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OBSERVATIONS ON OCCUPATION AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND GERMANY
IN WORLD WAR II

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________________
Prior to the current Global War on Terror (GWOT), the United States military had not participated in occupation and military governance mission on as a massive a scale as that experienced in World War II. From that period on until the start of the GWOT, the military had either forgotten this experience or chosen to avoid this type of mission wherever possible. Since the start of the GWOT, and in particular the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. military has entered a period of resurgent study and production of doctrine, now under the current moniker of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction. Those who work at the operational level can benefit from studying the two seemingly disparate occupation missions in post-WWII Germany and Japan. By reviewing with a simple ends, ways, and means analysis, a few keys to success begin to emerge: the establishment of a base educational level in SSRT operations for officers; the importance of placing enough “boots on the ground” in order to fill any potential security vacuum and pacify a territory; the creation and employment of specialized teams (i.e., military government teams) in sufficient quantities; and the concept of “indirect rule” in order to empower a defeated populace to rebuild itself.
INTRODUCTION

It was January of 2003 and planning for the invasion of Iraq was in full swing. Deep in the operations branch of the Army Surgeon General’s Office in Northern Virginia, a group of medical staff planners were reviewing the latest version of the USCENTCOM plan in order to determine changes to the U.S. Army Medical Command’s (USMEDCOM) Title 10 support requirements. Looking over the changes on the classified computer net, one officer asked out loud, “Hey, where’s the post-hostilities phase section to this plan?” From behind a cubicle, a disembodied voice answered back, “It’s TBP (to be published). Supposedly, they’ve got some group led by a retired general working that piece separately.” That exchange ominously summed up the U.S. military’s effort towards gearing up for occupation operations – too little, too late.

The U.S. military has performed various degrees of occupation and nation building operations in the Philippines (1899-1913), France and Italy (1944), Austria (1945-55), Germany (1945-1949), Japan (1945-1952), Korea (1945-1948), and now Iraq. While there are those who have attempted to directly relate the American occupation of Japan and Germany to what is going on in Iraq, those comparisons often get muddled because these countries and the conflicts that brought them to ruin are dissimilar in many respects. Each experience has been different in terms of: the occupied countries’ characteristics (e.g. political, cultural, etc.), the United States’ strategic interests at the time, and the type and amount of national power applied to secure those interests, to name a few. Furthermore, there is a danger to historical analysis - formulating a conclusion that is too simplistic in order to conjure up a “one size, fits all” solution set for modern complex problems.
Operating with these considerations in mind, this paper is not a direct comparison of the American military government experience of post-World War II with the ongoing mission in Iraq. Nor is this a comparative study of national-strategic, or theater-strategic “best practices”. Spurred on by the U.S. experience in Iraq, there is a growing body of work, published and unpublished, which seeks to address this level. Instead, this paper will compare the two experiences of the U.S. military occupation and governance experience in post-hostilities Germany and Japan at the operational level. An ends-ways-means construct is used to conduct the comparison and help identify key factors of success common to both experiences. Care is taken to limit the discussion to the theater-operational/operational level in order to provide current operational staffs useful common factors when planning and executing Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSRT) operations.

WHY JAPAN AND GERMANY?

Ask the average American today when was the United State’s involvement in WWII and you will invariably hear in response, “1941 to 1945”. The mind-numbing grind of industrial, state-on-state, attrition warfare in WWII led people everywhere to look upon V-E Day (Europe) and V-J Day (Japan) – the end of hostilities - as the end of the war in those respective theaters. Few saw those wild days of post-conflict celebrations as actually just a milestone marking the transition to another phase in a much larger operation. The attainment of these SSRT objectives in the post-hostility phase engaged U.S. military forces from 1945 until 1949 in Germany, and until 1951 in Japan. In no other conflict have we witnessed the fullest employment of America’s military,
diplomatic, and economic power directed not just towards military victory but also to the attainment of nation building objectives (what we call SSRT today) in order to prevent the future regional instability.

