The Future of Indigenous Security Force Training

Considerations for the Joint Operational Commander

Training Iraqi security forces is of immediate importance for U.S. success in OIF. While the importance to the U.S. strategy in OIF is clear, it is less clear if it also holds significance for future joint operational commanders. Future commanders must determine if the current focus on indigenous security force training and development (ISFTD) is unique to OIF or if it foreshadows a requirement that must be addressed in future military operations. If ISFTD is a future operational need, is the joint force adequately postured to address it? Given the increasing likelihood for this operational requirement, the U.S. military's history of abandoning this capability after each conflict, and the undeveloped plans to permanently address the joint capability shortfall, the future joint force commander must be prepared to address this critical mission in his operational plans using ad hoc capabilities. This research paper seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military has an increased need to train indigenous security forces in the future, to analyze how it is conducting this mission in Iraq in the context of historical examples of comparable missions and finally, to identify how the joint force is postured to meet the future requirements for post-conflict indigenous security force development and training.
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The Future of Indigenous Security Force Training: Considerations for the Joint Operational Commander

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Training Iraqi security forces is of immediate importance for U.S. success in OIF. While the importance to the U.S. strategy in OIF is clear, it is less clear if it also holds significance for future joint operational commanders. Future commanders must determine if the current focus on indigenous security force training and development (ISFTD) is unique to OIF or if it foreshadows a requirement that must be addressed in future military operations. If ISFTD is a future operational need, is the joint force adequately postured to address it? Given the increasing likelihood for this operational requirement, the U.S. military’s history of abandoning this capability after each conflict, and the undeveloped plans to permanently address the joint capability shortfall, the future joint force commander must be prepared to address this critical mission in his operational plans using ad hoc capabilities. This research paper seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military has an increased need to train indigenous security forces in the future, to analyze how it is conducting this mission in Iraq in the context of historical examples of comparable missions and finally, to identify how the joint force is postured to meet the future requirements for post-conflict indigenous security force development and training.
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**Introduction**

In 2003, the United States-led coalition rapidly removed the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and dramatically demonstrated the conventional combat capabilities of the U.S. Joint Forces. The subsequent four years of post-conflict operations have demonstrated equally dramatic shortfalls in stability capabilities of that same Joint Force. While there is ongoing debate over the appropriate roles and responsibilities in Iraq for Department of Defense (DOD) versus the other U.S. Government departments in establishing governance, improving essential services, economic development, and conducting information operations, there is little controversy that improving security and building host-nation security forces are core U.S. military responsibilities.¹ The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq clearly states the importance of this mission area and stresses that developing capable Iraqi security forces is critical for near and long-term success.²

While the immediate importance of Iraqi security force training for the U.S. strategy in OIF is clear, it also holds significance for future joint operational commanders. Future commanders must determine if the current focus on indigenous security force training is unique to OIF or if it foreshadows a requirement that must be addressed in future military operations. If it is a future operational need, how well is the joint force postured to address it?

This research paper seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military has an increased need for this capability in the future. It will then analyze this mission in OIF in historical context to determine lessons for future operational commanders. Finally, the paper will assess how well the joint force is postured to meet the future requirements for post-conflict indigenous

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security force training and development (ISFTD) and offer areas for additional study. Given the increasing likelihood for this operational requirement, the U.S. military’s poor history of sustaining this capability after each conflict, and undeveloped plans to permanently address the joint capability shortfall, the future operational commander must be prepared to address this critical mission using ad hoc capabilities.

**Likelihood of Future Need**

A convergence of three major factors, geopolitical and population trends, the rise of trans-national terrorism, and U.S. policy changes, has increased the likelihood that U.S. military forces will execute what have historically been called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability And Support Operations, or Stability Support Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). The very number of different names that have been assigned to other than conventional combat operations over the past twenty years provides some indication that the doctrine in this area remains unsettled. To avoid confusion, this paper will use the term stability operations as the single term to describe all of these areas. This research paper focuses on the specific sub-mission of training indigenous security force training and development (ISFTD). The factors that increase the likelihood for the U.S. to conduct stability operations also increase the requirement for ISFTD as a component of stability operations.

