A FUTURE NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT: APPLYING A CANADIAN DEFENSE POLICY PROCESS MODEL

by

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Preface

This project has its origins in my assignment to the Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) in Kingston, Ontario, Canada as a National Defense Fellow. It was here that I began to become aware that although the U.S. and Canada shared many cultural similarities and a rich history of security and defense cooperation, very little could be taken for granted as to the future of any such cooperation. It was in my quest for a better understanding of the mechanics of this relationship that this project began to take shape.

It is a pleasure for me here to acknowledge the generous aid of the Fellows and staff at the QCIR for assisting and challenging me throughout this undertaking. I am especially grateful to Dr. Charles Pentland for his patience in working through the study. Others such as Brig Gen (ret) Don Macnamara, Dr. Douglas Bland, and Dr. Joel Sokolsky inspired me with their considerable efforts in exploring many of these same issues. Finally, I am grateful to my wife and sons for their support throughout this adventure in an almost foreign land.
Abstract

The principal objective of this research is to inform the reader of the key aspects of and prospects for a possible bilateral Continental Defense and Security Agreement (CDSA) between the US and Canada. The approach here will be to apply a Canadian defense policy process model as a framework to analyze recent and pending Canadian government decisions with respect to North American defense. This policy model was originally formulated by US researchers to illuminate the US defense policy process and has been modified by the author as a tool for understanding the Canadian case. Areas for exploration include a brief history of the US-Canada defense relations, the lineage and evolution of the current proposal for enhanced bilateral cooperation, a summary of the current proposal for such an agreement accompanied an evaluation from the perspective of Canada, and considerations for the future. A by-product of this research is that it will provide the reader insights into past and present US-Canadian defense relations as well as a framework for understanding Canadian defense decision making.
Chapter 1

Introduction

When the U.S. decided to form NORTHCOM, they invited Canada to join. Although we had been courting for 43 years, the Canadians felt that it was a very sudden move.

—LGen Rick Findley, NORAD/CV
October 2004

The geostrategic environment for North America has evolved dramatically over the past several decades. More recently, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) coupled with the rise of international terrorism have added new dimensions to traditional views of continental defense. Mindful of these new realities, leaders on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border have attempted to address with appropriate capabilities and structures, the aerospace, land, maritime and information threats that could endanger Canada and the United States (CANUS). These threats may include state and non-state actors that sympathize with terrorist activities or permit the transit of illegal material (such as drugs, weapons, explosives, etc.) or persons bound for the CANUS Region.¹

The future of North American defense cooperation

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer insulate the U.S. and by extension, Canada, from foreign aggression.² Postulating that an attack on one nation affects the safety, security, economy,
and well being of the other nation, U.S. and Canadian decision makers began exploring new strategies for protecting their homelands and strengthening the existing CANUS partnership to meet new challenges to common interests. By working more closely together, they contend that both nations can better meet the challenges of the new security environment.³

The Bi-National Planning Group

In 2002, by mutual agreement between Canada’s Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, the two nations created the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) to address the future of the relationship. To ensure that the perspectives of both nations had been considered, the BPG team was fully integrated with members of the Canadian Forces (CF), and U.S. representatives from North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The group is led by the Canadian General who also serves as the Deputy Commander of NORAD and its analysis is vetted by the U.S. General Commanding NORAD/NORTHCOM.⁴ Since its inception the BPG has worked toward broadening bi-national defense arrangements and establishing an environment of continuous progress toward enhanced military cooperation between the two nations.

In 2003 the BPG undertook a formal analysis in order to determine the changes in concepts, policies, authorities, organization, or technology needed to facilitate improved CANUS military cooperation. The Canadian-U.S. Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation (Dec 2002) directed the BPG to determine the optimal defense arrangements in order to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks, as well as respond to natural disasters and/or other major emergencies in Canada and the United States.⁵ Following President
Bush’s visit to Canada in November of 2004, the BPG’s mandate was extended by mutual agreement in order to continue its efforts. In February 2005, more than two years of effort culminated in the BPG’s Interim Report which posited several initiatives in order to facilitate closer Canadian and U.S. military cooperation.

**The BPG Interim Report**

Notable BPG report notes that “critical mechanisms that could contribute to detecting or sensing in the maritime domain are not as robust as those serving NORAD.” Additionally, the BPG found existing CANUS military agreements “do little to facilitate defending, defeating, or acting against asymmetric threats.” Finally, the BPG report highlights a “lack of formal, bi-national plans, policies and procedures to act in support of civil authorities of both countries.”

Essentially, the BPG identified gaps among the aerospace, maritime and land domains between the two countries. It determined that not only do such seams and gaps exist along the geo-political borders between the nations, but procedural seams were also prevalent between different departments and agencies. The lack of bi-national shared situational awareness, unity of command, and unity of effort, all contribute to these seams. At a recent conference hosted by NORAD/NORTHCOM, U.S. General Bill Hodgins, the NORAD J5, explained the post-9/11 challenge that NORAD faces is one of shifting from the old mission of providing “additional strategic warning” of attack to one of “time sensitive targeting in new environments.” In the maritime realm, in particular, he offered, “How do you respond to a maritime track [or target vessel] of interest? A bi-national approach makes sense and we are working very hard…the ‘how’ to do it is a question of resources.” A tabular summary of the BPG’s specific gap analysis in both
defensive and civil support (CS) mission areas sorted by key defense functions is found below.

Table 1. BPG Current Assessment

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<td>Deter, Prevent, Shield</td>
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<td>Defend, Defeat, Act</td>
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<td>Focused Logistics, Sustain</td>
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**Key:** Bold “X” represents robust relationship; “X” represents less robust relationship; Blank Cells represent the lack of formalized relationship; Lines between each cell represent seams or gaps.

A Continental Defense and Security Agreement (CDSA)?

Thus, in the view of the BPG, there is “an opportunity to make bold and meaningful strides towards streamlining continental defense and security policy.” The Group points out that since NORAD has enjoyed bi-national success in reducing the seams and gaps within the aerospace domain over the last 46 years, additional levels of cooperation may be attained by building on the NORAD model. These levels are discussed within the context of maintaining the ability to act unilaterally, while simultaneously attaining synergy in all domains. “BPG planners conducted an analysis of the information and
intelligence, maritime defense and MDA, land defense, and CS mission sets as each related to the five operational functions. This analysis helped determine the “mechanisms” by which to ensure effective and efficient mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{9} According to the BPG, these mechanisms are not necessarily synonymous with “organizations”—they may be net-centric, web-based, plans, policies, procedures, agreements and/or organization-centric approaches.\textsuperscript{10} The relationship between the mission areas, functions and potential mechanisms for implementation are depicted in below in Figure 1.

![Figure 1 BPG Interrelationship Analysis](image)

**Figure 1 BPG Interrelationship Analysis**


In conducting its analysis, the BPG highlighted four levels of cooperation that decision makers may consider in order to determine the appropriate organizational changes to achieve a new CDSA. The four levels the BPG considered are briefly summarized below:\textsuperscript{11}
Level 1: Coordination between the National Defence Command Center (Canada) and the Domestic Warning Center-Current Operations Group (US) continues on a “management by exception” or *ad hoc* basis. Formal information sharing is conducted between Canadian and US operations centers without personnel augmentation, and there is no change to existing personnel structures.

Level 2: Parallel Commands with the use of a Combined Operations and Intelligence Center and with Liaison Officer exchanges.

Level 3: Bi-National, Joint Command that has regionally based subordinate commands—*an air, land, maritime “NORAD”*

Level 4: Bi-National, Joint Command that has functionally-based subordinate commands—the most robust integrated structure

Figure 2 below overlays these levels of cooperation along a historic CANUS defense cooperation timeline in order to depict a functional assessment of cooperation levels.

Figure 2 BPG Assessment—Levels of Cooperation

**Source:** Bi-National Planning Group, Canada and the United States Enhanced Military Cooperation, Interim Report, 13 October 2004, 60.

Ultimately, the BPG proposed that the desired end state for the future is a command that would address the *global domain* (aerospace, maritime, land): “The NORAD concept
can be expanded to integrate all domains in a coherent military strategy that will seal our common seams and gaps.”12 Figure 3, below depicts the BPG’s “level 3” structure of cooperation—a bi-national command with regional sub-commands. This is the level of cooperation that most closely represents adding the land and maritime domains to the existing NORAD command and control structure. It is such an organization that most analysts seem to evoke when assessing the prospects for enhanced continental defense cooperation into new mission areas. Therefore, it is useful to visualize such an organization—albeit only one of four discussed in the BPG’s comprehensive report—as one considers the prospects for an enhanced CDSA.13

**Figure 3 Bi-National Command with Regional Sub-Commands—an “Expanded NORAD”**


A Continental Defense and Security Agreement (CDSA) providing national authority and intent could replace the current NORAD Agreement and provide the mechanism that streamlines national policy with regard to bi-national defense and security. Such an agreement is envisioned to provide the national policy authority under which an all
domain command would be established, enabled and matured. According to the BPG, “if a CDSA is adopted by both Governments, an expanded, multi-domain North American Defense Command could be established before the end of 2005.” The result: “through enhanced military cooperation, the defense of our two nations can achieve the synergy required to defeat the threats that we collectively face in this new millennia.”

