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The United States military has overwhelmingly succeeded on the battlefield during recent conflicts, only to be stymied during post-conflict Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. As a result, the U.S. has repeatedly struggled to meet desired national strategic objectives. In sharp contrast, U.S. post-conflict operations were highly successful in Germany and Japan following World War II. This paper will analyze why there is a huge discrepancy between more recent war termination results and post-conflict nation building efforts. Specifically, the paper will define war termination, as distinguished from conflict termination and conflict resolution, and then highlight the Joint Force Commander's role in war termination planning using experiential conflict lessons and current policy guidance as a framework. After establishing the Joint Force Commander as the appropriate lead for war termination planning, an analysis of the experiential lessons will detail organizational and environmental obstacles to the Commander’s successful war termination planning. The paper will conclude with recommendations for addressing these obstacles and improving overall war termination planning during operational design development to ensure our nation’s strategic objectives are satisfactorily met.

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WAR TERMINATION PLANNING:
THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER’S ROLE

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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Abstract

The United States military has overwhelmingly succeeded on the battlefield during recent conflicts, only to be stymied during post-conflict Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. As a result, the U.S. has repeatedly struggled to meet desired national strategic objectives. In sharp contrast, U.S. post-conflict operations were highly successful in Germany and Japan following World War II. This paper will analyze why there is a huge discrepancy between more recent war termination results and post-conflict nation building efforts. Specifically, the paper will define war termination, as distinguished from conflict termination and conflict resolution, and then highlight the Joint Force Commander’s role in war termination planning using experiential conflict lessons and current policy guidance as a framework. After establishing the Joint Force Commander as the appropriate lead for war termination planning, an analysis of the experiential lessons will detail organizational and environmental obstacles to the Commander’s successful war termination planning. The paper will conclude with recommendations for addressing these obstacles and improving overall war termination planning during operational design development to ensure our nation’s strategic objectives are satisfactorily met.
Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Terms and Definitions 3

Who is Responsible for War Termination Planning? 4

Obstacles to Planning 9

Recommendations 12

Conclusion 15

Bibliography 16
WAR TERMINATION PLANNING: 
THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER’S ROLE

The United States military has suffered nearly 3,700 combat deaths in Iraq since 
May 1, 2003, when an end to hostilities was declared after 41 days of combat operations.¹ In 
Afghanistan, the U.S. has suffered 109 hostile casualties since December 2002 when Hamid 
Karzai was sworn into office as the first democratically elected Afghani President-- 
presumably a signal of stability after 14 months of U.S. led armed conflict.² Although Iraq 
and Afghanistan have both progressed towards establishing democratic rule and viable 
economies, lasting progress and stability do not appear imminent in either country. Similarly, 
“the chaotic aftermath of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama . . . threatened to mock the 
attainment of the operation’s stated objectives” until a military support group was established 
to focus on reconstruction efforts and correct serious planning shortfalls that surfaced 
immediately following the end of armed conflict.³ In each of these operations, the U.S. 
military overwhelmingly succeeded on the battlefield, only to be stymied during post-conflict 
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. As a result, the 
United States has repeatedly struggled to meet desired national strategic objectives.

In sharp contrast, U.S. post-conflict operations were highly successful in Germany 
and Japan following World War II. Admittedly, success was challenging and did not come 
overnight, but occupation and reconstruction forces faced little of the ongoing stability issues 
experienced today by U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their efforts were generally

(accessed 19 October 2007).
Magazine 93, no. 6 (March 2006): 20.
³ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, Summer 
1993, 42.
supported by the population and ultimately both nations emerged from the occupation to resume sovereignty as stable, democratic, and peaceful allies. Additionally, both nations have continued towards outstanding economic prosperity -- the World Bank currently ranks Japan and Germany 2nd and 3rd respectively in total Gross Domestic Product, just behind the United States. In light of these positive results, why is there a huge discrepancy between more recent war termination results and post-conflict nation building efforts?

Clearly, the recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Panama have as many differences as similarities to the World War II conflicts, but comparisons of these conflicts reveal a number of lessons for improving operational level planning for war termination. This paper will first define war termination, as distinguished from conflict termination and conflict resolution, and then highlight the Joint Force Commander’s role in war termination planning using experiential conflict lessons and current policy guidance as a framework. The conflict experiences demonstrate the Joint Force Commander is uniquely positioned to lead war termination planning even though policy currently assigns this responsibility to the State Department. After establishing the Joint Force Commander as the appropriate lead for war termination planning, an analysis of the experiential lessons will detail organizational and environmental obstacles to the Commander’s successful war termination planning. The paper will conclude with recommendations for addressing these obstacles and improving overall war termination planning during operational design development to ensure our nation’s strategic objectives are satisfactorily met.

