U. S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress

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Summary

In 1974, India exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device and demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a result, the United States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has convinced other states to do the same.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced a new global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. The desire to transform relations with India, according to Administration officials, is “founded upon a strategic vision that transcends even today’s most pressing security concerns.” Nuclear cooperation is one element of that strategic vision. President Bush said he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies.”

Administration officials have described the agreement as a “win” for nonproliferation because it would bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream. At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an Nuclear Suppliers Group exception. It would reverse nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice towards India. Many observers believe India requires a new paradigm, but some of those also believe the agreement should contain additional restrictions, like a ban on further nuclear material production for Indian nuclear weapons. Some believe this agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan.

India’s uncertain support for U.S. efforts to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons may be an important consideration for some members of Congress. Some have questioned why the United States would reward India, given its alliance with Iran. Other members of Congress have questioned whether nuclear cooperation is the appropriate “carrot” in U.S.-Indian relations, in contrast to other options like supporting a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council.

Significant U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation cannot go forward without action by Congress. India does not meet existing nonproliferation criteria under current U.S. law (Atomic Energy Act; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. 2153 et seq.), so the Bush Administration could use exemptions and waivers under current law; propose legislation to amend certain portions of the Atomic Energy Act; or propose stand-alone legislation to create an exception for India. The Administration has not revealed its proposal yet. Congress may also choose to approve an agreement with conditions, as it did for the 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement with China. This report will be updated as necessary.
U. S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress

Background

The United States actively promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India from the mid-1950s, building nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. Although India was active in negotiations of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India refused to join the NPT on grounds that it was discriminatory. The “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974 demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. In the United States, the Congress responded by passing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA, P.L. 95-242), which imposed tough new requirements for U.S. nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states — full-scope safeguards and termination of exports if such a state detonates a nuclear explosive device or engages in activities related to acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons, among other things. Internationally, the United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to implement nuclear export controls. The NSG published guidelines in 1978 “to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.”


2 The NNPA, in part, amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. See 42 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. Prior to the 1970 NPT, safeguards (inspections, material protection, control and accounting) were applied to specific facilities or materials (known as INFCIRC/66-type agreements). The NPT required safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities for non-nuclear-weapon-state parties (those states not having detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to Jan. 1, 1967).

3 IAEA Document INFCIRC/254, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology. Part 1 covers “trigger list” items: those especially designed or prepared for nuclear use: (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production; and (v) associated technology. Part 2 covers dual-use items. Additional NSG criteria for dual-use exports include NPT membership and/or full-scope safeguards agreement; appropriate end-use; whether the technology would be used in a reprocessing or enrichment facility; the state’s support for nonproliferation; and the risk of (continued...)
Conditioning U.S. nuclear exports on non-nuclear-weapon states having full-scope safeguards created a problem particularly for U.S. fuel supplies to India’s safeguarded Tarapur reactors. When the NNPA was enacted, the United States was supplying fuel. The Carter Administration exported two more shipments under executive order after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) refused to approve an export license on nonproliferation conditions. Given slim support in Congress, no more exports were attempted after 1980. France supplied fuel under the terms of the U.S. agreement with India until France adopted a full-scope safeguards requirement also (1984 to 1995). After the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards condition in 1992, China picked up the slack. Russia supplied fuel from 2001 to 2004.4

Global Partnership

The Bush Administration had been considering a strategic partnership with India as early as 2001. Indian officials identified their growing energy needs as an area for cooperation, particularly in nuclear energy. The U.S.-India 2004 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative included expanded cooperation in civil nuclear technology as one of three goals. Phase I of the NSSP, completed in September 2004, required addressing proliferation concerns and ensuring compliance with U.S. export controls.6

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced the creation of a global partnership with India in a joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.7 Noting the “significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner,” President Bush said he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies.”

Three paragraphs of the joint statement were devoted to civil nuclear cooperation. The statement noted that the United States “will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel

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3 (...continued)

4 China was not a member of the NSG until 2004. Russia, an NSG member, exported fuel, citing a safety exception, but NSG members objected so strongly that Russia suspended supply in 2004. Russia may be reconsidering. “Russia to Review Tarapur Fuel Decision” South Asian Media Net, May 10, 2005.

5 See also CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005, and CRS Issue Brief, India-U.S. Relations.


supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.” The United States committed to encouraging its partners to consider this request — a reversal in the U.S. position, which has been to ban fuel to Tarapur — and to consulting with its partners on Indian participation in ITER (collaboration on fusion research) and in the Generation IV International Forum for future reactor design.

The leaders agreed to create a working group, to negotiate the scope and pace of nuclear cooperation, and implementation of Indian commitments. Prime Minister Singh conveyed that India “would take on the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.” India agreed to:

- identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs;
- declare its civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- voluntarily place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- sign an Additional Protocol for civilian facilities;
- continue its unilateral nuclear test moratorium;
- work with the United States to conclude a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT);
- refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as support international efforts to limit their spread;
- secure its nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.