First, the world geopolitical and population trends indicate an increased likelihood of instability and failing states. A number of different analyses indicate that there are a number of disturbing trends that point to greater world instability in the future. The Index of Failed or Failing states offers that a significant number of the world’s nation-states are failed or
failing. Barnett analyzes the future trends and identifies “Non-Integrating Gap” regions that are disconnected from the global economy and stability represent a threat to U.S. and global security and that closing this gap is an essential to U.S. national security interests. This prediction of future demographic trends leading toward increased instability is similarly reinforced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies “7 Revolutions” analysis. The new Chief of Staff of the Army has assessed the convergence of geo-strategic trends and characterizes a future of “persistent conflict”. All of this analysis and trend projection clearly indicates that there is an evolving geostrategic environment that is likely to require U.S. military forces to execute ISFTD as part of stability operations in the future.

Second, the rise of a trans-national terrorism in the form of a global insurgency (against the current nation state-based world order) has made the potential threat to U.S. interests represented by failing or failed states of significantly greater concern. President Bush in the 2002 NSS captured this concern: “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” By definition, failed or failing states often lack the ability to provide for their own security. The security threat facing weak states is often manifested in insurgencies

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3 “The Failed States Index 2007” (Foreign Policy; July/Aug 2007 Issue 161), p 54-63
that may be home grown and externally supported. 9 A critical element of any successful counterinsurgency strategy is strengthening the legitimate government’s security force capability to address the insurgent threat. The need to assist weak or vulnerable nations in addressing internal Islamist insurgency is likely to grow in the current environment. 10 A final related issue is that the current U.S. conventional military overmatch also makes the use of asymmetric or unconventional warfare forces a more likely strategy for potential adversaries. This will likely require the U.S. to rely more on host nation forces. 11 For all of these reasons, U.S. forces must be prepared for an increased requirement to train indigenous security forces.

Finally, DoD Directive 3000.05 directs an increasing role for military forces in stability operations. It has put stability operations on par with combat operations and specifically identified rebuilding indigenous security forces as a task.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning…Stability operations tasks include helping: ... Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment. 12

This new emphasis requires a complete review of the joint force capability (DOTLMPF) and resource priorities that is beyond the scope of this paper, but at a minimum, it portends an

9 The Failed State Index 2007, p 54-63
10 John D. Waghelstein and Donald Chisholm, “Analyzing Insurgency” (Naval War College, Newport, RI), p1-13
11 U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, Quantico, VA, August 2006, p 9-10
increased use of military forces in phase 0 and post-conflict operations where Foreign Internal Defense and other indigenous security force training missions is required. While the DOD directive 3000.05 sets a policy that makes stability operations a priority on par with combat operations, there continues both an internal and external debate about the appropriate role of land forces in SSTR-type missions (ranging from military must be able to do it all to narrowly defining the military role to just security to enable other agencies actions across the diplomatic, informational and economic levers of national power). \(^{13}\) This paper focuses on one specific subset of the stability operations mission that requires the U.S. military to develop indigenous military and security force capabilities.

Both newly published doctrine and military think tanks have recognized this change in focus. The Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (Version 2.0, DEC 2006, p 61), the Army and Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24, pg 155 and Chapter 6) both address as a critical capability or critical logical line of operation the need to train, equip, advise and employ host-nation forces. Even the more future oriented and “out of the box” think tank-based analysis which have differing views on the nature of future conflict and on how and which services or branches of government should play which roles, acknowledge a requirement for combat advisory and training capabilities.\(^{14}\)

As a result of geostrategic trends, the impact of trans-national terrorism, and the changing direction of DoD and service directives and doctrine, there will be an increased demand for joint forces to conduct indigenous security force training in future operations.

\(^{13}\) Barnett, p 32-43

\(^{14}\) See Barnett, 2006 and Hoehn, et al., 2007
Post-Conflict Indigenous Security Force Training

The future nature of conflict is increasing likely to demand military capabilities beyond conventional combat. One of those capabilities is ISFTD. As a result, the operational commander must appreciate how U.S. forces have conducted post-conflict ISFTD in the past and how we have conducted this mission in OIF. By this analysis, one may gain insight into how well postured the U.S. military may be to meet future requirements.

