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In the modern era, virtually every military operation the U.S. and its allies undertake involves a coalition. Coalitions, as opposed to alliances, are by nature ad hoc and informal. The challenge faced by Geographic Combatant Commanders is to improve the stand-up time and quality of coalition headquarters, while minimizing friction, especially in the early stages of an operation. Typically, security assistance programs and theater security cooperation are touted as means by which these goals are accomplished. This paper first examines security assistance, demonstrating that while useful, these programs do not adequately meet the combatant commander’s needs. An examination of coalition-building requirements follows as an introduction to the Multinational Augmentation Planning Team (MPAT) pioneered by U.S. Pacific Command. Operation Unified Assistance serves as a supporting case study, demonstrating the MPAT’s practical utility. The operational factors of space, time and force are reviewed as applicable to the MPAT, in order to determine the viability of the concept outside of the Asia-Pacific. Lastly, the paper draws conclusions as to the efficacy of the MPAT concept outside Asia, with a particular recommendation for the emerging U.S. Africa Command.

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MPAT: A COALITION WARM STARTER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _______________________

06 November 2007
Abstract

In the modern era, virtually every military operation the U.S. and its allies undertake involves a coalition. Coalitions, as opposed to alliances, are by nature ad hoc and informal. The challenge faced by Geographic Combatant Commanders is to improve the stand-up time and quality of coalition headquarters, while minimizing friction, especially in the early stages of an operation. Typically, security assistance programs and theater security cooperation are touted as means by which these goals are accomplished. This paper first examines security assistance, demonstrating that while useful, these programs do not adequately meet the combatant commander’s needs. An examination of coalition-building requirements follows as an introduction to the Multinational Augmentation Planning Team (MPAT) pioneered by U.S. Pacific Command. Operation Unified Assistance serves as a supporting case study, demonstrating the MPAT’s practical utility. The operational factors of space, time and force are reviewed as applicable to the MPAT, in order to determine the viability of the concept outside of the Asia-Pacific. Lastly, the paper draws conclusions as to the efficacy of the MPAT concept outside Asia, with a particular recommendation for the emerging U.S. Africa Command.
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INTRODUCTION

The need for most future military operations to be conducted by coalitions rather than unilaterally has gained in acceptance since the end of the Cold War, not just in the United States, but among our allies and likely partners as well. The associated challenge is perhaps best expressed by an Australian, Brigadier Steve Ayling:

… it is clear that multi-national coalitions will continue to be required … in many cases this requirement will be met by the creation of ad-hoc coalitions that are formed on a temporary basis to undertake a specific operation, and at short notice. These ad-hoc military coalitions will invariably include military contingents from nations who only have membership of the United Nations in common, and do not have the benefit of permanent security relationships. The question is what is the best model for forming these ad-hoc coalitions and conducting successful coalition operations?²

For the U.S. military, the geographic combatant commanders are largely responsible for answering the question posed by Brigadier Ayling, through their respective Theater Security Cooperation Plans. As the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) stands up over the course of fiscal year 2008, it is appropriate to examine the tools available for developing effective coalition skills in advance of short notice operational requirements.

Broadly speaking, the theater security cooperation tools available to the combatant commander are categorized by Colonel (retired) Joel Williamson and Dr. Jennifer Moroney in a DISAM Journal article as falling into four categories: Security Assistance, Defense and Military Contacts, Combined Education, and Combined Training and Exercises.² Many of these, however, are either not controlled by the combatant commander, and are therefore limited by his ability to influence the various program managers, or are not directly related to developing a coalition “warm-start” capability needed to address the most likely mission set facing the new AFRICOM at the lower end of the range of military operations.
Combatant Commanders need a tool specifically tailored for this goal of improving coalition start-up time and effectiveness, to “warm start” a coalition headquarters. This tool must be flexible, adapted to the specific area of responsibility, and independent of outside agencies for approval, funding, and priority assignment. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), as pioneered by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) answers this requirement, especially for the emerging AFRICOM.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Security Assistance, as a category of engagement, is frequently viewed as the primary means for developing competent coalition partners. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, defines security assistance as follows:

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.³

The Joint Staff J-5 Coalition Management Manual discusses the programs provided for by these two acts, indicating their value to coalition development. Most programs focus on the transfer of equipment or technology or the provision of training for foreign personnel, commonality of which clearly is in the interest of a combined task force commander. Other programs such as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding or Economic Support Funds (ESF) are directly linked to specific types of operations or projects.⁴ Despite the obvious utility of providing common equipment and training to prospective and current coalition partners, there are significant drawbacks to these programs from the combatant commander’s perspective.
Alexander T. J. Lennon, in his book, *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*, indicts current U.S. foreign aid programs citing that, “The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, specifies a remarkable 33 different goals and 75 priority areas … The U.S. foreign aid system is bogged down by a heavy bureaucracy, overly restrictive legislative burdens, and conflicting objectives.” Examining this indictment of the legal basis for security assistance programs uncovers specific limitations that impact the ability of combatant commanders to tap into these programs, or to fully utilize their potential for coalition development.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the arm of the Department of Defense (DOD) charged with administering security assistance for DOD, identifies six major security assistance program components: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). DSCA also identifies four related programs: Leases, Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Emergency Drawdowns, and Third Country Transfers. Of these ten programs, the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) controls none; although he has input, mainly in the form of recommended prioritization, into the administration of many.

FMS, DCS, and Leases all rely on the receiving government to purchase or lease equipment, training, parts, supplies, and other services from the United States – either from the U.S. Government (FMS and Leases) or directly from vendors (DCS). As the receiver is required to foot the bill, the GCC can only encourage nations in his area of responsibility to “buy American.” Additionally, the decision-making authority for sales, leases, financing,
exports, military education and training (IMET), and economic assistance (under ESF and other programs) belongs to the Department of State, not DOD.\textsuperscript{8} Security assistance funding, whether for FMFP, IMET, PKO, or special authorities recently enacted by Congress to support the War on Terror (including Coalition Support Funds and Coalition Solidarity Support Funds), are also all controlled and disbursed by the Department of State, further limiting the influence of the GCC on how Security Assistance funds are employed.\textsuperscript{9}

Further hampering U.S. Security Assistance capabilities, the American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002 states that, “… no United States military assistance may be provided to the government of a country that is a party to the International Criminal Court …” unless the President waives this prohibition on a country-by-country basis, based on a finding “… that such country has entered into an agreement with the United States pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute preventing the International Criminal court from proceeding against United States personnel …”.\textsuperscript{10}

Since the Camp David Accords, an enormous percentage of security assistance funding is earmarked for only two countries – Israel and Jordan. In FY06, of $4.5 billion in FMFP funding contained in the Foreign Operations Act, $3.58 billion was earmarked for these two nations alone; leaving only $920 million (20 percent) for the entire rest of the developing world. Removing other Congressional earmarks leaves a scant $313 million (about seven percent of the total) available to State’s discretion for disbursing in response to needs determined in partnership with the GCCs.\textsuperscript{11} Viewed another way, Admiral Keating recently reported to the Senate that, “Pacific region countries typically receive less than one percent of the annual worldwide allocation of FMF.”\textsuperscript{12}
Remaining programs are of limited utility (such as EDA, which involves transfer of old, used U.S. equipment to other nations on an “as-is, where-is” basis) or are not directed at improving military capabilities, such as the Economic Support Fund. Security Assistance, therefore, while of great utility in developing potential coalition partners’ capabilities over the long haul, is not responsive to the GCC seeking a tool to improve coalition start-up time and effectiveness today.

Defense and Military Contacts is the next engagement category described by authors Williamson and Moroney. This category they break down into four sub-components: Counterpart Visits, General Officer/Flag Officer Visits, Ship Port Visits, and Bilateral and Multilateral Staff Talks. These programs clearly fall well within the GCC’s purview, and are key tools frequently employed in security cooperation plans. Like security assistance, these events are useful in the big picture for developing relationships and trust, but they are not going to develop the specifics required to address coalition ramp-up speed or competence in a meaningful manner.