**Issues for Consideration**

Under current U.S. law, significant nuclear cooperation with a state that does not have full-scope nuclear safeguards requires Congressional action (described below). The House International Relations Committee held a hearing on September 8, 2005, on “The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?” and there may be several more hearings, both in the House and Senate, as the details of cooperation emerge. Some of the issues discussed below arose during the September 8 hearing; others may emerge as the Administration proceeds to implement the agreement.

**Strategy vs. Tactics**

There appears to be broad support for cultivating a close relationship with India for many reasons. The Bush Administration has described its “desire to transform relations with India” as “founded upon a strategic vision that transcends even today’s

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8 July 18 Joint Statement.
most pressing security concerns. Yet, some members of Congress have suggested that civil nuclear cooperation may not be the most appropriate vehicle for advancing our relationship. In a House International Relations Committee hearing on September 8, 2005, Congressman Jim Leach stated,

I don’t know any member of Congress that doesn’t want to have a warming of relations with the government of India. This is a time that is extremely appropriate. I also don’t know many members of Congress who are pushing for the precise commitment that the administration has made.

Congressman Leach instead suggested that U.S. support for a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council might have been a more appropriate gesture. In response, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns noted that U.S. efforts to expand the security council would have to wait until after UN reform.

Other observers outside of Congress have questioned whether U.S. energy assistance should focus on expanding nuclear power, in contrast to other energy alternatives. Henry Sokolski, of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, has argued that Indian energy needs might be better met through free market allocation, including improved efficiency. He asserts that nuclear power is the least leveraged of India’s options to meet India’s energy needs, given that it currently provides only 2.7% of installed electrical capacity. India’s projections of its nuclear energy needs are predicated on an estimated annual growth rate of 8%, which some observers believe may be unrealistic.

Impact on U.S. Nonproliferation Policies

The Administration has characterized civil nuclear cooperation with India as a “win” for nonproliferation because it would bring India into the nonproliferation “mainstream.” In short, the Administration is proposing that India should be courted as an ally in U.S. (not global) nonproliferation policy, rather than continue as a target of U.S. (and global) nonproliferation policy. India should become an ally for three reasons: past policies have not worked; India has a relatively good nonproliferation record anyway, and India could be a useful ally in the nonproliferation regime.

Some observers, however, are concerned that India may not support U.S. nonproliferation policies sufficiently to warrant nuclear cooperation, particularly


11 Ibid.


where the United States faces its greatest nuclear proliferation threat: Iran. For example, at the September 8 hearing, several members of Congress questioned whether the United States had obtained assurances from India of its support on Iran before it issued the July 18 joint statement.

**Iran.** Two factors may present challenges to Indian support for U.S. policies toward Iran. First, India has a growing strategic relationship with Iran, not limited to its interest in a proposed $7.4 billion, 2800-km-long gas pipeline between Iran, Pakistan, and India. Second, India also has a tradition of foreign policy independence, as a long-time leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states and as a vigorous opponent of the discriminatory nature of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Indian officials have stated they do not support a nuclear weapons option for Iran. However, they do not agree with the United States on the need to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council, which the United States has proposed for two years, and on the need to limit Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle development.

On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution (GOV/2005/77) finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The resolution, according to several observers, was weaker than the United States hoped for on two counts: it did not pass by consensus (Venezuela voted against it and 12 countries abstained) and it did not refer the matter immediately to the Security Council. India voted for the resolution which called for Iran again to help resolve outstanding questions, and explained its vote this way:

In our Explanation of Vote, we have clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being declared as noncompliant with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the current situation could constitute a threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the Security Council and has agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This is in line with our position and therefore, we have extended our support.

According to Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, India voted for the resolution and against the majority of NAM states which abstained, because it felt obligated after having pressured the EU-3 to omit reference to immediate referral to the UN Security Council. Two future tests may indicate the depth of India’s support: the next Board decision to immediately refer Iran to the Security Council, and consideration of the matter by the Security Council.

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A further issue is India’s support for curtailing Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. India has always been an advocate of states’ rights to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for thirty years has derided the NPT and nonproliferation policies as discriminatory. The official Iranian press agency reported Prime Minister Singh as telling President Ahmadinejad on September 22 that solutions to Iran’s nuclear problem should be based on the principle that Iran as an NPT member should retain its lawful rights. On September 26, Foreign Secretary Saran told the press that “With respect to Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that is something which we have ourselves no reservations about.”