JAPAN: Overview of Post-Hostilities

It was thought that the Japanese would fight until the bitter end. The U.S. Sixth and Eighth Armies had drawn up two plans (OLYMPIC and CORONET) for the invasion of the home islands. Following two atomic blasts and Japan’s capitulation however, these plans were dropped and the occupation plan (BLACKLIST) was hurriedly activated. Task Force 31 from Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, with support from a British landing force, and 11th Airborne Division troops under Eighth U.S. Army commenced L-day landings on 30 August 1945 near Tokyo Bay. I Formal surrender documents were signed on 2 September. Thereafter, Sixth U.S. Army, supported by the Fifth Fleet, landed in Southern Japan to commence occupation operations.ii

Unlike the German occupation, overall occupation of Japan was for all intents and purposes orchestrated by the United States. Although other Allied powers were given responsibility for local administration, and disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops on territories conquered by Japan (most notably, the British occupation of the Malay Peninsula), the U.S. maintained a free hand to direct the transformation of Japan itself. On the Japanese home islands, the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) was fully integrated into the U.S. occupation force.iii

For command and control, President Truman directed General MacArthur to assume responsibilities as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). MacArthur was
no stranger to military governance, having served as military governor in the Philippines before WWII. Intriguingly, he separated the two missions of occupation and governance, and along those two lines, he created two separate organizations with himself at the head of each. Splitting off the Military Government section from the U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) headquarters and building it up with civilian technicians and other agencies created one organization, General Headquarters (GHQ) SCAP. When the State Department lobbied to create a separate office to handle political and economic issues, as they had in Germany, MacArthur killed the idea and ensured they were firmly under his GHQ SCAP. SCAP assumed total responsibility for the reform of the Japanese government, economy, and society. The other organization, GHQ, USAFPAC [later reorganized as Far East Command (FECOM)] took on the occupation duties of military disarmament, repatriation of Japanese military personnel from conquered territories, and occupation duties.

GERMANY: Overview of Post-Hostilities

In post-conflict Germany, the situation was very different. Allied forces slowly implemented occupation and military governance tasks as they advanced into Germany territory. Following the surrender of the German High Command, the country was carved up and apportioned into military occupation zones between the U.S., Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. For the purposes of coordination and unity of effort, each of the occupying powers reported to the Allied Control Authority’s Control Council on which sat the four national occupation military commanders. However, the forces in each zone also reported along their respective national command authority lines for
guidance. Thus the main challenge here was to obtain consensus among four different occupation powers that often held competing visions for post-war Germany.

But here too within the U.S. zone of occupation, a separation between occupation duties and military governance occurred but for a different reason - The Army wanted to transfer military governance to civilian control as quickly as possible. In fact, General Eisenhower sent a letter to President Truman on 26 October 1945 requesting relief from governmental duties by 1 June 1946. Where MacArthur embraced the mission, Eisenhower was trying to get “unstuck” from it.

After the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was dissolved, all forces reverted back to the control of their parent nations. For the U.S., responsibility for occupation tasks was under (initially) the Commander, U.S. Forces in the European Theater (USFET), initially General Eisenhower, then McNarney and finally Clay. The USFET commander also wore the “hat” of the U.S. Military Governor on the Control Council. Military government responsibilities in the U.S. zone were placed under the Office of Military Government for Germany – U.S. (OMGUS), headed by Lieutenant General Clay who also wore the deputy military governor hat. Clay eventually was elevated to the position of Military Governor in January 1947 when he became Commander, USFET. He remained in charge through the rest of the occupation.

ESTABLISHING COMMONALITY – PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

When comparing the two occupation experiences in Japan and Germany, one useful key for success markedly stands out commonly between the two regions; specifically, the infusion of trained teams in military governance and civil affairs all the way down to
Army division level. The U.S. military wisely had foreseen that post-hostility operations would require leaders and staff planners with some measure of professional education on these subjects.

To prepare for post-conflict operational success in WWII, the U.S. began taking serious steps as early as 1941. At that time, the government formed an advisory committee, and two study groups to address policy and development for military governments in Germany and Japan. Simultaneously, the War Department stood up a Civil Affairs Division. Its first director, General Cornelius Wickersham, realized that staffs in the field were going to need officers trained in these specialized subjects. Over the initial objections of the War Department, Wickersham was able to help launch the military’s first ever, School of Military Government at the University of Virginia. The first class entered the school for training in May 1942. Follow-on training was added at the Provost Marshal General’s School at Fort Custer, Michigan. Later in 1943, additional Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) were created to help the demand for more trained officers. These schools were affiliated with civilian colleges and universities.