**A Challenge to enhanced cooperation?**

The prospects for such a negotiation are complicated by the February 2005 decision of the Government of Canada not to participate further in the US missile defense program. This decision, while certainly the right of a sovereign nation to take in its pursuit of national interests, came as something of a surprise to observers in Canada and the U.S. Indeed, the Government of Canada projected increasingly positive signals in the months, weeks and days prior to the Prime Ministers announcement, yet it ultimately chose to “opt out.” US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci publicly expressed dismay and concern about the announcement and its implications for the future of CANUS relations. It is widely accepted that Prime Minister Martin made the decision based on weak public support for Canadian participation in BMD and, perhaps even more interestingly, based on calculations of the negative consequences his Government’s participation would have inside his party caucus. Essentially, domestic politics may have exerted a substantial influence on a major foreign policy decision. Given this possibility, it seems appropriate to attempt to understand the workings of Canada’s defense decision making process in a manner that considers domestic variables. It is hoped that such an approach will prove generally illuminating and specifically relevant to gauging the chances for achieving a CDSA.
The Objective of This Project

The principal objective of this research is to inform the reader of the key aspects of and prospects for a possible bilateral Continental Defense and Security Agreement between the US and Canada. The approach here will be to apply a Canadian defense policy process model as a framework to analyze recent and pending Canadian government decisions with respect to CANUS defense. This policy model was originally formulated by U.S. researchers to examine the US defense policy process and has been modified by the author as a tool for understanding the Canadian case. Areas for exploration include a brief history of the CANUS defense relations, the lineage and evolution of the current proposal for enhanced bilateral cooperation, a summary of the current proposal for such an agreement accompanied an evaluation from the Canadian perspective and an assessment of the future prospects for a CDSA. A by-product of this research is that it will provide the reader insights into past and present CANUS defense relations as well as a framework for understanding Canadian defense decision making.

Notes

2 Ibid, 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, i.
5 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Notes

9 Bi-National Planning Group, 58.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 60-61.
12 Ibid, ii.
13 Figure 3 depicts the added possibility of expanding such an organization to include the forces of other North American nations (i.e., Mexico) in such a future arrangement. This option, however, is beyond the scope of this research project and will not be discussed here.
14 Ibid.
17 See for example, Brian Laghi and Jane Taber, “It was not an Easy Decision to Make,” The Globe and Mail, 25 February 2005, A4.
Chapter 2

Understanding a Defense Policy Process Model

This chapter provides baseline analytical material in order to establish a context in which Canadian defense policy is made. The discussion below stems from an adaptation of thoughts on American defense policy outlined by Hays, Vallance and Van Tassel in their comprehensive text entitled American Defense Policy.

What is Canadian Defense Policy?

The best way to begin a discussion of Canadian defense policy is to examine the term itself. Some confusion may arise if one does not recognize that this term has more than one meaning. Canadian defense policy can be viewed as a plan or course of action, a component of Canadian national policy, or a political process. A political process model outlined below will be the primary organizational construct and framework for policy analysis for this project.

Canadian Defense Policy as a plan or course of action

The meaning that defense policy first brings to mind is: “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine future decisions.” Thus, Canadian defense policy can be seen as a plan or
course of action regarding the recruitment, training, organizing, equipping, deploying, and use of military forces.2

Examples of this definition might cover the spectrum of conflict (as defined in traditional security terms) encompassing nuclear war through conventional war, low intensity conflict to military operations other than war. Although Canadian defense policy is intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters regarding Canadian military forces, it also can have unintended or unforeseen consequences as is evident from some of the current concerns of Canadian defense observers, policy makers and practitioners. What, for instance have decades of budget and manpower cuts done to Canada’s ability to recruit quality soldiers, sailors and airmen and field a viable future force for any nationally desired purpose? How do declining operations and maintenance budgets impact the military’s ability to adequately train for a variety of roles? How will the tempo of current worldwide operations affect the Canadian force’s current and future readiness?3

Viewing Canadian defense policy this way, however, begs a fundamental question: what is the policy’s objective? In attempting to answer this question, one encounters the term’s second meaning: Canadian defense policy is also a component of national security.

**Canadian Defense Policy as a component of national security**

The terms “Canadian defense policy” and “Canadian national security” are often used interchangeably. They are not synonymous, however, and a distinction must be made between them. National security refers to protecting Canada, its citizens, and its interests through the potential or actual use of power. Power is A’s ability to get B to do
something that B otherwise would not have done (compellence). It is also A’s ability to stop B from doing something B would have done (deterrence). The sources of power are numerous. Among the tangible sources are geography, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military capability. Intangible sources include national character, image, morale, and leadership.  

Canadian defense policy is therefore but one component of Canadian national security. The military component, in turn, consists of numerous tangible and intangible elements, including the size and structure of a force, the quantity and quality of weapons, and the kind of strategy and tactics pursued.

Other major components of Canadian national security are economic and political power. Economic power depends on a country’s natural resources and broad economic capacity. It is most commonly used to compel and deter through sanctions and incentives affecting international trade, international finance, and international aid. Political power is usually exercised through diplomacy, which can be defined as “the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels, the highest as well as the subordinate.” Diplomacy is conducted by representing interests, gathering and interpreting information, sending and receiving signals, negotiating agreements, and managing crises.

Canada’s three enduring core national security interests are outlined in its first-ever National Security Policy document penned by Prime Minister Paul Martin’s Government in April of 2004. Foremost is “to protect Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad”—“the right to life, liberty and security of individuals as elaborated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Second “is to ensure that Canada is not a base for threats to [its] allies.” The NSP explains that the interconnected nature of the modern world makes it impossible to isolate Canada from the effects of any
serious threatening event or activity. Third is to continue Canada’s long tradition in “contributing to international security.” A Canadian formulation, according to the NSP, of exercising the military, political and economic components of national security on the world scene in pursuit of Canada’s interests is via the situational marriage of “defense, diplomacy and development (the ‘3 Ds’).”

It is also important to note that power is a complex concept, the components of national security are highly interrelated, and the components affect and are affected by both international and domestic factors. Power is complex in that it is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational. It is dynamic in that it changes over time. The perception of power matters in that a potential aggressor will draw on that perception in determining whether or not to act. Power is assessed in relation to the actor against which it is directed. It is also assessed in relation to the situation in which it is being threatened or used. Although U.S. military power succeeded during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, its results in the ensuing insurgency have been less clear cut.

Diplomacy, for example, may be strengthened if backed by a credible threat of economic sanctions or military force. Economic and military powers are also highly interrelated. It is difficult for a state to sustain a military if it does not have sufficient economic vigor. Likewise, foreign military sales can strengthen political ties between the states involved, provide economic benefits and reduce domestic weapons costs. These examples also indicate that the components of national security affect and are affected by both international and domestic factors. In other words, Canada’s national security and Canadian defense policy face the international and domestic systems simultaneously.
As this second definition suggests, national security involves the determination of national interests; the identification of threats to those interests; and the formulations of strategies, policies and programs to reduce the identified threats.\textsuperscript{12} Although the primary objective of Canada’s national security—which is the “protection and safety of its citizens”\textsuperscript{13}—has not changed much since Canada’s Confederation in 1867, the nation’s interests, threats and strategies have evolved. These changes can be divided generally according to the periods in which they occurred: before the Cold War, the Cold War, after the Cold War, and after 2001.

\textbf{Pre Cold War experience.} Before the Cold War, Canada had completed its journey from subject nation to fully sovereign dominion that had achieved “a distinct international character and a nationally directed foreign policy” with an emphasis on securing trade relationships in order to develop a solid economic base.\textsuperscript{14} Canada chose to seek national security in the form of alliances first with the British Empire and then on the eve of the Second World War with the emerging power to the South. Through these alliances, Canada found itself involved in the major armed struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries: its armed forces were postured to participate with strong partners in these global efforts rather than provide solely for security along its own borders and ocean approaches.\textsuperscript{15}

As war loomed in 1938, speaking in Kingston, Ontario, President Roosevelt declared that “the Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give you my word that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by another Empire.”\textsuperscript{16} Prime Minister King later replied:

\textit{We, too have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbor, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune}
from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.\textsuperscript{17}

Taken together, the leaders’ remarks “constitute the normative core of the Canada-U.S. security obligation” to demonstrate nearly as much concern for each other’s physical security needs as for its own.\textsuperscript{18} In August of 1940 a decision would be taken in Ogdensberg, New York through an exchange of notes between the two leaders that not only allowed for the coordination of North American defense for the duration of the war, but established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). This board on which Canada would meet the U.S. on equal footing inaugurated an unprecedented integration of the strategic efforts of the two nations.\textsuperscript{19} The PJBD continues its work to this day.

