The Horn of Africa is among the most dangerous areas of the world for maritime activity. Given the scarcity of regional capabilities to police these waters, Coalition naval forces maintain a maritime security presence in the region. These forces have had some notable successes, but face a complex challenge in suppressing piracy and human smuggling. At the heart of this maritime problem is the vast and ungoverned land area of Somalia, in which chaos creates too many incentives and not enough deterrence for maritime criminal activity. The recent creation of a United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) places the landmass of Africa (except Egypt) inside the AFRICOM AOR. As a result, the dynamic waters surrounding the Horn of Africa will soon lay on a seam between the USCENTCOM AOR and USAFRICOM AOR, creating new challenges and opportunities for conducting maritime security operations in the region. This paper will first discuss the operational factors that affect maritime security efforts to date. It will then examine command and control implications brought about by the creation of USAFRICOM and the combatant commanders’ shifting seams of responsibility. Finally, it will make recommendations on how to work effectively across this dynamic seam of responsibility to the benefit of both USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM.
Maritime Security on the Horn of Africa: Threading the Needle at a Seam of Responsibility

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

**Maritime Security on the Horn of Africa: Threading the Needle at a Seam of Responsibility**

The Horn of Africa is among the most dangerous areas of the world for maritime activity. Given the scarcity of regional capabilities to police these waters, Coalition naval forces maintain a maritime security presence in the region. These forces have had some notable successes, but face a complex challenge in suppressing piracy and human smuggling. At the heart of this maritime problem is the vast and ungoverned land area of Somalia, in which chaos creates too many incentives and not enough deterrence for maritime criminal activity. The recent creation of a United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) places the landmass of Africa (except Egypt) inside the AFRICOM AOR. As a result, the dynamic waters surrounding the Horn of Africa will soon lay on a seam between the USCENTCOM AOR and USAFRICOM AOR, creating new challenges and opportunities for conducting maritime security operations in the region. This paper will first discuss the operational factors that affect maritime security efforts to date. It will then examine command and control implications brought about by the creation of USAFRICOM and the combatant commanders’ shifting seams of responsibility. Finally, it will make recommendations on how to work effectively across this dynamic seam of responsibility to the benefit of both USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM.
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From the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center:

17 OCT 2007: 1830 LT: 10-20 NM off Mogadishu port, Somalia.
A general cargo ship was proceeding to Mombassa, Kenya after discharging UN WFP chartered cargo at Mogadishu when pirates in a boat chased her, opened fire with automatic weapons, boarded, and hijacked her.

An LPG tanker was warned by vessels ahead of her about unlit boats that had failed in approaching them. The master raised the alarm and mustered the crew then carried out evasive manoeuvres. The boat tried to pursue but could not keep up.

A chemical tanker was pursued by seven boats with three persons in each boat. The master managed to out manoeuvre boats and assessed vessel was not in danger.

27 OCT 2007: 1940 LT: 00:48.8N - 053:49.4E, Somalia.
Container ship noticed, on radar, a suspicious craft proceeding at six knots. OOW informed master and increased to full speed. Crew mustered and activated anti-piracy measures. The craft followed the ship then reduced speed and stopped following.

Distress call received from chemical tanker underway. Owners and piracy reporting centre unable to contact vessel. Coalition naval forces in vicinity indicate that pirates hijacked and sailed tanker into Somali territorial waters with 23 crew on board.¹

INTRODUCTION

As illustrated by these five recent incidents of piracy and attempted piracy over less than a two-week period, the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa remain among the most dangerous areas of the world for maritime activity. Endemic piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking inhibit economic development, contribute to regional de-stabilization, and disrupt international maritime commerce. Unfortunately, the problem is getting worse instead of better. The International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) research indicates that acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the second

quarter of 2007 jumped by 37% when compared to the second quarter of 2006.² The smuggling of refugees across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia to Yemen is also approaching record levels and reflects growing instability in the region.

Piracy and human smuggling are motivated by profit and are predominantly criminal enterprises. Although both pirate and terrorist networks exist in Somalia, the evidence shows that no direct link exists between these nefarious groups.³ However, terrorist organizations can and do exploit the chaos created by piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking to move and operate more freely throughout the region.