Each graduating class of civil affairs officers at the University of Virginia received three to four weeks of initial training. The curriculum provided a targeted study for the area each officer was to be assigned including government, banking, education, culture, and language training. Depending on the region, additional training was often required – for example, there were 2,500 civil affairs officers receiving additional training in England prior to Operation OVERLORD. Those destined for service in Japan attended the Joint Army-Navy Civil Affairs Staging Area at The Presidio in California. After graduation, all these officers were assigned to either Military Government Teams or Civil
Affairs Detachments and further attached to army, corps, and division headquarters. Following the Sicilian operation, General Eisenhower was so impressed by the performance of his military government section that it was turned into a full G-5 section.xvii

Hand in hand with filling this educational void, the Army rapidly developed doctrine. Prior to 1940, the only reference to military government was a slight nod to questions of legality in FM 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*. In 1940, the first true doctrine (FM 27-5, *Military Government and Civil Affairs*) was published. However, it was found somewhat limiting due to its focus on the U.S. Army’s experience in the Rhineland following WWI. A more revised edition was published in 1943 in conjunction with the Navy (OPNAV 50E-3). This version fully expanded the basic policies and principles for these types of operations.xviii For example, it differentiated between “civil affairs” and “military government” functions. The former term referred to the establishment of administration in a friendly territory where the U.S. military had to control civilians. The latter term applied to assuming absolute control over all governmental functions of an occupied enemy territory or country.xix

**ANALYSIS OF “ENDS”**

**Japan.** “Ends” means that planners seek to determine the conditions required to achieve the objectives of an operation. The overarching objectives of the occupation of Japan were ‘to demilitarize Japan, to democratize Japan, to develop ultimately friendship with Japan, and to make Japan economically self-sufficient’.xx To achieve these objectives, certain conditions were identified. The first condition that was needed was to
obtain and ensure Japan’s full cooperation during the occupation. Fortunately for the operational planners, Japanese cooperation was surprisingly achieved by technically stepping back from the Allies’ unconditional surrender demand. As a condition to surrendering, the Japanese successfully bargained to retain Emperor Hirohito and his throne. The U.S. agreed (with some stipulations) and successfully convinced the other Allies this was a desirable situation. Although a strategic decision, it nevertheless had an important affect upon those operating at the operational level. Maintaining the throne guaranteed that all Japanese officials and military (as well as the people) would cooperate fully with the occupation forces. This cooperation would soon reap huge benefits for the Sixth U.S. Army (in Northern Japan) and Eighth U.S. Army (Southern Japan) who would become responsible for executing the military occupation mission under AFPAC/FECOM.

A second condition that was identified was the need to fill any security vacuum quickly and immediately begin the disarmament/demilitarization of Imperial Japanese forces, both in Japan and out in the conquered territories. General MacArthur was particularly concerned with the potential for guerilla groups rising up within the first 30 days of surrender in Japan. On the ground, MacArthur had only about 460,000 troops assigned to Sixth and Eighth U.S. Armies. The Eighth U.S. Army commander, Lieutenant General Eichelberger, shared his boss’ sentiments: ‘one undisciplined fanatic with a rifle could turn a peaceful occupation into a punitive expedition’. Despite some minor revolts of Imperial Army officers and a threat to seize the emperor, officials of the Japanese government were able to defuse most situations. With Japanese cooperation, 7 million men were disarmed and demobilized in approximately two months. So
successful was this mission that, within a year, Sixth U.S. Army was disbanded leaving Eighth U.S. Army with the responsibility for maintaining security. Those objectives involving military governance and the imposition of governmental, economic, religious, educational, and social reforms fell under the responsibility of the SCAP. The SCAP grew to about 5,000 personnel of which the majority were civilian specialists. This headquarters was a true interagency organization.