\textbf{The Cold War.} During the early years of the Cold War Canada’s government undertook an understandable reduction in military forces from World War II levels, yet remained engaged both bilaterally with the U.S. as well as on the international scene. The Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was established in 1946 to facilitate the exchange of information between the two defense establishments relating to North American defense. During this period “Ottawa’s foreign policy was predicated on Canada’s taking an active role in global diplomacy and adopting international stability and order as its goals.”\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, Canada pursued multilateral arrangements as a charter member of the UN and NATO in order to secure its place in a peaceful world. NATO was deemed attractive by Canada as a means to deter and, if necessary, win a conflict against the Soviet Union through close integration with the nuclear-capable U.S, while simultaneously protecting Canadian sovereignty and independence from being subsumed in a strictly bilateral alliance with its larger southern neighbor.\textsuperscript{21}
As the Cold War continued, both governments became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a Soviet bomber attack that might be capable of inflicting great harm on the populations of North America and, perhaps more importantly, the U.S. nuclear deterrent force. Thus, the North American Air Defense Command was established in 1958 in order to formalize an “increasingly integrative and cooperative approach to air defense.” It took shape as a joint command—in essence, an alliance—headed by U.S. and Canadian generals jointly responsible to both governments for the air defense of the continent.\textsuperscript{22} Among the by-products of the NORAD relationship was increased economic integration through a Defense Production Sharing Agreement which established a partial free-trade regime in defense products and ultimately led to a market relationship in which the U.S. became the prime market for Canadian defense products and the Canadians purchased the bulk of their equipment from U.S. manufacturers.\textsuperscript{23}

The 1950s also saw Canada assume the peacekeeping role that would become a distinctive component of the Canadian “brand-name” in the years to follow. The decision to expend defense resources on international peacekeeping was consistent with governments’ overall approach to foreign and defense policy during the Cold War. Canada, above all, sought to promote international order and stability—in some cases such as Cyprus, with the aim of preserving NATO unity, in others such as Suez, to calm a potentially all-consuming international conflict.\textsuperscript{24} Canada elected to participate in every UN peacekeeping operation undertaken prior to 1989.

The latter part of the Cold War saw declines in Canadian defense expenditures from a post-World War II high of nearly eight percent of gross national product to substantially more modest levels as the result of deliberate policy decisions made by governments that
had to balance the need for armed forces against an array of economic and social demands. Canada was free to undertake such reductions as some of the Cold War tensions eased while its continental and NATO allies sustained more robust—including nuclear—capabilities, and thus, underwrote Canada’s security.

The Post Cold War experience. The end of the Cold War brought a sea change to the international environment and led to substantial structural alterations in Canadian national security and defense policy. Faced with a safer world and a large fiscal deficit, the Canadian government under Prime Minister Chrétien attempted to reap a substantial peace dividend. The accumulated debt of the federal and provincial governments stood at approximately $750 billion; the federal government's annual debt servicing payments in 1994-95 alone would amount to $44 billion—more than the budget deficit of $39.7 billion and some 27% of the total federal budget. Under these conditions, the selected response was a flexible, realistic and affordable defense policy, one that would have the means to apply military force only when Canadians considered it necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests, at home and abroad.

Nonetheless, dedicated to the “Pearsonian” view articulated, yet again, in the 1994 Defence White Paper that “Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature,” Mr. Chrétien committed the Canadian Forces to numerous and frequent UN and NATO operations. The resultant operational tempo for the Canadian Forces coupled with the continued funding cuts dealt what knowledgeable observers on many fronts have characterized as an unacceptable blow to Canada’s national security. At any rate, “the peace dividend failed to materialize and it was during this period that Canadians in parliament, in government, in uniform, and in civil society—including universities—
began, yet again, to wonder about the strategic purpose or value of continuing to underwrite a dwindling military capability.\textsuperscript{31} The events of 2001 would intervene in this ongoing national discussion in a substantial way.

**Beyond 9/11.** On September 11th, 2001, it was a Canadian general posted to NORAD who directed the immediate US and Canadian aerospace response to the attack. In the immediate aftermath, Canadian land, sea and air forces rapidly stood at the ready to defend from any follow-on attacks on North America and offer post attack aide to the stricken United States.\textsuperscript{32} Some weeks later, Canada responded along with the U.S. and other willing allies in deploying forces for the mission in Afghanistan. At the height of operations there, Canada was the fourth largest contributor with nearly 3,000 personnel supporting the international coalition against terrorism. Her combined contributions included a Naval Task Group, a light infantry battle group, a tactical airlift detachment, Special Forces and associated support elements.\textsuperscript{33} While small numbers of Canadian Forces remain deployed today in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Government has ordered a one year major operations stand-down in order to rest, refit, and prepare for the Fall 2005 ISAF rotation. To the extent that it was able, Canada has sought to honor its continental and international collective and cooperative security obligations—at the cost of accelerating the decline in CF capability and long term viability.\textsuperscript{34}

This post-9/11 period has seen substantial changes to Canadian national security and defense policy. Although Canada remains globally committed and its interests coincide in many ways with those of the U.S., direct threats to Canadian interests beyond terrorism have not always easy to identify, and may not always be best dealt with by the military.
Acts of God compete with acts of men in the threat hierarchy.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, the exact nature and implications of a terrorist threat to Canada are viewed by some as less profound than for the U.S. Thus, other components of Canadian national security remain important. Indeed, as the Government of Canada endeavors to manage and reduce the risks to its interests in the current security environment, it expresses a desire to work with international partners and build a more effective, integrated national security system.\textsuperscript{36}

The challenges of this period have already led to Canada’s above-mentioned, first-ever National Security Policy document. By the end of 2005 a long-awaited international policy review as well as the first Defence White Paper since 1994 should be tabled. As these reviews unfold, it is worth noting that many national security issues are actually international, transnational, or global problems that require multinational solutions. They also include a number of military issues such as international counter-terrorism, homeland defense, and nuclear counter-proliferation. Thus, reasonable observers may disagree as to the proper mix of military versus other elements of national power in addressing the current security environment. Nonetheless, for the foreseeable future these issues will be examined and dealt with using the major structures and processes created during the Cold War that endure to this day. This point leads to a final definition—Canadian defense policy is a political process.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Canadian Defense Policy as a political process}

Thus far, this chapter has focused on actions of the Canadian state operating in the international system as a unitary, rational actor—a “realist paradigm.” Such a paradigm may be limited in that it treats states as “black boxes” that determine their interests and threats to those interests; and then simply select the optimal strategies, policies and
programs to address the identified threats.\textsuperscript{38} Accordingly, one need not look inside a state to understand its actions. While such a model may be useful in understanding crisis decision making and other phenomena, its explanatory power may falter on more routine decisions and the politics that occur within states. For the latter, a model like the one depicted below is proposed.\textsuperscript{39}

**A Defence Policy Process Model**

The Canadian defense policy process model is adapted from a similar model proposed to understand the U.S. process in the text *American Defense Policy*. It draws on historic elements of political systems and bureaucratic politics theory.\textsuperscript{40} As such, the model consists of inputs, communications channels, conversion structures, outputs, lenses and feedback within an international and domestic environment.

![Diagram of Defence Policy Process Model](image)

*Figure 4 A Defense Policy Process Model—Canada*
**Inputs.** The defense policy process model begins with inputs. These consist of needs, wants, demands, and expectations from three sources: the international environment, the domestic environment, and feedback from previous outputs. Most military threats to Canada’s national security originate in the international environment, which can be described as anarchic—conflict and war remain prominent features of the international landscape. The domestic environment, however, shapes Canada’s responses to those threats. A key component of the domestic environment is Canada’s strategic culture—how Canadians think about national security and defense. Dr. David Haglund argues convincingly that Canada’s experience in overcoming various internal separatist challenges inculcated certain domestic values that ultimately inform Canada’s strategic thinking. “Thus, through its emphasis on inclusiveness (and its assumption that this must mean negotiation and the search for compromise), and because of the stress it places on conflict management, cooperative security can be linked to a Canadian foreign policy style that is synonymous with a ‘Pearsonian [or internationalist] tradition’ itself characterized by a distrust of dogma, an abhorrence of grand designs, a belief in compromise, and a disposition towards pragmatism—all attributes that Denis Stairs holds to be derivative of a domestic political culture whose ‘ultimate origin...lies in the application of the basic principles of liberalism to the governance of a polity composed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living in a space too large with a topography too varied’.”