Terms and Definitions

Before delving too deeply into a discussion of war termination experiences, it is vital to establish a definition for the term “war termination.” Much literature discusses conflict termination, conflict resolution, and war termination with varying levels of agreement on the definition of these terms. Many authors are comfortable categorizing conflict termination as the point at which military hostilities formally cease, vice the end of conflict.6 The goal of conflict termination is to choose the right time and manner to end hostilities such that the transition to post-conflict activities leverages battlefield success to preserve and reinforce strategic and political objectives.7 Following conflict termination, negotiation or sometimes compulsion, is used to achieve conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is typically categorized as a process, whereby the root causes of the conflict are successfully settled to each party’s agreement.8

In contrast, the term “war termination” has a myriad of definitions both broad and narrow in scope. One author makes a Clausewitzian argument for interchanging the terms conflict termination and war termination since conflict and war are merely varying levels of violence associated with political disagreement.9 Based upon interchanging the two terms, he cites the following definition:

Conflict termination is the process leading to the resolution of a conflict and the basis for mutual acceptance of interests and objectives to ensure lasting settlement conditions. Conflict termination not only includes the use of force but may involve all the instruments of power such as political, economic, and informational.10

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7 Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail,” 44.
8 Ibid., 96.
Although his approach to defining war termination is reasonable, the cited definition does not allow for a distinction between the key elements involved in optimizing the point of conflict termination and the remaining elements involved in the process of conflict resolution. The distinction between these elements is substantial and differentiating between conflict termination and war termination greatly facilitates analysis of war termination successes and failures. For this paper, war termination is defined broadly, as the umbrella of activities required to transition from Phase 3 combat operations back to normalized Phase 0 state, to include conflict termination and conflict resolution elements. This approach supports an analysis of who should be responsible for each of these elements, and how these elements can best be accomplished to support strategic objectives.

**Who is responsible for war termination planning?**

The first element for war termination planning involves the timing and manner for conflict termination. While ending the conflict is ultimately the National Command Authority’s (NCA) decision, the Joint Force Commander must plan for and advise the NCA when to cease military hostilities to ensure maximum leverage over the enemy’s will to accept the desired strategic objectives.\(^\text{11}\) Although the Joint Force Commander is the primary operational planner, political considerations and strategic direction can significantly influence the decision.\(^\text{12}\) In World War II, Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur had a clear strategic objective – the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. Based upon this

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strategic objective, the commanders’ operational design did not terminate conflict until such surrender occurred.

In more recent conflicts, strategic and operational objectives were not as clearly defined nor as clearly obtained before the operational commander terminated conflict. The decision to terminate conflict in OPERATION Desert Storm was primarily based upon the political concern over the world’s perception of the “highway of death,” and therefore, military objectives to completely destroy the Republican Guard were not met.13 In OPERATION Iraqi Freedom, conflict termination was declared in April 2003, soon after the overrun of Baghdad, even though conditions have still not been established to meet the strategic objective of improved stability in the region.14 While political influences played a crucial role in each of these conflict termination decisions, the military operational commander was ultimately responsible for conflict termination and served as the primary planner and advisor to the National Command Authorities on the manner and timing of conflict termination.

The second element of war termination planning is conflict resolution. The post-conflict activities involved in conflict resolution must “flow logically from conflict termination as an integral part of strategic and operational design.”15 This element may range from negotiations and withdrawal as occurred after OPERATION Desert Storm, to the opposite spectrum of occupation and SSTR activities following regime change as occurred after OPERATION Iraqi Freedom. Planning for this element is where the U.S. has experienced the most problems during recent conflicts and will therefore be the primary

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14 Garrard, “War Termination in the Persian Gulf”
focus area of this paper. A look at policy, doctrine and experience will shed light onto why this portion of the planning effort is so difficult.