The nations comprising east Africa’s 4,750 mile-long coastline cumulatively possess only 25 craft for maritime security.⁴ Given the scarcity of regional capabilities, Coalition naval forces maintain a continuous presence in the region to promote maritime security and disrupt terrorist networks. While these forces have had some notable successes, they are inherently focused on treating the symptoms (piracy and smuggling) rather than the disease (economic and political instability).

At the heart of this problem is the vast and ungoverned land area of Somalia, in which a state of near anarchy fosters too many incentives and not enough deterrence for maritime criminal activity. Better governance in Somalia and economic development throughout the region are essential to attacking this problem at its roots on land in order to improve maritime security over the long-term. For now, the sea is the only regime in which Coalition forces

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can act directly against these criminals. Ironically, this environment favors pirates and human smugglers over technologically superior naval forces. This paper will begin with an overview of Coalition Maritime Security Operations in the region. It will then examine the operational factors that make suppressing human smuggling and piracy so difficult from a solely maritime posture. The better strategy is a coordinated approach on land and sea. However, designing such a strategy must be discussed in the context of an emerging shift in relationships among Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).

Since the creation of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1983, both the nation of Somalia and its surrounding waters have been entirely within the CENTCOM geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR). However, the recent creation of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which stood up on 01 OCT 2007 and is scheduled to be fully operational on 01 OCT 2008, places the entire landmass of Africa (except Egypt) in its AOR.\(^5\) As a result, the littoral waters surrounding the Horn of Africa will soon form the border, or seam, between the USCENTCOM AOR and USAFRICOM AOR.

Along this seam of responsibility, large merchant ships carrying half of the world’s hydrocarbon exports and millions of tons of raw and finished goods, will follow predictable transit routes as they approach the Strait of Bab al Mandeb and transit the Red Sea. Meanwhile, a host of other maritime activity will move perpendicular to the flow of merchant traffic and across the seam of responsibility, including: legitimate regional trade carried mainly by smaller cargo dhows, narcotics smuggling, arms smuggling, pirate vessels operating out of Somalia, human trafficking of refugees bound for Yemen and Saudi Arabia, foreign vessels fishing legally and illegally in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, and

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domestic fishing vessels. This activity, which is largely unpredictable and very difficult to
monitor, will remain pertinent to the interests of both USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM.

The expertise for promoting security, shaping events, and disrupting terrorism on
land in the Horn of Africa resides with the Commander of Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), located in Djibouti. Since its inception in 2002, CJTF-HOA has been
predominantly land-focused but has recently made efforts to improve maritime security in the
region. Despite these efforts, CJTF-HOA has no direct command relationship with the
Coalition Task Force conducting maritime security operations adjacent to the Horn of Africa.
This disunity of command makes it difficult to share intelligence and to synchronize
activities ashore and at sea for more effectively combating piracy and human smuggling.

Since CJTF-HOA’s mission has implications for both USCENTCOM, and
USAFRICOM, the Combatant Commanders are approaching a cross-road that will define
their emerging command relationships. This transition is a logical and important opportunity
to re-evaluate CJTF-HOA’s role in maritime security and to take advantage of its resources
ashore to influence events at sea more effectively.

The realignment of USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and CJTF-HOA comes at a
challenging time in this region. The growing piracy problem in Somalia threatens the United
Nations World Food Program’s efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to hundreds of
thousands of Somalis. The looming humanitarian crisis would de-stabilize Somalia further,
create more refugees, perpetuate the vicious cycle of instability, and foster a chaotic
environment in which the human traffickers, pirates and terrorists thrive.

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6 United Nations World Food Program. “Somalia Piracy Threatens UN Lifeline to Country,” 10 July 2007,
Because this region is of vital interest to CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and CJTF-HOA alike, they must thread the needle of command relationships correctly to enable a synchronized approach on land and sea to suppress piracy and human trafficking in Somalia and to keep this dynamic seam of responsibility stitched together.

**MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA**

Following the attacks for September 11, 2001, the U.S. launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to combat global terrorist networks. In support of this ongoing operation, a twenty-nation Coalition called the Combined Maritime Forces operates under the command of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central (CUSNC), the USCENTCOM Maritime Component Commander. Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), one of three CTFs within this Coalition, is comprised of ships from France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. CTF-150’s mission is “to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean. MSO help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment and complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts in regional nations’ littoral waters.” In addition, the close coordination required to operate these Task Forces provides a long-term benefit of building invaluable operational experience and training among Coalition navies. VADM Cosgriff, CUSNC, states, “we [the coalition] are protecting essential maritime infrastructure,

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9 Ibid.
while we continuously expand and strengthen our Coalition’s individual and collective capabilities.” 10

At a recent CTF-150 change-of-command ceremony, the outgoing French Commander, Rear Admiral Alain Hinden, highlighted some of CTF-150’s achievements: “Throughout these 120 days at sea, [the task force] boarded dozens of vessels, saved just as many lives, visited every nation in the region, and fought off pirates. Having to conduct a diverse nature of operations in a large AOR every single day brought new challenges.”11

Similarly, the current commander of CTF-150, Commodore (CDRE) Khan Hasham Bin Saddiqu of Pakistan, visited Yemen and met with a number of senior military officials, including the Minister of Defence (sic), Chief of Yemen Navy, and Chairman of the Coast Guard. They discussed efforts to counter piracy and human smuggling, among other issues.12

As the statements of these commanders attest, CTF-150 is clearly an ideal force for building regional security cooperation, enhancing Coalition interoperability, and promoting international support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. However, as Commodore Hasham’s visit to Yemen suggests, CTF-150 faces several immediate challenges, namely human smuggling and piracy, which are well beyond CTF-150’s capacity to solve through MSO alone. Until regional partners, like Yemen and Somalia, have substantially improved their capacity to enforce laws and remove the economic incentives that foster criminal activity, CTF-150’s MSO efforts will remain among the too few deterrents in the region.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
In 2006, 13,493 Somalis and 1,221 Ethiopians new arrivals approached Mayfa’a Reception Centre “MRC”. An additional estimate of 14,151 Somalis and 11,727 Ethiopians arrived at the Yemeni coasts, but Ethiopians in particular avoid MRC being afraid of the Yemeni authorities, and dispersed in the country.

The travel begins from the various seaports of the North-East Region of Somalia, which is called Puntland and mostly from the city of Bossasso where trafficking boats start off the 48-hour sea journey to Yemen. Passengers are subject to beatings, food deprivation, sun exposure, and women are especially at risk during the trip. A total of 330 deaths and 300 missing persons were reported during 2006.13

Due to growing instability in Somalia, Sudan, and parts of Ethiopia, human smuggling from Somalia to Yemen rose significantly in 2007. By mid-October, refugees were estimated at more than 20,000 for the year with over 900 dead or missing.14 The month of September 2007 marked a record 5,808 refugees crossing the Gulf of Aden with 264 known to have died enroute.15 The human trafficking trade out of Somalia is among the world’s busiest, most lucrative and the most lethal.16 Dozens of corpses are found floating in the Arabian Sea each month, often with gunshot wounds or with hands tied behind their backs.17

In the only recently documented case of a CTF-150 ship having direct involvement in combating this problem, the German Navy ship AUGSBERG identified two Somali skiffs on 08 OCT 2007 heading toward the Yemeni coast and successfully reported the contact to the Yemeni Coast Guard, which intercepted the boats and brought the 200 refugees safely to


17 Ibid.
Based on other reports of human trafficking activity, most smuggling vessels carry between 75 and 100 persons. Assuming a conservative average boat capacity of 100 persons, a rate of 5,000 refugees per month yields an average of two smuggling trips every three days. Taking into account the relatively short transit (about 48 hours), the length of coastline, and the wide dispersion of Coalition forces, a smuggler’s chance of being stopped is very low.