Internationalism in its various forms—collective security, cooperative security, human security—is at the core of Canada’s strategic culture. Canada’s strategic culture can then be understood as a subset of its political culture which is often described as liberal, democratic, multicultural and collectivist. To this strategic culture should be added the
reality of Canada’s sharing a continent and long border with an economic giant and the
world’s only remaining superpower. The implications of this relationship manifest
themselves in persistent Canadian concerns about protecting national sovereignty and
mostly latent, although sometimes spectacular displays of anti-Americanism.

Domestic politics, including a variety of economic, social, and environmental issues,
also will affect Canadian defense policy. Although Canada’s defense spending of
approximately C$13 billion represents a decline of about 60 percent since the mid-1980s,
it still remains a substantial portion of the government’s discretionary budget, and, thus,
faces significant domestic competition for additional resources. Those who want to
spend defense dollars elsewhere often argue that the issues of concern to them also
pertain to national security and are even more urgent than Canada’s defense needs, even
in the current international environment. Among Canada’s most pressing economic
issues are its federal debt (which is approximately $600 billion, 40% GDP), slowing
economic growth and a widening per capita income rate gap with the US. Its social
issues include perennial Quebec separatist tendencies, sustaining multiculturalism, and
shortfalls in the public medical care, social welfare and education systems. Because
budgets are finite, tough choices have to be made between these and other public policy
issues. To make these choices, the government needs to know how much defense
spending is enough—or as Dr. Joel Sokolsky puts it, “How much is just enough?” A
definitive answer may only be understood in the years hence.

Inputs are also created through feedback from previous outputs. As outputs are
implemented, they are assessed to determine whether they should be continued,
terminated, or modified. Overwhelmingly positive feedback creates needs, wants,
demands, and expectations. Overwhelmingly negative feedback creates inputs to end a strategy, policy or program. Mixed feedback falls somewhere between these two extremes. A decision in any of these directions, however, results in additional inputs for the actors involved in the defense policy process.  

The actors. The defense policy process model assumes that individuals and organizations are the most important actors. More specifically, the prime minister (and his cabinet), the Parliament, the bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, and public opinion are the principal actors in the Canadian defense policy process. Interest groups, the media, and public opinion serve as communication channels—the second box in the model—and “provide for the aggregation, organization, and representation of needs, wants, demands and expectations” to the government institutions. The prime minister, the Parliament, and the bureaucracy are conversion structures—the model’s third box. They “receive the varied, and frequently conflicting, system inputs and convert them into decisions of government.”

Each of these actors has its own sources of influence. Under the Canadian Constitution, legislative authority rests with the Parliament of Canada—consisting of the Queen (represented by the Governor General), the House of Commons and the Senate. Executive government and authority rests with the Government of Canada—consisting of the Queen (again, the Governor General) aided and advised by the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. By custom, ‘the Government’ consists of the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers—who are the “active” Privy Councillors. As the Queen’s representative, the Governor General has been the head of state and commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces since the earliest colonial days. With the development of the
Canadian system of parliamentary government, however, the actual center of political legal authority over defense policy has changed along with the formal mechanisms by which this control is exercised. Thus, while the Governor General remains the symbolic head of the Canadian Forces, Parliament, and more specifically, the cabinet has become the dominant defense policy-making player in Canada. Ultimately, the prime minister is wholly accountable for the economy, security and other national concerns and since Canada's legislative and executive branches are effectively fused because of the prime minister’s very close controls over his cabinet and party caucus in Parliament.

This unity is most evident in the House of Commons and especially in the governing party. The government maintains its position and advances it policies by controlling the day-to-day activities of the Commons—it sets the agenda, schedules votes, and defines or limits debates. The government’s grip over its own members of Parliament is such that members must vote with the party or risk their political future. “Party loyalty coupled with party discipline ensures that the government (and even minority governments for long periods) can force, if necessary, most any legislation through the House of Commons. The Opposition may criticize, delay, and at times embarrass the government and some of its members, but it rarely changes anything of substance once the government has set its collective mind on a particular course or policy.” Parliament may vigorously debate any policy decision and can even bring down a government on a matter of significant disagreement through a no confidence vote, which equates to a drastic, but legally available check on the government’s power.

The Senate of Canada, whose members are appointed by the government and serve until retirement age, can delay legislation, but essentially “rubber stamps” matters under
consideration. Although both the Senate and the House of Commons routinely establish committees focusing on matters of national defense, these committees do not have budgetary authority and, thus, rarely act outside the interests of government.\textsuperscript{52}

The bureaucratic element of Canada’s decision making process is comprised of functional departments or ministries directed by elected members of the governing party. Key DND civilian leaders are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the prime minister. This power of appointment over the public servants in DND combined with the responsibilities afforded to the Minister of Defence via the defense portfolio enables the prime minister to set and oversee implementation of DND policy through control over his ministers and the professional lives of senior public servants.\textsuperscript{53} This control extends into the Canadian Forces in that the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) is similarly appointed by the prime minister. “Prime ministers, of course, exercise control in other customary ways by, for instance, opening and closing the doors to the treasury, supporting favored projects, and championing the armed forces in public. In return, he expects and gets compliance, good order and discipline in the ranks, and public support for his policy from the chief of defense.”\textsuperscript{54} Thus, bureaucratic organizations such as DND and the CF primarily provide information and analysis to decision makers and implement output.

Information is the primary source of interest group influence and is used to lobby the government and the Canadian people. Interest groups and issues advocates do not carry the same weight in Canada as they might in the U.S. due to campaign contribution limits and the relative inexpensiveness of Canada’s parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{55} Information and the speed with which it can be delivered are the media’s most important assets since the media largely determines what the public sees and how they see it. For its part, public
opinion usually sets the broad parameters for Canadian defense policy. In high profile
cases, such as the recent ballistic missile defense decision, however, it can affect the
specifics of a strategy, policy or program, thereby reminding us that power is indeed
dynamic and situational—a fact that applies to individuals and organizations as well as
states.56

The lenses. Along with their own sources of power, the individuals and
organizations involved in the defense policy process have their own preferences
regarding ends and means. Understanding Canadian defense policy, therefore, requires
knowledge of not only who the actors are but also their point of view and why they hold
those views. This divergence of opinion is represented by the concave lenses in each of
the model’s middle boxes.57

Because there are numerous actors and each has its own powers and perspectives,
converting inputs into outputs requires coalition building. Achieving agreement among
the actors is made easier by what Halperin and Kanter called “widely shared values and
images of international reality” and certain rules of the game.” These images and rules
are associated mainly with the actors’ common strategic and political cultures and are
represented by the convex lenses in each of the model’s middle boxes. They also result
from the constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, procedures, customs, traditions,
etc. which organize the government and structure the process by which decisions are
made and actions are undertaken.58

In addition to emphasizing individuals and organizations, the defense policy process
model assumes that decision making can not be “rational” in the broadest, most
demanding sense since, more often than not, the actors fail to agree on interests and
threats, examine every alternative, consider every advantage and disadvantage, and select optimal solutions. Instead, in most cases decisions are made incrementally, resulting in agreeable, not necessarily perfect solutions. Decision making is incremental because defense policy issues are highly complex. Small steps are taken to avoid big mistakes, especially when a nation’s security is at stake. Decision making is also incremental in that it requires coalition building, bargaining and compromise—small steps may be all that can be agreed upon. Allison and Halperin wrote that “the actions of a nation result not from an agreed upon calculus of strategic interests, but rather from pulling and hauling among individuals with differing perceptions and stakes.”

Summary and Road Ahead

In summary, this chapter outlined three definitions of Canadian defense policy--as a plan or course of action, a component of Canadian national policy, and a political process in order to lay the ground work for understanding the Canadian decision making environment. The defense policy process model outlined above will be the primary organizational construct and framework for policy analysis throughout the remainder of this project in attempting to understand possible outcomes relating to the future of North American defense.

Notes

1 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Inc), 901.
3 Ibid, 8-9.
Notes

9 Ibid, 47.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
15 Ibid, 9.
16 Ibid, 14.
17 Ibid.
19 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 15.
20 Ibid, 16-17.
21 Ibid, 18-19.
22 Ibid, 21.
23 Ibid, 23.
25 Ibid, 10.
28 Ibid.
29 Bland, Canada Without Armed Forces, 6.
34 Bland, Canada Without Armed Forces, xiv.
35 Author’s interview with members of the Privy Council Office staff, Ottawa, August, 2004.
36 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, 8.
Notes

37 Hays, et al., 11.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
43 Author’s lecture notes Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Fall 2004, Political Science 472.
45 Ibid. The implication here is that Canada needs to find a balance as much informed by any threat mitigation approach as satisfying international and domestic expectations commensurate with Canada’s obligations.
47 Ibid.
49 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 61.
52 Ibid 29-30.
53 Ibid, 28-29.
54 Ibid, 29.
55 Answers.com, np.
57 Ibid.
Chapter 3

Canadian Defense Policy Process Impact on a CDSA

Inputs

As previously stated, the defense policy process model begins with inputs. These consist of needs, wants, demands, and expectations from three sources: feedback from previous outputs, the international environment, and the domestic environment. Canada’s future role in North American defense arrangements, in general, and a Continental Defense and Security Agreement, in particular, will be determined by the way these inputs interact with the other elements of the policy process.