The first guidance is found in National Security Presidential Directive – 44 which defines U.S. policy for management of interagency effort concerning “reconstruction and stabilization for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”\(^\text{16}\) This directive appoints a number of responsibilities to the Secretary of State to include: approving strategies, coordinating the interagency process, providing decision makers with detailed options, and coordinating responses with the Secretary of Defense.\(^\text{17}\) Further, Department of Defense guidance documents for SSTR, Directive 3000.05 and Joint Operating Concept, are both entitled Military Support for SSTR Operations (emphasis on support added) and acknowledge “the Secretary of State is the designated lead of U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct SSTR activities.”\(^\text{18}\) Importantly, the guidance also declares stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” and directs military forces to “be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”\(^\text{19}\) These Department of Defense directives clearly open the door for the operational commander to assume responsibility for the conflict resolution element of war termination planning. A quick look at conflict experiences will show the operational commander is almost exclusively positioned to take the lead in conflict resolution planning and execution.

\(^{16}\) “Management of Interagency Efforts,” 1.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., 2–4.
\(^{19}\) Department of Defense, DoD Records Program, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (Washington DC: GPO, 28 November 2005), 2.
The occupation and rebuilding of post World War II Germany was meticulously planned by the military, long before the war ended. Thousands of officers and soldiers planned every aspect of how the new government would operate.\textsuperscript{20} President Roosevelt initially criticized and curtailed the military’s efforts and turned the planning over to civilian agencies, but the civilian agencies quickly realized they lacked the resources and organization for the task.\textsuperscript{21} Reluctantly, the President directed the Army to assume the burden. Similarly, the military took the lead for planning in Japan. Based upon the broad national strategic objectives laid out in the Potsdam Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff carefully laid out all theater strategic occupation force actions in directive 1380/15 to include political, administrative, and military actions.\textsuperscript{22} This document elaborated on basic guidance provided in the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee Direction (SWNCC 150/4) and was used by General MacArthur to guide his detailed operational planning for the occupation and rebuilding of a democratic Japan.\textsuperscript{23} As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur directed execution of the operational plan to include nearly every aspect of the occupation and rebuilding. Under the terms of surrender, the Japanese Emperor and government were subject to General MacArthur.\textsuperscript{24}

Recent conflicts have demonstrated similar trends in military planning and execution. Because of secrecy concerns, the military exclusively planned OPERATION Blind Logic for post conflict activities in Panama.\textsuperscript{25} The planners excluded all civilian coordination and

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 716-718.
\textsuperscript{22} James Dobbins et al., \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq}, Rand Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 30
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 26.
predictably, the poorly thought out plan resulted in a situation where civilian agencies could not assume control as expected.\textsuperscript{26} Interestingly, a military support group was activated, to develop and execute a recovery plan.

OPERATION Desert Storm introduced a new issue in post conflict planning. The war ended so abruptly that no one had accomplished war termination planning and the task was handed to Gen Schwarzkopf with a two day suspense to support cease fire talks with Iraq.\textsuperscript{27} Although the General’s hastily prepared plan focused exclusively on military issues, the State Department was still given approval review authority. Their review had little impact on the final plan as the State Department could not keep up with the pace of events and ultimately provided no substantive comments to the surrender terms.\textsuperscript{28}

In each of these examples, the operational commander was the only entity with sufficient resources to conduct war termination planning. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies states that civilian capacity for post-conflict reconstruction has decayed to the point that their comparative advantages to rebuild countries can not be marshaled.\textsuperscript{29} In contrast, the military has a tremendous capability to rapidly apply vast resources during a crisis.\textsuperscript{30} This capability is especially critical in the immediate aftermath of conflict when troops must remain in place to establish security and typically to fill the resulting governance vacuum. For example, U.S. forces occupied Germany for four years and Japan for seven years. Even in the much smaller scale Grenada conflict, troops remained in country for two years. Military forces still remain in the Balkans, Afghanistan,

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 21-32.
\textsuperscript{27} Garrard, “War Termination in the Persian Gulf”
\textsuperscript{30} Rampy, “The Endgame,” 54.
and Iraq, long after the U.S. declared conflict termination in these theaters. Accordingly, the operational commander must include SSTR planning in his operational design as a logical follow-on to combat operations. In summation, the operational commander is the only entity sufficiently resourced and reasonably postured to conduct war termination planning.