A third condition that was of vital importance was the employment of the concept of “ownership”. At the heart of this concept was the idea that the occupation forces would rule indirectly through the existing Japanese government and emperor, which in turn would take ownership of transforming itself. GHQ, SCAP would issue guidance and direction to the Japanese government; the Japanese would execute the reform for themselves; and the occupation force (AFPAC/ FECOM) would constantly survey out in the prefectures and ensure Japanese compliance.

Initially, and possibly influenced by post-hostility operations in Germany, MacArthur was concerned he might have to impose direct military rule over the Japanese. Indeed, his first three proclamations issued following the surrender ceremony nearly initiated direct military rule. Fortunately, he was prevailed upon by the draft U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, and by the surprisingly effective arguments of the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who pointed out that direct military rule would relieve the Japanese Government from the responsibility of ensuring all occupation policies were carried out. MacArthur cancelled the first three proclamations but an Eighth U.S. Army landing force led by BG Cunningham almost botched things when Cunningham
began imposing controls on salaries, rationing, commodity prices, and the judiciary system. Fortunately, MacArthur ordered him to retract those local edicts.xxvi

Germany. The conditions required to achieve the objectives of the post-hostility occupation were different what from the U.S. experienced in Japan. The objectives were very similar - in Germany, it came down to the three “d’s” of disarmament, demobilization, and denazification. A fourth “d” was added – displaced personnel. In some respects the conditions were easier – the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies in the U.S. zone of occupation had fought there way in and were already on the ground, which mitigated any impact of an uprising due to a security vacuum. However, the overriding difficulty was that no matter how well the U.S. occupation force was able to set conditions and attain their objectives, it would matter for little if all the other Allied zones of occupation were not synchronized. In this respect, the occupation of Germany was a far more difficult operation than Japan.

However, unlike the situation in Japan, both the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies commanders – Generals Patton and Patch, respectively - initially labored under guidance that would make it difficult to terminate military governance - the draconian Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 (JCS-1067) directive. The overall tone of JCS 1067 was “make the Germans pay”, and most notably forbade anyone initially from taking any steps toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany. Another provision stipulated that there would be no creation of a German central government for some time and JCS 1067 failed to indicate what should be built in its place.xxvii This meant the U.S. occupation forces had to impose military government – a direct rule – upon the German people.
At the USFET/ OMGUS level, Clay saw the inherent contradictions of the Allied powers’ aims. While the Allies agreed in principle that Germany would someday be restored as a member of the world society, the guidance to keep the German nation broken and economically hobbled would only prevent Germany from ever achieving that. Salvation came in the form of loopholes in the Potsdam Conference Declarations. Whenever there was a conflict with the JCS 1067 guidance, Clay went with the Potsdam Declarations and, in his capacity as Military Governor, issued guidance to the occupation armies accordingly.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

Still, when it came to denazification, Clay was unyielding when it came to ensuring that JCS 1067 was followed to the letter. However, one of his occupation commanders – Patton – did not consistently apply efforts to remove those who may have had affiliation with the Nazi party. Instead, he reasoned that it was more important to find people who get things done rather worry too much about their former party affiliation. Patton created a firestorm of editorial protest in the American media when he remarked to the press that he distrusted the whole denazification program and likened people with Nazi party affiliation to those who were Republican or Democrat.\textsuperscript{xxix} Patton was given a different command (in reality “removed”) for this gaffe and moved off the scene.

A final condition that Clay saw as vital to the occupation process was to get the governance and civil administration of Germany transferred as quickly as possible from the military to the Department of State. Despite several entreaties by Clay to his superiors in Washington, D.C., it was to no avail. After months of delay, Secretary Byrnes informed the War Department that DOS was not organized or prepared to take on
the responsibilities of administering Germany (or any other country for that matter). The military would have to continue doing that mission itself.

ANALYSIS OF “WAYS”

Japan. When discussing “ways”, operational planners seek to determine the sequence of actions most likely to create the conditions required to achieve an operation’s objectives. First off, the single most important action was the Allies’ allowance of the Japanese to retain their emperor. That act set the stage that allowed for indirect rule by SCAP/ USAFPAC/ FECOM through the Japanese government. Had the Allies insisted upon the removal of the emperor, the Japanese, at best, would not have cooperated with the occupation troops. At worst, the Japanese could have rejected surrender and headed down the path towards a suicidal “last stand” defense of the homeland.