Restricting Enrichment and Reprocessing. On July 18, India agreed to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have already have those technologies and also agreed to support international efforts to limit their spread. This could be an important step in moving India politically into the mainstream of nonproliferation efforts, since India historically has stood with non-aligned nations in championing the inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To some observers, U.S. efforts to restrict development of certain aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) that are most useful in a nuclear weapons development program are seen as creating a new category of “have-nots” — those states that can have some peaceful nuclear technology but cannot be trusted with it all. In other words, states like Japan, Germany, and Brazil might be trusted with sensitive technologies, but states like Iran and North Korea cannot be trusted. India has supported EU-3 negotiations with Iran, which have as their ultimate objective getting Iran to walk away from enrichment and reprocessing, but India has also, at least rhetorically, supported states’ inalienable rights to the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. Nonetheless, there is little evidence thus far that India had exported such technology abroad in the past.

One question that has not been raised publicly yet is whether or not U.S. cooperation with India will include any technology or assistance related to enrichment or reprocessing. A U.S. agreement for nuclear cooperation is required to specify the extent of cooperation. Some Indian experts have suggested that the United States has little to offer in terms of reactor technologies, since U.S. reactors use low-enriched uranium and India hopes to continue to use natural uranium in its ultimate quest to use thorium as fuel. In any case, provision of U.S. assistance in areas related to enrichment or reprocessing could be perceived by many as difficult to safeguard against diversion to the Indian nuclear weapons program, and could potentially hurt U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of that technology. The 1985 peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with China — the only other peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement the United States has with a nuclear weapon state — did not allow cooperation in sensitive nuclear fuel cycle-related activities like reprocessing and enrichment. Instead, the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment

17 “Ahmadinejad Thanks India for Positive Stands on Iran in IAEA,” IRNA, Sept. 23, 2005.
18 September 26, 2005 press briefing, op. cit.
19 The United States does have a Section 123 agreement with EURATOM, of which France
Statement on China, submitted to the Congress on July 19, 2005 pursuant to Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act, noted that the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, facilities, or major critical components would require an amendment to the agreement because additional control mechanisms would need to be obtained.20

Other Priorities. In his February 11, 2004, speech, President Bush outlined several counterproliferation priorities, including expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative; strengthening laws and international controls against WMD and missile proliferation (ultimately resulting in adoption of UNSCR 1540); expanding the G8 Global Partnership; and strengthening IAEA safeguards through universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. Ambassador Joseph noted on September 8, that the United States had discussed Indian endorsement of PSI, and that India’s adherence to NSG and MTCR guidelines would help ensure that WMD and missile-related technologies would not be transferred. India’s adoption of the Additional Protocol would contribute to its universalization.

Impact on the Nonproliferation Regime

India has long stood outside the nonproliferation regime and this initiative raises questions about whether a partial solution can be beneficial or detrimental. Some considerations include cohesion within the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, effect on non-nuclear weapon member states of the NPT, and perspectives on whether the initiative missed opportunities to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

NSG Cohesion. A first order concern is the impact on cohesion within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). As noted earlier, the NSG has followed the U.S. lead on requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. During the September 8, hearing, House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde noted that “Many of us are strong supporters of the NSG and would not want to see it weakened or destroyed.” Chairman Hyde asked whether the administration could assure the Committee that...

...no matter what else happens, that the administration will continue to abide by NSG guidelines, and if you are unable to gain consensus within the NSG for the amendments you need, you will not implement the new India policy in violation of NSG guidelines.

Ambassador Joseph responded with an assurance that “we intend to take no action that would undercut the effectiveness of the NSG,” and further, that the

19 (...continued)
and the UK are members.
Administration did not intend to change the consensus procedure or even change the NSG full-scope safeguards condition of nuclear supply.\(^{21}\)

Dissent within the NSG could be counterproductive to achieving other objectives the United States is pursuing in nuclear nonproliferation, such as restricting the fuel cycle, disarming North Korea, and restraining Iran, all of which rely on the considerable support of friends and allies. Moreover, harmonizing export controls has played a key role in Bush counter- and non-proliferation policies in the last few years and is particularly important for interdiction efforts. U.S.-India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other non-nuclear-weapon states, like Pakistan. China, which joined the NSG in 2004, reportedly has not yet shared its views on the nuclear cooperation agreement. Russia, which only halted fuel supplies to the Indian Tarapur reactors in December 2004 at the insistence of the NSG, could welcome the opportunity to resume fuel supplies to Tarapur, but might also be emboldened to push ahead with supplying more reactors to Iran, regardless of U.S. views.

**Effect on NPT Member States.** India has complained for years that it has been excluded from regular nuclear commerce because of its status outside the NPT. Some observers believe this is a good thing and shows that the policy works. Others believe that a new paradigm is needed for India because it will not join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

The NPT is basically a two-way bargain. Non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT give up the option of developing nuclear weapons in exchange for the promise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Nuclear weapon states under the NPT were not required immediately to disarm, but to commit to eventual disarmament. India, as a state outside the NPT, is bound by neither of these commitments. Some observers may see the offer of nuclear cooperation previously reserved for states under the NPT with full-scope safeguards not only as undermining the agreements made by non-nuclear weapon states, but also the commitments made by nuclear weapon states to eventually disarm. In this view, India’s continued unilateral testing moratorium is insufficient, compared with signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its support for FMCT negotiations is insufficient compared with capping its nuclear weapons fissile material production now, as four of the five nuclear weapon states have formally done.