Further examining the tools of engagement delineated by Williamson and Moroney; Combined Education consists of the DoD Regional Security Centers, the George C. Marshall Center, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. These institutions develop ties among regional leaders through education, research, and conferences, and tend to focus on the higher levels where policy is made. While useful in future coalition “recruiting” efforts, these centers are not developing the nuts and bolts interoperability and techniques of interest to the future coalition force commander. From the APCSS web site, “… the Center focuses on a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to defining and addressing regional
security issues and concerns. The most beneficial result is building relationships of trust and confidence among future leaders and decision-makers within the region."\(^{16}\)

Lastly, Combined Training Exercises are also subdivided by Williamson and Moroney into categories, including Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Exercises, and other Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises.\(^{17}\) As described by General Charles E. Wilhem, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command in 1998, JCET exercises “… gives our Special Operations Forces an opportunity to sharpen their language skills, to increase their area of familiarization, and to better prepare themselves for their most likely missions in the region … While there are some limited benefits for the host nation forces, it is designed primarily for our people.”\(^{18}\) So this program, limited to Special Operations, is not building a ready coalition, either. Obviously, Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises provide exactly the sort of venue desired for practicing interoperability with potential coalition partners. The key is to have something to practice when you get to the exercise. This will be addressed further later on in this paper.

**COALITION-BUILDING REQUIREMENTS**

To best discuss how a GCC can prepare for regional coalition capabilities, we must first address which capabilities are within the bounds of reality for early development, and what these coalitions will look like. What warm-start capabilities are we talking about? As at the beginning of this paper, our allies in Australia offer a good start point. Karen Walker writes in *Armed Forces Journal*:

> Defense departments see coalition issues in terms of interoperability, common operating standards, data access, lines of communication, network security and authorization levels. To these, they apply technological tools. But coalitions are built around people, not hardware.\(^{19}\)
While her last statement is a pithy summation, it can be argued that interoperability and common operating standards are not technical factors, but are well within the human realm she advocates pursuing in order to develop, “The best coalitions … built on trust, relevance and shared confidence born of a common understanding…” Writing in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Thomas Linn agrees, stating that the key issues in coalition success hinge on “understanding the decision making and planning process, and recognizing and ameliorating differences among coalition partners” in the areas of command structure, standard operating procedures, language, cultural understanding, operational differences, rules of engagement, and general capabilities. Aside from the last, these are “software” issues, not technology-driven hardware solutions that must be bought or given at great cost to taxpayers. General Robert Riscassi, also writing in *Joint Force Quarterly* further concurs, commenting on the poor initial start-up performance of many coalitions, due at least in part to the lack of any common doctrine. Every event is therefore a fresh start scenario. These are the areas of “coalitioneering” that can and should be developed by the GCCs in advance of their requirement for a contingency.

In the past, U.S.-led coalitions have been built bilaterally, one nation at a time. This approach requires significant diplomatic effort and takes time, but has the advantages (from a U.S. perspective) of ensuring unity of command (or at least an acceptable structure), choice of actors, and seamless integration of our traditional high-end partners, Great Britain and Australia. This bilateral approach focuses more on U.S. requirements and interests, as the government “shops” for a coalition. Nations, however, “coalition up” for their own national interests. In the lead-up to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, nations joined the coalition for such diverse reasons as seeking influence in favor of future NATO
applications, repayment of debt (both fiscal and debts of gratitude for previous U.S.
assistance), seeking repayment in turn (lucrative U.S. reconstruction contracts, future U.S.
basing agreements), seeking debt relief, hoping for increased foreign aid, or other interests.24
The result was what was frequently referred to in the Pentagon as a “coalition of the
billing.”25 While acceptable for U.S.-led coalitions, comprised of a “dominant U.S. military
force with subordinate allies expected to do what is demanded of them,” such is not always
the desired framework.26

In their book, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against
Terrorism, Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy offer an intriguing alternative. They
premise that the key to maintaining a coalition for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is to
maintain a “coalition of coalitions” outside of the GWOT, and that the U.S. should
intentionally take a back or co-equal seat in many of these. These coalitions are varied, and
are intended to be of a long duration. One deals with humanitarian needs, another is
concerned with “draining the swamps” that sustain terror networks, another focuses on donor
countries and “multinational development banks” and yet another is an information-based
coalition aimed at supporting Islam – the mainstream, the democratic, and the tolerant.27 The
point they make is that coalitions breed coalitions. Nations who are seen to be inclusive in
their daily dealings, in many foreign policy actions and decisions, reap coalition cooperation
in return when needed. In their words, “The more the United States acts under multilateral
auspices, the more cooperation it will get.”28

Anne Dixon, writing in Joint Force Quarterly a decade before Operation Iraqi
Freedom, identified some changing rules of coalition warfare. During the Cold War, the U.S.
led the big coalitions, and the United Nations the small ones. While the U.S. still prefers to
lead, the coalition of the future may not let us lead, or may refuse to play by the old rules. Ms. Dixon suggests that a “free market approach” will apply to coalitions of the future, which will be situation-specific, regionally-based, and very much ad hoc. These are the coalitions of interest to today’s GCC, especially those GCCs outside of Europe who lack the formal structures provided by NATO and the European Union.