Next in importance was the action of getting sufficient forces on the ground to prevent a security vacuum and begin disarmament/ demobilization. Admiral Halsey and Lieutenant General Eichelberger were instrumental in synchronizing and quickly moving their forces into Tokyo Bay and Atsugi Airfield days prior to the signing of the surrender. 1st Cavalry Division occupied Tokyo by 8 September. In just two months, Eighth U.S. Army pushed tactical units and Military Government Teams to every prefecture in Japan to ensure occupation compliance. By late 1945, over 430,000 troops were stationed throughout Japan.

The third most important action, in sequence, was the need to render the concept of “ownership” (indirect rule through the Japanese government) official across all Allied governments and interagencies. This was achieved on 22 September 1945 when
President Truman released the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan document. Soon after, GHQ, USAFPAC/ FECOM issued a directive which formally renounced direct military rule so long as the Japanese government continued to abide by the surrender terms. The GHQ, SCAP began to officially operate through the Japanese Cabinet, Diet (parliament), and Emperor, pending a new constitution.xxxii

Germany. Unlike the case of Japan, U.S. forces, and in particular the military government teams, had the opportunity to implement initial occupation tasks concurrently with final combat operations as the U.S. forces drove deeper into Germany. Military government teams found civilians to be generally compliant and would accept a non-Nazi village or town resident as acting. For example, a few civil affairs officers attached to their maneuvering divisions operating within their future zone of occupation took steps to ensure agricultural production continued despite combat operations. This resulted in cultivation of 85 percent of the arable land by VE-day in the U.S. zone.xxxiii

On the other hand, the proper sequencing of planned tasks for the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies suffered a serious complication. Both armies had based their planning on the second draft of the occupation plan, OPLAN ECLIPSE, released by 12th Army Group on 27 February 1945. In that draft, Patton’s Third U.S. Army was tasked to occupy the western district of the U.S. occupation zone, while Patch’s Seventh U.S. Army was to occupy the eastern district (predominantly Bavaria). Operational planners from both staffs prepared their own plans based on that draft. Unfortunately, on 11 April 1945, 12th Army Group issued the final plan, which reversed the assignments. General Patch’s staff complained they lost three months of planning time.xxxiv
Beyond the immediate occupation tasks of disarmament, demobilization, and
denazification, Clay relied heavily upon the loopholes presented in the Potsdam
Declarations to attempt to put local governance back in the hands of the Germans in the
U.S. occupation zone. In such a way, he (like MacArthur) envisioned the Germans’
would never become a democratic society unless they were indirectly ruled. “We cannot
expect the Germans to take responsibility without giving it to them. We are going to
move a little fast.” Clay told the USFET G-5. Thereafter, Clay ordered all local and
regional military government detachments to cease direct supervision of German civilian
administrations no later than 15 December 1945. He then set goals for local and regional
elections no later than June 1946.xxxv

ANALYSIS OF “MEANS”

Japan. When discussing “means”, operational planners seek to identify the resources
required to accomplish the sequence of actions that will eventually achieve an operation’s
objectives. For the first sequence of action (the generous Allied allowance of the
Japanese to retain their emperor), the no specific resource was required at the operational
level. Suffice it to say, the machinations and policy directives required to make this
happen rested at the strategic level.