The proliferation shocks of the 1990s, when the Iraqi and North Korean clandestine nuclear weapons programs surfaced, led to the strengthening of the NPT and export control regimes. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, NPT parties affirmed the NSG’s decision to require full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports, supporting the principle that non-NPT parties should not be eligible for the same kinds of assistance as NPT parties in good standing. At the 2000 conference, NPT parties again supported that principle. According to one U.S. participant in that conference, “Reinforcement of this guideline is important given some who have questioned whether this principle should be relaxed for India and Pakistan, which

\(^{21}\) HIRC US-India hearing.
have not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. The answer from NPT parties is clearly no.”

In the last ten years, virtually all states agreed to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, sacrificing some sovereignty by opening up to additional, intrusive inspections under the Additional Protocol. In the wake of revelations in 2004 about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market sales, non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT are also being asked to consider further restrictions on their sovereignty by voluntarily restricting their access to sensitive nuclear technologies like uranium enrichment and reprocessing. If some states view the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement as a breach of faith in the basic bargain of the NPT, they might be less inclined to accept additional sacrifices, to the detriment of the nonproliferation regime.

**Missed Opportunities.** Ambassador Joseph described the nuclear initiative as representing “a substantial net gain for nonproliferation. It is a win for our strategic relationship, a win for energy security, and a win for nonproliferation.” Ambassador Joseph said he was “convinced that the nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result.”

However, some observers have suggested the United States asked for too little. For example, Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf and Lawrence Scheinman, argued in the October 2005 issue of *Arms Control Today* that

> It is open to serious doubt whether the proposed Indian concessions were significant enough to justify the accommodations promised by the United States and whether the steps the United States and India agreed to take in the civil nuclear area will, on balance, be supportive of global nonproliferation efforts...If the Bush Administration is able to implement the joint declaration without significant modification, it will have given the Indians a great deal — acknowledgment as a de facto nuclear weapon state and access to the international nuclear energy market — in return for largely symbolic concessions in the nonproliferation area.

The Indian embassy itself, not surprisingly, has downplayed the depth and breadth of its nonproliferation commitments, describing all but its safeguards commitments under the July 18 statement in the following way:

> A number of existing policies were also reiterated by India, among them a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, working towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, non-transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, securing nuclear materials and technology through

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23 Ibid.

export control, and harmonisation with MTCR and NSG guidelines.[emphasis added]  

India has had a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium for years, although supporters of this agreement note that this agreement would bind India bilaterally to honoring that pledge. If the NSG used a similar criteria in approving exports, it could further strengthen that pledge. India has supported FMCT negotiations for years, despite continuing to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Since the pace of FMCT negotiations is glacial, support for negotiations could allow India to continue producing fissile material indefinitely. At least one supporter of the agreement, Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that India should not cap its nuclear weapons program, and that outcomes restraining the ability to build up its nuclear stockpile “threaten to place New Delhi at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in Asia.”  

The most far-reaching of the commitments is to separate civilian and military facilities, declare civilian facilities, and place them under safeguards. Administration officials have pointed to this aspect of the agreement as a nonproliferation “plus.” Yet, India’s voluntary safeguards commitments essentially place India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states. Allowing India broad latitude in determining which of its facilities to put under international safeguards is a privilege accorded currently only to nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Although the United States “in no way recognizes India as an NPT nuclear weapons state,” excluding military facilities from inspections is a tacit recognition of their legitimacy. Indian statements to the press indicate that they see their safeguards commitment very much as the kind that nuclear weapon states undertake. The Indian embassy backgrounder on the agreement stated that “Nuclear weapon states, including the US, have the right to shift facilities from civilian category to military and there is no reason why this should not apply to India.”  

Such an approach would not meet U.S. legal standards for agreements for cooperation.  

The IAEA has supported placing Indian facilities under safeguards, and it is clear that encouraging a culture of transparency and accounting is a positive development. Dr. ElBaradei said that he has “always advocated concrete and practical steps towards the universal application of IAEA safeguards.”  

27 ibid.  
29 “IAEA Director General Reacts to U.S.-India Cooperation Agreement,” See [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2005/prn200504.html]. Critics of the IAEA point out that it is an organization that measures its success in part by how much (continued...)
Burns told reporters on July 19, 2005, that “this agreement can be verified and will be verified,” and presumably that refers to verifying the U.S. obligation under Article I of the NPT “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.” From a broader nonproliferation perspective, however, there is little value in inspecting facilities in a nuclear weapons state. In particular, an Additional Protocol on top of largely symbolic safeguards seems to add few nonproliferation benefits.

The Administration has asserted that India has an “exceptional” record of nonproliferation and despite a few isolated sanctions, most of the evidence supports the view that India has exercised restraint in export controls. As such, however, India’s promise to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as its promise to adhere to NSG guidelines, may be little more than a formality.