Dr. Lawrence Yates, a historian with the Army’s Combat Studies Institute has conducted extensive research on the subject of the Army’s historical role in nation-building. He writes

While the number of major conventional wars involving the United States hovers around a dozen in over two centuries, the country’s armed forces have conducted several hundred military operations that in today’s bureaucratese would be categorized as Stability and Reconstruction Operations. 15

The U.S. Army has demonstrated a historical unwillingness to embrace the mission areas that traditionally encompass host-nation security force and has instead focused its doctrine, structure and resources on fighting conventional wars. It has relegated stability operations as a secondary, if unavoidable distraction to be quickly dealt with in order to allow a return to combat preparation. 16 Waghelstein notes the historic unpreparedness of U.S. Army forces to meet the demands of each new guerilla warfare operation despite its extensive past experience. The U.S. Military intellectual and doctrinal default has been to return to a conventional warfare mindset after each non-conventional operation which has had


significant negative impact on its sustained capability to develop indigenous security forces.¹⁷

The Army can rightfully argue that it has proven reasonably adept over time at improvising and adapting when each new SASO mission has emerged. Given the changing global strategic and security environment, the DoD must assess land force capabilities in this mission area to determine if ad-hoc solutions still make sense. For the future operational leader, the significance of this historic trend is that it indicates that the current capabilities that have been built to support large-scale indigenous force training and development in Iraq and Afghanistan may not be sustained as these conflicts wind down.

Where the U.S. conducts regime change or in failed states, U.S. forces will likely have to conduct combat operations to create the conditions to allow the establishment or re-establishment of the government. In these cases, the complexity of the post conflict indigenous security force problem is exponentially greater and more complex. The United States is addressing this complex problem in Iraq with varying degrees of success. While the lessons learned there can not be applied wholesale to future conflicts, they do provide future operational commanders some important considerations to help evaluate how to address building indigenous security force capabilities. The OIF experience developing security force capability in Iraq points to significant pre-conflict challenges. There were failures in operational planning for this mission, in coordinating the political military decision-making about Iraqi forces post-MCO and in appreciating force capability short-falls and gaps that continue to this day.

Ricks (2006), Rathmell (2005), Record (2004) and Cordesman (2006) each provide insightful descriptions of the challenges of inadequate phase IV planning in OIF, the impact of senior policy decisions coupled with poor coordination between the military and diplomatic agencies, and challenges in how the force was organized for phase IV. All of these issues together dramatically complicated the immediate post-major combat operations phase of OIF.

One of the most serious US strategic failures in Iraq was the lack of effective planning to ensure the continuity of government, police, and legal operations. Another was the failure to see the transformation of the Iraqi military and the various militias into an effective force as the key both to providing local stability with a local face, and to keeping such elements from becoming part of the security threat.\(^\text{18}\)

While the details of the post-MCO “Fiasco” are beyond the scope of this paper, the broad challenges described by these four authors provide important lessons to inform the operational commander as he analyzes future operations.

One planning lesson flows from the magnitude of the current challenges in OIF. While major combat operations or regime-change may be unavoidable, future commanders have a clear incentive to adopt an operational strategy that addresses the strategic/operational problem below the level of major combat operations. This lesson reinforces the importance of phase 0 actions. One such strategic/operational approach is to improve host-nation security capabilities to avoid the need for large-scale U.S. force involvement. This approach increases the future need for military advising and training capabilities.

Another planning lesson from OIF is to recognize that decisions made in planning the MCO (shaping or decisive operations) may be as significant to the joint force commander’s

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\(^{18}\) Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, (Working Draft for Review and Comment Revised, August 1, 2006 Center for Strategic and International Studies), p7
ability to reestablish indigenous security forces as those made in Phase IV (post-conflict/transition). For example, in OIF, targeting decisions about which units to attack with Information Operations versus bombs not only impacted the phase III fight but also helped determine to a large degree what existing Iraqi military capability might be available post-MCO. Regular Iraqi Army forces were targeted with IO to influence them not to fight while the Republican Guard was targeted for destruction. The operational disconnect occurred when later operational commanders chose to disband the very force that had been preserved to help provide post-MCO security. For the operational commander responsible for post-conflict indigenous security forces, making sure that this critical post-MCO operational requirement is at least considered in the planning for combat operations is essential. While intellectually difficult, it is important to identify not only the size and type of host nation security forces needed post-conflict, but also what parts (if any) of the existing forces might be leveraged. Integrating that information into MCO planning decisions about operational fires and maneuver may influence how the commander fights the war in order to set conditions for the peace.

Operational senior leader coordination and decision making is the second area that provides lessons from OIF. The negative impact of poor and uncoordinated interagency planning (ORHA, CPA, and CJTF-7) at the operational level negatively impacted the commander’s ability to leverage the Iraqi Army forces post-conflict and created an unforeseen operational requirement to rebuild the Iraqi security forces from scratch.  