Several other factors further complicate human smuggling interdiction. First, the appearance of a Coalition ship creates the risk of smugglers jettisoning their human cargo, knowing that the ship will stop to aid the refugees at the expense of letting the smugglers escape. The utter ruthlessness of these smugglers cannot be overstated; they show no compassion for their human cargo. Second, the Coalition ships are obliged to observe the 12 nautical mile territorial seas unless they have express permission for entering these waters from the host government. Since this permission is seldom granted carte blanche and can be difficult to obtain in a crisis situation, smugglers can use this sanctuary to their distinct advantage. Finally, because naval vessels are legally and morally obligated to help people in distress, refugee recovery can be a time consuming process that takes ships off station while they work through the diplomatic and legal issues of turning over the refugees to a host government. Although navy ships do not take on refugees very often, it is conceivable that if smugglers felt enough pressure from Coalition ships, they could resort to engineering such a crisis and then exploiting the gap in patrol coverage.

Vice Admiral Cosgriff addressed the difficulty of stemming this activity in saying, “human smuggling is a serious issue in the maritime environment. What we need to do is

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cooperate with other parties and other regional nations who have a vested interest in confronting this activity.”

Mr. Adel Jasmin of the UNHCR office in Aden, Yemen identified that the human smuggling center of gravity is not maritime in nature, but economic: “One key option to help reduce this humanitarian crisis is to make smuggling a less appealing option- both for the smuggler and for [the refugees] who…pay substantial amounts in order to undertake this risky course of action.”20 He offered no suggestions on how to achieve this difficult task.

Successes like the AUGSBERG’s might cause a smuggler to think twice, but quantifying this deterrence is difficult since smuggling activity fluctuates in response to so many other factors (number of refugees, influence of governments, weather, etc). Successful interdictions do, however, create valuable opportunities for communicating a negative message of deterrence to both refugees and human smugglers while conveying a positive message of goodwill and commitment to the people and governments of the region.

Since the presence of ships at sea is only a small part of the solution, commanders must continuously re-assess how all elements of national power are being used to tackle the underlying political and economic forces that sustain human trafficking.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS OF PIRACY

Piracy around the Horn of Africa presents a direct challenge to one of the core capabilities embodied in the United States’ Maritime Strategy, which states “the creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these

irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and
secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”21

Like human trafficking, piracy is also motivated by economic forces but the rewards
for a successful highjacking are inordinately higher. According to Noel Choong, head of the
International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lampur, “the pirates’ going
rate for the return of a highjacked ship is about $800,000.”22 The pirates themselves are
typically Somali fisherman hired by powerful warlords. The pirates see almost none of the
ransom money and engage in piracy mainly to subsist in an economy that provides virtually
no other options.23 The vast majority of the profit goes to the warlords, who use the money
to remain in power and to buy sophisticated weapons, GPS, and satellite phones.

Figure 1 shows piracy patterns around Africa in 2005 and the first nine months of
2006. Somalia is not the only place in Africa where piracy occurs, but it is the most
concentrated. Figure 2 uses data over a 15-month window from JAN 2005 to MAR 2006 to
show the pervasiveness of piracy throughout Somalia.24 2007 is on track to be the most
prolific year in recent history for Somali piracy, with nearly double the number of attacks
from 2006.25

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21 Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commandant of the Marine Corps. A
23 Felix Nwaneri, “IMB Calls for International Intervention Over Pirates,” Daily Champion, Nigeria. 22 June
24 UNOSAT, “Reported Incidents of Pirate Attacks & Highjackings off the Coast of Somalia”
horn_piracy28mar06_small.jpg (accessed 01 November 2007).
Lloyd’s List International links the 2007 surge in piracy to the collapse of the short-lived Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) government in late 2006. During its six month’s in power, the UIC outlawed piracy under Sharia (Islamic) Law. Pirate attacks ceased so abruptly that International Maritime Bureau declared Somalia “Yesterday’s Problem” in September 2006. This optimism was short-lived as the pirate attacks resumed almost immediately after the UIC regime was deposed following Ethiopian intervention in December 2006.

As the UIC’s effectiveness in stopping piracy suggests, the presence of political will can quickly bring piracy under control. Like human smuggling, the center of gravity for piracy is the warlords’ economic incentive. Piracy also has a critical vulnerability in the sanctuary fostered by an absence of law and governance. The warlords’ high profit margin thus fosters a strong interest in perpetuating the chaos in Somalia. Despite pressure from the United Nations (UN), neighboring countries, and the shipping industry, the Transitional Government in Somalia continues to be impotent in its efforts to control the warlords and stop piracy. One major impact for the country of Somalia is that UN World Food Program shipments have become increasingly expensive due to the dangerous security environment, causing significant disruption to a precarious humanitarian situation. Some shipments have been blocked altogether due to delivery ships being highjacked by pirates.