**Obstacles to Successful War Termination**

While the Joint Force Commander is in the best position to lead war termination planning, many obstacles lay in the path to successful planning. First, the Joint Force Commander is already task saturated with managing combat operations and has little time to focus on the post-conflict planning. This fact appears to be no different in post World War II experiences than in today’s conflicts. In Germany, the planning task was initially assigned to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan and his staff, not to the operational commander, General Eisenhower. At the time General Morgan started his planning, victory over Axis forces was far from certain, and General Eisenhower was busy enough with operational battle plans.31 In Japan, General MacArthur did not begin detailed post-conflict planning until the fighting was concluded and the Japanese surrendered.32 Similarly, the operational commander in Grenada, General Thurman, did not spend time on post-conflict planning: “I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic [the post conflict plan] . . . the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic.”33 General Thurman’s comment captures the key point that operational commanders have their primary focus on ensuring they win the war in order to have an opportunity to achieve their directed strategic objectives during the

31 McCreedy, “Planning the Peace,” 716.
32 Dobbins et al., America’s Role, 31.
33 Richard H. Shultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUSE (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 1993), 16.
subsequent post-conflict resolution process. In reality, war termination planning requires, but rarely receives, as much of the commander’s attention as the war plan.

The second key obstacle to successful planning is the lack of training within the military to handle the SSTR mission set. The military is well trained and postured to handle security, the most immediate and pressing post-conflict need. In contrast, the military is not traditionally equipped and trained to handle missions such as humanitarian relief and displaced civilian control even though these missions are critical to achieve state reconstruction and democratization.\(^{34}\) The Washington DC based Center for Strategic and International Studies reports the military “has not been prepared to do the job of post-conflict reconstruction. It has not been trained for the types of duties it is now undertaking, it does not have the doctrine necessary, nor has it received a mandate to do the job.”\(^{35}\) Dr. Conrad Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute adds: “[the military’s] warrior mentality and culture are seen to be at odds with the requirement for winning over suspicious or hostile populace.”\(^{36}\) The Joint Force Commander can not properly plan for, or execute these critical post-conflict tasks if the forces provided are not adequately prepared to accomplish the task.

The third obstacle to successful planning is the cultural and political landscape of the area of conflict. Cultural factors (e.g. population homogeneity, tribal cultures, and religious beliefs) and political factors (e.g. functioning governmental administration and external influence) can add tremendous complexity to war termination planning and execution.\(^{37}\) Unfortunately, these challenges seem to be more applicable to the regional conflicts of the

\(^{34}\) Rampy, “The Endgame,” 54.
\(^{35}\) Orr, Winning the Peace, 15.
current era, thus the World War II Germany and Japan experiences offer few lessons. In Germany, no significant divisiveness resulted from the ethnicity or religious beliefs of the population. Additionally, the German population was war weary and posed few, if any, security problems for the Allied occupation and demilitarization effort. In Japan, the critical religious and political factor was the fate of the Emperor which was pacified when the U.S. backed off the unconditional surrender terms to allow the Emperor to remain. Also, the bureaucratic administration of both Germany and Japan remained modestly functional after the conflict ended – a huge enabler for the occupation forces as they conducted their reshaping occupation. Arguably, the most beneficial aspect of these occupation efforts was the virtual non-existence of external influences causing disruption to the occupation forces.

In contrast, the cultural and political landscapes in Afghanistan and Iraq are virtually polar opposites of those in post-war Germany and Japan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban removal left the nation without any effective governance through which the U.S. forces could implement reforms. Although President Karzai is working to establish a stabile central government, his efforts are hindered by local chiefs, tribal confederations, bandits, and warlords who have “few incentives for engaging with the embryonic central state.” In addition, the short sighted initiative to arm these factions to aid the fight against numerous external influences is counter to long-term governmental legitimacy. External influences,

38 McCreedy, “Planning the Peace,” 728.
40 Dobbins et al., America’s Role, 26.
42 Ibid.
to include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, proto-Taliban groups, Al-Qaeda, and others, operate from the Afghanistan borderlands, supporting terrorist efforts and the re-burgeoning Afghani Opium trade.\textsuperscript{43} The drug trade creates both security and economic concerns for the infant democratic government and significantly threatens the government’s stability.

In Iraq, similar shortfalls plague post-conflict efforts. The lack of a functioning government has created tremendous problems for regaining administrative control over the vast nation. Tribal and external influences have taken advantage of this governance vacuum, and continue to cause turmoil by skillfully exploiting existing mistrust between non-homogenous Iraqi religious factions. The resulting unrest and violence undermines the establishment of both security and central governance. These experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate the Joint Force Commander faces a unique challenge in trying to implement war termination objectives in regions with diverse cultural and political landscapes. Unfortunately, World War II experiences offer few parallels from which to draw lessons.