Joint doctrine is just beginning to reflect this software approach to coalition-building. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, continues the old model, stating that the U.S. “can be expected to play a central leadership role” within alliances and coalitions, and limits discussion of multinational planning and coordination to ensuring that plans and operations are coordinated/integrated with multilateral actors. The value of language and regional expertise receives a paragraph in mention, seemingly as an afterthought. Three months after the publication of the rather disappointing JP 5-0, however, the newest version of JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* was published, clearly demonstrating that some doctrine-writers understand the emergent requirement. This doctrine reads much like the works cited earlier in this paper, referring to interoperability in terms of common doctrine, procedures, communications, and training – software solutions. The stated goal is to achieve unity of effort through standardization, which increases through four levels. Baseline standardization consists of compatibility. From that base, improvements occur through interoperability and interchangeability to a goal of commonality.

**THE MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION TEAM**

In November 2000, US Pacific Command (PACOM) began to address this issue of not only how to get to commonality, but how to get there with the understanding that “a coalition must share a common doctrine to take advantage of commonalities.” With four
other nations participating, the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command launched development of
the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT). The goal of the MPAT “is to
facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of multinational coalition
or combined task force headquarters (CTF HQ).”33 This is precisely the goal discussed
throughout this paper – to create a warm start capability for future coalitions.

Since its inception, MPAT has grown to include 33 nations, has developed a trained cadre of
international military planners, has incorporated participation from major intergovernmental
and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), and has developed a comprehensive
Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) dedicated to multinational
operations.34

One of the keys to success for the MPAT has been its egalitarian lack of ownership,
particularly by the United States. As is frequently stated in MPAT briefings, “[the] MPAT
program belongs to all interested nations.”35 By de-linking the program from U.S. ownership

Figure 1. Improving Multinational Force Response Time. (Reprinted from Multinational Planning
Augmentation Team Secretariat, “What is MPAT?” Powerpoint. 09 July 2007.)
and interests, PACOM addressed the international leadership issues raised by many of the authors cited earlier in this paper, as well as the policy inhibitions that frequently plague multinational operations and exercises. This approach has been successful to the point of being recently included in joint doctrine, with an entire appendix in Joint Publication 3-16 devoted to the MPAT and particular mention made of the key factor of non-ownership.36

The MPAT vision is the creation of “a cadre of multinational military planners from nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific region capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational force headquarters established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to small scale contingencies.”37 To achieve this vision, the MPAT developed a Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), which like the MPAT itself, is non-binding, non-U.S., unsigned, and cooperative in nature. The MNF SOP resides on the internet, accessible to all nations with interest, and is focused on the “lower three-quarters” of the range of military operations, including all operations other than war as well as small-scale contingencies (Figure 2). The MNF SOP is an operational-level planning and execution document with a four-fold purpose; to increase the responsiveness of a combined task force response to a crisis situation, to increase interoperability among likely participants, to improve overall mission effectiveness, and to establish a pre-existing framework for unity of effort in a multinational situation.38

Development of the MNF SOP has been iterative, taking place over the course of ten MNF SOP development conferences, with an associated series of MPAT Tempest Express staff planning workshops/tabletop exercises used to test, evaluate, and refine the product.39
Through these venues, the MNF SOP has matured into the comprehensive four-volume work outlined in Figure 3. The MNF SOP builds on coalition development lessons learned by the Australian Defence Force during their successful coalition lead of International Force
East Timor, or INTERFET. The Australians recognized during INTERFET that regional forces lacked common doctrine, training, and interoperability standards, and developed an approach to discussing future coalitions based on “the basic premise … that the more negotiating that is done in advance and the more understandings reached beforehand, the easier it will be to conduct a coalition operation.” The MNF SOP has done just this.