**International Environment.** In Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, Prime Minister Martin emphasized that “the September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security.” President Bush has described the CANUS relationship as "vital" stating, "We share the same values: freedom and human dignity and treating people decently.” Further, within his National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America he states, “… there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada…” Additionally, during his November 2004 visit to Canada Mr. Bush reaffirmed, “The relationship
between Canada and the United States is indispensable to peace and prosperity on the North American continent.”

The former Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Ray Henault, pointed out that the “U.S. is Canada’s most important ally and defense partner. Our defence relations are longstanding, well entrenched, highly successful, and mutually beneficial.” Evoking the linkage of security concerns to the trade relationship to both the U.S. and Canadian economies, General Henault further explains, “[W]hile neither country wants to restrict trade, security considerations are increasingly the driving concern for American decision-makers following September 11th. In this environment, it is in Canada’s national interest to work collaboratively with the U.S. to strengthen continental security.”

These statements seem to point toward a Canada determined to rededicate itself to the continental defense role while building a force capable of acting in concert with the U.S. and other allies in furtherance of Canada’s international aims. Similarly, an avowed primary objective of the United States is to work closely with Canadian friends and allies to deter aggression or coercion, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

To these voices on the international scene is added that of outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci. In numerous public forums Mr. Cellucci has offered his consistent advice that Canada should spend more on defense and contribute more to international as well as continental security. His “wish list” leaves little doubt as to specific U.S. desires from Canada—enhanced intelligence analysis capabilities, a larger and more capable JTF-2 special operations unit, some form of strategic lift, and a rapidly deployable brigade-sized strike force—in order that Canada may “punch above it weight” in the international security ring. Mr. Cellucci joins those in the BPG calling for an enhanced and expanded NORAD—a CDSA: “We can’t defend
North America alone. Canada occupies a huge piece of territory here in North America and we need Canada’s help in defending the air, the land and the sea.” It is safe to say that the U.S. government has sent the message that it desires more from Canada continentally and internationally. It is also reasonable to assert that the government of Canada has received the message.

**Feedback from previous strategies, policies and programs.** As stated earlier in this report, for Canada, alliance commitments and the nature of international relations have been major influences on the historic content of defense policy. Throughout the past sixty years, bilateral continental defense cooperation provided Canada a cost-effective means of gaining a seat at the table with the U.S. while imposing few constraints on Canada’s European and internationalist defense policy orientations. Specifically, NORAD participation allowed Canada to stake out and protect “the Canadian interest in a lopsided continent.” In this sense continental collective defense forces assist in protecting Canadian sovereignty. This is what has been called the *defense against help* role of Canada’s armed forces, and it applies especially to North American defense. The concept, originated by Nils Orvik, is based on the premise that, without a Canadian military contribution to the defense of North America at sea in and particularly in the air, all continental defense tasks would be assumed by the U.S. Canada would be unaware of measures that the U.S. might be planning for the defense of the continent. “Defense against help,” then, means safeguarding Canadian sovereignty against unwanted U.S. “help.” Understanding this concept is helpful when considering official Canadian government statements regarding a CDSA.

The Canadian government’s recent decision to “opt out” of BMD will have an impact on CDSA outcomes as well. CANUS relations may not have been irreparably damaged, but there
will be work for Prime Minister Martin to rebuild trust with his U.S. partners. His challenge will be in doing it while not alienating the significant part of the Liberal party that thinks he has been right all along. Indeed, some players inside his political caucus remain at least skeptical if not hostile toward any close cooperation with the current U.S. government. In the wake of his BMD decision “Mr. Martin said that Canada remains committed to the defense of North America, as shown by [the] $12.8 billion increase in funding for the Canadian Forces.” Furthermore he offered that “Canada recognizes the enormous burden that the United States shoulders when it comes to international peace and security…The substantial increases made yesterday to our defense budget are a tangible indicator that Canada intends to carry its full share of that responsibility.”

It should be noted, however, that the recent budget increase may indicate the government’s acknowledgement of the need to reverse the previously discussed long term erosion in CF capabilities. It is relatively certain that the announced dollars will be applied to a force structure that attempts to achieve an optimal mix between a continental defense and an international expeditionary role.

Additionally, Canada’s involvement in North American defense is conditioned, but not determined, by the perception of the threat to the continent—after 9/11, concerns about terrorist events have held the prime position in certain defense planning scenarios, yet our look at Canadian public opinion indicates that Canadians find other concerns more pressing and compelling.

**Domestic Environment**—preeminence of trade/economics/social programs

In the Speech from the Throne before Parliament, Prime Minister Martin put forth his assessment of Canada’s priorities for the legislative year ahead. He noted that Canadians now enjoy the benefits of a “balanced budget which helps foster a strong economy, which in turn
increases business and consumer confidence.” Additionally, he reiterated his commitment to “bring down the national debt—to 25 percent of our GDP within the next decade” in order to protect the future of Canadians while lowering taxes and investing in important social programs. He announced $41 billion in federal health care spending increases over the next decade along with Medicare reforms in order to respond to “the number one priority of the people…”\textsuperscript{14} The Prime Minister further outlined his other priorities to include education, child care, and the environment. He reminded Canadians that “seismic” changes to the world economic, security and political landscape demand that Canada be active beyond its borders in order to protect its interests from the threat terrorism and nuclear proliferation presents to Canada’s trade relations with the U.S. and the world. Thus, he announced force structure increases that would be reflected in his February 2005 budget plan in order to expand Canada’s role in the world and enable “Canada to continue to be an instrument of peace.”

In Canada, one often hears that September 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 was as significant a day for Canadians as September 11\textsuperscript{th} was for Americans—for different, but related, reasons. $1.8 billion in goods and services crosses the Canada-US border every day—much of it on board the 45,000 trucks (one every 2 seconds) that make the daily crossing.\textsuperscript{15} In 2003, the U.S. was the destination of 85.81 percent of total Canadian merchandise exports; likewise, the U.S. was the source of 61.88 percent of total Canadian imports.\textsuperscript{16} Canada’s preoccupation with a free and a free flowing border with the United States is a rough, but instructive, measure of the degree of economic integration that exists in North America. Canada’s economy is now hugely dependent on its uninterrupted ability to deliver goods to and receive goods from the U.S. market. Beyond any short-term effects on current trade levels, possible border interruptions can also affect long-term investment by eroding Canada’s attractiveness to both North American and overseas firms as a location from
which to serve the North American market.17 “Many plants in Canada now have North American product mandates and are producing for the entire Canada-U.S. market, while those in the U.S. operate in the same fashion. That means a huge amount of cross-border trade is now intra-company trade.”18

Canada is especially sensitive to anything that could slow (or halt) the cross-border flow as happened just after the 9/11 attacks and again at the start of the war with Iraq.19 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, border waits for trucks hauling cargo increased from just a few minutes to 10-15 hours, delaying shipments of parts and perishable goods. One crossing point saw a 36 kilometer line of trucks backed up awaiting entry into the U.S. The auto industry was hit hardest, resulting in the closure of Ford plants in Ontario and Michigan due to parts halts.20

To the extent that Canadian participation in a CDSA can be linked to securing Canada’s profound economic dependence on access to the U.S. market—either from a future post-attack border closure or simply the US economic fallout—the prospects for achieving a CDSA will be strengthened. Such a linkage, must however, be reconciled with Canada’s other above-mentioned domestic priorities.

**Communication Channels**

**Interest groups.** In Canada as in many countries are found groups that organize for the purpose of enabling their members to act collectively to influence government policy in the direction of their common interest. These groups vary greatly in their degree of organizational rigor, the scope and depth of their interests and objectives.21 Some examples include:

*Business/economic interests*—such as the Conference Board, Chamber of Commerce, and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives which tend to link Canada’s trade and
economic fortunes to US perceptions of Canada’s role as a good neighbor from a security perspective.

Defense-related think tanks and interest groups—which propose and evaluate various defense and security policy options and generally support improving Canada’s defense capabilities in order to further a variety of international and continental interests (CDA, IRPP, CIIA, plus several government sponsored defense groups).

Broad spectrum of academics—mostly political scientists and historians that offer ideas and assessments ranging from the traditional to the postmodern.