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Because the International Maritime Bureau has advised ships to remain beyond 200 nautical miles from the Somali coastline, pirates have been forced to venture farther out to sea to capture the larger merchant vessels that draw higher ransoms. Coalition Navy ships thus gain some advantage of time and space to react to pirate attacks. An incident in June 2007 involving a Danish merchant, named the Danica White, highlights several key themes:

The Danica White was just over 100 n miles off Somalia on 1 June when it was attacked by pirates in three small skiffs. The merchant seamen were taken hostage.

The next day, coalition military aircraft spotted the vessel with the three boats in tow heading towards Mogadishu. The USS CARTER HALL, a HARPERS FERRY-class landing ship dock, tried to prevent the hijackers from reaching the safe haven of Somali territorial waters by firing warning shots.

The skiffs were destroyed [by the CARTER HALL], but the pirates on board the Danica White ignored the warnings to stop and as soon as they were across the 12 nautical miles national boundary. The CARTER HALL called off the chase.\(^{30}\)

The first theme is that the pirates are willing to venture well beyond sight of land to conduct their attacks. The second theme is that Coalition forces are using expensive state-of-the-art ships and aircraft to combat a relatively unsophisticated enemy. Third, the limitation imposed by the 12 nautical mile territorial sea provides sanctuary for the pirates. Finally, the threat of violence to captured crewmen gives pirates an asymmetric advantage over naval forces attempting stop them.

From 2005 to 2007, only four incidents resulted in U.S. Navy ships shooting at pirates. In two of these cases, pirates were killed or captured. Due in part to the fact that the Coalition navies operate under mixed rules of engagement,\(^ {31}\) there are no reported cases of non-U.S. Coalition ships shooting at pirates during this period. A Royal Navy ship did


successfully board a ship and capture the pirates without shots being fired. Considering the nearly 100 pirate attacks during this time period, the statistical probability of a pirate attack being thwarted by naval forces remains very low.

Given the difficulty of stopping pirates on the high seas, merchant ships have become increasingly effective at rigging passive defenses such as acoustic warning devices and electrified security barriers on their ships. They also are vigilant to suspicious activity in high threat areas and have developed pre-planned responses to repel pirates or out-maneuver them. Furthermore, an October 2007 incident in which twenty-two North Korean crewmen on the MV Dia Honga Dan overpowered their pirate captors suggests a possible trend among merchant mariners to defend their ship more actively. It is too soon to tell if this trend will continue and, if so, whether it will be a deterrent to pirates or a catalyst for the relationship among pirates, merchantmen, and naval forces to become more violent.

The most effective counter-piracy strategy is to target bases and supply networks and to address the underlying socio-economic forces that encourage criminal activity. Given the ineffectiveness of the Somali government, this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. In the absence of an effective campaign ashore, the only deterrent to piracy is the deterrence posed by merchant ships and Coalition naval forces. These forces must therefore make the most of their relative strengths: communications and information.

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Merchant ships at sea can report pirate attacks in real time by satellite phone to the IMB Piracy Center in Kuala Lumpur. The Piracy Center notifies the Maritime Component Commander in Bahrain, who in turn passes the information to CTF-150 for action. It then becomes a time-space problem depending on where the nearest ship is and whether it has organic aircraft. The initial response is critical because the pirates gain a significant advantage if they get the highjacked ship to the sanctuary of their operating base, where they can hold ships and crews hostage indefinitely while negotiating a ransom.

From an information standpoint, the Navy, the commercial shipping industry, the insurance underwriters, and the regional governments share a common interest in deterring piracy. Several groups, including the IMB, have developed large databases and human intelligence networks to facilitate both piracy prevention and ransom negotiations with the pirates. These groups share some information and analysis but must continue to improve their collaboration to understand better the pirates’ infrastructure ashore and to predict more accurately pirate behavior.