Many observers have noted that there are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program. Some have suggested that the United States should have asked India to halt fissile material production for weapons. Ambassador Bob Joseph stated that the United States remains “committed to achieving Indian curtailment of fissile material production, and we have strongly encouraged a move in this direction. We stand willing to explore options that might serve this objective, but we will not insist on it for purposes of this civil nuclear initiative.” Indian officials, on the other hand, have taken pains to point out that “There is no commitment at all to cease production of fissile material ahead of the conclusion of such a multilateral [FMCT] treaty.” Other observers have noted that although India committed to a test ban, it did not commit to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Still other observers have suggested that if India insists on being treated as a nuclear weapon state, it should undertake responsibilities similar to those of the other nuclear weapon states, for example, placing fissile material excess to defense needs under safeguards. Many believe that real limits on India’s nuclear weapons program would constitute a “win” for nonproliferation.

The Way Ahead: Challenges and Uncertainties

Ambassador Joseph highlighted three challenges and uncertainties in his September 8 testimony: how India proceeds on separating its civil and military

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20 (...continued)
nuclear material and how many facilities are under inspection.

30 In Sept. 2004, the State Department published a notice in the Federal Register imposing sanctions pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Two Indian scientists were named in the notice — Dr. Prasad and C. Surendar. The State Department has not revealed what technology or equipment was transferred, but both scientists have worked for the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd., a government-owned entity that runs India’s nuclear power plants.

31 HIRC US-India hearing.

facilities and placing the civilian ones under international inspections, how NSG members will react, and the issue of “other states.” By this last issue, Joseph is referring to whether or not Pakistan and Israel would also ask for such cooperation, which Joseph says the United States will not seek.33

A particular challenge for the United States is to ensure that the new steps — separating civilian and military facilities, placing civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, and applying an additional protocol — are implemented in a way that satisfies U.S. legal requirements. The United States, under Article I of the NPT must ensure that its assistance does not “in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture nuclear weapons.” A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards, can provide sufficient confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes, as it was in 1974.34 Some observers believe that IAEA safeguards provide little assurance of the non-diversion of fissile material, particularly in a state that has an active nuclear weapons program that is not safeguarded. Others believe that the application of an Additional Protocol helps strengthen the IAEA’s capabilities to detect diversion. India has agreed to sign an additional protocol for its civilian facilities. However, given India’s unsafeguarded nuclear weapons program, this step is also unlikely to make a difference in providing additional assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material.

The United States also has a legal obligation under Section 123 a. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act to maintain safeguards with respect to all U.S. materials and equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement as long as that material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party, irrespective of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended [emphasis added]. The language of the joint statement, however, refers to India “voluntarily placing its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.” There are currently three kinds of safeguards agreements in force: INFCIRC/66, INFCIRC/153, and voluntary safeguards agreements made by the five nuclear weapon states.35 Only INFCIRC/66 agreements, which predate the NPT and which India currently has on four of its nuclear reactors,

33 Statement of Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Sept. 8, 2005, House Committee on International Relations, US-India Hearing. Amb. Joseph describes India as an exceptional case and civil nuclear cooperation as a mechanism to further deepen its commitment to international nonproliferation. Joseph then suggests that neither Pakistan nor Israel — two other nuclear weapon states outside the NPT — has a civil nuclear energy program that approximates India’s and that the United States will not seek such cooperation with those states.

34 Although India maintained a certain ambiguity by calling its 1974 test a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the 1998 tests leave little doubt that the experience gained was put to use in a nuclear weapons program. Plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor, which the United States supplied with heavy water, was used in the 1974 test. See Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal. “India Cheated,” Washington Post, June 15, 1998.

35 INFCIRC, an abbreviation of “Information Circular,” is a designation the IAEA uses to record its agreements with states and organizations. INFCIRC/66 and /153 are model agreements; the actual agreements with states will bear different numbers. INFCIRC/66 agreements predate the NPT and were used in bilateral safeguards arrangements, whereas INFCIRC/153 agreements are “full-scope safeguards” under the NPT.
have indefinite application. INFCIRC/153 agreements apply to nuclear material, which means that if a facility is emptied of nuclear material, it would not have to be inspected, and voluntary safeguards agreements make facilities “eligible” for safeguards, but do not require the IAEA to inspect them. It is not clear which kind of agreement India will seek and which one will be acceptable to the IAEA.

 Ultimately, the United States will have little influence over the outcome of that negotiation process, since safeguards agreements are negotiated between the state and the IAEA. India’s broad latitude in separating its civilian facilities from military facilities and voluntarily placing them under safeguards will have an effect on how observers perceive the “verifiability” of the agreement. Congress could, however, predicate its approval of an agreement for cooperation on adequate implementation of safeguards on India’s civil nuclear program, as described below.