The resources required to prevent a security vacuum and execute the disarmament and
demobilization missions for the occupation of Japan involved manpower, transport, and
logistics. As previously mentioned, Eighth and Sixth U.S. Armies combined for a total of
430,000 personnel but it would take support from Third and Fifth Fleets and Fifth Air
Force to make it happen. Eighth U.S. Army was organized with three Army corps. Sixth
U.S. Army was organized with two Army corps, and one Marine amphibious corps. Fifth Air Force shouldered the massive airlift and aerial resupply requirements were shouldered. Backup support was provided to Fifth Air Force by Far East Air Force.xxxvi Funding the occupation was immense although the Japanese were expected to fund many of the costs in the form of reparations. It cost the U.S. taxpayer $600 million in 1948 alone to fund the U.S occupation in Japan.xxxvii

For the third condition of indirect rule through the Japanese government work, the single most vital resource to accomplish this condition was the military government team. These teams were initially assigned to corps and division/ regimental level. By the end of 1945, when Eighth U.S. Army took sole responsibility for occupation duties, military government teams were assigned to the army and each of the corps’ headquarters. Additionally, 53 more teams were assigned to the eight Japanese regional headquarters, and to the 46 prefectures. Each of these prefecture teams was generally manned by seven officers, seven Department of the Army civilians, 20 enlisted personnel, and 50 Japanese civilians who demonstrated some required special skill, qualification, or education.xxxviii In total, it took 500 officers, 500 civilian specialists, and 2,300 enlisted men from the U.S. to staff these military government teams.xxxix

Germany. For the occupation, Third and Seventh Armies had adequate troop numbers to occupy the U.S. zone of occupation and execute their tasks. (Seventh U.S. Army employed three corps alone in its district.xl) Both army’s commanding generals became their respective district’s military governors, and their respective G-5 sections became the conduit through which military government was administered. Patton set up his headquarters in or near Munich, while Patch established Seventh Army’s headquarters
It is observed that Patch was far more successful at employing his Seventh U.S. Army military government teams than Patton. Patch believed military government had an important role to play in warfare and decisively engaged his civil affairs officers. He made sure that the military government teams received full support from his combat units and that the latter did not interfere in governmental operations.

ARGUMENTS

Inevitably, there are those who will argue studying the U.S. occupation experience in Japan and Germany is not useful to those involved in ongoing operations because we are combating asymmetric groups that are transnational and employ irregular warfare. Indeed, Sir General Rupert Smith, the recently retired British Army commander concludes that the days of large-scale industrial warfare fought by organized “state-on-state” forces, such as in WWII and the Persian Gulf War, have given way trans-national groups employing a campaign of irregular warfare to mitigate the technological advantage of modern, state military forces. Such an argument misses the point. Whether one defeats a nation, or eradicates a transnational group like a cancer from a host, the military will still likely be called upon to provide some level of capacity in order to rebuild the weakened or defeated state that served as the host.

Another argument, set forth by Robert Orr in his recent book, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, states that based on the analysis of six case studies we are now in the third generation of post-conflict reconstruction. If the definition of “generation”, as he uses it in his argument, means that each succeeding generation indicates a transformation and supplants the previous one, then this argument
is flawed. Such an argument only works if one believes that the world will only see wars wrought by transnational groups; that we will never witness another state-on-state, industrial-styled war similar to WWII, the Korean conflict, or the Persian Gulf War. This is highly unlikely. The U.S. military remains prepared to execute the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO), regardless if a greater percentage of operations occur more frequently one side of the scale. Though the reasons for initiating conflict may change (e.g. preemption based on perceived WMD threat), the post-conflict objectives rarely do not (disarmament, regime change, promotion of democracy, political and/ or economic stability, etc.).

CONCLUSION

Although it is often difficult or impossible to apply a historical solution as a “one-size fits-all” template to a modern SSRT problem, today’s operational leaders and staff officers can realize some benefit from the study of the U.S. military occupation and governance of post-WWII Japan and Germany. Some keys for success during the occupations of Japan and Germany that still can apply today include the establishment of a base educational level in SSRT operations for officers; the importance of placing enough “boots on the ground” in order to fill any potential security vacuum and pacify a territory; the creation and employment of specialized teams (i.e., military government teams) in sufficient quantities; and the concept of “indirect rule” in order to empower a defeated populace to rebuild itself. A final, unexpected, point to remember is the Department of State of WWII was in no better position to take on civil administration in an occupied country than it is today. Operational planners need to take this under advisement before putting too much faith in the availability of interagency support.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., 11-12.


11. Ibid., 1.


24. Ibid., 35.


26. Ibid., 63.


30. Ibid., 264.

32. Ibid., 64.


38. Ibid., 118.


Bibliography