These developments naturally do not come for free. PACOM has invested heavily in the development of the MPAT, the MNF SOP, and the series of MNF SOP development workshops and Tempest Express exercises. There are seven personnel permanently assigned to the MPAT Secretariat; a GS-14 Branch Chief, two O-5 military personnel, and four contractor employees, comprising program managers, an operations officer, and a networks/information systems specialist. MPAT products are hosted on the Asia-Pacific Area Network:

The Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) is a World Wide Web portal offering information resources and a collaborative planning environment as a means to greater defense interaction, confidence-building, and enhanced security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. APAN is hosted by the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ... an unclassified web-based information sharing and collaboration network as a means of enhancing interoperability and multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

As the APAN predates the MPAT by several months, and hosts numerous other collaborative venues for PACOM, it can be considered a “sunk cost” for PACOM, money already spent. However, the costs for such a password-protected, restricted-access, yet unclassified and accessible site would have to be considered by any other GCC seeking to adopt a MPAT for their region.

Tempest Express exercises have cost on average approximately $300,000 for each event over the past six years. Similarly, the MNF SOP workshops cost approximately $105,000 each. Aside from the personnel costs, here is the cost of the MPAT – two Tempest Express events and two SOP workshops for roughly $810,000 annually. Arguably,
at less than $1 million a year, this is a theater security cooperation bargain. While other GCCs could leverage the work that has been done to date (the MNF SOP is not region-specific), the value of continuing to work through these venues is in the development of that cadre of officers who are knowledgeable about the SOP, coalition planning and execution, and who are identified by their nations as MPAT member/planners – core personnel for the augmentation of future combined task force staffs (Figure 4).

With the rough costs identified, the next question is to evaluate the efficacy of the MPAT by examining any return on investment. The 26 December 2005 Southeast Asia earthquake and ensuing tsunami relief effort, Operation Unified Assistance, provides the answer. On 4 January 2005, Admiral Fargo, Commander USPACOM, provided a special briefing at the Pentagon on the ongoing relief efforts under Combined Support Force 536 (CSF-536). During this briefing he stated that “the basis of their effort is a multinational standard operating procedure that has been worked through by 31 countries in the region … the reason we have been able to move with the kind of speed is because we made an
Clearly, when the real-world situation presented itself, the GCC believed that five years’ investment in the MPAT and the SOP were worthwhile, as both performed as designed. Of the 21 nations who provided military forces to the tsunami disaster relief, 16 were participants in the MPAT program.  

U.S. MPAT participation consisted of a 30-member cadre deployed by PACOM on 31 December 2005, in order to provide JTF 536 (later redesignated CSF 536) with trained, knowledgeable MPAT core staff. This U.S. cadre facilitated standup of the Combined Coordination Center (CCC), establishment of a dedicated website on the APAN, and integration of additional MPAT staff as they arrived in theater. MPAT redeployment commenced 18 January 2006, and was complete with CSF stand down on 12 February.  

As depicted in Figure 5, the MPAT formed the nucleus of CSF-536’s Combined Coordination Center (CCC), through which the CSF commander was able to facilitate operational level coordination among multinational military, the international humanitarian community, and other inter-agency activities. The MPAT-based CCC was critical to
ensuring that US military activities did not complicate or duplicate the efforts of other actors supporting the tsunami relief efforts.\textsuperscript{47}

**MPAT AND THE OPERATIONAL FACTORS**

The MPAT was developed in the Asia-Pacific by one GCC, responsible for that particular operational space. What remains is to determine whether the Asia-Pacific, as an operational space, is unique in regards to the utility of an MPAT, or whether this construct can and should be adopted by other GCCs. A quick comparison of operational space in the PACOM and emerging AFRICOM areas of responsibility will answer this question.

Returning to *The Battle for Hearts and Minds*, the author notes that PACOM is currently facing an influx of al Qaeda and al Qaeda-inspired terrorists into the Southeast Asian region. He describes a region of porous borders, large populations of both urban and rural poor, and both Muslim and non-Muslim extremist groups. Past histories of Western colonization indicate that Western-led coalitions run the risk of appearing as a return of colonial ambitions, necessitating a multilateral, and frequently non-U.S. led approach.\textsuperscript{48} Campbell and Flournoy present a similar picture, and note that “more than one in five of the world’s Muslims live in the region.”\textsuperscript{49} Typhoons, mudslides, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and other natural disasters frequently wreak devastation on the Asia-Pacific, creating massive humanitarian needs.