**Negotiating with India**

The July 18, 2005, joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh noted that the two countries would establish working groups to hammer out details of cooperation. As Ambassador Burns has noted, transparency on both sides will be important in achieving quick progress. On September 16, it was announced that Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran would head the Indian working group, and Ambassador Burns would head the U.S. working group. It is envisioned that significant work will be completed by the time President Bush travels to India sometime in 2006. Although a nuclear cooperation agreement reportedly already has been drafted, it is not clear whether Congress is expected to approve an agreement before the details of safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities are clear. In the case of other states, safeguards negotiations have taken years.

**NSG Consultations**

U.S. officials have consulted both informally and formally with NSG members thus far. Initial responses from the United Kingdom, Russia and France have all been positive. In mid-September, France issued a joint statement with India that it would work with NSG partners to enable nuclear cooperation with India to go forward. Other responses have been mixed, especially from Sweden and Canada. Some “NPT purists,” including Ireland, Japan, and the Netherlands, reportedly have raised questions. Canada, which provided the CIRUS reactor to India, as well as blueprints for CANDU reactors (that India subsequently used to build indigenous reactors that could make plutonium for its weapons program), reportedly told U.S. officials that it welcomed U.S. steps to addressing what has been a thorny issue in the NPT — nuclear weapon states outside the regime — but had hoped the United States

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would have placed more conditions on the agreement. In particular, the deal would have been more positive if the United States had obtained an Indian commitment to freeze production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.³⁹

In October, the NSG held a Consultative Group meeting, in which member states discussed the issue of nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. officials (Assistant Secretaries of State Rademaker and Rocca) did not present a strategy for creating an exception, but presented the issue. NSG members are likely to want to see exactly what Indian safeguards commitments are before proceeding further. Reportedly, some NSG members may want to see restrictions on cooperation, such as no enrichment or reprocessing cooperation, no heavy water cooperation, and no exports of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Brazil will chair the next NSG plenary meeting in May 2006.

Although U.S. officials did not present a plan to the NSG, Ambassador Joseph told members of the HIRC on September 8 that he envisions adopting an exception or set of criteria that would allow full cooperation with India without abandoning NSG consensus rules or the full-scope safeguards condition of supply.⁴⁰ One approach could be to adopt the commitments India made on July 18 as the criteria for an exception. In short, exports to a non-nuclear weapon state without full scope safeguards could be allowed if that state: separated military and civilian facilities, declared and placed civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, adopted an additional protocol, supported FMCT and a nuclear testing moratorium, refrained from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies, implemented export controls, and adhered to the MTCR and NSG guidelines. NSG members would have to agree that those commitments represent significant enough nonproliferation gains to warrant full nuclear cooperation.

An alternative to additional criteria would be simply to have all 45 member states decide in the plenary to allow nuclear exports to India, based on its past export control history and its future commitments. While this has the benefit of not seeking changes to NSG policies or procedures, it still must be compelling enough to win the support of all other member states. Some NSG members, for example, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Ireland, are expected to be critical of the U.S. policy on the basis of nonproliferation principles.⁴¹

**Consulting with Congress**

Significant U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation cannot go forward without action by Congress. India does not meet existing nonproliferation criteria under current U.S. law (Atomic Energy Act; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. § 2153 et seq.). Three kinds of legislative approaches are possible, as outlined below. Administration officials

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⁴⁰ HIRC US-India hearing.

⁴¹ Mark Hibbs, “U.S. to face some opposition if it seeks consensus NSG rule on India,” *Nucleonics Week*, Sept. 29, 2005.
told House International Relations Committee members on September 8 that they had not yet decided on a legislative approach.

There are three basic options for the Administration to follow. These are

- Comply with Existing Law (Atomic Energy Act);
- Amend provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to allow for cooperation with India; or
- Introduce stand-alone legislation to create an exception for India (i.e., nuclear cooperation notwithstanding any other provision of law).

**Complying with Existing Law.** All significant nuclear cooperation requires an agreement for cooperation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), to include a requirement for full-scope safeguards for significant nuclear exports non-nuclear weapon states.

**Agreements for Cooperation.** Section 123 of the AEA (42 U.S.C. 2153) requires an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for significant nuclear cooperation with any nation; the United States has about 27 agreements for cooperation in place now, and had an agreement with India from 1963 to 1993. There are nine criteria that an agreement must meet unless the President exempts the agreement. The most important of these with respect to India is the full-scope safeguards requirement for non-nuclear weapon states (AEA, Sec. 123(a)(2)). The NNPA stipulates other important requirements: 1) guaranteeing that no transferred items and no special nuclear material produced from transferred items will be used for any nuclear explosive device; 2) guaranteeing physical security; and 3) guaranteeing that no reprocessing or alteration in form or content will take place without prior U.S. consent. The President may exempt an agreement for cooperation from any of the requirements if he determines that the requirement would be “seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” An exempted agreement

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42 P.L. 83-703, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153 et seq.

43 Nuclear cooperation includes the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes. These terms, “special nuclear material,” “source material,” and “byproduct material,” as well as other terms used in the statute, are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2014.