“Out-of-the-box” thinkers/critics—such as Canada25, the American Assembly, as well as various peace and disarmament groups, and some of the “the “big idea” literature from groups such as the CD Howe Institute which may tend to challenge the status quo on a more basic level and offer more dramatic alternatives to Canada’s traditional international and defense policies.

There is no shortage of voices representing a broad spectrum of interests. Each of these groups produces reasoned (or at least impassioned) arguments advocating its particular view of the proper approach to promoting Canada’s interests and determining its role in North America and the world. From so-called “big ideas”—linking security, defense and trade in one comprehensive agreement with the U.S., to big departures from historic paths such as extricating Canada from the US influences on the very same issues—exploring other market relationships and other defense roles and partners, to small agendas and steps in discreet policy areas—such as niche roles for the Canadian Forces; ideas, data, and policy options decision makers and the Canadian public can draw upon a wide array and volume of interest group advice.

Furthermore, Canada’s decision makers have established links to various groups in order to tap into their efforts and ideas. Thus, in some sense, a symbiotic relationship exists between the interest groups, the decision makers, the media, and ultimately the public. Ideas advanced in interest group forums or academic circles are echoed by DND bureaucrats, staff officers and government ministers. Interests groups have much to say that pertains to a CDSA—and other actors seem to draw liberally from the well.
**Public Opinion.** When asked in the December 2002 MacLean’s survey, “What is the most important issue facing Canada today,” Canadians responded as follows:  

- Health care/education/social services - 37%
- Unemployment/economy - 14%
- Environment - 8%
- Government/deficit - 7%
- Foreign issues - 5%
- Terrorism - 5%

According to a Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute/Dominion Institute poll (Nov 2004) 88% of Canadians surveyed report being interested in events or issues on the international scene with 43% saying they are *very interested*. Additionally, 75% agree that given how important trade is to Canada’s economy, protecting trade relationships should be Canada’s top foreign policy priority.

A bare majority (51%) of Canadians do not believe the U.S. can be trusted to treat Canadian concerns fairly while almost as many (46%) disagree. Although few Canadians are undecided about this basic orientation towards the United States, the fundamental differences on this question appear to be regional and linguistic. A majority of Ontarians (54%) agree the U.S. can be trusted as do an even larger number of Atlantic Canadians (68%). However, two out of three Quebecois (66%) do not trust the U.S. to provide fair treatment of Canadian concerns. Similarly, a bare majority of 50% of anglophones trust the United States while 60% of francophones do not.

Almost four out of five (79%) Canadians provide an endorsement of the point of view that the “U.S. is behaving like a rogue nation--rushing into conflicts without attempting to first find solutions by working with its friends and allies”—54% *strongly agree* with this statement. The Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive actions with or without multilateral sanction does
not find a receptive audience in Canada. While Canadians are still more likely to believe the US is a force for good rather than a force for evil, there is a Canadian consensus that the U.S. is acting like a rogue nation.

Additionally, Canadians may be strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage—75% supported an “engaged” international policy, yet 81% do not support doing so if it means doing without things in areas like healthcare and education. An April 2004 poll found that 55% of Canadians advocated increased government spending on fighting terrorism in Canada and 54% believe the national defense budget should be increased. This level of support by Canadian for the military is indicative of an “opt-in” attitude.

If as stated in the previous chapter, public opinion in Canada establishes the broad parameters and the boundaries beyond which the public executive must not transgress, these parameters and boundaries may be summarized as follows:

On balance polling data would seem to suggest that Canadians desire free and unfettered trade, its resultant economic prosperity, and the associated societal benefits prosperity can underwrite. If defending Canada’s continental (i.e., trade and economic and security) interests against terrorism implies closer cooperation with the U.S., however, it appears Canadians are divided on their perception of whether the U.S. would treat them fairly in any such arrangement. Furthermore, Canadians appear willing to be internationally engaged, but much less so if such engagement came with a hefty bill attached. It follows that a CDSA may receive cautious public support and that the support would rapidly erode if a CDSA required substantial capital outlays at the expense of highly prized social programs.

The Media. The media appear to occupy an important position in the defense policy making process in Canada, and serve to inform and educate the general public as well as interest
groups and to help establish the general boundaries within which the political leadership and the bureaucracy must act. The media, especially the print media, have been influential in defining and reciprocally, in reflecting, the broad contours of what is acceptable to the Canadian public in security matters. On the CDSA issue substantial print and electronic coverage is available. While various reporters and op-ed page editors tend to focus on the politics of the policy matters relating to a CDSA, through well-established relationships with various interest group “experts” the media have served as a means to convey the substance of a CDSA and its implications for the government and the people of Canada. Additionally, while the media do occasionally publicize dramatic defense issues, especially those that serve to embarrass the government of the day—such as the current government’s reportedly clumsy management recent BMD decision—they do so only on an intermittent basis.

Again, it is in the media that Canada’s political and public opinion landscape has been painted in broad brush strokes. One such element of the scene is a somewhat muted perception of the terrorist threat to Canada undergirded by the notion that the U.S. ultimately would come to the aid of Canada in an unlikely time of need. As one reporter explains, “I think Canadians by–and–large just don’t feel threatened. And we’ve become a little smug and complacent, perhaps. 9/11 didn’t seem to shake that up too much, because we have been protected more or less by the U.S. security umbrella.” Also, latent anti-Americanism, traditionally linked to sovereignty concerns, finds new strength in general Canadian skepticism about the current U.S. administration’s foreign and trade policies. Thus, there is “a tendency for any prime minister in Canada to play the anti–American card—if you want to put it that way—every so often. And sovereignty seems to become an ill–defined end in itself.” Canada’s decision to opt out of BMD is usually explained as a reflection of Canadians’ general caution and skepticism in dealing
with the U.S. in matters of foreign and security policy. As one media observer summarizes, “proponents of missile defence have to do a much better job selling the concept if they ever hope to get Canadians onside.”\textsuperscript{34} Sage advice it would seem for proponents of a CDSA as well.

**Inputs and Communication Channels Summary.** As outlined in the previous chapter, interest groups, the media, and public opinion serve as communication channels—the second box in the defense policy process model—and “provide for the aggregation, organization, and representation of needs, wants, demands and expectations” to the government institutions. The Prime Minister, Parliament, and the bureaucracy are conversion structures—the model’s third box. They “receive the varied, and frequently conflicting, system inputs and convert them into decisions of government.”\textsuperscript{35} The following items outline the varied and indeed potentially conflicting images facing Canada’s decision makers as they consider a decision on CDSA:

- **Needs**—an ultimate security underwriter, assured trade/economic linkages with the U.S.
- **Wants**—free and unfettered trade, robust and costly social programs, a broad “internationalist” security/defense agenda
- **Demands**—budgetary constraints, national debt reduction mandate
- **Expectations**—cheap defense (“just enough” to satisfy the United States, cooperation with the U.S., but not too much, a military that can protect Canada’s sovereignty and sustain an image of a certain kind of Canada—one that makes a difference in the world)

**Conversion structures**

**Parliament.** Parliament has a role in generating public awareness of issues such as CDSA through debate and a daily House of Commons question period regarding important decisions. Also, given the government’s current minority status, it is impossible for the Prime Minister to ignore the potential perils of misreading the will of all the parties that came together to allow him to form a government. Getting a CDSA decision “wrong” might not bring the government down, but it certainly would not strengthen a government’s future political prospects—which are
directly reflected in the makeup of Parliament. As previously stated, it was this dynamic that is widely reported to have been responsible for Canada’s decision regarding ballistic missile defense. As Jean Lapierre, the Transport Minister, stated to Liberal convention delegates in March, “I must tell you that the decision by the prime minister and cabinet on missile defence will make the task easier for us to rebuild and regain ridings in Quebec” and, thus, capture a majority government.36

Nonetheless, as related earlier in this report, given the relatively low priority of defense matters (more mundane than BMD) to the Canadian public and political decision makers when compared to other matters on the national agenda as well as the virtual fusion of the executive and legislative branches of government, the political executive in Canada has been free to conduct defense policy without having to constantly defer or refer to Parliament.37 Still, the Senate and House of Commons defense committees have provided a forum in which senior military and civilian defense officials have had to explain policies and provide information on the activities of the forces. In that role, these committees perform a public education function and contribute to the national dialogue on CDSA. For example, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defense has recently produced several reports that are cogent to the CDSA discussion. One, entitled Canada’s Coastline: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World focuses on how best the plug the surveillance, policing and defense gaps in Canada’s coastal waters.38 Another report from the same committee is For an extra $130 Bucks: Update On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis A View From the Bottom Up. These reports and others like them chronicle the challenges Canada faces in fielding and funding a force capable of playing a meaningful role in either continental defense or international security. To the extent that parliamentary committees draw on the research efforts and ideas of interest groups or deal
with controversial issues, some momentum has been generated that again, is reflected in public declarations of decision makers.