Despite these advantages, billion dollar warships are almost powerless in recovering a pirated vessel without endangering the merchant crewmembers’ lives. Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen addressed the complexity of this challenge:

If you had told me five years ago that I would be sending U.S. warships to conduct anti-piracy patrols off Africa, I am certain I would have been skeptical. But the truth is that piracy can no longer be viewed as someone else's problem. It is a global problem because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks and the disruption of vital commerce. There's no one right solution, and even if there were, there's no one nation that could come up with it. All maritime nations are affected by these challenges, and all of us must bear a hand in taking them on. The future of maritime security depends like never before on international cooperation and understanding. Frankly, we need each other.

While Coalition forces work to deter piracy at sea and build regional capacity for maritime security, it is important to examine how the U.S. and its partners can begin to approach a long-term solution on shore.

**CJTF-HOA AND ITS ROLE IN MARITIME SECURITY**

From the CJTF-HOA Home page:

The CJTF-HOA command philosophy is to provide for Partner nations a stable, secure environment—a place where education and prosperity are within each person’s grasp and where terrorists, whose extremist ideology seeks to enslave nations, have nothing to offer the citizens of the Horn of Africa. CJTF-HOA’s focus is regional and centered on ensuring Partner nations have the capacity to secure their homeland and contribute to the Horn of Africa’s future.

CJTF-HOA consists of about 1,800 people from each military branch of the U.S. military, civilian employees, Coalition and Partner nations make up CJTF-HOA. The area of responsibility for CJTF-HOA includes the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. Other areas of interest are Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar.36

CJTF-HOA was originally established in 2002 at Camp Lejeune, NC and was led by a Marine Corps officer. In May 2006, command of CJTF-HOA transferred to a Navy Flag Officer. Although it is a joint command, Navy personnel comprise the vast majority of the task force. While preparing to take command of CJTF-HOA in March 2006, Rear Admiral Richard Hunt spoke about his intent to expand the command’s influence to the maritime domain: “My focus is to continue the ground piece and then expand into an area that we haven’t had as much interaction as I think would be desirable [the sea].”37 Since May 2006, CJTF-HOA has translated this vision into action through several initiatives. For example,


Beyond these efforts to shape the environment for a stable future, CJTF-HOA remains largely detached from current maritime security operations associated with piracy suppression and human smuggling. Adverse security conditions preclude CJTF-HOA’s access and ability to influence the landward side of the piracy problem in Somalia. On the seaward side, CTF-150 is under the command of CUSNC in Bahrain and has no direct command relationship to CJTF-HOA. Figure 3 shows existing command relationships for USCENTCOM, CJTF-HOA, CUSNC, and CTF-150.

If security conditions were to improve in Somalia and CJTF-HOA developed a closer relationship to Somali law enforcement and military forces, CJTF-HOA could be an ideal agent for synchronizing maritime security operations at sea with anti-piracy/anti-smuggling initiatives and intelligence collection ashore. Given CJTF-HOA’s high concentration of Navy personnel, it has a strong talent base projecting operational influence into the littoral. However, achieving unity of command would require a better defined relationship between CJTF-HOA, CUSNC, and CTF-150.

CTF-150’s command relationship beneath CUSNC is established, effective, and unlikely to change. Because the commander of CTF-150 is a Coalition partner flag officer,

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having CTF-150 work under anyone besides the three-star Maritime Component Commander would be politically untenable. Also, CTF-150 is responsible for the entire Arabian Sea basin and cannot narrow its focus solely to a nation or sub-region, like the Horn of Africa.

CJTF-HOA and CTF-150 achieve some unity of effort by virtue of their shared interest in combating piracy and human smuggling as well as their shared objective to build regional maritime security through cooperation with regional partner nations. For now, they also both fall under the USCENTCOM chain-of-command.

**USAFRICOM: NEW COCOM, NEW BOUNDARIES**

Figure 4 shows the intended Areas of Responsibility under the revised Unified Command Plan that established USAFRICOM. These new boundaries have several implications for the waters surrounding Somalia, the mission of CJTF-HOA, and the efforts of Coalition forces conducting Maritime Security Operations in the region.