Looking at Africa, we find a similar description of the space: poor government, widespread poverty, porous borders, corruption, and uncontrolled spaces. Natural disasters are common, often in the form of drought and famine, with their associated humanitarian crises. One-third of Africa’s 700 million citizens are Muslim.\textsuperscript{50} Western colonization was
certainly a factor in the history of Africa as well, and since Operation Enduring Freedom began, it has become common knowledge that al Qaeda originated in Africa (Sudan.)

On the surface, then, it seems that these two operational spaces have enough similarity to warrant consideration of an MPAT in AFRICOM. But, are Africans willing to “coalition up” for the greater good, in the manner Asians recently demonstrated during Unified Assistance? Campbell and Flournoy think so. They cite the post-9/11 coalition of diplomatic and anti-terrorism support orchestrated by Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade, which consisted of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania as an example that African nations can and do form coalitions, to include coalitions of “value” to Western nations.51

The operational factor of time is equal in all areas of responsibility in this case, with the probably exception of European Command, where robust NATO structures make an MPAT unnecessary, and likely redundant. Time plays two roles when considering an MPAT. First, the time invested over the course of years, as nations join the MPAT, the MNF SOP is developed and refined, and Tempest Express or other exercises are conducted. This time factor is the norm in any theater cooperation program. Second is the time saved in standing up a functional coalition headquarters when an event occurs, such as the Asian tsunami. When evaluating factor time, the question is whether the early expenditure of time (and resources) is worth the later savings in time (coupled with improved capability.)

Force will vary among the GCCs, but is not especially relevant when evaluating the utility of an MPAT. While PACOM is one of the few “forces rich” GCCs, and AFRICOM will be a “forces poor” GCC, the personnel costs of an MPAT are not units, ships, aircraft, or other traditional measures of force. A few headquarters personnel on a permanent basis, and
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

According to Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, with the establishment of AFRICOM, “our military engagement on the African continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counter-terrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs.” An MPAT could contribute meaningfully to these goals, especially given that “AFRICOM is a headquarters staff whose mission entails coordinating the kind of support that will enable African governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity…”

There are significant concerns in Africa about U.S. Intentions vis-à-vis AFRICOM. These include concerns that a host nation will be criticized for doing so, historical concerns about self-proclaimed “help” from former colonial powers, U.S. history of selective engagement with Africa, discomfort in dealing with the military on matters of development and sovereignty, perceptions that AFRICOM may be a U.S. effort to derail increased African unity through the African Union, lack of consultation prior to the announcement of AFRICOM’s establishment, fear that AFRICOM will suffer mission creep and turn into an intervening force on the continent, and a wariness of the militarization of U.S.-Africa relations, viewed in a post-Iraq context. To address these concerns, AFRICOM will have to tread gently, and seek the back seat – the lack of U.S. ownership in the MPAT program.
and its associated MNF SOP is an ideal model in a region where U.S. motivations are suspect.

AFRICOM is budgeted to receive $75.5 million in Fiscal Year 2008.\textsuperscript{55} At a rough cost of $810,000 per year, leveraging the work that PACOM has already done in terms of structure, development, and a MNF SOP is logical, affordable, and prudent. The MPAT concept has had eight years to mature in PACOM, has been proven in a real-world contingency, and has been cited in joint doctrine. All that remains is for leaders to get beyond the “not invented here” roadblock and import one of the great success stories of coalition building to a new continent. As Campbell and Flournoy state, “If managed carefully … so that credible new U.S. commitments are put in place … the United States may realize genuine gains in the next five years and consolidate ties with an enduring, core African coalition.”\textsuperscript{56} MPAT should be the first step down that road.
NOTES


7. Ibid., 47-51.

8. Ibid., 88.


14. Williamson and Moroney, 82.

15. Ibid.

17. Williamson and Moroney, 82.


20. Ibid.


24. Ibid., 95-97.


26. Lennon, 34.


28. Ibid., 62-63.


32. Riscassi, 60.


34. Ibid.


40. Ayling and Guise, 6.


46. Ibid.

48. Lennon, 46, 55.

49. Campbell and Flournoy, 270.

50. Ibid., 265, 255.

51. Ibid., 256-257.


56. Campbell and Flournoy, 265.
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