However, recognizing its own inherent inability to implement desired defense policy changes, the Senate committee observes that none of its “recommendations has the slightest change of being implemented unless the central agencies of the Government of Canada—the Prime Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, Treasury Board and the Department of Finance—join forces to expedite the rejuvenation of Canada’s armed forces, instead of dragging their heels to resist it.”

**The Bureaucracy.** “The Department of National Defence, like other departments and agencies, must compete for a limited amount of government revenue. And it must do so in a political environment in which national security and defense issues are rarely a high priority for the prime minister and his cabinet. This competition must also take place in a political culture in which there are very few votes to be gained by spending more on defense.” As one expert notes, “In the choice between ‘guns and butter,’ the Canadian public may want some of the former, but they want a good deal more of the latter. Thus, at the highest political level, where decisions and trade-offs must be made…DND often finds itself in somewhat of a disadvantaged position.”

The Government’s 2005 budget, then, appears somewhat of a departure from past decisions in that while generous in traditional domestic policy areas, it also set forth substantial new dollars for defense. While not universally embraced across Canada, this budget has been widely understood to have generated enough appeal among diverse constituencies to ensure the survival of the current minority government.

Nonetheless, it appears that the voices calling for improvements in CF manning, operations and maintenance and capital account funding have found a sympathetic ear in the current
government. “Not only does the budget signal the government’s intention to increase defense spending, it also indicates what kind of military capability it wants by allocating monies to particular military objectives.” In reviewing these implications, it is important to note not only what the government is willing to buy, but also how the government intends to allocate the funds over time. The bulk of the 2005-2008 dollars are for sustainment (operations/maintenance and infrastructure) and land force troop strength increases. New equipment, however, is not significantly funded until the 2009-2010 time-frame.

The government has directed that the $12.8 billion added to DND over the years 2005-2010 be spent to address the following shortfalls and acquire the following capabilities:

- $3.0 billion to expand the CF by 5,000 regular and 3,000 Reservists
- $3.2 to address sustainability (infrastructure and “the base”)  
- $2.8 billion to acquire medium capacity helicopters, logistics trucks, arctic utility aircraft, and to expand JTF2 SOF facilities
- $3.8 billion for post Defense Policy review requirements (most likely strategic lift—a mix of sea and air)

The 2005 budget builds upon to the Government’s 2004 commitment to acquire new maritime helicopters, a mobile gun system, and a search and rescue aircraft. On balance, it appears that real capabilities will be added to the CF if all the budget promises are kept by the current and any future Canadian government. Along with these new capabilities will come a renewed CF that emphasizes joint operations and establishes “Canada as an operational theater” in order to better conduct operations to support the needs of all Canadians and “to prevent threats from being manifested in Canada.” This reinvigorated CF will be able “to have the maximum profile and footprint for Canada’s benefit anywhere [it] does business” and it will be particularly well-suited for brigade-level expeditionary, stability operations—a stated goal of the CDS as well as the prime minister. Such an expeditionary CF would be capable of “making a
difference in the world” and guaranteeing Canada a “seat at the table” in dealing with international partners.47

Some of the new equipment—for example, maritime patrol aircraft—outlined in Canada’s budget will be “dual use” in that it will provide utility in both the CDSA and the expeditionary missions. Other items such as strategic lift, more land force troops, and medium lift helicopters appear more suited to an expeditionary role. Absent from the budget is any mention of a next generation fighter aircraft, a replacement for the Navy’s four aging destroyers or upgrades for her 12 capable frigates. Canada’s navy, conditioned over the decades to support overseas task force operations, may be less inclined to commit or seek assets best suited for continental defense. It is in this area where a CF CDSA capabilities gap should be examined.

Canada’s navy currently possesses 12 maritime coastal defense vessels which because they are lightly armed and slow are usually assigned to training naval reservists rather than offshore security patrolling. Therefore, the navy “is presently compelled to task two frigates on the east coast alone for domestic security related roles.”48 Replacing current coastal defense ships with an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) that is optimized for the task and interoperable with other CDSA maritime partners would likely come at the cost of replacing a future “ocean-going” surface combatant that would be better suited for an international role. Thus, a “difficult choice” will be required by decision makers. It should be noted that neither ship appears slated for funding under the current budget proposals. It is doubtful that the $14 billion for a future surface combatant or the $5 billion for an OPV replacement will appear any time before 2010.49 To the extent that the capabilities of either type of vessel would be critical to the success of a CDSA, the absence of either presents a potential gap in the CDSA maritime mission areas of Deter, Prevent, Shield Defend, Defeat, and Act that extends as far as the eye can see. In the near term, the navy
will certainly continue to fill that gap with other ships of the line at the cost of making them available to support missions farther from the continent.

In explaining why the U.S. chose after 9/11 to stand up NORTHCOM, General Ralph Eberhart related that it reflected U.S. policy makers’ recognition that “the home game is not a lesser included version of the away game.” He noted that defending the NORTHCOM AOR required certain unique force capabilities and organizational arrangements that could not be drawn together on an ad hoc basis. “We should not,” he offered, “be exchanging business cards at the site of the next ground zero” after the next attack on our nation. Thus, NORTHCOM creates demands on the DoD for unique forces and formations tailored to meet its mission to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate threats within its AOR while working in harmony with other combatant commanders and interagency players.

General Eberhart’s “home game/away game” analogy may be helpful in analyzing the comments of the new CDS, General Hillier, regarding Canada’s budget and its intended transformational influences on the CF. This, in turn, may shed light on Canada’s current and potential contributions to a CDSA. At a recent conference in Canada, General Hillier noted that budget presented by the government represented the dollars required for people, capital and infrastructure requested by DND. Essentially, DND got what it asked for.

What DND appears to have asked for and what General Hillier seems to be talking about with his renewed emphasis on joint expeditionary operations while treating Canada as an operational theater may be related to concepts outlined by two Canadian scholars in their recent book entitled Campaigns for International Security. Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney propose that Canada’s national security will be best served by “harmonizing deterrence and defence at home with the protection of North America and such overseas interventions as threats and
interests warrant. The guiding principle must be to prepare the armed forces for a single strategic imperative encompassing the defence of Canada, North American and international operations defined by the circumstances’ of what the authors refer to as the world order era.”

Such a strategic harmony would be enabled and assisted by a unified command and logistics system directed by the CDS and assisted by a unified central staff. DND would provide a capability set based on the level of resourcing afforded by the government. The CF would then apply its capabilities across three broad mission areas:

The Harmonized Mission in Canada—aimed at the defense of Canada, Canadians and their property by detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile and illegal intrusions, internal security and traditional aid to civil authorities for a range of domestic activities.

The Harmonized Campaign in Cooperation with the U.S.—not just the defense of North America, but cooperative national defense with the US on a worldwide basis in pursuit of Canada’s interests. Convincing the U.S. that no serious threats to the U.S. will originate from Canadian territory and undertaking in unison expeditionary operations on matters that may threaten mutual CANUS security and defense. Forward defense of North America would occur in areas far from the homeland such as Afghanistan and Haiti. Additionally, the CF would be prepared to act with or without direct support from the U.S. wherever and whenever the U.S. cannot do so.

The Harmonized Campaign in International Security Affairs—continue to make militarily significant commitments and contributions to international security institutions and alliances under guidelines of relevance, selectiveness and practicability. In other words, “make a difference in the world”

When viewed through this lens, General Hillier’s statements and by implication, his policy recommendations through the Defence Minister to the Prime Minister and his cabinet—would likely favor enhanced cooperation with the U.S. across a broad spectrum, certainly including a CDSA in some form. Optimism that capabilities of Canada’s force structure can meet the commitments implied in this concept of strategic harmony, must be tempered, however, by a cleared-eyed assessment of the current state of the CF coupled with an understanding of what is and isn’t in the budget.
The Prime Minister. Historically, “Canada has answered the question ‘how much is
evenough’ by spending just enough—just enough to keep its armed forces together and allow the
military to operate alongside allied units undertaking similar roles. The allies have not been
altogether happy with this but there is little they can do...Canada’s allies have almost no real
leverage over the size of Ottawa’s defense budget. If they did, it can safely be argued that
Canada would be spending much more on its military than it currently does.”55 All of Canada’s
important force structure decisions have been made by the political executive and the
bureaucracy with little or no direct parliamentary, interest group, or public involvement. To be
sure, there have been intragovernmental discussions, and outside experts were sometimes
consulted. But mainly it is the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign
Affairs that “are involved, with differences between them being resolved and final decisions
made, by the cabinet. All of this is done in secret, and the results are presented as faits accomplis
to the public.”56

The current government’s international policy review (IPR), which Mr. Martin launched
more than a year ago, will map out a plan to streamline and reinvigorate Canada’s place abroad
by refocusing military, foreign aid and diplomatic priorities.57 It will serve as a guide for the
Minister of Defence’s first policy review since the 1994 White Paper—as such, it will show
what, among other security needs, Canadians will expect their armed forces to satisfy.58 Officials
from four departments have been “pulling and hauling” in order to ensure the document reflects
the proper mix and measure of Canada’s 3 “Ds”—defense, diplomacy and development. Apparently dissatisfied with early drafts of the review, Mr. Martin looked outside his cabinet and
traditional circle of bureaucratic advisors and handed the review over to Oxford University
professor Jennifer Welsh in order to put the finishing touches on the project. “Welsh’s academic
work and recent book on Canadian Foreign Policy have addressed the same basic question
Martin hopes will be answered by his review:  How can Canada make a difference in the
world?”  