First, the boundary between USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM will be defined by the territorial sea limit of the African countries that border the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Since maritime activity crossing from territorial waters to the high seas is relevant to both Combatant Commanders’ interests, the naval forces in these waters will be under the operational control (OPCON) of one Combatant Commander but may encounter a situation or obtain information that is of immediate or long-term interest to the other COCOM.

Second, the high seas off the northern coast of Somalia will remain in the USCENTCOM AOR while the high seas off the eastern Somali coast will fall under USAFRICOM. This means that any policy or operational plan focused on the problem of

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piracy in Somalia will require both commanders’ concurrence and continued cooperation. Sharing forces and achieving either unity of command or unity of effort will be challenging.

In 2008, command of CJTF-HOA will transfer from USCENTCOM to USAFRICOM. This has potential to widen the operational gap between CJTF-HOA and CTF-150. In addition, CJTF-HOA’s AOR includes the nation of Yemen, which will remain within USCENTCOM’s AOR. Under this regime, CJTF-HOA’s mission remains inextricably linked to both Combatant Commanders’ AORs and interests.

USAFRICOM will be uniquely different in structure and function from the other regional COCOMs. AFRICOM’s mission will be “to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command’s military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.”41 Army Gen. William Ward, first commander of USAFRICOM, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the effectiveness of the command will be measured “in terms of how it directly contributes to the stability, security, health and welfare of the regional institutions, nations and people of Africa.”42

With a focus on capacity building and partnership, USAFRICOM will have a substantially smaller military focus than the traditional COCOMs. With no plans to increase the presence of U.S. forces in Africa beyond the existing forces of CJTF-HOA,43 the unique nature of AFRICOM’s Interagency structure complicates creating military components

typically integral to functionality of a COCOM. Without substantial air, land, and sea assets, AFRICOM may not require permanent component commanders at the theater level. Since CJTF-HOA is the one entity that has forces assigned, it could arguably serve in some capacity as a Land or Maritime Component Commander for that region.

General William Ward summarized CENTCOM’s efforts to promote Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa during his nomination hearings:

Presently, both the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean region lack significant naval forces, coastal security forces or security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic deterrent. CENTCOM, through the efforts of CTF-150 and CJTF-HOA, has made great strides to assist the region in combating the threat while helping the region strengthen its ability to fully maintain its maritime security. AFRICOM will continue to build on these efforts and look to add value where needed to lead toward African solutions for African challenges.44

Concerning the emerging relationship between USAFRICOM and the other Combatant Commanders, General Ward goes on to say:

Once AFRICOM reaches Full Operational Capability (FOC), there will be a series of agreements between AFRICOM and EUCOM with regards to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries…There will also be unique Commander-to-Commander agreements and memoranda concerning Egypt, Yemen and the Gulf of Aden (between CENTCOM and AFRICOM). Formal relationships between the AFRICOM Commander and the geographic and functional Unified Commanders, like the other Unified Commanders, will derive from command authority established by title 10 USC, section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions.45

What remains unclear is how the Commander-to-Commander agreements and memoranda concerning the Gulf of Aden will affect Maritime Security Operations. Given

the problems with human smuggling to Yemen and the need to engage piracy both at sea at its support base on land, CJTF-HOA and CTF-150 must be synchronized in their efforts.

**MAKING A SEAMLESS TRANSITION AT A SEAM OF RESPONSIBILITY**

Because AFRICOM is a unique COCOM, it will require unique approaches to functioning primarily in a nation building role while also fulfilling its role as a military combatant commander. With an AOR that is dominated by land, AFRICOM’s focus will naturally be biased towards events happening ashore. Since the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden remain in USCENTCOM’s AOR, it makes sense to capitalize on the expertise of the CUSNC and CTF-150 and keep the preponderance of U.S. naval forces under their OPCON.

To combat piracy and deter human trafficking successfully, though, Maritime Security Operations in the Gulf of Aden need to be coordinated with activities on shore in both Somalia and Yemen. To achieve this, CTF-150 and CJTF-HOA need to both be involved, despite being in different COCOM chains of command.