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is not consensus on whether the CPA decision to disband the Iraqi military was necessary or justified; however, in recent U.S. experience (post-WW II Germany, Panama, Balkans, and Vietnam) leveraging existing security force capabilities has been the norm. Nevertheless, there may be situations when the indigenous security force is so corrupt, incompetent or associated with a former regime that starting over is the best option. 21 The critical lesson for the future joint force commander is that such a momentous decision should be made deliberately after detailed coordination between the military and civilian authorities and ideally addressed as part of the operational planning.

The third area of operational analysis of the OIF indigenous security force training is how the joint force has organized in Iraq to accomplish the security force training mission. Initially there was significant confusion about who was in charge of the mission and how it would be accomplished. While traditionally and doctrinally it is a SOF mission to train indigenous security forces, under ORHA’s plan, much of the work was to be contracted out like had been done in Bosnia. Part of this decision reflected the OPTEMPO of the Special Operations Forces at the time and their focus on counter-terrorism and direct action missions. When CPA took charge they initially followed a similar model adding conventional forces to assist. The results after the first year were poor as evidenced by ISF performance in Fallujah.22

Despite the requirement for capable Iraqi security forces as the lynchpin for U.S. disengagement, Iraqi security force training continued to be a contractor mission or a


decentralized and often secondary mission for both conventional and SOF forces in Iraq until July 2004. In July 2004, Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) established the Multi-National Security and Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) to command and control a centralized effort to train, man and equip all the disparate ISF training efforts. \(^{23}\) For the future operational commander, it is useful to understand that MNSTC-I is not built on a standing joint force capability but was created specifically for the ISF mission. Over time, its capabilities and organization have grown to meet the emerging and changing requirements of its complex mission. Unfortunately, each new capability has had to be largely created from scratch and resourced from joint force (primarily land forces) capability in an ad-hoc manner.

In order to help meet the requirements to train Iraqi forces (and to a lesser degree Afghan forces) the U.S. Army has assigned several thousand officers and noncommissioned officers to ad hoc Military Transition Teams. The challenge for the Army is that these personnel are normally assigned to existing Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and this non-standard assignment creates shortages in those units. The Army has also established a Military Transition Team (MITT) training center at Fort Riley Kansas in order to train ad hoc units to conduct indigenous force training. This training base is sourced by an Infantry Brigade Combat Team that would otherwise be available for the rotational force pool. There is a tentative Army plan to transfer this individual and small unit training capability to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort, Polk to make it more permanent. \(^{24}\)


\(^{24}\) Unnamed Military Officer from DAMO –FMO, ODCS G-3/5/7, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
A final operational lesson in OIF is found in the initial unequal focus on military over police type security forces. Much of the variation in focus rests in the unequal capability and disjointed designation of operational responsibility between Department of State and DoD.

The lesson for the operational commander is that his plans must account for the full range of required security forces and their enabling capabilities like courts and jails. 25 While the operational commander may not own all the resources required to accomplish this set of tasks, he must seek to coordinate the necessary unity of effort between the responsible agencies and address the broader requirements in operational plans. 26

**Joint Force Capabilities**

While there is evidence that DoD and the land forces are starting to address the need for different capabilities to meet the new security environment, the pace, depth and resourcing of those changes has been slowed by the continuing internal debates of balancing conventional war fighting capability with the need for unconventional capabilities. 27 There are a number of ongoing initiatives that address some of the capability shortfalls for indigenous security force training seen in OIF. What the future operational commander must realize is that current FID doctrine is SOF centric and does not adequately address how to establish a broad post-conflict indigenous security force training and development operation that will requires resources in excess of SOF or peacetime FID operational capability. The

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25 Baker and Hamilton, p 8-11

26 U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, p 200-203

27 Barnett, p 2-3 and Hoehn p 32-50
2006 QDR directs conventional forces to assume more of this mission area but the force development has not yet caught up. ²⁸

The Army is in the midst of a transformation even as it fights the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The transformation is most evident in the changes to force structure but it is intended to increase the capability of the Army to support the requirements of the Joint Force as across the full range of military operations (ROMO). ²⁹ A major part of the Army transformation adds high demand low density capabilities to the force. These include Military Police, Civil Affairs, and SOF which directly impact training host nation security forces.³⁰

Many of the transformation changes add new capabilities to the transformed brigade combat team (BCT) as the new building block for Army capabilities. The BCT transformation has added a dramatically increased headquarters capability to plan and to command and control operations across the ROMO. Specific enhancements in planning, communications, computers, intelligence, civil affairs, public affairs, fires and effects, air space management, and logistics provide for the brigade commander capabilities previously only available at Division Headquarters. Changes to the manning policies for some BCTs have stabilized all soldiers in the unit for three years. One of the benefits of this stability is that it allows the unit to progress beyond the basic combat skills and add a greater depth of

³⁰ QDR 2006, p 44-45
capabilities in medical, language, and cultural skills than can be done in non-stabilized units.