44 These are listed in Section 123.a., (1) through (9), 42 U.S.C. § 2151. Briefly, they are guarantees that 1. safeguards continue in perpetuity; 2. full-scope safeguards are applied in non-nuclear weapon states; 3. there is no transfer; 4. U.S. has right of return; 5. there is no transfer of material or classified data; 6. physical security is maintained; 7. no enrichment or reprocessing without prior approval; 8. storage is approved by U.S. for plutonium and HEU; 9. anything produced through cooperation is subject to all the above requirements.

45 42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(2). Sec. 4 (b) of the NNPA specifies that all other terms used in the NNPA not defined in Sec. 4 “shall have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Treaty [NPT].” S.Rept. 95-467 further clarified that under the NPT, the five nuclear weapon states are the U.S., U.K., China, the Soviet Union, and France. *U.S. Code Congressional and Administration News, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.*, 1978, vol. 3, p. 329.
would not become effective “unless the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint
resolution stating that the Congress does favor such agreement.” In other words,
both chambers of Congress must approve the agreement if it does not contain all of
the Section 123 requirements.

Export Licensing. Sections 126, 127, and 128 of the AEA (42 U.S.C. 2155,
2156, 2157) cover export licensing procedures. Under Section 126, the NRC would
have to license significant nuclear exports in accordance with Sections 127 and 128
of the AEA. Section 127 criteria for exports mirror those in Section 123 for the
agreement for cooperation. Section 128 requires the recipient non-nuclear-weapon
state to have full-scope safeguards. In addition, the President must judge that the
proposed export or exemption will “not be inimical to the common defense and
security” or that any export of that type would not be inimical to the common defense
and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Additional
considerations, if warranted, include whether the license or exemption will materially
advance the nonproliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient
nation to adhere to the NPT; whether failure to issue the license or grant the
exemption would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to U.S. nonproliferation
objectives; and whether the recipient nation has agreed to conditions identical to
those laid out in Section 127. The President may still authorize an export if he
determines that failure to approve an export would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security.” In that case, the President would submit the license or
authorization, along with a detailed assessment and other documentation, to Congress
for 60 days of continuous session. If Congress disapproves the export, no further
exports can be made during that Congress. If Congress does not disapprove the
export, it would review one license for export each year. If the export is made
pursuant to an exempted agreement for cooperation, the Congressional review is
delayed for one year.

Termination of Cooperation. Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act (42
U.S.C. 2158) requires ending exports of nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive
nuclear technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state that, after March 10, 1978,
detonates a nuclear explosive device; terminates, abrogates or materially violates
IAEA safeguards; or engages in activities involving source or special nuclear material
and having “direct significance” for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
explosive devices, and “has failed to take steps which, in the President’s judgment,
represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.” There is a provision
for a presidential waiver “if the President determines that cessation of such exports
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” The President
must submit his determination to Congress, which is then referred to the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
60 days of continuous session. The determination would not become effective if the
Congress opposes it.

46 This new requirement was added by the Export Administration Amendment Act of 1985,
P.L. 99-64, Sec. 301 (b) (2), 99 Stat. 120.
Reports to Congress. The NNPA (P.L. 95-242) also required the President to report annually to the Congress on federal efforts to prevent proliferation. These reports have become known as the “Section 601” reports. Among other things, they describe progress in U.S. efforts to encourage non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the NPT to adhere to the treaty or full-scope safeguards, and to forewarn the development of nuclear weapons, as well as progress in discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states that have not taken such steps. The reports must also include a determination on which non-nuclear-weapon state recipients of U.S. nuclear exports have detonated a nuclear device, refused to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities, refused to give specific assurances that they will not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device, or engaged in nuclear weapons-related work. In short, the President must report to Congress if a recipient state has engaged in activities that would require a termination of exports under Section 129 of the AEA, as described above. The Section 601 reports must also describe implementation of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export controls. The most recent Section 601 report to Congress for the year ending 2004 notes that none of the non-nuclear-weapon states that have U.S. agreements for cooperation in effect had engaged in any of the prohibited activities of Section 129 of the AEA. India is not described in that section since there is no agreement for cooperation in place now, but if the agreement is approved, the President would need to report specifically on India’s nuclear weapons program.

The Process. The process of implementing an agreement under existing law would be, roughly, as follows:

- The President submits an exempted agreement for cooperation to Congress.
- The exempted agreement lies before Congress for 60 days of continuous session (once a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement is received). An exempted agreement becomes effective only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval.
- If the exempted agreement is approved, no congressional review of exports is required until 12 months after the first export has been licensed. Thereafter, an annual review is required per Section 128. President would thereafter have to waive Section 128 provisions.
- President would have to waive Section 129 provisions which call for cessation of exports.