Figure 5 proposes a command and control architecture that gives CJTF-HOA the concurrent task of being AFRICOM’s East African Maritime Component Commander. In this capacity, CJTF-HOA would coordinate with CUSNC and CTF-150 to synchronize intelligence and enforcement activities ashore with maritime security operations. This relationship would be enhanced by the use of Djibouti as a naval logistics hub since it would provide opportunities for CJTF-HOA to meet face-to-face with the CTF-150 staff as well as CTF-150 units. If a situation develops that requires naval assets but is incompatible with CTF-150’s mission or rules of engagement, then CUSNC or CTF-150 could give tactical control or operational control, depending on the circumstances, of U.S. assets directly to CJTF-HOA. As East African Maritime Component Commander, CJTF-HOA would also
become responsible for naval activity outside of its current AOR, such as a theater security port visits to southeastern Africa.

CJTF-HOA would retain Yemen in its AOR as well, requiring coordination of activities between USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM. This dovetails well with the problem of human trafficking, managing refugees, and building Yemen’s coast guard capabilities. CTF-150 would remain responsible for Maritime Security Operation in AFRICOM’s water space off of Eastern Somalia, again requiring coordination between USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM.

This command and control architecture would require thoughtful staffwork by both USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM to develop the requisite agreements and to address frequency management issues prior to implementation. It would then require extensive use of liaison officers among the staffs to communicate priorities and overcome the friction of a parallel command structure.

While arguments can be made that working across COCOM boundaries will create inefficiencies and promote disunity of command, this architecture does provide a means of conducting a coordinated approach to problems rooted on both sides of the seam.

CONCLUSION

The concept behind USAFRICOM embraces the idea that attacking problems at their socio-economic roots is the best means of achieving long-term stability. Human smuggling and piracy are excellent examples of problems that yield very little to military force. Achieving lasting maritime security requires a long-term commitment to restore order in Somalia and build on the maritime security infrastructure of regional partners like Yemen and Kenya.
Piracy poses an immediate threat to international trade and threatens to cause widespread suffering in Somalia. Since the Coalition cannot penetrate the chaos of Somalia to stop piracy on land, the Coalition is responding to the problem in the only place that it can: on the sea. Maritime Security Operations yield many second orders benefits such as Coalition building and reassurance of our partners, but they are only marginally effective against piracy and human smuggling due to a variety of operational factors that favor the smugglers and pirates.

While USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA pursue long-term security cooperation objectives, the Coalition must maintain a deterrent presence and achieve the greatest effectiveness possible with a limited number of ships and aircraft.

MSO could be enhanced through better coordination with intelligence collection and, eventually, disruption of pirate sanctuaries ashore. In order to achieve such a coordinated effort, CJTF-HOA must be enabled to synchronize its counter-piracy and counter-human trafficking efforts with the Maritime Security forces. By working across COCOM functional boundaries and working beyond COCOM boundaries, CTF-150 and CJTF-HOA can successfully close the seam of responsibility that runs along the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.

The re-drawing of AORs is necessary to consolidate Africa under one command, but it creates a seam in the dynamic and troubled littorals around the Horn of Africa. As USAFRICOM approaches full operational capacity, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM will need to set a new standard of cross-COCOM cooperation so that the forces operating at this seam can work in tandem towards a mutual desired end state of maritime security and long-term regional stability.
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Figure 1

01 JAN – 31 DEC 2005

01 JAN – 30 SEP 2006

ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Piracy and Armed Robbery - 1 Jan to 31 December 2005
Attacks in Africa

Arabian Sea = 2
Indian Ocean = 1

ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Piracy and Armed Robbery - 1 Jan to 30 September 2005
Attacks in Africa

Arabian Sea = 2
Figure 1. Map of Proposed AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Proposed Area of Responsibility

Today  At Full Operational Capability

Source: Department of Defense.
Current Command Relationship for USCENTOM, CUSNC, and CJTF-HOA

Figure 3
Proposed Command Relationship for USCENTOM, USAFRICOM, CUSNC, and CJTF-HOA

Commander, US Central Command (USCENTCOM)

CENTCOM Maritime Comp Commander (CUSNC)

Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150)

TF 150 Coalition Ships & Aircraft

TF 150 US Ships & Aircraft

Commander, US Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

AFRICOM - East Africa Maritime Comp Commander (CJTF-HOA)

US Ships & Aircraft

Figure 5