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There are a number of other transformation initiatives that seek to improve leader and soldier development. Many initiatives focus on building leaders that can function more effectively in complex, ambiguous environments in order to adapt to an increased set of mission requirements. If successful, these efforts should enhance the ability of Army personnel to adapt to the unique challenges of an indigenous security force training mission.32

There are also improvements in the Marine Corps capabilities in this mission area:

The Marine Corps has increased both its capacity and its capability to conduct irregular warfare. Since 2001, the Marines Corps has realigned its force structure to address lessons learned in recent operations, … It has also established Foreign Military Training Units to train indigenous forces worldwide. This rebalancing has increased potential Marine Corps contributions, especially for preventive actions and irregular warfare operations.33

The joint doctrine to support the operational commander in addressing training indigenous security forces is limited. Fortunately, Service doctrine better addresses indigenous force training requirements. The doctrinal tools in the operational planner’s toolbox include current doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) JP 3-07.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)) and the more current U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.202 (Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations) and the FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency). All provide useful information and considerations that

31 Army Modernization Plan 2007, p 28-29
32 QDR p C-1 to C-5
33 Ibid
address elements of the indigenous security force training but with some significant limitations. The FID manual focuses primarily on SOF-based peace-time FID and does not address operations on the scale of those currently being conducted in OIF. The COIN Manual provides additional context and considerations for large scale indigenous security force training operations but can not describe the available forces or headquarters organized or trained to execute future large scale training missions because they do not exist as standing capabilities.
Conclusions

In the future, the joint operational commander must anticipate the requirement to train the indigenous security forces of friendly nations, of collapsed states, and of formerly hostile nations after regime change. The operational requirement to execute ISFTD is likely to occur with greater frequency and with greater importance than in the past. The changing geostrategic environment, the impact of the GWOT and a renewed national focus on the importance of stability operations in the National Military Strategy has magnified the importance of this mission area. Even as the geostrategic environment increases the requirement for IFSTD, the other-than-FID demands on SOF may limit the operational commander’s ability to use the forces that have historically trained for this mission. The only large-scale indigenous security force training capability available to the operational commander will likely have to be sourced from general purpose forces.

The initial and current OIF ISF training operations provide tremendous insights into the challenges of large scale training. The Herculean efforts required by the military to establish the capability to effectively train ISF in Iraq point to the likely challenge for a future operational commander to grow this capability from a standing start. The lessons from OIF provide the operational commander a framework from which to address this mission requirement in planning future operations. Coordinated interagency planning for post-conflict requirements to build indigenous security forces must get accomplished before the major combat operations. This coordination allows the operational commander to consider the post-conflict security force requirements as part of MCO planning. It also may help
minimize the lag time in reestablishing indigenous security capability post-conflict in order to allow U.S. forces to disengage.

DoD has directed conventional forces to increase capability in this area, the history of the military to sustain stability operations capabilities after a conflict make it difficult to know if the capabilities that have been grown for OIF will be sustained in the future. As a result, operational decision makers must recognize the current gaps in joint force capabilities to build or rebuild indigenous or host-nation security forces. This knowledge can inform how much time and energy must be spent planning and organizing ad hoc capabilities to meet this mission in future operations.

There is a significant need for additional study to determine what changes in DOTLMPF are required to adequately meet the joint requirements for ISF training. Joint and Service doctrine have begun to address the requirements for ISF training and development but the doctrine still lacks a comprehensive approach. As additional service capabilities are developed, they must be incorporated into doctrine. Force developers need to analyze the new capabilities developed for OIF to determine if any can be transformed into standing service or joint capabilities. While the unique nature of each ISFTD operation may argue against maintaining large standing training teams, there may be great utility in maintaining a expandable capability to rapidly surge to support future requirements. Sustaining a training base, developing regional focus for land force units, language and cultural training, and incorporation of training team tasks in conventional units may all be worth further analysis.
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