Amending the Atomic Energy Act. The Administration might propose to the Congress to amend certain sections of the Atomic Energy Act. In Section 123, a potential provision to amend could be the full-scope safeguards requirement

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47 22 U.S.C. 3281 et seq.
48 “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, As Amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 for the Year Ending December 31, 2004.”
50 Specific procedures are found in AEA, P.L. 95-242, Sections 123 and 130.
Taking out the full-scope safeguards requirement would open up the possibility of U.S. nuclear cooperation with states such as Pakistan and Israel, however. While some might argue that the costs of lowering the threshold for U.S. nuclear cooperation globally outweigh the benefits, others might argue that there are only three states outside the NPT now, and therefore, lowering the threshold is not that significant.

Another option would be simply to delete Section 128 of the AEA, which added the full-scope safeguards requirement for exports, particularly since other criteria for U.S. exports are already contained in Section 127. In addition, Section 129 could be amended to either change the effective date of the restriction so that nuclear testing after 2005 (rather than 1978) would trigger a cutoff (Section 129 (1) (A)), but this is unlikely to be sufficient, since India will continue its nuclear weapons activities that would trigger cessation of exports under Section 129 (1) (D). Or, Sections 128 and 129 could be eliminated.

**Stand-Alone Legislation.** One precedent for waiving nonproliferation sanctions is the so-called Brownback Amendment of 1999, which lifted nuclear testing sanctions for India and Pakistan. Senator Brownback offered his amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act of FY2000, which stated simply that sanctions contained in the Arms Export Control Act and the Export-Import Bank Act would not apply to India and Pakistan for any reason, effective for five years. The President could renew the suspension for an additional five years if he certified to Congress that it was in the national interest of the United States to do so. The final version, in PL 106-79, did not contain a time limit, but did contain a termination of the waiver in the event that either country tested another nuclear explosive device. A new bill to create an exception for India along these lines may be the most appealing option to the Administration.

**Potential Issues for Congress**

As the Administration consults with Congress over implementation of the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement, Congress may want to consider several questions:

- What level of intrusiveness, either in the process of separating India’s civilian and military nuclear activities, or in an inspections regime, is sufficient to meet U.S. NPT obligations not to aid, assist, or encourage efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
- Should India be required to completely separate its military facilities (including reactors that might now generate electricity) from the civilian sector?
- How should an additional protocol be implemented in India’s case to maximize the IAEA’s ability to detect diversion from the civilian sector to the military sector? What is the added value of the additional protocol, given the certainty that nuclear weapon facilities cannot be inspected?
- How well do India’s export controls function?
What are India’s plans for its nuclear weapons program and what is the possibility that U.S. assistance could benefit that weapons program?

If India is prepared to take on the responsibilities undertaken by other nuclear weapon states, is it prepared to stop producing fissile material for weapons? Is it prepared to declare some nuclear material as excess to its defense needs and place that material under IAEA safeguards? Is it prepared to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

What impact will nuclear safeguards on civilian facilities have on India’s transparency efforts with Pakistan?

What would be the impact of NSG agreement to an exception for India before the U.S. Congress approves an agreement for cooperation?

Are other countries’ nuclear industries more likely to benefit from opening up nuclear cooperation with Indian than U.S. industries?

On a broader level, members of Congress may be interested in continued progress between India and Pakistan with their dialogue on nuclear confidence-building. Ultimately, some of these issues might be addressed in a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which the Administration is required to submit to the Congress along with the Section 123 agreement for cooperation, assuming the Administration complies with existing law.

If Congress chooses, it may attach conditions to approval of any agreement for cooperation. One precedent is the 1985 U.S.-China agreement for cooperation. As noted earlier, the US-China agreement is the first U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another nuclear weapon state. The agreement contained certain restrictions on cooperation, but more importantly, Congress required the President to certify that a) reciprocal arrangements would ensure that nuclear materials, facilities or components would be used solely for peaceful purposes; b) China was not violating paragraph 2 of Section 129 (particularly with respect to assisting non-nuclear weapon states in a nuclear weapons program); and c) that U.S. approval for subsequent potential Chinese requests to enrich, reprocess or alter in any form material provided under the agreement would not be automatic.51

When the US-China peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement was submitted to Congress in July 1985, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had concluded that China had met all the statutory requirements. On Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, ACDA concluded that “Based on the available information, it is believed that a finding under Section 129 that would preclude nuclear exports to China under the proposed Agreement is not warranted.”52 Nonetheless, a presidential certification on the three matters was not made until January 12, 1998. Reciprocal arrangements

51 P.L. 99-183.
52 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, page II-13 (reprinted in House Document 99-86, p. 41.)
to ensure the peaceful uses of material, facilities, and components transferred were submitted to Congress for review and published in the Federal Register.

In the case of a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, it may be attractive to require similar certifications, particularly on the peaceful uses of U.S. technology and material. Other potential prerequisites for implementing an agreement could include completion of India’s safeguards arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, executive branch certification of adequate transparency in the separation of India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities, prior agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group for creating an exception for India, or substantive progress toward negotiating a fissile material production cutoff treaty.