\textbf{Recommendations}

First, policy should be revised to move responsibility for war termination planning to the Joint Force Commander albeit with strong support from the Department of State and other key members of the Interagency Process. War and peace are linked actions and cannot be considered in isolation.\textsuperscript{44} War termination is the critical link and flows naturally from the Joint Force Commander’s operational design for the actual conflict. Further, history has shown that war termination responsibilities inevitably fall upon the operational commander because he alone has the assets to accomplish the job. Civilian agencies simply are not equipped to handle the job. Finally, recent conflict terminations are categorized by difficult

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 156-157
\textsuperscript{44} Robert R. Soucy II et al., “War Termination and Joint Planning,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1995, 97.
security situations which require the presence of the Commander’s troops and challenge the quick transition to civilian personnel.

Second, the commander should establish a distinct planning staff with responsibility for developing the war termination plan as the commander’s war planning staff has neither the expertise, nor time to split their attention between operational combat planning and war termination planning. However, both planning teams must coordinate to ensure the combat plans and war termination plans are not disconnected. The termination planning staff must also include a broad representation of offices from the interagency process to draw upon expertise not available in the military and to ultimately facilitate the SSTR transition to civilian agencies. The process used in World War II for OPERATION Eclipse provides an excellent framework for establishing and operating this planning cell.

Third, war termination planning should be given the same level of attention as war planning and become an integral part of deliberate planning and crisis action planning. This approach will require improved guidance within Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0 and within the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System. Currently, none of these doctrinal references include consideration of war termination in the deliberate or crisis planning processes. As demonstrated in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, conflict termination can occur more quickly than anticipated, particularly when war is waged with overwhelming force as described in the Powell doctrine. The probability of meeting war termination objectives are much greater if the objectives are developed in the planning phase rather than the execution phase, which may conclude quicker than expected.45

Finally, the military needs to develop officers with a broader range of SSTR skills and with a greater understanding for the diverse cultures in which they may find themselves conducting SSTR activities. This need for improved development was also espoused by Dr. Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute. Despite his earlier cited belief that the military is not the correct organization for SSTR missions, Dr. Crane concedes the Army, as the lead ground force, will likely continue to assume these expanded SSTR roles during the Global War on Terrorism. He continues by imploring Army leaders to begin shaping a force with the skills to conduct these missions.46

In addition to broadening the soldier’s skill sets, military leaders must develop a force that is savvier about the cultures in which they will be operating. Most U.S. military planners do not fully appreciate the complexity of tribal and religious cultures found in Middle Eastern and African hotspots. The challenges of tribal systems are captured in the ancient Somali proverb: "Me and Somalia against the world, me and my clan against Somalia, me and my family against the clan, me and my brother against my family, me against my brother."47 Americans simply can not relate to this type culture; however, any war termination plan for this region that does not consider this cultural bias is doomed to failure. The Congressional Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World advises a dramatic enhancement in language fluency and professional knowledge in Arab and Muslim societies.48 The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept provides a potential model for improving cultural sensitivities. Under

46 Matthews, Winning the War, 29.
the JFCOM plan, personnel are “permanently embedded within one region [so] they will be able to study that area every day” and provide decision makers with a “better grasp of a nation’s economic, cultural, and infrastructure dilemmas.” Another approach might include establishing exchange programs between the Joint Force Commanders planning cell and the State Department regional experts. As expressed by David Kilcullen, we must understand how local populations think if we are to be successful in war termination.

Conclusion

War termination is the critical link between strategic objectives and the Joint Force Commander’s operational objectives. As such, failure to adequately include war termination in the operational design puts our nation’s strategic objectives at risk and mocks our ability to provide global influence, in spite of unsurpassed battlefield domination. In order to successful plan for war termination, the U.S. needs to return to the successful lessons from post World War II Germany and Japan, as well as address key obstacles present in most modern day conflicts. War termination planning must be the responsibility of the Joint Force Commander to ensure conflict objectives are synchronized with post-conflict activities. In addition, planning must be completed early, preferably before conflict begins, to ensure plans are in place to support the rapid pace of modern conflict. Commanders should establish a unique planning cell that can focus all their attention on war termination to ensure it receives attention equivalent to the war planning effort. And finally, military leaders must invest in the development and education of their forces to increase their ability to support SSTR activities, and to improve their cultural and political awareness of their region of operations.