Dr. Welsh advocates a “mature relationship with the U.S.” based on the premise that “we are
friends, but not best friends.” She encourages Canada to pursue its role as a “model power” for
the world based on its credentials and worldwide “brand” as “relatively successful liberal
democracy—civil, pluralist, internationalist” in outlook. As to the role of the military, Welsh
argues that Canada should share the risks and burdens of continental defense with the U.S. and
build a deployable “peace enforcement brigade” capable of operating alongside the U.S. or alone
in order to “help others help themselves.” In such a role, Canada would be understood to play
the role of “regime builder versus regime changer” and act as a member of the collective
international community that both “pulls its weight and exercises restraint.”

The final IPR has yet to be released, and apparently a subsequent draft that presumably
reflects Dr. Welsh’s input still has not met Mr. Martin’s expectations. One report indicated,
“When Canada’s international policy review was brought to the Prime Minister for his review [in
March 2005], some cabinet ministers protested that it placed too much emphasis on relations
with the United States...‘Do we tell our own story enough—that we’re more than just the
neighbor of the United States?’ was how one Liberal familiar with the document put the
ministers’ concerns.” “It is under those diplomatic tensions that Canada will struggle to perform
its familiar balancing act: promote close ties with the U.S. while also seeking an independent
voice abroad.” Or, promote close ties with the U.S.—discreetly.

The Prime Minister’s international policy review “balancing act” will have a significant
influence on his ultimate decision regarding CDSA. Considering what is presently understood
about the advice Mr. Martin has received throughout the IPR process, significant momentum from his policy advisors appears to have been generated in favor of enhanced North American defense cooperation—albeit with the above-mentioned caveat.

Notes

5 Ibid.
6 BPG Report, Appendix VI, 2-3.
10 Ibid, 154.
14 The Speech from the throne is similar to the US state of the union speech. It outlines the Government’s priorities for the upcoming legislative session and is accepted by the Parliament via vote as its agenda for the session as well. Office of the Prime Minister, *Address by the Prime Minister in Reply to the Speech from the Throne*, 5 October 2004, np, http://www.pm.gc.ca.
Notes

18 Waddell, np.
21 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 121.
22 Maclean’s Annual Poll, 30 December 2002, Macleans.ca, Rogers Media Inc., np.
23 The Dominion Institute of Canada and The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, *Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy*, survey by Innovative Research Group, 4 November 2004, 6.
25 Ibid, 11.
26 Ibid, 15.
27 Ibid, 4.
28 Ibid, 4 & 15.
30 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 130.
31 Interview with Dr. Douglas Bland, Queens University, March 2005.
32 Bob Sudeyko, “Canada’s Military role in Fortress North America,” CBC News Online, interview with Dan Middlemiss, 5 May 2003, np.
33 Ibid.
37 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 99.
40 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 223.
41 Ibid.
43 CDA, Budget, 2.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
Notes

49 Ibid.
51 Hillier, np.
52 This new direction for the CF became apparent after numerous interviews by the author with individuals familiar with current DND strategic plans who preferred to remain off the record.
55 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 220.
56 Ibid, 222.
58 Ibid.
59 Panetta, “Foreign Policy…” , np.
60 Jennifer Welsh, remarks to gathering at Queens University, 17 November 2004. Author’s notes on prepared remarks as well as responses to audience questions. Her remarks were based on ideas put forth in her recent book At Home in the World: Canada’s Vision for the 21st Century, Toronto, Harper Collins, 2004.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
Chapter 4

Conclusion

CDSA Progress Report

Since the BPG began its work, considerable progress—in the form of numerous small victories—has been made across domains in the realm of North American defense and security. Continental defense has clearly been elevated to a priority position for both governments. Substantial commitments have been made and honored in areas beyond defense as well. In Canada, the government established a new cabinet-level portfolio for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, a more or less parallel organization to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. NORAD has re-engineered itself to look inward as well as outward and respond rapidly to emergency situations. Maritime cooperation between CANUS navies and coast guards continues to blossom through exercises and the continuation of previous operational relationships. Canada’s Maritime Security Operations Centers will be operational and further enhancing the North American common operations picture by summer 2005. Yet, the role of Canada’s Coast Guard in the security realm must continue to evolve and the Canadian Navy’s coastal patrol capabilities augmented or assumed by other Navy assets. In the near term, the most progress on continental defense cooperation can be expected in the lower cost areas associated with enhanced situational awareness. It is in the areas requiring a concrete Canadian commitment to providing platforms that the future of a CDSA force, remains in doubt even in
the event of a Canadian decision to participate. In the near term, should Canada “opt in” on CDSA—regardless of the organizational construct selected—new capabilities will be a long time in materializing. Current capability gaps will remain, even with agreement and resolve to overcome them.

**Report Summary**

“It is because the external environment does not automatically determine all of Canadian defense policy that the governmental and domestic environments are also important in understanding the process and content of defense decision making.”¹ In this spirit, the Canadian defense decision making model examined inputs, communications channels, conversion structures, outputs, lenses and feedback within an international and domestic environment. In choosing to consider possible CDSA outcomes in light of the model, it is hoped that the reader has been given an appreciation for the complexity of the decision that will ultimately rest in the hands of the Government of Canada.

While each actor in the defense policy process will influence the CDSA policy outcome, the need and ability to make defense policy choices will remain. “For to govern is to choose, and despite all the readily apparent constraints, Canada’s [past] defense policies have been of Canada’s own choosing, commensurate with its sovereignty and independence. Only if Canadians and their governments refuse to recognize the need to decide, if they become too skeptical of their ability to make policy, will the choices no longer be available. If this should happen, then indeed, Canada’s sovereignty and independence, as well as security will be diminished.”²
Concluding Remarks

After September 11th, the U.S. made it clear that security came ahead of other matters, including trade and the economy. These new U.S. priorities and their enforcement threatened and continue to threaten the Canadian as well as the U.S. economies. The evolution of CANUS defense cooperation shows how a relationship clarified by crisis can move successfully and rapidly into new areas.³

According to Dwight Mason, former chairman of the U.S. section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, “Negotiating a new agreement that will create an all domain NORAD [a CDSA] is clearly in the interests of both countries. We need the improved capabilities it promises.” Mason continues, “The bi-national principle institutionalized in NORAD has proven successful. Expansion is particularly in Canada’s interest because it is the most effective and practical way for Canada to control key elements of its own defense at a reasonable cost. It is also a good way to expand Canadian capabilities in the land and sea domains because, as in NORAD now, Canada will be able to call on the resources of both countries”⁴—not only for defense, but for civil support should the need ever arise.

While the Government of Canada’s decision not to further participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defense presents an obstacle to organizing a CDSA, the decision illuminates other forces at work that may affect the chances for ever achieving a CDSA. It would seem that policy makers on both sides of the border who consider a CDSA the right next step for CANUS security should consider a more deliberate “strategic communications” plan that reaches actors deeply imbedded in Canada’s domestic political process. Surrendering the rhetorical “high-ground” to nameless/faceless actors—with perhaps narrowly construed aims or biases unrelated to continental defense—will lend an air of unpredictability to the process of achieving CDSA.
“Nevertheless, it is in the interest of both countries to surmount these difficulties to renew and extend NORAD. An early, strong Canadian endorsement of the [Bi-National] Planning Group’s recommendation would be a smart move—one that demonstrates vision and leadership.”

If the CF is to meet the challenges of the 21st Century—in terms of international security as well as continental defense—the historic Canadian cycle where making ends meet takes away from an ability to prepare for the future must be broken. Three ingredients are needed to overcome current challenges associated with past choices—resources (personnel, material, financial), political commitment, and time. The Government of Canada’s latest defense budget coupled with a strong commitment to CDSA and a role in the world based on the concept of strategic harmony would be a strong and positive step in the right direction.

As the analysts assigned to the BPG point out, the desired end state is “[e]nhanced defense and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutual societies continue to prosper in an environment where they are, and feel, free and safe.” (emphasis added) A goal worth striving towards.

Notes

2 Ibid, 228-229.
5 Ibid.
6 Canada’s National Security, CDAI, 4.
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