly. Future force structure needs to reflect reality.

Endnotes


7 Ibid., 12.

8 Ibid., 16.


10 Carus, 2.


13 Carus, 11.

14 Ibid., 10.


16 Mauroni, “The Future of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense,” 76.


21 Mauroni, *Where Are the WMDs?*, 262.


23 Mauroni, 26.


26 Ibid., 6.

27 Ibid., 4.


29 Ibid., 35.


31 Ibid., 36.

32 Ibid., 37-38.

33 Spoehr, 34.


36 Mauroni, *Where Are the WMDs?*, 261-270.

37 Ibid., 262.